Untitled [Ron Viney on the South African War, 1899-1902]

Bill Nasson. The South African War, 1899-1902. London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1999. 304 pp. $24.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-340-74154-2. Reviewed by Ron Viney Published on H-SAfrica (December, 2000) "The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars." son makes clear that Britain's weakness at the out‐ Just a note to the publishers frst. Typographi‐ set of the war handed the Boers an initial strategic cal errors are irritating at the best of times, but advantage. [p.viii]. This advantage dissipated when the distance between Pretoria and Johan‐ while the old tardy Boer leadership pondered on nesburg is given as: "... about 300 miles away" (p. their siege strategy as the way to defeat the 181), then it changes the theatre of the war. This British. This was nothing new, as all the battles should read: "... about 30 miles away". and skirmishes fought by the Boers with black polities relied heavily on siege tactics. Ironically, This book argues that the war has a recog‐ as the author shows, it was a younger, more liber‐ nised significance in world history. Bill Nasson al generation [and generally better educated and aims to provide an account of how the war un‐ well read; as well as being part of the Boer landed folded. How the political contest between Boer re‐ gentry] - Botha and Smuts pre-eminent among publicanism and British imperialism developed them - who reinvigorated the Boer's military ef‐ into a violent struggle. How the warring sides con‐ fort in 1900 and took it to the guerilla phase. (p. ducted their operations; how adversaries saw ix). Nasson manages to admirably bring together each other; how the conflict affected belligerent research on race, class, gender and military histo‐ societies and some beyond; how the combatants ry in this book. finally turned to peace; and how fnally how the war has come to be remembered in the country For Nasson the account recapitulates much of across which it was fought and how it might be the staple history of the war, it does not attempt seen now. [p. xi]. The British defeats of 1899 were to reproduce every well-known detail about cam‐ surprising precisely because they were inflicted paigns, sieges, personalities, regiments, and units. on an army that had long appreciated the danger This is partly because such technically descriptive of underestimating its opponents or the variety of detail can be found elsewhere. But it is also be‐ local conditions it would encounter. [p.viii] Nas‐ cause the main purpose here for the author is to H-Net Reviews produce a fairly compact interpretation rather the British by this ignominious defeat- as well as than an exhaustive treatment of what has been the refusal by the British to believe that a handful called the Transvaal War, The Great Boer War or of farmers could hold off large numbers of regu‐ even the Grate Bore War (p. xiv). The name for lar troops accustomed to victory. this war even a hundred years later has stirred up By the time of the guerrilla phase of the war, great controversy in South Africa. Those wishing the British had slowly come to realise the value of for a more inclusive parameter in the new South the use of irregular strategy. This provided ample Africa wanted it to be the South African War. opportunity for colonial irregulars in the British Most British, Canadians, New Zealanders and Aus‐ army to prove their worth by attributing British tralians still know it as the Anglo-Boer War. The and Boer characteristics to themselves. Only those idea of referring to it as the Anglo Boer South steeped in knowledge of the Boer [horsemanship, African war also was toyed with or, as some wit good shooting, hardship on the open veldt, being noted, the ABSA war - the name of a large banking able to live off the land] and his ways could defeat group in South Africa. him. Quaintly this provided a sense of national Initially I thought that the amount of space identity for Canadians, Australians and New given to the military campaigns and troop move‐ Zealanders, but not especially for English speak‐ ments was out of proportion to the social issues ing South African colonials. the war has raised. I am not too keen on tradition‐ Nasson looks at the perceptions Boers had of al military histories myself and still see very little themselves and their enemies, what perceptions point in counting how many bullets were expend‐ the British and colonials had of themselves and ed on the battlefield. Perhaps, I thought, it was an their enemies as well as some of the popular myth attempt to get back to the 'real war'; as Janet Far‐ making in the British [especially around Mafek‐ quarson - a Correspendent with the South