Didiman: Australian Agricultural Extension Officers in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, 1945 - 1975
Kim Elizabeth Godbold BA Hons (QUT)
Humanities Program Queensland University of Technology
2010
Statement of Original Authorship
I, Kim Elizabeth Godbold, the author of this thesis, am fully aware that Queensland University of Technology, Australia, will make it available for use within the university library and by microfilm or other means, which would allow access by users in other institutions. All scholars having access to this thesis must make proper acknowledgement of all information obtained from the thesis and agree not to copy or closely paraphrase it in all or part without the consent of the author.
I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Kim Elizabeth Godbold
Date:
i Table of Contents
Statement of Original Authorship ...... i Table of Contents ...... ii Table of Figures ...... iv Table of Tables ...... iv Abstract ...... v Keywords ...... vi Acknowledgements ...... vii Acronyms ...... viii Prologue: Inspiration ...... 1 Chapter 1 : Didiman, Agriculture and Colonies ...... 5 1.1 Objectives ...... 5 1.2 Development ...... 8 1.3 Extension ...... 9 1.4 Agents of Change ...... 10 1.5 Diffusion ...... 11 1.6 finding the Didiman ...... 13 1.7 Data Sources ...... 18 1.8 History of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea ...... 20 1.9 Structure of the Thesis ...... 22 Chapter 2 : The Evolution of Agricultural Policy in the Colonial Periphery ...... 27 2.1 The Empires and Agriculture ...... 31 2.2 The League of Nations and Agricultural Development ...... 38 2.3 Agriculture and Extension ...... 42 2.4 Conclusion ...... 46 Chapter 3 : Agriculture: the Economic Imperative in developing the Territory of Papua and New Guinea ...... 49 3.1 Approaches to Agriculture in the War Years ...... 60 3.2 The Emergence of a Post World War II Agricultural Policy ...... 67 Chapter 4 : Didiman: The Australian Agricultural Officers ...... 82 4.1 The Role of the Didiman ...... 84 4.2 Recruiting Didiman...... 85 4.3 Cadetships ...... 97 4.4 In-Service Training ...... 103 4.5 Principle of Diffusion ...... 107 4.6 Retention of Didiman ...... 109 4.7 Conditions in the Field ...... 117 Chapter 5 : The Field Work of the Didiman ...... 128 5.1 Didiman and Formal Agricultural Training ...... 147 5.2 Patrols ...... 151 5.3 Didiman and Smallholder Farmers ...... 174 5.4 Land Settlement Schemes ...... 184 5.5 Conclusion ...... 190
ii Chapter 6 : Administration, Policies and DASF 1946 – 1972 ...... 193 6.1 Organisational and Functional Changes in DASF 1946-1972 ...... 194 6.2 The 1960s ...... 212 6.3 Canberra-Konedobu and Didiman ...... 219 6.4 Conclusion ...... 231 Chapter 7 : Didiman and the Impact of Australian Agricultural Policies ...... 233 Epilogue: Reflections ...... 243 Bibliography: ...... 246 Primary Documents: ...... 246 Published Material: ...... 256 Other ...... 283
iii Table of Figures
Figure 1.1 Territories of Papua and New Guinea Source: Papua New Guinea Agricultural Journal, vol 18, no 1, 1955, p.1 ...... vi Figure 4.1 ‘The Bridal Suite’, Kikimunga, Mekeo Region, 1954 ...... 122 Figure 5.1 Plans for Siwai Extension Centre ...... 133 Figure 5.2 Patrol Map of Koiari Sub District, Central District 1949 ...... 157 Figure 5.3 Patrol Map of Normanby Island, Milne Bay District 1957 ...... 158 Figure 5.4 Patrol Map of Saidor Sub District, 1960 ...... 159 Figure 5.5 Didiman George Greenwood on patrol along the Fly River, Gulf District, 1960s ...... 165 Figure 5.6 Didimisis Maggie van Schilfgaarde patrolling on Misima Island, Milne Bay, 1960s ...... 165 Figure 5.7 Didiman George Greenwood patrolling in the highlands 1960s ...... 166 Figure 6.1 Sketch of DASF Headquarters, Konedobu ...... 196 Figure 6.2 Organisational Chart of DASF 1946, A518/1, item F852/6/7, AA Canberra ...... 201 Figure 6.3 The TPNG Administration Organisation Chart ...... 209 Figure 6.4 The TPNG Proposed Organisation of DASF ...... 214 Figure 6.5 DASF Organisational Chart 1968 ...... 217 Figure 6.6 DASF Top Structure 1971 ...... 217 Figure 6.7 Symmetric System of Decentralisation ...... 230
Table of Tables
Table 3.1 Quantity of Copra Exported from Mandated New Guinea, 1913 to 1933 .... 51 Table 3.2 Main Agricultural Commodities of Papua in 1914 ...... 56 Table 3.3 Papua's Subsidy Grants, 1928 to 1934 ...... 59 Table 3.4 The Territories of Papua and New Guinea - Financial Statistics, 1941 ...... 79 Table 3.5 Australian Grant-in-aid* to Papua and New Guinea, 1946 to 1952 ...... 80 Table 4.1 Positions in Division of Extension, DASF ...... 95 Table 4.2 Number of Agricultural Extension Stations and Centres, 1962-1969 ...... 104 Table 4.3 Retention of DASF Staff 1963 to 1967 ...... 110 Table 4.4 DASF Number of Graduates and Diplomates 1964 to 1969 ...... 115 Table 4.5 Didiman Staff Postings ...... 117 Table 5.1 DASF Food Crop Introductions 1950 to 1975 ...... 139 Table 5.2 Patrols by Didiman in all Districts, 01/07/1958 to 30/06/1960 ...... 160
iv Abstract
Historically, the development philosophy for the two Territories of Papua and New Guinea (known as TPNG, formerly two territories, Papua and New Guinea) was equated with economic development, with a focus on agricultural development. To achieve the modification or complete change in indigenous farming systems the Australian Government’s Department of External Territories adopted and utilised a programme based on agricultural extension.
Prior to World War II, under Australian administration, the economic development of these two territories, as in many colonies of the time, was based on the institution of the plantation. Little was initiated in agriculture development for indigenous people. This changed after World War II to a rationale based on the promotion and advancement of primary industry, but also came to include indigenous farmers.
To develop agriculture within a colony it was thought that a modification to, or in some cases the complete transformation of, existing farming systems was necessary to improve the material welfare of the population. It was also seen to be a guarantee for the future national interest of the sovereign state after independence was granted. The Didiman and Didimisis1 became the frontline, field operatives of this theoretical model of development.
This thesis examines the Didiman’s field operations, the structural organisation of agricultural administration and the application of policy in the two territories.
1 There seems to be some controversy over the origins of the word Didiman. Peter Sack claims (personal communication to R. M. Bourke, July 1977) the origins of the word Didiman is a corruption of German officer, Dr. Bredeman, who was based in Rabaul and was the senior curator of the Rabaul Botanical Gardens prior to World War I. This also seems to be the opinion of Peter Mulhausler (1975) p. 106. However, the Pacific Island Monthly (May, 1956) pp. 29-30 suggested that the word originated from a German surveyor named Dietmann, who laid out the original Rabaul Botanical Gardens, and that Didiman is a derivative of his name. Regardless of the word’s origins, in time it has been accepted into Tok Pisin (the national language of Papua New Guinea) as meaning an agricultural officer involved in extension work; see also Mulhausler, P. (1976) “Samoan Plantation Pidgin English and the Origins of New Guinea Pidgin: An Introduction”, JHP, No. 11, No. 2, pp.122-125; von Fleckenstein, F. (1980) “Helping the Didiman Help the Farmer: A Cooperative Extension Service for Papua New Guinea”, Administration for Development, 15,: pp. 74-83. Didimisis were female agricultural extension officers. The plural of Didiman in Tok Pisin, the national language of Papua New Guinea, is Didiman and consequently is used in this plural form throughout this thesis.
v
Figure 1.1 Territories of Papua and New Guinea Source: Papua New Guinea Agricultural Journal, vol 18, no 1, 1955, p.1
Keywords
Territories of Papua and New Guinea, economic development, agricultural extension.
vi Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the many Didiman who inspired me to write this thesis. My gratitude especially goes to: Fred Arndt, Ralph Arnison, Mick Belfield, Max and Cecile Benjamin, Barry Biel, Bill Conroy, Bob Curtis, Gordon Dick, Doug Franklin, David Freyne, George Greenwood, Bill Heath, Jean Lynch, Bob McKillop, David Marsh, David Montgomery, Dennis Nicholls, Syd Saville, Rinus and Margie van Schilfgaarde, Dr. Dorothy Shaw, Jack White and Dave Willis. I am grateful for their time, support, advice, access to personal papers and photos, and for the hospitality shown to me by many on my travels in Australia and Papua New Guinea.
I would also like to thank Thomas at the PNG National Archives who allowed me access to the reading room outside of opening hours; Dr. Michael Bourke (ANU), for allowing me to access his extensive library; and Dr. Robin Hide, for his enthusiasm for my project and his bibliography on PNG agriculture.
To Dr. Max Quanchi, my principal supervisor, I am forever grateful for his belief and continual encouragement in writing this thesis, and for his support when time and energy were overwhelming me. I would also like to thank Melody McIntosh who guided me through the administrative tasks of the endless paper work, presentations and submission. To Chris Page, thank you for your proofreading and editing for which I am truly grateful.
To my family, Peter, Skye and Eliza, I am appreciative of the hugs and love when I became frustrated, grumpy, tired, at times irrational and full of self doubt. A special thank you to Eliza for aiding me in formatting, fixing my mistakes and for generally being my private secretary.
I would also like to acknowledge my parents, Jack and Shirley Lamrock, whose lives in TPNG motivated me to research the Didiman.
vii Acronyms
ANGAU Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit ANGPCB Australian New Guinea Production Control Board ANZA Australia New Zealand Agreement ASOPA Australian School of Pacific Administration B.S.I.P British Solomon Islands Protectorate (Solomon Islands) CBAE Commonwealth Bureau of Agricultural Economics CRTS Commonwealth Rural Training Scheme DASF Department Agriculture Stock and Fisheries DAO District Agricultural Officer DCA Department of Civil Aviation DCC District Co-ordinating Committee DDS Department of District Services DDSNA Department of District Services and Native Affairs DNA Department of Native Affairs FAO Food and Agriculture Organization IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICTAT Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture Trinidad LAES Lowlands Agricultural Experiment Station MIA Murrumbridgee Irrigation Area RAO Regional Agricultural Officer RPS Rural Progress Societies SPC Secretariat of the Pacific Community TPNG Territory of Paua and New Guinea UN United Nations VAC Village Agricultural Committee
viii Prologue: Inspiration
My father was a Didiman in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG) from 1949 until independence in 1975. This thesis was inspired from the work that he and other Didiman carried out in TPNG in bringing agricultural change to Papua New Guinean farmers.
As a Pacific studies undergraduate, I noted that post-1975 agriculture among indigenous farmers in the Pacific Islands and, in particular, Papua New Guinea had been well researched. However, there had been little or no mention of the Didiman as the catalysts for change among indigenous farmers between 1945 and 1975. For example, of scholars working on agriculture in post-independence Papua New Guinea, one typically had written numerous works on the subject of agriculture but had not examined the Didiman. Other authors have mentioned Didiman and the agricultural extension programme implemented by them, but references to Didiman have generally been written by Didiman. For example, Didiman were not an entry in The Encyclopedia of Papua New Guinea (Ryan 1972) and were acknowledged three times in Denoon and Snowden’s index of the history of agriculture in TPNG, A Time to Plant and a Time to Uproot in 1988. Some works on pre-independence agriculture and training have been specifically aimed at agricultural students learning about extension or written for the Australian Administration's Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF) for their own published journals.
It seemed to me, at this early stage, that the Didiman and Didimisses were actors with a considerable role in the development of rural TPNG and in implementing Australia’s colonial policies in its two New Guinea territories, but their presence had not yet been thoroughly examined (in Chapter 1 I address this gap). I knew that, during this period in TPNG’s history, there were government patrols and missionaries traversing the country, that exploration and mining expeditions were also active, and various government officials—from DNA, Police and Health—were also implementing Australian policies in and out of villages. DNA Officers or Kiaps, as they were known, established patrol circuits, patrol posts, opened up new territory, established local government councils and, if other government departments were not established within districts, Kiaps acted as agents for those departments.
1 After World War II, Kiaps concentrated on repatriation, the restoration of village life and the payment of war damage claims. Later, Kiaps helped the people to take a greater part in the economic development of TPNG. They were part of the vital mechanism for the operation of government policies. The Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) worked with Kiaps in opening up new territory within Papua and New Guinea. They were a conspicuous force while patrolling throughout the territory.
One of the earlier main objectives for the Health Department was the control of malaria in outlying districts. The department used patrolling as a way to combat malaria and other crippling tropical diseases in outlying areas. Later, the department established medical aid posts and training schools for medical and hygiene assistants throughout the territory. These patrols were also important in regards to nutrition and health programs later established by the Australian government.
I knew, from the stories of a large group of ex-Didiman, that they had also been in and out of the same villages. The development of European-led and owned plantation agriculture in colonies is not new to researchers, but no one had, to this stage, sought to analyse the significance of the work of the Didiman in TPNG. It was a story I decided to tell.
As a researcher I was aware of the need to disclose my own involvement in the Didiman story. Reflexivity requires the researcher (in this instance, myself, as the daughter of a Didiman) to acknowledge the impossibility of remaining outside of one’s subject while conducting research. My awareness of reflexivity influenced the approach that I used to explore the ways in which my involvement in this particular study “influenced, acted upon and informed the research” (Nightingale and Cromby 1999, 228). This thesis, therefore, became an exercise in reflexivity as much as it was a purely empirical, archival-based research project.
The framework that I adopted for this thesis is development through agriculture. The period from 1945 until independence is significant as events in this period relate to changes sweeping the world, primarily decolonisation and increasing international scrutiny of the operations of colonial administrations. These dates are also significant in TPNG as it was during this period that Australia governed the Territory of Papua and the United Nations Trust Territory of New Guinea under one umbrella and proceeded to implement an agricultural policy as a means of development. Worldwide indigenous
2 agricultural development within other colonial possessions had been limited; only after World War II was it perceived as a responsibility and a way forward for many colonies. This was also true of the Australian Government and its relationship with TPNG.
This thesis often mentions Konedobu where DASF, Extension Services and the Australian colonial administration were housed. ‘Kone’ became a slang word, often used in a derogatory way by Didiman, but also synonymously taken to mean the ‘administration’. From Konedobu, policy directives reached down to the Didiman in the field. Policy information flowed one way; from Canberra down through Konedobu and then dispersed into the field. This thesis questions the ability of Didiman to interpret these policy directives accurately and to implement them. Canberra was a distant homeland and bureaucracy, and Konedobu was equally foreign to those in the TPNG bush where Didiman were based.
I read the earlier historians’ work on agricultural development in a colonial setting but wanted to redirect attention to the men, and later women, who set out to modify traditional forms of agriculture for the betterment of TPNG’s rural communities. Other public servants working under the Australian Administration in TPNG have been acknowledged such as the Administration’s patrol officers or, as they were known, Kiaps. Didiman also patrolled extensively, lived on stations in remote parts of TPNG and contributed, not only to traditional agriculture, but introduced western ideas that impacted on the social and political life of many rural communities. As with the Kiaps, Didiman were often perceived by indigenous people as the ‘government’ and at times they wielded considerable autonomy in their field of work. There has been considerable numbers of memoirs, reminiscences and general histories by Australian authors. In 2003, historian Hank Nelson (2008, pp. 243-276) listed over 200 biographies and reminiscences written by Australians in TPNG. Rose, Quanchi and Moore (2009, pp. 108 &183-189) noted that this list would now have extended to 250 authors.
In the sub-fields of history, colonial policy, agriculture and economic development, there is regular reference to “agriculture” in the context of development and economic growth. Historians writing on agriculture in TPNG have noted crop outputs for export, food production for domestic markets and problems associated with land capabilities but have ignored, dismissed or failed to recognise Didiman and their work as a starting point in bringing change to rural TPNG. There was still a gap in our knowledge of the work of
3 the Didiman and the Didimisis in the pre-dependence era. This silence can be traced to a general lack of attention by historians to the work and philosophies of Didiman who worked in rural TPNG2 throughout the full 1945-1975 era.
Agricultural development within the colonial world had been linked to compulsion and its rapacious nature, but non-compulsive strategies within agricultural development had been pursued. Once I had researched the actual field operations of Didiman, I found that they did not use compulsion towards indigenous, traditional farmers but, instead, used a form of persuasion.
I wanted to write about the Didiman’s extraordinary work ethic in introducing new crops, new farming concepts and aiding in the improvement of health and diet through agriculture. The following chapters describe the development of agricultural policy, its administrative structure and its ambitious targets and objectives, but mostly they draw attention to a group of young Australians and acknowledge the Didiman’s place within Australian and TPNG history.
2 Anthropologists, on the other hand, have been extensively studied rural New Guinea, so much so that New Guinea is virtually synonymous with the study of anthropology.
4 CHAPTER 1: DIDIMAN, AGRICULTURE AND COLONIES
1.1 OBJECTIVES
This thesis begins with the broad question:
How did the principles and philosophies of agricultural extension affect the work of the Didiman on agricultural development in the Territory of Paua and New Guinea?
Three further questions shaped the research:
How was the development of agricultural policy influenced by the formal colonial bureaucracy?
What concepts, theories and models guided the Didiman’s application of the economic model of development proposed by the Australian colonial administration?
What was the Didiman’s role in the field?
Seeking answers to these questions led to an examination of British and other agricultural development programs. This raised further conceptual questions about the definition of development and about the Didiman as ‘agents of change’. Historians have noted the presence of the Didiman, however, little research has been done on the philosophies and relevance of the Australian colonial agricultural extension program. They have tended not to scrutinise, analyse or examine the Didiman’s place in the Australian administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, nor in the process of post-war, pre-independence development. There is an absence of mention of the Didiman, especially in the areas of economic and social development, as prescribed initially by the League of Nations and later by the United Nations. This thesis addresses the lack of research about the Didiman and, therefore, closes a gap in Australia’s colonial history in Papua New Guinea.
After World War II, a drive for education and economic and political development introduced changes that were never contemplated by the pre-war administration. It meant the creation of new departments, including the DASF (Brown 2001, 19; Lamrock 1962; Fisk 1966; Harris 1977). Development was defined in terms of progress, expressed in the
5 language of economic growth, commercial profit, investment and balanced budgets. In terms of agricultural development, it also meant a shift from the exploitive policy of compulsory planting to one of collaborative, co-operative cultivation (Mair 1970, 21). The wide-ranging aims of agricultural extension were to:
(a) raise the levels of subsistence farming food production;
(b) improve the methods of indigenous agriculture;
(c) introduce the economic means of supporting a higher standard of living;
(d) bring about the optimum use of the agricultural resources;
(e) contribute to an increase in agricultural production;
(f) improve diet and standard of living; and finally,
(g) contribute to vocational training for the people (South Pacific Commission 1961, 61).
These aims were in line with the United Nations Charter for indigenous people in under- developed countries and promised the benefits of progress to all colonial subjects.
The first post-war Administrator of the combined territories, Jack Keith (J. K.) Murray, declared that the Department of Agriculture was to service the villages (Jinks 1971; White 1972; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979). He said, “the interests of the natives were paramount in … any proposed economy” (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 108). William Cottrell-Dormer, on taking up the position of Director of Agriculture in 1949, insisted on being able to create and maintain a Division of Extension to facilitate certain aspects of education in agriculture amongst the indigenous population (Univeristy of Queensland Fryer Library, Manuscript 124 (UQFL124)). An important aspect of this department and the newly created Division of Extension was to place an emphasis on the improvement of indigenous food supply with a view to improving the nutrition and living standards of the village people (Das 1988).
With the introduction of new subsistence crops, Didiman hoped to create a more nutritious diet (Brown 2001). DASF was invited to participate in a nutrition survey of New Guinea (Hipsley and Clements 1950), but the Australian Administration, surprisingly, stated that agriculture was, perhaps, the least important purpose of the survey. Nevertheless, some Didiman involved in the survey did so for the purpose of “ascertaining whether it would be possible and desirable to recommend a policy of
6 native agriculture which would combine the production of cash and native food crops without detriment to the latter” (Hipsley and Clements 1950, 13).
In 1962, an administrator in the new Konedobu bureaucracy responsible for agriculture, Jack Lamrock (1962, 3), added that the work of DASF was “to promote the development and advancement of primary industry” and in doing so “the rural people are to play an active part so that their standard of living may improve”. Later, the historians Denoon and Snowden (1988) and McKillop (1976) acknowledged that the reshaping of indigenous agriculture was instigated by Cottrell-Dormer and the Department of Agriculture. McKillop and Firth (1988) also claimed the introduction of a village-based agricultural production system in this era, eventually would have a major impact on Papua New Guinea rural life.
The development of an agriculture policy in Papua and New Guinea began from a notion of duty owed. That is, civilisation delivered in the form of export crops. Mair noted that the aim of developing a source of cash crops was a sound one, but was never an explicitly formulated policy (Mair 1970). Extension work or demonstration, education and training in agriculture was dependent on the objectives set by broader agriculture policy and was a direct result of political decisions made in Australia, the United Nations and, to some extent, in the field in Port Moresby. The early work of the Didiman contributed to rural Papua New Guineans in stimulating a rapid change in the quantity, quality and variety of subsistence, commercial and exportable agricultural products. A great deal of effort was put into the provision of basic resources such as planting material, marketing and processing facilities, as well as new crops and livestock. However, the impact was geographically uneven and ranged from no contact at all to resettlement, and whole scale changes in land use in some areas across the 40-year period. Therefore extension work in agriculture in Papua New Guinea may not have left a constructive legacy. For example, agricultural extension was not important enough to be mentioned specifically in Somare’s Eight Aims in 1973 or the National Goals and Directive Principles in 1975 but the general principle of rural development were considered (Kari 2005).
This thesis investigates an overlooked aspect of Australia’s relationship with the TPNG, and the relationship between Papua New Guineans and modernity. The key concepts
7 underpinning the research questions and analysis are development, diffusion, extension and change.
1.2 DEVELOPMENT
According to Mair (1984, 1), ‘development’, in its basic meaning, refers to a process that, in its “contemporary contexts … is a movement towards a condition that some of the world’s nations are supposed to have attained”. Mair noted that development was as old as the expansion of Europe and, in all interpretations, a notion of duty was present. At times this notion of duty had been towards God, as in the task given to ‘man’ to make a more productive world in which he had been set as God’s steward (Mair1984). At other times, a notion of duty had a more secular direction, as in the development of “new territories as trustees for civilization, for the commerce of the world” (Ludgard 1922).
The notion of duty remains in the form of mercantilism. Rich nations which possessed colonies realised that a duty was owed to the territories they controlled. However, McMichael (2000; Moore 1963; Lewis 1955) argued that development, as an idea, was clearly linked to economic growth and that there was a tendency to evaluate development in terms of metropolitan outcomes and gains. Turner (1980, 18-26) also alluded to development as merely a continuation of metropolitan capitalist expansion; therefore, from a Western viewpoint, development could be seen as a process of modernising ‘backward’ societies.
Moore (1963, 9) expressed development as:
a total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterizes the advanced economically prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World.
Modernisation and development, in this scenario, merged and overlapped in a single colonial view. In the 1950s and 1960s, development was seen as, primarily, a matter of economic growth and, secondly, as a policy for securing social changes necessarily associated with economic growth (Seers 1981, 7-22).
8 1.3 EXTENSION
The term ‘extension’ was coined at Cambridge University in 1873 by Richard Moulton, a lecturer in literature (Adams 1982, 1).
It was decided that formal education as given within the university be extended, to a limited degree, to that of other groups, excluding formal students, that is, to people who may have as their goal a university degree, but who are eager to improve their educational background either for personal gain or material gain. (Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (DASF) 1967)
It was a term used to describe the method of spreading knowledge to the mass of people outside the walls of formal education institutions. Early extension teaching was not concerned specifically with agriculture. Extension education programs generally featured four common elements that later became synonymous with agricultural extension. These were the knowledge to be extended, the people to be served, a central extension organisation, and the extension agent or contact person (Adams 1982, 1). The term ‘agricultural extension’ came into common use in the United States of America early in the twentieth century, when ‘cooperative extension services’ were formed under the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 (United States) (Lynn 1949). It then became synonymous with agriculture, education and training throughout the world (Lynn 1949, 62; Adams 1982). Section 2 of the Smith-Lever Act 1914 stated:
Agricultural extension work shall consist of the giving of instruction and practical demonstrations in agriculture and home economics to persons not attending or resident in colleges, and imparting to such persons information through field demonstrations, publications and otherwise. (Lynn 1949, 62)
Agricultural research had been mostly confined to the biological and physical sciences, however, the Smith-Lever Act allowed social and economic research to enter the field of agriculture (Busch and Sachs 1981, 142). The work of social and economic research was specifically aimed at helping American farmers become more efficient by applying the principles of farm management, marketing and forecasting to a wide range of products and helping to encourage the broad diffusion of agricultural innovation (Busch and Sachs 1981, 142; Wilson and Smith 1930). These principles subsequently spread worldwide to become part of agricultural policy in the colonies.
Agricultural extension was later developed in the 1920s by the British and used in their colonies to improve agricultural efficiency, labour, and land utilisation and capabilities (Adams 1982, pp. 53-54). After World War II, Australia instigated moves to introduce
9 these agricultural extension philosophies for the purpose of introducing modifications and changes to the Papua and New Guinean farmers. Agricultural extension became the work of the Didiman in the field. The Director of DASF in 1961, Bill Conroy, stated that:
extension programs were aimed at the agricultural advancement of under- developed communities or the modernization of their agriculture, necessitating changes in traditional agriculture practices that are likely to be the subject of important community values and perhaps lying at the root of the traditional social and economic order. (Conroy 1961, 39)
In 1967, DASF defined agricultural extention, operationally, as a programme which aims to increase the efficiency of the majority of farmers by constant adoption of methods to achieve their own and national goals (DASF 1967, 1). By 1972, Maunder (1972, 20), citing a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) publication, defined extension as a:
service system which assists farm people through educational procedures in improving farm methods and techniques, increasing production efficiency and income, bettering levels of living and lifting the social and educational standards of rural life.
According to Das (1988, pp. 18-30), extension was an economic instrument based on agrarian production, but was also seen as having a ‘notion of duty’ in that it alluded to an effort to achieve an improvement in the material well-being of the rural family and community. Extension was the central concept in the framework of development in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.
1.4 AGENTS OF CHANGE
This thesis argues that Didiman were agents of change. ‘Agents of change’, as a concept, relates to those actors, processes or mechanisms which bring about technological progress: “Technological progress does not just come to us, it involves continual change in social and environmental arrangements” (McMichael 2000, 3). Progress is brought about by agents of change. The concept of an agent of change is also linked to the concept of extension. Through extension activity, the rate of acceptance of innovations throughout a social system can increase. Seers (1981) defined the work of the change agent as one of adoption and diffusion. Crouch and Chamala (1981) observed that adoption and diffusion had their origins in agriculture and there was a need for change agents to possess a social responsibility and social commitment to the client or community they served.
10 1.5 DIFFUSION
As agents of change, Didiman were expected to modify or change agricultural practices among rural communities in the TPNG. They were expected to ‘get the message across’ to rural communities. To achieve this, Didiman applied strategies of implementation that drew on diffusion.
The idea was to diffuse, break down, disperse and gradually infiltrate the results of agricultural research to rural communities and, therefore, raise their standard of living. It was one thing to have a theory on development and to reframe it as a policy. What was then needed was an approach that would educate indigenous farmers and gradually bring their improved knowledge to the task of reforming or reshaping rural agriculture. It was a concept that used persuasion and not compulsion, allowing the individual farmer to make his own decisions. Roling and Engel (1991, 129) noted that “extension is not a powerful coercive instrument” as rural farmers could say ‘no’ to any suggestions for agricultural change. The concept of diffusion was based on argument, proof, conviction, trust and voluntary change. It was top-down and paternalistic in design and execution.
The model was simplistic, linear, one-way, hierarchical and biased in favour of technology. Berlo (1960, 40), a communications theorist, characterised diffusion as “the source-message-channel-receiver paradigm of communication”. However, as a concept underpinning the approach used by Didiman to convey messages about changes to indigenous agriculture production (the source of the message), the success of this form of communication depended on the relationship between Didiman and indigenous farmers. The attitudes of the Didiman towards indigenous farmers reflected their awareness of diffusion processes. Nevertheless, as an approach, diffusion was seen as flexible enough to include, not only oral instruction, but also demonstrations, posters and written articles. These would generate the message and produce the change required by the Australian Government’s policies for agricultural advancement and development in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.
After 1945, the emphasis in development had been on technical advancement and economic growth, with little attention paid to the social implications of planned change. Gradually the concepts of development, extension, agents of change and diffusion were linked. They underpinned the work and philosophies of the Didiman within agricultural development in the TPNG.
11 Following WWII, many countries were faced with new problems in managing the development of colonies. Consequently, the decision-makers, planners and administrators were drawn to key words which encapsulated their goals. Development, extension, change and diffusion became the catch-cries of colonial planners as they were charged with the duty of improving the life-style and the economic conditions of the colonised inhabitants whom they were administering. As most colonial inhabitants had some form of farming system, an agent of change situated in a rural location was the model used to implement agricultural expansion and create economic development. In colonised countries, such as the TPNG, subsistence or traditional agriculture dominated, however, for national progress to occur, new but practical schemes in agriculture were considered as essential. It was thought that, through an agent of change and an approach based on education and the diffusion of ideas, rural people could be stimulated to make changes that would result in a more efficient production and marketing of farm products, conservation of natural resources, more comfortable homes, improved health and a more satisfying community life. The concept of change through extension took form as a policy of direct contact in order to demonstrate new crops, give advice and assistance to farmers and to help improve their methods of production (Adams 1982).
The key practical element was the agricultural extension worker. He or she was the agent through which agricultural change would happen (Adams 1982; van Den Ban and Hawkins, 1988). However, a change in farming methods also impacted on the social, economic and political lives of indigenous farmers. To understand their role, Didiman had to be familiar with the theory and practice of decision-making, communication, the psychology of learning and of perception, and the diffusion and adoption of innovations. The theoretical basis for agricultural extension was formulated around these understandings (van Den Ban and Hawkins, 1988, 2). It was realised that indigenous farmers were spending a lot of time growing food for themselves, but, by improving the farmers’ efficiency, their labour and land could be released for the production of surplusses. Agricultural extension services were then developed to relay technical information to specialist agents based in rural areas in the form of recommendations, for example, on crop varieties, dates of sowing, row spacing and storage. Special residential training courses were established for extension officers.
The duties of an extension department became more pronounced and came to include the investigation of indigenous farming methods in order to document what was useful, to
12 stimulate the improvement of the indigenous methods of cultivation and the introduction of new methods, to give advice to farmers and to train subordinate staff. Agricultural extension, as a concept, was applied in practical forms to agricultural development in most British colonies. Extension took ‘concrete’ shape as a hierarchical structure with a network of professionally trained field staff at its base, supervised by administrators and specialists. Extension was part of the effort to achieve a balanced social and economic development of rural areas and, by necessity, meant an increase in production, which would also enable indigenous people to gain a monetary income. Agricultural extension had developed into a theory, not only of agricultural development, but of development in general.
1.6 FINDING THE DIDIMAN
Agriculture and agricultural development within the Territory of Papua and New Guinea and after independence (1975) has been examined and discussed by geographers, historians, anthropologists and scientists. There is regular reference to ‘agriculture’ in the context of development, and colonial and decolonisation programs, but no systematic, scholarly record on the application of those policies in the TPNG. Agriculture’s role in economic development has been discussed in papers, journal articles and other publications. It has been the focus of conferences and seminars in Australia, Papua New Guinea and other Pacific countries, but there is still a gap in our knowledge of the work of Didiman and Didimissis in the pre-independence era.
Anthropologists in the 1960s and the 1970s noted cash cropping in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. They described the early success stories of the ‘big men of business’, entrepreneurs who organised coffee or cocoa plantations using traditional ties to get land and labour (Epstein, 1968; Salisbury 1970; Finney 1973). However, these accounts have tended to focus on the negative effects of development. Other anthropologists have discussed agriculture as an integral part of local culture, examining, for instance, the Sepik region and yam production (Huber 1978, pp. 175-6; Tuzin 1972). Pig husbandry (Waddell 1973, 36), plants grown for non-food purposes (Lea 1996), the influence of magic and sorcery on crop failures or successes (Newton 1985, 93); all have suggested the social role of food consumption, production and exchange.
13 Environmental damage through agricultural practices in remote areas in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea have been discussed and examined. Authors have noted the irreversible damage done to the land through limited labour inputs and minimal land management (Battaglia 1990, 92), as well as grass burning practices (Finch 1989, 134). However, other authors have noted practices of specific conservation measures and noted soil retaining barriers (Wood and Humphries, Sillitoe, 1993).
Historians and geographers have written extensively on agriculture systems within Papua and New Guinea (White 1972; Mitchell 1976; Densley 1977; Komba 1977; Golson 1988; Jarrett 1989; Bourke 2001, pp. 219-235; Minnegal and Dwyer 2001, pp. 269-285; Ballard 2002). However, much of the research is conducted within an ethnographic, anthropological or archaeological theoretical framework. It questions the evolution of agriculture in Papua New Guinea, but ignores the perspective of colonial policy and practices of Didiman (Williams 1969; Hogbin 1973; Sillitoe 1979; Lacey 1980; Epstein 1992; Sillitoe 1996; Strathern and Stewart 1998; McPherson 2001; Young and Clark 2001).
Researchers have also noted the differences between agricultural systems that operate within Papua New Guinea. White (1972, 14) acknowledged the significance of subsistence farming among Papuans and New Guineans from which they obtained the bulk of their foods through a primitive, but highly efficient, horticulture. Kelleher and Klein (1999, 104) defined horticulture as a focus on domestic plants, while Minnegal and Dwyer (2001, 104) noted that horticulture had a major emphasis on the immediate returns from resources within shifting agriculture or subsistence. This is distinct from agriculture. Kellher and Klien (1999) noted that an essential element of agriculture is the ability of technology to increase yields, either for an economic purpose or for feeding more people in smaller areas. Gourou (1958) believed that, if the horticultural practices of subsistence were not replaced, the large-scale European forms of cultivation, the yield and the quality of the produce would decline and the prime costs increase.
Stent (1962-63) acknowledged that to go beyond a horticultural system to an efficient agricultural system is an essential prerequisite for a country’s economic development. Minnegal and Dwyer (2001) noted that to reform a country’s agriculture is difficult, as agricultural systems are embedded within the total socio-cultural system of which they are part. When agricultural systems replace horticulture, many people have been driven
14 back to foraging or into extinction. In the case of Papua New Guineans, Lett (1942) stated that they must advance under the pressure of advancing civilisation or by the instrumentality of their own customs and traditions. Therefore, the development of agriculture becomes a priority for the coloniser; as Lett (1942, 127) noted, it becomes necessary to “convert the entirely, irresponsible savage to a regular system of commercial agriculture”. As stated by Gourou (1958, 159), “to raise the standard of living of tropical peoples the first step is to abolish the … system of shifting cultivation … since it is incompatible with a high standard of living.”
After World War II, agriculture became part of the economic development policy of Australia for the jointly administrated Territories of Papua and New Guinea. Agricultural extension was to play an important part in not only cash crops, but also in the improvement of indigenous agriculture. However, Ward and Ballard (1976, 445) noted that the reason for developing the economy and social welfare of Papua New Guinea was essentially to advance the interests of Australia or Australians. Therefore, the development of agriculture was to assist Australia’s economy, especially in providing products of tropical agriculture and to raise revenue to fulfil Australia’s obligations to the United Nations.
Traditional farming systems in eastern New Guinea have benefitted from introduced crop species since 1870 through the arrival of missionaries, traders, planters, explorers and the commencement of permanent settlement (White 1972; Ballard 2001; Panoff 1969; Powell 1982). However, Elster (1983) makes a distinction between ‘substitution’, which was a “change in the production process of existing technical knowledge” and ‘innovation’ which was “the production of new technical knowledge”. It is through ‘innovation’ that ‘development’ implies changes in technology and an increase in useful material resources. This distinction between ‘substitution’ and ‘innovation’ is important, as it is through ‘innovation’ that agricultural development is based. For Mosher (1971), the term ‘agricultural development’ can be represented as a cluster of a least six related, but separated, concepts:
(a) agricultural expansion;
(b) increased production (per acre of cropped land or per head of livestock);
(c) agricultural growth,
15 (d) a situation characterised by the rising value of agricultural products per agriculture worker;
(e) rising income per person employed; and
(f) agricultural transformation.
Das (1988) stated that it is for these reasons that the subsistence farmer, during colonisation, was not given adequate attention and has thus remained relatively untouched in Papua New Guinea agricultural development. Powell (1982, 64) also noted the neglect of subsistence food crops, but states that food shortages were a relatively infrequent occurrence and usually restricted in distribution. Also the indigene had their own strategies for coping with food shortages.
The Hoskins Oil Palm settlement, which became one of Papua New Guinea’s major developments, is suggested by Ploeg (1972, pp. 21-118) as an example of intelligent, careful, technical planning. However, it also showed the effects of administration policies which incorporated Australian assumptions concerning social and economic behaviour. Other literature about smallholders and land settlement schemes initiated by the Australian government for economic development have been discussed by Spinks, Langton and Gray (1964), Fenbury (1972), Carrad (1982) and MacWilliam (1988).
The literature regarding agricultural extension and the Didiman in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea by historians is not extensive. The Directors of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF), Cottrell-Dormer (1946), Dwyer (1952), Henderson (1955) and Conroy (the last Australian Director) are all mentioned by historians and in political memoirs in relation to policy changes, economic development and retirements (Hasluck 1979; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979; Downs 1980). The lack of organisation, lack of manpower and the policies of the Australian Administration and DASF have been acknowledged, but not the men and women who implemented the changes in agriculture (Downs 1980; Ballard 1981; McKillop 1988).
Shand’s and Straatmans’ (1974) work on cash crop development in Papua New Guinea discussed agricultural extension in Boana, Sinsina, Karkar Island and Maprik. They also report on the development of cash crops and the existence of agricultural extension activity within these districts. These extension activities related to agricultural patrols where extension emphasis was on cash crops such as coffee, vegetable production for
16 local markets, passionfruit, peanuts, pyrethrum, coconuts, cocoa and rice. They also noted the inadequacies of agricultural extension staff and the impact on crop yields. Extension activities in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea are discussed (White 1972; Griffin et al. 1979; Downs 1980; Denoon and Snowden 1988). Little is written about the recruitment of the Didiman who could be persuaded to the Territory or the quality of those recruited—those who had the special skills needed, general qualities of character and temperament required to be Australian colonial officers.
