Index accountability Alcoa World Alumina 183 institutional governance, supervision Alesina, A. 52 and regulation 158–9, 168 Alter Ego or Identification Theory, public officials and lack of criminal liability of legal persons accountability 21–2 369–70 shortcomings, international Alvarez, J. 275 framework emergence 252–3, Anechiarico, F. 268 260 Argentina, capital returns, adverse see also transparency effect on SMEs 48 accounting and auditing standards Aronoff, A. 215 financial markets, politically- Asia connected firms 104, 105, 111 microfinance institutions (MFIs) preventive and non-criminal-related 131, 133–8, 139, 144–6 measures 421–3, 427–9 see also individual countries sanctions and corporate liability 355 asset recovery 479–523 adjudication versus international banks with no physical presence in supervision see follow-up territory and not affiliated to a procedures as specific cases financial group 491–2 of international supervision, capacity-building programs 493 international supervision versus capital that originates from crime adjudication 485–6 Africa civil claims and burden of proof microfinance institutions (MFIs) 496–7 129, 131, 132–3, 139, 144–6 civil procedures and mutual legal Nigeria see Nigeria assistance requirements Nyanga Declaration on the 495–6 Recovery and Repatriation of confiscation tools and international the African Wealth 479 cooperation 497–9 African Charter on Human and contingency fee arrangements 496 Peoples’ Rights 248, 253 cultural objects, possessor in good African Union Convention on faith of stolen cultural objects Preventing and Combating 484 Corruption see AU Convention cultural objects, return of 481–3, agency model, firms and markets 486, 501 20–25 freezing or redistribution of assets Aggarwal, R. 105–6 504 Aidt, T. 15, 16 freezing and seizure of property on AIG 100 specific order issued by State Akehurst, M. 379 Party 497 Akerlof, G. 18, 49, 85, 86 illegal transfer of funds, prevention Alam, M. 316–17 of 485–6

595

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IMF estimate of global money recovery assistance 508, 510 laundering 479–80 technical assistance 391, 508, 510, information disclosure requirements 513–14 492, 500–501 Trust Fund support 508, 509 international framework emergence asset recovery, Stolen Asset Recovery 237, 257, 266–9 Initiative (StAR), legal barriers legal grounds for international 514–19 restitution of proceeds from bank secrecy 519 illicit activity 479–84 conflict of interests within financial legal value and interpretation 487–9 system 518 mandatory repatriation, early lack of transparency in settlements proposals 480 of foreign bribery cases 515–17 mutual legal assistance and legal requirement recommendations extradition 397 518–19 national legal systems, differences misuse of corporate vehicles 517–18 between 499–500 non-conviction based asset ordre public 499–500 forfeitures 515 public officials, financial information political immunities 518 disclosure 492 asset recovery, Stolen Asset Recovery reciprocal judicial assistance Initiative (StAR), operational 499–500 barriers 519–23 return of assets to requesting State INTERPOL joint initiative, Global Party 489–90 Focal Point Platform 520–21 return and disposal of assets 489–90, management of returned assets, 501–3, 504 insufficient guidance 521–2 return and disposal of assets, prior technical difficulties in identifying ownership cases 502 and quantifying proceeds of technical experts for developing corruption, OECD joint study countries 504 522–3 transparency and due diligence of asset recovery, Stolen Asset bank intermediaries 490–91 Recovery Initiative (StAR), UNCAC see UNCAC, asset political will, dealing with lack recovery of 507, 511–14 see also confiscation inadequate monitoring of politically asset recovery, Stolen Asset Recovery exposed persons and due Initiative (StAR) 183, 389–90, diligence requirements 512–13 413, 507–23 non-compliance with anti-money activities and organization 508–11 laundering measures 511–12 challenges and priorities 511–23 public officials and ineffective and Extractive Industries systems of income and asset Transparency Initiative (EITI) disclosure 513–14, 521 303 AU Convention global knowledge sharing and accountability shortcomings 252–3, advocacy 509–10 260 governance structure 511 approaches to counteracting legal framework and UNCAC 508, corruption 250–51 516 bank secrecy 406 national capacity building 510 bribery of foreign public officials partnership between the UNODC 322, 323, 324, 325, 331, 337 and World Bank 509 civil society groups’ involvement 249

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claw-back clauses, limiting nature extradition 396–7, 398, 402–3, of 252 406–7, 409 fair trials and treatment of the preventive and non-criminal-related accused 252 measures 419 follow-up procedures as specific Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative cases of international (StAR), legal barriers 519 supervision 466–7 banking good governance approach and banks with no physical presence in development 250 territory and not affiliated to a human rights obligations 249–50, financial group 491–2 251–3, 260, 406 central bank independence 166 illicit enrichment provision 253, 260 intermediaries, transparency and due investigative powers, lack of 467 diligence 490–91 jurisdictional provisions 385 supervision 160–61 mutual legal assistance and Bardhan, P. 25, 56 extradition 405–6 Barron, G. 31 political parties, illicit funding 346 Basdevant, J. 487 preventive and non-criminal-related Bassiouni, M. 395, 396 measures 424–6 Baumann, T. 130 public official definition 332 bearer shares and bearer-share ratification problems 253–4 warrants 391 seizure and confiscation of goods see also jurisdictional issues, treaty- 359–60, 363, 366 based mechanisms selected provisions of convention Beck, M. 368 into national law, enactment of Beck, P. 15 249 Becker, G. 24, 82 AU Convention, preventive and non- behavioral economics 49, 85–6, criminal-related measures 424–6 87–8 accounting, auditing, and follow- Belgium up systems, maintenance of corporations’ tendency to bribe internal 425 public officials 64 civil society and media involvement liability for legal persons 376 425 market capitalization 117, 120 private sector involvement in the Berman, F. 380 fight against unfair competition Bernasconi, P. 494 425 Berthod, A. 398, 399, 403, 404 public officials, declaration of assets Bertrand, M. 105–6 424–5 Bhagwati, J. 13 whistleblower protection 425–6 Bhargava, V. 13 Australia, corporations’ tendency to bilateral agreements, conclusion bribe public officials 64 consideration 413 Austria Bogdandy, A. 275 corporations’ tendency to bribe bond issues in developing countries public officials 64 95–6 market capitalization 117, 120 Bonucci, N. 225–6, 454, 455 borrowing costs 95–7 Bai, J. 95 see also financial markets Balmelli, T. 487, 504 Brau, J. 130 bank secrecy Brazil mutual legal assistance and Mensalão scandal 410–11

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monetary authority corruption 74 cultural objects, possessor in good politically-connected firms 105 faith of stolen cultural objects bribery 484 contractual relationship, underlying business 362 advantage, foreign public officials and corrupt officials, comparable and bribery 328–9 treatment 356 environment index 50 costs to firms, effects of 57–8 interests, politically-connected criminalization of offense see firms see financial markets, criminalization of offense, politically-connected firms bribery obstacles to 40–41 decentralization effects 2 talents 48–9, 172–3 definition 339 see also corporate liability; firms and and demand side of corruption 221 markets efficiency implications 15–16 lightening of regulatory load 23 Calderoni, F. 239 “offering” “promising” and “giving” Campos, J. 13 a bribe 322–3, 325 Canada proceeds, sanctions and confiscation corporations’ tendency to bribe 358–63 public officials 64 and public spending 3–4 tax revenues and corruption 76 punishment probability effect 4 capacity-building programs 305, 493 red-tape requirements 41 capital seizure and confiscation of costs, effects of, on firms and bribery proceeds, mutual legal markets 39 assistance and extradition 399 flows, multinationals and bribery of public officials macroeconomic performance AU Convention 322, 323, 324, 325, 63–6, 67 331, 337 originating from crime 485–6 follow-up procedures as specific returns, adverse effect on SMEs cases of international 48 supervision 456–7, 476 see also financial markets foreign 233–4, 322–6, 328–32, Carino, L. 102 336–40 Carrington, P. 172, 496 international framework emergence Cartier-Bresson, J. 20–22 233–4, 322–6, 328–32, 336–40 Cassani, U. 393 multinationals, corporations’ Cassese, A. 443, 444, 445–7, 448 tendency to bribe public Cassin, R. 203 officials 63–4 Chalmers, D. 240 payments qualifying as bribes, Chen, C. 105–6 supranational anti-bribery Chen, D. 104 regulation 211–12 Cheng, T.-M. 36 preventive and non-criminal-related China measures 420–22 corporations’ tendency to bribe as tax-deductible expense 216, 230, public officials 64 420–21, 436 politically-connected firms 103 Brun, J. 493, 509 Chiu, M. 103 Buergenthal, T. 275 Ciocchini, F. 95–6 burden of proof Civil Law Convention on Corruption civil claims and asset recovery 496–7 (Council of Europe) see Council