African ing] and European popular narrative. He looks at Sunday Times and avid amateur military histori‐ the inherent weaknesses that come out in the an - commented at the UNISA Conference on 'Re‐ Boer military system based on equality, as well as thinking the South African War,' held in August the inherent weaknesses of the rigid British mili‐ 1998. [The conference dealt mainly with social is‐ tary parameter. What does not come out clearly sues and very little with military narrative.] though are the distinct differences in the British On closer reading, however, the interpretive Army itself between colonial regulars and colo‐ nuances provided by Nasson are well worth it. nial irregulars that often hampered the British This clearly comes out with the interfering war effort. No clearer example is that of Breaker Rhodes in the siege of Kimberley. The antics of Morant. Rhodes seen a hundred years distant are very What can be deduced from this work is that reminiscent of the fuss a drama queen makes both sides initially used their traditional methods over little things. The 'over by Christmas' mentali‐ to wage war and failed in their objectives. Clearly, ty that was to permeate through to the two world these outdated methods would not give either wars comes out in this narrative. Nasson points to side the victory they wanted. Armoured trains the engendered nature of the war - women on the and the railway, the telegraph and heliograph, Boer side infiltrating a masculine world of fght‐ balloons, guns with ranges and smokeless powder ing. This was not unusual, as war for the Boers that made killing the enemy an ever more remote was always something of a family business. Ini‐ experience, the end of the fxed formation charge, tially the war was sustained by memories - for the construction of sangars and trenches [a rather Boers, of the victory at Majuba in the 1880s, and disastrous experiment that was attempted during 2 H-Net Reviews the frst world war and modelled after the Boer harsh imperialist-republican fght is timely (p. entrenchments at Magersfontein] all squarely and xiii). unmistakably made this a modern war of the Not all share this view and the majority of twentieth century - right up to the guerrilla tactics South Africans remain to be convinced otherwise. used in the second stages of the war. The newly elected democratic government as well The book attempts to appeal to roughly two as a number of radical historians called for a boy‐ groups of readers: cott of the 100-year commemoration. One possible A] Those interested in a digestible general reason being that they saw the war as too distant portrayal of the war, with minimal prior knowl‐ to provide relief for the immediate trauma inflict‐ edge of the conflict or perhaps even no basic com‐ ed by years of struggle against apartheid. An inti‐ prehension of the episode at all. In this, Nasson mation of this was the very small amount of oral admits it is an attempt to squeeze quarts into pint tradition to be found in the search for the black pots (p. xiv). concentration camps. On the other hand White Afrikaner martyrdom was and still is based heavi‐ B] Those who have an outline grasp of the ly on concentration camp trauma during the war conflict, or even a grasp of some central detail. and passed down as a treasure trove of oral and Nasson would like to see in the ensuing perspec‐ written accounts. A hefty debate raged in Free tive that readers should fnd something over State Afrikaans newspapers in 1996 as to whether which to ponder or quibble. Greater understand‐ blacks had participated or been involved [even on ing of the war can only benefit from the critical the periphery] in the war. Some white Afrikaans judgement of readers as well as the continuing di‐ readers vehemently denied black participation or alogue of historians (p. xiv). involvement. Judging, however, from the fact that all dis‐ For Nasson it was undertaken partly because tances are given in miles the book is aimed main‐ no new general narrative treatment in English ly at the US market. It should be made more acces‐ has appeared since Thomas Pakenham in the sible to those places directly involved with the 1970s (p.xiii). Nasson does not try to emulate Pak‐ war, especially South Africa. This may help to dis‐ enham's work but does manage to bring in wider pel the myth of this being just another colonial research conducted on the war since Pakenham's war between two white groups. work appeared. Perhaps it is intimated that it Nasson incorporates his earlier work to show should be read as a plea from the novelist Kathy how involved in the war many of the black popu‐ Lette's Australian anti-heroine, Maddy Wolfe: 'go lation became (p.

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