There has been a substantial growth of written material on cash crop development in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea from the 1950s through to the 1990s. Crops examined in crop production literature include rice (Cottrell-Dormer 1951; Poggendorff 1953; Spate 1953; Katayama 1962; Wienand and Young 1972), coffee (Cartledge 1978; Downs 1980; Grossman 1984; the Department of Primary Industries (DPI) 1985; Robinson 1993; Sinclair 1995), rubber (Dwyer 1941; Hogbin 1964; Parker 1967; Arnold 1978) and cocoa (Clarke and Offtlele 1980; Bridgland 1981; Bleeker and Freyne 1981; Atony and Parton 1991).
In the post-independence era, 1975 and onwards, agricultural literature has concentrated on food crop production and has been extensively analysed. Conferences concerning food crop production, food security and nutrition within post-independence Papua New Guinea have been held. These conferences have covered subject matter concerning food and nutrition, crop production, food shortages, farming systems and crop production, and policy issues (Wohlt, Allen, Goie and Harvey 1975; Wilson and Bourke 1976; Bourke and Kesavan 1982; Bourke, Allen and Salisbury 2000). The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) has also published numerous publications on agriculture in Papua New Guinea. These publications have included discussions relating to yam nutrition, coffee and cocoa policy and mapping land resource potential in Papua New Guinea (ACIAR 2001-2010). The Waigani Seminars (Inglis 1968; Ward 1970; Brammall and May 1974) produced papers relating to the Australian administration and administrators, archeological sites in Papua New Guinea, rural education and localisation. Agriculture, agricultural extension and Didiman are not prominent within these papers.
This literature review reveals the absence of reference to Didiman in relation to agricultural development in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Didiman have been
17 overlooked by historians and others writing about Papua New Guinean agriculture as the ground force that introduced policies through patrolling, education and field work. Little has been examined or discussed concerning Didiman’s education, recruitment, in-service training, field work or living conditions. For example, Waiko (1993), in the first history of Papua New Guinea by an indigenous author, fails to mention the work of the Agricultural Extension Officers as part of agricultural development. It is hoped that this thesis will fill the gap in Australia’s and Papua New Guinea’s history of the Australian Agricultural Extension Officers’ (Didiman) contribution to Papua New Guinea’s agricultural development.
1.7 DATA SOURCES
This research is qualitative. The collection of primary data for this thesis came from:
(a) the National Archives of Australia;
(b) the National Library of Australia;
(c) the Pacific Manuscript Bureau (PMB);
(d) the National Archives of Papua New Guinea;
(e) the Papua New Guinea Collection of the Somare Library (UPNG);
(f) the Fryer Library (University of Queensland);
(g) NationalAgricultural Research Institute (NARI), Lae, PNG;
(h) the Archival Library of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC); and
(i) original documents from several ex-Agricultural Extension Officers (Didiman).
Key evidence was found in Australian policy papers, committee minutes, parliamentary papers and field reports to Port Moresby and Canberra, and other manuscripts including the papers of the first Administrator of TPNG, J. K. Murray, and the first Director of Agriculture for Papua New Guinea after World War II, W. Cottrell-Dormer. Both Murray and Cottrell-Dormer were agriculturalists trained at the University of Queensland.
Other manuscript collections, of individuals who worked extensively in agriculture in the Territory, included the private papers of R. E. P. Dwyer and F. Henderson; both of
18 whom eventually became Directors of the DASF and introduced policies from Australia to the Agricultural Extension Officers in the field. Another key manuscript is the collection of D. Fenbury, the Director of the post-World War II Department of Native Affairs, who implemented policies for the Administration concerning the indigenous population, indigenous agriculture and the introduction of cash cropping within the Territory.
Further archival material included reports and notes of patrols, projects, special secondments, conferences, descriptions of postings (role and dates), modes of transport (including relevant equipment), administrative paperwork, maps, photos, movies, slides, tapes, sketches and newspaper clippings. The reports of visiting United Nation Missions to Trust territories in the Pacific, from 1950 to 1971, papers from the Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA), DASF Annual Reports, the DASF Extension Manual and the DASF Manual of Procedures, Agriculture Conferences held in the TPNG, Rural Broadcasts (a series of radio talks prepared by DASF on TPNG agriculture) and DASF circular memoranda, and other miscellaneous printed records also contributed to the compilation of a history of agricultural extension.
A limitation is that, like most material held in archives and libraries, there are gaps and missing records. Much of the archival material held in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea during World War II was destroyed, whilst in Papua, some material has been lost, degraded or simply destroyed. Records sent to Australia in 1942 and 1943 for safekeeping, were later returned to Papua New Guinea in 1957, when an archives repository was established (Green and Helia 1971, 164). There are also only a few archival records of agricultural development within the Territory prior to World War II. These include the private papers of F. Henderson, who worked in the newly established Department of Agriculture in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea prior to World War II (National Australian Archives (ANA), No. A452)3. However, the New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, published before World War II, does contain evidence of the
3 Frank Henderson was appointed as an inspector and instructor for the Department of Agriculture in the public service of the Territory of New Guinea in 1936. Between 1936 and 1939, Henderson was responsible for the selection and breeding of indigenous food crops. During this period, a comprehensive collection of indigenous food plants was built up and introductions were tested in the field and in the plantation labourers’ diet. During 1939 to 1941, Henderson was working in Talasea doing extension work based on the earlier work of seed selection and indigenous needs for crop diversification (National Archives, Canberra: Henderson, F. C.; Series No. A452).
19 agricultural work directed to the European plantation owners4. The author was able to obtain opinions and advice from Didiman who served in the TPNG during this period (from 1945 to 1975) and who were able to verify facts about the administrative structure and the philosophies they held about the policies and strategies implemented by Australia. The author had long discussions with Didiman in the form of informal meetings, emails and telephone calls.
1.8 HISTORY OF THE TERRITORIES OF PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
Until the advent of the colonial era, the majority of indigenous people, in what we now call ‘developing countries’, lived relatively stable relationships with their environment, producing food by applying the same economic organisation, social structure and technological use as their ancestors. Their methods of production were well adapted to the local environment, involving minimum risk and ensuring enough food for the family in all but exceptional years. This is known as traditional economy, subsistence agriculture or swidden agriculture. After the expansion of the European colonial empires, this form of farming was interrupted or modified and changed by foreign colonial governments, missionaries and traders for export, either as exotic foods or as raw materials, for manufacturing in the metropolis.
The island of New Guinea lies between 1° and 9° south of the Equator and contains a land area of approximately 462,840 square kilometres or 178,703 square miles. It lies less than 160 kilometres across the Torres Strait from Australia’s northern tip, Cape York.
In 1828, the Netherlands annexed the western portion of the island of New Guinea. In August 1884, discussions between Britain and Germany began over spheres of influence in New Guinea and on 6th November 1884, a British protectorate over the southeast coast of the island was declared. This was followed by a declaration on 1st April 1889 for the north coast and the Bismarck Archipelago by Germany, at which time the area became a German protectorate.
4 Articles from various years in this journal point to the introduction of new plantation cash crops and the instructions given to indigenous people working on plantations. Help for indigenous agriculture was limited to seed distribution. Newspaper articles also point to the introduction of new food plants being introduced to village gardens; see “Native Agriculture in Papua”, Pacific Islands Monthly, Oct. 1934, p.38.
20 In 1901, British New Guinea was transferred to Australia as the Territory of Papua. This was formalised in 1906 with the Australian parliament passing the Papua Act. At the start of World War I, Australian troops occupied German New Guinea and established a military administration over the northern part of the eastern half of the New Guinea mainland, New Britain and the arc of islands running from the Admiralty Islands to Bougainville. The Australian military administration was replaced by the Australian civil administration in 1921. Under Article 22 of the League of Nations Treaty, New Guinea’s administration was transferred to Australia and became known as the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Papua and New Guinea were administered under separate administrations. Papua was administered under magisterial divisions; each division was under a Resident Magistrate assisted by Assistant Resident Magistrates and Patrol Officers. In the Mandated Territory of New Guinea the administrative districts operated under a District Officer, Assistant District Officer and Patrol Officers.
Between 1942 and 1945, both territories became battlegrounds between the Japanese, Australian and American forces. After the war, Australia voluntarily placed the Mandated Territory under the United Nations and in 1946 a trusteeship agreement between Australia and the General Assembly of the United Nations made Australia the administering authority. At the same time provision was made to link the trust territory in an administrative union with the Australian Territory of Papua. This was consolidated by the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 which provided for common legislative, administrative and judicial systems.
In the period between the two wars, the economic development of these two territories, as in many colonies of the time, was based on agriculture centred on the institution of the plantations and mining. This changed after World War II to a rationale of promotion and advancement of primary industry which included indigenous farmers. To develop agriculture within a colony, it was thought that a modification to, or in some cases the complete changing of, existing traditional farming systems was necessary to improve the material welfare of the farming population and for the future national interest of the sovereign state.
Historically, the development philosophy which was applied in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea equated economic development with agricultural development (Chamala 1988, pp. 1-17; Das 1988, pp. 18-30). To achieve this modification to, or
21 complete change of, indigenous farming systems, the Australian Government adopted and utilised a programme based on agricultural extension.
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis will examine the effects of agricultural change in the Australian colonial Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG) from 1945 through to independence in 1975. It will examine the policies and practices implemented by the Australian Administration and the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF). In particular, the training, instruction and teaching work of the Division of Agricultural Extension, which was created after World War II and eventually involved approximately 250 men and women, will be scrutinised.
Before World War II, the Mandated Territory of New Guinea had begun to use agricultural extension in the field, however, much of the technical assistance and guidance was directed towards the colonial plantation owners and little was instigated for the indigenous farmer. In the Australian Territory of Papua there was no extension service.
Together with the policies and strategies implemented by the post-war Australian Administration and the DASF, this thesis will also examine the contribution of Didiman—Australian Agricultural Extension Officers working in the field. The effect of these extension aims was dependent upon the professional competence of the Agricultural Extension Officers. Their task was to promote agricultural development through the introduction of cash crops and increase food production among indigenous farmers. The agricultural officers who carried out this work were known by the indigenous name as Didiman and Didimisses5.
5 There seems to be some controversy over the origins of the word Didiman. Peter Sack claims (personal communication to R. M. Bourke, July 1977) that the origin of the word Didiman is a corruption of the name of a German officer, Dr Bredeman, who was based in Rabaul and was the senior curator of the Rabaul Botanical Gardens prior to World War I. This also seems to be the opinion of Peter Mulhausler (1975, 106). However, the Pacific Islands Monthly (May, 1956, pp. 29- 30) suggested that the word originated from a German surveyor named Dietmann, who laid out the original Rabaul Botanical Gardens, and Didiman is a derivative of his name. Regardless of the word’s origins, in time it has been accepted into Tok Pisin (the national language of Papua New Guinea) as meaning an agricultural officer involved in extension work; see also Mulhausler, P. (1976, pp. 122- 125); von Fleckenstein, F. (1980, pp. 74-83).Didimisis were female agricultural extension officers. The plural of Didiman in Tok Pisin is Didiman and, consequently, is used in this plural form throughout this thesis.
22 This research is about the history of the TPNG, the history of Australia’s colonial adventures and the history of a particular group of Australians working in agriculture (Schafer 1980; Neuman 2003, 415)6, This thesis connects the actions of the Agricultural Extension Officer as an individual, or a group of individuals, to the political and economic structures of the Australian colonial administration (Schafer 1980, 33).
This research also has a structure that relies on narrative history. Neuman defines narrative history as “a type of writing about a historical setting in which the writer attempts to ‘tell a story’ by following chronological order, describing particular people and events and focusing on colourful details” (2003, 539). This thesis includes dialogue with ex-Didiman who worked in the Territory, their stories, philosophies and their views on their own contribution to the development of agriculture within the Territory.
The thesis also applies an inductive strategy entailing the collection of data, followed by analysis and the development of generalisations on the role of agricultural extension from 1945 until independence in 1975. A second strategy, retroductive, was then applied to investigate the underlying mechanisms and reveal the observed strategies of the Australian colonial administration. These mechanisms reveal the ontological assumptions of the work and activities of the Didiman within the framework of development requirements of the United Nations, which Australia applied to the Territories.
The chapters follow a broad chronological order exploring the policies of the Australian Administration in three broadly defined stages: post-war rehabilitation from 1945 to 1955, cash crop production from 1955 to 1965 and market expansion from 1955 to 1975.
This thesis consists of an introduction, Chapter 1: Didiman, Agriculture and Colonies, five chapters and a conclusion, Chapter 7: Didiman and the Impact of Australian Agricultural Policies.
Chapter 2: The Evolution of Agricultural Policy in the Colonial Periphery is an historical account of the development of agriculture in the colonial world. It examines the development of colonial agriculture from an informal to a formal basis, one that was
6 According to Shafer, ‘history’ means the events of the past, a record of the past and a discipline that studies the past. ‘Historiography’ is defined as the method of doing historical research or of gathering and analysing historical evidence.
23 organised through a system of policies and procedures implemented by colonial administrators. It discusses the historical link between the development of agriculture and botanical gardens, and the introduction of scientific research relating to agricultural produce in the colonies. After World War I and the commencement of the League of Nations, a colonial mandate system was introduced, which was the start of nations creating agricultural policies for colonies. Chapter 2 also discusses the evolution of agriculture from a notion of duty towards the state, to one that eventually encompassed the indigenous farmer. This was implemented by a strategy known as ‘agricultural extension’. Chapter 2 is divided into three sections:The Empires and Agriculture, The League of Nations and Agricultural Development, andAgriculture and Extension. Chapter 2 discusses colonial empires and their movement towards creating an agricultural strategy for the development of their colonies and entrance to world markets.
Chapter 3: Agriculture: the Economic Imperative in developing the Territory of Papua and New Guinea discusses the history of agricultural policy and development within Papua New Guinea. It outlines the different approaches to agriculture in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea and Papua, which were treated separately until the end of World War II. This chapter also examines the establishment of a joint administration, when the Australian Government began to form a policy for agricultural development that included the indigenous farmer. This policy was not driven from ‘notions’ of duty towards the colonised inhabitants who had suffered a war that was not of their making, but because Australia wanted the colony to be able to support itself. Australia also had to fulfil international obligations set out by the United Nations. Chapter 3 discusses the implications of ‘development’ on increased productivity and rural betterment among farmers. The sub-headings in this chapter are Approaches to Agriculture in the War Years and The Emergence of a Post World War II Agricultural Policy.
Chapter 4: Didiman: The Australian Agricultural Officers analyses staffing of the Division of Extension and the recruitment in universities and agricultural colleges in a post-war Australia. It examines the type of men who were employed, noting that Australia operated under the ‘White Australia Policy’ and this affected the employment of men who were not from Australia or Britain. It discusses the minimum education qualifications of Didiman joining the service and their indenture of cadetships, their pre- service training and in-service training. It concludes this was of particular importance as Australia did not have a school of tropical agriculture from which to draw experienced
24 tropical agriculturalists. Chapter 4 also discusses the retention rates of the Didiman in regard to grievances relating to pay within the rank and file of the Division and the movement of Didiman to other career choices away from DASF. Chapter 4 concludes that working conditions in the field were reflected by problems of isolation, living conditions, staff postings and the Didiman’s dissatisfaction, and their personal response to the policies that determined their work practices. This chapter discusses seven issues: The Role of the Didiman, Recruiting Didiman, Cadetships, In-Service Training, Principle of Diffusion, Conditions in the Field and Retention of Didiman.
Chapter 5: The Field Work of the Didiman discusses the different methods used to change farming systems in the TPNG and concludes that the establishment of agricultural and extension stations and centres was central to bringing change to the rural areas. It highlights the role of patrolling in relation to familiarisation, investigation and contact with the people of the TPNG. It acknowledges the difficulties related to this process in relation to sparsely and overpopulated areas, and the difficulties of introducing a monetary system, based on the individual farmer, to people who were entrenched in a system of communal values, beliefs and organisation. It discusses smallholder farmers and the introduction of rural progress societies. Chapter 5 discusses the proposed changes to traditional land tenure to accommodate and advance the individual smallholder away from a communal-based farming enterprise to one based on the concept of individual farming. It also discusses the proposed land settlement schemes and mobility patterns. Chapter 5 contains sections entitled Didiman and Formal Agricultural Training, Patrols, Didiman and Smallholder Farmers and Land Settlement Schemes.
Chapter 6: Administration, Policies and DASF 1946 – 1972 appraises the structure of administration and policies applied to the TPNG and the structure and policies developed for the creation of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF). It became the arm of the Territory’s economic development. Chapter 6 analyses the formation of a division for agriculture extension within DASF and critiques the process by which it intended to bring rural change to farming communities. The chapter concludes that the aim, which was to assist subsistence farmers by the introduction of new food crops, was compromised by the policies of introducing cash cropping. The chapter also concludes that the Australian Government’s principal objective was to change the existing indigenous farming systems because it was seen in a global
25 development context as not being efficient in terms of modern agriculture. The key focus of the Australian Administration was land utilisation and maximising land capabilities. The chapter questions whether DASF had the administrative structure and human resources to implement changes in indigenous agriculture. Chapter 6 is divided into three parts: Organisational and Functional Changes in DASF 1946-1972, The 1960S and Canberra-Konedobu and Didiman.
Chapter 7: Didiman and the Impact of Australian Agricultural Policies discusses the impact of colonial policies and strategies implemented by the Australian Administration through DASF and extension activities. It discusses the contribution and lasting effectiveness of change instigated by the agricultural extension worker as an external force in the traditional economy of rural areas of the TPNG. It concludes that extension workers did instigate permanent change to agriculture in the Territory and that, marginally, some policies of agricultural extension were retained by the post- independence Ministry of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea. This chapter evaluates the usefulness of concepts such as development, agricultural extension and cash-economy in constructing a history of rural change in the TPNG and tests the initial hypothesis against the empirical evidence presented on the role of the Didiman in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. The thesis opens with a short prologue and concludes with a brief epilogue.
This thesis argues that agricultural extension was applied as a means to bring about economic development. An examination of the strategies developed by the DASF in the field of agricultural extension reveals its effectiveness in strengthening the original system of subsistence agriculture, with, perhaps, some increase in dietary balance. The Didiman were partially successful. The main contribution of this thesis is to document, for the first time, the actual work, philosophies and contribution of agricultural extension to economic development in the Territory of Paua and New Guinea in the often overlooked 1945 to 1975 period of Papua New Guinea’s history. This thesis tells the Didiman’s story.
26 CHAPTER 2: THE EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN THE COLONIAL PERIPHERY
After World War II, in the recently joined territories of Papua and New Guinea, Australia adopted an agricultural extension policy. The origin of this policy goes back to post World War I rethinking of the relationship between colonial power and economic development. Empires had founded their nineteenth century colonies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific on resource exploitation and settlement. From the beginning, several colonies developed a monoculture agricultural economy based on a system of plantations. The beginnings of this form of agriculture can be traced back to the Portuguese Empire in the colony of Brazil, where they produced exotic ‘groceries’, such as sugar, for the European markets (Deere 1949 and 1950; Ratekin 1934; Schwartz 1985; Russell-Wood 1992; Fieldhouse 1965; Crosby 1972; Godinho 1963 and 1965). By the seventeenth century, plantation agriculture was producing specialised crops as the best method of drawing wealth from tropical and subtropical colonies. By the end of the nineteenth century, the main colonial powers included Britain, Portugal, France, Holland, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, Spain, Belgium and Russia. The French, Dutch, British and Spanish were using plantation systems throughout the Caribbean and parts of North America. In the Pacific, plantation economies existed in Hawaii, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa and New Guinea. Development, expansion and responsibility were bound up in the mercantile system of the controlling state.
To create colonies as ‘grocery stores’, colonial regimes nurtured, exchanged and experimented with tropical plants to generate new markets (Garcia d’Ortas 1563; Lipson 1956; Baker 1970; Sideri 1970; Arruda 1980; Walvin 1997)7. A second impetus was the need to feed the growing slave labour force (Curtain 1969, pp. 87-91). The establishment of botanical gardens led to a scientific approach to agriculture, which eventually saw the establishment of colonial and metropolitan departments of agriculture. Silva de Souza (1997, 94) argued that it was “selfishness, not cooperation that marked the process of agriculture technology transfer from European Empires to their tropical colonies”. The motive for scientific research and knowledge transfer was chiefly to induce the indigenous farmers and settlers to adopt new crops for export to Europe. For indigenous
7 Garcia d’Ortas’ book was in part appropriated by the leading European botanist Charles Lecluse who published Aromatum et Simplicium Aliquot Medicamentorum apud Indious Nascientium Historia (Antwerp, 1567). This work was translated into Italian (1576), French (1602) and English (1604).
27 farmers, this meant not only a loss of land but an introduction to monoculture, the forced growing of non-food crops and the introduction of slavery in some cases and certainly indentured labour. There was no notion of duty towards the colonised people as agriculturalists in their own right and no acknowledgment that they followed a complex system of land tenure and were highly skilled in resource management and production to satisfy their material needs (White 1972, 14)8. In the early twentieth century, the idea that an agricultural education or extension programme was important in the governing of colonies became associated with two concepts, the notion of duty (Ludgard 1922) and the need to foster development (Darby 1987, 3; Kidd 1894 and 1898; Thornton 1959; Memni 1967; Scott 1973; Green 1980; Nandy 1983)9. Hobson (1938, pp. 227-256) accepted that governments of ‘civilised powers’ had rights and responsibilities with respect to the development of the tropics and their people. While Robinson and Gallagher (1967, pp. 395-508) noted that Joseph Chamberlain’s view of the neglected estates of the tropical world was one of development and the state was required to act in the interests of prosperity. According to Mair (1984, 1), development is as old as the expansion of Europe and that, in all interpretations up to the present, there had been some notion of duty. It was a duty that allowed the great powers to trade, invest in and control territories. Adam Smith (1776) provided the theoretical rationale that free trade was the surest means of economic growth for empires. He described, in 1776, how
a great empire was established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of customers who should be obliged to buy from the shops of our different producers, all the goods with which these [colonies] could supply. (cited in Campbell, Skinner and Todd 1976, 661)
According to Campbell, Skinner and Todd (1976, 661), colonial rule was one of the “mean and malignant expedients of the mercantile system” in which colonies not only supported free trade and mercantilism, but also were dependent upon them for their own fiscal existence (Darby 1987,60). Robinson and Gallagher (1967, 8) noted that Victorian statesmen strongly preferred influence to political possession as a means to national
8 This is known as subsistence farming known or traditional economy, which was an efficient form of horticulture. Horticulture was defined as “people who focus on domestic plants” (Kelleher & Klein 1999, 104). It involves a “major emphasis on immediate returns on resources within agriculture or subsistence” (Minnegal & Dwyer 2001, 2). 9 Darby noted that, alongside the concern to secure diplomatic advantage and the desire for economic benefit, stood a body of thought and belief that advanced peoples had obligations to those less advanced. Societies which had travelled ahead had some duty to offer guidance, instruction and even to rule. Signposts were marked by concepts drawn from politics and economics: trusteeship, colonial development and modernisation. Kidd argued the case for the economic development of the tropics under European administration, stating that work would have to be managed by the white man and the tropics governed as a trust for civilisation. Scott (275-6) notes that the notion of duty is expressed as “man-bap”, that is “I am your father and I am your mother”.
28 prosperity and world power. However, alongside this rationale of free trade ran an evangelistic justification “to save, transform and protect natives” (Dougals 1999, 357) in which “moral improvement went hand in hand with material advancement” (Douglas 1999, 54). This attitude by empires extended throughout the colonised world to Africa, India, the Dutch East Indies and the Caribbean, and the imperial powers applied it in the Pacific Islands.
The Pacific Islands was the last area of the globe to be settled by Europeans. It began with the Spanish, in 1668, settling temporarily in the Marianas. However, colonisation of the Pacific did not commence in earnest until the 1840s. By the turn of the century the entire Pacific was under European hegemony (Morewell 1960; Campbell 1990; Robiallard 1992; Denoon 1997; Scarr 2001; Howe 2002). By 1920, Australia administered Papua, New Guinea and Nauru; New Zealand had control of the Cooks, Samoa, Niue and Tokelau; and the Dutch had West New Guinea. The British ruled the Ellice Islands, Fiji, Gilbert Islands, Banaba, Solomon Islands and Tonga. Japan, until it lost control after the Second World War, had mandates over the former German territories in Micronesia. The French held the Society Islands, Marquesas, Wallis and Futuna, New Caledonia; and the United States of America held eastern Samoa, Hawaii, and Guam (Schofield 1919; Masterman 1934; Brookes 1941; Luke 1945; Ward 1948; Legge 1958; Kennedy 1977; Steven 1983; Howe 1984; Aldrich 1990; Heiry 1997). Not all of these colonial powers developed a post World War I colonial agricultural policy, but the word ‘development’ became a catch-cry for colonial powers and their colonies. The League of Nations, Permanent Mandate Commission (Minutes, 1st session 1921, 4), when introducing the mandate system, stated that ‘development’ formed
a compromise between the proposition advanced by the advocates of annexation and the proposition put forward by those who wish to entrust the colonial territories to an international administration. (Wright 1923, 691, and 1930; Hall 1948; White 1926; van Rees 1927).
Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant (Rappard 1925, 205)10 advocated a better system for the administration of ‘backward’ areas than had existed under the regimes of colonies, protectorates or spheres of influence.
Better in the sense that it would more effectively secure the liberty, material welfare and opportunity for development of the native inhabitants and that it
10 Under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the historical antecedents, administrative organisation and legal characteristics of the institution of mandates are set up and are entirely Anglo- Saxon in origin.
29 would more effectively secure the opportunity of all states of the world to equal participation in the trade and resources of the area. (Wright 1923, 691)
Modernisation and development in this scenario assumed a single theoretical approach and became a path followed by colonial regimes. In the aftermath of World War I, colonial governments realised, or were pressured into acknowledging, that their duty was greater than protecting planters, miners and traders, and facilitating their operations. It was the duty of the European powers in, for example, Africa,
to keep as its first and foremost object, not for the benefit of European trade and the production of raw materials for the industries in Europe, but for the moral and material advancement of the natives of the country. (Faulkner and Mackie 1933, 4)
Changes in agriculture could answer to both objectives and, based on Article 22, the colonial welfare and rural betterment of colonised people could improve through cash- cropping and export production. This led to the development of a system of agricultural extension as a practical scheme to bring rural betterment to colonised people under the mandate system. The mandate was a dual one, concerned with the material advancement of indigenous people within their culture and, secondly, their material advancement that was bound up with their production of a surplus for export after providing their own food11. This meant that the development of an agricultural extension programme had to be concerned with human relationships in agriculture, between government and rural communities, and between administrators and farmers.
This chapter examines the literature on colonial agriculture and the notion of duty and how this duty changed from one based on the premise of a duty owed by indigenous colonial people to the sovereign states, to a notion of duty towards the indigenous people of colonised lands by the colonial powers. This chapter suggests that the movement to a notion of betterment of rural life for indigenous people was misleading, as the outcome was still to reinforce the mercantilist prosperity of the colonial powers.
(It raises the question: Was Australia in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG) for the advantage of Australia, or for the improvement in the lives of Papua New Guineans?)
11 Lord Lugard published a book titled the Dual Mandate (1922) based on the concept that Europeans had the right to open up the African continent, but also had a duty to educate the inhabitants so that they could share in the benefits of civilisation. The phrase came into general use.
30 2.1 THE EMPIRES AND AGRICULTURE
In 1974, Robinson and Eatwell (1974, 323) identified conflicting attitudes towards commercial agriculture and its application in the colonies. They noted that, in some tribal societies, agricultural surplus was shared within the community with no compulsion to produce more than what was consumed. They also noted that there was no super structure known as civilisation, compelling the cultivator to work for others.
Kelleher and Klein (1999, 104) put this more directly: agricultural change had two purposes, to increase yield through technology for an economic purpose or for feeding more people in smaller areas.
In the early colonial period, commercialised agriculture was extensively developed as colonial interests sought to exploit the potential for primary production. In doing so, the indigenous farmers were exploited for both their labour and their land. According to McMichael (2000, 10), “plantations and other kinds of cash cropping arrangements sprang up across the colonial world, producing specialized tropical exports”. Utilising the model of plantation colonies, the British, Portuguese, French, Germany and Dutch produced cash crops for Europe. These crops ranged from the production of sugar from Brazil, Fiji and the Caribbean (Barton 1850; Stephen 1862; Deere 1949-50; Burns 1954; Aykroyd 1957; Beachey 1957; Moynagh 1981; Mintz 1985; Richardson 1997; Sandiford 2000), cotton from India and Egypt (Sainsbury 1907-1938; Krishna 1929; Silver 1966; Owen 1969; Banerjee 1982), cocoa from Ghana and Ivory Coast (Manu 1989; Harwich 1992; Amoah 1998; Clarence-Smith 2000), rubber from Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya (Wickham 1908; Fowler 1922; Wolf and Wolf 1936; Parkinson 1996) and coconuts (copra) from the Pacific and Africa (Brookfield, Ellis and Ward 1985; Jackman 1988). With the growth and utilisation of the plantation system was an increasing need for cheap labour; relying on slavery until it was abolished, and then indentured labour. Indentured labour was supplied from India and China to sugar plantations in the Caribbean, Fiji, Mauritius, Hawaii and Natal, and to rubber plantations in Malaya and Sumatra. As many as two million indentured workers were used in the Pacific (Moore, Leckie and Munro 1990; Graves 1993).
Until the mid nineteenth century, the development of cash crop economies in the colonies was left to trading companies and individual planters. They played a crucial role in expansion, regulation of trade and administration (Vlekke 1949; Philips 1961; Prakash
31 1985). The colonial powers could not justify new tropical colonies in terms of their economic value, so the ‘great powers’ with colonies became dependent on trading houses to fulfil this role. Lugard (1922) stated that the government ignored the dictum of Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, which was “the government of an exclusive company of merchants is perhaps the worst form of government”. Kidd, (1898, 38) also argued that “Government by chartered company is the oldest, the most indefensible and in theory the most reprehensible of all forms of government in the tropics”.
Africa had British trading houses such as the British East Africa Company, the Royal Niger Company and the Rhodes British South Africa Company (Lugard 1922; MacMillan 1949; Dike 1956; Galbraith 1972). In Germany’s African colonies, Carl Peters ran the East African Company (Henderrson 1962; Gann 1977; Perras 2004). In the Pacific, Germany relied on companies in German New Guinea, the Marshall Islands and Samoa (Kennedy 1974; Firth 1982; Hardach 1997, 233). Lever Pacific Plantation dominated the British Solomon Islands (Wilson 1954; Fieldhouse 1978). In Fiji, the sugar industry was dominated by the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) (Roberrtson 1931, 400-411; Shephard 1945; Lowndes 1956) and in Tahiti the dominating company was French Tahiti Cotton and Coffee Plantation Ltd. (Morwell 1960, pp. 187,127 & 210; Newbury 1980). Several Australians also dominated shipping, retail and, eventually, rural development. These included Burns Philp Shipping (Burns Philp and Company 1903; Buckley and Kulgman 1981) and W. R. Carpenters (Brij and Fortune 2000, pp. 217-218)12.
The Dutch in Indonesia pioneered extraction industries and cash crops in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; first cloves and nutmegs, then sugar, indigo and coffee under the Dutch West Indies Company (Bachman 1969; van Goor 1986). India, under the British East India Company, became a source for raw materials such as cotton, indigo, opium and hemp (Morse 1926-9; Marshall 1976; Trocki 1999). Plantations and other localised systems of cash cropping produced specialised tropical exports, from bananas to peanuts, across the colonial tropical world. This became known as monoculture, the specialisation in production of single crops for export (McMichael 2000, 9; Darby 1987, 158). Curtain (1990, 131) defined the plantation composition as one of cash crops, unfree and often imported labour, export-orientated which was widely utilised in the
12 Carpenter W. R. Company Ltd. became a household name in the Pacific Islands and was established in Sydney in 1914. In Papua New Guinea, Carpenters’ established trading and inter-island shipping operations and later became involved in copra plantations after 1920.
32 Pacific Islands. Crosby (1972, 68) stated that the economic underpinnings of most of the important settlements in the tropical and semi-tropical zones had historically been the raising of a certain few crops on large plantations for export to Europe. The dependence upon monoculture eventually provided a formidable barrier to rural betterment in the lives of colonised communities (Lewis 1996, 205; Ekundare 1973; Hopkins 1973; Worger 1999), but this mistake was not acknowledged by DASF and Didiman in the TPNG when, late in world colonial history, Australia tried to develop a plantation economy in the post-war Pacific.
The link between botanical gardens and the development of cash crops and, later, the work of agricultural extension programs, was first conceived by the botanist Joseph Banks in the late eighteenth century. Banks noted the possibility of establishing a network of botanical gardens that would ultimately lead to experiments and hybridisation and development of cash crops, such as fruit and vegetables, for the colonial economy. What Banks initiated was a dual function of advancing science and colonial economic development (McCracken 1997, x; Dickerson 1994). Banks saw colonies in commercial terms in which “botanic gardens were to be primarily economic depots to encourage and service plantation agriculture” (McCracken 1997, 2; Drayton 2000). In Britain, the Kew Botanical Gardens would eventually play this role, while for the Dutch it was their Buitenzorg Garden on Java and for the Germans the botanical gardens in Dar-es-Salaam in German East Africa. Belgium and Portugal each had a botanical garden solely devoted to developing tropical plants for the benefit of their colonial planters (Brockwell 1979, 450; Maat 2001). These botanical gardens played a vital role in the experimentation of cash crops and the development of colonial agriculture.
The largest network of botanical gardens for scientific purposes was developed by the British and by 1901. There were 102 botanical gardens throughout the empire (McCracken 1997, 206; Bean 1908; Desmond 1995; Drayton 2000) with the British producing a bulletin, known as the Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information to distribute information on economic products and plants to distant parts of the empire. The Bulletin also provided information on plantation agriculture (McCracken 1997, 23). Later known as the Kew Bulletin, the Bulletin was produced by the Kew Botanical Gardens in London.
33 Silva de Souza argued that, “botanical gardens became the mechanism to advance empires’ economic interests disguised as scientific interest” (Silva de Souza 1997, 94). Botanical gardens were not formally linked to the colonial office but were in close liaison with it, so much that Brockway (1979, 451; Crane 1972) concluded,
the mechanism of western botanical gardens were a scientific elite, and “invisible” elite … making and implementing decisions of worldwide implications with the wholehearted support of their government and the commercial establishment.
By the end of the nineteenth century, botanical gardens were an arm of colonial policy and had become, in effect, commercial experiment stations. For many European settlers and planters in the colonies these institutions displayed new technology, improved species and methods and were a crucial factor in the success of new plantation crops and plant-based industries.
In the British Empire, the advent of “botanic economics” (Siva de Souza 1997, 99)13 meant that stations were developed for the sole purpose of experimentation for cash cropping. In India, tea-growing stations were established at Mousoorie and Chajoorie. Ceylon developed stations at Peradeniya, Heneratgoda and Hakgala. McCracken (1997, 26) noted that all made a significant contribution to the growing economics of cocoa, rubber, tea and cinchona. In Entebbe, Uganda, botanic economics included experimentation with rubber, cocoa, fruit trees, coffee and tea, and was, in McCracken’s view, the foundation of the plantation economy in the protectorate. Other experimental stations were developed in Mauritius, Barbados and Fiji for sugar (Brookfield 1997, 35)14 and experimental work in Singapore became famous for promoting rubber cultivation on the Malaysian peninsula. No part of the British Empire was untouched by the work of botanical gardens and their botanic economics. Their principal object became one of production, propagation and distribution of seeds for cash cropping and export, a role later given to Didiman in the TPNG.
The Germans, although late to colonisation compared with the British and the Dutch, made intensive studies of the agricultural possibilities of German East Africa (Maclean
13 Botanic economics became a term used to describe the usefulness of new plants to the national economy of European empires. Plants were scrutinised for their use as food, fibre, timber, dye or medicine. 14 The development of the sugar industry, under the guidance of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR), in Fiji was based on sugar plantation models used in the Caribbean and was known as a ‘total institution’. This meant that CSR was the employer, provider and immediate authority with little government control.
34 1918; Townsend 1930; Rudin 1938; Henderson 1962; Gifford 1967; Gunn and Duignan 1977). Their botanical garden network, based at Dar-es-Salam, led to the establishment of an agricultural department which was supplemented by some twenty substations at which studies were made of soils, their adaptation for growing tropical export crops and varieties of cotton and other plants that were best adapted for each locality (Adams 1916, 453). The German botanical gardens in Dar-es-Salam benefitted from the British work at Kew. Usurping Kew’s scheme to expand sisal production, Germany eventually monopolised the world market (Brockway 1979, 460; McCracken 1997, 134). The Germans also developed a botanical garden in Rabaul, New Guinea, with long-term economical benefits in mind, and were selective about introducing new species. The Rabaul site included 200 acres of cultivated ground (Heiry 1995, 57-58). The British network was large, but the German network was more effective (Smith 1974, 659). This was probably because the British in the nineteenth century had not formulated a single, imperial economic policy for her colonies and protectorates (Swinton 1948)15, whereas the German implementation of a colonial economic policy in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, allowed it to become known as the power that excelled in agricultural scientific development (Adams 1916, 452; Heiry 1997, 1 & 10)16.
Botanical gardens, as noted by Silva de Souza (1997, 100), “consciously served the state and science, and shared the mercantilist and nationalist spirit of the times”. Although scientific or technical assistance was not provided to indigenous colonial inhabitants prior to World War I, McCracken (1997, 69) noted the work of Captain Alfred Moloney, the Governor of Lagos. Moloney developed agriculture with the aid of the local chiefs whose sons were trained at botanic stations and became a role model for local communities and villages. The Lagos scheme was aimed at promoting improved subsistence and cash economy agriculture among the indigenous population, rather than promoting new settler plantation agriculture. Ultimately the notion of duty was to benefit
15 Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (later Lord Swinton) records that, on his appointment as Secretary of State for the Colonies in November 1931, no-one had ever attempted to make an economic survey of the colonies; there was no economic department, although it was known what the different colonies produced. 16 However, Adams also admits that Germany showed limitations within its colonial policies. These included the use of coercion with its dealings with indigenous populations and the fact that Germany’s military expenditure in most colonies had been enormous. No other colonial power in Africa waged war against the indigenous population to the extent that the Hereros of German Southwest Africa were to become nearly extinct (p.452). Hiery (1997, p.1) noted that, while Germany excelled along scientific grounds in her African colonies, in the Pacific, “Germany was prepared to learn from its previous mistakes” but while “the government pursued commercial aims” it also tried “to introduce a German form of the European concept of modernism without endangering the local traditions” (p. 10).
