Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis Laniran and Adenikinju

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis Laniran and Adenikinju COVID-19: Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis Laniran and Adenikinju Commonalities in Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic Temitope Laniran1 and Adeola Adenikinju2; 1Central Bank of Nigeria, 2Centre for Petroleum, Energy Economics and Law, University of Ibadan 1.0 Introduction The outbreak of Coronavirus in December 2019 which started from a small city called Wuhan in China has an epidemic and subsequently spread to become a global pandemic barely three months after, this pandemic also has an adverse effect on many countries economy and it has affected the economy globally. It has caused the closures of businesses, the stoppage of factory outputs, and the disruption to global manufacturing industries and their supply networks. The economic shock propagates downstream to customers through lack of supplies, and upstream to suppliers through lack of demand. The challenge faced by economies around the world now is mostly a struggle between lives and livelihoods. The pandemic has crushed hopes for stronger growth on the backdrop of previously expected output gains for the year 2020. The initial shock has continued to intensify through familiar channels from past severe downturns and crises. Financial markets are sharply repricing with the increase in uncertainty and the sudden materialization of extensive disruptions to economic activity. The flight to safe assets and rush to liquidity have put upward pressure on borrowing costs and credit has become more scarce, aggravating financial strains. This has led to a downward revision of global economic outlook for the year 2020. The International Monetary fund (IMF) expects the 2020 world growth to be below 2.9 per cent rate for 2019 and argues that the world might just witness the slowest economic growth pace since the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Trade wars pushed global growth last year to the lowest rates since 2009. Tensions between the USA and China as well as oil price tensions 1 Dr Laniran is with the Monetary Policy Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria. 2 Professor Adenikinju is Director, Centre for Petroleum, Energy Economics and Law, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 1 | P a g e CPEEL’s Covid-19 Discussion Papers Series COVID-19: Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis Laniran and Adenikinju between oil giants Saudi Arabia and Russia among other major international economic issues led to very volatile global economic terrain for the year 2019. While the exact economic implication of the tensions is yet to fully manifest, the implications of an ongoing global pandemic only leave the globe in a more precarious state. Perhaps, there is no worse time than now for the global economy to be hit by a pandemic than after a very volatile 2019. A global recession is almost inevitable as countries begin to count their losses to the outbreak. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to provide an overview of how countries, global institutions as well as international figures have responded to the pandemic. It also seek to evaluate if there is a commonality in policy responses to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the looming 2020 economic crisis. The latter part of this work tend to highlight the following: The current state of the economy, global responses to the 2007-2009 global recession, the COVID- 19 pandemic, the looming and global recession, the commonalities of both global events and finally the concluding section which summarizes the paper 2.0 State of the Global Economy Global economic growth since the last recession about a decade ago has remained sluggish. The global economy has continued to struggle with its recovery from the global economic meltdown of 2007-2009. On one hand, it is possible to argue that since the great recession of 1930s, the world had not been hit with any economic challenge as momentous as that of 2007- 2009. The recovery, on the other hand, has not been very encouraging as global growth has been very slow and lingering as seen in figure 1: Figure 1: Global Growth 2000-2020 2 | P a g e CPEEL’s Covid-19 Discussion Papers Series COVID-19: Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis Laniran and Adenikinju 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 Advanced EMDEs Global Source: World Economic Outlook, 2020 By 2019 global growth was barely above 2 per cent. This growth was however, encumbered with a lot of economic bottlenecks that challenged future growth opportunities. A lot of developing economies are deeply indebted, continued trade wars between global economic powers and a commodity market crash has culminated in a struggling global economy. While most economic recessions are often preceded by a “Minsky moment” before the bubble bursts as witnessed in the 2007-2009 recession, the global economy is perhaps at the eve of another recession due to the pandemic that has almost completely shut down the globe. Global growth is