The Indo–US Nuclear Deal Not Occur

BOOK REVIEW from civilian to military applications did The Indo–US Nuclear Deal not occur. As things turned out, the sep- aration asked for was a tough call since A Closer Look the Indian nuclear programme had just gotten used to functioning without internal walls. Sukumar Muralidharan The constructivist model sees technological change as a process propelled by ell over a decade has passed A Debate to Remember: The US–India Nuclear the demands, often in confl ict, of “rele- since that moment of epipha- Deal by Chaitanya Ravi, New Delhi: Oxford University vant social groups.” There is no effi ciency Wny when the United States Press, 2018; pp xix + 311, `995. drive or teleology that technological (US) as the sole global superpower change fulfi ls, only the articulated explicitly assumed mentorship over India’s 2005 nuclear deal with the US, which demands and expectations of various passage into the league of great powers. was the breakout moment from isolation social groups with determinant power. This special status was to be consecrated for India. The nuclear non-proliferation The theory has a certain explanatory by the recognition of India’s unique treaty (NPT) in force since 1968 granted power over technological development status within the nuclear realm, in both only fi ve states the legally recognised begun de novo, as for instance, in its civilian and military dimensions. right to bear nuclear arms. India was explaining how the choice between dif- India’s capabilities had been won in now allowed entry, not as a nuclear ferent objectives articulated by relevant splendid isolation, to some degree self- weapons state under the NPT, but as part social groups were resolved in the devel- imposed. Energy was always the cover of a newly confected and rather ambigu- opment of a mass-produced artefact, story for India’s intensive research and ous category called “a responsible state such as the bicycle. Ravi alters the terms development effort in nuclear science with advanced nuclear technology.” It of the model in applying it to a study of and technology, but the military objec- was a niche uniquely created for India, how existing technological artefacts, are tive was never far behind. The early po- involving a judgment call by more privi- absorbed into milieus with differing litical leadership managed to stick to the leged nuclear club members of how far confi gurations of social power, though peaceful use rationale, in part because India lived up to expected levels of he seems inattentive to this shift in the of the enduring power of the doctrine of responsibility. But, even with that lever- argument. non-violence bequeathed by the Indian age, the US was not willing to allow In importing the model into a study of freedom movement. Internal and external an unravelling of the NPT that it was the bargaining that followed the fi rst insecurities on two notable instances principally responsible for enforcing, statement of intent by India and the US, compelled an effacement of that vital dis- though often—as with apartheid South Ravi identifi es certain “relevant social tinction. First came the nuclear test of 1974, Africa and Israel—with unprincipled groups and individuals.” The fi rst such which was rather implausibly portrayed selectivity. coalition included former Prime Minister as “peaceful” in intent, but led to global As the fi rst down payment, India was Manmohan Singh, his cabinet colleagues sanctions. And, then, came an explicit obliged to separate its military and civil- and a number of strategic affairs’ com- statement of intent to weaponise the ian nuclear facilities and, in accordance mentators and offi cials, notably from the nuclear option in 1998. with NPT procedures, place the latter foreign service, who saw an opportunity category under safeguards by the Inter- to secure India’s energy supplies, while Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). forging advantageous strategic alliances. Chaitanya Ravi’s A Debate to Remember: That would institute an audit of nuclear Anil Kakodkar, then head of the Depart- The US–India Nuclear Deal takes up the materials and ensure that a diversion ment of Atomic Energy (DAE), is grouped 26 FEBRUARY 8, 2020 vol lV no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly BOOK REVIEW within the fi rst coalition, though subse- isotope that would power the third since he had reason to believe, with cor- quent events were to reveal that he was generation of reactors. roboration from one individual scientist not entirely at ease in the company. The plan was a leap into the un- on the inside track in 1998, that the fusion known, in being a tightly interconnected device tested alongside four fi ssion devices Eight Horsemen nexus of technologies, mostly unproven performed well below expectation. A second coalition comprised a number in the 1950s. In principle though, the That assessment was sharply contested of retired