35 the British Empire by lessening dependency on trade with the African interior, where Britain had little or no control.
The colonial regimes had varied policies relating to agricultural development or innovation. The French were committed to a colonial policy that was “to serve the needs of the French nation without in any way draining the country’s material or human resources” (Nadel and Curtis 1964, 19). The colonial policies of Germany, Belgium and Holland had a unifying element, which was an overriding concern with the economic profitability of colonies (Nadel and Curtis 1964, 21). This also included colonies in the Pacific. By 1884, Germany had claimed a colony in New Guinea and by 1900, Western Samoa, Nauru and the Marshalls, Caroline and Marianas Islands were often ruled by trading companies. The initiative for taking up these ‘possessions’ came from German investors (Fieldhouse 1965, 211). German planters and trading houses in Samoa were able to administer the colony without direct financial aid from Germany (Moore and Cannon 1936, 41). The Hamburg House of Godeffroy, with its headquarters in Samoa, controlled trading stations all over the South Seas and organised trade in copra (Fieldhouse 1965, 131). In 1853, the only British possession in the Pacific was Pitcairn Island, but by the 1870s Australia and New Zealand colonial governments were urging Britain to annex Fiji, New Hebrides and Papua (Piesse 1927, 1). According to Thompson (1980, 15), the Australian and New Zealand colonies demanded that “the British Government should take immediate possession of all islands in the Pacific Ocean not already occupied by or under the protectorate of any civilized power”. The Australian and New Zealand colonial governments were not prepared to make financial contributions but relied on Britain to add these colonies to its Empire, in part due to trade and in part due to security. Britain annexed Fiji in 1874, Papua in 1884, the Solomon Islands in 1892 and Niue and the Cook Islands in 1900 (but not on strategic grounds) (Piesse 1927, 1), the New Hebrides, jointly with France in 1906 and created the Gilbert and Ellice Island colony in 1916.
Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, and Curzon, the Viceroy of India, realised that political and economic development were two realms that could not be separated (Darby 1987, 65). This caused a more formal approach to the colonies to be developed, as well as a scramble for territories where the flag was planted, annexation declared or protectorates negotiated. Chamberlain, in England, believed that determined action had to be taken because the neglected estates of the tropical colonies had to be
36 developed and the state was required to act in the interests of prosperity (Darby 1987, 65). The French, by the 1870s, had developed three types of colonies17, but most of France’s colonies were ‘colonies of exploitation’, and were based on the old principle of l’exclusif, which meant that colonies could only sell to France, import only to and through France, and had to use French ships (Fieldhouse 1965, 306). Germany had also developed an economic colonial policy based on the premise of efficiency. Bismarck proclaimed territories in New Guinea, South West Africa, Togo, Cameroons and East Africa and, with it, a deliberate programme based on the economic theory of multiplying cash crops for trade, “thus accelerating the growth of commerce, the monetization of the economy and the agricultural education of the populace” (Smith 1974, 659). Britain saw both France and Germany as an economic threat because Britain still practiced an ‘open door’ policy within her colonies (Perham 1960, 568). However, Darby (1987, 133) noted that an open economy would not necessarily promote the best interests of a colonial society.
The only development in agriculture that crossed national boundaries and avoided being entwined with political ideologies was botanical work. This included the transfer and scientific development of new plantation crops for the tropical colonies, often through colonial governments but also through private individual planters and trading houses such as the Dutch East Indies Company. Transfer of plants was not new to empires and can be traced back to early explorers transferring plants from the Old World to the New World. These transfers included rye, oats, wheat and, from the New World to the Old World, cassava, peanuts, potatoes, squash and sweet potato (Ridley 1930; Verrill 1932; Jeffery 959; Crosby 1972; Hobhouse 1985; Russell-Wood 1992; Silva de Souza 1997).
The evolution from colonial gardens to agricultural research stations also included development work for European settlers. Between 1900 and 1930, experimental agricultural stations numbered over 1,400 worldwide (Busch and Sachs 1981, 133). Their main concern was improvement in yields in tropical produce for export, such as cotton, sugar, rubber, tea, coffee and coconuts (Stockdale 1949, iii)18. For mandates and
17 Les colonies ou comptoirs de commerce, les colonies agricoles ordinaries ou de peuplement, et ce l’on a appele les colonies de plantations au d’exploitation. (Colonies or colonial trade, countersfor business (commerce) exchange, general agricultural ordinaries or settlement, and this has required the colonies and colonies for plantation colonies to the operating exploitation). 18 By 1925, Britain had established an institution in Trinidad that was equipped with laboratories for research into tropical agriculture. This institution became known as the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, where British students could receive scientific training before becoming planters or directors of plantations. The British Government sponsored the college together with contributions
37 colonies, the success of plantations and their existence depended upon the adequate supply of native labour, exemplified by the case of the Belgian colony in the Congo, which was dependent on indigenous inhabitants employed in the export crop industry. In 1939, 6,670 Africans were employed compared to 93 Europeans (Busch and Sachs 1981, 138). Australia, in its mandated Territory of New Guinea, employed 17,269 indigenous workers in 1936, all on plantations under indentured labour contracts (Dwyer 1936, 8).
2.2 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
After World War I, President Wilson of the United States put forward 14 points for the post-war settlement of Europe at the peace conference at Versailles (Chamberlain 1998, 13)19. These 14 points became the guiding principles of the League of Nations and mandatory system. The mandatory system was embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Mills 1923, 50) and was seen as the brain-child of General Smuts. It placed emphasis upon the idea that the League was to be considered as the heir of the old empires. However, the overriding concern during the period following the peace conference was not how to establish the nationality of the inhabitants of the mandated territories, but how to terminate German and Turkish sovereignty (Louis 1969, 75).
The German colonies were handed over unconditionally to the major Allied and Associated Powers, and it was this entity that the League divided into mandates. The division of the colonies was based on the condition “that they were taking them not for the purpose of selfish exploitation but in the interests of the native populations concerned and with some regard for the interests of the world as a whole” (Amery 1937, 6) and this ‘self-denying’ agreement became embodied in Article 22 of the mandate system. It stated that “the tutelage of such people should be entrusted to advanced nations … and
from the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, the British Cotton Growing Association and a few private contributors. Lord Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that the college was “of immense benefit not only for our Colonies but also for the Mother country, as Britain was dependent on the tropics for food-stuffs and raw materials for her industries” (Anon, 1925, “Its Great Importance of the Empire: Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture”, College: St. Augustine, pp. 8-9). Later this college would play an important role in extension education, not only for British agricultural officers but also for Australian agricultural officers. 19 Wilson’s fourteen points promised “the settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic development, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest and advantage of any other nation or people” (Chamberlain, W. E., 1998, p. 13).
38 that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League” (Wright 1923, 695).
Seven of the victors of World War I supervised these mandates20. The obligations placed on the mandatory powers included the writing of annual reports, allowing petitions to be heard from the inhabitants, not to gain financial or military advantages from their administrations, the maintenance of fiscal autonomy in the mandated area and creation of a policy of equal commercial opportunity among League members and the inhabitants of the mandates. The inhabitants of mandated territories were to be given citizenship of the ruling power and these powers could not be transferred by the assigned mandatory (Wright 1923, 695). However, many inhabitants were not given citizenship, as in the case of the indigenous inhabitants of the mandated Territory of New Guinea who were not given Australian citizenship. Inhabitants of Papua were given Australian citizenship, though without right of entry to Australia.
The territories under the umbrella of Article 22 were divided into three classes. ‘A’ class mandates included the territories of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and Syria/Lebanon; all were formerly part of the Turkish Empire. Article 22 stated that, due to the advanced stage of development, their existence as independent states could be provisionally recognised and that, by a mandatory rendering administration advice and assistance, they would be able to stand alone (Chamberlain 1998, 14). ‘B’ class mandate territories differed in that these territories needed to be under a mandatory to protect freedom of conscience and religion and to prohibit the slave trade, arms traffic and liquor traffic. These countries included Cameroons, North West Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, Togoland and Togoland West (Chamberlain 1998, 14). ‘C’ class territories were seen as the least developed due to the sparseness of the population, small size or isolation. These territories were to be administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territories (Chamberlain 1998, 14). These territories included South West Africa and former German territories in the Pacific Islands. Both ‘B’ and ‘C’ class mandates were to be administered as integral parts of their mandatories and were described in 1923 as “closely approaching annexation” (Wright 1923, 696). It meant, in essence, that Australia now governed the colonies of Nauru, Papua and New Guinea.
20 The seven were Australia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand and Union of South Africa.
39 The fiscal policies recommended in Article 22 were judged in 1923 to bind the mandatory to “maintain the policy of the ‘open door’ or equal economic opportunity for all” (Mills 1923, 52; Gerig 1930, 1). Jenkins defined the ‘open door’ policy as a “policy of equal commercial opportunity and treatment for the nationals of all countries in colonial possessions and dependent territories” (Jenkins 1929, 604). This did not mean that there was an absence of commercial restrictions and regulations. Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand rejected the ‘open door’ policy and wanted to apply protective tariffs and legislation which excluded imported coloured immigrants in their ‘C’ class mandatories. A concession was made for these mandatory states enabling them to govern their territories as integral parts of the state. It is for this reason that Article 22 did not make any provisions for economic equality in the ‘C’ class mandates (van Maanen- Helmer 1929). This allowed the ‘C’ class mandates to be annexed, with all that was implied, and allowed British interests in the Pacific to be protected.
The covenant for the mandated territories which affected Australia’s control of the former German New Guinea came into force on 10th January 1920, but the whole mandate system was under the shadow of the philosophy of ‘white man’s burden’ and consisted primarily of colonists judging themselves and other colonists (Chen 1979, 154). In 1944, Hinden(1944, 168) criticised the system declaring, “Beneath a cloak of fine phrases regarding the sacred trust of civilization, the granting of a mandate has been just another name for the annexation of colonial territory”21. Colonial powers benefited from the post World War I distribution and sale of German property even though Article 22 stated, “The administration of backward peoples is a trust for the benefit of these peoples, that the terms of this trust should be defined and regulated by international law” (Wright 1938, 342). For ‘B’ class mandates this policy was seen to promote international export specialisations, which would maximise the territory’s budget and income. ‘C’ class mandates in the Pacific continued to depend upon plantation industries. In fact, Neville Chamberlain admitted that, “We in our colonial policy, as fast as we acquire new territory, develop it as ‘Trustees for Civilisation’ for the commerce of the world” (Lugard 1936, 9; Strauss 1971).
Article 22 stipulated that mandate powers had “to promote the well-being of the natives” (Currey 1926, 12). This justified encouraging them to work on plantations and, in some
21 Rita Hinden was the Secretary of the Colonial Bureau of the Fabian Society, whose interests included political questions concerned with Africa.
40 cases, it was argued that this could be enforced for their protection from abuse at the hands of unregulated foreign recruiters and employers (Currey 1926, 120). Plantation labour was seen as a means of safeguarding and advancing the interests of the inhabitants (Darby 1987, 132). Le Plae, Director-General of Agriculture in the Belgian Congo, stated,
in countries with very backward agriculture, the temporary requirement of obligatory plantings is often necessary to assure the indigenous population sufficient and regular nourishment and to introduce the export crop that will be the principal sources of prosperity and well-being for the natives. (Busch and Sachs 1981, 132)
This was an oppressive and self-serving motivation for indigenous agricultural development (von Albertini 1982; Macmillan 1938)22. However, what also evolved out of the doctrine ‘to promote the well-being of the natives’ was an awareness that not all forms of development were necessarily in the interests of the European settlers (Darby 1987, 134).
Colonel Ainsworth, Chief Native Commissioner of the colony of Kenya, wrote a report on the Territory of New Guinea in 1924, which was commissioned by the Australian Government. In this report, Ainsworth advocated a policy of agriculture under which the indigenous habitants would gradually become producers and so help to increase the exports of the country and at the same time improve their own material wellbeing (Marr 1938, 30; Currey 1926, 5). In a later report on indigenous development in New Guinea, Ainsworth (1924) stated, “It seems fairly certain that the first thing to do is to instil into their minds a real sense of agriculture by which means alone their future prosperity and very existence can be assured”. C. H. Currey (1926, 13) argued that the subject of indigenous agriculture is “the crux of the question regarding indigenous prosperity, not only of the New Guinea Islands but the whole of the Pacific”. Sir Hugh Clifford, governor of Nigeria also advocated a policy whereby agricultural production and landownership remained in the hands of peasant, small-scale producers. He found that peasant-owned agricultural enterprises were self-supporting in terms of labour, were the cheapest means of agricultural production and were capable of rapidity of expansion and of a progressive increase of output never displayed by European plantations in the tropics (Hopkins 1968, 580-606; Goodridge 1996, 258). Lord Olivier, Colonial Secretary
22 von Albertini, noted the changes in direction in actual policies pursued by colonial authorities especially in East Africa and Malaya. Macmillan also argued for a greater emphasis on food crops for local consumption.
41 and later Governor of Jamaica in the West Indies, also advocated the need for the development of peasant agriculture as,
no reform affords so good a prospect in the future of the West Indies as the settlement of the labouring population on the land as small proprietors; and in many places this is the only means by which the population can in future be supported. (Gilbert 1930, 261)
A policy requirement also developed that tied agriculture to the nutritional requirements of the indigenous people, when it was feared that encouraging indigenous populations to produce an export crop might lead to serious neglect of food crops (Masefield 1972)23. Therefore, agricultural policy balanced production for export by indigenous farmers against family and village indicators of health and well-being. By 1933, it was being argued that, in order to accomplish this balance, it was “necessary not merely to study what export crop could be grown, but also to try to increase the quantity or quality of the native foodstuff” (Faulkner and Mackie 1933, 5). The nutritional concern for the local inhabitants was also based on the racist attitude that indigenous cultivators were indolent and inefficient. This was seen to be a constraint on capital development. The ‘development’ of peasant farming became part of the “promotion of well-being of the native” (Darby 1987, 136). Agriculture to promote the well-being of indigenous peoples eventually was divided into two phases, an experimental stage, and an application phase (Darby 1987, 260).
2.3 AGRICULTURE AND EXTENSION
Lugard (1922, pp. 504-505) outlined a branch of agriculture advocating an association with research and consisting of propaganda and instruction for indigenous farmers. By the 1930s, the British had developed a model for agricultural extension that was more broadly based than the American model, gradually adapting to the changing relationship between the indigenous farmer and their colonial masters (Adams 1982, 53). Development now meant creating a modified and more prosperous peasant society with some central planning and state involvement (Darby 1987, 139; Lynn 1949). The British approach selfishly aimed to make each colony’s administration financially self-sufficient by producing as much raw material as possible for export to the colonial metropolis. In the colonies the policy for a more “modified and more prosperous peasant society” led to
23 Masefield noted the nutrition status of populations and the steps to improve nutrition for the indigenous which was asked of all colonial governments.
42 programmes imposing new agricultural practices on indigenous subjects. Agricultural advice to indigenous farmers was extensively tried in the British colonies of West Africa and became a model for agricultural extension development (Darby 1987, 135; Faulkner and Mackie 1930; Gilbert 1937; Tothill 1940; Lynn 1949 and 1937; Masefield 1946).
Peasant agriculture became the focus for agricultural officers in the field, separate from agricultural departments which focused on the needs of expatriate settlers, and separate from research that focused on export yield improvements. The agricultural officer’s role was to improve farming methods over a large area and for these methods to be utilised by as many indigenous cultivators as possible (Gilbert 1930, 261). British Colonial Office Memorandum No. 9 of 1945, entitled “Colonial Agricultural Policy”, stated that “Extension work consists in the supply of advice to all farmers, large, small, through personal visits, demonstration plots and farms, conferences, agricultural shows and all other methods” (Lynn 1949, 5). Lynn (1949) stated that, although persuasion was to be used among the changing or modifying of indigenous agriculture, many colonial agricultural extension workers found the process slow and considered the need for compulsion to speed up rural betterment. The Director of Agriculture, Kenya, who in his Annual Report for 1945 stated,
The extension service has in part made use of demonstration, precept and, in certain cases legislation, exemplified this. The results of some 25 years’ work on these lines have been to indicate clearly that unless some direct pressure is applied to urge improved methods and practices and unless such pressure is continually applied results obtained are extremely slow. (Lynn 1949, 3)
However, Lynn (1949, 3) restated “Force and legislation offer no permanent solution for agricultural ills in the absence of a sound policy based on survey and research and an adequate organization for extension”. The use of persuasion eventually replaced old methods of obligation and enforced labour24.
With regard to New Guinea peasant agriculture, Ainsworth stated that “the greatest educational force is, and will be, example and industry” (Marr 1938, 30). The emphasis had swung away from the importance of the crop in favour of the importance of the people growing the crops. According to Marr (1938, 31),
under a policy of native agricultural development, the peasant farmers will be required to grow crops, which if the object of the policy is to be obtained, will result in the creation of a surplus of agricultural products for export.
24 Lynn was a lecturer in Agricultural Advisory and Extension Methods, Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad, British West Indies.
43 Hence, the initial role of agricultural extension expanded to include investigating local conditions and conveying new ideas to the cultivator (McMillan 1949, 247), with the primary objective that its adoption was to be profitable (Faukner and Mackie 1933, 76). Rural surveys of particular districts became part of British Colonial Policy after World War II to provide quantitative, agricultural information based on number of stock, number of acres farmed for a unit of population, produce movements and market prices. These surveys also collected data on the social structure and customs of indigenous population. This data was used for research into crops, diseases and pests among introduced and local plants, and also became an important source for knowledge of the indigenous populace (Lynn 1949, 10: Tothill 1938; Beckett 1944). Australia, in the Territory of Paua and New Guinea, was also to use surveys as part of their Agricultural Extension Policy (Conroy 1947; Dwyer 1936).
To implement changes in indigenous agriculture, various propaganda methods were applied. Persuasive posters and pamphlets on what to grow, when, where and how to grow a particular crop, were produced by local agricultural officers. Gilbert, the Assistant Director of Agriculture in Trinidad in 1930, noted four factors that influenced the decisions of agricultural officers when planning changes in indigenous agriculture (Gilbert 1930, 261). These included the illiteracy of the indigenous people, their state of indebtedness to local money-lenders, the retarding effect of the system of land tenure when considered in connection with development, and difficulties arising from local customs. The advice given in oral, text or visual propaganda was not allowed to be interpreted as an order.
Macmillan (1949, 248) demonstrates that this was the case with coffee growing among the people of Wachagga of Kilimanjaro, which started because the enthusiastic advice of a keen British officer was interpreted as an order. The advice given regarding new crops often was not based on previous surveys or detailed local research, but, accidentally, the propaganda sometimes turned out to be accurate because new crops did actually flourish for other reasons. In these few instances the new crop became profitable, but only because of local conditions or the customs of the indigenous inhabitants of a particular area (Faulkner and Mackie 1933, 78).
An approach for extension work among indigenous populations began to evolve in West Africa where the recommendations made directly by a political officer or other colonial
44 official were based on the results of experiments. If the advice was proved to be sound, it was envisaged that others would follow the example (Faulkner and Mackie 1933, 79: Knowles 1924; Powesland 1957; Wriggley 1959; Robinson 1965; Marsh and Kinsnorth 1965). In this way, it was argued that extension within agriculture should use scientific and technical knowledge to inform experimentation and demonstration. Diffusion and development had become the key catch-words. Extension work became synonymous with agricultural research (Lynn 1949, 2). Without research, agricultural extension would have stagnated. Science was seen as lending its support but it was still a ‘hasten slowly’ approach to agricultural development (Darby 987, 138: Ehrlich 1973).
In the 1920s and onwards, the word ‘extension’ began to appear in statements of colonial agricultural policy. The approach to peasant agriculture changed from working towards the farmer, with a policy based upon external market requirements, to working with the farmer, seeking a solution to his problems and betterment by development along his own lines (Darby 1987, 3). The development of agricultural extension policy was still not distinct from a fiscal policy where development was concerned (Darby 1987, 138), and agricultural extension was still linked to expanding export production. Lord, in 1939, argued that agricultural extension was “originally crude in methods, programs diffused and ill considered, training of staff inadequate, and the demands on time and strength beyond reason” (Lord 1939, pp. 218-219). However, he acknowledged that nearly all programmes of agricultural extension had a “close grip on actual and pressing problems, an earthy and healthy sense of dealing barehanded with reality, and – how shall I say it? A sustaining sense of motion” (Lord 1939, pp. 218-219).
In the 1920s and 1930s, ‘extension’ developed as a separate entity within agriculture. Fay defined agricultural extension based on the fundamental principle: “it assists people engaged in farming to utilize more fully their own resources and those available to them, in solving current problems and in meeting changing economic and social conditions” (Fay 1962, pp. 13-14). Maunder, citing a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) publication, defined extension as a
service system which assists farm people through educational procedures in improving farm methods and techniques, increasing production efficiency and income, bettering levels of living and lifting the social and educational standards of rural life. (Maunder 1972, 20)
According to Das (1988,18), extension was viewed as an economic instrument based on agrarian production, but was also seen as having a notion of duty in that it alluded to an
45 effort to achieve an improvement in the material well-being of the rural family and community.
Agricultural extension, therefore, had multiple aims to contribute to the individual and collective welfare of rural people, to aid farmers in adjusting to changes in economic and social conditions and to improve efficiency of production and the distribution of food and fibre. Conroy claimed in the TPNG in the 1960s that
Extension programs were aimed at the agricultural advancement of under- developed communities or the modernization of their agriculture, necessitating changes in traditional agriculture practices that are likely to be the subject of important community values and perhaps lying at the root of the traditional social and economic order. (Conroy 1961)
A theme, repeated in the 1920s and 1930s, of moving away from the growing of crops to an emphasis to the people growing them (Lynn 1945; United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 1945; Brunner, Sanders and Ensminger 1954; Penders 1962; Conroy 1961), also took place alongside a contradictory, continued call for colonies to be self-supporting, to develop export monocultures and to have all indigenous inhabitants drawn into a cash economy.
2.4 CONCLUSION
By the time DASF was created in the TPNG, botanical gardens were in decline and their experimentation and education role had been taken over by colonial departments of agriculture. The modification, expansion and improvement of colonial agriculture from its earliest mercantilist years through to the development of plant research and extension, was still geared to a world economy created within the West, in which the notion of duty was a duty owed to the West. Together with the development of agricultural science and plans for the transformation from subsistence farming to a capitalist enterprise, the rhetoric of colonialism changed to the promotion of the material well-being of colonial subjects. The notion of duty, derived from mercantilism, directed towards the centre not the periphery, gradually lost support. The words and rhetoric had changed.
For colonies such as Papua and New Guinea the evolution of agriculture was determined by Australia’s attitude towards indigenous economic development. Prior to World War I, German New Guinea’s administration arrangements were based on the utilisation of a company system in which agricultural development was based on the principle of large-
46 scale plantation planting of crops, mainly coconuts, utilising a large, local labour force. In Papua under the Australia administration, a small sub-department of agriculture had been formed, having as its objective the introduction of new species and varieties as a base for new primary industries, but primarily for expatriate farmers. In Papua, under the administration of Hubert Murray, Australia made some attempt to include the indigenous farmer in cash cropping but export agricultural production was primarily for the Australian market. European settlement was only encouraged for the production of large scale plantations. However, both territories acknowledged a common target of improving the standard of living of the indigenous people. After the war, the advantage was that both territories were administered as one unit. This allowed the establishment of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF), whose aims were to rehabilitate agriculture after the effects of war and to promote the development and advancement of indigenous primary industry.
The experimentation and advancement of some economic plants had created an avenue for colonial powers to begin investigating agricultural policies for their colonies. Direct agricultural involvement by colonial powers replaced the dominance of trading houses and companies in colonial territories. This enabled the powers to accumulate revenue through farming in a form acceptable to the League of Nations. Indentured labour was perceived by colonial powers as a preferred alternative to the use of enforced labour. For colonial subjects, it still meant that they were controlled by their colonial masters and, in some cases, the working conditions were similar to slavery. This was the situation when Didiman arrived in the TPNG.
The movement towards indigenous extension programmes after World War II appeared to be for the benefit of the people but, ultimately, meant that production of agricultural produce was to increase the wealth of the metropolitan state, the colonial administration, settlers and foreign investors. It meant that colonial powers still sought to maintain control of the farming efforts of the indigenous people. Indigenous subjects were to be forced to grow certain crops under adverse conditions. The changes in agriculture meant that some indigenous people took up new farming practices, and new food crops did increase their dietary needs, but for others it also meant indenture and the loss of their lands. The catch-cry ‘development’, for the colonised did not mean independence, but was directed to new forms of imperial capitalism.
47 Didiman, working in Papua and the TrustTerritory of New Guinea after World War II, realised that extension and education had been directed towards the European plantations. They also knew that for fifty years the TPNG’s importance was strategic, more than as a source for tropical produce. It was this confused ideology and the contradictory policy-making processes that met Didiman when they signed on in the TPNG after World War II. The next chapter will discuss the evolution of agricultural development policy within the Territory of Paua and New Guinea.
48 CHAPTER 3: AGRICULTURE: THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE IN DEVELOPING THE TERRITORY OF PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
Prior to World War II, the metropolitan powers had a pragmatic focus on the relationship between economic benefit and colonial power. The initial emphasis was largely on the strategic, political or cultural imperial value of the colonies, only later changing to their assumed economic value (Stanner 1944, 4)25. Papua New Guinea’s assumed economic value to Australia had been weak and secondary to strategic interests. Lett (1944, 20) noted that there were many spurious arguments put forward for Papua’s annexation in 1884, such as a source for cheap labour for plantations in northern Australia, the discoveries of gold and other profitable lines of investment. However, the one motivation that counted most for annexation when Britain was being pressed to act, was based on Australia’s defence and strategic requirements. The call for British possession of Papua by Great Britain, and, in 1902, the transfer to Australia, was due to suspicion of German intentions in the northeast portion and adjoining islands.
The northern sector later became the Mandated Territory of New Guinea and was forced from Germany after World War I under the auspices of the Treaty of Versailles, in 1919 (McAuley and Hogbin 1948, 48). Prior to World War II, all the Administrators of the Mandated Territory were high ranking military officers: Major Wisdom, Brigadier General Griffiths and Brigadier General McNicoll. Practical colonial experience and knowledge of the Pacific Islands and their people were not called for when Administrators were being selected; all that counted were their military careers and rank (Hiery 1995, 229).
The post-World War II Administrator of the combined territories, a professional agriculturalist and a World War II soldier, J. K. Murray (1949, 11), noted that Papua and New Guinea had been in the forefront of Australian public attention on only three occasions, all for strategic purposes. These were the period preceding and immediately following British assumption of control over Papua in 1884; the taking over of German New Guinea in 1914 and the granting of a ‘C’ class mandate; and, during World War II, upon the Japanese invasion. Outside of these three periods, Murray argued, the
25 Stanner noted that, before the war, an estimated 268 million indigenous people were living under colonial rule and, of these, only one million or less lived in Australian colonial territories. Of these colonies, trade as a whole was only one tenth of total world trade. The contribution of Papua New Guinea to world trade was minute.
49 Australian public and the Australian Government had ignored the economic value and development of the Territory of Paua and New Guinea. National concern and development proceeded so slowly that, even as late as 1939, most of Australia’s requirements of copra, tea, coffee and quinine were imported from other tropical countries not under Australian control (McAuley and Hogbin 1948, 48). Thompson argued that one reason for the absence of economic development in British New Guinea was a long delay in the formulation of Australian policies regarding its territorial possessions (Thompson 1998, 6). Development of the economic resources of the territories was not an important motive in the campaign to secure a post-World War I mandate, nor joint administration post-World War II, security was the main aim of securing both territories. Although there had been some hope for development of copra, rubber, tobacco, sisal and mineral resources such as gold, copper, coal and oil, most of the limited development had been in agriculture (West 1968, 5). In the Mandated Territory of New Guinea between 1921 and 1942, agriculture, as an economic resource, increased marginally except for copra exports which tripled between 1920 and 1930 from what had been developed by the Germans (see Table 3.1 below.).
In 1921, Edmund Piesse was appointed to oversee Australia’s obligations under the League of Nations. When he became responsible for policy making in the newly acknowledged Mandated Territory of New Guinea, he advocated the promotion of village production on the British West African model (Thompson 1998, 38; Hiery 1995, 234). This was closely related to Lugard’s model of agricultural development in which the cultivation of exportable products by indigenous subjects on their own land (or holdings) was preferred to a system of European-owned plantations “worked by natives”, provided that the enterprise did not require large capital, technical skill, management and that the crop was indigenous or a naturalized one (Lugard 1922, 419). However, Wisdom, the first post-World War I civil Administrator of New Guinea, objected to this form of native agricultural development as it would deprive the Territory’s copra plantations of a labour force (Thompson 1998, 38).
In 1923, Dr. George Bryce became the first Director of Agriculture in the Mandated Territory. He was educated in Edinburgh and had worked in Ceylon before working in New Guinea, where he remained until his retirement in 1925 (McKillop and Firth 1988, pp. 100-101). Bryce considered that it was his duty to encourage indigenous production. He saw the importance of introducing new crops and better systems of cultivation
50 because much of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea’s agricultural policy was previously directed towards copra production. Plantations that had commenced in 1883 kept extending coconut production to the point that, by 1924, copra exports totalled 98% of all trade (Tudor 1968, 346).
Table 3.1 Quantity of Copra Exported from Mandated New Guinea, 1913 to 1933
Year Quantity (tons) 1913 14,000 1919 20,000 1923 - 1924 34,974 1929 - 1930 63,832 1931 - 1932 59,452 1932 - 1933 59,040
Bryce thought that a copra-based, single export economy was dangerous as he was against monoculture (West 1968, 16; McKillop and Firth 1988, 100; Sinclair 199, 30). This assumption proved correct as, during the 1942 to 1945 Pacific War, 25% of the coconut bearing area in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea was totally destroyed and the economy collapsed (Tudor 1968, 346).
The responsibilities of the Department of Agriculture in the Mandated Territory were outlined in the 1921-1922 Annual Report to the League of Nations. It was charged with the responsibilities of technical advice on all agricultural matters: supervision of administration plantations; advising settlers and the public generally; directing the botanical gardens; administrating cemeteries; controlling the Rabaul Museum and inspecting for pests and diseases (Report to League of Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea 1921, 22 & 44; McKillop and Firth 1988, 100). In 1923, Bryce began to organise the Department of Agriculture into four divisions: research, botanical gardens, experimental stations, and agricultural training (McKillop and Firth 1988, 100). It was also the first time that an examination of the soil in different localities was inaugurated, revealing that much of the previous plantings of economic crops had been planted in soils not favourable, for example, for coconut growing (Tudor 1968, 346). Bryce’s legacy was a native agricultural school and demonstration plantation at Keravat. The stated purpose of the school was to train indigenous agricultural assistants in the correct methods of cultivating tropical crops (Lamrock 1962; McKillop 1988, pp. 131-140; Sinclair 1995, 31). During this period, the Mandated Territory of New Guinea’s
51 administration was able to construct and operate three agricultural stations that trialled plants and, to a limited extent, offered training for indigenous farmers in improved agricultural practices. These were the Demonstration Plantation at Keravat, and the agriculture station at Aiyura and Maprik in the Sepik region (New Guinea Agricultural Gazette 1940, pp. 6-9).
Marr (1938, 30), an Agriculture Inspector and Instructor with the Department of Agriculture in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, noted that a re-adjustment of policy was necessary so that instructional staff, or agricultural officers, were graduates from Australian universities or agricultural colleges. During Bryce’s period, there was an increase of patrolling throughout New Guinea’s districts and instruction was given to indigenous farmers on proven methods of agriculture, particularly with regard to crop rotation and the cessation of “shifting agriculture” (Marr 1938, 30). By 1938, Marr was able to identify instruction, tuition and practical demonstration among indigenous farmers as an essential task if the creation of a surplus of agricultural products for export was to be attained (1938, 31). By 1941, inspectors and instructors were based in the Kieta District, Namatanai (New Ireland), Talasea (New Britain), Maprik (Sepik), Aiyura (Highlands) and Keravat (Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain) (New Guinea Agricultural Gazette. 1941, pp. 77, 84-86). However, Lucy Mair (1970, 123), an early analyst of Australian policy, claimed that the Director of Agriculture was only appointed to “rescue the Territory from the desolating blight of an obsession of coconut growing”, an agricultural residue of the German occupation of New Guinea. Dwyer (1936, pp. 1-2) also noted that coconut production in the Territory was not only an important feature of plantation agriculture, but copra was the most important agricultural export. In 1936, New Guinea supplied about 40% of copra exported from all British South Sea islands.
George Murray replaced Bryce in 1928 and remained as Director of Agriculture until World War II when normal administration in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea was suspended (New Guinea Agricultural Gazette 1938). As Director, Murray made an economic survey of the possibilities of various plants and every effort was made to encourage the cultivation of crops other than coconuts. At the newly established Keravat Demonstration Plantation near Rabaul, experiments were carried out on new economic crops, but Murray’s concern for improved ‘native’ agriculture gave way to renewed efforts to support plantation production. Consequently, Keravat turned to experimental work and, by 1932, was conducting trials in coffee, oil palm, dwarf coconuts, maize,
52 peanuts and rice (New Guinea Gazette 1938, 25; McKillop and Firth 1988, 101). Peanuts, although a minor industry, entered into the economic life of the indigenous farmer, not only as a food crop but also as a surplus crop for sale in local markets (New Guinea Gazette 1939, 15). At Aiyura agriculture station, cinchona, tea and coffee were planted. This was the first experimental plantation established in the Highlands of New Guinea (Post Courier 2006, 21). Other economic plants investigated as export crops included rubber, coir fibre, derris, pyrethrum and cocoa. They remained at an experimental stage and did not become established as export crops. Crops such as coffee initially suffered from poor plantation management, the tea planted at Aiyura was destroyed by fire and cocoa failed as few European and New Guinean planters understood its complex requirements (New Guinea Agricultural Gazette 1937, pp. 6-7; Bailey 1928, pp. 103-107). Experimental work at Keravat distracted attention away from training. It was soon realized that only districts that were accessible by ship or rail could be drawn into the new economic order. This meant that development had to be near the coast. Some tropical crops were considered unsuitable for cultivation, or required expensive machinery, including pimento, for which there was a limited world demand, (it was considered little more than a peasant crop grown only in Jamaica), nutmeg and pepper (which took about six years to be in full profit) took too long to bear fruit. Pepper was also found to have a limited world market. Stockpiles of pepper in London were so great that the production of this product in the Mandated Territory could not penetrate the world market. There were limited opportunities in world markets for other crops including cloves, arrowroot, ginger, cardamom and cinnamon. The problem with growing vanilla was that it was an orchid and needed to be hand-pollinated to produce a crop. Sisal hemp could only be grown on an extensive scale and under able and skilled management, as it had been done in Papua in the immediate post war years (Mcmahon 1916, pp. 19 & 24; Town and Country Journal 1919, 20). A great deal of expensive machinery was also necessary.
Regardless of the work of Bryce and others, the Mandated Territory of New Guinea remained a one-crop territory. Although copra remained the most important economic crop, it was constantly affected by the fluctuations of the world markets, a factor that New Guinean villagers rarely understood. Between 1906 and 1939, the world price see- sawed between £35 and £5 a ton (New Guinea Gazette 1938, pp. 28-29; White 1965, 121; Mair 1970, 116). In 1922 to 1923, the price of copra averaged £18/19/- per ton, increasing to £20/10/- per ton, reaching a high of £23/15/- per ton in 1925. Prices of
53 copra then dropped to £14 per ton at the end of 1930, with further drops during the Depression to £7/5/- per ton (1934). Copra was fetching £15/10/- per ton in 1939, gradually improving to £19 per ton at the end of the war (Tudor 198, 346). Several factors had influenced the production of copra in New Guinea in the 1930s:
(a) The Depression and reduced purchasing power lead to less competition in buying.
(b) Economic nationalism, whereby a number of colonies that wished to become self- contained imposed quotas, tariff barriers and legislative protection to encourage internal production.
(c) Changes in the international finance and investment markets led to some countries going off the gold standard. This led to difficulties in standardized buying.
(d) More competitive sources of oils and fats entered the world market, including, oil palm, cottonseed oil, soya bean oil, lard and tallow.
(e) The substitution of oils previously thought to be unsuitable for the chemical processes of hydrogenation, hardening, deodorization and neutralization meant that margarine replaced coconut oil (Dwyer 1936, pp. 20-26).
Annual price fluctuations were affected by natural disasters: drought in the United States of America, typhoons in the Philippines that damaged palms, and a malaria epidemic in the coconut producing area of Ceylon, each affected the price of copra (Dwyer 1936, pp. 20-26). The greatest advancement of agriculture in New Guinea was in the introduction of non-export, domestic market varieties of edible plants in gardens. Maize, potatoes and beans, as a supplement to diets, were successfully introduced into the Highlands (White 1965, 121). The Annual Agriculture Report of 1940 claimed that European vegetables such as tomatoes, spring onions, carrots and cabbage had been introduced to indigenous farmers. These had entered into the New Guineans’ diet and the Administration claimed that it had a salutary effect on their health (New Guinea Gazette 1941, 86).
In Papua, under the pre-war administration of J. H. P. (Hubert) Murray26, the Department of Agriculture was amalgamated within the Department of Mines, Agricultural Lands and Survey. In 1907, it had been under the directorship of Miles Staniforth-Smith
26 In 1904 Hubert Murray was appointed as a judge in British New Guinea and in 1906 gave evidence to a Royal Commission, which criticized Captain Barton’s administration of the colony. It has been suggestedthat, because of his evidence, Murray was appointed Acting Administrator in 1906 and Lieutenant-Governor of the Territory of Papua in 1908. He remained in office until his death in 1940. (West 1968; Lett 1944 and 1949; Stuart 1970; Nelson 1982; Thompson 1998)
54 (Gibbney 1988, 657)27, a former federal senator, who had visited Ceylon, Malaya and the Pacific (West 1968; Lett 1944 and 1949; Stuart 1970; Thompson 1998). However, unlike Bryce, he was not an agricultural specialist. On his arrival in Papua in 1907, Staniforth- Smith selected sites for nurseries and experimental stations. These were at Kemp Welch River, Waga Waga, Milne Bay and Hombrom Bluff. He also imported 10 tons of coffee, rubber, sisal and cocoa seeds; however, this mostly did not germinate. Murray considered the creation of these government nurseries and government plantations, which were to grow experimental crops as a model for settlers, to be a waste of effort. He viewed such schemes with suspicion because they promised vague and unspecified development rather than precise and defined results. Staniforth-Smith boasted of 140 operating plantations in 1910. Murray was later proved correct when the expenditure on the government plantations outstripped the loan in 1913, which annoyed the Commonwealth authorities in Canberra.