mostly driven by the performance of the largest economies in a highly interconnected global economy. Most of the large economies have barely been able to sustain growth since the last recession, except a few such as China and recently the United States. The Chinese economy which was perhaps, the fastest growth experienced among the large economies grew at an annual range of 6 to 9 per cent between 2010 to 2019, compared to its pre-crisis period when its growth peaked at 14 per cent in 2007. However, the post-crisis growth was adequate to sustain the Chinese poverty alleviation campaign, and a growing middle-class. China’s post-crisis growth has been mostly driven by a 2009 stimulus programme of USD586 billion, one of the largest in economic history, which focused on public infrastructure investment in high-speed rail, airports and road upgrades and has also underpinned growth in economies dependent upon Chinese demand for their exports. Other members of the critically acclaimed emerging front-liners “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia and South Africa) barely grew above 1.5 per cent in recent times. In the case of South Africa, it is 3 | P a g e CPEEL’s Covid-19 Discussion Papers Series COVID-19: Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis Laniran and Adenikinju witnessing its weakest economic growth since the global financial crisis. It slid into a 2nd recession in the space of two years by the last quarter of 2019, due to electricity cuts and drop in business confidence. A combination of these factors had adverse implications for output as well as a worsening effect for an already existing unemployment crisis. The non-performing economy and the resultant drop in revenue collection also had an impact on the fiscal ability of the South African government, putting it in its worst position since 1994. The US recovery has been mostly slow by historic standards, however, in 2018 an impressive growth of 2.9 per cent was witnessed. This was largely due to tax cuts, which dramatically stimulated corporate profits. While it is important that some level of growth has been recorded in the American economy, it is, however, more important to note that this has come at some costs. For example, the federal reserves have had to maintain a loose policy regime for a significant period. Furthermore, real average American wages in 2018 had the same purchasing power as 40 years ago, and corporate debt has reached a record level (45 per cent of GDP). The Eurozone has continued to struggle, growing by just 1.8 per cent in 2018. Germany marginally missed a recession in the last quarter of 2018, with zero growth recorded for the period. Italy returned to negative growth and the UK growth in 2018 was its weakest since 2012, and output fell by 0.4 per cent in December. Japan’s growth has been low but stable, given its rapidly ageing population which declined by more than 400,000 in 2018 alone. It is clear that while the global economy experienced has on the whole barely struggled to sustain growth since the last recession. In 2018 there was a significant slowdown globally which has continued to linger through 2019. The world has unfortunately been locked down by a new pandemic at a time the global economy is not very favourable. Policymakers are faced with really challenging times as governments have significantly lost fiscal space and room for manoeuvring owing to debt crises and monetary authorities having mostly maintained very low monetary policy rates since 2008. The lingering abysmal economic performance has mostly been channelled towards the quest for a new world order mostly in the advanced world. This is evident in the rise of the populist far-right and anti-globalisation /free-market ideologies. This has led to the rise of Donald Trump and Brexit. Other regions of the Eurozone such as Italy have witnessed protests that would almost inherently imply a collapse of the Eurozone, which indeed has been the least performing part of the world since the 2007-2009 recession. 4 | P a g e CPEEL’s Covid-19 Discussion Papers Series COVID-19: Policy Responses to Global Financial Crisis Laniran and Adenikinju These populist ideologies are mostly anti-free trade and support boundaries such as the famous “Trump wall” and Brexit. They are mostly nationalist in thinking and believe that the national interest of individual countries should supersede global agendas. They almost suggest that the continued underperformance of their domestic economy is a direct cost of prosperity elsewhere. 3.0 Responses to Global Recession 2007-2009 Before the global financial crisis, there was an almost uninterrupted upward trend in real estate prices, particularly in the United States and western economies. While what led to the boom remains a subject of debate, however, there appears to be a consensus on the role of financial innovation in the form of asset securitization, government policies to increase homeownership, global imbalances, expansionary monetary policy, and weak regulatory oversight played an important role (see for example, Keys et al., 2010; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; and Taylor, 2009).
