Content Clause Construction in English

THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH

MASUHIRONOMURA University of California at San Diego

A content clause is a that-clause that is in apposition to a noun and expresses its content. The present paper is an attempt to consider what kinds of nouns can take a content clause and to explain how the content clause construction is related to some other similar constructions. It will be claimed that nouns interpretable as something composed of words can take a content clause and that the CONTAINER-CONTENT image- schema suggests a perspective from which to relate the content clause construction to the relative (adverbial) clause construction.*

0. Introduction The term "content clause" was originally employed by Jespersen (1927), and later redefined by Zandvoort (1965) as a that-clause in apposition to a noun and expressing its content (e.g. statement/belief/ news that S). It has occasionally been pointed out that Japanese learners of English tend to make the following kind of mistakes, presumably due to first language interference from the equivalent Japanese sentences:1 (1) *a picture that children are playing in the park (Egawa (1964: 20)) (2) *Looking at the appearance that the birds gradually build their nest- (Matsui (1979: 89))

* Portions of this paper were presented at the Eighth National Conference of the English Linguistic Society of Japan held at Rikkyo University in November 1990. I am grateful to Adele Goldberg, Yoshihiko Ikegami, Suzanne Kemmer, and Ronald Langacker for their valuable comments on earlier versions of the present paper. I am indebted to Charles W. Cushman and lots of students at UCSD for providing native-speaker judgements. Any remaining inadequacies are, of course, my re- sponsibility alone. 1 For a discussion of Japanese noun-modifying constructions, see Josephs (1976), Teramura (1980) and Matsumoto (1988). English Linguistics 10 (1993) 184-210 -184- (C)1993 by the English Linguistic Society of Japan THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 185

(3) *He noticed the smell that something was burning in the kitchen. (4) *John's success that his novel won the Pulitzer Prize surprised us. (5) *John's achievement that he mastered Chinese in a month is surprising. (6) *The videotape describes the crime that a burglar broke into the bank and shot the manager. These mistakes involve the use of a content clause with a head noun that cannot take a content clause. They suggest that there are some semantic restrictions on the noun that can take a content clause in English. There has not been, however, a work that gives a satisfactory account of the problem. For example, Quirk et al. (1985: 1260) note that "the head noun of the phrase must be a general abstract noun such as fact, idea, proposition, reply, remark, answer, and the like". It is obvious, however, that the characterization of that-taking nouns as a "general abstract noun" is quite insufficient, since the nouns in examples (4)-(6) may safely be assumed to be an instance of "general abstract noun".2 The aim of the present paper is to provide a semantic characterization of the nouns that can take a content clause and to explain how the content clause construction relates to some other constructions.

1. Motivations of the Construction 1.1. Assumptions Among the nouns that can take a content clause, some can be associated with a verb (or sometimes an adjective) that takes a that-clause (e.g. statement that Scomplement as their corresponding verbs. This means that when the verb takes a that-clause, its deverbal noun does the same.

2 For a list of that-taking nouns, see Bridgeman (1965), Higgins (1979), Ozawa (1955), and Watanabe (1966). 186 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

(8) The semantics of the content clause construction ("N that S") is based on the nominalization of "V that S". The non- deverbal nouns that satisfy this semantics (e.g. fact, idea, news, etc.) are attracted to the class of nouns that appear in "N that S".3 It follows from these assumptions that the semantic characterization of that-taking verbs will be an important clue as to the semantic characterization of the nouns that take a content clause.4

1.2. Categories of the Verbs that Take a That-Clause In this section, we aim to see what kinds of verbs can take a that- clause in English. Givon (1980) is the most comprehensive account of the relationship between verb semantics and complementation and I will assume his analysis without further discussion. Givon proposed the concept of "binding" to capture systematic and iconic correlations between the semantics of complement-taking verbs and the syntactic structure of their complements. The definition of "binding" goes as follows: (9) The stronger the influence exerted over the agent of the complement clause by the agent of the main-clause verb, by whatever means, the higher is the main-clause verb on the binding scale. (p. 335)5 The binding of the verb correlates inversely with the degree to which its complement appears syntactically similar to a main clause in terms of such parameters as case-marking, tense-aspect-modality, and predicate-raising: (10) The higher a verb is on the binding scale, the less would its complement tend to be syntactically coded as an independent/main clause. (p. 337) According to the positions of the verbs on the binding scale, Givon classifies verbs into three categories, namely, manipulative verbs (e.g.