In 1914, the Australian government halted all work, although the plantations were four years from bearing (Hastings 1969, 60; West 1968, pp. 138-139; Stuart 190, 88; McKillop and Firth 1988, 96; Sinclair 1995, 12). In 1915, Staniforth-Smith submitted a report to the Minister for External Affairs in Melbourne outlining his agricultural policy. Since his appointment, he had visited other tropical countries in order to seek advice on their agricultural systems and methods. He had decided that, subject to government approval, he would
experiment as little as possible and simply copy the institutions and methods of Ceylon, Java and the Federated States of Malaya, so far as the native conditions in Papua, the unskilled labour, probably unskilled planters, and exigencies of finance would justify me. (Sinclair 1995, 12)
Staniforth-Smith’s agricultural policy for Papua was motivated by a desire to create an Australian dominated plantation economy (Sinclair 1995, 12: McKillop and Firth 1988, 97; West 1968; Murray 1925; Lett 1942; Stuart 1970; Jinks, BIskup and Nelson 1973; Lewis 1996). This meant that development in Papua was to be synonymous with agriculture, and arable, workable holdings were to be made available via land settlement, which became the principal task of the Australian Government.
27 Staniforth-Smith served in World War I, returning to Papua in 1921, as Commissioner for Crown Lands, Mines and Agriculture and eventually retired in 1930, settling at Kulikup in the south-west of Western Australia.
55 An extremely liberal land policy, the Land Ordinance (1906), provided leases for settlers to be used for agricultural or pastoral use (West 1968, 124; White 1965; Lett 1949). The Land Ordinance resulted in what Murray termed a “land boom”. In 1908, 242,395 acres were under lease, increasing to 336,803 acres in 1909 and, by 1911, to 364,088 acres (West 1968, 124). Unfortunately, Papua came under the Australian Navigation Act. This was designed to protect Australian shipping and its application to Papua meant that all of the country’s exports had, firstly, to be sent to Australia and, then, trans-shipped from there to other distant ports. Imports also had to travel to Australia before arriving in Papua. The effect of this literally bankrupted Papua. By the end of 1914, Papua’s revenue had reached £84,703; of this £30,000 was the Australian Government grant. The main agricultural commodities were as shown in Table 3.2 below.
Table 3.2 Main Agricultural Commodities of Papua in 1914 Copra 26,063 lbs Sisal 3,633 lbs Rubber 1,536 lbs (West 1968, 124)
Murray continually appealed against the Navigation Act and, after a Royal Commission in 1925, the Act was repealed, but the Bounties Act which replaced it did little to improve the export markets for Papuan produce (Murray 1925; Lett 1942; Stuart 1970; Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1997; Lewis 1996).
Hubert Murray entertained the concept of a dual mandate, a duty to preserve and civilize the Papuans and an equal responsibility to develop the country, which would require European capital and enterprise (Tate 1971, 43; West 1968; Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973; Lattas 1996, pp. 141-164). By 1913, Murray felt some justification for the economic optimism created by European settlers and a more positive emphasis to native development. However, Murray also felt that any white community left in absolute power over ‘natives’ would resort to slavery within three generations (West 1968, 143). He began to place upon the government a duty to the Papuans. This duty was embedded in the Land Ordinance 1906.
Murray aimed to lift the Papuans above the level of mere labourers by training them as skilled artisans and agriculturalists to service their communities (Thompson, R. C. 1998, 72).To achieve this, Murray looked to peasant production as the best means of improving the Papuan skills (McKillop and Firth 1988, 98; Thompson 1998, 72; West 1966, pp. 3-
56 22; Lattas 1996; Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973). He invoked the Native Regulation 1894, a William MacGregor initiative by which villagers could be compelled to plant economic trees. However, this Regulation merely enforced planting and weeding and did nothing to enforce the collection and marketing of the coconuts. Murray, after seeking advice from other colonies, modified the Native Regulation into the Native Plantation Ordinance, which came into effect in 1918. Murray also introduced the Native Taxation Ordinance (1918). This tax was to test the theory that, if indigenous people had to earn cash to pay the government demands, they would be encouraged to extend their own activities to earn cash for their own use (White 965, 77). Murray linked the Native Tax Ordinance to the Native Plantations Ordinance (1918), which made compulsory the cultivation of crops such as coconuts, rice and coffee by indigenous villagers (White 1965, 77; Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973, pp. 120-121, Thompson 1998, pp. 66-67). It differed in that the government declared native land to be a plantation, supplied the seeds and the tools, while the villagers worked out their tax on the plantation and shared profits equally with the government, whose own share would be paid into a fund for the exclusive use of the natives. This became known as the “Village Plantation” scheme. The inability of European plantations to attract sufficient labourers was one reason for adopting such a policy and, at the same time, native plantations allowed the Papuans to engage in low level capitalism. Murray believed that a degree of economic autonomy and power would confer a degree of political and social protection to the indigenous population. Unfortunately, the impact of this new Ordinance amounted to a direct competition with the European planters (Sinclair 1998, 14; West 1968, 185; McAuley and Hogbin 1948, 50; Mair 1946, pp. 118-119; Lattas 1996, pp. 141-164; Crocombe 1964).
The two ordinances provided the basis of a new agriculture policy in Papua; an agriculture policy that involved Murray overshadowing Staniforth-Smith as policy- maker (McKillop and Firth 1988, 98). Murray argued that moral suasion would be ineffective and believed that compulsion and sanctions were necessary, as Australia was not supplying funds for the welfare and agricultural development for the Papuans (Harris 1988, 133). Papuans did “what the government told them to do under pressure and not by preference” (White 1972, 77; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 27). Compulsion “identified all work with the interests of the government and constituted a major obstacle in the way of encouraging personal interest in cash cropping” (Miles 1956, 237). Griffin, Nelson and Firth, (1979, 27) claimed that many of the “natives” always thought of the
57 plantations growing alongside their villages as belonging to the government and they “kept them in production only because the gavamani gaoled them if they did not”.
Murray’s agricultural policy in Papua was based on a minimum of expertise and a maximum use of unskilled labour and was nothing short of a “frantic search for new crops which would bring economic prosperity” (McKillop 1976, pp. 8-10). By 1925, there were only four staff to supervise village plantings and none were qualified in agriculture (McKillop and Firth 1988, 99; Thompson 1998, 71). Although crops such as sisal, coconuts, rubber, tobacco, cotton and sugar were all attempted as plantation crops, only coconuts and rubber remained viable. Rubber imported from Malaya was planted at Kokoda, Buna and Collingwood Bay on village plantations, however, poor tapping methods resulted in low production (Allen 1988, 112). Sinclair (1995, 17) noted that, by 1928, fourteen village plantations in Papua were growing coffee and it was estimated that 700 villagers were actively engaged in coffee growing. However, Murray had failed to create a viable export crop, even with a policy of compulsory planting.
In contrast to the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, the indigenous Papuan did not play any role in crop production outside that of plantation labour. No agricultural schools for indigenous farmers were created. Staniforth-Smith had originally pushed for the establishment of government nurseries and government plantations to grow experimental crops, to supply seed for settlers and as a source of government revenue, but only one experimental station was ever established (West 1968, pp. 138-139). This experimental station was established at Hombrom Bluff in 1909, but was eventually leased into the private sector and, with it, went the end of any semblance of a Department of Agriculture for Papua (Murray nd, UQFL 91, Box 2, 3). There had been no support from the Australian Government. Colonel J. K. Murray (nd, UQFL 91, Box 2, 3) noted that, although the Commonwealth Government wanted Papua to “rise as an imposing, tangible proof” of Australia’s pioneering and colonising prowess, Tudor (1968, 390) suggested that Papua was hamstrung by the demand that it should cost Australia as little as possible.
Throughout Sir Hubert Murray’s administration, Papua was crippled by financial considerations and agricultural development remained ad hoc and speculative. The Australian Government’s lack of enthusiasm can be illustrated by the amounts of financial grants. Originally the annual amount to Papua was £20,000, which increased to
58 £30,000 under Andrew Fisher’s Labor government in 1912. Between 1920 to 1921 and 1930, it increased from £40,000 to £50,000, respectively (Thompson 1998, 750). Australia never exceeded the grant of £50,000 to Papua until after the War.
Table 3.3 Papua's Subsidy Grants, 1928 to 1934
Year Amount 1928 - 1929 £50,000 1929 - 1930 £42,000 1930 - 1931 £45,000 1931 - 1932 £40,000 1932 - 1933 £34,000 1933 - 1934 £42,000 (Tudor 1968, 393)
For the rest of the 1930s the grant was set at £42,500 per annum. This lasted until 1941 (Tudor 1968, 393). Murray was to comment that the “lack of money makes administration more interesting, for you have to watch every shilling, but it is very hampering - not only as regards to roads and bridges, but also in native matters” (cited Thompson 1998, 75). This, in turn, discouraged enterprise and the introduction of new capital. Colonel J. K. Murray noted that, in regards to pre-war federal grants to Papua that “there was much chaff and not much grain in the Federal Government’s pre-war gestures of interest in the welfare and development of the native peoples of Papua” (Murray 1969, 206). He noted that the lack of interest and lack of financial provision to meet its obligations characterized Australia’s attitude towards Papua (Murray 1969, 206; Nelson 1982, 19). The failure of agricultural development in Papua was also blamed on the shortage of labour caused by the ‘Village Plantation’ scheme. The development of the ‘Village Plantation’ scheme was unevenly spread and ineffective and, as Australia made no significant commitment, villagers responded with equal lack of interest.
In both territories, commercial agriculture or the “exploitation of the resources of the colony” was a matter of concern only for Europeans (West 1968, 122). Papua and New Guineans were forced into the background as a source of labour and drawn into a cash economy, mainly through copra and, to a lesser extent, coffee production. Unfortunately, these opportunities were not evenly distributed. The shortage of investors and a lack of capital meant it was impossible to promote a viable export economy. By resorting to compulsion, the Papuan Administration tried to include the villagers in the commercial cash economy, but this failed due to lack of skilled agricultural advisory staff and the lack of government capital for infrastructure. This was, perhaps, a result of the weak
59 Australian economy in the inter-war years and that Australia required all of its revenue for its own post-war, then post-depression recovery, and did not have the additional revenue to give to Papua and New Guinea. The impression that a largely negative Australian Administration had done little socially, economically and politically was criticized at the United Nations after the War28.
A new approach developed after World War II due to international obligations set out by the United Nations (UN) Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea29 and under the advice and urging of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), an arm of the UN. Another international factor that influenced post-World War II agricultural policy in the territories was the South Pacific Commission, which grew out of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 1944 (Murray 1949, 22; Wright 2002, pp. 65- 80)30.
The next section argues that the agricultural policies implemented by Australia after 1945 were reinvented to transform, not only the land-use, but also the social and political welfare of the people of Papua New Guinea.
3.1 APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURE IN THE WAR YEARS
The effect of four years of invasion, fighting, disruption and new infrastructure, in some parts of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, was profound. There was physical damage, but also social upheaval caused by being forced to survive in a warzone not of their making. In areas of military importance, there was damage to indigenous property,
28 A Soviet delegate to the United Nations General Assembly (11 November, 1946) asked “When the Mandate was established the natives may have been in the Stone Age, but did Australia intend to develop the natives to the Bronze Age with the same slowness as humanity generally had progressed?” (Cited in Murray, 1949) 29 This Agreement was also extended and applied to the Territory of Papua by the Australian Government. The United Nations Trusteeship Agreement was never applied directly to Papua (the only part of Papua officially visited by the triennial United Nations Visiting Missions to New Guinea was the combined Territory’s capital, Port Moresby. 30 The South Seas Conference (1947), which was held in Canberra, led to the signing of an agreement between the United Kingdom, France, United States, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia and provided for the constitution of a commission, a research council and a South Pacific conference. The purpose of the South Pacific Commission was to “encourage and strengthen international co-operation in promoting the economic, social welfare and advancement of the peoples of non-self governing Territories in the South Pacific region”. Wright acknowledged that, due to indifference of the American and British governments to Australia and New Zealand, they failed to include or consult with them regarding preparations towards peace in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand then acted without Britain and America, making independent decisions on matters of major political and regional importance.
60 casualties, dislocation of indigenous people from village economies and deterioration of indigenous health caused by land battles and air attacks. The establishment of Allied bases also caused dislocation and manpower shortages. Indigenous labour was used to assist in the Japanese and Allied war efforts in the construction of new roads, bridges and airstrips. The Japanese, cut off from their supply line by the Allied forces, came to depend on indigenous food, causing a shortage of vegetables and a reduction in the amount of village pigs (Fry 1946, 149; Jinks 1971, 31). Jinks (1979, 15) noted that the extent of devastation was never appreciated because few in the post-war administration paid attention to the villages. It was also partly due to an assumption that the Allied armies had left vast amounts of equipment and materials behind. It was assumed that Australian New Guinea Administration Unit (ANGAU) had instituted new programmes in the unoccupied areas. However, World War II also hastened the abandonment of the assumption that colonies, such as Papua and New Guinea, must be individually self- supporting. It also raised questions about European enterprise as a means of achieving indigenous development. The war, therefore, provided an unexpected and unplanned opportunity for Australia to provide fundamental changes in its policy towards developing Papua and New Guinea.
In 1942, the Australian Government, realizing that there needed to be a transformation of the administration of Papua and New Guinea, placed Papua and New Guinea under the single administration of ANGAU. ANGAU was created in 1942 under the command of Major-General Morris and was made up of pre-war government officers, including resident magistrates, district officers, patrol officers and other officials (Ryan 1969, 532). ANGAU had a direct military role; one that included the maintenance of law and order, provision of medical services to the indigenous population and responsibility for the general welfare, provision and supervision of indigenous labour (Ryan 1969, 532). ANGAU also had direct responsibility for the continued production of rubber and copra on those plantations not affected by enemy action. Murray (1949, 23) observed the influence of ANGAU on the New Guinea Production Control Board, which was responsible to the Minister of External Territories in 1943, and continued to be made up of military personnel until 1946 when the Board became a purely civil organization. Ryan (1969, 537) noted that, although the Papua and New Guinea Production Board relieved ANGAU of its production function, the Board was exclusively dependent on ANGAU for labour “without which not a sack of copra nor a sheet of rubber would have been shipped”.
61 Although ANGAU had commenced some welfare programmes for health and education, these were aimed mostly at plantation workers for continued production of copra and rubber (Jinks 1979, 16; White1965, 128). ANGAU was responsible for the foundation of the much-publicised ‘New Deal’ for Papua New Guinea (White 1965, 130; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979; Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1979). One of the first aims of this new deal related to ‘native rehabilitation’, which involved compensation authorised by the Commonwealth Government to Papuans and New Guineans who had suffered physical injury, or loss or damage to property. At the first wartime conference, the ANGAU Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff (1944), covered indigenous administration, medical, indigenous welfare, labour and land, the topic of agricultural development and the creation of an agricultural policy were also discussed (Parker 1968, 191). Much of the agricultural produce was for the army, such as rice grown in the Mekeo under ANGAU, and was carried out by indentured labour (Thompson 1944), but the idea of agricultural training for indigenous farmers was raised along with the introduction of new crops (such as soya beans) and the expansion of a Department of Agriculture that would include livestock and fisheries. Dwyer (1944, Vol. III), an agricultural officer on the Production Control Board, also put forward a policy on indigenous agriculture and called for a long-sighted agricultural policy for post-war development. He argued that limited progress had been made in relation to agricultural policy previously31. At the conference it was also pointed out that Australia had done nothing financially to help the indigenous farmers to develop their own lands. Captain W. R. Humphries (Lewis 1996, pp. 519-520)32 claimed that it was ANGAU’s job to identify Papua New Guinea’s post-war needs and that any policies would only succeed
31 Dwyer was an Economic Botanist in the Department of Agriculture in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea in 1934, where he did comprehensive surveys of main plantation industries in the Territory. He published a series of technical articles on major crops of New Guinea, especially coconuts (Dwyer 1936). In 1937, he completed a survey of rubber in Papua on behalf of the Papuan Administration and again in 1947 (see “Review of Papuan Rubber Industry” (1947), Dept. of External Territories: Canberra, PMB 12371/8.) Post WWII, Dwyer became a member of the Australian-New Guinea Production Control Board, an ANGAU organization that was responsible for controlling agricultural products during the war. He was later appointed adviser to the Commonwealth of Papua and New Guinea War damage claims working with J. B. McAdam to produce a resources survey which became a useful paper for planning post-war Administration activities. In 1946, he held the position of Economic Botanist with the Provisional Administration of Papua New Guinea and was later promoted to Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension in the newly formed Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries. In 1952, he was made Director of DASF. He held this position until his death in 1959, at the age of 57 (Anon. 1959, pp. 47-48). 32 Humphries first went to the Territory of Papua, as a Patrol Officer in 1912. Between 1916 and 1917 he served as Acting Assistant Resident Magistrate on the Lakekamu goldfields. Later, from 1918 to 1941, he served at Misima and Abau, and as Resident Magistrate in the Gulf, Delta, Northern and Central Divisions. He was later appointed Captain in the Citizen Military Forces, where he was eventually posted to ANGAU. In 1945, he served in the Administration as Director of Native Labour until his death in 1951 during the eruption of Mount Lamington. He wrote of his patrolling in
62 with the aid of ANGAU (Humphries 1944, Vol. III). However, the ‘New Deal’, and a new approach to agriculture, remained unformed and J. K. Murray acknowledged this in 1947, when he stated that there was no plan at the end of the war, merely broad trusteeship objectives and statements of intention (Campbell 2000, 198). ANGAU, according to Lieutenant-Colonel T. P. Fry did not operate in 1945 at a high policy level and the Territory’s post-war development was not entrusted to it, nor was it equipped to handle such an all-embracing project (Ryan 1969, 545). Much of the advice to ANGAU came from the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs at Landforce Headquarters, which became known as the policy arm of ANGAU (Gray 2006, pp. 145-163).
E. J. Ward, the Minister of External Territories, and General Blamey encouraged post- war planning for the territories through the Allied Landforces Directorate of Research. In 1944, it became the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs. The Director, Major A. A. (Alf) Conlon33, drew his staff from the armed forces, universities and the pre-war civil services of Papua New Guinea. The Directorate directly recruited anthropologists to study the effects of war on indigenous peoples in PNG, including Ian Hogbin, Camilla Wedgwood, Kenneth (Mick) Read and Ralph Piddington (Gray 2006, 152). Other members of the Directorate included Professor Julius Stone, R. M. Crawford, ‘Panzee’ Wright, A. K. Stout, K. Isles, John Passmore, James McAuley, Sir Ian Clunies-Ross and Peter Ryan. These men were selected from military units and became known as Conlonites (Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973, 321, Jinks 1983, pp. 21-33). Coleman (1963, 24) claimed that it was “one of the strangest collections of brain-trusters ever assembled in Australia”. Keith Jackson (ASOPA, 2007) maintained that “Conlon created the mysterious Directorate, in part, as a haven for artists and intellectuals to avoid the slaughter of the best minds of a generation that had impoverished Australian culture after the losses of the First World War”.
Lucy Mair was recruited in 1944 and was influential in assisting the Directorate to formulate colonial policy in PNG. For this formulation, Mair relied heavily on her
Patrolling in Papua (1923) Unwin: London, and wrote two papers for the ANGAU: Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff (1944). These were “The Administration of the Territory of Papua” and “A Review of Native Plantations and Some Aspects of their Importance to Papua”, ANGAU: Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff (1944), Vol. I and Vol. III respectively. 33 Conlon rose to fame throughout World War II in the position of University Manpower Officer, then as chairman of the Prime Minister’s Committee on National Morale, then as the army’s Director of Research and Civil Affairs. It was during this period that he became a confidant of Blamey, Ward and Curtin (Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973, 321).
63 expertise in British colonial administration (Gray 2006, 152). The Directorate organized a number of enquiries into matters relating to post-war policy, including a study of the labour situation and a survey of agricultural potential (Mair 1949, 19). Ian Hogbin (Hogbin Papers Sydney University Archives (SUA) Group No. P 015) initiated an inquiry into labour, while indigenous education was investigated by Camilla Wedgwood (Camilla H. Wedgewood Papers 1928-1954, Australian National Library, MS483: Box 7, 21 and 28, Wetherall and Carr-Gregg 1990, pp. 18-21) and agriculture by J. K. Murray (U QFL, 91, Box 2). Read and Hogbin also examined indigenous communities with special emphasis on the effect of the war (Read 1947, pp. 95-116; Hogbin 1951) and W. E. H. Stanner (Stanner 1944, pp. 481-491; 1944, Vol.III; Stanner Collection Australian National Archives, MS3572 item 91; MS3572 Series 33) produced an overview of colonial issues involving the United States of America and Britain in terms of “obligation and commitments, economic capacity, manpower requirements and policy imperatives” (Gray 2006, 153; Pybus 1999). Stanner’s initial work for the Directorate was to write a report on ANGAU and colonial policy.
The Directorate served as a ‘think tank’ and borrowed heavily from the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and 1945 (Jinks 1979, 18). British colonial policy changed to external support for the colonies under the provisions of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945, which allowed for expenditure on long-range development schemes (Frost 1945, 309-320). This was an explicit abandonment of previous policy of colonies being self-supporting and made provision for the British Treasury to give financial help to British colonies and, specifically, for the development of agriculture and industry. It looked to implement the work of Lugard (1922) and his policies of indirect rule. These Acts were an attempt to teach colonial peoples the art of self-government through practical experience without subjecting indigenous society to the dangers attending a sudden dislocation of their traditional ways of life and habits of thought.
By 1943, a policy document of the British Labour Party stated that the British, in their colonies, had an “obligation to promote the progress and well-being of the inhabitants” and “to develop the economic potentialities of the territories and people” (Frost 1945, 318). This general objective of improving colonial standards of life, health and civilization required a considerable increase of revenue and capital expenditure. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act also included advice on long-term labour
64 contracts and appropriate systems of taxation, declaring that long-term labour contracts and the necessity of working for wages to pay taxes kept many indigenous people from agricultural pursuits and hampered, rather than improved, the economy and social life of villagers. The Act stressed measures for affording security and tenure to the indigenous agriculturalist and conditions in which agriculture could flourish and maintain a balance between cultivation for export and local production. This Act heavily influenced policy in the TPNG. In 1943, Hogbin and Wedgewood (1943; Gray 2006, 153) produced a pamphlet, Development and Welfare in Western Pacific and T. P. Fry (1946, pp. 146- 164; Gray 2006, 153) produced a paper for the Institute of Pacific Affairs, “Relief and Rehabilitation in Australian Territories in New Guinea”, which he presented at the Institute of Pacific Relations (1945). Both gave support to the sentiments and ideas for the Directorate but also repeated the British obligations and broad aims. Plans were completed later for a proposed Development and Welfare Act, which borrowed heavily from Britain.
While the Directorate planned and developed policy internally for post-war Papua New Guinea, the Australian Government pushed forward externally for more recognition in the international arena. In 1942, America and Britain had failed to include Australia and New Zealand in discussing peace preparations and colonial policy in the Pacific (Wright 200, pp. 68-80).
In 1944, the Australian-New Zealand Agreement (ANZA) was signed. This was the first attempt by Australia and New Zealand to reach an accord on matters of common interest in the region. The emphasis of the agreement was on staking a claim for special regional interests and each undertook to accept equivalent responsibilities (Bridgen 1944, 326). The Australian Government wanted to take a more lively part in the affairs of the British Empire in the South Pacific. A major point of the agreement was the participation of the dominions at future post-war and imperial conferences. This related to the previous exclusion of Australia and New Zealand from the Cairo peace talks (Johnstone 1944, 32). ANZA also proposed the creation of a South Seas Commission, later becoming known as the South Pacific Commission (SPC) based in Noumea, New Caledonia, a French territory.
The SPC became a regional organization to promote advancement and well-being of indigenous people of the South Pacific islands. It was not a new idea. The idea was first
65 raised by R. W. Robson, who, at the time, was the editor of Pacific Islands Monthly, and again by Lord Hailey in 1942 (Padelford 1959, 381; Ward 1947, pp. 17-28). The main functions laid out by ANZA for the SPC were to
gather, correlate and disseminate information concerning the islands and the people, to help provide technical assistance, to offer recommendations to governments for the promotion and social development and well-being of the native peoples and to bring together periodically representatives of these people to discuss problems of mutual concern (Padelford 1959, pp. 383-384; Anon “South Pacific Organization”. (1947, pp. 368-370)
The two governments applied the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the doctrine of trusteeship to the Pacific. The main intention of trusteeship was the welfare of indigenous peoples and their social, economic and political development, and this doctrine was already in force in the case of pre-war mandated territories within the Pacific. Both the Australian and New Zealand governments held mandatory powers (Johnstone 1944, 33). Australia administered Nauru (jointly with Britain and New Zealand), Papua, Norfolk and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. New Zealand administered West Samoa (mandated), the Cook, Nuie and Tokelau Islands (DFAT, Historical Publications 1944, Vol. 7, No. 26; Ball 1944, pp. 216-220, Jenkins 1945, pp. 8-9; Johnstone 1944, 31). In 1946, Prime Minister Chifley stated to the House of Representatives that “we [Australia] recognize and gladly accept the general duty laid down in the Charter, to promote the welfare and advancement of the inhabitants of New Guinea” (Murray 1949, pp. 19-20).
The combined impetus of the Directorate, the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act, the Australia-New Zealand Agreement, the SPC, and the United Nations influenced the policies and policymakers for the newly combined Territory of Papua and New Guinea. These institutions and organizations continually examined the issue of the social, economic and political development of indigenous people and the importance of policies in obtaining material well-being for colonial subjects. It was believed that promoting foreign investment and European enterprise was not going to achieve the desired objective and that an increase in wealth for indigenous people had to come from increased involvement in commercial agriculture. At the ANGAU conference 1944, Stanner stated, “regardless of a colonial policy influenced by trusteeship, or dual development or parallel development, the constant note was that the economic development of the indigenous people was the main objective” (Stanner 1944, 30). To achieve this aim, economic development in the TPNG was declared to be through cash-
66 crop agriculture. Export earnings from indigenous agriculture were to have a central role in the economy.
J. K. Murray noted the weakness of relying on a single export staple, stating that there was a lack of soil conservation due to lack of expert knowledge, low technical standards and inefficiencies of plantation management. He also claimed that the weakness of the one crop system was that it exposed the Territory to fluctuating world markets for which adequate stabilization machinery had not been devised. Apart from isolated experiments and showcase examples of new crops, there had been little crop diversification, and coffee, ginger and tobacco had not been supported enough to create an impact on world markets and were still at an experimental stage. It was felt that the practice of relying on Europeans as managers and skilled workers delayed the development of skills, management and the entrepreneurial advance of indigenous farmers. The lack of attention to a potential livestock industry was an important issue, Murray argued, as livestock could have contributed to both nutritional and economic needs (Murray 1949, 50). Agricultural development was a worthy concept in 1945, but without practical implementation in the field.
3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF A POST WORLD WAR II AGRICULTURAL POLICY
In 1945, the Papua New Guinea Provisional Administration Act became law. It provided for the return of a civil administration and for the unified control of the two territories. E. J. Ward, Minister of State for the External Territories, introduced the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act into the Australian Federal Parliament and was responsible for the policy of the Australian Government in relation to the territories. In an address to the full Cabinet, Ward (1945) presented the “Economic Development, Agricultural and Commerce Agenda” for the territories, declaring that indigenous peoples should be given “better health, better education and an opportunity to share in a greater extent in the resources of the country”, and that “to make these declarations effective the future economy of the Territories must be planned and controlled with the following objectives” (Australian Archives (AA) series A2700/1). These objectives repeated the ideas of the 1920s and 1930s that improvement of living conditions with greater facilities for indigenous people to engage in industry on their own account would come as long as they did not remain merely as paid workers of the Europeans.
67 In 1945, the Prime Minister announced that the economy of Papua New Guinea would blend “native and European Industry with the limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare of the native generally” (AA series A2700/1). This led to the end of contract labour under a new native labour ordinance that eliminated labour recruiters. The Administration also specified the number of indigenes who could leave a village for employment, and a 44-hour week was to replace, in New Guinea, the 55-hour week and, in Papua, the 50-hour week. The ordinance also introduced a minimum work age of 16 years, which was formerly 14 years. Women were not permitted to be under indenture and employment was limited to a maximum of 12 months, with re-engagement not permitted until the worker had returned home for at least three months (Trusteeship Discussion Bulletin nd, 15; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 102; Murray 1971, 187). Ward went further, stating that the fundamentals of such a programme would be in education and teaching about better agricultural methods and providing a market for the crops grown by the indigenous producers (Ward 1945, AA series A2700/1). To achieve this, Ward, as the minister responsible, stated that the government would use experienced tropical agriculturalists to assist in improving indigenous peoples’ methods of production (Ward 1945, UQFL24, Box 1; McAuley and Hogbin 1948, 49). This was the impetus for what was soon to become known as Didiman. Funds were to be provided by the Commonwealth Government. This was in line with British Government policies for the welfare and development of British colonies elsewhere in the Pacific, Africa and Asia. Ward suggested that the Commonwealth should allocate funds as soon as details could be worked out, and after civil administration had been fully restored in the territories (Ward 1945, AA series A2700/1).
These policies were not popular among the European plantation owners, who had depended on indigenous labour before the War. They argued that the abolition of indentured labour would hinder economic progress. R. W. Robson, editor of Pacific Islands Monthly, commented sarcastically on the new labour ordinance, stating, “the need for reform of native labour conditions in New Guinea and Papua exists only in the imaginative mind of Mr. Ward” (Robson 1945, 10). Ward defended the ordinance, citing the mass exodus of labourers who were returning to their villages from plantations, which proved that indentured labour was not popular among Papua New Guineans (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 103). Regardless of opposition to the labour ordinance, Ward reaffirmed the Australian Government’s obligations for indigenous advancement under the United Nations trusteeship. This showed that the Administration would not
68 impede indigenous advancement in order to satisfy the demands of expatriate settlers. The issue for expatriates in the TPNG was whether the Administration should set limits on the growth of European participation in the economy.
The decision to free up the indigenous labour force within Papua New Guinea was aimed at an increase in subsistence farming and to allow for the introduction of a cash economy into the villagers lives. J. K. Murray (1979, 191) noted that the return of indigenous troops and labourers to their villages after the cessation of the War, as well as the loss of indentured labour, had weakened the Territory’s economy, but, at the same time, it had strengthened the subsistence economy. This was because men returning to their villages were able to clear land for more gardens than was possible during the War, when many villages had been left with only old men and young boys to do the heavy work required in subsistence gardening. This was a policy that related closely to the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act that supported the idea of indigenous agricultural enterprise as a way to increase not only economic development, but also better health and better welfare. It also resonated the beliefs of Hubert Murray, the pre-war Lieutenant-Governor of Papua who had stated,
If the Papuan was shown how to use his land productively, taught to read and write, given the chance to learn a trade and instructed how to keep his family healthy, then he would have been given as good a chance as any native had. (Cited in Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 27)
Fry (1946, 160), writing after the War, claimed that
if New Guinea was to prosper, a corollary of the Australian government policy of restricting the number of native labourers to be employed by Europeans, is that they must be encouraged to establish additional native plantations and in other ways to produce surpluses of marketable cash commodities. Before any policy can succeed there must be an intensive campaign to educate natives in scientific agricultural methods.
Fry was expressing the post-war belief that, with the aid of Australian agriculturalists, indigenous farmers could improve not only their subsistence crops, but also be introduced to cash or so-called economic crops.
Ward appointed J. K. Murray as the first Administrator of the combined Territories of Papua New Guinea. Murray joined the Allied Land Forces Headquarters, which later became the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs. Murray had previously been part of Conlon’s directorate, serving as a link between the wartime planners and the administration men in the field (Jinks 1971, 31, and 1979).
69 Murray served in the army during World War I and was a citizen soldier in the 1930s. In 1935, Murray became active in the militia and in 1940 commanded the 25th Battalion, Darling Downs Regiment and spent the next three years administering army training establishments in Queensland (Jinks 2000, 450-451). Murray later graduated in Arts and Agricultural Science at Sydney University (1915) and became the Principal of Queensland Agricultural High School and College, Gatton (1923-1945). In 1927, Murray was made an honorary Professor of Agriculture at the University of Queensland, a position he held until 1945 (Wilson 1997, 7; Jinks 2000, pp. 450-451). After visiting Papua New Guinea in late 1944, Murray was appointed Chief Instructor at the Land Headquarters School of Civil Affairs. This later became known as the Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA), where personnel were trained for the administration of Australian territories.
Part VIII of the Papua and New Guinea Act No. 9 of 1949 stated that, “the function of the school shall provide special courses for the education of officers and prospective officers of the Territory and of such other persons as are prescribed” (Jinks 2000, 450 and 1975).
As a scholar, Murray lectured on tropical agriculture at ASOPA. This included the concept of fertility as applied to a tropical climate, and especially on the gardens of Omovakana, tropical forest lands, New Guinea indigenous gardens, indigenous garden techniques and rubber (“Lectures on Tropical Agriculture”, UQFL91, Box 10). Murray was appointed Administrator of Papua New Guinea in 1945; he was one of 53 candidates for the position. On the strength of his agricultural background, it appeared that Murray was the right choice if agriculture was to be the main avenue to the economic development of Papua New Guinea. The following year, Fry (1946, 152) criticised the appointment, saying
the selection of a scientist as a new Administrator was but a token that Australia would endeavour to apply an increasing extent the methods of scientific research to the economic and cultural problems of the Territories.
However, Downs acknowledged that J. K. Murray’s appointment as Administrator was “based on merit within the requirements of the Government at the time” (Downs 1980, 17).
70 In 1947, Chifley, then the Australian Labor Prime Minister, wrote to Ward (Minister of External Territories) stating that Australia needed to consider what direction production and other policy in the Territory should take. This included a programme for agriculture, and became the work of an inter-departmental committee (UQFL 91, Box 3). This committee was “appointed and commissioned to carry out all necessary investigations and to make recommendations to the Minister of External Territories” so that the “government could be in possession of a complete survey of conditions and future possibilities and expenditure that it is considered necessary annually to give effect to the government’s policy in relation to the Territories” (Memorandum from the Office of Administrator to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 1947 Papua New Guinea Archives (PX) 20-1-40). Murray reported back that consideration of economics and policy matters by the inter-departmental committee would be considered in terms of Australia’s international commitments and the social, economic and political development of the indigenous people. He also noted that any plan in connection with the Territories must be aware of the size of the Territories, the potentialities of the area and, as Australia was not likely to produce its own requirements of many tropical products, that these could be produced for the Australian consumer (“Plans for Native Welfare, Social Development and Economic Development” 1947, 2, PX 20-1-40).
Murray formed several sub-committees to undertake the drafting of outlines for long- term planning and empowered these committees to designate personnel and identify ad- hoc problems (1947, 3, PX 20-1-40). These committees were named the Native Welfare Committee, the Social Development Committee, the Finance Committee and the Economic Development Committee. Agriculture came under the jurisdiction of the Economic Development Committee, which was chaired by J. B. McAdam (Director of Forestry), E. P. Holmes (Secretary of Lands), R. E. P. Dwyer (Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension) and C. J. Millar (Department of District Services and Native Affairs) (“Plans for Native Welfare, Social Development and Economic Development” 1947, 2, PX 20-1-40). Agriculture was included within the Economic Development Committee as it was thought that the introduction of cash cropping to indigenous farmers would be the mainstay of economic development, leading to an expansion of primary, secondary and tertiary production of agricultural products.
The Economic Development Committee collaborated with the Commonwealth Bureau of Agricultural Economics (CBAE) to determine the Australian demand for agricultural
71 products, as an indication of the possible integration of the TPNG’s agricultural output with the Australian markets. The CBAE compiled basic data relating to crops and production, exports from the TPNG, imports into Australia, Australian and world consumption and tariff rates for several products; tea, sugar (cane), peanuts, sago, maize, tapioca, coconuts, bananas, vanilla essence, cinchona, ginger and spices, rubber, copra, sisal, kapok, tobacco, cotton, coffee, rice and cocoa (Territory of New Guinea- Interdepartmental Committee, Progress Statement No. 2 and No.3, 1947, PX 1-1-5). The idea was to determine which export cash crops were best suited, economically, for development in the TPNG. The Committees compared Papuan and New Guinean production with then present Australian production, and normal Australian consumption in respect of each commodity. Much of this information was obtained from existing statistics or published sources and was forwarded to the CBAE from Dwyer. Dwyer noted in a letter (9th July 1947) to the Administrator that the data was skewed by the Japanese invasion and much of the data had been derived only from export figures from the wartime production board and, therefore, no long-term production figures were available (“Re: The Integration of New Guinea Agriculture with the Australian Economy”, 1947 PX 1-1-5). Regardless of this, the Economic Development Committee was able to make some recommendations that would eventually influence agricultural development and policy.
The final report from the Economic Development Committee was submitted in September 1948 (Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration, 1948). It stated that copra needed improved methods; that cultivation, cutting and collection were in need of further investigation despite the fact that, prior to the War, it had been the main contributor to the Mandated Territory of New Guinea’s economy. At that time, it had constituted more than 40% of all of the copra production in the South Seas.
In Papua, as in New Guinea, coconut planting had also been important. However, the post-war dogma was that copra constituted a monoculture, which was considered unhealthy, as it left the TPNG’s economy predisposed to world demand and price fluctuations. The report stated that “the economic future of this crop was assured”. This was due to rising post-war world demand and the belief that the expansion of cocoa production in the Territories was secure because there was a substantial market for cocoa in Australia. It was also noted that indigenous farmers could be encouraged to become
72 producers of this crop in areas where it had not been previously established. Rice was also considered a good economic prospect. Pre-war Australia had imported rice from Saigon, where it was no longer available, leaving a shortage in Australia (Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration, 1948, 3).
The report suggested that vegetable oils extracted from peanuts, cottonseed, maize, soybeans, sesame seeds and sunflowers should be developed. Pre-war, these possibilities had not been investigated. All of these oils were believed to be of value to the Australian market and it was suggested that plant fibre produce, such as sisal and jute could develop an excellent market in Australia. It recommended that the marketing avenues for these crops should be fully exploited. Regarding tea, it was estimated that Australia’s full tea requirements was 52 million pounds, needing an estimated area of 75,000 acres, with 100,000 labourers and pickers. Although estimates were that the TPNG could not meet Australia’s demands for tea, the report suggested that a substantial quantity of Australia’s needs could be produced. Rubber was also found to have an Australian market and it was suggested that the TPNG’s production would protect Australia against the isolation of this raw material in the event of another war.
The Committee also investigated the introduction of a livestock programme, as it had been proven elsewhere that the combination of stock-raising with agriculture in tropical countries could almost double the total income from a given acreage. This was based on a report by Mr. Wakefield of the British Overseas Food Corporation where he particularly mentioned the long-term need for animal fat; a product which could be handled without expensive planting and could be produced by feeding stock starchy foods, such as cassava and sweet potato. Thus indigenes had not only fresh meat but also could effectively utilise the fibrous roughage as fertiliser (Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration 1948, pp. 132-133). It was suggested that stock could be raised on the grass plains of the river basins, which amounted to a total area of approximately two million acres in the TPNG. The breed suggested was a Zebu hybridisation, which could be preserved and also used as fresh meat. Together with cattle it was suggested that sheep could be raised in the Upper Ramu for mutton.
