Darin Roy Nesbitt Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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A Liberal Theory of Virtue and the Good: The Moral and Political Thought of T.H. Green Darin Roy Nesbitt A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science Edmonton, Alberta Spring 1997 Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Sefuices - services bibiiogmphiques The author bas mteda non- L'autem a accorde une Iicence non exclusive ücence ailowing the excluSm permettant a la National Li'brary of Canada to Bibliothèque Patiopale du Canada de reproduce, loaa, distn'bute or sell repfodime,prCta, distni~erou copies of hismer thesis by any means vendre des copies de sa thèse de and in any form or format, mahg quelque &ère et sous qyelqye this thesis adable to interested forme que a soit pour mettre des persors. exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées. The author retaiis ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copytight m hislher thesis. Neither droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni the thesis nor substantid extracts la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de fiom it may be printed or othewise ceHe4 ne doivent être imprimes ou reproduced with the author's autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. This dissertation is dedicated to my parents: Sheila J. Nesbitt and James E. Nesbitt. This dissertation critically examines the moral and political philosophy of T.H. Green in order to assess his reconceptualization of individuality, freedom, and rights within a common good liberal framework. The objective is to expand out understanding of Green's version of liberalism. There are four main themes: (1) Green's conception of individuality is appraised and upheld as a substitute for liberal individualism; (2) the role and place of values, virtues, and a conmon good in his moral philosophy are explored and defended vithin a liberal context; (3) Green's concept of political obligation, one based on a common good, is reviewed in order to demonstrate the liberal character of his apptoach; and (4) an attempt is made to extract from Green's texts a consistent theory of individual rights . The dissertation supports Green's revised conception of political obligation and his general theory of individual rights revolving around a liberal common good. Acknowledgments 1 wish to offer my utmost appreciation to Professor DmJ. Cm Caaichael for his scholarly assistance and persona1 support tovard the completion of this dissertation. It vould be an oversight if 1 neglect to mention that he opened my mind to new vays of thinking. 1 must acknowledge Professor T.C. Pocklington who appears to have resolved, where f often cannot, a paradox of academic life: our work is important, but let us not be too serious- In addition to Professors Carmichael and Pocklington, 1 vant to thank the other members of my examining cornmittee, Professor David Whitson, Professor Wesley Cooper, and especially Professor David Laycock for his time and effort as the external examiner. Finally 1 wish tu thank Augustana University College, Camrose, Alberta, and in particular Professor Roger Epp, for the use of its resources. To my mother and tather, Sheila and James, 1 extend my deepest love for al1 of their support during these past few difficult years. My greatest hope is that the completion of this research partially compensates them for allowing me to monopolize the family cottage. They selflessly provided me with a rare scholarly commodity: the peace and solitude to reflect and write. 1 cannot name al1 the friends whose patience with me bordered on the angelic, but three in particular stand out: Mark L. Hotz, whose stoicism and vit fortifies my will; Dimitrios Panopalis, who understands what is at stake in the following pages; and Marc Poulin, whose idiosyncrasies never cease ta amaze me. Finally 1 want especially to acknowledge Ms . Jeralyne K. Manveiler for al1 of her support during the final stages of my research. Her ideas, advice, and inner strength altogethet vere a source of great encouragement. Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter One: T.H. Green and the Liberal Tradition 9 1-1. Green and the Liberal Tradition 10 1.2. Life and Times 12 1.3. Scholmly WO~~S 22 1.4, Green's Place in the Liberal Tradition: Priend 30 or Foe? 1.5. Contemporary Liberalism and its Challenge 37 Chapter Two: The Integrated Liberal Self: Green's 51 Conception of Individuality Liberalism and Human Agency 52 The Significance of the Self 55 Green's Metaphysics: A Prelude to the Knowing Self 63 Affective and Cognitive Paculties 73 Self-Consciousness and Reason: Composite Elements 76 of a Self Reason and Will: The Self as a Moral Agent 80 The Self as Individual 85 Green's Integrated Liberal Self 91 Chapter Three: Individuality and the Good: The Common 