3 This is a methodological assumption and is not intended as a diachronic statement. Historically, the content clause construction existed as early as in OE (see Mitchell (1985: 21) and Traugott (1992: 234-235) for some OE examples). 4 For traditional studies on the verbs and adjectives that take a that-clause, see Alexander and Kunz (1964) and Storms (1966). 5 Strictly speaking, this definition holds for manipulative verbs, and it has to be slightly modified for modality verbs and cognition-utterance verbs; see Givon (1980: 336-337, 342). THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 187

'order', 'cause', 'tell', 'force', etc.), modality verbs (e.g. 'want', 'suc- ceed', 'fail', 'start', 'intend', 'try', etc.) and cognition-utterance verbs (e.g. 'say', 'think', 'know', etc.), and concludes, with ample cross-linguistic data, that manipulative verbs and modality verbs occupy higher positions on the binding scale than cognition-utterance verbs (cf. I made [him go to Tokyo] vs. I tried [to go to Tokyo] vs. I think [that he went to Tokyo]).6 This means that cognition-utterance verbs are most likely to have their complement clause expressed as an independent/main clause, which is, in English, a that-clause. Cognition-utterance verbs are scaled according to the degree of "emotional commitment" of the main-clause subject/agent to the outcome encoded in the complement clause (pp. 336-337, 345):

(11) 'say'<'think'<'decide'<'hope'<'want''believe' 'agree' 'remember' 'know' 'expect' 'forget' This scale shows that 'say' is the lowest on the binding scale, which means that in English, say is the most typical verb that takes a that- clause.7 This is intuitively quite natural because the verb 'say' "involves simply quotation with no emotional commitment whatever" (p. 346). There is some additional evidence to suggest that 'say' is the lowest on the scale. First, in a number of languages, a low-binding complementizer (equivalent to English that) is derived from the verb 'say' (See Givon (1980: 338-346), Ransom (1988: 371), Saxena (1988), Heine et al. (1991: 216) for examples). Second, in a number of languages, 'say' behaves differently from other cognition-utterance verbs in terms of complementation. Consid- er: (12) a. He knew/thought/*said of her coming. b. He knew/thought/said that she came. (pp. 367-368) Comparing a nominal complement in (12a) with a sentential complement in (12b), Givon notes that the nominal complement "tends to be interpreted as 'presupposed' and in that sense expressing stronger

6 For cross-linguistic evidence, see Givon (1980:347-368). Words enclosed in single quotation marks are used as meta-language. 7 For a different view on the prototypicalthat-taking verb, see Wierzbicka(1988: 132-140),who argues that KNOW is more closely related to THAT complements than is SAY. 188 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993) certainty, which characterizes the higher portion of the epistemic-verb continuum" (p. 367). Unlike know and think, which can take both types, say can take only the sentential one. This suggests that say is situated lower on the binding scale than know and think.8 It can be concluded that say., or more broadly UTTERANCE verbs (say, state, remark, etc.) are the prototype of the that-taking verbs. I suggest that this prototype is extended to COGNITION verbs (know, believe, think, etc.), on the one hand, and EMOTION verbs (rejoice, lament, etc.) and MENTAL MANIPULATION verbs (deny, doubt, prove, etc.), on the other hand, in terms of the selection of a that- clause. The extension from UTTERANCE to COGNITION is motivated by our conception that thinking is internal speech. The following usage of say where say comes to mean "think" or "assume" is suggestive of this extension: (13) a. Let's go into business together; what do you say? (L) b. "I didn't tell a lie", she said to herself. (G) c. Let's say (that) he is lying, then what will you do? (G) With typical UTTERANCE verbs and COGNITION verbs, a that- clause constitutes the content of the verbal/cognitive activity. Thus, in (14), the that-clause constitues the content of Mary's saying/thinking. (14) Mary said/thought that John had not come. This use of a that-clause is considered to be basic: the that-clause expresses the content of the activity denoted by a verb as propositional information. This usage serves as a basis for extensions. I suggest that other uses of that-clauses are derived either from mentally manipu- lating a proposition or from emotionally reacting to a proposition. Bolinger (1984: 47) states: "That clauses (provided they have no modal, as in I desire that they would leave) presuppose INFORMATION. The information may be affirmed, doubted, denied, or emotionally reacted to, but there is always a representation of knowledge, which simply reflects the fact that a that clause is a proposition."9 What I have called "mentally manipulate a proposition" corresponds to Bolin- ger's notions "be affirmed, doubted, denied".

8 See Givon (1980:366-367) for similar phenomenain Ute and Sherpa. See also Munro (1982)for the low transitivityof the verb say in "say that S". 9 Cf. Wierzbicka(1988: 137) THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 189

Examples of mental manipulation of a proposition are the following: (15) a. They denied that their firm had been involved.10 b. I doubt that she will get the job. (L) c. She proved that it was false. (G) The that-clause in (15) does not constitute the content of "deny/ doubt/prove"; what these sentences mean is "NP deny/doubt/prove the truth of S". Examples of emotionally reacting to a proposition are the following: (16) Bill rejoiced/lamented that John had not come. Here, the notion conveyed by the that-clause induces the emotion, rather than the that-clause constituting the content of the emotion.11 There is a cline between COGNITION verbs and EMOTION verbs: (17) a. Mary thought that John had not come. b. Mary worried that John had not come. c. Mary rejoiced that John had not come. As you go down from (a) to (c), emotive overtones get stronger and the subject's control over the content of the complement clause gets weaker.12 To sum up what we have discussed thus far, we get the following picture for that-taking verbs:13

