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Sectarian and Regional Factionalism in the Syrian Political Elite Author(S): Nikolaos Van Dam Source: Middle East Journal, Vol

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Sectarian and Regional Factionalism in the Syrian Political Elite Author(S): Nikolaos Van Dam Source: Middle East Journal, Vol Sectarian and Regional Factionalism in the Syrian Political Elite Author(s): Nikolaos van Dam Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring, 1978), pp. 201-210 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4325740 . Accessed: 26/04/2011 18:41 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mei. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Middle East Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle East Journal. http://www.jstor.org POLITICAL REVIEW Sectarian and Regional Factionalism in the Syrian Political Elite Nikolaos van Dam "The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. All differences existing among its sons are accidental and spurious, and will disappear with the awakening of Arab consciousness" (The Constitution of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, 1947). Ever since the rise of nationalism in the Arab the time of a complete or partial takeover of world, a transformation process has been going power found itself more or less forced to revert on in which the traditional religious, tribal to just these traditional loyalties in order not to and regional loyalties are being replaced, com- lose the power necessary for realizing that pletely or partially, by national and/or socio- ideology. economic loyalties. The major religious groups in Syria are the Nevertheless, these traditional loyalties can Sunni Muslims, forming a majority of 68.7 per still play an important role in the struggle for cent of the total population, the 'Alawis (11.5 political power. This can especially be the case per cent), Druze (3.0 per cent), Isma'1lis(1.5 per in states containing a great variety of religious cent), and Christians (14.1 per cent), of whom groups, and may become evident when the back- the Greek Orthodox (4.7 per cent) constitute grounds of the political power elites of the re- the most important community-' Whereas the spective states are investigated. Sunnis and Christians live scattered through the Syria may in this respect serve as a grateful country, the 'Alawis, Druze and Ism'il-is form example for research, since the population of so-called compact minorities whose members are this state is characterized, a.o., by a great mainly concentrated in particulardistricts in which diversity of religious communities. Moreover, they form a local majority.2 Thus, most Syrian since 1963 Syria has been ruled by a single 'Alawis live in the northwestern Latakia region, political party, or a faction thereof, which where they constitute a majority of 62.1 per cent pursued an ideology aimed at the disappearance of the local population.3 Most Syrian Druze of sectarian, regional and tribal loyalties, but at live in the southern province of Suwayda', also 1. Gabriel Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East (London, 1964), p. 109. For different statistical data concerning the major Syrian religious communities, see Eugene Wirth, Syrien: Eine GeographischeLandeskunde (Darmstadt, 1971), p. 452. The Christians mentioned in the tables of this article are almost exclusively Greek Orthodox. 2. Cf. Albert H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London, 1947), p. 14. 3. In this article the words "Latakia region" denote the area of the present provinces Latakia and Tartus, which before 1966 formed one province called Latakia. The "Dayr al-Zuir region" denotes the area of the present provinces of Dayr al-Zur, al-Raqqah and al-Hasakah. Cf. Michael H. Van Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria," in The Middle EastJournal, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 1972, p. 124. A NIKOLAOS VAN DAM is a staff member of the Middle East Section of the African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect those of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This article is based on research done for his doctor's dissertation (De Rol van Sektarisme,Regionalisme en Tribalismebij de Strijd om de PolitiekeMacht in Syrie (1961 -1976), University of Amsterdam, 1977). 