In 1947, Murray, in communication with Kerr, (1947, UQFL91 Box 3) the Principal of ASOPA, expressed his support for a livestock industry in the TPNG. He wrote,
73 the place is crying out for the most rapid possible development of animal industries so that the present absurdity of bringing in hundreds of tons of meats and fats shall become a thing of the past as soon as possible and the chronic shortages of animal proteins and fats also become a thing of the past.
Development was the responsibility of the newly created Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (DASF). Initially, its main functions were to be advisory, based on its investigations of production, home consumption and export, development for indigenous and non-indigenous agriculture, and the provision of scientific services. It was foreseen that one of the main obstacles would be the willingness or unwillingness of indigenous farmers to work along the lines put forward by the Committee and to fall in with new ideas set out by Australian policy. However, the crux of the report by the Economic Development Committee was that indigenes should be educated and encouraged to strive for a better standard of living through permanent systems of mixed farming and communal settlement, with the possibility of a combination of both individual and community development (Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration 1948, pp. 143-144). The domestic market, export and trade with the Commonwealth and other countries and, lastly, the training of indigenous agriculturalists were all considered in the report (Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration 1948, pp. 116-118). However, Murray challenged some of the ideas in the report, arguing that,
It is practically impossible to lay down a hard and fast policy for Agriculture because of the continually changing international situation altering world trade conditions and market prices. Internally also there are considerable obstacles to development such as widely diverse soils, topography and environmental conditions, language, customs and needs of the various tribes, scattered population and rather limited labour potential. (Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration 1948, 141)
Murray (1949, 42) recognised the difficulty of promoting rapid agricultural development within the Territories, noting that it was a mistake to regard all land in the Territories as completely fertile. He pointed out that, although there were extensive fertile tracts of land in the Central Highlands extending westward from the headwaters of the Markham and Ramu Rivers, there were considerable tracts of land so steeply sloped that cultivation and removal of natural cover would be highly detrimental, unless radical and expensive conservation techniques were applied. He also noted that there were extensive areas of coastal swampland which made agricultural development difficult. As well as the difficulties of the terrain, there was the influence of two main climatic systems, the northwest monsoon and southeast trade winds, which resulted in a wide range of local
74 climates (1949, 42). These variable climates affected crops and food supplies throughout the Territories and it was feared that they would diminish the regular and sustained cultivation necessary for the Australian and international markets (Spate 1956, pp. 430- 436; Cottrell-Dormer 1955, pp. 53-55; Conroy 1960, pp. 94-97; Lamrock 1962, pp. 1-2).
Another consideration for developing agricultural policy was the role of the indigenous farmer. Murray thought that the potentialities of the Territories “must be considered in relation to the size of the indigenous population and cultural practices” (1949, 48). The principal system of land use in the Territories was described by Murray as a bush- fallowing rotation (1949, 48). This form of agriculture relied on land being plentiful in relation to population and was complicated by a wide variety of customary modes of land tenure and the practice of extending usufructuary rights (Murray 1949, 49; Cottrell- Dormer 1955, 5; Vasey 1988, pp. 17-32; Carmen 1980; Crocombe 1968; Larmour 1991). The obstacles to non-indigenous agricultural development were the limiting factors of the availability of land and labour. During the War, Lett (1944, 91) had acknowledged this by stating, “It would not be possible to establish a string of plantations [in regards to Papua] … as it is not suitable for agriculture of any kind”. He went further, stating that the settlement of thousands of Australia’s returned soldiers was impossible as the Territories could not provide the quantity of native labour that would be needed (194, 91). However, indigenous producers possessed one characteristic in regard to economic development that non-indigenous producers did not possess. This was the fact that men and women were already established in their own localities, in their own homes and on their own lands. With regard to labour, they could call on relatives and friends to help with the clearing, maintenance and harvesting of produce (Cottrell-Dormer 1955, 55).
Australia also adhered to the nineteenth century land policy signalled by Commodore Erskine’s proclamation that “your lands will be secure” (Murray 1949, 15; Mayo 1971, pp. 17-33; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, pp. 8-9). This saw land, traditions and customs respected by Administrator MacGregor (Papua 1888-1889) (Rowley 1958; Joyce 1971) and later, Lieutenant-Governor Hubert Murray (Papua 1906-1941). MacGregor and Hubert Murray both considered the Papuan labour supply limited (Biskup, Jinks and Nelson 1968, pp. 76 and 168; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 23; West 1968, 122; Harris 1980, 132; Joyce 1971, pp. 199-208). Although there were policies to protect the Papuans and their lands, J. K. Murray conceded that much of this policy was really designed to prevent improper recruiting practices (1949, 15). Ward was
75 also in agreement with MacGregor and Murray, stating that there was not “an unlimited supply of indigenous labour” to aid in the development of non-indigenous farming. In Australian parliament, Ward also noted that if “the Government proposed a vigorous policy which would enable indigenous to take a greater share in agriculture”, then the Administration would have to “determine the number of Indigenes who may leave a village for employment” (Provisional Administration Act 1945). The geographer, D. Howlett (1963, 1), later observed that post-war opinions were limited in thinking that the only way to achieve economic growth was to convert the subsistence economy into a commercial, or at least semi-commercial, enterprise.
The tempo of agricultural development in any colony was not governed by economic factors alone. Other factors militated against the indigenous farmer becoming the dynamic element in economic growth. Howlett (1963, 6) and Cottrell-Dormer (1955, 55) later claimed that indigenous agricultural knowledge did not extend beyond subsistence gardening, that Western education did not extend beyond elementary schooling, capital (cash reserves) were limited and that Papuans and New Guineans customarily worked only to satisfy immediate needs and often had no marketing facilities to dispose of excess produce. This meant that, after the introduction of a radical new social and economic organisation into the village, the subsistence economy of a given community would be affected by a period of readjustment. If the impact were too severe, serious dislocation, disillusionment and unrest would occur. Conroy, (later a Director of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea) concluded that
any particular rural group must be either actively confronted or surrounded by the full working mechanism of the commercial exchange economy before it is likely to voluntarily embark on programs of rapid and substantial economic change. (cited in Harris 1980, 140)
The attitude of the indigenous farmer to introduced change in agricultural techniques and methods was summed up by Fisk’s doggerel:
The Song of the Tribal Economist The primitive farmer says cash Is unsatisfactory trash: It won’t keep off the rain And it gives me a pain If I use it to flavour my hash… If I act in a rational way I’ll sit on my backside today. When I want a good feed I’ve got all I need Piping hot, and there’s nothing to pay
76 Cash cropping is all very well If you’ve got something to sell: But tell me sir, why, If there is nothing to buy Should I bother? You can all go to hell. (cited in Denoon 2005, pp. 12-13)
The anthropologist, C. D Rowley (1965, 95), thought that, regardless of the methods used by the Australian Government to bring pressures to bear on village agriculturalists, “it is the fact of contact with the money economy itself, which initiates profound changes, by loosening the bonds, which held together traditional village life”. It was not until much later that it was agreed that an affluent New Guinea economy could be built on the foundations of native society and was seen as the most economically feasible and socially desirable (Denoon 2005, 11).
Post-War, it was generally thought that a subsistence economy once introduced to a world industrial economy was inextricably trapped in a process of destructive change, no matter how slowly this change may occur. It was argued that commercial export crop agriculture could push or draw indigenous subsistence farmers into a cash economy, but this social, economic and cultural engineering would be slow and would require careful work by the DASF. The compulsion used by the Germans and previous Australian administrations were no longer considered tolerable or useful.
In 1949, the Papua New Guinea Act changed the form of administration. It was
an Act to approve the placing of the Territory of New Guinea under the International Trusteeship System, to provide for the Government of the Territory of Papua and the Territory of New Guinea and for other purposes. (The Commonwealth of Australia Papua New Guinea Act No. 9 of 1949)
In the same year, Australia saw a change in government from the Labor to Liberal- Country Party under Menzies. Percy Spender (1972) replaced Ward as Minister of External Territories in December 1949. It was assumed that the Administration would change policy and allow for the greater encouragement of European enterprise. Ward had seen “little merit in private enterprise” and many had disliked Ward’s policy of “natives first” (Thompson 1998, 128). Spender promised more opportunities for European settlers and investment and argued that it was in the “interests of the people of Papua New Guinea for more Australians to settle and to invest in the Territories” (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 123). He wanted the Territory’s economy to complement that of Australia and he expected the TPNG’s trade to be dominated by
77 Australia (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 123). What was not clear was how this was to be achieved without large-scale alterations of the land and labour laws (White 1972, 157).
Spender launched plans for private enterprise development by introducing 18-month employment contracts to alleviate the labour shortage (Spender 1972, pp. 271-278). In his first major statement about the TPNG, Spender announced that the indigenous people were “our first and foremost duty” and, as such, improvements in health and agriculture were the first requirement with the provision of trained, specialised staff (Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973, 340) and an increase in government funding (Thompson 1998, 128). However, Spender also noted that, under the previous Labor government and the administration of Murray, “no plan for the development of New Guinea” (cited in Thompson 1998, 128) had been in place. He claimed that there was no post-war plan for the advancement of the TPNG and, in his opening speech in Parliament, relating to his appointment as Minister of External Territories, Spender proclaimed that agriculture was a “main foundation upon which the progress and development of New Guinea has been erected” (cited in Thompson 1998, 128). Spender left the main areas of policy unchanged. Spender held this office for only 15 months and was replaced by Paul Hasluck in 1951.
Hasluck, upon taking office in Canberra, formed the Department of Territories, which replaced the old Department of External Territories. Hasluck noted that there was a need for wharves and jetties, roads, electricity supplies, housing, malaria control, preparation of land for settlement, soil surveys, experimental projects, control of pests and plant and animal diseases, and the introduction of stock (Hasluck 1976, 11). Much of what Hasluck suggested was, indeed, needed in Papua and New Guinea, but it was not a new idea, having been put forward by the Committees formed by J. K. Murray in the post- war period. Murray thought it was not a radical change but “after a change of government, the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the territories continued but was accelerated” (1971, 207).
In 1952, Murray was replaced. Hasluck chose the Assistant Administrator, Donald Cleland. On Murray’s dismissal Hasluck stated, “the Government does not regard the administrative capacity of Colonel Murray at the present day as adequate for the duties of this office” (1976, 52). According to Jinks, Hasluck had Murray removed because
78 Hasluck “intended to control Territory affairs: not for policy or ideology, but power” (1979, 29). Hasluck was to dominate policy within the Territories for the next 12 years. He declared that “in future very little discretion would be accorded to the New Guinea Administration in determining broad policy” (cited in White 1972, 158). Policy would be the prime concern of the Federal Cabinet in Canberra. The men in the field would be required to steer the course set by Canberra, no matter what local difficulties arose. However, as noted by Wright, “it is erroneous to dismiss the Curtin and Chifley Labor governments’ promise of colonial reform as political rhetoric devoid of substance and hence a continuation of the past”(Wright 2002, 74). Hasluck did not introduce any new agricultural policies during his term of office. Jinks summarised the period by noting that “later events showed that long-range objectives of Murray and Hasluck were very similar” (Jinks 1971, 35). Jinks also noted that the reports of the Committees formed under Murray, “not only contained the schemes implemented before 1952 but all were the apparent innovations that occurred throughout Hasluck’s period in office together with many that became acceptable only after 1972” (Jinks 1979, 25). Despite a change of minister and administrator, the ‘Wardian’ policies were maintained and practised even more thoroughly than before.
An examination of the two territories’ financial statements reveals the pre-war economic positions of the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea:
Table 3.4 The Territories of Papua and New Guinea - Financial Statistics, 1941
Papua New Guinea Annual Revenue £189,518 £423,750 Annual Expenditure £189,000 £431,79234
Papua had a total of approximately £86,000 of outstanding Commonwealth loans in 1942. Papua’s revenue for 1942 also included Commonwealth grants of £42,500 (Ward 1945, “Territoryof Papua and New Guinea Economic Development, Agriculture and Commerce”, AA series 2700/1). The Mandated Territory had repaid all of its loans. After the War, there was an increase in the amount of grant-in-aid given to the TPNG. Ward, following the British Government’s blueprint for the “Welfare and Development of British Colonies”, saw the importance of providing funds for development. Murray stated, “the change from rhetoric to intent became clear from war’s end and from the
34Full Cabinet address by E. J. Ward (1945) “Territory of Papua and New Guinea, economic Development, Agriculture and Commerce, AA, Series A2700.
79 commencement of the New Deal” (Murray 1971, 206). Australia continued to increase grants to both territories:
Table 3.5 Australian Grant-in-aid* to Papua and New Guinea, 1946 to 1952
Year $ 1939 - 1940 90,000 (for Papua only) 1945 - 1946 505,000 1946 - 1947 4,037,000 1947 - 1948 3,734,000 1948 - 1949 6,393,000 1949 - 1950 8,369,000 1950 - 1951 8,709,000 1951 - 1952 10,569,000
*(Formerly known as subsidy grants.)
During the 1960s, Australia spent approximately $100,000,000 per year (“TPNG, The Economy in the 60s” 1967, 51). Wright, in a study of local government and economic development, argued that agricultural policy, as laid out during the post-war period in Papua New Guinea, was in accordance with what he called an “agrarian doctrine of development” (Wright 2002, 194; Cowen and Shenton 1996, pp. 294-369). For the people of Papua and New Guinea this meant that they were to remain attached to their land through customary landholdings, while development became synonymous with plans for strengthening that attachment, with some changes in the terms of occupancy. Citing Cowan’s and Shenton’s work on an agrarian doctrine, Wright noted that the concept of development contained two cores (Cowen and Shenton 1996, pp. x-xv). These were immanent and intentional development. The first refers to a spontaneous process of capital accumulation, while the second describes an intentional programme designed to compensate for the negative consequences explicit in the former, such as proletarianisation.
The intention to develop becomes doctrine when plans to redress the negative consequences of capital accumulation are attached to the administrative apparatus of state power and realised through state practice. In the TPNG, an agrarian doctrine of development was paramount throughout successive governments, even though they were aware of the changes of creating a landless proletariat. The agricultural policy that emerged after World War II tied indigenous labour to a means of production without undermining a prior definition of ‘community’. The development of an agricultural department that investigated, experimented and introduced new farming techniques,
80 allowing indigenous farmers to not only enter a world economic market but also establish an internal economic market, was encouraged, not only for better health, but also better wellbeing.
What was planned for agriculture in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea from 1946 onwards was not new; Australia borrowed heavily from the British Colonial Acts and abided by the principles of the United Nations Trusteeship. While no real attempt had been made to respond to problems of terrain, climate, culture and language, they were seen as difficulties that could be overcome by scientifically empathetic agriculturists who would go into the field and educate indigenous farmers in new techniques and/or methods, introduce new cash crops, experiment with new economic plants and, at the same time, allow the indigenous farmer to continue subsistence farming on their own lands. It was a fine idea but lacked commitment, until a structural mechanism for introducing and implementing the Australian Government’s ‘native’ agricultural policy was introduced.
Murray appointed William Cottrell-Dormer as the Director of Agriculture in 1946, making him responsible for planning and organising agriculture in the territories. The next chapter will discuss the Didiman, the Australian Agricultural Extension Officers, many of whom started their careers under the cadet system introduced in 1948, and who were to be the instruments and agents of agricultural policy in the territories.
81 CHAPTER 4: DIDIMAN: THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL OFFICERS
In 1946, the responsibility of training, controlling and channelling the agricultural energies of Papuans and New Guineans was given to the Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (DASF). A large staff was necessary if agriculture was to meet all the expectations being laid out for it in post-war planning. The Director of DASF in 1959, Frank Henderson, noted “it is pointless in developing a highly efficient health and education system if the economic resources of the country cannot absorb the increased population and also provide improved living standards” (“Reorganization and Classification of DASF” 1959, 1, AA series A452/1item C852/1/1). In 1946, William Cottrell-Dormer (1946, series A1838/1, AA), the first Director of DASF, proposed a working plan for DASF, which aimed at improving nutrition and encouraging indigenous farmers to take full advantage of the potential marine, plant and animal wealth of their country. They had of course been doing this for 40000 years; what Cottrell-Dormer meant was taking full capitalist, commercial value from the resources. Based on the work of Lynn on agricultural extension in British colonies (Lynn 1949), Cottrell-Dormer (1946, series A1838/1, AA) proposed a working plan with three phases. These were field-testing, application and extension. The first or field-testing phase was ‘investigation’. The aim was to study the potential of crops either for export or as food crops, accompanied by a greater understanding of local farming systems and indigenous knowledge. Cottrell-Dormer was “influenced by the unshakeable conviction” that development could not proceed without obtaining technical information relative to the Territories’ natural resources. The second phase of ‘application’ involved applying this knowledge in the field. In the case of food crops, the distribution of improved varieties also involved instruction on how to grow new crops and how to make maximum use of new varieties. This also meant a change in the indigenous farming method of shifting cultivation. Gourou in defence of changing indigenous farming methods, claimed “to raise the standard of living of tropical peoples, the first step is to abolish the … system of shifting cultivation … since it is incompatible with a high standard of living” (Gourou 1958, 159). The third phase was ‘extension’ or the ‘introduction of export crops’. Cottrell-Dormer believed, in line with the thinking of the day, that with an improvement in the indigenous nutrition, the indigenous farmer could gradually contribute to the development of export industries. It is not clear from the records whether proposed dietary improvements was paying lip-service to a popular post-war creed, and there is
82 little evidence to show any DASF policy or action driven primarily by dieting needs. Diet clearly ran well behind cash cropping and export markets as criteria for agricultural policy. John Kerr declared in 1948, “It is clear that our economic policy must be in the interests and for the benefits of the native peoples” (Proceedings of Conference of District Officers 1948, 6). This reiterated Cottrell-Dormer’s belief that indigenous farmers through agriculture could capitalise their resources to enable them to enter a cash economy and implement Australia’s economic development plans for Papua and New Guinea.
Cottrell-Dormer’s real aim was to develop permanent mixed farming systems. He set about examining land use capabilities to establish the best way to utilise these capabilities for crops either for export, industry or food. As with agricultural extension programs in other colonies Cottrell-Dormer wanted to change farmers’ behaviour. This was a serious and possibly tragic proposal demanding large-scale social engineering of the people’s way of life. Because of the communal nature of the colonised subjects (mostly located in villages), extension work was based on the principle of transformation (Lynn 1949, 7). That is, if agriculture extension was to work in the colonies or dependencies, such as theTPNG, it needed to change the behaviour of the farming community in a way that introduced new ideas but maintained local values, standards and social-political processes. Cottrell-Dormer’s perception of agricultural extension was a ‘social system’ that used technical information delivered by a qualified instructor, the Didiman, to strengthen concepts of family unity, community, welfare and citizenship in the minds of the people. He thought the lack of indigenous technical knowledge would hinder agricultural extension (Lynn 1949, 7: Cottrell-Dormer. 1947, PX 1-3-2). In 1939, Robert Lord stated in regard to agricultural extension, that “the spread of new findings, thoughts and practices throughout a country is a phenomenon as old as agriculture and older” (Lord 1939, 15). He further stated “to do new things, to try new ways and to get other people to try them: These have been the main purposes and methods of agricultural extension since the time of Noah” (1939, 15). The role of the Didiman was to be that agent of change. They were the catalyst that would motivate Papua New Guineans to change their farming system and to increase their productivity. Didiman did this under the pretext that it was good for the economic development for the future nation.
83 4.1 THE ROLE OF THE DIDIMAN
It was necessary for the Didiman to be familiar with indigenous farming systems, to be capable of giving farmers practical field demonstrations, to locate farm supplies and follow up requests for seed, fertilisers, crop processing, tools, improved crop cultivation and give guidance on nutrition and health. However, the introduction of new plants or animals, a change to tillage, a new household garden method or a new marketing mechanism had to be accepted by the villager, or be modified in action. The Didiman followed a number of phases when working with the Papua New Guinean communities. Firstly, the indigenous farmers had to be willing to divert some of their traditional crop production and land for cash crop purposes. The indigenous farmer had to willingly accept new crops but at the same time accept advice on unusual and often radically different agricultural techniques. Indigenous farmers also had to change their traditional mechanisms of land tenure and inheritance to enable them to enter into a commercial economy. These tasks called for tact, a well-developed skill in cross-cultural and interpersonal relations, respect for the individual and mostly the ability to ‘talk the language’ of the farmers they wanted to reach. The Didiman’s work was not to spoon feed the Papua New Guinean farmers but to convince them to help themselves. The goodwill and active co-operation of the farmers was essential to the success of DASF policy. Bruner, Saunders and Ensminger noted “there is no extension unless people are changed, and there is little constructive change unless the people co-operate” (Bruner, Saunders and Ensminger 1945). Thirty years later, Schramm agreed, noting “It is individuals who must change” (Schramm 1965, 118). However he also acknowledged that “these individuals live in groups, work and play in groups” (1965, 18), because of this, many of the beliefs and values they hold most strongly were group norms which were commonly held and defended. To change or modify agriculture within the boundaries of group norms was not necessarily difficult if the changes imposed were not contrary to a community’s norm. A problem arose only if the changes were either introduced too fast or the changes were too extreme. The importance of appointing the right type of European instructor became paramount. In 1944, Dwyer noted that the right type of instructor was one “who would be in direct contact with the villagers with a forceful personality could not be exaggerated where results were to be secured” (Dwyer 1944). Thirty years later, Cottrell-Dormer (1973, 5) still maintained that an effective agricultural extension officer had to be culturally ambivalent, familiar with the value- orientation of the major socio-technical system in which he worked (the TPNG), and with the rural development activities to be implemented, but he also had to be familiar
84 with the socio-ecological system of the rural people and on whose behalf he would be working. Because of this dual expectation, Didiman faced the challenge of operating in a wide range of situations.
4.2 RECRUITING DIDIMAN
On the resumption of civil administration within the TPNG in 1946, only three members of the former pre-war Department of Agriculture of the old Mandated Territory remained. These were R. E. P. Dwyer, C. C. Marr and F. C. Henderson (“Organization and Administration- Cadet Agricultural System” 1949 PX 1-3-5). Sending trained staff into the field as quickly as possible was a priority as Cottrell-Dormer thought Government policy could not otherwise be initiated (“Regarding letter written by Cottrell-Dormer” 1948, PX 1-3-2). It was originally the role of the Department of External Territories to advertise for staff in Australia, through the Public Service Commonwealth Territories Gazette. This process became bogged down with red tape and distance between recruitment and the work site. A major problem identified for recruitment was the timing of advertising for officers. Advertisements appeared in newspapers and the Government Gazette in late December with applications closing in January. Interviews were not commenced until February through to March, four months after the academic year ended. For many applicants, this meant a long delay after the completion of their university or college courses and many either accepted permanent employment or temporary employment or lost interest in working in the Territory (“Advancement of Native Agriculture” 1960, series A452 item 1963/2761 AA). It became evident to Cottrell-Dormer that it was “not enough to merely insert advertisements in southern [Australian] newspapers”. He had “to go looking for staff” (“Regarding letter written by Cottrell-Dormer” 1948, PX 1-3-2) and he began to appeal directly to Australian Agricultural Colleges for the recruitment of officers. This included visits to Dookie Agricultural College in Victoria35. In keeping with his idea that the recruitment of staff was to include men with war service, Cottrell-Dormer appealed to the Deputy Co-ordinator of Rural Training Victoria for help in recruiting staff from Dookie where the Commonwealth Government had established a Rural Training Centre for ex-servicemen in 194636. Unfortunately the response was that most ex-servicemen
35 Dookie was Australia’s 2nd oldest agricultural college, which was moved in 1945 with all Victorian Agricultural colleges to the newly created Division of Agricultural Education within the Department of Agriculture (Victoria). (See www.dookie.unimelbourne.edu.au). 36 For Dookie College see www.dookie.unimelbourne.edu.au.
85 with service in the Territory during World War II were “apt to judging living conditions by their war experience” (Correspondence from Beruldsen to Cottrell-Dormer 1948, PX 1-3-2). Of the seventy-five ex-servicemen to graduate from Dookie in September 1948, only one expressed interest in working for DASF (1948, PX 1-3-2). Eventually DASF was able to recruit men with war service elsewhere. Men with war service recruited as Didiman included W. J. Fielding (RAAF), R. L. Pulsford (AIF), R. W. Cottle, (RAAF) and F. X. Ryan (RAAF), T. F. Hurrell, S. Saville, R. E. P. Dwyer, F. C. Henderson and W. L. Conroy (“Organization and Administration – Cadet Agriculture System”, 1949, PX 1-3-5). DASF also recruited from other agricultural colleges such as Hawkesbury (NSW), Gatton Agricultural College (QLD), Roseworthy Agricultural College (South Australia), Longeranong (Victoria) and Muresk College (Western Australia).
In a report to the Government Secretary in regard to courses at ASOPA37. Conroy noted that only three diplomates and no graduates had been recruited from ASOPA‘s short course (Correspondence DASF to Government Secretary 1948, PX 1-3-2). Cottrell- Dormer expressed his frustration with staff shortages to the Administrator as early as 1947 and persistently asked for at least an ‘Agriculture Officer Grade III’ as he was of the opinion that each agricultural station needed to be visited by a senior officer at least every two years or more frequently (“Discussions in Canberra and Sydney”1947 series A518, item F852/6/7 AA). Cottrell-Dormer sought the senior Grade III officers for a number of reasons. He felt junior or new field staff, left to their own resources, were becoming frustrated and many of their problems could be solved by contact with a senior, qualified officer who was invested with the necessary authority to deal directly with problems arising in the field and could keep Didiman abreast with development in technical matters and other activities of DASF. Stations also needed to conform to the same set of procedures and rules. These visits were also seen as important in order that work in the field was kept correctly aligned with administration policy directives. Cottrell-Dormer (1947, 1, A518, item F852/6/7 AA) wanted at least three new Grade III officers as the appointed Regional Agricultural Officers (RAO). In the same correspondence, Cottrell-Dormer noted the need for another 10 Grade I Agriculture Officers to be university graduates, or if they did not have the qualifications to be absorbed into either technical or extension divisions within DASF (1947, 7, A518, item F852/6/7 AA). However, regular visits to stations by senior officers did not eventuate. As noted by one Didiman, “in the twelve years of service, I was visited once in situ by a
37 Conroy had been an agricultural Lecturer there in 1948.
86 Regional Agricultural Officer” (Bob Curtis, email, May 8, 2008). The lack of visits by senior agricultural officers was one of the reasons for a rift between DASF headquarters at Konedobu and the men in the field as field officers felt isolated and ill-informed in ongoing administrative directives.
In 1949, Cottrell-Dormer took decisive action and sent Leon Bridgland, a senior staff member of DASF, to travel around Australian universities and agricultural colleges (Bridgland to Secretary Department of External affairs 1950 series A518 item C852/6/7 Part 4 AA). The purpose was to increase recruiting numbers by stimulating interest through lectures. Although the Public Service Commission noted that they had not been informed of the tour by Bridgland, approval was later given by the minister, (“Recruitment of Staff” 1950, series A518 item C2/1/1 AA). The tour did lead to several enquiries from students concerning matters pertaining to duties, condition of service, location on appointment, number of personnel at each centre, scholarships, and training at ASOPA (1950, series A518 item C2/1/1 AA )38. According to Bill Conroy (personal interview November 2004) the recruitment tours through Australian institutions were specifically aimed at men (and later women) who appeared to have few racial prejudices, would be able to cope with isolation, had adequate bush skills and crafts, and in general had a country upbringing. The Territory’s terrain and DASF’s work was thought to preclude a city person. This eventually became part of the formal recruitment policy for DASF and became quite a successful strategy. Dave Willis (personal interview 2005), who became a Didiman, recalled that a “Senior DASF Officer visited Longeranong, and influenced my career choice. TPNG seemed exotic and appealed to my sense of adventure”. However, the processing of recruits was fraught with problems and caused some frustration among agricultural college graduates either applying or enquiring into positions within DASF. In 1949, the Public Service Commissioner advised DASF of a list of persons who had made enquiries concerning DASF as a result of lectures by L. A. Bridgland at Australian universities and agricultural colleges. However, five students at Muresk College had not received any return correspondence to their enquiries into postings in the Territory and had employed the aid of the principal of the college to make further enquiries (Public Service Commission to DASF 1949, series A518 item C852/6/7
38 The list of interested students for work in DASF included Beirne, K. G., McGrath, J., Haskew, H. C., Scott, K. J., Wilson, B. E. (University of Sydney), Taylor, R. H. (University of Melbourne), Byrne, S. D., Angell, G., Howe, D., Anderson, R. W., Hogbin, D. (Agricultural College, Muresk, W. A.), Memorandum For Public Service Commissioner from J. R. Halligan, 1949, series A 518, C852/6/7 Part 4 AA.
87 part 4 AA)39. Bridgland also acknowledged that a recruit, F. X. Ryan, had waited nearly a year after attempts to gain employment in DASF in 1949. Bridgland noted, “Knowing critical staff shortages, if statements like that of Ryan’s were true – it was nothing less than a tragedy for DASF” (series A518 item C852/6/7 Part 4 AA). Bridgland (series A518 item C852/6/7 Part 4 AA) asked for Ryan’s claim to be investigated and appropriate action taken. DASF was slow in acknowledging correspondence and this added frustration to the overall hiring processes. For example, sixteen years later, Dennis Nicholls (email, June 12, 2008) also applied to work with DASF in 1965 but it took a year for his application to be reviewed, approved and implemented.
The advertising for applicants to DASF was eventually widened in 1951 to include a wider audience through Australian newspapers. This followed a complaint from the Administrator to the Public Service Commission that DASF was having difficulty coping with the demands made upon it (“Staffing in DASF” 1951, series A518 item C852/6/7 Part 4 AA). Advertisements for recruitment drives for Didiman were extended beyond the Government Gazette and began to appear in 1951 in Australian newspapers such as Canberra Times, Sydney Morning Herald, The Argus (Melbourne), The Telegraph (Brisbane), The Mercury (Hobart), The Herald (Newcastle), The Age (Melbourne), Courier Mail (Brisbane), The Western Australian (Perth) and the Examiner (Launceston) (Memorandum from Lambert to Advertising Division, 1951, series A518 item C852/6/7 Part 4 AA). In 1960, DASF also began to use recruitment films to assist in their recruitment campaigns in universities and agricultural colleges. The films showed a broad range of working conditions, career prospects, and agricultural work among the indigenous farmers (DASF Recruiting Film” 1959, PX 1-3-29B). Film became an integral part of all DASF’s recruitment drives.
Even though staff shortages plagued DASF throughout the 1950s and 1960s, many applicants were still rejected. In 1951, the Public Service Commission allowed for the temporary employment of Asians and of ‘mixed race’ persons throughout the Territory’s Departments. This was amended in 1959 to allow Asians and ‘mixed race’ persons to be employed on a permanent basis (Public Service Commission to DASF 1959 PX1-3-5). Dwyer (“Recruitment of Assistant Agricultural Officers” 1957, PX 1-3-29A) in considering an application from one recruit stated, “the department had no bias whatsoever in relation to such men; however, it has to be stressed that their work in the
39 These students were D. Howe, G. Angell, R. W. Anderson, D. Hogbin and S. Byrne.
88 Territory lies primarily among the native population and often amongst the most backward sections of it”. He claimed non-Europeans lacked social advancement and “frequently exhibited a pronounced racial bias” (1957, PX 1-3-29A). He went further, stating DASF had employed several men of Asian origin in the past but they had left the Territory because they “simply found themselves unable to achieve any basis of understanding with the natives and were the constant object of insults and outright antipathy” (1957, PX 1-3-29A). Dwyer cited the case of a recruit, who was an expert tea worker from Ceylon [Sri Lanka] and as such, his experience should have been an asset to DASF but unfortunately he proved “quite ineffective … because of the attitude of the native employees” (1957, PX 1-3-29A). Some men of Asian and Eurasian backgrounds were employed by DASF in the Division of Agricultural Extension, as was the case of J. G. Seeto, (Queensland Diploma of Agriculture) and G. K. H. Chan (BSc. Agr. Sydney). Chan eventually taught at the Agricultural College, Vudal, New Britain (DASF Annual Report 1967-69, 226).
Other applicants were rejected due to age. It was found that men near the ‘top of the age limit’ not only had to face re-orientation from temperate to tropical agriculture but they were also the most affected by rigorous field conditions. Other applicants were rejected for reasons relating to their level of English language skills. Other applicants were thought only “useful in an instructional position which would free them from the more rigorous side of Assistant Agricultural Officers work” (“Recruitment of Agricultural Officer Grade I 1960, PX 1-3-29B). Others were rejected when their qualifications were not equivalent to an Australian Diploma of Agriculture. This was found to be the case with applicants from East Germany and applicants from Boskoop Agricultural College, Holland (1960, PX 1-3-29B). In the case of Boskoop it was judged that the college was more strictly horticultural and its courses did not offer suitable training for positions in DASF (Dwyer to Public Service Commissioner 1956, PX 1-3-12).
In 1960, Frank Henderson (1960, PX 1-3-29B), the Director of DASF, expressed concern over the number of ‘new Australian’ applicants, based on the fact that one or two applicants were in their late thirties and possibly were Eurasian. Henderson had no qualms about hiring Southern and Eastern European men within the technical sections of the department but “doubted the wisdom of employing a high percentage of ‘new Australians’ in the extension field (1960, PX 1-3-29B). He reiterated Dwyer’s opinion of rejecting applicants due to their age or Eurasian background. He stated that DASF was
89 “not keen on recruiting officers in their late thirties, due to the large amount of patrolling” (1960, PX 1-3-29B). He further stated that, in regards to Eurasians the Department had “found them a disadvantage in the past when dealing with native people and had not yet had a satisfactory experience with people of this background” (1960, PX 1-3-29B).
Alan W. Charles, Acting Director DASF, stated in 1960 that the ideal proportion of graduates to diplomates within the extension division would be one third graduates and two-thirds diplomats (“Recruitment and Cadetships” 1960, PX 1-3-29). Because recruiting within Australian universities and colleges was slow, it was suggested that DASF consider recruiting graduates outside of Australia. Charles noted that DASF was probably getting as high a proportion of ‘new Australian’ recruits as could be absorbed within the department. He was in agreement with Henderson, whose opinion was that “wherever possible, officers with Australian or British backgrounds were to be used in the Division of Extension” (1960, PX 1-3-29B). It was suggested that there were a number of colleges and universities in England that could be investigated, noting the differences between standards and levels of education. Charles went one step further, suggesting the inclusion of New Zealanders (1960, PX 1-3-29). The rule that British recruits could only be hired on migrating to Australia also applied to New Zealand recruits, although New Zealand applicants had previously been found in 1955 to have a much lower educational standard. It was reported by DASF for the Public Service Commission that New Zealand’s matriculation and pass degree standards were considerably below those in Australia (“Qualifications for Assistant Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Officers”, 1956, PX 1-3-2). Charles (1960, PX 1-3-29) added his opinion that “increasing the number of cadetships or attempting to recruit overseas was likely to be mere palliative rather than affecting an immediate cure of the situation”. He went on to state that the root of the problem was the “fact that professional agriculturalists could see a better career offering in Australia than in the Territory” (1960, PX 1-3-29).
Applications began to be accepted from Holland. In 1951, the Australian Ambassador to the Netherlands wrote to the Department of Territories informing them of his visit to the tropical Agricultural College of Deventer in eastern Holland (Dispatch No. Hague 17/51, “Netherlands State College for Tropical Agriculture and Migration to Australia” 1951, series A518 item C852/6/7 Part 4AA). He reported that graduates from this college had a
90 good grasp of English and were trained in general farm work, growing, pruning, grafting and theoretical work. He perceived in these graduates an opportunity for Australia to recruit trained agriculturalists and potentially Australian settlers. Many of these graduates had been ‘earmarked’ for work in the Dutch East Indies; however, due to political unrest in the Dutch colonies, relating to Indonesia’s independence in 1949, many were looking elsewhere for work. Five students in Java had been killed in 1950 (1951, series A518 item C852/6/7 Part 4AA). Rinus van Schilfgaarde, an ex-Didiman, recounted that he had been shot at numerous times while working in Java in the late 1940s (email April 24, 2006). Willoughby, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs acknowledged that if “these Dutch trained tropical agriculturalists could fit in and be accepted on immigration grounds it would be a distinct gain” (Series A 518 AA). Other enquiries about the inclusion of Dutch agriculturalists into the Extension Division in the TPNG were received from Francis Peek & Co. Ltd., based in Indonesia (1957 PX 1-3-5). The company was seeking positions within DASF for senior and junior Dutch planters based in Indonesia due to the mass evacuation of the Dutch from Indonesia in connection with independence in 1949. Dwyer’s response to these enquiries was that there were limited opportunities in the Administration and, although DASF had previously employed Dutch planters, “it was Canberra where all engagements were made” (1958 PX 1-3-29A). Although many of these men were trained at the tropical College of Agriculture at Deventer in Holland, Australia was reluctant to accept Dutch company men from the Dutch territories (now Indonesia). The probable reason was that DASF saw these Dutch agriculturalists as merely plantation overseers. Dwyer suggested that private planters in the TPNG might be interested in employing such men (1958 PX 1-3-29A).
In 1947, the Division of Extension consisted of thirteen Didiman with R E. P. Dwyer as Chief of Division under the DASF Directorship of Cottrell-Dormer. (“DASF Staff Postings 1/7/47 to 30/11/47”, PX 1-3-22). By 1949, staff had increased to twenty. In that year eight staff members were away; two were studying overseas at the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad; three were attending ASOPA; one was on sick leave; one was lecturing at ASOPA and one was attached to Dogura at the Church of England Mission, (“Location of DASF Staff” 1949, PX 1-3-22). In 1952, Cecil Lambert (Lambert to Cleland 1952, series A452 item 1957/382 AA), the Secretary to the Department of Territories, acknowledged the number of extension officers in the field
91 was “hopelessly inadequate for the task facing the Administration”40. He went further noting “the present services provided were numerically far below the active demands by the indigenous people and Europeans for advice and assistance and needs for a vigorous policy of agricultural development” (1952, series A452 item 1957/382 AA). By 1954, there were 56 applicants for cadetships of which 32 were selected for interviews (“Agriculture and Veterinary Cadetships” 1954, PX 1-3-5 Part 2) and 27 were placed (Department of Territories Ministerial Schedule No. 1320 1954, 1). The recruitment of officers gradually improved in 1956, increasing to 46 officers and 16 cadets in training. Hasluck’s plan for the intensification of the agricultural extension programme in 1959 saw a rapid increase in these numbers as plans were put in place for an additional employment of 74 Didiman (Anon 1959, 48). In 1960, Hasluck claimed that DASF had built up to a staff of approximately 75 Didiman41. By 1973, there were 139 Didiman; 35 officers had degrees, and 104 had diplomas (McKillop 1974, 1). Seven of these extension officers were women known as Didimisis42.