104 Good in Green's Moral Philosophy The Self and the Good: The Individual in Society Atomism and Emotivism: lisguided Common Ideals Green's Individualism and the Good The Critique of Utilitarianism Green on the Moral Good Green on the Common Good and Virtue Green and the Ethics of Character The Self, Individuality, and Social Life Chapter Four: Green's Rights-Based Conception of the 158 State: The Limits of State Action 4.1. Green and Liberal Sovereignty 159 4.2. Authority and Sovereignty: The Exercise of State 164 Power 4.3. Green on Classical Liberal Natural Right 169 4.4. Theorists of Power: Spinoza and Hobbes 173 4,5, Innocence Lost: Locke and Rousseau on Political 184 Society 4.6. The Concepts of Natutal Law and Political Obligation 4.7. The Rights-Base4 State 4.8. The Task of Green's Liberal Theory Chapter Five: Liberties, Entitlemento, and Conunon Puposas: The Elements of Green's Theory of Rights 5.1. Individual Rights and a Cornion Good 5.2. Social Recognition 5.3. The Right to Pree Life (1): The Right to Life 5.4. Th8 Right to mee Life (11): Tb Right to Negative Liberty 5.5. The Right to Free Life (III): The Right to Positive Liberty 5.6. The Role of Virtue in Green's Theory of Rights Conclusion: The Liberal Politics of T.H. Green Bibliography Introduction 2 This dissertation examines the implications for liberalism of T.H. Green's most recognizable and siqnificant contribution to political philosophy: hi8 conception of negative and positive freedom or liberty.' The principal implication vas an expansion of the concept of freedom from the negative, Hobbesian-inspired mode1 of self-activated subjects considered free just insofar as their movements are unimpeded by external forces or obstacles (or unftee as those movements are effectively impeded or ptevented) to one or a combination of its positive conceptions .2 This dissertation has one primary argument: I will defend Green's general case for a theory of individual rights predicated on hie conception of freedom as a first-order human good--and as representing a common good--and that there is and should be a heavy burden of justification both on those who propose interferences with liberty and those who make liberty-claims. tike al1 contested human goods, liberty requires justification; and al1 claims to expand or reduce individual liberty in Green's account must be consistent with vhat 1 vil1 cal1 his wcommon good criterion." I maintain that his ncommon good liberalismn upholds * traditional liberal concerns about the nature, extent, and limits of political power, and what animates Mis dissertation is Green's novel and humane vision of liberalism. Green's moral and political philosophy taken together have two leading claims: (1) a system of laws is worthy of obedience if it expresses a common good, and (2) individual 3 rights must be justified with reference to this common good. Green links freedom and individual rights with human goods beyond the minimal yet fundamental good of security against the arbitrary acts of others. Liberty, he maintains, cannot shply mean freedoin (or rights) froi the effects of actions of others but must also include freedom (or rights) to goods other than freedom itself . If freedom means more than the absence of external forces acting upon an agent's movements, then the subsequent question is, freedom to what end(s) ? Green argues that the human good of freedom is distinct but not separate trom other goods such as justice and equality. While freedom as a basic good can and should be independently justified, where freedon is intimately related to other human goods it must be recognised in that mannet. Both claims are part of Green's general thought. He discerned a development in the negative (or minimalist) conception of freedom originating with Hobbes's argument that subjects or citizens are at liberty just insofar as the sovereign has not promulgated laws or commands tequiring or forbidding modes of conduct (freedom thus meaning the absence of rules) to Mill's that individuals are Ptee just insofar as their npermanent interests" as "progressive beingsN are neither haried nor injured (freedom thus meaning the specification of acts harnful or injurious to oneself and others). The concept of liberty shifted from the province of external actions (Hobbes) to that of interests (Mill) and thus the good of liberty became included in the 4 realn of public justification, minimally as a good that requires reflective justification (good teasons) and potentially a public good capable of being exchanged for or overridden by other human goods. 1 believe Green recognized this development--ewn if he nowhere expressed it in such terms-and his moral and political works should be intarpreted in such a marner. Freedom for Green though remains the basic and primary human good, a -position confirned by his cornmitment to individual rights.