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of Europe Civil Law Convention regulated competition 42–4 on Corruption (CoECivLCC) SMES and cost of corruption 46–8 civil procedures US competitive disadvantage as asset recovery and burden of proof result of FCPA 216 496–7 see also firms and markets and mutual legal assistance confiscation requirements 495–6 mutual legal assistance and national level, sanctions and extradition 405 confiscation 365 and sanctions see sanctions and politically interconnected firms corporate liability, confiscation taking over media 204–6 tools and international cooperation preventive and non-criminal-related 497–9 measures 436–42 see also asset recovery sanctions and corporate liability 355 conglomerates, hybrid (legal and illegal civil society involvement markets) 29–30 follow-up procedures as specific consumer sovereignty and freedom cases of international principle 30–33 supervision 450, 470, 476 contingency fee arrangements 496 interest groups, economic cycles, see also asset recovery influence during 88 Cooper, M. 106 international framework emergence corporate liability 249 corporate entities, corrupt offenses non-governmental organizations committed through 388 (NGOs) 335 and sanctions see sanctions and preventive and non-criminal-related corporate liability measures 425, 427 see also business; firms and markets Claessens, S. 105–6 corruption, definitions and Clark, K. 368 characteristics 1–6, 27 Clark, N. 196 behavioural definition 1 claw-back clauses 252, 258 criminalization of offense see CoECivLCC see Council of Europe criminalization of offense, Civil Law Convention on corruption definition Corruption governance 4–6 CoECLCC see Council of Europe legal perspective 1 Criminal Law Convention on preconditions 3–4 Corruption Transparency International (TI) Coffee, J. 368 definition 1 collective action on global governance, World Bank definition 2 support for 302–3 corruption indicator control 168, see also harmonization 173–5 company registries, information corruption measurement problems 14 limitations 389–91 Costanzo, P. 306 see also firms Council of Europe Civil Law competitiveness Convention on Corruption effects 5, 14–15, 24, 28 (CoECivLCC), preventive and free competition, limited 29, 34, non-criminal-related measures 36–7 437–9, 496 market functionality 28, 30–31, 34, damages compensation 437–8, 439 40–44 government agencies, control market sector impact 45–6 reduction 439

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international cooperation, and sanctions see sanctions and encouragement of 438–9 corporate liability, criminal international framework emergence liability of legal persons 246 criminal matters territoriality principle 384–5 capital that originates from crime, victim empowerment 439 asset recovery 485–6 see also EU Convention against criminal organizations, firms Corruption belonging to 35 Council of Europe Criminal Law criminality and threats, firms and Convention on Corruption markets 29, 41–2 (CoECLCC) 244–6 integration in, international bribery definition 339 framework emergence 229–32, bribery of officials of international 238–9 organizations 324, 325, 326, mandatory criminalization 332, 336–7 requirements, mutual legal confiscation of proceeds 405 assistance and extradition 396 criminal liability of legal persons penalties, effective, proportionate 371, 372, 373–4 and dissuasive 398 international framework emergence criminalization of offense 311–49 233–4 mens rea and criminal intention jurisdictional provisions and 341–3 territoriality principle 384–5 and national criminal law 325, 326, Multidisciplinary Group on 327, 330, 331–2, 341–2 Corruption (GMC) 244–6 non-governmental organizations mutual legal assistance and (NGOs) 335 extradition 404–5 objective elements of corruption political parties, illicit funding 345–6 offenses 321–40 sanctioning standards 351, 359, 366, offender as any person 321 371, 372, 373–4 sovereign equality principle 330 seizure and confiscation of goods subjective element of corruption 359, 366 offenses 341–4 Council of Europe, GRECO (anti- criminalization of offense, actus reus corruption body), follow-up bribery of foreign public officials supervision procedures 460, 461–6 of international public evaluation process 464–5 organizations 327–31 evaluation reports 462–3 bribery of foreign public officials harmonization extent, publication of international public of 466 organizations, limitation to lessons learned from 465–6 business advantage 328–9 on-site visits 465–6 bribes to national public officials Situation Report 464–5 322–7 whistleblowing 433–4 national public officials, requesting Craig, P. 239 or soliciting bribes by 327 Craufurd Smith, R. 358 criminalization of offense, bribery credit strength of legal rights 38, acts and omissions by official 326–7 39–40 bribe as any undue pecuniary or see also firms and markets other advantages 339–40 criminal liability of legal persons bribe as any undue pecuniary or international framework emergence other advantages, immaterial 371, 372, 373–4 benefits 340

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direct and indirect forms 325 Daams, C. 361 of foreign public officials Dabla-Norris, E. 49 of international public damages compensation 437–8, 439 organizations 327–31 see also preventive and non-criminal- of foreign public officials related measures of international public Daniel, T. 500 organizations, limitation to Davigo, P. 18, 86, 87, 88 business advantage 328–9 Davoodi, R. 46, 47, 48, 49, 56, 61, 69, of national public officials 322–7 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 85 “offering” “promising” and “giving” De Búrca, G. 239 a bribe, differences between De Soto, H. 16, 102, 104 322–3, 325 De Speville, B. 262 criminalization of offense, corruption debarment, international financial definition 314–21 institution (IFI) initiatives 280–81, broad (lato sensu) and restricted 286–7, 288–9, 301 (stricto senso), dichotomy conditional non-debarment 294–5, between 320–21 300 economic studies 315–18 conditional release 292–4 economic studies and legal standard mutual recognition (cross- 317–21 debarment) 292, 301–2 economic studies and legal standard, see also international financial public interest and public institution (IFI) initiatives opinion approaches 319–20 debt legal analysis of the main financing and leverage 105 international anti-corruption relief in heavily indebted developing treaties 319 countries 98–9 references in history and different see also financial markets cultures 314–15 Della Porta, D. 26–7, 35, 318 criminalization of offense, illicit Delmas-Marty, M. 371 funding of political parties Deming, S. 338 344–9 democratic legitimacy 172 campaign financing 346–7 Depaak, L. 102 elections 346 developing countries regional anti-corruption agreements aid provision 84–5 345–6 bond issues 95–6 criminalization of offense, public corruption costs for small firms 48 official definition 331–9 debt relief in heavily indebted delegation of powers 333–4 countries 98–9 officials acting in the name of FDI as percentage of GDP 61, 62–3 organized foreign area or entity foreign debt, effects of corruption 334 on 199 public functions 332–3 framework implementation public international organizations resources, concerns over 266–8 definition 334–5 human rights-based approach to Cull, R. 103, 130 development 171 Cullen, P. 356, 357 Oil-for-Food Programme see cultural objects, return of transnational corruption, asset recovery 481–3, 486, 501 economic and institutional possessor in good faith, burden of textures of States, corruption’s proof of ownership 484 effect, Oil-for-Food Programme

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state intervention intentions 26 and literacy levels as indirect technical assistance 202–3 causation on macroeconomic Dinç, I. 103 performance 69–73 disposal of assets 489–90, 501–3, 504 and public spending levels 69–71, see also asset recovery 80 Donahue, J. 102 effective, proportionate and dissuasive double jeopardy principle (ne bis in principles 356–7, 358, 372, 398 idem doctrine), transnational efficiency implications 15–17, 34, 35, corruption 201–2 44, 427 Draetta, U. 392 Egmont Group 493 Drew, K. 368 Ehrlich, I. 15, 17 drug-trafficking 220, 361–2 Eiras, A. 16 see also UNODC (United Nations EITI (Extractive Industries Office on Drugs and Crime) Transparency Initiative), and dual criminality 401, 402, 404, 407–8 StAR see asset recovery, Stolen see also mutual legal assistance and Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) extradition emerging countries see developing Dubois, P. 275, 282, 287 countries Dupuy, P. 448 EU Convention against Corruption Dworkin, R. 33 criminalizing corruption of public officials of the Community 330, Easterly, W. 2 336 economic analysis 5–6, 13–18 follow-up procedures as specific arguments on benefits of corruption cases of international 15, 16–17 supervision 460–61 credit access and economic growth illicit funding of political parties 16 345–6 criminalization of offense 315–18 jurisdictional provisions 384 economic cycles and future research legal person definition 372 85–8 seizure and confiscation of goods economic development and 358–9, 363 corruption 49–51 see also Council of Europe headings economic and social inequality 84–5 EU Convention against Corruption, growth and corruption, causal mutual legal assistance and relationships 56–73 extradition 414–17 rent-seeking, impact on growth and European Arrest Warrant (EAW) talent 172–3 415–17 transnational corruption see and national legal provisions 414 transnational corruption, EU Convention on Mutual Legal economic and institutional Assistance 400, 401, 412 textures of States, corruption’s EU Convention on the Protection effect of EC Financial Interests (PFI weak governance effects 14–15, 25 Convention) 231–2, 235–6, 359, economies of scale, microfinance 363, 366, 371–2 institutions (MFIs) 133, 134, 136, EU, international framework 138–9, 140, 142, 144 emergence 229–44 education accession to international and governance quality, correlation instruments 233–4 between 71, 78 Action Program on organized crime investment, effects on 5 230–31

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Anti-Corruption Report 237–8 cooperation between states asset recovery and money- 235–6 laundering 237 public procurement directives 242–4 binding instruments to curb supranational anti-bribery regulation corruption 231 objections 216 bribery of foreign public officials tax deductibility of bribes, banning 233–4 230 comprehensive anti-corruption transferring convicted prisoners policy 234 back to their EU country of Convention on the Protection of nationality 241 the European Communities’ United Nations Convention against Financial Interests (PFI Corruption (UNCAC) signing Convention) 231–2, 235–6 234 corruption amongst European Vienna Action Plan 230 Community officials 232–3, 236 Euro-crimes 239–40 Council of Europe Criminal Law euro-listed industrial firms, shares’ Convention on Corruption and return impact 115–28 the Convention 233–4 annual investment return 123–8 criminal law, protection of financial data and methodology 116–22 interests through 231–2 empirical results 123–8 criminal matters, integration in high- and low-capitalization 229–30, 238–9 countries, differences between distinguishing features 229–30 115–28 ECJ and preliminary ruling perceived corruption index 123 mechanism 236–7 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) Euro-crimes 239–40 230, 238 European Anti-Fraud Office European Arrest Warrant (EAW) (OLAF) 230, 238 230–31, 240–41, 415–17 European Arrest Warrant (EAW) European Bank for Reconstruction 230–31, 240–41 and Development (EBRD) 36–7 European Public Prosecutor’s Office European Court of Human Rights (EPPO) proposal 241 (ECtHR) freezing or confiscation orders Doorson v. The Netherlands 431 within the territory of a Guja v. Moldovia 434 different EU country 241 Kokkinakis v. Greece 262 judicial cooperation tools 235–6, principle of presumption of 240–41 innocence 261–2 Lisbon Treaty and cooperation in Salabiaku v. France 262 criminal matters 238–9 European Court of Justice Millennium Strategy on the Buitoni v. Fonds 357 Prevention and Control of Donatella Calfa 358 Organized Crime 230 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. principle of assimilation 236 Canada) 373 private sector corruption, Krombach v. Bamberski and ordre Framework Directive 233, public 500 234–6 preliminary ruling mechanism private sector corruption, 236–7 Framework Directive, liability sanctions and corporate liability 357, of natural persons 235 358, 373 private sector corruption, judicial Evans, M. 248