Recommended publications
  • The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008-2009 and Developing Countries
    THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2008-2009 AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Edited by Sebastian Dullien Detlef J. Kotte Alejandro Márquez Jan Priewe UNITED NATIONS New York and Geneva, December 2010 ii Note Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNCTAD secretariat. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Material in this publication may be freely quoted; acknowl edgement, however, is requested (including reference to the document number). It would be appreciated if a copy of the publication containing the quotation were sent to the Publications Assistant, Division on Globalization and Development Strategies, UNCTAD, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10. UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/2010/1 UNITeD NatioNS PUblicatioN Sales No. e.11.II.D.11 ISbN 978-92-1-112818-5 Copyright © United Nations, 2010 All rights reserved THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS O F 2008-2009 AND DEVELOPING COUN T RIES iii CONTENTS Abbreviations and acronyms ................................................................................xi About the authors
    [Show full text]
  • Nber Working Paper Series Banking Crises
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES BANKING CRISES: AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY MENACE Carmen M. Reinhart Kenneth S. Rogoff Working Paper 14587 http://www.nber.org/papers/w14587 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 2008 The authors are grateful to Vincent Reinhart, Keyu Jin, Tarek Hassan, Vania Stavrakeva for useful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft, and to Cesar Sosa, Chenzi Xu and Jan Zilinsky for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2008 by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff NBER Working Paper No. 14587 December 2008 JEL No. E6,F3,N0 ABSTRACT The historical frequency of banking crises is quite similar in high- and middle-to-low-income countries, with quantitative and qualitative parallels in both the run-ups and the aftermath. We establish these regularities using a unique dataset spanning from Denmark's financial panic during the Napoleonic War to the ongoing global financial crisis sparked by subprime mortgage defaults in the United States. Banking crises dramatically weaken fiscal positions in both groups, with government revenues invariably contracting, and fiscal expenditures often expanding sharply.
    [Show full text]
  • Debt and Financial Crises
    Policy Research Working Paper 9116 Public Disclosure Authorized Debt and Financial Crises Wee Chian Koh Public Disclosure Authorized M. Ayhan Kose Peter S. Nagle Franziska L. Ohnsorge Naotaka Sugawara Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Prospects Group January 2020 Policy Research Working Paper 9116 Abstract Emerging market and developing economies have experi- were associated with financial crises which typically had enced recurrent episodes of rapid debt accumulation over worse economic outcomes than those without crises—after the past fifty years. This paper examines the consequences 8 years output per capita was typically 6-10 percent lower of debt accumulation using a three-pronged approach: an and investment 15–22 percent weaker in crisis episodes. event study of debt accumulation episodes in 100 emerging Third, a rapid buildup of debt, whether public or private, market and developing economies since 1970; a series of increased the likelihood of a financial crisis, as did a larger econometric models examining the linkages between debt share of short-term external debt, higher debt service cover, and the probability of financial crises; and a set of case and lower reserves cover. Fourth, countries that experienced studies of rapid debt buildup that ended in crises. The financial crises frequently employed combinations of unsus- paper reports four main results. First, episodes of debt tainable fiscal, monetary and financial sector policies, and accumulation are common, with more than 500 episodes often suffered from structural and institutional weaknesses. occurring since 1970. Second, around half of these episodes This paper is a product of the Prospects Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Determinantesdodesempe