The appointment of women as Didimisis within DASF began in 1949. Cottrell-Dormer (1961, 105) supported the inclusion of women agricultural extension workers because, “It seemed singularly one-sided and futile if women were overlooked. In the house and in the gardens, women were the principal workers in both areas”. As economic development must always be accompanied by parallel social and political developments, he argued that women could not be excluded from the service (1961, 105). As early as 1948, Murray, the Territory Administrator, noted that
gardening in this country [Papua and New Guinea], which provides subsistence for over a million people, is primarily the work of women … Obviously, unless we are going to use men as intermediaries in teaching women, we must have a staff of women here who can make easy contacts with other women, both in teaching them agricultural procedures and in getting them adopted. (Murray to Professor Wadham 1948, UQFL91, Box3)
40 Cecil Ralph Lambert (1899-1971) worked with the Rural Reconstruction Division of the Rural Bank of New South Wales (1939) and then the Rural Commission (1943-1948) set up by the Commonwealth Bank in wartime as part of its post-war reconstruction planning. In 1949 he was made director (later assistant-secretary) of Northern Territory Affairs, Department of Interior. In 1951, Lambert became the Secretary, Department of Territories under the Minister of Department of Territories (Sir) Paul Hasluck, until his retirement in 1964. See Grundy, P. C. (2000) “Lambert, Cecil Ralph (Eski) (1899-1971)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 15, Melbourne University Press” Melbourne, pp. 48-49; P. Hasluck, (1976) A Time for Building, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, pp. 7-8. 41 Statement in the House of Representatives by the Minister of External Affairs, 23 August 1960, p.5. 42 They were Mrs. M. R. Godwin, Mrs. C. Torlach, Mrs. D. R. Bently, Miss C. Laws, Miss K. A. Carman, Miss M. M. Mason and Miss J. M. Grant. See DASF Annual Report 1967-69, pp. 223-231.
92 Two women graduates in Agriculture applied for positions and their appointment was approved 43. These women attended Melbourne University, then ASOPA to complete the “short course” (1948, UQFL91, Box 3). In the Territory the two Didimisses studied the part played by indigenous women in agriculture and made recommendations for the incorporation of gender in agricultural extension activities (DASF Newsletter 1949, 3, PX 1-1-63). Murray noted his only concern in employing these two women was that “they would marry, but hoped if they did they would pick people in New Guinea and continue to work for the Administration”(1948, UQFL91, Box 3). One left the Territory due to illness in 1949 and never returned, but the other married and continued to work on Women’s committees within the Territory (DASF Newsletter 1949, 3, PX 1-1-63; Women’s Central Committee 1950, PX 7-1-5). These two women were the only ones appointed to DASF extension work during the administration of Murray. It was not until 1963 that a ministerial directive from Canberra allowed for DASF to recruit females in the ratio of one female to every three males (DASF Newsletter 1963, 1, PX 24-1-39M). Miss Margaret Mason became the third female Agricultural Extension Officer employed within DASF. She was recruited through a DASF Agricultural Extension Officer, while on a recruitment drive to the University of New England and in his judgment she was a ‘sound’ recruit (PX 24-1-39M). However, Didimisses had difficulty being accepted within the ranks of an all-male division. On the announcement of a female recruit to the department in 1963, the DASF Newsletter (PX 24-1-39M) commented humorously that “tenders were now open for the attraction of this recruit,” suggesting “tenders would run high” and that a tender had already been received with the added bonus of the District Agricultural Extension Officer’s “undivided fatherly attention” to “our problems” (PX 24-1-39M) . Mason (email April 24, 2006) acknowledged that DASF Extension Didiman in 1963 was a ‘boys’ only club’ and hence there were no limits on ‘boy talk’. She also noted she “certainly could not miss the hostility of many [Didiman]” (email April 24, 2006). She perceived this hostility as stemming from a threat to their male job status, and socially due to the gender discrimination in the TPNG and “knew without a doubt that to be seen as having any professional use at all she had to achieve at a high level, compared to her contemporaries” (email April 24, 2006). Mason eventually fulfilled Jack Murray’s wishes by marrying a Didiman and remaining in the TPNG. The Didimisses were a good idea, but in a restricted sense (Bob Curtis, email May 8, 2008).
43 These women were Miss Millis and Miss Egglestone (See correspondence from Murray to Professor S. M. Wadham (Professor of Agriculture, University of Melbourne), 12 July 1948, J. K. Murray (manuscript) University of Queensland Fryer Library (UQFL) 91, Box 3. For the appointment of these women see Proceedings of Conference of District Officers held at Port Moresby, 18-28 1948, Territory of Papua New Guinea, p.56.
93 Women had to go on patrol with a sufficient force to protect them and, as noted by one Didiman, “we may have been over protective, but in our view there was a need” (Bob Curtis, email May 8, 2008). Mason acknowledged that she went on many easy patrols, but always with a Didiman (email October 29, 2006). By 1962, the recruitment of agricultural officers had improved as a result of change in the employment market in Australia, growing interest in agricultural employment in the Territory, improved conditions of employment and salary, and more logical timing of advertisements in terms of date of final examinations. The visiting of senior DASF officers to Australian universities and agricultural colleges also continued (“Advancement of Agriculture”, series A452 item 1963/2761, AA).
The men to fill the positions of agricultural extension officers were expected to be “young graduates from Australian agricultural colleges and universities, with good academic and cultural backgrounds” (“Dristrict Officer Grade 1 – Increase in Establishment” 1947, PX 1-3-2). The desired men would have diplomas in agriculture and animal husbandry or degrees from universities in Agricultural Science, Veterinary Science and Agronomy. The Assistant Director of District Services and Native Affairs, John Black (1946, PX 1-3-2) also asked, in 1946, if agricultural officers could be found with the “right racial approach”. If not, Australian agricultural extension officers would “merely be an added incubus on the native community” (1946, PX 1-3-2). Ward and Ballard (1976, 443) a year after independence, noted that Australian agriculturalists rarely had prior experience in the tropics; were new to land where root crops rather than grain crops were the staples, and where shifting rather than sedentary agriculture was practised, where land was held communally rather than individually, and where technology was man-powered, not machine-powered. To overcome this shortfall of trained Australian tropical agriculturalists, Cottrell-Dormer (1947, Pacific Manuscript Bureau (PMB) 629 Mic. 3241) envisaged the training of “young men ourselves in the Territory with the appropriate technical methods”. What was proposed was internal and overseas training for Australian agricultural extension officers. This meant that DASF became a technically orientated department modelled on Australian practice and, as such, stood apart from the generalist administration model associated with the colonial administration of pre-literate societies (McKillop 1981, 241). In setting up the new agricultural organisation, Cottrell-Dormer proposed the Staff Selection Committee would take several factors into consideration when recruiting staff. These included war service, relevant tropical experience, length of service in the TPNG, and the quality of
94 prior experiences and roles. Agricultural officers were graded into divisions depending on educational levels. A Division III Agricultural Officer required a university degree or an Agricultural College Diploma and was assumed to have wide tropical experience in indigenous agriculture and extensive dealings with indigenous people. Administrative abilities were required. A Division II Agricultural Officer required a suitable university degree, and a suitable personality for dealing with indigenous peoples. However, a position in Division II could be obtained if the applicant could provide a diploma from an agricultural college together with tropical experience in indigenous agriculture and experience dealing with native people that were deemed equivalent to a university degree. The lowest level was as an Assistant Agricultural Officer. They were required to have an Agricultural Diploma and a suitable personality for dealing with indigenous peoples (“Organization of DASF” 1953, series A452/1 item 1959/2709, AA).
Table 4.1 Positions in Division of Extension, DASF Cadet (Those still at university doing a degree in agriculture or veterinary science or had completed their degree) Acting Assistant Agricultural Officer Assistant Agricultural Officer Agricultural Officer Grade 1 Agricultural Officer Grade 2 (Acting District Agricultural Officer) Agricultural Officer Grade 3 (District Agricultural Officer, Acting Regional Agricultural Officer) Senior Agricultural Officer (Regional Agricultural Officer)44
However, it was not enough for DASF agriculturalists just to possess a degree or diploma in agriculture. In 1954, Henderson pointed out recruits had to be “trained in tropical crops and tropical land management” (Henderson to Administrator 1954, PX 1- 2-2H). Very few of the 250 Didiman who served in the TPNG met all the criteria.
Promotion within DASF was slow and hampered by the limited seniority track available. Positions within DASF were filled from within the department, including promotions but it was not proposed to fill positions created within the department until suitably trained personnel were available. This caused promotions to be delayed. Cottrell-Dormer, in 1948, warned that promotion within DASF would be slow as there was a “need for young men to be trained and receive experience before being able to fill vacancies as they occurred” (“Organization of DASF” 1946, series A518/1 item F852/6/7, AA). The increase of Didiman’s responsibilities called for an increase in headquarters’ staff and
44 Information on positions within DASF supplied by Bob Curtis.
95 management positions. Early extension programs had led to rapidly increased production of cash cropping by indigenous farmers and consequently the Extension Division activities in processing and marketing of indigenous production had expanded (“Reorganization and Classification of DASF” 1959, series A452 item 1959/6120, AA). It became essential for staff positions to increase in number and quality to meet the demands of an expanding economy and the anticipated needs of the indigenous people (1959, series A452 item 1959/6120, AA). Assistant Agricultural Officers could advance to the position of Agricultural Officer Grade I after having served three years satisfactorily in the department or four years subsequent to obtaining a diploma (“Professional Officers of DASF” 1958, series 452 item 1957/382). The positions for Agricultural Officers Grade III were intended for District Agricultural Officers, but only in what were determined as districts of importance. These were the Madang, Sepik and New Britain districts. Grade II Officers were intended for District Offices in less important districts such as Bougainville, New Ireland and the Gulf districts. These positions were open to men with diplomas, particularly men who had extensive experience in DASF (Memorandum from DASF to Public Service Commissioner 1954, PX 1-3-2). However, these positions were intended for university graduates. In 1959, DASF created five positions for Principal Agricultural Officers, two positions for Agricultural Officer Grade III, four positions for Agricultural Officer Grade II and thirty- four positions for Agricultural Officer Grade I. (“Organization, DASF-Creation of Additional Professional Positions” 1959, series A452/1 item 1959/2709, AA). The opening up of higher-level positions within DASF aided in extending careers for many Didiman. Although the director of DASF thought that Assistant Agricultural Officers should automatically be promoted to Grade I on attaining the necessary experience, the Public Service Commission wanted promotion on a competitive basis, and Didiman applying for Grade I positions were required to apply through the Commission (1958, series 452 item 1957/382). Promotions for Grades II and III were filled by promotion through DASF (“Classification of DASF” 1953, series A452 item F1957/382, AA). Promotion for Didiman in reality meant they had to serve a minimum of four years or more and depended on whether they had proven themselves as good ‘bushmen’ and had acquitted themselves competently at all postings (“Recruitment of Agricultural Officer Grade 1” 1958, PX 1-3-29).
Promotions were not automatic. In 1958, two Didiman applying for promotion to the position of Agricultural Officer Grade I, were not proved suitable 91958, PX 1-3-29).
96 One Didiman had obtained his Agricultural Diploma in 1949, and DASF felt that he had not yet adapted to the TPNG conditions and was not considered fit for a higher grade. He had been in DASF service for nine years. The other Didiman was not promoted due to doubt over continuing within the service and had not yet proven that he had adapted to extension work. He had been with DASF from 1952, a total of six years. The lack of positions available for promotions and the slowness of promotions within DASF added to frustration for many career minded Didiman working in the TPNG.
4.3 CADETSHIPS
Agricultural Cadetships were open to both undergraduates and matriculates. The normal procedure for an applicant was through a process of screening, interviews and being graded in order of preference on an overall basis in accordance with the approved interview and selection procedures. Subject to the Minister’s approval, appointments could be made up to the desired number (“Recruitment of Cadet Agricultural Officers and Graduate Grade I Officers” 1958, PX 1-3-29). As early as 1947, “Cadets were advised that their overall training during the period of Cadetship would be in the hands of DASF, Division of Extension” (“Training 1947, PX 1-3-5). In 1954, this was again reinforced by Frank Henderson, then acting director. He stated, “Officers joining DASF were to be posted to agricultural stations for the first twelve months of services to work with experienced officers” (“Agricultural Cadets” 1954, PX 1-3-5). This became the normal procedure “irrespective of whether they were trained under a Cadet scheme or not” (1954, PX 1-3-5). The preferred cadets were to be male, unmarried and less than 25 years of age. Marriage was seen as unsuitable for cadets as “conditions under which training will be carried out are not suitable for married persons”. Special permission had to be sought by cadets wishing to marry before training (Memorandum from Dwyer to Government Secretary 1947, PX 1-3-5). It was accepted that the Territory could not properly accommodate married cadets. Cadets stationed at headquarters in Port Moresby were accommodated in administration single quarters and, in the field, cadets had to produce most of their food from the land and obtain and build accommodation from local building material. Unlike some other isolated rural areas in the world, field workers in the TPNG had the assistance of local villagers in constructing their accommodation (Territory of Papua New Guinea Agricultural Cadets nd. PX 1-3-5). The ‘unmarried’ clause in the contract of work for DASF not only related to the lack of accommodation available in the Territory but also to the arduous nature of the work, which included
97 constant patrolling in remote areas. The Administration anticipated many obstacles if spouses accompanied cadets in the field (nd. PX 1-3-5). Perhaps it was their post-war memories of service, but in the early years many believed that the rigours of basic patrols and field work demanded an almost military style discipline (Bob Curtis email May 8, 2008).
A cadet was originally bonded for three years but this was later reduced to two years. In this period, cadets received instruction in practical field work and training in the various establishments of DASF. Cadets were posted anywhere within the TPNG and most of their training was confined to periods spent at the Lowlands Agricultural Experiment Station (LAES) at Keravat, New Britain, the Highlands Agricultural Experiment Station at Aiyura, Central Highlands and the District Agricultural Station in Madang (“TPNG Agricultural Cadet” 1950., PX 1-3-5). In 1947, the course for cadets within the TPNG had not been fully finalised. To overcome this shortfall, DASF attached the cadets, in small numbers, to the experiment stations. Although no formal training was given, cadets were expected to “give a hand with routine work” where every effort was made to “encourage an academic approach to work” (DASF to to Aiyura 1947, PX 1-3-5). The full training course began in July 1948.
Cadets were involved in practical demonstrations, given personal advice and suggestions on appropriate academic literature. Eventually the training programme included at least six months at each agricultural experiment station where cadets undertook practical field work and technical instruction (Keravat to DASF 1947, PX 1-3-5). Practical field work included familiarisation with crops, ground covers and shade trees as well as visits to adjacent plantations where small groups of cadets would work with indigenous farmers. Through these visits they gained experience in labour supervision and became competent using ‘pidgin’45. Cadets visited local garden plots where they were instructed on indigenous food crops, various species and varieties, planting methods, harvesting and storage. Each cadet spent time with an indigenous labour overseer to become familiar with general labour supervision, the care of the sick, ration scales, keeping of labour ration returns and maintenance of hygiene in the labour quarters. They were also instructed on how to communicate effectively with indigenous labour and to contribute to the general welfare of the labourers. Each cadet also spent one week with each of the technical officers working on the station.
45 ‘Pidgin’ was the universal trade language of, firstly, New Guinea and, later, Papua.
98 Daily field diaries were maintained to enable the cadet to formulate a monthly report (DASF Circular to All Agricultural Cadets 1947, PX 1-3-5). The diary was brief and simple in its format, describing the extension work being performed and their observations of indigenous agriculture. The purpose was to identify problems in indigenous farming that could be improved with a more scientific agricultural approach. Cadets were also encouraged to implement experiments that would improve nutrition by the introduction of new crops such as peanuts. A monthly report was also submitted (1947, PX 1-3-5) and was more detailed and provided a discussion on what the cadets had achieved.
Cadets were also introduced to patrolling which was seen as the most effective method of contact and communication with the indigenous farmer. The training programme for cadets, for example, at the Madang station included patrols moving through the district north to Bogia, West to Amele and south to Saidor to ascertain the possibilities of commencing sub-stations (Inspection of Madang Agricultural Station 1949, PX 1-2-2D). Cadets were not considered as ‘farm hands’ and an appropriate amount of time was given to instruction in keeping station books, records, experimental methods, care of machinery, and seed storage so that the cadets learnt the importance of accuracy in book work, reports and fieldwork notes.
Cadets were also expected to attend a short course of approximately three months at ASOPA. However, to attend this course, the cadet needed to have completed at least a 12-month probation period working within the Territory. The course was intended to provide a more intensive and detailed knowledge suited to their work in the TPNG and included subjects such as Colonial Administration, Elementary Medicine, Geography of the Pacific, Elementary Tropical Agriculture and Elementary Anthropology (1950, PX 1-3-5). For agricultural cadets, the ASOPA short course was given a special orientation and they were given technical instruction by visiting senior DASF officers, for which they sat a special paper (ASOPA Registrar to Government Secretary 1949, PX 1-3-5).
During 1949 to 1950, DASF established a Staff Training School at Mageri in the plateau country behind Port Moresby (“Staff Training” 1951, PX 1-3-44). Although cadets had attended ASOPA, many could not afford the associated living expenses as cadets were expected to pay for their living expenses while attending ASOPA. DASF complained to the Administrator regarding the economic position of cadets noting that “a Cadet from
99 the first group of Cadets attending ASOPA [in 1947] applied to the Department of External Territories for an advance and was told there was no provision for advanced loans” (“Advances to Agricultural Cadets 1951, PX 1-3-5). DASF also noted that cadets were too young to qualify for bank loans (1951, PX 1-3-5). Mageri Training School was perceived as a way of relieving cadets of any additional expenses and of allowing DASF to conduct the specialised training needed for their recruits in a tropical setting, rather than in Sydney (DASF to The Secretary, Department of Territories 1952, PX 1-3-44). The first training course for Cadet Agricultural Officers was conducted at Mageri on the 7th May 1950, with six Cadet Agricultural Officers drawn from 1948-49 recruits46. Bridgland, the supervisor, was a graduate officer who held a Diploma of Tropical Agriculture from the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad. The Mageri course lasted eight months, after which cadets were posted to agricultural stations under the supervision of senior agricultural officers. The course involved an appropriate balance between lectures and practical work and allowed for visits to the principal experiment stations at Keravat and Aiyura. The syllabus included General Agriculture, Botany and Improvement of Tropical Crops, Tropical Soils, Entomology, the Pathology of Tropical Crops, Design and Analysis of Field Experiments47 and the Diseases and Parasites of Man in the Tropics48. The syllabus introduced the cadets to the ground work for surveys of indigenous rural life and welfare, agriculture and economy, the initiation of projects, the demonstration of superior farming methods and techniques in agricultural production (“Advances to Agricultural Cadets” 1951, PX 1-3-5). Bridgland viewed Mageri as only a starting point for ‘in-house’ training for cadets (“Future of Cadet Training School” 1951, PX 1-3-44). His view was that DASF “needed refresher courses and staff conferences”, so suggested to the Director of DASF that these roles should be added at Mageri (1951, PX 1-3-44). He also felt that Mageri should be established not only for training European staff but should eventually be able to train indigenous DASF staff (1951, PX 1-3-44). Formal indigenous agricultural training began at Mageri by DASF in 1952/53 (“Agricultural Training Centre Mageri: Progress Report” 1956, PX 7-1-7).
46 These cadets were C. L. Dominey, G. L. Edwards, D. R. Carey, G. N. Angell, J. T. Barret and R. D. Haseler. 47 These lectures were delivered to cadets by Mr. W. Granger (Animal Husbandry), W. Conroy (Modern Agricultural Economics and Backward people), Dr. Belshaw, an anthropologist (Native Agriculture), Mr. Lincoln, ex-Java, (Recent Advances in Tropical Agriculture in Java and Malaya), Mr. R. E. P. Dwyer (The Aims and Functions of DASF), Mr. I. Champion (The Early History and Exploration of Papua and New Guinea) and Mr. C. C. Marr (Problems Facing DASF in Performing and its Functions). 48 This lecture was given to cadets by the visiting specialist Dr. J. T Gunther.
100 At the agricultural extension stations and centres, the new Didiman were taught about DASF procedures and participated in at least one patrol of one week’s duration. They also had to write and submit three papers (DASF 1968, Section G (B), pp. 3-5), including a study of subsistence gardening based on regular visits to a selected village. Each cadet had to establish a farming calendar for a 12-month period covering basic points of land tenure, family groupings, division of labour and botanical and common names of plants grown for food, clothing, housing, medicine, feasting and other special occasions. They were instructed to note gardening techniques, fundamental foods such as leaves and nuts, food preparations, dietary patterns and cropping rotations. They were given six months to write a report on their findings, presented in the form of a gardening calendar with supporting notes.
The second assignment was a study of cash crops. Didiman selected and carefully investigated a particular crop within the district they were stationed and discussed soil and climatic factors, cultural practices, pest and disease control, transport, processing and marketing, including a costing of processing and marketing with an economic potential and, where appropriate, a livestock project.
The third assignment was a study of rural organisations and included Rural Progress Societies (RPS), Village Agricultural Committees (VACs), growers’ committees, or local government agricultural committees. By 1968, these organisations had formed within districts to help indigenous farmers learn about processing and marketing of export crops. The essay was required to analyse the inter-relationship between agricultural extension and an organisation and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the organisation in the sphere of economic development. They also had to cover social and political changes.
Cadets were also posted to Australia for training in rice culture. DASF and the administration viewed the training of personnel in rice culture as paramount as rice projects were being developed in the Mekeo and Maprik areas. In 1949, T. F. Hurrell, a cadet agricultural extension officer was assigned to the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area (MIA) in Australia to undergo a period of training and instruction in rice culture (“Re: T. F. Hurrell Cadet Agriculturalist”, PX 1-3-26). Hurrell returned to the TPNG in 1950 and was stationed in the Mekeo area and later Madang (DASF Personnel File nd. PX 1- 3-2). Another junior agricultural officer, Jack White, was assigned to the Humpty Doo
101 dryland rice project under the supervision of the Darwin Department of Agriculture. In 1955, White returned and went to Bainyik where rice cultivation was expanded (email, December 24, 2007).
Judged on their proficiency during the two-year training period they were offered a permanent posting within DASF as Assistant Agricultural Officers. The cadet scheme led to different careers depending on the ability, initiative and suitability shown by the cadet for a particular position. The options within DASF included:
(a) Being posted permanently to a district with a view for undertaking indigenous agricultural extension duties and ultimately to be promoted to the position of District Agricultural Officer.
(b) A one-year concentrated training programme on animal husbandry for a posting as manager of a livestock station or a position as a stock inspector.
(c) An assisted degree course at an Australian university (subject to ministerial approval) that would include agriculture, veterinary science or pure science with major studies in subjects related to agriculture.
(d) Training at an experiment station for duties as a field experimentalist, horticulturalist or technical assistant.
(e) Extension work in the Mekeo-Goilala District expanding rice.
(f) One year training in tea plantation management.
(g) Nursery work.
(h) Posting with the Division of Production and Marketing for duties as a Native Project Manager, Produce Inspector or Produce Manager.
(i) Posting with a fisheries survey vessel as a fisheries extension officer with duties to include the organisation of the indigenous fishing industry (Territory of Papua New Guinea Agricultural Cadets nd PX 1-3-5).
In 1945, the Pacific Territories Research Council and in 1947, the Australian Prime Minister, gave covering approval for the dispatch of up to five students for overseas post-graduate training under tropical conditions (Memorandum from Halligan to Public Service Commissioner 1950, PX 1-3-45). They had the opportunity of “obtaining the most modern information and of learning the most modern methods in various specialties” (“Establishment of DASF 1946-49”, 1950, PX 1-3-45). The reasoning
102 behind overseas training was to obtain information on permanent mixed farming systems, plantation management, soil erosion control, soil management and cultivation methods, and specialised knowledge on particular crops such as rubber, coffee, tea and quinine in other tropical countries. Graduates were also to gather information on extension methods used in other colonies (DASF Newsletter 1949, PX 1-1-63). They were expected to bring back knowledge to the Territory on tropical extension methods suitable for indigenous farmers, agricultural education suitable for indigenous schools, and the organisation of indigenous shows and harvest festivals (1950, PX 1-3-45). This enabled the Didiman to see what was happening in other colonial countries where indigenous extension work had been successful, and also where it had failed.
4.4 IN-SERVICE TRAINING
Refresher courses for Didiman later became a part of DASF in-service training. Courses were held on the introduction of Rural Progress Societies (RPS) and included subjects such as marketing agricultural produce, basic accounting, land classification, plant diseases and pests control (Administration Press Statement No. 122 1962, AA series A1838, item 936/16 Part 1). In 1964, DASF announced that courses on rubber as a cash crop were to be held at Mageri “until every Agricultural Officer from areas suitable for growing rubber had attended” (Administration Press Statement No. 119 1964, AA series A1838). Mageri eventually became the rubber training school. Other in-service training courses open to Didiman included courses in the use of extension aids which lasted between four to five days and specialised refresher courses on cash crops such as tea and pyrethrum (DASF Annual Report 1965-64, 137 and 1963-64, 129). Other courses included co-operatives and business, and farm management courses. Business management courses were held approximately at five monthly intervals and commenced in July 1961 (DASF Newsletter 1961, 3). These courses were attended by small groups of extension officers. As late as 1971, DASF was still holding courses for agricultural officers. Tei Abal, later the Minister of Agriculture, saw these senior officers’ training courses as a way to alleviate the lack of management skills (Press Release No. 1612 1971, AA series 1838). Other courses involved the training of higher-level staff in using educational aids for group learning, including flipcharts and posters, how to use them and how to make them (DASF Annual Report 1965-66, 135). Courses also included group discussion techniques, broadcasting, how to conduct a census and the use of film in extension work (DASF Newsletter, 1970, 3, PX 24-1-39). One Didiman noted that
103 these courses “whetted people’s appetites for more extension training” (1970, 3, PX 24- 1-39). Quarterly conferences were also commenced in May of 1964 and involved DASF headquarters staff and senior agricultural officers (DASF Annual Report 1963-64, 129). At these conferences senior staff discussed field, administrative and financial problems, training and extension philosophy and methodology. Beginning in 1961, the DASF in- training programme for cadets and newly employed officers was organised by the District Agricultural Officer (DAO) in the district where recruits were appointed (“Duty Instruction”1961, PX 1-1-39A). The DAO supervised and assisted each new recruit. New recruits had a 10-day general induction course held at Port Moresby Headquarters, then a two week specialist course at LAES Keravat including tours of indigenous and European plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula. After the course, the new agriculture officers were dispersed to all districts (DASF Newsletter 1961, 2, PX 24-1-39A). In 1964, the training of Didiman changed and became more centralised. Frank Ryan became the Officer in Charge of the training for recruits based at Kerema (DASF Newsletter 1964, 3, PX 24-1-39A).
In 1948, there had been only seven agricultural stations at Lae, Madang, Wewak, Aitape, Sohano, Popondetta and Sogeri. Later other stations opened at Lorengau, Buin, Maprik, Namatanai and Kairuku. By the late 1960s, agricultural stations and agricultural extension centres were operating throughout the TPNG. Agricultural extension centres were smaller establishments than stations. Both served as local bases at the sub-district or area level for field extension activities, which included patrolling, rural organisation, marketing, field training and distribution of seed and plant material.
Table 4.2 Number of Agricultural Extension Stations and Centres, 1962-1969
Year No. Agricultural Extension Stations No. Agricultural Extension Centres 1962-63 13 69 1963-64 13 75 1964-65 12 130 1965-66 14 167 1966-67 15 172 1967-68 16 174 1968-69 16 17749
During the 1960s, Didiman travelled extensively throughout Australia and the South Pacific attending conferences and agricultural extension courses such as the Regional
49 See DASF Annual Reports form 1962-69.
104 Management Conference, Brisbane, the Fisheries Development Conference, Canberra, the Second Australian Extension Conference, Hobart, South Pacific Commission Technical Economic Training Methods Conference, Noumea, the FAO Regional Conference, Manila, and all of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) meetings (DASF Annual Reports 1965-66 163 and 1964-65, 160). SPC meetings were inaugurated in 1947 and held tri-annually in Noumea. The fourth SPC conference at Rabaul in 1961 was hosted by DASF and the Division of Extension (South Pacific Commission, Agricultural Extension Meeting 1961). Didiman were also represented at a meeting in Paris of the Directors of Agricultural Extension sponsored by the OECD (DASF Annual Report 1967-68, 233) and where a series of lectures were given on ‘Human Relations’ to students in the Overseas Colombo Plan at the request of the Department of Territories (DASF Annual Report 1967-69, 233)50. Didiman also went overseas investigating sugar and the DASF Annual Report of 1964-65 noted the visit of Russ Cheetham to Fiji to study the sugar industry in relation to possible developments in the TPNG (DASF Annual Report 1964-65). This specialisation led to DASF being one of the most technically-orientated departments within the Territories’ administration. It also led to Didiman carrying out consultancy work throughout the South Pacific. Bruce Boniwell visited the United States territory of Samoa in 1967 where he acted as a consultant on agricultural extension. Fred Kleckham and Eric Wilson consulted on the growing of cocoa for the South Pacific Commission, visiting B.S.I.P. (Solomon Islands), New Hebrides (Vanuatu), Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa (Samoa) (Annual Report 1967-68, 233).
As there was no school of tropical agriculture in the South Pacific, a search began to find a school that would train personnel for the leadership roles in economic development in the TPNG. The locations suggested by J. K. Murray were the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad, the Hawaiian College of Agriculture, and the University of Queensland and Queensland College of Agriculture (“Potentialities of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea” nd, UQFL91, Box 2). The Australian Government settled on the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad (ICTAT). Agricultural cadets
50 The Colombo Plan was designed to achieve security but by exclusive economic assistance to and friendship with underdeveloped countries whose enmity would be dangerous should low living standards foster the growth of communism within. The plan originated at a meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held at Colombo Ceylon in 1950. The original members included Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. The purpose was to organise the economies and raise the living standards in the countries of South and South-East Asia. See Oakman, D. (2004) Facing Asia: a History of the Colombo Plan, Pandanus Books: Canberra.
105 receiving overseas training at ICTAT were also given the opportunity of examining extension work in other British colonies (“Staff Overseas Studentship” 1950, PX1-3-45). These observation tours gave graduates the opportunity to see the principles that they had learnt in Trinidad applied in the field in East Africa51 and West Africa (Dwyer 1952 PX 1-3-45)52. The established cost of overseas training for each graduate in 1950 was approximately £1,000, of which salary and allowance constituted £600 per annum, fees £75, books £20 and fares £300. The first student to complete an ICTAT course and return to the TPNG was Leon Bridgland. Other agricultural graduates who attended ICTAT included Ron Carne (DASF Newsletter 1949, PX 1-3-63), Greg Graham (“Urgent for Bridgland, re: Graham’s study” 1950, PX 31-1-3), T. Sorensen (“Overseas Studentships” 1950, PX 1-3-45), Jack Lamrock (Dwyer 1952, PX 1-3-45) and Peter Ramm (DASF Annual Report 1961-63, 122). Cottrell-Dormer also attempted to have diplomates included in overseas training in Trinidad, as Trinidad was prepared to take eligible diplomates from Australian Agricultural Colleges such as Gatton, Dookie, Roseworthy and Hawkesbury. The first diplomate recommended by Cottrell-Dormer for training in Trinidad was Dave Kingston (“Overseas Studentships” 1950, PX 1-3-45). Graduates from ICTAT were awarded a postgraduate Diploma in Tropical Agriculture. However, the Department of Territories declared in 1954, “There had been no specific proposals received for any extension of the scheme or for any other schemes for overseas training” (Ministerial Schedule No. 1320 1954, p1).
Although there was a need for more agricultural specialisation, it was found newly arriving Didiman did not have any real direction in regards to specialisation and were unaware of Canberra’s policies (“Professional Officers DASF” 1954 PX 1-3-2). A study of Australian university courses showed that specialisation was achievable for future DASF officers at the degree level (1954 PX 1-3-2). The University of Sydney provided specialist courses on animal husbandry and agriculture economics, plant pathology, microbiology and biochemistry. The Queensland University provided specialised training in agronomy, soil science, plant pathology, botany and entomology. The University of Western Australia offered specialisations in plant breeding, general agronomy, animal nutrition and rural economics and farm management. The University of Adelaide, through its affiliation with the Waite Agriculture Research Institute offered specialisation in agronomy, agriculture chemistry, economic entomology and plant
51 These colonies were Kenya, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Uganda, Somaliland, Zanzibar and Rhodesia. Dwyer, R. E. P. (1952) to Public Service Commissioner, p. 2, PNGA 1-3-45. 52 These colonies were Nigeria, Gold Coast Sierra Leone and Gambia.
106 pathology and agriculture microbiology and crop physiology. All these courses were relevant to roles taken by Didiman in the TPNG. In 1954, a report noted that the universities of Melbourne and Tasmania offered little specialisation suitable for DASF officers (“Agriculture and Veterinary Cadetships” 1954, PX1-3-5). In the Territory, Dwyer pointed out the lack of specialisation among Didiman made it difficult to establish a “clear cut line for the advancement of diploma men as against trained technical officers” (“Cadetships- Agricultural Colleges” 1954, PX1-3-29B). He suggested to DASF that there were “already diploma men in the service” and that diploma men wishing to specialise at university should be allowed to do so under the cadet scheme (1954, PX 1-3-29B). Many Didiman with diplomas later began to upgrade their diplomas in undergraduate degrees (Jack White, ex-Didiman, email December 24, 2007).
In 1962, the University of Queensland’s Department of Agriculture recognised the need for research, teaching and training in agricultural extension. A new course initiated by Dr. Joan Tully, challenged the overall delivery of agricultural extension methods to indigenous people (Crouch 2002, 420-421). Tully was a senior lecturer in the university’s Department of Agriculture 53. It was the first postgraduate diploma course in agricultural extension in Australia. The course was open to graduates and to diplomates. Jack Lamrock was the first DASF officer to attend the inaugural course in 1962 (Chamala and Claridge 1992)54. For diplomates, a ‘short course’ was made available and was attended by Frank Ryan, Eric Wilson, Fred Kleckham and Dave Kingston (DASF Annual Report 1965-66, 89).
4.5 PRINCIPLE OF DIFFUSION
Previously extension methods used by DASF were based on the Principle of Diffusion. This operated on two basic concepts: that changes in farming practices would occur if information were disseminated among farmers. Secondly, that information and new practices would diffuse from individual innovators to other farmers throughout the
53 Joan Tully (1907-1973) was an agricultural scientist with a degree in Bachelor Science, University of Western Australia (1932). She won a Fullbright scholarship and studied extension education at Cornell University New York (1952-53). In 1956 she worked with the CSIRO agricultural research liaison section in Melbourne and later moved to the Melbourne University Faculty of Agriculture (1959). In 1961 she taught at the University of New England before moving to the University of Queensland (1962). Many of her publications emphasised that the behavioural sciences were the cornerstone of extension and were crucial when working with client communities. 54 Inside cover, a photo of students in the Pioneer Extension Course.
107 farming community. It followed that the efficiency of extension based on diffusion principles could be measured in terms of the adoption of recommended practices (Tully 1966, 391). The training of cadets within DASF was geared to this method of agricultural extension up to 1962. It was also referred to as a ‘progressive farmer’ strategy, because individual farmers were singled out to adopt new farming practices. However, this method was not successful as the individual farmers singled out among communities in the TPNG did not pass on their new found knowledge, and ownership of agricultural techniques was causing conflict between farmers. It was also found that “mere dissemination of information was not sufficient” as the “knowledge” passed on by Didiman was in many cases seen by farmers as irrelevant. Tully argued that if information was not used due to the irrelevance of it to a given situation, or was beyond the individual’s resources to use it, or was seen as only a means of furthering personal goals, then extension would fail (Tully 1966, 392).
Tully relied on the theory of Van den Ban who divided communities into two; the traditional community and the modern community (1966, 392). She argued that in a traditional community, the farmers knew little of what went on outside their own village, outsiders were regarded with distrust and economically they did not count depreciation, family labour and other expenses that did not involve a cash outlay, as costs (1966, 392). She contended that modern community farming was regarded as a business, outsiders’ advice was sought, and farming organisations were established to share knowledge and improve output and marketing (1966, 392). Using this dual categorisation, a ‘traditional community’ roughly approximated the villages of the TPNG. Tully’s new course at the University of Queensland acknowledged these differences but also offered a critique of the Van den Ban dichotomy into traditional and normal villages.
As DASF was aware of the failure of the diffusion principle for extending farming knowledge through the individual it adopted a new approach which applied to the whole community. The basis for extension changed from providing a channel of communication for information to individual farmers to one that relied on group interaction as a method of changing norms of behaviour among the whole village community. This was in effect a ‘self-help’ approach to extension methods. McKillop (1974, 6) claimed this approach was opposed to a ‘centralised planning’ approach in which rural people were told what to do to meet the aims of the government. DASF produced an Extension Manual for all staff members on this new approach to agricultural
108 extension, which McKillop described as a “democratic extension strategy” (McKillop 1974, p4). Bob Curtis, (email May 10, 2008) a Didiman concluded, the “system added a new dimension to agricultural extension, but like anything new, was to meet some opposition amongst the Didiman”. Curtis noted that although a few Didiman thought that Pidgin fluency was enough, he thought, “solid patrolling, with effective contact aided by sociometrics, coupled with good communication skills would prove to be a superior form of extension methodology” (email May 10, 2008).
Although training at times appeared ad hoc, Didiman did become familiarised with the land, but probably through patrolling and individual enthusiasm, rather than training. Like the Kiaps, the Didiman lacked training suited to the unique circumstances of the TPNG, and like Kiaps55, were just a bunch of young men with a smattering of pre- service and in-service training, who headed into the rural areas of the TPNG, innocent of the massive social engineering and economic transformation that the theorists dreamed extension would create (Downs 1980, xvi-xvii). Over time DASF did try various schemes to prepare Didiman for their job, and in specific instances these were successful. Overall DASF, supported by the Australian government, did provide training to its capabilities, considering its haphazard beginning.