10 Compare this with "to object that S" (e.g. I wanted to climb the hill) but Bill objected that he was too tired (L), where it is not the case that "Bill objected to the truth of his being too tired"). 11 Cf. Wierzbicka's (1988: 136) analysis of "commentative" type (e.g. regret) vs. "epistemological" type of that-clauses (e. g. believe) 12 Bolinger's (1977: 143-151, 1984) contrast between EMOTIONS PROJECTED and EMOTIONS CAUSED might be relevant to characterize the difference between worry and rejoice. As for the position of emotive predicates on the binding scale, Givon (1980: 345) notes: "The position of truly presuppositional verbs on this scale, such as 'regret' or 'be happy', remains problematic. This is so because they involve no emotional commitment toward the event/state in the complement clause, but rather an emotional impact resulting from the event/state in the complement having already turned out to be true. One would suspect that these verbs may turn out to scale as low as 'know"'. 13 That-taking verbs could be classified into finer groups (see Bolinger (1972: 43-55) for example), but I assume this is enough for the present purpose. 190 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

(18) THINKING IS SAYING UTTERANCE COGNITION (say, state, remark, etc.) (think, know, believe,etc.) worry,fear, regret

mental manipulation of a emotional reaction to

a proposition a proposition

MENTAL MANIPULATION EMOTION (deny, doubt, prove, etc.) (rejoice, lament, etc.)

2. Categories of the Nouns that Take a Content Clause 2.1. The Prototypical Nouns that Take a Content Clause: UTTER- ANCE Nouns If the UTTERANCE verb say is the most typical verb that takes a that-clause, we should expect to find, given Assumption (7), that the typical nouns that take a content clause are UTTERANCE nouns, and that the category extends to COGNITION nouns, EMOTION nouns, and MENTAL MANIPULATION nouns. That is, that-taking nouns are expected to form the same configuration as that-taking verbs shown in (18). As a piece of evidence to postulate the parallelism between that-taking verbs and that-taking nouns, let us consider the following pairs of sentences: (19) a. He sent us a message that he was unable to come. b. He sent us a message saying (that said) that he was unable to come. (20) a. We adhere to the principle that everyone should be treated fairly. (B) b. We adhere to the principle asserting (that asserts) that everyone should be treated fairly. The above nouns, message and principle, can take a content clause as in the (a) sentences; at the same time, they can have an UTTERANCE verb (e.g. say, tell, assert, suggest, etc.) inserted before a that-clause, as in the (b) sentences.14 This suggests that the that of "N that S" may be

14 It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the Japanese content clause THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 191

the same as the that of "V that S". Thus, if UTTERANCE verbs are the most typical verbs that take a that-clause, it is natural that typical that-taking nouns also have something to do with UTTERANCE. The fact that both direct and indirect speech can appear in a content clause might lend additional support for the basicness of UTTER- ANCE nouns, since this distinction specifically concerns UTTER- ANCE: (21) a. How true is the old cliche that "A friend in need is a friend indeed"? b. How true is the old cliche that trouble shows us who our friends really are? (C) (22) a. Pullum's (1986, p. 409) remark that 'If you believe in Small Clauses you probably eat steak with a spoon' (A. Radford, Transformational Grammar, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 599) b. She made the remark that being interviewed was bor- ing. (B) The following are examples where UTTERANCE nouns that are associated with UTTERANCE verbs take a content clause:15 (23) a. She has issued a statement that she intends to be a candidate. (B) b. There is an old saying that time is money. (K) c. We have received information that they may have left the country. (L) d. We have heard reports that the road is closed. (B) e. His explanation that he had been held up by the traffic didn't seem very plausible. (L) f. They kept their promise that the debt would be repaid promptly. (B) g. The negotiators came to an agreement that all troops would be withdrawn. (B) h. She agreed, but with the stipulation that she be allowed

construction is expressed as "S to yuu N", where to is a complementizer and yuu means "say". Cross-linguistic research on how the content clause construction is expressed will be a future task. 15 Some of the nouns below have the same form as their corresponding verbs (e.g. promise, report, command). I assume that they are deverbal nouns with zero- derivation. 192 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

a share in the profits.16 (L) i. We obeyed their command that prisoners (should) be treated properly. (B) j. She left instructions that her estate (should) be divided evenly. (B) It is well known that nominalization involves ambiguities between a "result" reading and a "process" reading (Grimshaw (1990: 49)): (24) a. The examination was. on the table. (result) b. The examination of the patients took a long time. (process) In (a), examination refers to a concrete entity, whereas in (b) it refers to an event. The addition of an adjective like constant or frequent forces a process reading (Grimshaw (1990: 50)): (25) a. The assignment is to be avoided. b. *The constant assignment is to be avoided. c. The constant assignment of unsolvable problems is to be avoided. The fact that frequent/constant cannot appear in (26) suggests that the nouns that have a content clause are result nominals (cf. Stowell (1981: 200), Grimshaw (1990: 74)): (26) a. *Their frequent/constant announcement that they were the greatest eventually became tiresome. b. *His frequent/constant statement that he was about to resign was intended to mislead. (Grimshaw (1990: 75-76)) When an UTTERANCE verb undergoes nominalization, the deverbal noun in the "result" reading acquires the meaning "the product of a process of UTTERANCE", or more specifically, SOMETHING COM- POSED OF WORDS (e.g. say>saying, state>statement, inform>information, complain>complaint, etc.). I suggest, therefore, the following hypothesis: (27) Nouns that are interpretable as SOMETHING COM- POSED OF WORDS can take a content clause. The following nouns do not have an associated verb or adjective, but are interpretable as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS and take a content clause (cf. Assumption (8)):