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business environment index 50 ownership rights 28–9 capital costs, effects of 39 penalty levels, effects of 21–2 capital returns, adverse effect on politically-connected firms and SMEs 48 financial markets see financial competitive market functionality 28, markets, politically-connected 30–31, 34, 40–44 firms competitive market functionality, power delegation 21 market sector impact 45–6 privatization of state-owned competitive market functionality, enterprises as incentive for regulated competition 42–4 corruption 22, 24 competitive market functionality, property rights’ protection, SMES and cost of corruption government role in 34 46–8 public officials and conflict of contract enforcement, government interest 3, 21, 24 role in 34–5 public officials and lack of credit strength of legal rights 38, accountability 21–2 39–40 public projects and services, criminal organizations, firms corruption affecting quality of belonging to 35 34–5 criminality and threats 29, 41–2 public sector monopoly power 21 customs payoffs 23 reform considerations 22 dangers and costs for firms 41–2 regulatory supervision, need for 44 developing countries, corruption rent control 21, 28, 46, 49 costs for small firms 48 resource allocation and domestic developing countries, state product distribution 33–4, 36 intervention intentions 26 risks and division of gains 23–5 economic development and rule of law (ROL) concept 30, 31–3 corruption 49–51 state capture by sector 45 efficiency losses 34, 35, 44 state capture costs 41 exclusion of rivals 34 state regulation, discriminatory financial access 39 nature of 36 free competition, limited 29, 34, subsidies and benefits, low rate of 22 36–7 talents, allocation of, and effects on freedom and choices’ limitations 34 growth 48–9 freedom principle and consumer taxation see taxation sovereignty 30–33 terrorism 41–2 government activities as incentive for white elephant projects 24, 82 corruption 22 see also business; competitiveness; hybrid conglomerates (legal and corporate liability illegal markets) 29–30 Fishman, M. 95, 97 “illicit” artificial barriers, and public Fisman, R. 103 officials 40 Fitzmaurice, G. 488 insider information 22 follow-up procedures market distortion 33–48 international framework emergence market distortion, new market 218, 448–52, 466–7, 467–78 entrants, impact on 36–40 money-laundering strategies and market sector impact 45–6, 47 Financial Action Task Force market segmentation 35 (FATF) 307 markets and rules 27–33 see also monitoring mechanisms; obstacles to business 40–41 supervision

Marco Arnone and Leonardo S. Borlini - 9781781006139 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/25/2021 02:54:57PM via free access 606 Corruption follow-up procedures as specific cases UNCAC procedures see UNCAC of international supervision follow-up supervision 443–78 procedures AU Convention 466–7 follow-up procedures as specific cases AU Convention, investigative of international supervision, powers, lack of 467 international supervision versus bribery of foreign officials 456–7, adjudication 444–6 476 judicial bodies, hearings of 445–6 civil society involvement 450, 470, monitoring body composition 444 476 overseeing procedure, forms of disciplinary penalties, lack of 452 outcome 445 EU Convention against Corruption supervisory provision initiative 460–61 444–5 GRECO procedures see Council of foreign direct investment and growth Europe, GRECO, follow-up FDI as percentage of GDP, supervision procedures developing countries 61, 62–3 group evaluation of each country’s investor behaviour and stock prices performance 453–5 98 harmonization extent, publication macroeconomic performance, effects of 466 of corruption on 60–63, 89 international supervision against Forti, G. 2 corruption 447–8 France media attention 478 anti-bribery regulation 378 non-compliance, dealing with 470 corporations’ tendency to bribe non-criminal law aspects 54–5 public officials 64 OAS Convention procedures see Dumez Nigeria Ltd 378 OAS Convention, follow-up liability for legal persons 376 supervision procedures market capitalization 117, 120 OECD Convention procedures see Oil-for-Food Programme, Banque OECD Convention, follow-up Nationale de Paris (BNP) role supervision procedures and letters of credit 187, 191–2, on-site visits 455–6, 458–9, 465–6, 195 476, 478 politically-connected firms 105 peer review 448–9, 452–5, 457–9, TSKJ investigations and outcomes 473, 475–6 196, 197, 198 ratification reservations 253–4, 452 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 100 reciprocal evaluation process 449, freedom principle and consumer 450–52 sovereignty 30–33 supervisory mechanisms and Freeman, K. 33, 266, 268 procedures 446–7 freezing or redistribution of assets 497, technical assistance to countries 504 requiring legal assistance 471, Frigo, M. 481 472, 476 Fumagalli, C. 34 technical cooperation activities and exchange of information 449 Gaeta, P. 380 Transparency International Gaines, L. 323 (TI) recommendations for Gambini, A. 160–61 strengthening monitoring Gelos, R. 98 process 457–8 George, B. 196, 197 transparency issues 475–6, 477–8 Gerlagh, R. 56, 57, 67, 71, 72–3, 153

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Germany government role, contract market capitalization 117, 120 enforcement 34–5 TSKJ investigations and outcomes indicators, microfinance institutions 198–9 (MFIs) 132, 134, 136, 140, 142, Giavazzi, F. 52 145–7 Gilmore, W. 396 institutional system of public Giuliano, M. 379 governance 26–7 Glaeser, L. 71 public sector size and governance global cartels see transnational quality 82–3 corruption, economic and reforms, promotion of, international institutional textures of States, financial institution (IFI) corruption’s effect, TSKJ initiatives 304 consortium as global cartel strategy, World Bank see World global distribution, politically- Bank’s Governance and Anti- connected firms 104–5 Corruption Strategy (GAC) Global Focal Point Platform, structure, Stolen Asset Recovery INTERPOL joint initiative Initiative (StAR) 511 520–21 weak, effects of 14–15, 25 global knowledge sharing and governance and effects on institutions, advocacy corruption and governance Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative 167–76 (StAR) 509–10 corruption indicator control 168, see also international cooperation 173–5 Gobert, J. 368 democratic legitimacy 172 Goldman, E. 103–4 government effectiveness indicator governance 4–6 168, 175–6 bureaucratic procedures, lengthy, and human rights 170–71 effects of 37–9 institutional accountability indicator cause and effect variables 4 154, 169–70 constitutional structures and voting media freedom and independence rules 25 173 corporate governance and stock political stability and absence of prices 97–8 violence indicator 168 decentralization and accountability regulatory quality indicator 168–9 25–6 rent-seeking, impact on growth and developing countries, state talent 172–3 intervention intentions 26 rent-seeking, social programs, effects distortions and inefficiencies on 173 resulting from lack of 4–5 rule of law indicator 168, 170–73, education and governance quality, 174 correlation between 71, 78 rule of law indicator, uncertainty good governance approach, issues 173 international framework tax system, undermining of 172 emergence 250 voice and accountability indicator government activities as incentive for 168 corruption 22 wealth distribution effects 172–3 government agencies, control governance and effects on institutions, reduction 439 monetary policy and transparency government effectiveness indicator 164–7 168, 175–6 central bank independence 166

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corruption and governance, need for, international framework institutions and governance emergence 217–19, 258–9, 260, factors 168–9 265–6 fiscal policy transparency, see also international cooperation connections between 166–7 Harms, B. 480 public sector accountability 166 Hart, O. 102 governance and effects on institutions, Hartmann, J. 480, 481 supervision and regulation Hatchard, J. 378 155–64 Hausmann, R. 99 banking supervision and Hayek, F. 27, 33 transparency 160–61 healthcare spending reduction 79 financial supervision 159–64 Herkenrath, M. 518 insurance market supervision 162–4, Heritage Foundation/Wall Street 165 Journal research 16 regulatory quality 155–7 Hirschman, A. 430 regulatory quality over time 156–7 Hong Kong, corporations’ tendency to regulatory quality and quantity, bribe public officials 64 relationship between 157–8 Huber, B. 1 regulatory quality, supervisory Huet, A. 396 agencies, accountability and human rights transparency 158–9 and effects on institutions, securities market supervision 162, corruption and governance 163 170–71 supervisory agencies’ autonomy 154, European Court see European Court 159 of Human Rights (ECtHR) Goy, R. 481 obligations, international framework GRECO see Council of Europe, emergence 249–50, 251–3, 260, GRECO (anti-corruption body) 406 Greece, market capitalization 117, violations and public looting, 120 transnational corruption 200 Grindle, M. 474 humanitarian imports, Oil-for-Food Grossman, S. 102 Programme see transnational Grote, R. 32 corruption, economic and Gupta, S. 78, 79 institutional textures of States, Gutierrez-Nieto, B. 130 corruption’s effect, Oil-for-Food Programme Hajredini, H. 448 Huntington, S. 15 Harari, M. 398, 399, 403, 404 Hurt, L. 441 harmonization hybrid conglomerates (legal and illegal collective action on global markets) 29–30 governance, support for 302–3 Identification or Alter Ego Theory, criminal matters, integration in criminal liability of legal persons 229–32, 238–9 369–70 follow-up procedures 466 Ige, B. 493 international harmonization, Iliopulos, E. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, limited, sanctions and corporate 35, 50, 52, 153, 272, 308 liability 358 illicit enrichment provision, national level reforms, sanctions and international framework corporate liability 375–6 emergence 253, 260–64