4.6 RETENTION OF DIDIMAN
The Didiman recruited through various advertisements and tour visits entered into the Commonwealth Cadet Agricultural system (Hasluck 1976, 133) and, on completion of the three-year cadetship, became Assistant Agricultural Officers (“Organization and Adminstration – Cadet Agricultural System” 1949, PX 1-3-5). This was later reduced to two years as problems arose in the ability of DASF to keep cadets. Within a year of the first recruited Cadets appointed in 1946 to 47, 14 had taken annual leave, one had already resigned, one left to manage a sheep property in Australia (although his leave had not expired), two others were dissatisfied with the system and two were seeking employment elsewhere (Cottrell-Dormer 1949, PX 1-3-5). A review of a three-year system of cadetship was needed and C. C. Marr, acting Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension, observed that the “altered conception of security of stabilized employment”
55 Kiaps were given twelve months’ orientation and training course at ASOPA where they were taught to study, report and treat with respect and tolerance the traditional customs of the people. They later spent time with senior and experienced officers receiving practical experience in the Territories. This training was similar to DASF training for their extension officers. The results of these studies and training in effect made Kiaps a mobile administration and all the powers this entailed.
109 in post-war Australia had led to some of these resignations (“Organization and Adminstration – Cadet Agricultural System” 1949, PX 1-3-5). Other problems were dissatisfaction with salaries, which were not enough to provide everyday needs and were not comparable with Australian states and the Commonwealth Public Service. The absence of a definite guarantee regarding a future with DASF meant many potential cadets left early to seek a career elsewhere (1949, PX 1-3-5). In 1951, the improved salaries were still below Australian standards, and in 1959 this problem remained unresolved. Staff losses continued and in 1959 problems of staff retention were brought to the notice of the Public Service Commissioner by DASF (“Re-organization and Classification of DASF 1959, AA series A452/1 item 1957/6/7). Dissatisfaction at all levels within DASF was noted and several mid-level staff with up to 10 or more years’ service indicated their intention to resign. It was reported that staff “had given up hope that anomalies within the service would be corrected or they could expect to receive salaries commensurate with their training, professional ability and responsibility” (1959, AA series A452/1 item 1957/6/7). The morale of the department was greatly lowered by the failure to meet reasonable requests for pay adjustments. Resignations in DASF are reflected in the following figures:
Table 4.3 Retention of DASF Staff 1963 to 1967 Year Resignations Retirements Transfers to other Depts. 1963 – 1964 54 2 2 1964 – 1965 80 2 3 1965 – 1966 77 - - 1966 – 1967 178 4 15 (DASF Annual Reports 1963-67,140, 133,131, and 183 respectively)
In 1965, extension staff took matters into their own hands by forming the Papua New Guinea Expatriate Agricultural Diplomates Association. Diplomates argued that their service to DASF had been one of loyalty and devotion to duty under extremely difficult conditions but that these services had gone unrewarded and led to dissatisfaction within the service. Morale was low and resignations were placing an increasingly intolerable load on the remaining staff. (“Details on the Formation of the Association” letter to Director DASF 1965)56. The reasoning behind the formation of the association was the lack of representation of diplomates in Port Moresby Headquarters, and the disparity in Didiman salaries for identical duties between diplomates and graduates (“Details on the
56 Details on the formation of the Association personal papers, Mr. Bob Curtis (ex Didiman and founding member of the Association.)
110 Formation of the Association” letter to Director DASF 1965). It was also felt that diplomates should have an affiliation with similarly qualified Australians (“Details on the Formation of the Association” letter to Director DASF 1965). The morale of diplomate officers required lifting. They argued that it was misleading that Australian diplomates intending to come to the Territory were not aware of the conditions (“The TPNG: Expatriate Agricultural Diplomates Association’, August 21, 1965). The founding members of this association included Dave Carey, Bob Curtis, Ken Adams, Dave Macaulay, John Gosbell, Eric Wilson, Barry Johnston, Frank Ryan, R. Smith, Ron Cheetham, Col Choat, Rolf Arnison and Mark Reid (August 21, 1965) and by October 1965 membership had increased to 55 (Circular to All Members of the Papua New Guinea Agricultural Diplomates Association (PNGADA ) 1965). The association informed both the Director of DASF and the Public Service Commissioner of its formation and that its members would “remain loyal to both the Department and the Public Service and to continue to carry out instructions to the letter and remain responsible members of the Public Service” (PNGADA 1965). It was formed not to subvert the department but for “the common benefit of members as a genuine effort to increase morale and better conditions by giving officers a sense of belonging to an organization which respected their rights and ambitions” (PNGADA 1965). Initially, a push was made by Frank Ryan for the creation of a new division within DASF. In a letter to Dave Carey, Ryan stated that “the Association should push ahead for a division entirely of Diplomates, as we are not going to get to first base by working with the Graduates” and suggested that graduates “could form a Division of planning and development if they want while the Division of Diplomates could implement the work of planning and development” (July 21, 1965). Ryan spoke with Jack Lamrock at Division of Extension Headquarters in Port Moresby. He recalled that Lamrock “got annoyed” and said “You blokes won’t get anywhere with your Association … You are wasting your time” (July 21, 1965). It is hard to tell whether Lamrock was against the Association or that he knew the Administration and Commonwealth government and its bureaucratic hierarchy would not allow restructuring, disruptions or organisational changes within the Extension Division. Lamrock was aware of the discrepancies of salaries within the Department but was unable to influence the Administration or Commonwealth about wages and therefore saw the Association and its objectives as a lost cause. Bob Curtis was later to state, “Jack did what he could, but our efforts to get representation through a Diplomates Association never got support from anybody” (email October 26, 2007).
111 As early as 1959 there were serious anomalies within the Department and there were a number of illogical differences between salaries for comparable positions. Salary scales generally were unsatisfactory as the salaries were lower compared with similar positions in Australia (“Re-organization and Classification of DASF 1959, AA series A452/1 item 1957/6/7). For example, in 1964, the Annual Report for Central District noted the resignation of four Didiman on completion of their first term due to ill health, lack of job security, family reasons and further studies. These resignations were received from B. A. Arney, A. G. Terry, W. R. Tapsall and R. J. Lancaster (Annual Report Central District 1963, PX 3-2-1 Part 4). At the same time a Grade III Agricultural officer resigned (1963, PX 3-2-1 Part 4). In 1973, a letter to Dr. John Guise57 by Arnold Smith Peresi was published in News Views at Vudal Agricultural College58. It discussed salaries and the limited opportunities for advancement within DASF. Peresi stated “to take up agriculture as a career you are in the worst career in PNG” (New View 1973, 12). He noted that although great changes had been made within the Public Service and in particular with localisation, the Public Service Board had underrated the Didiman. A career comparison showed that although Didiman had a Form 4 Certificate, Certificate of Agriculture, and had DASF in-training they were underpaid compared to other departments. He noted Patrol Officers in the Chief Minister’s Department were paid a salary of up $1970 with two years’ training and holder of a Form 4 Certificate, while Didiman Grade 1 with the equivalent education and training received a maximum of only $1,450. Advancement opportunities for Patrol Officers could see their salary rise to between $4,355 to $4,715, whereas the increments in Didiman salaries only increased to $1,645 to $1,775. The rigorous salary caps of the Australian administration and public service had affected Didiman’s morale and confidence, even though as Peresi noted, “PNG could not afford a weak Didiman force if it wanted to be dependent on its agricultural products after independence in 1975” (New View 1973, 12).
Another reason for the low retention of some staff was the gap between high expectations and Didiman’s ability to fulfill the work required of them. A typical case involved C. R. Stoner, an English agricultural graduate who had experience in extension working with the hill tribes of north India. On his arrival in the TPNG in 1949, Stoner was stationed at Goroka to become the Senior Agricultural Officer for the Highlands District and was appointed as an Agricultural Officer Grade II (Cottrell-Dormer to the
57 Then Minister of Agriculture of the TPNG. 58 This was a fortnightly publication by Vudal, New Britain and was distributed to students, staff and colleges throughout PNG.
112 Official Secretary 3/5/49, PNGA 1-3-2). Stoner, a year later, reported that extension in the Highlands District was not working (DASF Memorandum Agricultural Extension Central Highlands 1950, PX 25-J-1). The backwardness of the people, according to Stoner, meant they were “simply not in a position to start keeping livestock on their own, or to cope with any cash crop requiring techniques other than those inherent in their own indigenous system of agriculture” (1950, PX 25-J-1). Stoner also stated he had no incentive to goad them to launch into new enterprises. He stated the way to succeed in any entirely new type of activity was to “enforce a mild degree of compulsion within the next few generations” (1950, PX 25-J-1). In response to these allegations Dwyer, then Acting Director, rejected Stoner’s claims about the backwardness of the people, noting, “this was not endorsed by this Department” and that
extension work in [a] primitive country is a long process, requiring continuous contact with the people concerned with a view to gaining their confidence and respect and conversely the Officer studying sociological problems, cultural practices etc so that he may ultimately be in a position to advise correctly without necessarily upsetting well established beliefs. (1950, PX 25-J-1)
Dwyer also rejected Stoner’s call for “mild compulsory methods.” Dwyer stated that there was a
danger of taking disciplinary action to enforce any such new adventure or agricultural methods as natives will probably lose the significances of cash crop introduction as benefiting themselves and revert to cunning with a view to avoid such regulations. (1950, PX 25-J-1)
Dwyer noted that agricultural extension work within the TPNG could be “most attractive and interesting” but added that in the case of Stoner and other likeminded officers, “the rate of development of an extension project should be in proportionate ratio with the capabilities of extension staff” (1950, PX 25-J-1). Dwyer was hinting at a problem often discussed by Didiman. Recruits who failed usually were not able to establish a rapport with the indigenous farming community and this allowed the frustration of their work to cloud their judgment, and as Stoner pointed out,
It is more than doubtful if Europeans will ever be found who were willing to patrol endlessly round checking up on weeding of cash crops: any normal man would go stale within a short time. (1950, PX 25-J-1)
Stoner resigned from DASF disappointed with the agricultural extension programme and returned to England (DASF Memorandum 1950, PX 25-J-1).
113 The realisation of localisation also became a catalyst for many Didiman to move out of the TPNG looking for new careers. Didiman felt they were not getting assurances from the Director of DASF in regard to placements after the advent of Self Determination (Bob Cutris, email December 9, 2006). A typical case involved Jack White (email, December 24, 2007)59. He resigned and then went to the University of Queensland from 1961 to 196960. Bill Stent also resigned to become a lecturer at Newcastle-upon-Tyne University in England. Andy Gillison resigned and moved to the the Department of Forestry in the TPNG (DASF Newsletter 1965, 6, PX 24-1-39A) and Bob Pulsford took up a position with the Public Health Department as a lecturer at the Papuan Medical College (DASF Newsletter 1963, 2, PX 24-1-39A). J. C. (Rinus) van Schilfgaarde left DASF in 1974. He first went to the TPNG in 1959 after serving in Indonesia in the early 1950s. Van Schilfgaarde originally from Holland had a diploma in agriculture from Deventer (email April 24, 2006). He migrated to Australia and eventually applied to work with DASF. He received his permanent posting in the TPNG from Hasluck in 195961. Although the government wished to retain van Schilfgaarde’s services until 1975, he thought that due to his age (he was 49 in 1975) it was better to leave as “the return is inevitable” and a later retention date would only make the transition to a new life in Australia more difficult” (Correspondence to DASF from van Schilfgaarde regarding “Retention Date” 1974). He was concerned with the education of his children and wrote that “the interruption of their schooling would be unavoidable by extending his stay in the TPNG” (“Retention Date” 1974). Van Schilfgaarde returned to Australia in 1974. Dennis Nicholls, who joined DASF in 1966 (he was a Didiman from1966-74), also returned to university studies to further his career, by taking a one-year Agricultural Extension and Community Development postgraduate course at Reading University in England in 1974. He returned to Papua New Guinea after independence (email June 12, 2008). Roy Vicary left in 1964 after 29 years in the Territory with 17 years spent with DASF (DASF Newsletter 1964, PX 24-1-39A). Vicary had joined DASF as a Grade I Agricultural Officer. His first appointment was to Rabaul as the Regional Agricultural Officer for the New Guinea Islands. However, due to a delayed departure from Port Moresby, Vicary suddenly found he became the acting Director of DASF. He stated “it
59 Jack White was a Didiman from 1951-1962. In 1971, White joined the Commonwealth Department of Trade and Industry as a Trade Commissioner with postings in Chile, Saudi Arabia, Fiji and Spain. He retired in 1991.
61 Letter from Minister of Territories, Canberra 27 October 1959 to J. C. van Schilfgaarde on completion of his probationary period with DASF and his appointment to the public service of Papua and New Guinea, in possession of J. C. van Schilfgaarde.
114 was unofficial, unappointed and unpaid and only came about because headquarters staff consisted of six and the other five were all away” (1964, PX 24-1-39A). While he was Acting Director, Vicary decided to post himself to Madang instead of Rabaul, a position he held for the next 14 years. Another Didiman to retire with a long service record in DASF agricultural extension was William Cottrell-Dormer. Cottrell-Dormer was the first Director of DASF, taking up the position in 1946. He relinquished this position in 1951 and became a Regional Agricultural Officer stationed in Milne Bay. He eventually retired in 1961 at the age of 60 and returned to Australia where he worked on a project for the South Pacific Commission on Agricultural Extension within the South Pacific (DASF Newsletter, 1961, 4, PX 24-1-39A).
Many applicants lost interest due to the slowness of the application procedures and generally lost interest in applying. Others could not tolerate the tediousness of the constant patrolling or the frustration over the gradual adoption by indigenous farmers of new techniques. Some left due to educational and career advancement, while for others it was age-related. Disappointment with the Administration and DASF concerning salaries and the poor general welfare of Didiman also affected retention rates during the 1950s and early 1960s. A study of DASF reports shows the retention rate of extension officers within DASF gradually stabilised in the 1960s where there was a small increase in the number of graduates but a large increase in the numbers of diplomates in the Extension Division.
Table 4.4 DASF Number of Graduates and Diplomates 1964 to 1969
DASF Annual Report No. of Graduates No. of Diplomates 1964 - 1965 27 117 1965 - 1966 29 136 1966 - 1967 26 150 1967 - 1969 28 145 (Figures compiled from DASF Annual Reports 1964-69)
The difference in staffing was due to indigenous field workers employed by DASF, not all extension centres were maintained by Didiman. Many extension centres were only opened and manned by a European officer when there was a need for the introduction of a new extension programme for the area or for the purpose of continued agricultural educational programs for the surrounding indigenous communities.
115 By 1973, the numbers of graduates had increased to 35 and diplomates had decreased from 145 to 104 (McKillop 1974, 5). The increase in graduates reflected the number of diplomates who furthered their education through the studentship program, which allowed them to gain agricultural degrees in Australian universities. The figures were also distorted by the localisation programme whereby trained indigenous extension officers were replacing Australian diplomates in the field.
While some of the young Australian men and later women who applied to DASF saw it as their duty, others saw it as an adventure and a challenge. Some were motivated by the lack of work in Australia while for others it was due to circumstance, such as the Didiman who stated he deferred his military National Service when he had been recruited by the Director of Agricultural Education (Mr. Woodgate) to become a Trainee Coffee plantation Manager for P. W. Reilly Pty. Ltd, based in Goroka. He then resigned due to lack of prospects and began work driving heavy equipment, building the Goroka Airstrip extensions until approached and recruited for the Administration by Ian Downs, who gave him the option of becoming a patrol officer, a policeman or becoming a Didiman. As he was a trained agriculturalist he applied to DASF in 1954 and remained with the department until 1966 (Bob Curis, email December 9, 2006). Another British trained agriculturalist had been sailing around the Pacific and ended up in Australia. After meeting and marrying an Australian woman who was born in the TPNG, they moved north in search of work (Dennis Nicholls, Didman (1966-74), email June 12, 2008). For some there was already a connection to the Territory through family, war or work. There were Didiman of Asian, Eurasian and European descent. Some stayed and built their careers within DASF, while others left disillusioned with the management, working conditions or the enormity of the task. In-service training in subsistence and cash cropping for some never eventuated, or was proposed but not offered. At the head office in Konedobu, DASF’s managers were told from ‘above’ (Canberra) the right way and the wrong way of doing things and in turn Konedobu informed the Didiman what to do. Konedobu was at times unable to respond to complaints from Didiman. Despite these difficulties of recruitment, training and retention, a division for agricultural extension was created. The next section will discuss the conditions of living and working in the field.
116 4.7 CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD
On completion of training, the cadets and recruits were sent to one of the eighteen Districts and 210 Sub-Districts of the TPNG to take up extension duties, but as noted by one Didiman, “staff postings within the Districts were without thought or knowledge of the conditions involved” (email, May 8 2008). Another Didiman noted that appointments “stemmed from complete ignorance of Sub-Districts in general and the job in hand” (Annual Report Kaiapit 1962-65, PX 38-2-2 Part 1).
Table 4.5 Didiman Staff Postings
District 1949 1959 1969 Port Moresby 2 3 9 Central 1 4 13 Gulf 0 2 4 Milne Bay 0 3 6 Northern 1 5 16 Western 0 1 3 East Sepik 2 5 9 Western Sepik 1 (Sepik combined) 4 Madang 1 5 10 Morobe 1 6 14 Chimbu 0 0 7 Eastern Highlands 0 5 10 Southern Highlands 0 1 9 Western Highlands 0 3 14 Bougainville 2 4 13 West New Britain 0 4 18 Manus 1 1 5 New Ireland 0 3 16 Total 12 55 180 (Figures complied from Agricultural Staff Postings 1949 (PX1-3-22), 1959 (PX 1-1-1) and DASF Annual Report 1969)
These figures only include Agricultural Extension Officers and Rural Development Officers. They do not include Didiman away on leave, special assignments or attending ASOPA.
The areas where Didiman were sent were often remote and not easily accessible. On arrival into these areas Didiman were expected to establish administration buildings from which to work but also housing for themselves and their wives if married. Complaints about housing continually plagued DASF. In 1947, Didiman John Waugh, while posted
117 in Madang, was “living in a camp on the concrete floor of an old army building under a rapidly deteriorating roof” (Division of Animal Industry to Agricultural Extension Division 1947, PX 1-1-63). Much of the housing throughout the district agricultural stations and extension centres was constructed of bush material and remained so for many years. The Wewak Annual Report 1956/57 reported the dismal situation of housing for Didiman throughout the district (PX 38-2-1F). At Bainyik Agricultural Station there had been no allocation of European material for homes and therefore bush houses had been built when the existing building had collapsed. In the Sepik, there were three European homes all of bush material with one being at least five years old and overdue for replacement. At the Wewak District Agricultural Station all buildings were attacked by white ants. The main residence was restumped and capped with brass from old shell casings left from the war. The floor had given way twice through the attack of white ants. In Aitape, complaints stemmed from the placement of the agricultural station. In 1947, a site for the station was chosen so that all people from the north coast and western interior would have to journey past the station to reach Aitape. However, the station was built on a pre-war civil aerodrome and the residence was built near unexploded bombs. In 1947, it was reported that one labourer had lost his life after being blown-up by a shell. The officer in charge of Wewak station stated he “was not exploding any more [bombs] by himself and hoped the Department would obtain the services of a qualified man” (District Agricultural station, Wewak, to Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension 1947, PX 25-D-1). In 1952, Dagua, via Wewak, reported that Corporals Stevenson and Stibbe of the Bomb Disposal Section had exploded 1020 bombs within a radius of two miles of the Dagua Air strip (Division of Agricultural Extension Dagua to Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension 1952, PX 25-E-1). The 1950 Annual Agricultural Report for Wewak (PX 38-2-1F) reported that
the first officer built a house which the bomb disposal personnel blew up; the fourth officer selected two alternative sites, while the fifth officer started building on another site. The seventh officer pulled it down and commenced building on yet another site. However, a visit from a senior agricultural extension officer revised the building plan and moved the site again. The seventh officer completed the house and the eighth was at last able to have housing. (Annual Report Sepik District 1950, PX 19-1-9D)
From 1947 to 1950, Aitape had eight changes in staff and the house-building efforts of each Didiman successfully neutralised the efforts of the previous Didiman62. The final dwellings “resembled those of a team of badly trained and badly driven horses, swinging
62 These Didiman were Messrs Parker, Morrison, McIndoe, Kingston, Doherty, Meldrum and Murray.
118 back and forth on a single tree” (1950, PX 19-1-9D). Buin in the Sohano District, Bougainville, also had housing problems. Most of the accommodation was of local material and according to the District Annual Report 1959-60 (PX 38-2-1) the facilities offered were not conducive for married officers and security was poor. In other areas such as Konga, Kieta and the Buka-Passage sub-district, the housing although interesting, was primitive and depressing. It was not fit for married officers and was often poorly placed in relation to distance to the administration centre. In the Gulf District in 1961, the housing was mostly ‘bush’ material (“Agricultural Officers-New Appointees 1961, PX 1-2-39B). Beara had married accommodation in the form of one European material residence and one bush material residence. At the Murua Agricultural Station in Kerema, only a dwelling of ‘bush’ material was available for unmarried Didiman and this also applied to Kukipi, where again only single accommodation of ‘bush’ material was available. Although housing was the responsibility of the Public Works Department (known as PWD), the majority of labour and materials used in construction and repairs to houses was supplied by DASF (Annual Report Kerema 1959, PX 19-1-9). Public Works building rates were slow due to the amount of buildings required throughout the TPNG. Public Works did eventually complete housing for DASF staff located throughout the districts, but it was at times ‘jerry-built’ and many were best referred to as hovels. However, as one Didiman noted, in 1950, “the pioneering stage of development is unavoidable and was cheerfully accepted” (Sepik Annual Report 1950, PX 38-2-1F).
For many Didiman marrying and having their spouses with them became a priority. This led to many building larger houses of bush material to accommodate their families. In 1949, Fred Kleckham was stationed at Popondetta Agricultural Station in the Northern District and reported he was “busy creating liveable married accommodation” as he was hoping to bring his wife to the TPNG (DASF Newsletter 1949, PX1-1-63). In the Mekeo, Jack Lamrock built a house constructed of bush material for his wife (Shirley Lamrock, interview, January 26, 2007). His wife joined him in the TPNG in 1952. Their house built at Kikimunga became affectionately known as the “bridal suite” as Didiman moved into the area with their spouses (see Figure 4.1, page 122). Didiman and wives who occupied this house included Jack and Shirley Lamrock, Don and Peg Shepherd, Geoff and Ricky Angell, and Bob and Jill Curtis. These homes were without electricity, used kerosene lamps or hurricane lamps. Refrigeration relied on kerosene. Flooring was split limbom palm covered with pandanus matting. For young brides, bush living
119 conditions were at times ‘testing’. Isolation was another problem for wives living in the bush, as roads were non-existent and travel was either by boat, canoe or airplane and usually irregular or late. To arrive at Kikimunga it was necessary to travel by government boat from Port Moresby to Yule Island and then proceed by raft consisting of forty-four gallon drums topped with bamboo flooring and then take an approximately twelve kilometer walk through bush which at times consisted of swampland (Shirley Lamrock, interview, January 26, 2007). To be posted to Konga in Southern Bougainville meant crossing the five rivers from Buin but at least the residence consisted of a two storey bush material home. This was acceptable except that Konga had the second highest annual rainfall after Kandrian in the TPNG (Bob Curtis, email May 1, 2007). For other married couples, accommodation became available only after Konedobu administration juggled staff appointments. To accommodate Ken Cole and his wife in Samarai, Cottrell-Dormer moved them into Mr. Wallis’ house at Kuiaro, and then Wallis moved into the Cole’s previous unmarried quarters. Wallis was then sent on a six week patrol so another Didiman could move from the guest quarters into the Coles/Wallis single quarters. After six weeks Cole’s married accommodation was ready. Cottrell- Dormer was sensitive to housing conditions in the Milne Bay area and eventually transferred Cole and wife to the Methodist area (Esa’ala sub-district) as he felt “ it would not be desirable for Cole to leave his bride alone at Kuiaro whilst on patrol” (Memorandum to Chief of Division Agricultural Extension 1967, PX 1-3-35). However, as one Didiman noted concern for the welfare of Didiman and their families, “was never a big issue” after Frank Henderson replaced Larry Dwyer (1959) after his death (Bob Curtis, email October 25, 2007). The Directors of DASF were William Cottrell-Dormer (1946-52), R.E.P (Larry) Dwyer (1952-59), Frank Henderson (1959-66) and William Conroy (66-73). After 1973 the director was John Natera, a Papua New Guinean (Potter 1982, 38-47). Curtis’ assessment of following directors of DASF is not held by other Didiman or the Australian Administration. Downs (1980, 52) noted that during the years of Dwyer and Henderson, they came under tighter control over finances by the Administration but there was also significant progress in extension and research. McKillop (242), an ex-Didiman, noted the work of Bill Conroy in the reorganisation of DASF which was introduced in 1967 and was still in the process of implementation in 1972. McKillop commented further that the reorganisation of DASF was the creation of Conroy. It is fair to acknowledge that among the Didiman there were big personalities and clashes between DASF headquarters and field staff, which were inevitable.
120 Transport problems afflicted the movement of Didiman in and out of districts. Air transport was mostly short take off and landing (STOL) airplanes, but mobility also relied on land rovers, motor cycles, canoes, powered and unpowered ferries, government trawlers and at times bicycles. One of the most unusual forms of transport was a weapons carrier left over from the War. This dilapidated armoured vehicle was at one time the only mode of transport at the Madang District Agricultural Station and remained so until its demise in October 1954 (Madang Monthly Report October 1954, PX 25-D- 1). Motorbikes were extensively used throughout the TPNG in the southern Gulf District (Annual Report Gulf District 1961-62, PX 38-2-2), Talasea sub-District of New Britain, (New Britain Annual Report 1961-62, PX 38-2-2) Lorengau Station in the Manus District (Annual Report Manus District 1962-63, PX 38-2-1) and Kaiapit in the Morobe District (Annual Report Kaiapit 1962-63, PX 38-2-2). In the Minj sub-district, in the Western Highlands, a Didiman purchased a motorcycle privately to carry out extension duties (Annual Report Western Highlands 1959-60, PX 38-2-1). Although at times motorcycles proved to be an effective mode of transport, many became burnt out, were involved in accidents and proved inadequate in the wet. As noted by one Didiman, motorcycles “were handy but not suitable transport as officers were not keen to ride them and were dangerous when roads were greasy” (Kaiapit 1962-63, PX 38-2-2). The main motor transport available to Didiman was the Land Rover. There was a car pool system in which Land Rovers were shared between government departments, so problems arose over usage and availability of vehicles on the days required. Forward planning was difficult.
121
Figure 4.1 ‘The Bridal Suite’, Kikimunga, Mekeo Region, 1954 Photo courtesy of Bob Curtis (Private Collection)
In Kaiapit, the Public Health Department (PHD) and Department of Native Affairs (DNA) had Land Rovers which were made available to DASF extension staff (Kaiapit 1962-63, PX 38-2-2). This proved to be impractical when Public Health needed the vehicle full time on a new Infant Welfare program, and the opening up of the road to Lae began to make heavy demands on the DNA vehicle. Water craft was the transport of choice for many in the Milne Bay, Manus, Gulf and Western and Sepik areas. In Manus, a departmental canoe was the most used form of transport in the district due to the number of islands. This also applied to the Gulf District where a small ferry operated between Kerema and Murua Agricultural Extension Station and in Samarai where sea transport was available through government trawlers. Some districts also depended on air transport for supplies even though a lack of airfields limited operations in the field. In the Gulf District up until 1960, there were no government stations that had an airstrip (Annual Report Gulf District 1959-60, PX 38-2-1). The only approved Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) airstrip available was located at Baimuru. Although there were airstrips in the District, these were used for an irregular service provided by a small private or Mission Otter aircraft. The Southern Highlands District (Annual Report 1958-
122 59, PX 19-1-9F) was also heavily dependent on air transport. In 1959, fifty percent of the district was still “restricted”. The Tari and Duna sub-Districts were completely listed as out of bounds by the Administration, except for small areas adjacent to government stations. The Mendi and Lake Kutubu sub-districts were only partially de-restricted. Lake Kutubu, due to its earlier contact with patrols, miners and missions was the only sub-district with unrestricted territory in the Southern Highlands. Due to the under- developed and still relatively unmapped nature of this area, Didiman were restricted to Mendi where an Agricultural extension station was built. Mendi was dependent on air transport that was unreliable due to inclement weather and a sub-standard airstrip. The lack of, and unavailability of transport for Didiman within the different districts and sub- districts not only hindered their work programs but also had an effect on their families. The most common concern for families living within bush areas was the lack of transport when illness and accidents prevailed. Bob Curtis noted that while living at Konga in Southern Bougainville, an area where the people had serious health problems, his family’s health was a constant worry (email May 1, 2007). Transport and communication problems took their toll on Didiman. One Didiman noted in exasperation “it is rather ironical under the circumstances to be informed that the utmost economy must be practised in the use of Administration vehicles. What are needed are some Administration vehicles which are capable of allowing their drivers to carry out the work they are expected to do” (Monthly Report Madang 1950, PX25-D-1).
Overcoming isolation, poor housing, health and inadequate transport, Didiman demonstrated enthusiasm and perseverance as one Didiman noted, in “far flung outposts of the Empire” (Ovenstone to Cottrell-Dormer 1947, PX 25-E-1). To keep Didiman in the field at the high numbers required was a constant problem, not only due to recruitment but also financial difficulties. Commonwealth funding for development in the TPNG had to be spread across administration, transport, communications, police health, education and lastly agriculture. James Griffin, Hank Nelson and Stewart Firth (1979, 106) noted in 1979 that 17% of the £1 million Commonwealth budget of 1949-50 was given to the Department of Public Health. Under the Administration of J. K. Murray, agriculture was always well down the list. DASF therefore maintained a field staff of Didiman that was under staffed, under paid and under equipped. The effort by Konedobu to maintain Didiman in most or all districts was not lost on the Didiman themselves, as noted by one Didiman on a visit to headquarters in Port Moresby. He noted that it “was privileged to be able to observe the organization necessary to keep
123 men in the field” (Ryan’s Field Officers Journal March 1955, 3014). In 1970, the DASF Newsletter, aware of the lack of communications between field and headquarter staff, noted that “in spite of telephones, radios, tape recorders and umpteen forms of the written word, the communication gap was still there” (DASF Newsletter 1970, PX 24-1- 39). DASF headquarters humorously went further stating “everyone wants more funds, more staff, more transport, more equipment, more pay and less work. But things can’t be too bad as nobody had claimed to be starving” (DASF Newsletter 1970, PX 24-1-39). The DASF Newsletter had evolved from a Division of Extension newsletter on field staff within districts and on “who was doing what”. This developed into a newsletter for the whole of DASF. The newsletter was also a social forum, informing Didiman of marriages, who went ‘south’ (Australia) to marry or who had become engaged while on annual leave, who was returning with a bride, and the birth of children and other personal activities.
However, what it did not acknowledge were the health problems the Didiman faced relating to diseases such as malaria, tropical ulcers, meningitis, cancers (in particular skin cancers) alcoholism, mental fatigue and depression. Cottrell-Dormer had relinquished his position as director due to depression and disillusionment, and Dwyer continually suffered from recurring malaria (supplemented by large quantities of alcohol) (Bob Curtis email May 8 2008). Didiman often pointed out to Dwyer, “the grog would kill him”, but in the end a shrapnel wound suffered during the war caused a clot in his leg and was responsible for his death (Bob Curtis, email, May 1, 2007). Conferences often tended to deteriorate into ‘pissups’ and poker sessions (Bob Curtis email May 8 2008) and alcohol played a large part in the Didiman’s social life and at times affected their work. A Didiman in the Mekeo was reported to do nothing but drink Negrita rum, and a few Didiman were categorised by their colleagues, as “drunks and womanisers” (Bob Curtis, email December 9, 2006). However, Didiman were not the only public servants within the administration who suffered from health problems, many aggravated by alcoholism. The majority of Didiman were young, with an average age of 20 to 25 years of age. DASF’s conditions of employment meant that Didiman over the age of 35 years were not employed as cadets. Many Didiman went ‘south’ to marry, bringing their wives to ‘honeymoon’ on remote agricultural stations throughout the TPNG. The amount of patrolling left wives alone for long periods of time and could have contributed to the divorce rate among Didiman as did periods of loneliness. The young age of the majority of married Didiman also led to some hasty and ill-chosen unions. The living conditions
124 were not always conducive to a settled married existence and many marriages paid the price for not being able to make the adjustment. However, other Didiman have celebrated 50-year anniversaries.
In 1971, “lack of communication” was one of the reasons given by staff for the poor relationships between field staff, office staff, technical staff and practical between headquarters and district officers (DASF Newsletter 1971, PX 24-1-39). Because DASF headquarters was based at Konedobu in Port Moresby, the chasm between Konedobu and field staff hampered progress mainly because responses from headquarters were slow and inquiries were sometimes unanswered. A Didiman based in Bainyik noted the lack of correspondence from headquarters concerning work-related matters. He wrote to Konedobu that he “had not received any official mail for the last five planes (5 weeks). I realise of course that this must be an oversight, but thought I had better mention it in case you had come to the conclusion that I had left the Department” (Ovenstone to Cottrell-Dormer 1947, PX 25-E-1). Complaints continued on unanswered correspondence, no follow up and letters incorrectly filed. DASF headquarters responded by claiming this problem was not contained to DASF. But a letter written on 10th February 1947, by the Director of DASF to the Director of Lands asking whether or not the area referred to as the Sir Thomas Blamey Botanical Gardens had been formally set aside as a reserve, received no follow-up action until July 1970. This letter’s reply, twenty-three years later, from the Acting Director of Lands stated, “No, it has not been set aside” (DASF Newsletter 1970, PX 24-1-39). However, many Didiman thought that Konedobu had become far removed from the workings in the field and for some Didiman, their work was self-motivated in a do-it-yourself mentality. Some Didiman thought that DASF’s concern for families was lacking especially when families living in isolated areas were often left with no radio to communicate to the outside world. For families living in these areas it meant there was little chance of outside help in times of sickness or for the unforeseen accident.
Konedobu and the administration were dependent on young fit men to work in the extreme conditions of the TPNG if policies were to be implemented. However, many of these young men had never travelled abroad and had no learning in tropical agricultural crops. A rural posting was a culture shock to many. These young men and later, women, travelled to a country where they knew nothing about the people, yet were expected to teach new crop methods using a language foreign to most farmers. The Administration
125 did provide in-service training but this training was not structured and many Didiman found themselves in the field with little or no tropical agricultural training. They were left to their own devices to learn about indigenous crop production methods and tropical crop culture techniques. DASF, itself, was hampered by the Australian Government’s policies for the country, as many members of the Australian Government had not visited the TPNG and did not have an understanding of the people, terrain, soils, rivers, seasons and weather which were vital in designing and implementing agricultural change. Before leaving for the TPNG, language lessons were not given, leaving Didiman initially without a means of communication with the local farmers.
The Didiman not only were trying to change agriculture among the indigenous people but were in fact agents of a massive social transformation. To change agricultural methods within the TPNG also meant imposing a change in the social life of the indigenous farmer. It was a huge expectation that villagers would believe a white, young agriculturalist could bring their lands to a position to be able to produce cash crops for the world markets. These young men were the hands, the eyes and ears of DASF in the field and their training and salaries, and living conditions should have been of paramount importance to the Australian Government and Administration. The young men who finally filled the ranks of DASF as Didiman worked long hours and lived under difficult conditions and maintained a sense of humour. They did the work that was put before them but the slowness of recruiting and the slowness of promotion within the department meant many potential Didiman were lost to the department. Cottrell-Dormer foresaw the need for a department built on flexibility with rapid promotion as one way of ensuring a dedicated workforce for his department. However, the Administration by making promotion competitive, created a contraction of the employment rate. Didiman in the position of assistant agriculturalists had already spent a minimum of three years in the TPNG working among indigenous farmers and many should have been promoted to Grade I officers after this period. This would have allowed DASF to expand their operations quickly due to having more dedicated men in the field. Promotion based on competition, meant many Didiman became disillusioned with the long periods between promotions. Primarily, DASF did not have the ability to maintain a proficient field staff for work among the indigenous farmers. DASF’s extension activities and programs relied on staff to have success. The evidence in correlation between Canberra and Konedobu, prescribed earlier, shows that control by Canberra was absolute in matters pertaining to recruitment, training and promotion. The lack of skilled agriculturalists
126 within Australia meant DASF was not only understaffed but was unable to recruit skilled agriculturalists quickly. Didiman were spread widely and thinly on the ground and expected to serve large farming communities. Although Canberra continually reinforced the need for development through agriculture within the TPNG, it never was able to supply the personnel to instigate these developments. Money for DASF was not the main priority. Commonwealth money was spread too thinly among all major departments, including education and health. DASF had a continual struggle for funds for Didiman’s salaries, which were well below those of Australian extension officers. The problems of salaries, recruitment and promotions affected the manpower of the department. Although Australia was committed to the advancement of the indigenous farmer, the lack of human resources in the form of numbers, skill and experience could be perceived as tokenism of Australia’s willingness to advance agriculture. DASF, under these conditions probably did the best it was able to and should only be judged by the quality of men and later women they were able to recruit and maintain in the field. The next chapter discusses the fieldwork of the Didiman.
127 CHAPTER 5: THE FIELD WORK OF THE DIDIMAN
In 1956, Cottrell-Dormer speaking at a conference in Goroka stated, “although extension programs must have an economic bias, the aim of extension was not to break all records in the number of coffee or cocoa trees planted or in the number of bags of copra produced but to help the people to find greater satisfaction in their way of life” (Native Agricultural Extension in a New Area”1956, PX 1-4-65A). To be able to perform any initiatives in the field the Didiman had to create a base from where their work would be directed. These bases were the District Agricultural Stations, Agricultural Extension Stations and Extension Centres that were developed within Districts and sub Districts of the TPNG.
The big question facing Didiman as they tried to introduce agricultural change was how to approach the indigenous farmer. Three approaches to rural development were used in agricultural extension programs by Didiman in the TPNG to persuade the indigenous farmer to modify or change his agricultural farming techniques (Adams 1982, 52). Autonomous extension, package programs and the use of contact farmers did not stand- alone and were used in a combination approach. When Australia first implemented the autonomous approach based on the British extension model, it involved extension staff being allocated to administrative districts to relay information on crop varieties and other technical advice to rural farmers. The principal means of communication was through demonstrations and field visits. Didiman investigated indigenous methods of agriculture, introduced new methods, and gave advice to farmers and trained subordinate staff. Most attention was given to areas that produced or were able to produce a cash crop for export.