16 See Chiba (1987)for a list of subjunctive-taking verbs and nouns. THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 193

(28) a. She sent us word that the football match had been called off. (G) b. I now saw the truth of the proverb that time is money. (K) c. Have you heard the news that the border has been closed? (B) d. We heard a rumor that she was back in town. (B) e. They accepted the excuse that I had been ill.17 (B) f. She gave her oath that she would not drink. (G) g. The two governments signed a pact that they would jointly defend their borders. (B) h. She will join us on condition that you also be there. (B) i. The government issued an edict that all prisoners would be released. (B) j. The court issued an injunction that picketing (should) not take place. (B) The above nouns in (23) and (28) are clear instances of SOME- THING COMPOSED OF WORDS; for example, it is obvious that statement, promise, rumor, news, proverb, etc. are composed of words. Note, however, that I stated in (27) that nouns that are "interpretable" as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS can take a content clause. The following nouns can take a content clause because they are "interpretable" as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS: (29) a. I can't believe the latest statistics that 30% of the people support the government. b. She put her finger to her lips as a sign that we should be quiet. (L) For instance, statistics refers to a collection of numbers, not words; however, we can extract verbal meaning out of these numbers. Thus, statistics is interpretable as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS and can take a content clause. Besides the nouns in (23) and (28), UTTERANCE nouns such as the following, interpreted as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS, can take a content clause: (30) remark, comment, advice, announcement, declaration, pro- nouncement, proclamation, admission, avowal, confession, pledge, vow, assurance, guarantee, warning, caution, threat,

17 Cf. *to excusethat S 194 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

claim, charge, argument, assertion, allegation, predication, contention, protestation, acknowledgement, objection, complaint, bargain, consensus, understanding, pretext, plea, pre- tense, answer, response, reply, rejoinder, notice, reminder, ultimatum, caveat, signal, wind, whisper, talk, tale, story, tip, message, scoop, note, call, letter, telegram, fax, dictum, ex- pression, adage, maxim, aphorism, cliche, precept, moral, lesson, motto, slogan, metaphor, metonymy, irony, joke, lie, record, provision, constraint, specification, convention, pro- viso, rule, law, order, demand, direction, directive, decree, recommendation, proposition, suggestion, proposal, motion, requirement, insistence, regulation, request, etc.

2.2. Extensions from the Prototype The previous section has shown that nouns of UTTERANCE, in other words, nouns interpretable as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS, typically take a content clause. In this section, we aim to see extensions from this prototype, namely, cases where COGNITION nouns, MENTAL MANIPULATION nouns, and EMOTION nouns take a content clause.

2.2.1. COGNITION Nouns COGNITION nouns can be semantically classified into three types: (i) TYPICAL COGNITION nouns, (ii) FACT-type nouns, and (iii) CHARACTERISTIC-type nouns.

2.2.1.1. TYPICAL COGNITION Nouns With TYPICAL COGNITION nouns, a head noun expresses a product of mental activity and its that-clause specifies its content. The nouns in (31) are associated with that-taking verbs or adjectives, while the nouns in (32) aren't, but are semantically motivated to take a content clause: (31) a. The thought that we would soon reach home gave us courage. (B) b. The conception that the superpowers must fight is dangerous. (B) c. She started taking money from her employer, in the mistaken belief that she would not be discovered. (L) d. I have every confidence that she will pass the examina- THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 195

tion. (G) e. I had an eery feeling that I had been there before. (B) f. They believe the teaching that they are superior to others. g. He cherishes the old recollection/remembrance that he was the richest man in the village. h. our mistaken assumption that the price would fall (L) i. I repeat my judgment that he was to blame. (B) j. I understand your fear(s) that you may be discovered. (G) (32) a. This discovery disproved the idea that the world was flat. (L) b. We tried to dispel the notion that benefits would be cur- tailed. (B) c. She expressed her opinion that a compromise would be reached. (B) d. The experience gave me faith that people can change. (C) e. I have a hunch that she didn't really want to go. (L) f. They believed the doctrine/dogma/creed/tenet that they are superior to others. g. Instead, he planted in them the false memory that the object had been sent to them directly from the other person, via a marvelous mechanism in the hub. (Reddy (1979: 307)) h. She advanced the hypothesis that the disease was spread by rodents. (B) i. They appealed the court's verdict that fraud had been committed. (B) j. We had misgivings that he would back out of the agreement. (B) The basic, though hardly clear-cut, difference between UTTER- ANCE nouns and TYPICAL COGNITION nouns is that the former express a product of verbal activity (whether spoken or written), while the latter express a product of mental, cognitive activity. For example, vow can be classified as an UTTERANCE noun when it is physi- cally uttered, but it can be classified as a COGNITION noun if it is made in one's mind. The motivation behind the extension from UTTERANCE nouns to COGNITION nouns is the same as in the case 196 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993) of verbs (see 1.2). Besides the nouns in (31) and (32), COGNITION nouns such as the following can take a content clause: (33) perception, image, realization, recognition, reflection, disclo- sure, revelation, finding, discovery, knowledge, conscious- ness, awareness, intuition, insight, wisdom, experience, meaning, sense, point, pessimism, optimism, persuasion, trust, principle, ethic, philosophy, theory, conviction, certainty, sentiment, view, attitude, position, viewpoint, standpoint, ground, concept, impression, misunderstanding, mis- apprehension, preconception, misconception, stereotype, fan- tasy, delusion, illusion, obsession, myth, legend, superstition, foreboding, forecast, prophecy, inkling, fancy, hope, anti- cipation, implication, hint, sign, suspicion, presumption, postulate, supposition, presupposition, premise, guess, con- jecture, surmise, speculation, reasoning, deduction, estimate, calculation, confirmation, conclusion, generalization, deci- sion, ruling, resolution, dream, desire, wish, prayer, sensa- tion, anxiety, concern, apprehension, worry, regret, etc.