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IMF information disclosure requirements Basel core principles for banking asset recovery 492, 500–501 supervision 160–61, 162 public officials 492, 513–14, 521 estimate of global money laundering infrastructure maintenance operations, 479–80 lower spending 79, 82 financial sector assessment program insider information see whistleblowers (FSAP) 164 institutional accountability indicator Special Recommendations on 154, 169–70 Terrorist Financing 490–91 institutional analysis, transnational IMF and international financial corruption see transnational institution (IFI) initiatives corruption, economic and 303–8 institutional textures of States, anti-corruption issues arising in corruption’s effect other international conventions insurance market supervision 162–4, 304–5 165 collaboration on international interest groups monetary problems 303–4 economic cycles, influence during 88 countries characterized by weak see also civil society involvement financial sector, support for interest rates, and macroeconomic 307–8 performance 57–66 governance reforms, promotion of international cooperation 304 combating corruption role 65–6, 67 Guidelines on Conditionality 304 confiscation tools 497–9 money-laundering strategies and encouragement of, preventive and Financial Action Task Force non-criminal-related measures (FATF) 305–7, 391 438–9 money-laundering strategies and follow-up procedures see follow-up Financial Action Task Force procedures as specific cases of (FATF), follow-up monitoring international supervision 307 importance of, mutual legal money-laundering strategies and assistance and extradition Financial Action Task Force 412–13 (FATF), politically exposed joint investigations, mutual legal persons (PEPs), identification assistance and extradition 395, of 307 396, 409, 411–12 technical assistance and donor- see also harmonization supported funds to boost International Country Risk Guide capacity building 305 (ICRG) 58 immaterial benefits 340 International Court of Justice (ICJ) income disclosure, public officials 418, criminal jurisdiction under 424–5, 492, 513–14, 521 international law 380 see also financial disclosure Lotus 380 Indonesia international financial institution (IFI) bureaucratic procedure length and initiatives 270–308 corruption 39 anti-corruption issues arising in corruption costs for small firms other international conventions 48 304–5 stock prices and public connections capacity building 305 97 collaboration on international inflation rate effects 73–4, 75 monetary problems 303–4

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collective action on global bribery and demand side of governance, support for 302–3 corruption 221 debarment 280–81, 286–7, 288–9, bribery of foreign public officials 301 233–4, 322–6, 328–32, 336–40 debarment, conditional non- civil society groups’ involvement debarment 294–5, 300 249 debarment with conditional release claw-back clauses 252, 258 292–4 CoECLCC see Council of Europe deferral agreements and freezing of Criminal Law Convention on sanctions 299 Corruption governance reforms, promotion of constitutionalization and political 304 development considerations IMF see IMF and international 218–19 financial institution (IFI) criminal liability of legal persons initiatives 371, 372, 373–4 legal consistency 282–3 criminal matters, integration in loan amount cancellation 278 229–32, 238–9 money-laundering strategies 305–7, developing countries’ 391 implementation resources, mutual recognition (cross- concerns over 266–8 debarment) 292, 301–2 dual criminality 402 partial risk guarantees (PRGs) 279 EU see EU, international framework sanctions cases, negotiated emergence resolution 297–300 evidence collection problems 263–4 “smart project design” 279 follow-up procedures 218, 448–52, technical assistance and donor- 466–7, 467–78 supported funds to boost freezing or confiscation orders capacity building 305 within the territory of a voluntary disclosure 281–2 different EU country 241 World Bank Strategy see World good governance approach and Bank’s Governance and Anti- development 250 Corruption Strategy (GAC) harmonization, need for 217–19, WTO and the revised Government 258–9, 260, 265–6 Procurement Agreement (GPA) human rights obligations 249–50, 308 251–3, 260, 406 see also financial system; illicit enrichment provision 253, microfinance institutions 260–64 (MFIs), political stability and illicit narcotics trafficking 220 operational efficiency international financial institution international framework emergence (IFI) initiatives see international 217–310 financial institution (IFI) accountability shortcomings 252–3, initiatives 260 interpretation problems 258, 264–5 African Charter on Human and judicial cooperation tools 235–6, Peoples’ Rights 248, 253 240–41 asset recovery provisions 237, 257, jurisdiction provisions 381–3, 384–5, 266–9 389 AU Convention see AU Convention legal flexibility concerns 258–9, 260, bank secrecy 402–3, 406 262 bribery definition 339 monitoring mechanisms 268, 269

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mutual legal assistance and criminalization of bribery offense extradition 394–7, 404–14 327–31 national laws of participating international trade and development countries, implementation issues 66–8 through 257–8, 259, 260, 264, INTERPOL joint initiative, Global 265–6 Focal Point Platform 520–21 non-criminal provisions 224–5 interpretation problems 211, 258, non-mandatory provisions 258, 259, 264–5 260 investment risks 57–66 OAS Convention see OAS see also macroeconomic Convention performance, effects of OECD see OECD Convention, corruption international framework Iraq, Oil-for-Food Programme emergence see transnational corruption, political parties, illicit funding of economic and institutional 345, 346–9 textures of States, corruption’s presumption of innocence principle effect, Oil-for-Food Programme 260, 261, 263 Ireland, market capitalization 117, preventive and non-criminal-related 120 measures 418–20, 424–36 Italy preventive and non-criminal-related civil remedies and politically measures, civil remedies 439–42 interconnected firms taking private sector corruption 233, 234–6 over media, CIR v. Fininvest public official definition 332, 338–40 204–6, 436 public officials, corruption amongst “Clean Hands” case 478 232–3, 236 corporations’ tendency to bribe public procurement directives 242–4 public officials 64 ratification problems 253–4 corruption ranking 50–51 sanctioning standards 351, 359, economic dynamics and political 360–61, 363, 364–5, 366, 371, crime detection 86–7 372, 373–4 liability for legal persons 376 seizure and confiscation of goods market capitalization 117, 120 359–60, 360–61, 363, 364–5, 366 politically-connected firms 101–2, tax deductibility of bribes, banning 103, 106–12 230 TSKJ investigations and outcomes technical assistance and information 198 exchange 267, 268–9 Wildenstein v. Pazzaglia and return treaties and other initiatives 219–308 of cultural objects 483 UNCAC see UNCAC UNCTOC see UNCTOC Jacobs, J. 268 Vienna Convention 223–4, 230, 352, Japan, corporations’ tendency to bribe 371, 487 public officials 64 International Institute for the Jayawickrama, N. 262, 263, 484 Unification of Private Law Jennings, R. 379 (UNIROIT), and cultural objects Jensen, M. 102 482–3 Joering-Joulin, R. 396 International Organization of Joh, S. 103 Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Johnson, D. 319 162, 164 Johnson, R. 318 international public organizations, Johnson, S. 103

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Latin America Low, L. 256, 258, 265, 409–11, 413, microfinance institutions (MFIs) 420, 440, 441, 471 131, 133, 138–9, 144–6 Lowe, V. 379 Organization of American States see Lowell Brown, H. 210 OAS Convention Lucchini, R. 170 see also individual countries Lui, F. 15, 16, 17 Laurens, B. 73, 166 Lee, C. 95, 97 McClean, D. 352, 361, 395, 396, 409, Leff, N. 15 411 legal issues McCord, J. and S. 323 analysis of the main international macroeconomic indicators, treaties 319 microfinance institutions (MFIs) asset recovery, international 132, 133, 134, 136, 140, 142, restitution of proceeds from 144–5, 148 illicit activity 479–84 macroeconomic performance, effects asset recovery, legal value and of corruption 52–90 interpretation 487–9 behavioral economics and economic assistance, provision of prompt and cycles 85–6, 87–8 effective 398–9 bribery costs to firms, effects of 57–8 barriers, Stolen Asset Recovery capital flows and exported Initiative (StAR) see asset corruption 63–6 recovery, Stolen Asset Recovery developing countries, aid provision Initiative (StAR), legal barriers and corruption 84–5 consistency, international financial domestic and exported corruption, institution (IFI) initiatives relationship between 65 282–3 domestic product 53–6 cooperation, mutual legal assistance economic cycles and future research and extradition 399–403 85–8 credit strength of legal rights 38, economic cycles, interest group 39–40 influence during 88 economic studies and legal standard economic growth and corruption, 317–21 causal relationships 56–73 flexibility concerns, international economic and social inequality 84–5 framework emergence 258–9, education and governance quality, 260, 262 correlation between 71, 78 supranational anti-bribery education and literacy levels as regulation 210–16 indirect causation 69–73 transnational corruption, economic education and literacy levels as and institutional textures of indirect causation, public States, corruption’s effect, Oil- spending levels 69–71 for-Food Programme 193–5 emerging countries, high FDI as transnational corruption, TSKJ percentage of GDP 61, 62–3 consortium as global cartel foreign direct investment and growth 199–203 60–63, 89 Leino, P. 275 GDP per capita in cross-country Leite, C. 57 data set 53–4 Lelieur, J. 401, 456–7 GDP per capita in emerging Leroy, A. 275, 277, 279, 282, 283, 285, economies 54–6 287–8, 292, 293, 297, 298, 299, 300 GNP per capita in advanced Lien, D. 15 economies 54