    Letícia da Costa e Silva Mourão Silva Costa e da Letícia Letícia da Costa e Silva Mourão BRASILEIRAS DESEMPENHO DETERMINANTES DO DESEMPENHO DO DAS INSTITUIÇÕES BANCÁRIAS BRASILEIRAS BANCÁRIAS INSTITUIÇÕES DETERMINANTES DAS Tese no âmbito do Doutoramento em Gestão - Ciência Aplicada à Decisão orientada pelo Professor Doutor Pedro André Cerqueira e Professor Doutor Paulo Gama e apresentada a Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra. Janeiro de 2020 1 Faculdade de Economia DETERMINANTES DO DESEMPENHO DAS INSTITUIÇÕES BANCÁRIAS BRASILEIRAS Letícia da Costa e Silva Mourão Tese no âmbito do Doutoramento em Gestão - Ciência Aplicada à Decisão orientada pelo Professor Doutor Pedro André Cerqueira e Professor Doutor Paulo Gama e apresentada a Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra. Janeiro de 2020 i Ao grande amor da minha vida, Lucas. Seu apoio e amor constante, me possibilitou viver esse desafio além de minhas forças. Sem você nenhuma conquista valeria a pena. ii Agradecimentos Aos meus orientadores, Pedro André Cerqueira e Paulo Miguel Gama Gonçalves, pela prestativa, perseverante e sábia orientação. À Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), pelo financiamento de meu Doutoramento. Ao Banco do Brasil, pelo apoio em minha pesquisa. A Deus, em quem acredito e confio plenamente. À Minha Família, que mesmo de longe, incentivou-me. Aos amigos, portugueses e brasileiros, novos e de longa data. iii Os bancos são mais perigosos para a nossa liberdade que os exércitos com armas. Thomas Jefferson iv Resumo Há um aumento dos debates académicos sobre o desempenho dos bancos. Alguns estudos argumentam que o desempenho bancário é reforçado por melhorias na organização interna e eficiência na gestão.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Shocks, Economic Growth and Financial Crises: 120 Years of New Zealand Experience
    Global shocks, economic growth and financial crises: 120 years of New Zealand experience Michael D Bordo, David Hargreaves and Mizuho Kida1 1 Bordo: Rutgers University and NBER. Kida and Hargreaves: Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some of this material is drawn from a lecture given by Michael Bordo during his Professorial Fellowship at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in July 2009. We would like to thank Ozer Karagedikli, Gary Hawke, Chris Hunt, Chris Meissner, John Singleton and an anonymous referee for comments or advice; the usual disclaimer applies. 1 Abstract We identify the timing of currency, banking crises and sudden stops in New Zealand from 1880 to 2008, and consider the extent to which empirical models can explain New Zealand’s crisis history. We find that the cross country evidence on the determinants of crises fits New Zealand experience reasonably well. A number of the risk factors that correlate with crises internationally–such as domestic imbalances, external debt, and currency mismatches–were elevated for New Zealand when the country had more frequent crises and have improved in the recent (more stable) period. However, a time-series analysis of New Zealand growth over 120 years shows that global factors–such as the US growth rate and terms of trade– explain New Zealand growth fairly well, and that crisis dummy variables do not have significant additional explanatory power. This suggests that having sound institutions and policies may help avoid severe domestic crises, but will not be sufficient to avoid the domestic economic impact of the global business cycle. 2 1 Introduction The shocks that New Zealand has recently faced in an environment of increasing globalisation of the world economy - integration in both goods and finance - have resonance to the first era of globalisation in the years 1880-1913.
    [Show full text]
  • The History and Remedy of Financial Crises and Bank Failures
    The author Michael Schemmann Michael Sche is a professional banker, certified public accountant, and university professor of accounting and finance. The book reviews a long litany of financial crises and bank failures since the 3rd century right up to the ongoing Global Financial Crisis. The author analyzes the financial statement mmann of a large international commercial bank in Frankfurt, Germany, and concludes that IFRS accounting principles and standards are not followed but violated, rendering the statements rather false and misleading. The book contains a remedy to end the Global Financial Crisis and prevent future crises, calling on the European Central Bank to step in and take over the role of money Money creator which is currently done by the private commercial banks, and allow governments to buy-back their general Breakdown and government debt theld by the banks, thereby reducing the MON outstanding sovereign debt of the euro area by 32% while improving the banks' liquidity sevenfold in a way that is Breakthrough completely inflation-neutral (sterile). The misconceived EY austerity programs 'to save the euro' can then be rolled back and abandoned. Br iicpa eak do The History and Remedy IICPA Publications wn and Br 1st Edition - 31 October 2013 of Financial Crises and ISBN 978-1492920595 eak Bank Failures thr ough IICPA PUBLICATIONS Money. Breakdown and Breakthrough. The History and Modern states gave control of monetary policy and markets to the Remedy of Financial Crises and Bank Failures. (1st Edition.) barons of global finance. The experiment has resulted in the same By Michael Schemmann disastrous outcomes as before.