2.2.1.2. FACT-Type Nouns This type of nouns concerns a speaker's assessment of an event/state. "Fact", "possibility", etc. do not exist independently of a speaker's COGNITION, which is conceptualized as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS. The following two meanings of the word hope are suggestive of the connection between TYPICAL COGNITION nouns and FACT-type nouns:18 (34) a. We've postponed the game until Monday in the hope that the weather will improve. (L) (in the hope that= hoping that) b. Is there any hope that she will recover? (L) (hope=possibility) Here are some examples of this class of nouns: (35) a. There is a possibility/probability that the storm will hit La Jolla. b. There is every likelihood that she'll come.19(B) 18 The same kind of semanticshift can be observedin expectationand fear. 19 It might be the case that possibility/probability/likelihood that S is motivated by it is possible/probable/likely that S. THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 197

c. There is no chance that she will win. (B) d. There is a good prospect that he will get well. (G) e. There was a danger that fire would break out. (B) f. The fact that you haven't got these qualifications doesn't necessarily mean you won't be able to enter the university.20 (L) g. He came to realize the truth that time is money. h. John quit school, giving the reason that he had to work to support his family.21 i. Nobody predicted the outcome/result that we would end up getting married.22 j. This had the unexpected consequence that everybody resigned. (K)

2.2.1.3. CHARACTERISTIC-Type Nouns As the third type of COGNITION nouns, some nouns that characterize a thing or a person can take a content clause: (36) a. Water has the property that it changes into steam at 100 degrees centigrade. b. Successful businessmen have the characteristic that they are very ambitious. c. This version of the morpheme alternant theory has the virtue that it no longer treats the different alternants of a morpheme as being totally unrelated in structure. (M. Kenstowicz and C. Kisseberth, Generative Phonol- ogy, Academic Press, 1979, p. 188) d. This plan has the genius that it satisfies both employers and employees.

20 Despite today's high frequency with which fact appears with a content clause (cf. Meyer (1992: 22)), the combination fact that S appeared quite late in history: the first citation of fact that S in OED2 is in 1803. See Jespersen (1927) and Waka- tabe (1968) for the functional motivation of the appearance of fact that S. 21 In (35h), the that-clause constitutes the CONTENT of "the reason". Consid- er, on the other hand, the following sentence: (i) The reason that Miami has so many amusement places is obvious. (G) In (i), the that-clause is the EFFECT, not the CONTENT, of "the reason". Hence the that-clause in (i) is not a content clause, but a relative adverbial clause, where that can be replaced by why. 22 Outcome and result are judged by Higgins (1979: 368) as those that cannot take a that-clause. 198 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

e. Newton's theory also has the great advantage that it is much simpler to work with than Einstein's! (S.W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time, Bantam Books, 1988, p. 11) f. His theory has the defect/shortcoming/weakness/limitation that it cannot fully account for these facts. g. This theory has the merit that it enables one to formu- late problems which would otherwise have passed un- observed. The that-clause of this type of nouns expresses a speaker's conception of a thing or a person. For example, it is a speaker's knowledge that water changes into steam at 100 degrees centigrade. In this respect, this type of nouns is related to TYPICAL COGNITION nouns. Be- sides the above nouns, nouns such as the following can be considered to be included in this category:23 (37) feature, quality, beauty, disadvantage, handicap, etc.

2.2.2. MENTAL MANIPULATION Nouns This class of nouns corresponds to the verbs in (15), where a proposition is mentally operated on. The following are deverbal nouns of this class of verbs: (38) a. The prosecutor furnished convincing proof that the accused could have been at the scene of the crime. (B) b. They issued a denial that their firm had been involved. (B) c. She expressed doubt that they would finish on time. (B) The that-clause of this type does not constitute the content of a head noun. Thus, our explanation that the nouns that take a content clause are those interpretable as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS does not apply to this class of nouns. Some of the nouns of this type take two complement sentences (cf. Higgins (1979: 136-137)): (39) The best proof/evidence/indication/demonstration that John was not lying is that he was here last night.