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governance variables 56–7 public revenues and domestic inflation rate effects 73–4, 75 corruption 75–7 interest rates, effects of corruption public spending and services 78–9 on 59–60 size and governance quality 82–3 international corruption as tax revenues, tax types and developmental and distributive corruption 75–7, 82 problem 67–8 Madoff and Ponzi scheme 100 International Country Risk Guide mafia cases and economic cycles 87 (ICRG) 58 Magrini, P. 264, 268, 309, 321, 326, international organizations, 338, 352, 356, 398, 422, 426, 474, combating corruption role 478 65–6, 67 Maher, M. 15 international trade and development Makinwa, A. 210, 309 issues as indirect causation 66–8 Malaysia, corporations’ tendency to investment risk, effects of corruption bribe public officials 64 on 58–9 Manacorda, S. 356 investments, risk and interest rates as mandatory jurisdictional provisions indirect causation 57–66 381, 396, 480 mafia cases and economic cycles 87 non-mandatory provisions 258, 259, market-oriented economies, global 260, 386–7 crisis and economic cycles 85–8 Mann, F. 379, 380, 387 military spending and domestic Mannozzi, G. 86 corruption levels 78–9 Marcelo, S. 504 monetary policy authorities as Mariani, P. 205, 206 corrupt 73–4 Marques, S.A. 518 multinationals and capital flows markets 63–6, 67 financial see financial markets multinationals, corporations’ and firms see firms and markets tendency to bribe public market-oriented economies, global officials 63–4 crisis and economic cycles 85–8 national production and growth, Mauro, P. 56, 69, 73, 79, 84 distinction between 53–4 Meckling, W. 102 persistence and corruption 89–90 media political crime detection 86–7 attention, and follow-up procedures political instability as indirect of international supervision 478 causation 58, 69 freedom and independence 173 private investment, lowering of 57 involvement, preventive and non- rent-seeking activities 78–9, 84–5 criminal-related measures 425 transparent fiscal policy, beneficial politically interconnected firms effects of 83 taking over media 204–6 macroeconomic performance, effects Messick, R. xxiii, 521 of corruption, public sector 74–83 Mian, A. 103 healthcare and education spending Michael, B. 448 reduction 79, 80 microfinance institutions (MFIs), maintenance operations, lower political stability and operational spending 79, 82 efficiency 129–49 public investment projects 79–82, Africa 131, 132–3, 139, 144–6 84–5, 86–7 Asia 131, 133–8, 139, 144–6 public procurements and economies of scale 133, 134, 136, “conspiracy of silence” 87–8 138–9, 140, 142, 144

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governance indicators 132, 134, 136, multinationals and capital flows 63–6, 140, 142, 145–7 67 Latin America 131, 133, 138–9, Muna, A. 247, 248, 254, 426 144–6 Murphy, K. 17, 49, 56, 256 macroeconomic indicators 132, 133, Murray, R. 248 134, 136, 140, 142, 144–5, 148 mutual legal assistance, and civil operating costs 131–2, 133, 138, 139, procedures 495–6 144 mutual legal assistance and extradition profitability 132, 133, 134, 136, 138, 394–417 139, 140, 142, 144, 147 asset recovery 397 research data and methodology 130, AU Convention 405–6 131 bank secrecy 396–7, 398, 402, 406–7, see also financial system; 409 international financial bilateral agreements, conclusion institution (IFI) initiatives consideration 413 military spending and domestic CoECLCC 404–5 corruption levels 78–9 confiscation of proceeds 405 Miller, R. 323 criminal penalties, effective, Millet-Eindinber, M. 216 proportionate and dissuasive Mitsilegas, V. 239 398 Mitton, T. 103 dual criminality 401, 402, 404, 407–8 monetary policy EU Convention see EU Convention governance see governance and against Corruption, mutual effects on institutions, monetary legal assistance and extradition policy and transparency extradition refusals 408–9, 410–11 macroeconomic performance and grounds for refusal 398 authorities as corrupt 73–4 international cooperation, see also financial supervision importance of 412–13 money-laundering strategies 305–7, international framework emergence 391 394–7, 404–14 non-compliance 511–12 joint investigations and cooperation see also international financial 395, 396, 409, 411–12 institution (IFI) initiatives legal assistance, provision of prompt Monfrini, E. 504 and effective 398–9 monitoring mechanisms legal cooperation, international inadequate monitoring of politically 399–403 exposed persons 512–13 mandatory criminalization international framework emergence requirements 396 268, 269 monitoring 395–6 jurisdictional issues, treaty-based multiple proceedings and reciprocal mechanisms 392 consultations 411 mutual legal assistance and national legal provisions 414 extradition 395–6 OAS Convention see OAS see also follow-up procedures; Convention, mutual legal supervision assistance and extradition monopoly power 21, 42, 43 OED Convention see OECD see also firms and markets Convention, mutual legal Mookherjee, D. 25 assistance and extradition Morduch, J. 130 political offense exception 396 Motta, M. 34 sanctions and corporate liability 355

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seizure and confiscation of bribery new entrants proceeds 399 market distortion 36–40 seizure and confiscation of illegal see also SMEs proceeds from corruption- New Zealand, tax revenues and related offenses 398 corruption 76 seizure and confiscation of proceeds Ng, D. 95, 96, 97–8 of corruption and national Ng, S. 17, 95 cooperation 408–11 NGOs see non-governmental special investigation techniques 414 organizations (NGOs) UNCAC see UNCAC, mutual legal Nigeria assistance and extradition Abacha case 504 UNCTOC see UNCTOC, mutual TSKJ consortium see transnational legal assistance and extradition corruption, economic and Muzila, L. 261, 262, 263, 514 institutional textures of States, corruption’s effect, TSKJ national level consortium as global cartel asset recovery and legal systems, non-compliance differences between 499–500 anti-money laundering measures capacity building, Stolen Asset 511–12 Recovery Initiative (StAR) 510 dealing with, follow-up procedures civil proceedings and confiscation of international supervision 365 470 cooperation, mutual legal assistance non-criminal provisions and extradition 408–11 follow-up procedures 454–5 and criminalization of offense international framework emergence 322–7, 330, 331–2, 341–2 224–5 jurisdictional issues, treaty-based non-criminal-related measures see mechanisms 387–8 preventive and non-criminal- laws of participating countries, related measures implementation through 257–8, sanctions, transnational corruption 259, 260, 264, 265–6 203–4 legal provisions, mutual legal non-governmental organizations assistance and extradition 414 (NGOs) 335 macroeconomic production and see also civil society involvement growth, distinction between non-mandatory jurisdictional 53–4 provisions 258, 259, 260, 386–7 sanctions and criminal liability of mandatory provisions 381, 396, 480 legal persons 375–6 Nowlan, A. 275, 282, 287 natural disasters, transnational Nye, J. 316 corruption 200 natural resource extractive industries OAS Convention 220–21, 322, 323, see transnational corruption, 329–30, 332, 335 economic and institutional jurisdictional provisions 383 textures of States, corruption’s mutual legal assistance and effect, TSKJ consortium as global extradition 396–7 cartel political parties, illicit funding of 345 Netherlands preventive and non-criminal-related corporations’ tendency to bribe measures 418–20 public officials 64 seizure and confiscation of goods market capitalization 117, 120 359, 363

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OAS Convention, follow-up corporate liability standards 368–9 supervision procedures 448–52 corruption and offender as any civil society involvement 450 person 321 Committee of Experts 450 criminal liability of legal persons disciplinary penalties, lack of 452 371, 372, 376 impartiality and objectivity 449–50 follow-up procedures as specific Implementation Mechanism cases of international (MESICIC) 449–50 supervision 452–60 peer review system 448–9 illicit funding of political parties ratification reservations 452 344–5, 347, 349 reciprocal evaluation process 449, jurisdictional provisions 383–4 450–52 mutual legal assistance and structural composition 450 extradition 398–404 technical cooperation activities and non-governmental organizations exchange of information 449 (NGOs) definition 335 OAS Convention, mutual legal preventive and non-criminal-related assistance and extradition 396–7 measures 420–24 asset recovery 397 public international organizations bank secrecy 396–7, 407 definition 334–5 direct notifications between public official definition 331–2, the designated competent 333–4 authorities 397 Recommendation for Further political offense exception 396 Combating Bribery of Foreign OAS Convention, preventive and non- Public Officials 222, 322, 323–4, criminal-related measures 418–20 325, 326, 328–9 bank secrecy 419 Revised Recommendation of the private concerns, strengthening Council against Bribery 221, safeguards against corrupt 226, 229, 422–3 practices 419 sanctioning standards 351, 355, 357, public officials, consideration of 359, 362, 363–4, 365, 366, 371, system for registering income 372, 423 and liabilities 418 seizure and confiscation of goods public officials, ethics rules, 359, 362, 363–4, 365, 366 strengthening 418 technical difficulties in identifying publicly-held companies, accounting and quantifying proceeds of controls 419 corruption, OECD joint study, whistleblowers, protection of asset recovery, Stolen Asset 419–20 Recovery Initiative (StAR), O’Brien, M. 368 operational barriers 522–3 OECD Convention Working Group on Bribery (WGB) accounting standards and sanctions in International Business 355 Transactions 221, 223, 224, Anti-bribery Convention 200, 201, 225, 227–9, 357, 363–4, 376, 203, 378 400–401, 403, 423–4, 452, 453, bribery definition 339 455, 456, 457, 459, 477–8 bribery, intentional element 343 OECD Convention, follow-up Convention on Combating Bribery supervision procedures 452–60 of Foreign Public Officials bribery of foreign officials 456–7, in International Business 476 Transactions 194 decision review process 456