    [Show full text]
  • Learning from History: Volatility and Financial Crises
    Jon Danielsson , Marcela Valenzuela and Ilknur Zer Learning from history: volatility and financial crises Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Danielsson, Jon and Valenzuela, Marcela and Zer, Ilknur (2018) Learning from history: volatility and financial crises. The Review of Financial Studies , 31 (7). pp. 2774-2805. ISSN 0893-9454 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy049 © 2018 Society for Financial Studies This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91136 Available in LSE Research Online: December 2018 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facil itate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL ( http://eprints.lse.ac.uk ) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the publishe d version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it . Learning from History: Volatility and Financial Crises ∗ Jon Danielsson Marcela Valenzuela Systemic Risk Centre University of Chile, DII London School of Economics Ilknur Zer Federal Reserve Board This version: January 2018 Forthcoming: Review of Financial Studies Abstract We study the effects of stock market volatility on risk-taking and financial crises by constructing a cross-country database spanning up to 211 years and 60 coun- tries.
    [Show full text]
  • Banking and Currency Crises: How Common Are Twins?
    Pacific Basin Working Paper Series BANKING AND CURRENCY CRISES: HOW COMMON ARE TWINS? Reuven Glick Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Michael Hutchison Department of Economics University of California, Santa Cruz and Visiting Scholar Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper No. PB99-07 Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies Economic Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco WORKING PAPER PB99-07 BANKING AND CURRENCY CRISES: HOW COMMON ARE TWINS? Reuven Glick Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Michael Hutchison Department of Economics University of California, Santa Cruz and Visiting Scholar Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco December 1999 Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies Economic Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 101 Market Street San Francisco, CA 94105-1579 Tel: (415) 974-3184 Fax: (415) 974-2168 http://www.frbsf.org Banking and Currency Crises: How Common Are Twins? December 1999 Reuven Glick Michael Hutchison Federal Reserve Bank of Department of Economics San Francisco University of California, Santa Cruz 101 Market Street Social Sciences 1 San Francisco, CA Santa Cruz, CA 95064 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Research Associate Economic Policy Research Unit University of Copenhagen We thank Mark Peralta, Rasmus Fatum, and Kathleen McDill for research assistance. The views presented in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    [Show full text]
  • Nber Working Paper Series the Global Financial Crisis
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-08: IS IT UNPRECEDENTED? Michael D. Bordo John S. Landon-Lane Working Paper 16589 http://www.nber.org/papers/w16589 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 2010 Paper prepared for the 2010 EWC-KDI Conference on “ The Global Economic Crisis: Impacts,Transmission and Recovery” Honolulu Hawaii August 19-20 2010 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2010 by Michael D. Bordo and John S. Landon-Lane. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08: Is it Unprecedented? Michael D. Bordo and John S. Landon-Lane NBER Working Paper No. 16589 December 2010 JEL No. E30,G01,N20 ABSTRACT This paper compares the recent global crisis and recession to earlier international financial crises and recessions. Based on existing chronologies of banking, currency and debt crises we identify clusters of crises. We use an identification of extreme events and a weighting scheme based on real GDP relative to the U.S. to identify global financial crises since 1880. For banking crises we identify five global ones since 1880: 1890-91, 1907-08, 1913-14, 1931-32, 2007-2008.
    [Show full text]
  • Banking Crises in Emerging Economies: Origins and Policy Options the Role of Banks
    BIS ECONOMIC PAPERS No. 46 – October 1996 BANKING CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: ORIGINS AND POLICY OPTIONS THE ROLE OF BANKS by Morris Goldstein and Philip Turner BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS Monetary and Economic Department Basle BIS Economic Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements and published by the Bank. The aim of the papers is to stimulate discussion of the topics with which they deal. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. © Bank for International Settlements, 1996. CH–4002 Basle, Switzerland All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISBN 92-9131-044-1 ISSN 1021-2515 Contents* Introduction . .............................. 5 Factors behind banking crises ...................... 8 Policy options for strengthening banking systems ........... 32 Conclusion . .............................. 56 Annex: Two examples of disclosure of the financial condition of banks ........................ 59 References . .............................. 64 *Mr. Goldstein is the Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., and a former Deputy Director of the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund. He was a consultant in the Monetary & Economic Department of the BIS when this paper was written. The authors are grateful to Ib Madsen who was responsible for most of the statistical work; thanks are also due to Stephan Arthur, Chris Bennett and Karsten von Kleist. They are also most grateful to the central banks who contributed much of the data. Helpful comments were received from Andrew Crockett, Charles Freeland, Judith Hunter, Carmen Reinhart, Jozef Van ‘t dack and Bill White.