23 Higgins (1979:367-368) classifies most of the nouns in (36) and (37), namely, property, quality, genius, advantage, disadvantage, handicap, limitation, defect, shortcoming, weakness, merit, virtue, and beauty, into the category that cannot take a content clause. THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 199 2.2.3. EMOTION Nouns EMOTION nouns can take a that-clause. I assume that the motivation whereby EMOTION nouns can take a that-clause is the same as in the case of EMOTION verbs: the proposition expressed by a that- clause can be emotionally reacted to. Here are some examples where EMOTION nouns are used with a that-clause: (40) a. He expressed his happiness/delight/joy that he had passed the exam. b. They felt resentment (indignation, exasperation, impa- tience) that nobody paid attention to their request. (B) c. He could not hide his irritation that he had not been in- vited. (B) d. His annoyance that he had been awakened so early was evident. (B) e. She expressed grief/sadness/sorrow that her son had died. f. They expressed astonishment (shock, surprise) that I won the election. (B) g. They felt satisfaction that a fair compromise had been reached. (B) h. She expressed her chagrin (disappointment) that the bill had been voted down. (B) i. He expressed his gratitude/thankfulness that he had escaped without harm. j. his dread that the child would be infected with the disease. (C) k. "..., many of us lose our momentum for academic pur- suit and tend to live merely with the foolish pride that we are Todai students." (Time, Nov. 20, 1989, p. 54) Some of these EMOTION nouns are associated with a that-taking adjective or verb (e.g. happiness that

24 We have seen two cases, namely, MENTAL MANIPULATION nouns and 200 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

3. Additional Support In section 2, it has been argued that the nouns that take a content clause are those interpretable as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS. In this section, we will see two additional pieces of evidence supporting this hypothesis.

3.1. Polysemous Words and Complement Selection The first piece of evidence concerns the following pairs of sentences, which involve polysemous words: (41) a. *Mary painted a picture that her children were playing in the park. b. I'm afraid this book might give you the false picture that Japan is a place of crimes and debauchery. (42) a. *This cloth has the pattern that red threads and blue threads cross each other. b. The research revealed the pattern that fewer and fewer young people return to their hometowns after gradua- tion. (43) a. *Mary admired the beauty that innumerable flowers were blooming all over the garden. b. Newton's theory has the beauty that it is much simpler to work with than Einstein's. In the (a) sentences, the words picture, pattern, and beauty express THE OBJECT OF (VISUAL) PERCEPTION, which cannot be conceived of as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS; hence they cannot take a content clause. On the other hand, in the (b) sentences, these nouns are used as COGNITION nouns: they are respectively close to "idea", "fact", and "characteristic" in meaning. Hence they can take a content clause.

3.2. Discrepancies in Complement Selection The second piece of support comes from the cases where there are discrepancies between a verb and its deverbal noun as to their selection

EMOTION nouns, where (27) does not apply. It is a matter of terminology whether we apply the term "content clause" to the that-clausespreceded by these nouns. THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 201 of a complement-clause: (44) a. *He criticized that modern economics is too theoretical. b. I agree with his criticism that modern economics is too theoretical. (45) a. *Mary accused that the mayor had accepted the bribes. b. Mary's accusation that the mayor had accepted the bribes surprised us all. (46) a. *He analyzed that the cause of the accident was drunken driving. b. I am not convinced by his analysis that the cause of the accident was drunken driving. (47) a. *Socrates defined that human beings are rational animals. b. Some people still accept Socrates' definition that human beings are rational animals. (48) a. *He prohibited that we should not smoke there. b. They ignored the prohibition that they should not smoke there. The verbs in the (a) sentences take a direct object NP as their argument structure and cannot take a that-clause. On the other hand, the deverbal nouns in the (b) sentences can take a content clause, because the acts of criticism, accusation, analysis, definition, and prohibition normally involve speech (spoken or written), so that these nouns are interpretable as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS.

4. Related Constructions 4.1. The "N be that S" Construction Reddy (1979) has pointed out that when we talk about our com- munication, we use what he calls "the conduit metaphor", in which words are conceptualized as a container and thoughts and feelings as its content: (49) a. Try to pack more thoughts into fewer words. b. That thought is in practically every other word. c. I don't get any feelings of anger out of his words. (pp. 287-288) The conduit metaphor seems to provide a clue to the understanding of the content clause construction. We have characterized the typical nouns that take a content clause as those interpretable as SOME- THING COMPOSED OF WORDS. Since words are likely to be con- 202 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