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group evaluation of each country’s seizure and confiscation of bribery performance 453–5 proceeds 399 monitoring implementation 453, seizure and confiscation of illegal 477–8 proceeds from corruption- non-criminal law aspects 454–5 related offenses 398 on-site visits 455–6, 458–9, 478 States not party to Convention peer-review process 452–3, 454–5, 402 457–9 and UNCAC ratification 402–3 preliminary reports assessing OECD Convention, preventive and performance 456, 459 non-criminal-related measures Transparency International 420–24 (TI) recommendations for accounting and auditing standards strengthening monitoring 421–3 process 457–8 accounting and auditing standards, OECD Convention, international sanctions for violation 423 framework emergence 221–9 bribery of foreign officials 420–22 Commentaries, legal nature of 223–4 financial statements disclosing enlargement to non-OECD members material contingent liabilities 226–9 422 fair trade approach 222, 227 tax deductibility of bribes to foreign framework for participation in public officials 420–21 subsidiary bodies and activities whistleblowing 423–4, 436 228–9 Offe, C. 346 “functional equivalence” model 224 Oil-for-Food Programme see future accession policy 226, 228–9 transnational corruption, Good Practice Guidance on economic and institutional Internal Controls, Ethics and textures of States, corruption’s Compliance 222 effect, Oil-for-Food Programme membership requirements of O’Keefe, D. 379, 380 accession 225–6 Olaniyan, K. 251, 252, 253, 254 multi-supervisory role of Working on-site visits, follow-up procedures Group on Bribery (WGB) 225, 455–6, 458–9, 465–6, 476, 478 227–9, 340 operational barriers, Stolen Asset penal law conventions 224 Recovery Initiative (StAR) see semi-openness problems 225, 228–9 asset recovery, Stolen Asset OECD Convention, mutual legal Recovery Initiative (StAR), assistance and extradition operational barriers 398–404 ‘Operational efficiency, corruption, and bank secrecy 398, 402, 407 political stability in microfinance’ dual criminality test 401, 402, 404 (written by Carlo Bellavite effective, proportionate and Pellegrini) 129–49 dissuasive criminal penalties 398 operational efficiency, microfinance grounds for refusal 398 institutions (MFIs) see legal assistance, provision of prompt microfinance institutions (MFIs), and effective 398–9 political stability and operational legal cooperation, international efficiency 399–403 ordre public, asset recovery 499–500 persons assisting in investigation or Organisation for Economic participating in proceedings Cooperation and Development see 400–401 OECD Convention

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Organization of American States see of offense, illicit funding of OAS Convention political parties Osborne, D. 314 international framework emergence Oxman, B. 379 345, 346–9 political stability Padoan, P. 66, 159, 306 and absence of violence indicator parent companies 168 crimes committed in interest or to microfinance institutions (MFIs) benefit of 392 see microfinance institutions liability of 214 (MFIs), political stability and Parsley, D. 103 operational efficiency Passas, N. 217 political will, dealing with lack of peer review, follow-up procedures of see asset recovery, Stolen Asset international supervision 448–9, Recovery Initiative (StAR), 452–5, 457–9, 473, 475–6 political will, dealing with lack Peers, S. 240 of Pellegrini, B. 115, 129 politically-connected firms, and Pellegrini, L. 56, 57, 67, 71, 72–3, 95, financial markets see financial 115, 153 markets, politically-connected penalty levels 21–2, 357 firms Perdriel-Vaissiere, M. 261, 262, 263 politically-exposed persons, money- performance levels laundering strategies and financial markets, politically- Financial Action Task Force connected firms 104, 111–13 (FATF) 307 macroeconomic performance see Pope, J. 172 macroeconomic performance, Portugal, market capitalization 117, effects of corruption 120 personal liability in addition to preferential treatment by governments corporate liability 373, 374, 375 103–4 PFI Convention (EU Convention on see also financial markets, politically- the Protection of EC Financial connected firms Interests) 231–2, 235–6, 359, 363, Presbitero, A. 98, 99 366, 371–2 presumption of innocence principle Pieth, M. 221, 222, 224, 361, 362, 260, 261, 263 363, 367, 384, 388, 392, 393, preventive and non-criminal-related 401, 456–7, 477–8, 480, 489, measures 418–42 507 accounting and auditing standards Pilapitiya, T. 171 421–3, 427–9 Pillay, N. 171 AU Convention see AU Convention, Pirenne, H. 3 preventive and non-criminal- political crime detection 86–7 related measures political immunities, Stolen Asset bank secrecy 419 Recovery Initiative (StAR) 518 bribery of foreign officials 420–22 political instability, and civil remedies 436–42 macroeconomic performance 58, civil remedies, international 69 framework emergence political offense exception, mutual legal 439–42 assistance and extradition 396 civil society involvement 425, 427 political party funding CoECivLCC see Council of Europe criminalization see criminalization Civil Law Convention on

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Corruption, preventive and private sector non-criminal-related measures accounting and auditing standards damages compensation 437–8, 439 427–9 efficiency, transparency and corruption, international framework accountability encouragement emergence 233, 234–6 427 enforcement, supranational anti- government agencies, control bribery regulation 214–15 reduction 439 investment, lowering of, and international cooperation, macroeconomic performance encouragement of 438–9 57 international framework emergence involvement in fight against unfair 418–20, 424–36 competition 425 media involvement 425 privatization of state-owned OAS Convention see OAS enterprises as incentive for Convention, preventive and corruption 22, 24 non-criminal-related measures profitability, microfinance institutions OECD Convention see OECD (MFIs) 132, 133, 134, 136, 138, Convention, preventive and 139, 140, 142, 144, 147 non-criminal-related measures property rights’ protection, private concerns, strengthening government role in 34 safeguards against corrupt property-based system 364 practices 419 Prost, K. 396 private sector, accounting and public interest and public opinion auditing standards 427–8 approaches, criminalization of private sector involvement in the offense 319–20 fight against unfair competition public officials 425 bribery see bribery of public officials private sector and privatization, and conflict of interest 3, 21, 24 accounting and auditing contract validity 438 standards 427–9 corruption amongst, and public officials, contract validity international framework 438 emergence 232–3, 236 public officials, declaration of assets ethics rules, strengthening 418 418, 424–5 and “illicit” artificial barriers 40 public officials, ethics rules, “illicit” artificial barriers, and public strengthening 418 officials, firms and markets 40 public officials, State responsibility income disclosure 418, 424–5, 492, for acts of corruption by 438 513–14, 521 publicly-held companies, accounting and lack of accountability 21–2, 39 controls 419 lack of accountability 21–2 tax deductibility of bribes to foreign multinationals, corporations’ public officials 420–21, 436 tendency to bribe public UNCAC see UNCAC, preventive officials, macroeconomic and non-criminal-related performance, effects of measures corruption 63–4 victim empowerment 439 State responsibility for acts of whistleblower protection 419–20, corruption by 438 423–4, 425–6, 429–36, 438 white elephant projects 24 prior ownership cases, asset recovery public officials definition 502 criminalization of offense see

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criminalization of offense, Reinhardt, U. 36 public official definition Reisman, W. 473, 480 international framework emergence rent-seeking activities 332, 338–40 impact on growth and talent 172–3 public sector macroeconomic performance, effects accountability, monetary policy and of corruption 78–9, 84–5 transparency 166 market control 21, 28, 46, 49 connections and stock prices 97 social programs, effects on 173 corruption and government resource allocation and domestic intervention levels 21 product distribution 33–4, 36 criminalization of bribery offense restitution emphasis 295, 364, 479–84, 327–31 489–90, 501–3, 504 investment projects, and Riahi-Belkaoui, A. 105–6 macroeconomic performance risk factors 79–82, 84–5, 86–7 corruption-risk, monitoring and macroeconomic performance reducing 374, 375 effects see macroeconomic and division of gains 23–5 performance, effects of International Country Risk Guide corruption, public sector (ICRG) 58 monopoly power 21 investment risks 57–66 procurement directives 87–8, 242–4 partial risk guarantees (PRGs) 279 projects and services, corruption World Bank Company Risk Profile affecting quality of 34–5 Database (CRPD) 279–80 revenues and domestic corruption World Bank Operational Risk 75–7 Management Framework size effects 17–18 (ORAF) 273 spending levels 69–71, 78–9 rivals, exclusion of 34 Punch, M. 368 Roberts, B. 103 Rodrik, D. 67–8 Raffray, F. 515, 519 Rooke, P. 268, 348 Rajan, R. 85, 103 Rose-Ackerman, S. 4, 20–21, 22, 23, Rajesh Babu, R. 256 474 Ramseyer, J. 25 Rosi, E. 377, 388, 393, 411 Rasmusen, E. 25 Rossi, G. 375 ratification problems 253–4, 452 Roubini, N. 85, 91 see also follow-up procedures rule of law indicator 30, 31–3, 168, Recanatini, F. xxiii, 272 170–73, 174 reciprocal evaluation process 449, Russia 450–52 corporations’ tendency to bribe see also follow-up procedures public officials 64 regulation foreign trade offices, bribing of 89 competitive market functionality, Ruta, M. 34 regulated competition 42–4 and effects on institutions see Sacerdoti, G. 329, 333, 392, 398, 399, governance and effects on 422, 477 institutions, supervision and Saks, R. 71 regulation Salbu, S. 212 regulatory supervision, need for 44 Salvioni, S. 504 state regulation, discriminatory Sanchez, N. 13 nature of 36 sanctions