201 202 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL TABLE I Regional and Sectarian Representationin Syrian Cabinets (1942 -1963) CabinetNo.: 31-65 66-69 70-75 31-75 Period: 1-'42/2-'58 2-58/9-61 9-'61/3-'63 1-'42/3-'63 District Religion Damascus(21%)* Sunni 36.9% (117) 36.8% (21) 37.1% (33) 37.3% (171) Christian 6.1% ( 19) 7.9% ( 7) 5.7% ( 26) Shi'i- Total 43.6% (136) 36.8% (21) 44.9% (40) 43.0% (197) Aleppo (20%) Sunni 17.0% ( 53) 14.0% ( 8) 13.5% (12) 15.9% ( 73) Christian 5.8% ( 18) - 2.2% ( 2) 4.4% ( 20) Total 22.8% ( 71) 14.0% ( 8) 15.7% (14) 20.3% ( 93) Idlib (7%) Sunni 1.0% ( 3) - 0.7% ( 3) Total 1.0% ( 3) - 0.7% ( 3) Hami (8%) Sunni 5.8% (18) 8.8% ( 5) 5.6% ( 5) 6.1% ( 28) IsmIZIi 0.3% ( 1) 0.2% ( 1) 'Alawi - Christian Total 6.1% (19) 8.8% ( 5) 5.6% ( 5) 6.3% ( 29) Homs (10%) Sunni 8.0% ( 25) 7.0% ( 4) 3.4% ( 3) 7.0% ( 32) 'Alawi - _ Christian Total 8.0% ( 25) 7.0% ( 4) 3.4% ( 3) 7.0% ( 32) Latakia(13 %) Sunni 1.9% ( 6) 10.1% ( 9) 3.3% ( 15) 'Alawi 2.6% ( 8) 1.8% ( 1) 2.2% ( 2) 2.4% ( 11) Ismrilli Christian - 4.5% ( 4) 0.9% ( 4) Total 4.5% (14) 1.8% ( 1) 16.9% (15) 6.6% ( 30) Dayr al-Zuir(12%) Sunni 6.7% ( 21) 7.0% ( 4) 6.7% ( 6) 6.8% ( 31) Total 6.7%( 21) 7.0% ( 4) 6.7% ( 6) 6.8%( 31) Hawrin (4%) Sunni - 1.8% ( 1) 2.2% ( 2) 0.7% ( 3) Christian Total 1.8% ( 1) 2.2% ( 2) 0.7% ( 3) Qunaytarah (2%) Sunni Druze 1.0% ( 3) 0.7% ( 3) Total 1.0% ( 3) 0.7% ( 3) Suwaydi' (3%) Sunni - Druze 1.9% ( 6) 3.5% ( 2) 3.4% ( 3) 2.4% ( 11) Total 1.9% ( 6) 3.5% ( 2) 3.4% ( 3) 2.4% ( 11) Non-Syrian Sunni 4.2% ( 13) - 2.8% ( 13) Christian 0.3% ( 1) - 0.2% ( 1) Total 4.5%( 14) - 3.1% ( 14) Unknown Sunni - 19.3% (11) 1.3% ( 1) 2.6% ( 12) Total 100.0% (312) 100.0% (57) 100.0% (89) 100.0% (458) * The percentagesplaced directly after the regional names indicate the respectiveparts of the total populationby region. POLITICALREVIEW 203 called Jabal al-Duriiz (Mountain of the Druzes) socioeconomic and political backgroundsof the orJabal al-'Arab,where they make up 87.7 per membersof importantpolitical power institutions. cent of the population. The Ism'il-is live mainly In this researchthe Syriancabinets between 1942 in the two districts (mantiqahs) Masyaf and and 1976 were investigated,as well as the Syrian Salamiyah of the central province Hama. Whereas Regional Commandsof the Ba'th Party which the above mentioned religious minorities are have been in power in Syria since 1963 (see mainly concentrated in specific areas of the tables 1- 7).4 Special attention is given to the Syrian countryside, the populations of the bigger militarymembers of the last mentioned institu- cities have a Sunni majority. tion, since afterMarch 8, 1963, they were Syria's This implies that sectarian categories can most importantrulers. Their backgrounds,there- overlap to a great extent with socioeconomic fore, will come closest to those of the "core" categories, and that urban-rural contrasts can of the politicalpower elite of that time. coincide to an important extent with sectarian contrasts. On the one hand, sectarian loyalties An HistoricalRevolution in the Syrian can have a catalyzing influence on the take off PoliticalElite (1963) of a class struggle in case sectarian contrasts coincide with socioeconomic differences. In It turns out to be possible to show clearly such a case, a class struggle can be directed that the year 1963 was an important turning and stimulated through sectarian channels. On point in modern Syrianhistory, with a view to the other hand, however, the growth of class the representationof specificsectarian, regional, consciousness can specifically be impeded by socioeconomicand political groups of the country. solidarity with one's own religious community, The relationshipbetween Sunnisand non-Sunnis, since one such community usually comprises urbanand ruralpeople, richerand poorer classes, different socioeconomic classes. An overlap and conservativeand progressivepolitical groups of sectarian, regional, tribal and socioeconomic underwent an abrupt change with the Ba'thist loyalties can consequently result in their elements takeover of power after March 8, 1963. This being tied to each other in an inseparable found clear expressionin the compositionof the way, as well as in their complementing and political elite which simultaneouslyunderwent reinforcing each other.
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