ceptualized as a container for thoughts and feelings, as the conduit metaphor suggests, we can hypothesize that the relationship between a head noun and its content clause is that of CONTAINER-CONTENT, as in: (50) John's opinion that money changes everything CONTAINER CONTENT This relationship holds for UTTERANCE nouns and COGNITION nouns. The semantic relationship between an EMOTION noun and its that-clause and the semantic relationship between a MENTAL MA- NIPULATION noun and its that-clause are considered to be as follows: (51) John's anger that he was not chosen EFFECT CAUSE (52) Their denial that their firm had been involved MENTALMANIPULATION OBJECTOF MENTAL MANIPULATION This semantic difference gives rise to the difference of acceptability in the "N be that S" construction: (50)' John's opinion is that money changes everything. (51)' *John's anger was that he was not chosen. (Higgins (1979: 132)) (52)' *Their denial was that their firm had been involved. As Higgins (1979: 150) points out, the "N be that S" construction has a specificational reading in which the predicate complement specifies the content of the subject NP.25 The COGNITION noun opinion has a content that can be specified by the predicate complement; hence the acceptability of (50)'. On the other hand, the EMOTION noun anger and the MENTAL MANIPULATION noun denial do not have a content that can be specified; hence the impossibility of (51)' and (52)'.26 UTTERANCE nouns and COGNITION nouns generally can appear in both the "N that S" construction and the "N be that S" construction, presumably because "N that S" and "N be that S" have in common that "that S" specifies the CONTENT of N. An exception I can think of is insistence:27 (53) a. Mary's insistence that we should leave

25 See, for example, Inada (1989: 99) for the contrast between a predicational sense and a specificational sense of be. 26 Doubt behaves the same as denial. Compare (38c) with: *Her doubt was that they would finish on time. It is not the case, however, that all MENTAL MA- NIPULATION nouns cannot appear in the "N be that S" construction; see (39). 27 Stowell (1981: 206) and Grimshaw (1990: 98) claim that awareness (Stowell) and knowledge (Grimshaw) cannot occur in the "N be that S" construction; how- THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 203

b. *Mary's insistence is that we should leave. (Higgins (1979: 132)) On the other hand, there are some nouns that can appear in the "N be that S" construction but not in the "N that S" construction: (54) a. *the upshot that we were not admitted b. The upshot was that we were not admitted. (Higgins (1979: 134)) (55) a. *We still talk about the wonder that she survived the plane crash. b. The wonder is that she survived the plane crash. (56) a. *Mary had the misfortune that she broke her arm soon after she had broken her leg. b. Mary's misfortune was that she broke her arm soon after she had broken her leg. The "N be that S" construction seems to allow nouns that are less easy to interpret as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS, and I surmise that this could be attributable to the specificational character of be.28 To summarize the relationship between the two constructions: (57) N that S N be that S

UTTERANCE nouns UTTERANCE nouns COGNITION nouns COGNITION nouns

doubt, denial, upshot, wonder insistence, etc. misfortune, EMOTION nouns greatness, etc.

ever, they can appear in this construction in an appropriate context: (i) The general awareness we have is that smoking is harmful. (ii) The knowledge ancient people had was that the sun moved around the earth. 28 Cf. Higgins (1979: 363-370). It was discussed in the 1970s whether these two constructions should be associated transformationally or not (see Chomsky (1972: 33) and Higgins (1979: Ch. 4)). For more recent treatment of these two constructions in the generative literature, see Stowell (1981: 197-207) and Grimshaw (1990: Ch. 3). 204 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993)

4.2. The Relative (Adverbial) Clause Construction Next, to support the hypothesis that the typical content clause construction has the semantic structure (50), let us consider the similarity between the content clause construction and the relative clause construction involving in which or where. Consider first the following sentences: (58) We now have the strange situation that nobody wants to become Prime Minister. (59) This example illustrates the case that supply is not always determined by demand. The problem is whether the that-clauses in (58) and (59) are content clauses or relative adverbial clauses. A relative adverbial that-clause typically follows a noun that expresses PLACE:29 (60) I saw the place that John lived. I will put the that-clauses in (58) and (59) to the following two tests to determine their status: (61) If a that-clause is a relative adverbial clause, that can be replaced by in which or where: e.g. I saw the place that John lived. →I saw the place {in which/where} John lived.30 (62) If a that-clause is a content clause whose head noun is an UTTERANCE noun or a COGNITION noun, it can appear in the "N be that S" construction (cf. (57)): e.g. Mary's belief that Bill is innocent→Mary's belief is that Bill is innocent. (Notice that a relative adverbial that-clause cannot appear after be: *The place is that John lived.) The that-clauses in (58) and (59) pass Test (61), because the that in (58) and (59) can be replaced by in which or where, and also semantically their head nouns can be construed as ABSTRACT PLACE: (58)' We now have the strange situation {in which/where nobody wants to become Prime Minister. (59)' This example illustrates the case {in which/where} supply is not always determined by demand. The that-clauses in (58) and (59) also pass Test (62):

29 See Van der Auwera (1985) for the relative adverb that. 30 I disregard the subtle semantic difference between in which and where in the present paper, as it is of little relevance to the argument here. See Nagahara (1990: 153-160) for the difference between the two. THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 205

(58)" The strange situation we now have is that nobody wants to become Prime Minister. (59)" The case this example illustrates is that supply is not always determined by demand. The above results of the two tests suggest that the that-clauses in (58) and (59) have two different interpretations, namely, the relative adverbial clause reading and the content clause reading. Are these two interpretations mutually exclusive or compatible with each other? I claim that the latter is the case. We have characterized the typical relationship between a head noun and its content clause as CONTAINER-CONTENT, which can be di- agramed as follows: (63) NP that S CONTAINER=NP