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negotiated resolution, international and illicit drug-trafficking 361–2 financial institution (IFI) prevention of further crimes 364 initiatives 297–300 proceeds definition 363 non-criminal sanctions, property-based system 364 transnational corruption 203–4 restitution emphasis 364 standards, international framework from third persons 366–7 emergence 351, 359, 360–61, value-based system 364, 365–6 363, 364–5, 366, 371, 372, 373–4 sanctions and corporate liability, supranational anti-bribery criminal liability of legal persons regulation 215 367–76 World Bank regime see World anti-corruption law 370–76 Bank’s Governance and corporate liability models 368–70 Anticorruption Strategy corruption-risk, monitoring and (GAC), Sanction Regime reducing 374, 375 sanctions and corporate liability criteria for sanction imposition 350–76 372–3 accounting violations 355 Faulty Corporate Organization bribe, confiscation of proceeds Theory and supervisory liability limited to net profit 362 370 bribe and underlying contractual forms of legal person 372 relationship, causal link between Identification or Alter Ego Theory 362 369–70 bribers and corrupt officials, liability of natural persons in comparable treatment of 356 addition to corporate liability civil and administrative sanctions 373, 374, 375 355 national level reforms and effective, proportionate and harmonization 375–6 dissuasive principles 356–7, 358, offenses committed by individual 372 subordinate to person in leading extradition and mutual legal position 373–4 assistance 355 Strict Liability Model (Causation and gravity of offense 351, 352, Principle) 370 354–5, 356 Schinke, M. 74 international harmonization, limited Schroth, P. 218, 252, 253, 258–60, 264, 358 267, 360, 397, 399, 426 penalties determined by seriousness Scott, J. 13 of crime 357 securities market supervision 162, 163 sanctioning standards 351–8 seizure and confiscation of proceeds sanctions and corporate liability, international framework emergence confiscation 358–67 359–61, 363, 364–5, 366 bribe and/or proceeds of bribery mutual legal assistance and 358–63 extradition 398, 399, 408–11 civil proceedings at national level 365 Senior, I. 315–16, 317–18, 320 concealment of proceeds within Sharma, S. 318 corporate vehicle or legal entity Sharman, J. 390, 391, 518 365 Shaw, M. 373 converted proceeds and benefits shell companies 390, 391, 517–18 deriving from proceeds 366 Shiller, R. 18, 49, 85, 86 fines and confiscation of equivalent Shleifer, A. 27, 78, 89, 102, 103 value 363–6 Siegel, D. 303, 304, 305, 307, 308

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Simpkins, E. 84 framework for participation in Singapore subsidiary bodies and activities corporations’ tendency to bribe 228–9 public officials 64 parent company of foreign tax revenues and corruption 76 subsidiaries, liability of 214 “smart project design”, international subsidies and benefits, low rate of 22 financial institution (IFI) supervision initiatives 279 effects on institutions see governance SMEs and effects on institutions, capital returns, adverse effect on supervision and regulation 48 Faulty Corporate Organization competitive market functionality, Theory and supervisory liability and cost of corruption 46–8 370 new entrants, market distortion follow-up procedures 444–7 36–40 jurisdictional issues, treaty-based Snider, T. 251–2, 262, 322, 385 mechanisms 392 social inequality 84–5 see also follow-up procedures; social programs, rent-seeking effects monitoring mechanisms 173 supranational anti-bribery regulation, South Korea, corporations’ tendency US FCPA as archetype 209–16 to bribe public officials 64 ambiguous language concerns 211 sovereign equality principle 330 commercial context 210–11 Spain European governments’ objections bureaucratic procedure length and 216 corruption 39 foreign subsidiaries, and “any corporations’ tendency to bribe person” provision 213 public officials 64 historical background 209–10 market capitalization 117, 120 jurisdiction over transnational special investigation techniques 414 corruption 213–14 Speckbacher, C. 434 legal aspects 210–16 state capture 41, 45 parent company of foreign state regulation, discriminatory nature subsidiaries, liability of 214 of 36 payment exclusion categories 212 see also regulation payments to foreign officials state-owned enterprises, and qualifying as bribes 211–12 privatization 22, 24 private enforcement 214–15 Stigler, G. 24 rules applying to grand as opposed stock prices, and corporate governance to petty corruption 212 97–8 sanctions 215 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative subjective scope of application (StAR) see asset recovery, Stolen 213 Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) travel and lodging expenses 212 Stratmann, T. 105–6 US competitive disadvantage as subjective element of corruption result of FCPA 216 offenses 341–4 voluntary disclosure program subsidiaries 209–10 crimes committed in interest or to and Watergate scandal 209 benefit of parent 392 whistleblower provision 215–16 foreign subsidiaries, and “any see also US, Foreign Corrupt person” provision 213 Practices Act (FFCPA)

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Sweden, corporations’ tendency to ‘The impact of corruption on shares’ bribe public officials 64 returns of euro-area listed Switzerland industrial firms’ (written by Carlo central bank and insider trading 74 Bellavite Pellegrini and Laura corporations’ tendency to bribe Pellegrini) 115–128 public officials 64 Thomas, J. 474 Montesinos corruption case 493–5 Tobler, C. 358 Philippines and Marcos case 502–3, transfer of funds, prevention of illegal 504 485–6 TSKJ investigations and outcomes see also asset recovery 198 transnational corruption, economic Szasz, P. 275 and institutional textures of States, corruption’s effect 177–9, Taiwan, corporations’ tendency to 183–206 bribe public officials 64 civil remedies and politically talents, business 48–9, 172–3 interconnected firms taking Talmon, S. 275 over media 204–6 Tanzi, V. 3, 15, 17, 23, 40, 46, 47, 48, transnational corruption, economic 49, 56, 61, 69, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, and institutional textures of 82, 85 States, corruption’s effect, Oil-for- taxation Food Programme 184–95 bargaining power 4, 23 Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) levels, and levels of corruption 16, role and letters of credit 187, 18, 23, 96 191–2, 195 and regulatory clarity 23 escrow accounts 187, 188, 191–2 revenues, tax types and and humanitarian imports 190–91, macroeconomic performance 193–4 75–7, 82 Independent Inquiry Committee system undermining 172 (IIC) on Programme tax deductibility of bribes 216, 230, Manipulation 186–92 420–21, 436 Independent Inquiry Committee technical assistance (IIC) on Programme cooperation activities and exchange Manipulation, proposed of information (OAS) 449 changes 188 countries requiring legal assistance kickbacks and surcharges earned 471, 472, 476 through 186, 187, 188, 190–92 developing countries, and legal issues 193–5 transnational corruption 202–3 secret oil vouchers 189–90 donor-supported funds to boost surcharge scheme on the selling of capacity building 305 crude oil 190 experts for developing countries 504 UN involvement in scandal 186, and information exchange 267, 192–3, 194 268–9, 449 US legal governance 189–90, 194 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative transnational corruption, economic (StAR) 391, 508, 510, 513–14, and institutional textures of 522–3 States, corruption’s effect, TSKJ territoriality imposition, jurisdictional consortium as global cartel issues 386, 387 195–204 terrorism, firms and markets 41–2 double jeopardy principle (ne bis in terrorist financing 41–2, 490–91 idem doctrine) 201–2

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French investigation 196, 197 corruption, economic and human rights violations and public institutional textures of States, looting 200 corruption’s effect, TSKJ international treaties and non- consortium as global cartel criminal sanctions 203–4 investigations, finding and outcomes Uganda, corruption costs for small 197–9 firms 48 legal resources, lack of 200 UK legal and systemic issues 199–203 Alter Ego Theory and Tesco lessons learned 203–4 Supermarkets Ltd v. Natrass 369 members 195–6 Bribery Act 376, 477 natural disasters 200 corporations’ tendency to bribe and natural resource extractive public officials 64 industries 195 TSKJ investigations and outcomes scheme operation 196–7 198 transnational legal enforcement, UN Convention Against Drug need for 200–201 Trafficking 361, 412 UNCAC, provision on technical UN involvement Oil-for-Food assistance to developing Programme 186, 192–3, 194 countries 202–3 UNCAC (United Nations Convention transparency against Corruption) 255–70, asset recovery and due diligence of 304–5, 309–10, 322 bank intermediaries 490–91 active nationality principle 382 fiscal policy, beneficial effects of 83 Ad Hoc Committee 255, 256–7, 258, follow-up procedures 475–6, 477–8 260, 265–6 lack of, in settlements of foreign asset recovery provisions 257, 266–9 bribery cases 515–17 asset recovery provisions, training and monetary policy see governance and technical assistance 267, and effects on institutions, 268–9 monetary policy and bank secrecy 402–3 transparency bribery of foreign public officials need for increased in jurisdictional 322, 324–5, 328, 329, 330, issues 389–91 337–40 and regulatory quality 158–9 bribery, intentional element 343 see also accountability claw-back clauses 258 Transparency International (TI) comprehensiveness and universal corruption definition 1, 318 aspirations 256–7, 259–60 corruption perceptions index (CPI) conduct committed both inside and 14 outside their territory by one of foreign bribery enforcement report their nationals 382 183–4 coordination of efforts by more than OECD Convention one State 382 recommendations on corruption trends and circumstances, monitoring 457–8 monitoring and analysis travel and lodging expenses 212 requests 268 treaty-based mechanisms, jurisdictional criminal liability of legal persons issues see jurisdictional issues, 371, 372, 373 treaty-based mechanisms developing countries’ Treves, T. 379 implementation resources, TSKJ consortium see transnational concerns over 266–8