offi cials who had overseen the energy objectives would not be seriously by the DAE, and the dispute remains un- DAE in its years of isolation following constrained from the FBR being catego- resolved. During the nuclear negotia- 1974 and retained a possessive sense of rised as civilian, subject to periodic tions, Kakodkar is believed to have spoken, pride over the know-how secured through material audit. India’s FBR programme, this time more discreetly, to the political that period. P K Iyengar (Kakodkar’s both the test reactor and scaled-up pro- leadership about the imprudence of predecessor once removed as the head totype, had been functioning in the acceding to the termination clause. It is of the DAE), A N Prasad (a retired DAE’s Kalpakkam facility, though with- believed that he spoke of unforeseen chairman of the Nuclear Power Corpo- out ever approaching expected effi cien- security contingencies and the likeli- ration), and A Gopalakrishnan (a former cy parameters. By insisting on keeping hood that India would be severely hand- head of the watchdog body, the Atomic these out of the scope of civilian over- icapped in its response if it stood to jeop- Energy Regulatory Board) were key sight, Kakodkar disrupted the early con- ardise investments committed to the players here. Their intervention on cord emerging between the US and nuclear energy sector in collaboration public forums leveraged the prestige India. He also perhaps gave away more with foreign partners. gained from years in the spotlight as than intended about the material con- The dilution of the termination clause explorers of the nuclear frontiers, and nections between India’s civilian and showed how keen the US was to gain gained additional traction when it was military nuclear programmes. India’s partnership in pushing back joined by a constellation of luminaries, Kakodkar’s open dissent, as Ravi re- against China’s growing power. Disre- including all the surviving heads of the counts, raised an imminent possibility of garding the urgings of the counterprolif- DAE going back to Homi Sethna, the the deal unravelling. There were some eration lobby at home, the US adminis- oldest among the fraternity with claims who thought the episode was choreo- tration of President George Bush replaced burnished by his oversight of the 1974 graphed by the Indian strategic estab- the termination clause with a gentler nuclear test. At key moments, this gath- lishment to extract more advantageous variant, which allowed for consultations ering of scientifi c grandees, which Ravi terms. Ravi thinks not, since there was before action from either side. confers with the collective appellation of seemingly a real possibility of Kakodkar Narrowly construed, India was a gainer the “eight horsemen,” drew support being sanctioned for speaking out of turn. from the negotiations over the nuclear from the incumbent DAE head. However, events transpired behind the deal, though there were signifi cant losses Kakodkar’s most signifi cant public in- scenes; the outcome was a happy one for incurred on the broader canvas. India was, tervention was to actively oppose a sepa- India’s nuclear establishment, with the in particular, put through two tests of ration plan, proposed by the foreign US acceding to the military categorisation loyalty as the US, scrambling desperately policy establishment—with the tacit of the FBR programme. to undo the damage caused by the Iraq endorsement of the US—that would invasion, launched a campaign of attri- place India’s fast breeder reactor (FBR) The Termination Clause tion against Iran. The focus of this cam- programme within the civilian side. The The deal was not yet out of the woods. paign was Iran’s uranium enrichment status of the FBR within India’s long- The next irritant was the “termination programme, which had been shown term energy plans was decided early in clause,” which stipulated a complete sus- after IAEA audit to be in marginal breach the 1950s by Homi Bhabha, who helmed pension of all cooperation if India were of NPT obligations. It was an awkward the DAE through its fi rst decade. Recog- to test a nuclear device. The “eight place for India, which had, since late- nising India’s relatively low mineral horsemen” pushed back strongly against 2004, been negotiating an ambitious endowments of uranium, the fuel of this stipulation, focusing their ire in pri- pipeline project that would fetch Iranian choice for the fi rst generation of nuclear vate on one of their own. Kakodkar’s im- gas through Pakistan, to feed India’s plants, Bhabha conceived of a second mediate predecessor, R Chidambaram, hunger for energy. The main architect of stage powered by the FBR, using pluto- had overseen the 1998 nuclear tests and the project, Mani Shankar Aiyar, was a nium extracted from uranium-fuelled since retired to take up an advisory posi- temporary occupant of the petroleum reactors.

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