CONTENT=that S

The relationship between a head noun expressing PLACE and its relative clause beginning with in which or where, on the other hand, can be illustrated as follows (The in of in which explicitly indicates that its head noun is conceived of as a container): (64) NP where/in which S PLACE=NP

where/in which S

Figure (63) shows that CONTAINER(=NP) is filled with CON- TENT (=that S), whereas Figure (64) shows that something happens or exists (=S) in PLACE (=NP). It is now clear from these two figures that the content clause construction and the relative clause construction involving in which or where are similar in that they both make use of the spatial CONTAINER image-schema, which provides the motivation 206 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993) whereby the same that is used for both a content clause and a relative adverbial clause.31,32 To sum up, the "N that S" construction forms the following gradation from the typical content clause construction to the typical relative adverbial construction, with "situation/case that S" being situated in-between: (65) N that S relative adverbial content clause clause place situation statement case, etc. news, idea, etc. In addition to situation and case, which are relatively easy to regard as expressing ABSTRACT PLACE, nouns such as the following can take both a content clause and a relative clause, with a slight difference in meaning:33 (66) a. Last night Mary had the dream that she travelled through space. b. Last night Mary had the dream {in which/where} she travelled through space. (67) a. The occurrence of the word "Death" in the line suggests the reading that what she declines to stop is her life's journey.

31 For image-schema, see Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987). 32 In his discussion of reference-point constructions, Langacker (1993: 34) makes a comment on relative clause constructions: "It is sometimes claimed that the noun modified by a relative clause functions as a topic with respect to it [...]. We can interpret this as saying that the head noun serves as a reference point and thus defines a dominion in which the content of the relative clause must be integrated. The most obvious kind of integration involves construing the head noun's profile as a central participant in the subordinate-clause relationship". We may extend his idea to the content clause construction, where the head noun only serves to define a dominion (which is, in this case, comparable to CONTAINER in our discussion) for the content clause, without acting as a participant in the integration with the subordinate-clause. Note that it is cognitively natural for CONTAINER to serve as a reference point for CONTENT (e.g. The kettle is boiling). The head noun of a relative clause involving in which or where provides a "setting" (in the sense of Langacker (1991: 345-355)) for the clause. The content clause construction and the relative clause construction involving in which or where are similar in that the head noun's profile is not construed as a central participant in the integration with the subordinate-clause. 33 That of a content clause cannot always be replaced by in which or where. Thus, it is necessary to inquire under what circumstances this replacement is possible as in the cases of (66) and (67). THE SEMANTICS OF THE CONTENT CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH 207

(G. Lakoff and M. Turner, More than Cool Reason, University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 4) b. The occurrence of the word "Death" in the line suggests the reading {in which/where} what she declines to stop is her life's journey. I would say that the difference between the sentence with a content clause and the sentence with a relative clause is shown in the Figures (63) and (64).34 Taking (66) as an example, "she travelled through space" is the dream itself in (66a), while it is part of the dream in (66b).

5. Conclusion What kinds of nouns can take a content clause has been an unsettled question. The present paper has shown that the typical nouns that take a content clause are not random, but can be characterized as those interpretable as SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS. This characterization explains UTTERANCE nouns and COGNI- TION nouns. EMOTION nouns and MENTAL MANIPULATION nouns are different from these two in their relationship between a head noun and its that-clause, which, I claim, is responsible for the fact that they are unable to appear in the "N be that S" construction. Reddy's (1979) "conduit metaphor" has led us to the hypothesis that the relationship between a head noun and its content clause has the spatial CONTAINER-CONTENT image-schema in the typical case. This perspective has provided a natural explanation for why a that-

34 Let us consider the following examples involving the word story: (i) *John wrote the story that Mark travels around the world with his dog. (ii) Have you heard the story that this house is haunted by ghosts? As the above examples indicate, story in the sense of "fictitious tale" (henceforth, story1) cannot take a content clause, while story in the sense of "rumor" (henceforth, story2) can. Story1 is undoubtedly SOMETHING COMPOSED OF WORDS. Then, why is (i) impossible? My speculation is that the container for story, is too big to be filled with a content clause, because story, includes a variety of events. Hence that in (i) should be replaced by in which or where. On the other hand, the container for story2 can be filled adequately with a content clause. The same thing can be said about myth in the sense of "ancient story" and in the sense of "widely believed but false idea". The unacceptability of "*book that S", "*essay that S" may be explained along the same line. 208 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 10 (1993) clause can, in some cases, be ambiguous between the content clause reading and the relative adverbial reading, and also for why the content clause that can sometimes be replaced by in which or where.

Abbreviations

B=The BBI Combinatory Dictionary of English, John Benjamins, Amster- dam, 1986. C=Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, Collins, London, 1987. G=Taishukan's Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Taishukan, Tokyo, 1988. K=Kenkyusha's New Collegiate English-Japanese Dictionary, 5th ed., Ken- kyusha, Tokyo, 1985. L=Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, new ed., Longman, Lon- don, 1987.

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