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dual criminality 402 technical assistance and information evidence collection problems 263–4 exchange 267, 268–9 follow-up procedures as specific technical assistance to developing cases of international countries 202–3 supervision 467–78 UNCAC (United Nations Convention harmonization, need for 258–9, 260, against Corruption), asset 265–6 recovery illicit enrichment provision 260–64 Ad Hoc Committee 485–6, 490–91, illicit enrichment provision, 492 proportionate use 262–3 asset recovery procedure 487–507 international governmental asset recovery within Conference of organizations as party to 270 States Parties (COSP) 505–7 interpretation problems 258, 264–5 balance between interest to recover jurisdiction over corporations 382–3 funds and consideration of jurisdiction provisions 381–3, 389 practical difficulties 500 legal flexibility concerns 258–9, 260, banks with no physical presence in 262 territory and not affiliated to a Legislative Guide 256, 264 financial group 491–2 mandatory jurisdictional provisions capacity-building programs 493 381 civil claims and burden of proof monitoring mechanisms 268, 269 496–7 mutual legal assistance and civil procedures and mutual legal extradition 406–14 assistance requirements 495–6 national laws of participating confiscation tools and international countries, implementation cooperation 497–9 through 257–8, 259, 260, 264, contingency fee arrangements 496 265–6 Egmont Group 493 negotiation process and financial intermediaries and Interpretative Note 255–6 financial intelligence unit (FIU) non-mandatory provisions 258, 259, 492–5 260 freezing or redistribution of assets opt-out considerations 270 504 political parties, illicit funding of freezing and seizure of property on 346–9 specific order issued by State presumption of innocence principle Party 497 260, 261, 263 information disclosure requirements preventive and non-criminal-related 500–501 measures 426–36 legal value and interpretation 487–9 preventive and non-criminal-related national legal systems, differences measures, civil remedies 439–42 between 499–500 public official definition 332, 338–40 ordre public 499–500 sanctioning standards 351, 360–61, political will of States, importance 363, 364–5, 366, 371, 372, 373 of 507 scope 257, 321 public officials, financial information seizure and confiscation of goods disclosure 492 360–61, 363, 364–5, 366 reciprocal judicial assistance 499–500 Settlement of Disputes 269–70 return of assets to requesting State shortcomings, alleged 256, 257–8, Party 489–90 259–66 return and disposal of assets 489–90, symbolic significance 259 501–3, 504

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return and disposal of assets, prior of corruption and national ownership cases 502 cooperation 408–11 Special Recommendations on special investigation techniques 414 Terrorist Financing 490–91 UNCTOC cooperation and and StAR legal framework 508, 516 avoidance of overlap 413 technical experts for developing UNCAC (United Nations Convention countries 504 against Corruption), preventive transparency and due diligence of and non-criminal-related measures bank intermediaries 490–91 426–36 UNCAC (United Nations Convention civil remedies 439–42 against Corruption) follow-up civil remedies, consequences supervision procedures 467–78 of corruption, measures civil society involvement 470, 476 addressing 439–40 formal review and Terms of civil society involvement 427 Reference 471 efficiency, transparency and implementation follow-up process, accountability encouragement lack of 474–5 427 implementation review and private sector, accounting and Conference of States Parties auditing standards 427–8 (COSP) 468–72, 475 private sector and privatization, Implementation Review Group accounting and auditing (IRG) 471–3, 474, 475 standards 427–9 non-compliance, dealing with 470 tax deductibility of expenses that on-site visits 476 constitute bribes, disallowance peer review and self-assessment 473, of 436 475–6 whistleblowers and witness review procedure behind schedule protection 429–36 475 whistleblowers and witness shortcomings, perceived 473–4 protection, confidentiality technical assistance to countries concerns 434–5 requiring legal assistance 471, whistleblowers and witness 472, 476 protection, US, Sarbanes-Oxley transparency issues 475–6, 477–8 Act comparison 435–6 UNCAC (United Nations Convention UNCTOC (United Nations against Corruption), mutual Convention against Transnational legal assistance and extradition Organized Crime) 254–5, 352–5, 406–14 371 bank secrecy 406–7, 409 active nationality principle 382 bilateral agreements, conclusion conduct committed both inside and consideration 413 outside their territory by one of dual criminality 407–8 their nationals 382 extradition refusals 408–9, 410–11 coordination of efforts by more than international cooperation, one State 382 importance of 412–13 jurisdiction over corporations joint investigations 411–12 382–3 multiple proceedings and reciprocal jurisdiction provisions 381–3 consultations 411 mandatory jurisdictional provisions OECD Convention ratification 381 402–3 mutual legal assistance and seizure and confiscation of proceeds extradition 394–6

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UNCTOC (United Nations International Anti-Bribery and Fair Convention against Transnational Competition Act 213 Organized Crime), mutual legal Lamb v. Philip Morris 215 assistance and extradition 394–6 legal governance, Oil-for-Food joint investigations and cooperation Programme 189–90, 194 395, 396, 409, 412 McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co. 215 mandatory criminalization Organization of American States see requirements 396 OAS Convention monitoring 395–6 politically-connected firms 103–4 UNCAC cooperation and avoidance private-to-private sector bribery 429 of overlap 413 SEC v. John Samson, John G. A. UNESCO, cultural property, return of Munro, Ian N. Campbell, and 481–3 John H. Whelan 213 Unger, B. 305 SEC v. Schering–Plough Corporation unilateral actions by single States 214 388–9 Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby United Nations Convention against 214–15 Corruption see UNCAC Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 215 United Nations Convention against TSKJ investigations and outcomes Transnational Organized Crime 197–8 see UNCTOC United States v. David Kay and United Nations Development Douglas Murphy 211 Programme (UNDP) US v. Syncor Taiwan 213 corruption definition 318 Watergate scandal 209 human rights-based approach to whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley development (HRBA) 171 Act 435–6 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) 217, 411, 412, Valenti, M. 392 416–17, 475 value-based system, sanctions and confiscation of property 366 corporate liability 364, 365–6 drug-trafficking 220, 361–2 Vannucci, A. 26–7, 35, 318 Legislative Guide 256, 262 Vervaele, J. 306 sanctions 352–4, 357 victim empowerment 439 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative Vienna Convention 223–4, 230, 352, (StAR) see asset recovery, 371, 487 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative Villinger, M. 224–5 (StAR) Vishny, R. 27, 78, 89, 102, 103 whistleblower protection 430 Vlassis, D. 217, 255, 259, 269, 313, 407, US 427, 489–90, 505 Cannon v. University of Chicago 215 voluntary disclosure 209–10, 281–2 competition regulation 43 corporations’ tendency to bribe Wade, P. 49 public officials 64 Waterbury, J. 316 Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act Waters, A. 13 67–8, 213 Watts, A. 379 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act wealth distribution effects 172–3 (FCPA) 189-90, 194, 201, 203, Webb, P. 253–4, 258, 267, 346, 396, 325, see also supranational anti- 428, 448, 460, 473 bribery regulation, US FCPA as Wei, S. 15, 61, 98 archetype Weidmann, J. 57

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Wells, C. 368, 369, 370 affiliates of Respondents 296–7, whistleblower protection 22, 215–16, 298 419–20, 423–4, 425–6, 429–36, 438 Bank Group-financed projects and white elephant projects 24, 82 debarment 280–81, 286–7, Whittle, R. 197 288–9 Wilsher, D. 262 Bank Group-financed projects, legal Wise, E. 395 consistency 282–3 Woller, G. 130 Bank Group-financed projects, World Bank Voluntary Disclosure Program Business Environment and (VDP) 281–2 Enterprise Performance Survey collective action on global 36–7 governance, support for corruption data set 14 302–3 corruption obstructing activity of Company Risk Profile Database firms, study on 40 (CRPD) 279–80 financial sector assessment program conditional non-debarment 294–5, (FSAP) 164 300 Governance Indicators (GI) 168, debarment with conditional release 173–5 292–4 rule of law concept 31–3 debarment effects 301 securities market standards 162 deferral agreements and freezing of Special Recommendations on sanctions 299 Terrorist Financing 490–91 Early Temporary Suspension phase state capture and administrative 287, 300 corruption, distinction between formal sanctions proceedings 2 288–301 Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) INT Statement of Accusations and Initiative see asset recovery, Evidence (SAE) 286–7 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative Integrity Compliance Guideline (StAR) 293–4 World Bank’s Governance and Anti- Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) Corruption Strategy (GAC) 274, 279, 281, 283, 284, 286–7, 271–303 288–92, 296–7, 301, 302 Anti-Corruption Guidelines 278–9 letter of reprimand 295 anti-corruption provisions in its loan amount cancellation 278 legal agreements with borrowers “Macmillan” settlement 297–8 277–80 main elements 283–92 Country Assistance Strategy 272 mechanism for the negotiated Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) and resolution of sanctions cases prevention strategy 274–5 297–300 International Corruption Hunters mutual recognition (cross- Alliance 303 debarment) 292, 301–2 Operational Risk Management non-legal tools 279–83 Framework (ORAF) 273 partial risk guarantees (PRGs) prevention strategy 274–5 279 Procurement and Consultant “Plain Vanilla” debarment 294 Guidelines 277–8 practices and norms of other World Bank’s Governance and international bodies, Anticorruption Strategy (GAC), comparison with 283–4 Sanction Regime 275–303 restitution 295

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Sanctionable Practices 284–5, Zacharias, J. 129, 130, 147 286 Zagaris, B. 196 Sanctioning Guideline, and Zaire, monetary authority corruption reduction in minimum period 74 of debarment 295–6, 298, 300 Zarin, D. 209, 215–16 “smart project design” 279 Zeckhauser, R. 34 Wraith, R. 84 Zerbes, I. 321, 323, 326, 328, 331–2, WTO and revised Government 333, 340 Procurement Agreement (GPA) Ziegler, J. 378 308 Zimmerman, S. 301 Zimring, F. 319 Xu, L. 103 Zingales, L. 103

Marco Arnone and Leonardo S. Borlini - 9781781006139 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/25/2021 02:54:57PM via free access