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Download the Transcript NATO-2020/03/02 1 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION FALK AUDITORIUM DEFENDING NATO’S EASTERN FLANK: A CONVERSATION ON RUSSIA WITH ESTONIA’S MINISTER OF DEFENSE Washington, D.C. Monday, March 2, 2020 PARTICIPANTS: Welcome and Introduction: MICHAEL O’HANLON Senior Fellow and Director of Research The Brookings Institution Keynote Address: HIS EXCELLENCY JÜRI LUIK Minister of Defense The Republic of Estonia * * * * * ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 NATO-2020/03/02 2 P R O C E E D I N G S MR. O'HANLON: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to Brookings. I’m Mike O’Hanlon with the Foreign Policy program. It is my distinct privilege and pleasure to welcome Juri Luik, the minister of defense for the Republic of Estonia to Brookings today for a conversation about his country’s military preparations and more generally NATO’s preparations for defending its eastern flank. I’m just going to give a couple words of additional introduction and then we’ll hear from the minister. He and I will then converse a little bit on stage and will look forward to your thoughts in the Q&A part of the final 20 minutes or so of the hour. So we have really seen a man of a remarkable career and now reengage and retake the position of minister of defense, a position he had held in the early years when Estonia had regained its independence. As you know, and if you drive around Washington, watch up and down Mass Avenue, you would have seen a year ago or so that the three Baltic States were celebrating 100 years of independence, but of course it was an independence that was taken from them and they suffered enormously in the period of World War II and then during the Soviet annexation, if you will, a process that was never recognized by the United States government, and which mercifully came to an end with the end of the Cold War. So Estonia has now been back as an independent state for some three decades, and it has been a member of NATO since 2004 in the big round of expansion that had been announced in 2002. I should also note by way of introduction that the Minister has had a number of positions in his government, which give him a broad view of the problem, not strictly in military terms, including being minister and ambassador extraordinaire to Moscow, get this, from 2012 to 2015. So he was there in a pretty interesting and important time. One last point by way of general introduction about Estonia. As you know, NATO has its cyber command and does a great deal of cyber activity and exercising in Estonia. So it has been important in that regard as well. It’s a country that meets its 2 percent obligations, spending as a fraction of GEP, so its military budget in percentage terms is among NATO’s highest. This still of course only ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 NATO-2020/03/02 3 permits a small military with a country of 1.3 million people, but a very impressive military nonetheless. And so without further ado, Mr. Minister, thank you for being here, and the floor is yours. MINISTER LUIK: Thank you very much, Mike. I’m extremely happy to be here in such a distinguished institution with such distinguished participants. Very happy to see Strobe here, my old friend. I’d been Estonia ambassador to Washington in 2003 to 2007, and was a frequent visitor here in these august settings, always had very interesting debates. Let me start with some words of introduction, and I’d be very happy to continue in the discussion format. Let me offer you ta view from NATO’s eastern flank about the security situation in the Baltic Sea region and what we, Estonia, the United States, and allies, are doing together in order to strengthen our common security and defense. Allow me however, to first say a few words about the significance and the role that is played by the NATO alliance in general. We have a working alliance but we need to strengthen it further, including through even stronger commitment by every member. That is why we all pledged to spend more on defense, and to do it wisely. Estonia achieved their NATO agreed defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP, and we are now even exceeding it years ago. And a growing number of allies have done it as well. The burden sharing in NATO is increasingly fair. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea and NATO’s summits in Wales in 2014, north Atlantic alliance has returned to its core task, collective defense. And it has done so for a very good reason. Russia did not only launch a massive armaments and defense reforms program since 2009, but it also unilaterally took the course of outright and aggressive confrontation with the West, particularly against the United States. It attacks and invades its neighbors, it deploys forces and wages indiscriminate war. In Syria, defending a criminal regime, and it interferes also militarily, including using private military companies, in Venezuela, in Libya, and other countries. The security situation in Europe has deteriorated since 2014 due to Russia’s efforts to strengthen its regional posture. Russia deploys to its western military district a wide range of modern ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 NATO-2020/03/02 4 offensive weapons and capabilities, including SSC8 land-based missile systems that stood in violation with the IMF Treaty. These dual-capable weapon systems are suitable for surprise precision strikes, threaten the entire Europe, and good in conflict situations, become a game changer. NATO’s actions and measures adjusting its deterrents and defense posture, have been taken in a step-by-step order that is transparent, non-provocative, and based on sufficiency. Russia, on the other hand, would hardly exclude the use of force when circumstances seem promising for exploiting our vulnerabilities. The U.S. led exercise Defender Europe 2020, the biggest allied exercise since the end of Cold War, will surely send a powerful and convincing strategic message to Moscow. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, recently stated that Russia would respond to Defender with its own borders, which is of course very reassuring to all of us. But he also added that Russia keeps its nukes at home differently from the U.S. That statement is of course to remind us that Russia has a huge nuclear arsenal. As the frontline state, we in Estonia work daily to ensure a credible defense and deterrents on the border with Russia. We will continue to maintain defense ponding, but in order to improve our readiness we conduct regular no-notice defense readiness exercises for our reserve army. For instance, in 2019, we held SNAPEX for two reserve battalions at the same time. Less than 40 hours after the government’s decision to launch the exercise, one infantry battalion had move more than 60 miles from the formation location and was ready for battle. You know, if you have a reserve army you have to make sure that A, it works; B, it works in time. So Estonia is doing these SNAPEX exercises, starting from a B team, giving a signal to the Estonia government that now there’s a crisis and we work very quickly and, as I pointed out, in 40 hours the battalion is already in place out of its organizational area. This is equal to how the professionals work. So for a small country whose defense is based on reserves, this is something which has to be trained and retrained all the time, and this is really important for us. In addition to Estonia’s efforts, NATO has made substantial and visible steps in bolstering ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 NATO-2020/03/02 5 collective defense. Besides U.S. leadership, its continuing commitment in NATO, and military presence in Europe, especially on the eastern flank, our European allies have considerably bolstered their commitment. The UK left NATO enhanced forward battle group, which is supported by France and Denmark, in Estonia, is an interoperable and integral part of our defense forces. It serves as an example of long-term real commitment to transatlantic security and ability to deter and defend the alliance borders. Just as a side remark, people often say Europe is not doing enough. I think we have to qualify this by remembering that there are now countries like Great Britain, like Germany, and many, many other European countries, France, who are standing in the front line in the Baltic States. They are standing as a tripwire, and they are really making perhaps not a large military effort, but an enormous political effort in bringing their boys into the harm’s way and providing this important line of deterrence when it comes to supporting the Baltic States. So we are deeply appreciative to countries like the United Kingdom, which is in Estonia. Canada, which is the lead nation in Latvia, Germany. I think we all understand what a difficult decision it must have been for Germans, for the German government, to take an armored battalion and bring it to Lithuania. I think we all imagine how difficult and complicated such a decision must have been.
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