    [Show full text]
  • The Global Economic Crisis
    THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ECONOMIC THE GLOBAL THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS Aspen Policy Books is a series devoted to developing new thinking on U.S. national security policy. This book, a collec- AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR tion of papers prepared for the 2009 summer ASG conference, CRISIS addresses the critical intersection of the global financial reces- FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY sion and its potential impact on America’s foreign policy and AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL POLICY FOREIGN FOR IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL national security. Authors explore the possible shift in global power, the changing relationship between the U.S. and China, Foreword By Joseph S. Nye & Brent Scowcroft the impact on America’s development policy, and assess the capacity of domestic and international institutions to respond to the crisis. Contributors include: Richard Cooper (Harvard University), Kemal Derviş (The Brookings Institution), Martin Feldstein (Harvard University), Michael Green (The Center for Strategic and International Studies), David Leonhardt (The New York Times), Sylvia Mathews Burwell (The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation), David McCormick (Carnegie Mellon’s Heinz College), Laura Tyson (University of California, Berkeley), and Bruce Stokes (National Journal). aspen strategy group The Aspen Institute, Washington, DC www.aspeninstitute.org/asg Edited By R. Nicholas Burns & Jonathon Price THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY FOREWORD BY JOSEPH S. NYE & BRENT SCOWCROFT EDITED BY NIcholas BurNs & JoNaThoN PrIcE Copyright © 2009 by The Aspen Institute The Aspen Institute One Dupont Circle, N.W.
    [Show full text]
  • The Great Recession of 2007-2009”: Unusual in Its Length, Magnitude, and Assault More on “Alleged” High Quality Than Low Quality
    “International Credit Optimization In The Post-Great Recession Financial System” North America Power Credit Organization (NAPCO) Chattanooga, TN September 12, 2013 Jack Malvey, CFA Chief Global Markets Strategist Director of Center for Global Investment & Market Intelligence BNY Mellon Investment Management Agenda Fifth Anniversary of Great Recession: Causes, Effects, and Aftermath Current State and Outlook for Global Capital Markets Big Data/Next Generation Credit Tool International Credit Optimization 2 Information Security Identification: Confidential Global Financial Asset Choice Set August 31, 2013 and December 31, 2050** $380 Trillion as of 8/31/2013: ~$54,000 Per Global Capita** Estimated $5 Quadrillion as of 12/31/2050: ~$541,000 Per Global Capita** Global Cash Financial Market Value Size (U.S.$ Billion) Global Real Estate Asset Value Size (U.S.$ Billion) 8/31/2013 CAGR (%) 12/31/2050 8/31/2013 CAGR (%) 12/31/2050 1 4 Total Debt 115,568 1,308,322 Real Estate/Land Multiverse Index 43,813 784,909 Non-U.S. Real Estate 140,981 7% 1,762,604 U.S. Aggregate Index 16,489 6% 145,192 United States 39,514 5% 244,242 Pan-European Aggregate 14,217 8% 251,552 Total 180,495 2,006,846 Asian-Pacific Aggregate 8,736 10% 306,633 5 Global High Yield 1,897 10% 66,602 Global Derivative Financial Markets Size (U.S.$ Billion) Canadians 1,162 3% 3,502 Notional Market Value Euro Yen 23 3% 68 Commodities 2,587 358 2,219 Other 1,290 6% 11,359 Gold 486 53 5% 328 Global Inflation-Linked Securities Index 2,017 5% 12,470 Other commodities 2,101 306 5% 1,891 Global Capital Securities 641 2% 1,342 Currencies 67,358 2,304 33,629 U.S.
    [Show full text]