The package approach was based on the premise of supplying a package of technical advice, supply and marketing services. This approach centred on the selection, introduction and promotion of one or more cash crops in each area throughout the TPNG. The object was to “generate the maximum income-earning response in communities within the constraints of limited public resources available for the task” (Shand and Straatmans 1974, 177). This approach was used extensively and was exemplified by the pyrethrum “push” in the Highlands during the 1960s when indigenous farmers were trained and educated in all technical and agronomic aspects of growing pyrethrum, and it was involved in establishing large acreages and nurseries (Willis Patrol Report 1963-64). They were also involved in the harvesting and drying of
128 the flower ready for the Australian market where it was used in fly spray (Bonniwell 1973, 93-95). A successful package approach had the following characteristics: it linked research, extension and the producer to provide an improved, locally adapted technology and secondly, the producer was linked to supply and credit process for seed, fertiliser, and marketing. This approach was also used for the development of cash crops such as oil palm, tea and coffee. The Didiman’s role was crucial in the development of high yielding export crops and the Standing Committee on Primary Industry in 1975 noted that “the package approach had much to recommend it for the early stages of transition from subsistence to simple cash cropping” (cited in Shand and Straatmans 1974, 177). However, it also meant that Didiman who were external to the village made all decisions about the content of the package. In effect Didiman ‘captured’ a few farmers and used them to substantiate change among other farmers.
The third approach was contact-farming, which was adopted by colonial governments, including Australia to increase the quantity of export crops that were being produced by land smallholders. It allowed the small farmer to work on his own land, in his own time and for his own benefit. The Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF) provided advice, farm input, credit and marketing services to the farmer in return for marketable produce of a certain minimum quality or grade. Rural Progress Societies (RPS) were created for this purpose and were organisations for local indigenous producers. The emphasis in the RPS was specifically on economic development. Economic development in RPS relied on improved technology as a motivation for either communal or individual enterprise. This form of approach was developed into projects such as the growing of rice in the Mekeo, Amele Plateau and Ramu-Warapu areas (Cottrell-Dormer 1951, 123-125). These three different approaches or strategies to agricultural development determined the actual day-to-day work of the Didiman.
In 1947, Cottrell-Dormer noted that beyond the administrative function of providing a base for Didiman, the main purposes for agricultural extension stations and centres were as receiving depots for livestock and seeds (“Establishment of District Agricultural Station” 1947, PX 1-2-2D). However, a role as a practical distribution network was not their main purpose. The primary purpose of agricultural extension stations was for demonstration and the provision of knowledge on Western agriculture.
129 In developing agricultural extension stations, Cottrell-Dormer asked Ron Carne, who was concluding studies at the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad to “map out a plan of action for a hypothetical Agricultural Extension Station” (Memorandum DASF to All Staff 1949, PX 31-1-2). Carne’s report contained a conglomerate of ideas based on lectures, what he had read in books and theories discussed at the College. His plan of action was also based on visits to agricultural stations in Trinidad, Barbados, Grenada, British Guiana and Jamaica (Report on an Agricultural Station 1949, PX 31-1- 2). Carne stated that firstly there had to be a need for a station within an area, and that its main role was to meet the ‘needs’ of the indigenous farming community. The station could then provide a more varied and improved diet, improved husbandry of soil, the introduction of more livestock in farming systems and new cash crops.
The station, through its Didiman, was an avenue for expressing DASF’s policy in a particular area. The station had to be within reach of villages and farming lands and this was imperative if Didiman were to have close contact with farmers in an area or district. Where indigenous farmers were not able to access these stations, the Didiman remained isolated and ineffective. As the stations also had similar topography and soil type, new farming techniques and new cash crops were typical of the indigenous farmers’ own lands. DASF tried to ensure that each station had sufficient land for growing food for the labour employed, as well as livestock grazing. The introduction of livestock to the indigenous farmers was limited to areas that could sustain a livestock industry. DASF also balanced introducing animal husbandry to the indigenous farmer where possible. This was imperative for increasing protein into their diets, and livestock was seen as a marketable commodity.
The station accommodated buildings for offices, stores, workshops, residences for staff, pens and yards for livestock and spare land for experimentation of new crops and demonstration. Carne suggested that stations should be staffed by at least one Didiman and where possible a cadet, who was to train under the Didiman. Carne also recommended the method of approach to the farmer was to follow a sequence of survey, investigation and extension. The Didiman were to ascertain problems within the area and decide which were most urgent, such as food supply, diet in general, protein status, water supply at village sites and the transportation of food. Carne argued that Didiman on stations were needed to gain the confidence of the local people (Report on an Agricultural Station 1949, PX 31-1-2). This was to become an exacting exercise for
130 Didiman as they were faced with language barriers and farming methods often closeted in mysticism and belief systems that did not correspond to Western methods of agriculture. However, Carne suggested that the way to integrate these two diverse agricultural systems was, firstly, to learn from the indigenous farmers.
Didiman were expected to begin with what the indigenous farmer knew and build on what worked, starting with the indigenous farming practices and developing and improving these methods. Secondly, Carne suggested that the Didiman needed to quickly feel comfortable with the cultural background of the indigenous farmer and his farming habits, and be aware of what ‘magic’ he used to clear the land, plant and harvest his crops, to learn his taboos and either try to dispel these beliefs by showing alternative methods or by incorporating traditional methods when introducing new crops. In 1933, F. E. Williams (1933, 6), the Government Anthropologist in Papua, suggested two main principles in regards to indigenous education63. “One is to foster all that is worthwhile in indigenous culture as it exists” and, secondly, “to fuse into it, or graft upon it, various acceptable improvements from our own” (Williams 1933, 6). In acknowledging these two principles, Carne suggested the Didiman needed to ask two questions before instigating any extension work among the indigenous people. Firstly, “What is the cultural background against which extension work must be carried out?” and secondly “How can the innovations desired by the people be most easily become part of their life?” (Report on an Agricultural Station 1949, PX 31-1-2).
To introduce new farming innovations to indigenous farmers required them to willingly and enthusiastically incorporate change into their daily lives. Cottrell-Dormer in a memorandum suggested that all Didiman study and implement Carne’s strategies for putting in place agricultural and extension stations (Memorandum DASF to All Staff 1949, PX 31-1-2). This hypothetical plan of an extension station became the basic structure of all post-war stations throughout the Territory and Didiman followed the proposed structure, organisation and functions in contacting, providing demonstration plots and general places of learning basic Western agricultural techniques. This can be exemplified by the development of the Siwai Extension Station, Konga on Bougainville in 1956. The creation of this centre took into account all of Carne’s criteria for a successful working station (see Figure 5.1, page 133). The station was established near
63 For more on the work of Williams see Australian National Archives series A452, A1 and A659.
131 indigenous held land, contained flat and graduating land for different crops, a good water supply and appropriate buildings as suggested by Carne.
Land was needed if the stations were to be successful. However, land for stations could only be acquired through the Administration and Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDSNA) and the Department of Lands. Land acquisitions in the TPNG by the Administration were governed by Land Ordinances. In Papua it was governed by the Crown Land Ordinance 1911-1953 and in New Guinea by the Administration Land Ordinance 1922-1953 (United Nations Questionaire on TPNG Land Policy 1952, PX 1- 1-193). These two ordinances were extended but generally remained in their original format (David Marsh, ex-District Services, telephone, April 13, 2009). DDSNA field staff negotiated with the traditional owners of the land and applications were then forwarded to the Department of Lands (David Marsh, ex-District Services, telephone, April 13, 2009). Land could only be bought by the Administration and only if the land owners were willing to sell (United Nations Questionaire on the TPNG Land Policy 1952, PX 1-1-193). Dave Marsh, a District Commissioner, acknowledged that large areas of land were purchased from indigenous communities and never used and that there had been excessive alienation of land by both the British and Germans before World War I (telephone, April 13, 2009).
132
Figure 5.1 Plans for Siwai Extension Centre Source: Combined Monthly Report August-September 1956, Buin, Bougainville, “Plans for Siwai Extension Centre”, By Didiman K. Tomlin, PNGA 25-H-1.
133 In 1952, approximately two and half million acres of indigenous owned land had been alienated or leased to the Administration and this comprised approximately 2% of the TPNG land (United Nations Questionnaire on the TPNG Land Policy 1952, PX 1-1- 193). DASF sent Didiman to reconnoitre land for stations in areas of the TPNG where ‘pacification’ had been achieved and to areas where control of the TPNG had reverted from ANGAU to a civil administration. Once a site had been decided as suitable, Didiman cut tracts through the bush for station boundaries prior to accurate mapping (Higaturu Monthly Report January 1948, PX 25-B-1). When the boundaries were fixed, plans were sent to DDSNA for acquisition through the Department of Lands and the land was either purchased from the indigenous landowners or if controlled by the administration, set aside for DASF. In other districts Didiman resumed control of agricultural stations established before World War II. These stations included Maprik (Sepik District) and the old government station at Sogeri (Central District) (Memorandum DASF to Wewak 1947, PX 25-E-1; Sogeri General Report 1948-49, PX25-A-1). Land for stations was also acquired through privately owned plantations such as the Boram Plantation, previously a freehold property run by Burns Philp (Madang District) and the Modilon plantation near Wewak (1947, PX 25-E-1; Madang Monthly Report December 1947, PX 25-D-1).
In 1949, Didiman were establishing agricultural stations at Lae, Madang, Wewak, Aitape, Manus and Sohano in New Guinea and in Papua, at Sogeri and Higaturu (near Popondetta). However, unsuitable land was often selected; there were problems with tenure, especially with privately held land. In some cases, land designated to DASF by the Administration reverted to the Administration due to the land being needed for other purposes. These problems frustrated Didiman in trying to create stations out of nothing. A Didiman in the Sepik District wanted to move a station to an alternative site, due to land tenure problems, but realised that “there was little to gain in moving as other sites investigated were not as suitable” (Sepik Annual Report 1948, PX. 38-2-E). In other districts, the inability of the administration to acquire privately owned stations such as the Modilon plantation near Madang, forced Didiman to abandon the original site on Modilon and move to a site at the back of the plantation (Madang Monthly Report June 1947, PX 25-1-D). The establishment of the agricultural extension station on Manus was held up due to the difficulty of obtaining definite information on government ownership as it was under the control of the American forces, although it did not have any American installations (Monthly Report Manus District August 1947, PX 1-2-2F).
134 Eventually, the District Officer divided the crown land on Manus between his own administration and other administrative departments. DASF was left with the residual land, which proved to be unsatisfactory for an agricultural station. Cottrell-Dormer complained to the Director of DDSNA as he felt “the District Officer did not have the right to excise portions of land as he thought fit” (August 1947, PX 1-2-2F). This problem of self-serving by district officers in the allocation of land for departments was not new and had happened previously in Madang where the District Officer had “seen fit to excise two portions of the DASF allotted area of Modilon without first referring the matter to the District Agricultural Officer in charge of the station, let alone DASF Headquarters” (August 1947, PX 1-2-2F). DASF also often forfeited land to the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA). This happened at the Boram station, Wewak and again at Aitape where DCA resumed the land on which Didiman had established a piggery (Division of Extension Port Moresby to District Agricultural Officer Wewak, PX 25-E-1; Sepik District Annual Report 1950, PX 32-2-1E).
Didiman in establishing stations had to clear the land for sub-division into blocks and plots for the purpose of growing crops that included indigenous crop selections, permanent fruit crops and other crops for their nutritional or economic value. In New Guinea, where the effects of war were evident, Didiman cleared away war debris ranging from aircraft and trucks to bomb fragments. Bomb craters had to be filled and levelled as did Japanese breast work and trench systems. Kunai grass areas were dug out and their roots removed by hand (Sepik Annual Report 1948, PX 38-2-1E). Buildings had to be erected for accommodation, grain storage and other produce, as well as storage for rations and tools (Sogeri Agricultural Station Quarterly Report December 1947, PX 25- A-1). The clearing of land, planting of blocks and plots and the construction of buildings was often delayed through the lack of and the slowness of the delivery of supplies. Didiman working in the Sepik District complained of the poor quality of seed being supplied to the area due to inadequate shipping from Wewak. One Didiman, in sheer desperation, was forced to order seedlings from Sydney by airfreight, but still was unable to get sufficient seed for distribution to indigenous farmers (1948, PX 38-2-1E).
The building programme for Tigak agricultural extension station in New Ireland, was delayed due to difficulty in obtaining building material from Rabaul and, as one Didiman noted, in general the lack of advice on proposed plans for developing stations from DASF Port Moresby contributed to their slow development (Annual Report Western
135 District 1960, PX 38-2-1). In Central District on the Sogeri station, a Didiman stated that the policy for the station, formulated at Port Moresby, was to be “a holding one as no major task was to be attempted” and consequently little was done in the way of agricultural plots for experimentation (Sogeri General Report 1948-49, PX 25-A-1). The Didiman writing this report mistakenly or perhaps deliberately wrote “holiday” instead of “holding”. Didiman were often disillusioned with the progress of establishing DASF agricultural extension stations (1948-49, PX 25-A-1).
Much of the work was done with the aid of indigenous labour. However, labour became an issue that forestalled the development of many stations. Didiman discovered that the coastal people around Aitape were pro-Japanese and were considered as the least desirable labour force (Sepik Annual Report 1947, PX 38-2-1E). Didiman in acquiring indigenous labour attempted to hire labour lines that were representative of whole districts so that knowledge of cultivation methods, planting and caring of livestock such as pigs, would be assimilated and subsequently passed on to villagers when the labourers’ one year contract terminated (Sepik Annual Report 1947, PX 38-2-1E ). However, the inability to employ labour lines affected Didiman’s work in establishing the workings of stations. In 1951, the Division of Agricultural Extension was forced to close a number of stations due to labour shortages throughout the TPNG. Stations at Buin, Wewak and Namatanai were closed and the existing labour lines were redistributed to other stations (Division of Extension to Madang, “Re: Monthly Reports July/August1951, PX25-D-1). As early as 1947, a Didiman warned that this shortfall of labour was going to be a problem in establishing stations and noted that the “abandonment of indentured labour” would be regretted (Sepik Annual Report 1947, PX 38-2-1E).
Not all stations remained as extension stations. In 1949, Sogeri agricultural station became known as an Agricultural Extension Section (Letter from DASF Port Moresby to Sogeri Agricultural Station 1949, PX 25-A-1), and in 1950, major development plans for Boram Station ceased and it became a livestock breeding station for the Sepik District. Bainyik became the main agricultural extension station for the district (letter from DASF Port Moresby to District Agricultural Station Wewak 1950, PX 25-E-1). The over- recruiting of indigenous labour by Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDSNA) in some areas also hindered Didiman in regards to their labour lines and Didiman thought it was necessary for recruiting to be curtailed to achieve a balance
136 between labour leaving and labour remaining within an area. The Western District Annual Report stated that over-recruiting “had made it impossible to implement anything [agriculture projects] on a large scale” and that the numbers of indigenous males leaving the district “resembled the nature of a general exodus” (Annual Report on “Advancement of Native Agriculture”, Western District 1959, PX 19-9-9F). Didiman also faced problems relating to supplies. Didiman were under supplied and this exacerbated the lack of policy from DASF and Canberra. One Didiman noted he had no advice concerning the actual job (Ovenstone to Cottrell-Dormer, April 1947, Px 25-E-1).
Eventually the establishment and development of agricultural extension stations and centres had an influence on the attitude of the villagers and Didiman noted the increase of more gardens consisting of both food crops and cash crops. Extension stations had initially been geared and directed at rehabilitation and this continued until 1955. Initially, it was from these stations that the indigenous farmers procured seeds for their gardens and replenished livestock, especially pigs.
Pigs were kept at stations for indigenous people to bring in their sows to be served (Wewak Monthly Reports November/December1949, PX 25-E-1). Australia imported Tamworth and Berkshire pigs to breed with local New Guinea pigs as these strains produced a pig that produced more meat and was less susceptible to disease. Piglets were later sold to the indigenous people to replenish their stock, much of which had been destroyed or eaten by the Japanese or allied forces during the war years (Month Report Madang 1950, PX 25-D-1). The replenishing of the pig population, especially in New Guinea, generally assisted in the rehabilitation process, but one Didiman alleged “it was a waste of time and energy” supplying good boars to serve local sows as they “immediately came into contact with pneumonia, anthrax or became worm infested which affected local pigs” (Eastern Highlands Annual Report1958-59, PX 19-1-19F). To combat this, he suggested that pig management training should be conducted by the Animal Industry Division of DASF. He also felt that indigenous people needed to think of pigs as a daily food, not as a measure of wealth or as a food to be eaten at Singsing64 time only (Eastern Highlands Annual Report1958-59, PX 19-1-19F).
Didiman based on stations provided seeds of introduced food crops such as European vegetables including radish, beet, parsnip, carrot, silver beet, rhubarb, capsicum, lettuce,
64 Singsing is an indigenous word for party.
137 tomato, cabbage and squash (DASF to Madang District Agricultural Station 1947, PX 1- 2-2D; DASF to District Agricultural Officer Manual 1947, PX 1-2-2F). The idea was to improve indigenous nutrition. Didiman either distributed seeds through patrols or when indigenous farmers visited the stations. However, the distribution of seeds caused some problems. Didiman noted that where villagers had no past experience with a new variety of vegetables, many did not know the correct planting procedures and much seed was wasted as they were given out haphazardly regardless of whether the indigenous population wanted them or not. Also the introduction of new food crops caused some health problems when it was found that maize, for example, caused “looseness in stomach” (Report of Visit to New Britain District 1947, PX 33-12-1). In 1933, F E Williams (1933, 7) had concluded “We should aim at improving the culture of native products before we begin the scattering of unknown seeds”. DASF and Didiman eventually acknowledged this advice.
In the Sepik District, seeds for European vegetables were not distributed unless the indigenous farmers came to the station and specifically requested certain types of seed, or if they were ‘finish time’ labourers. Even then care was given in the type of seeds distributed. Lettuce, radish, parsnip and turnips were not given to villagers residing below an altitude of 2,000 feet (Annual Report Sepik District 1950, PX 38-2-1E). At times, Didiman found that distribution did more harm than good and this was clearly shown “if an officer cared to follow in the wake of a previous DASF or other patrol in which vegetable seed had been indiscriminately tossed out to the farmer” (Report of Visit to New Britain District 1947, PX 33-12-1). Cultural methods were not understood, the climate unsuitable and most seeds were found low in viability (Report of Visit to New Britain District 1947, PX 33-12-1). It was suggested by one Didiman, working in the Sepik area in 1950, that Chinese cabbage and tomatoes were the best initial seeds and plants for farmers (Annual Report Sepik District 1950, PX 38-2-1E). This was due to their simple plant culture and planting techniques. In other cases the introduction of food plants did not find a place within the subsistence economy.
Villagers often set aside a portion of their gardens for European vegetables but then sold them to Europeans living in the area (Report of Visit to New Britain District 1947, PX 33-12-1). In 1947, Marr (Inspection Report of Rabaul District 1947, PX 33-12-1) observed that it was a “waste of time and money to distribute European seed in bulk in all districts” until such a time that DASF had the staff to follow up and instruct the
138 indigenous farmers in methods of cultivation and pest control (Inspection Report of Rabaul District 1947, PX 33-12-1). DASF did manage to introduce a wide variety of food plants into the cultivation practices of the indigenous farmers. But records from the Plant Introduction Section of DASF indicate that not all material brought into the TPNG survived or was not efficiently tested at stations (Charles 1979, pp. 379-380)65. The following list gives an indication of the variety of food crops introduced into the TPNG between 1950 and 1975.
Table 5.1 DASF Food Crop Introductions 1950 to 1975 Barley, buckwheat, oats, rice, rye, sorghum, wheat, maize, Grains: chenopodium quinoa Chickpeas, cowpeas, guar, lentil, lima beans, mung, peanuts, Legumes: pigeon pea, soybean and wing bean. Oilseeds: Sesame and sunflower. Sugar: Sugar beet and sugar cane. Anona spp, avocado, carambola, custard apple, durian, guava, jack fruit, lychee, Malay apple, mango, mangosteen, pawpaw, Fruit (tropical): pulasan, rambutan, salak, sapodilla, Solanum quitoense and soursop. Apple, brambleberries, Chinese gooseberry, citrus, date, grape, Fruits (sub-tropical loquat, mulberry, olive, passionfruit, peach, persimmon, plum and and temperate): strawberry. Brazil nut, Canarium spp, cashew, macadamia, oyster nut and Nuts: pecan. Asparagus, basella, bean, broad bean, cabbage, carrot, capsicum, cauliflower, Chinese cabbage, cucumber, egg fruit, Jerusalem Vegetables: artichoke, leek, lettuce, melons, okra, onion, pea, potato, pumpkin, radish, tomato and tree tomato. (Charles 1979, 379-380)
Agricultural extension stations and centres were more than a place for the distribution of seeds by Didiman. They served as places for static demonstrations for villagers and trainee farmers; in food crops and cash crops such as rubber, coffee and cocoa. They were also places where Didiman conducted plant trials and experiments with varieties of indigenous crops, shade crops and in some cases the trials for trees for reforestation programs.
In 1957, Didiman on Goroka station were trialing blocks of six different varieties of coffee and had trial blocks of 120 pyrethrum plants for experimentation. Crop rotation trials were also being conducted with peanuts and sweet potato (Monthly Report Goroka January 1957, PX 25-J-1). Didiman working on the Kainantu station were using coffee
65 Charles noted that traditional foods were not introduced often as there was already a broad range of genetic material in the TPNG and the introduction of new material carried a risk of introducing new diseases or pests.
139 blocks for the demonstration of three types of pruning. These were multiple stems by capping, single stem and the agobida system (Monthly Report Kainantu 1956, PX 25-R-1).
At Wewak agricultural station, Didiman planted a number of annuals. These annuals produced food, cash crops, or were used for seed propagation and as field demonstration plots for the indigenous farmers. Maize, sweet sorghum, sweet potato, yam, bean and cowpea were grown as food crops and rice and peanuts as cash crops.
Didiman on stations had begun to experiment with shade tree crops, planting crotalaria, anagyroides, leucaena glauca and pigeon pea. Crotalaria, a creeping legume, was used to suppress weed growth in coconut plantations and was also used as cattle food in pastures. Anagyroides were similar to Crotalaria. Leucaena glauca, a legume tree, was used to shade coffee and cocoa. Didiman found that although leucaena glauca harboured a weevil that attacked the cocoa, it was quick growing, and would survive droughts, was nitrogen fixing and had a good leaf fall providing humus to the soil. It was also used for firewood, soil erosion control and as a fodder tree if planted in hedgerows. It was used in permanent sustainable food gardening as a source of nutrient from slashing the tops for mulch (David Dillis, ex-Didiman, email August 2007). As a shade plant, leucaena glauca was used extensively by Didiman in coffee gardens throughout the TPNG. Small perennial plants of economic importance were maintained also on the station and included kapok, sisal, coffee, cocoa and coconut. The Didiman’s demonstrations of preparation, planting, maintenance and harvesting of these crops coincided with the farmer-training syllabus (Wewak Annual Report 1956-57, PX 38-1-2E).
Didiman in the Highlands experimented with coffee, wheat seed from the Belgian Congo and planted nine different pasture grasses on the Korn and Goroka stations (Resume of Agricultural Extension Activities, Goroka 1955, PX 25-J-1). Didiman based on all district stations and agricultural extension centres were involved in crop trials that were used simultaneously for demonstration and experimentation. In the New Ireland district, Didiman were involved with cocoa and coffee trials, white Spanish peanuts and cow peas trials (District Agricultural Officer New Ireland District to Chief of Division 1960, PX 38-2-1) and in the Central District with rubber planting programs (Annual Report Central District1962-63, PX 38-2-1). Didiman in Goroka trialled two species of pine trees for potential reforestation in the Eastern Highlands (Monthly Goroka Report July
140 1956, PX 25-J-1). These demonstrations and trials supplied district farmers with a steady supply of seed for food and cash crops and at the same time allowed Didiman to demonstrate particular plant cultures and find the best type and best variety of crops for each area.
However, not all experimental and introduced crops by Didiman were successful. In Aitape, Didiman had problems with cultivation of crops, especially Kaukau66. They reported that it took five to six months to produce a crop of Kaukau, compared to the indigenous farmer who was able to produce a crop, using a different variety, within two months. Tobacco failed outright and a quarter acre of European pumpkins was yielding only three pumpkins in 1947 and, in 1950, although some good pig yards were built, Didiman had insufficient stock to fill them (Annual Report Sepik 1950, PX 38-2-1E). Didiman on Wewak station had other failures. They reported that all crop introductions for the year 1949-1950 were considered failures at Wewak (Annual Report Sepik 1950, PX 38-2-1E). Mauritius bean was affected by fungus and destroyed, winged beans were attacked by rust, taro was affected by a leaf eating caterpillar (Hawk Moth), rice developed various rust and smuts, and crops that were doing well, such as peanuts, maize and pumpkins were washed out by floods.
Added to the failure of crops, the Didiman had to contend with wild pigs that caused havoc despite nightly vigils with a .303 rifle. Didiman based on both Wewak and Aitape station regarded these stations as “of little real value but they had cost the Administration a great deal of money and caused DASF to spread their scant equipment and staff further afield than was necessary, and held up the work of the Didiman to the ridicule of Europeans and indigenous people alike” (Annual Report Sepik 1950, PX 38-2-1E). The new District Agricultural Officer (DAO) in the Western District in 1959 found that demonstration coffee plots had been planted on the edge of a swamp (Annual Report 1959, PX 19-19-F). Not only was the position a poor choice but also the spacing of the plants was dubious and growth of the coffee was poor. A Didiman claimed that “the orchard planted had to be expressly pointed out to me - it just didn’t exist!” and he discovered the cashew nut block was overgrown (Annual Report Western District 1959, PX 19-19-F). All previous work on the station had to be abandoned and replanted. The constant movement of Didiman in and out of districts meant much of their work had in some cases, to be redone.
66 Indigenous word for sweet potato.
141 Often problems of development for Didiman related to lack of staff, supplies and indigenous supervision. In 1950, the Bainyik extension station (Sepik District) had a Didiman in residence for a period of less than six weeks over a ten-month period. A Didiman stated that “although it was a worthy experiment, this system failed” (Annual Report Sepik 1950, PX 38-2-1E). Although an appropriately specially trained indigenous foreman had been left in charge of the labour line during this period, it was found that he and his labour line sat in the shade during the day and went to singsings at night. Aitape Station (Sepik District) was also troubled by the lack of staff, with one Didiman noting, “this station is better not opened unless permanent staff can be found” (Annual Report Sepik 1950, PX 38-2-1E). As with Aitape, the Wewak extension station in the Sepik District suffered from continual staff changes and the centre at Magarida (Central District) was abandoned due to staff shortages (Annual Report Central District 1962-63, PX 38-2-1). Staff shortages were also acknowledged at Oriomo (Western District), while other stations such as Kukipi (Gulf District) were manned by inexperienced junior officers. In the case of Kukipi it was noted the indigenous people “lived in a tough and somewhat brutal society” (Annual Report Gulf District 1960-61, PX 38-2-1 Part 2) and Didiman at the junior level probably had little hope of understanding local cultures or making real contact with local farmers.
One of the Didiman’s tasks was to turn the extension stations and centres into an agricultural training area. The Didiman conducted training courses for indigenous farmers that were practical, with trainees receiving instruction and experience concerning crops and general agricultural practices applicable to their home areas. Training included specific nursery practices, hole-lining, and instruction in the growing, care and preparation for the market of specific crops (Tudor 1964, 171). This low level training scheme was aimed at a mass education approach to increase and improve the modification of the farming skills of the indigenous community. It also aimed at steadily increasing the number of farmers in the villages who had an association with DASF activities and who could provide points of contact for Didiman who were implementing particular programs or were seeking data for the planning of a new programme (ASOPA Senior Officers’ Course No. 3 1958, PX 1-2-2). Those selected as trainees were mostly elderly influential farmers from villages. The reasoning behind the targeting of elders was that if Didiman could influence the elders, the villagers were sure to follow their lead in changing their agricultural practices. In some instances when these local ‘big men’ were powerful and convinced about cash cropping, they became effective contact
142 agents for Didiman and agricultural change (Shand and Straatmans 1974, 179). However, young men between the ages of 20 and 30 were selected from organisations such as local government councils, missions and other field departments of the Administration. It was problematic whether the Didiman, as new young arrivals, without the ability to speak local languages, could have chosen ‘elders’ or promising young men on their own. Patrols by DDSNA would have documented elders of villages, so Didiman would have known who the elders were and it was probably these elders who designated young men for further agricultural training.
The establishment of Christian missions through the Territory also had a great influence on the indigenous people and agriculture in general (Chalmers 1902; Tomkins and Hughes 1969; Langmore 1974 and 1989; Gostin 1986; Wetherall 1996; Maiden 2003). Missions strongly supported the Didiman, and Didiman often appointed missionary church leaders as field workers to continue extension activities between patrols (Shand and Straatmans 1974, 22). Shand and Straatmans (1974, 22) noted the influence of one church leader in the Naba villages was reflected in the high percentage of cash crop growers in the area.
The Lutheran Mission was also responsible for the establishment of Banz Agricultural School in 1957, and also instigated the establishment of Yangpela Didiman67 clubs in 1972 (Samana1975, 230). Missions and their followers encouraged agricultural extension activities. However, in some cases the introduction of coffee by the missions had disastrous effects and became a challenge for the Didiman when coffee introduced by the Lutheran Mission before the war had been planted in indigenous gardens rather than in groves in the Finschhafen sub-district (Patrol Report Hube 1950, PX 32-1-25). These plants were cared for before the war but a drop in coffee prices during the war and occupation by the Japanese during the war, meant the coffee was neglected. The bush around the coffee had been cleared but no pruning had taken place (Patrol Report Hube 1950, PX 32-1-25).
In the Chimbu District, a Didiman reported “the vast majority of trees were too close together, planted on old food garden land or on poor hillside soil, with little or no shade”
67 Yangpela Didiman clubs aimed at promoting rural development with the concept of self-reliance and to develop infrastructure that would aid the rural economy and the improvement of internal markets. In 1973 there were 79 established clubs with a membership of 2,500. These clubs were formed in the Highlands.
143 (Patrol of Upper Chimbu Census 1960). Another report noted that practically all blocks were thick with weeds (Patrol Report Hube 1950, PX 32-1-25). This was a common concern throughout the TPNG. Generally, Didiman were grateful for the work of missions. Later, an effort was made by DASF to familiarise missions with DASF policy. DASF argued that a balance was needed between good economic development in the form of cash agriculture and religious obligations that also involved working for missions on mission-owned copra plantations, the construction of village churches, or in ‘congregational’ trade stores and schools. The Didiman came to see that the initiation of these activities by missions reinforced local interest in earning money and greatly facilitated their own official economic development programme (Shand and Straatmans 1974, 33).
Cottrell-Dormer, speaking at a Mission Conference in 1949, stated, “he was aware of the work of missions in encouraging the development of coffee and rice production among the indigenous and the distribution of fruits and vegetables” (DASF Director’s Address to Mission Conference 1949, PX 1-4-9). But he pointed out that there “needed to be a common policy and philosophy in the field of indigenous rural progress” (Mission Conference 1949, PX 1-4-9).
In 1950, a Senior Agricultural Officer along with members of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Seventh Day Adventist Missions, adopted a plan that included taking two indigenous mission representatives from each mission for training courses (“Re Agricultural Trianing- Native Missionaries” 1950, PX 1-4-9). Cottrell-Dormer perceived the idea of the missions and DASF working together was “one of great possibilities for the country” (Mission Conference 1949, PX 1-4-9). He stated that there “were more than 2,000 missionaries in the field and if all were given some agricultural training” they would be an immense value to the work of the Didiman’s extension activities (Mission Conference 1949, PX 1-4-90).
A Didimisis travelling through Boana stayed at the Lutheran Mission House and noted the work of the missionaries in introducing vegetables, fruit trees, dairy and poultry and soybeans (Margaret van Schilfgaarde, ex-Didimisis, email, October 29, 2006). She reported that, “the missionaries had been a steady and permanent influence in the area, while Didiman were transient, although DASF as an organization was permanent” (email, October 29, 2006). She also acknowledged the previous work of the mission in
144 literacy, commercial enterprises and schools enabled her to “develop a school for women in agriculture in which they could participate” (email, October 29, 2006). The relationship between the missions and Didiman in agricultural development in the TPNG has been overlooked by historians. It added a whole new dimension to PNG’s history. We now need to think more of Kiaps, Didiman and the missions as one complex, related process.
As many of the farmers were assumed to be illiterate, literacy alone was not a criterion for selection as a trainee. The criteria included the farmers’ keenness, willingness to work and natural intelligence, but Didiman were given no instructions on how to apply these criteria (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 15/63, PX 1-1-39A). The emphasis on training by Didiman was simplistic, even naive and racist in the manner in which it was based on “Learning by Doing” (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 15/63, PX 1-1- 39A). Training varied from district to district according to differing requirements, average education levels and facilities available. Fulltime training on extension stations by Didiman was supposed to be between 6 and 12 months (DASF Annual Report 1963- 64, 127). Didiman taught trainees ‘why’ as well as ‘how’ to follow competent smallholder cash crop practices (DASF Annual Report 1963-64, 127).
Provisions on agricultural extension stations were made by Didiman to accommodate and feed trainees, and blocks of land from one to one and half acres were put aside especially for crop training. This ‘new style’ of training by Didiman was an “attempt to increase cash crop production with an emphasis on individual or household cash crop production and good husbandry as a means of securing satisfactory incomes” (Harris, 1988, 138). In 1964, the Australian Government proposed that a thousand farmer trainees would be processed each year at Extension Stations and Centres (DASF Annual Report 1963-64, 127). This acceleration of the Farmer Trainee Scheme emphasised the new focus on the decentralisation of knowledge and community-based education throughout the TPNG. It was essentially an adult educational process that depended for its success on universal participation. Its failure was in relying on ultimately young Didiman with limited experience to implement change on a scale well beyond their abilities and competency. The Farmer Training Scheme was basically directed towards a process of social evaluation and cultural change. In 1962-1963 over 1200 trainees were included in the scheme (DASF Annual Report 1961-63, 176). Out of a population of
145 more than three million people, of which at least 80% were rural dwellers, the impact of this rural education was limited.
Although Didiman were active in the field in most areas of the TPNG and enthusiastic about the development of the Farmer Training Scheme, there were criticisms of this scheme (Rowley 1965, 73). Bonniwell, a Didiman, noted critically that “educational needs of local farmers were attributed by expatriate Government workers”. These “attributed” needs stemmed from European values, beliefs and attitudes which reflected completely different socialisation processes to those found in the villages of the TPNG (Bonniwell 1973, 94). He complained that, even when needs were recognised and understood by Didiman, the ‘attributed’ needs were still wide of the real requirements of the local farmers (Bonniwell 1973, 95). His opinion reflected the acknowledgment by many Didiman and by DASF that the policies of agricultural education and the training of indigenous farmers were founded on an alien and imposed Western philosophy. This scheme was like others, full of good ideas and intentions, but ultimately flawed because they all sought to impose change from the outside and above, rather than within, and at the request of local farmers.
Criticisms of the Farmer Trainee Scheme were voiced by other administrative departments and by the Farmer Trainees. It was thought that the training given by the Didiman despite the ‘simple’, practical approach was in some cases too academic for the trainees, and that Didiman had a tendency to use trainees on Agricultural Extension Centres and District Agricultural Stations purely as labourers to assist in their general extension programs (McKillop 1976a, 27). However, the Farmer Training Scheme operated in the Territory up until the late 1960s, and as a form of mass rural education it could be regarded as ‘cutting edge’. In the late 1970s, Dennis Nicholls, then Chief Extension Officer at Konedobu, stated “we had overseas experts coming in and suggesting ‘brand new’ successful approaches to agricultural extension – things like ‘farmer training’ that DASF had been previously engaged in twenty years before” (email June 12, 2008). Although Nicholls thought the scheme had out-grown its usefulness by the end of the 1960s, he did wish “that something similar had occurred to rescue village cocoa and rubber [plantations] which he visited in 1988/89 and were dead with old age” (email June 12, 2008).
146 Many trainees saw their position at Extension Centres as employment rather than training. They saw it as a chance to move away from the village to other employment in agriculture, especially to urban employment. This was especially true of school leavers who joined the ranks of the Farmer Trainees (McKillop 1976, 27).
In the field, perhaps the Didiman’s greatest contribution was to create a platform for later crop experimentation, crop introduction and indigenous agricultural training. Reeves expressed the importance of agricultural extension stations to the work of the Didiman in 1964, when opening a centre at Kagua, in the Southern Highlands District68. He claimed that centres could teach the local people “how to grow new food, how to grow things that could be sold for money and this money used to buy other things” (Administration Press Statement No. 83 1964, series A 1838). He went further stating that “the people were invited to send young men to the station to live and learn how to do things properly and then return to the village and teach the people all they had learnt” (series A 1838). For the Didiman, patrols were a more important avenue for contacting the indigenous farmer. Reeves was on safe ground claiming that “centres were a base for patrols which would contact farmers, sponsoring new rural activities and aid in the looking after of gardens and advice about growing crops” (series A 1838). The next section will discuss the Didiman and the introduction of formal agricultural training for indigenous people as part of Hasluck’s policy programme for economic development and nationalism.
5.1 DIDIMAN AND FORMAL AGRICULTURAL TRAINING
Cottrell-Dormer thought agricultural training should be offered to indigenous farmers. The aim was to “get a sprinkling of trained native people throughout the Territory who will be useful in developing communal projects and the adoption of new methods of agriculture as they were introduced” (1948, 55). The Australian Department of Territories had already noted the majority of indigenous people were agriculturalists, but alleged their methods of agriculture were wasteful of land and lacked crop varieties, and were not conducive to obtaining the highest possible output from the soil (Department of Territories 1955, 2). This was ‘output’ in terms of a commercial return. DASF took on the role specifically to teach sound land use and better methods of crop production. The agricultural training programme within DASF became a cornerstone of the overall colonial development policy of the Australian Administration (Agriculture Extension
68 Reeves was the Assistant Administrator (Economics Affairs) in 1964.
147 Circular No. 2, 1958, PX 1-1-39A Part 1) “on one hand to improve the food supply of those people still living in villages and on the other hand it was the intention to use indigenous extension workers to provide a better economic foundation for the Territory” (Hasluck 1976, 309). At the ground level, Kingston, a Didiman, repeated the DASF mantra that “it is our duty to train the native in all aspects of the necessary cultivation and processing of his crop” (1956, PX 1-4-65A). Increased production from indigenous lands in the TPNG, if it could be measured, would indicate the success of DASF’s agricultural education programme (Harris 1988, 138).
Formal indigenous agricultural training began under the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme (CRTS) (Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973, 341)69. Under CRTS, the Administration and missions provided basic agricultural experience for indigenous ex- servicemen and others whose lives had been disrupted by the war (DASF Annual Report 1963-64, 126). In 1948, Cottrell-Dormer reported to the Conference of District Officers acknowledging “a start had already been made with rural training at Sangara and Erap, while there were a few applicants at Aitape and Wewak” (1948, 55). Agricultural officers were instructed to accept all applications. However, CRTS was an adopted Australian apprenticeship scheme based on too much formal teaching. Cottrell-Dormer warned that if this Education Department scheme was applied to rural training, it would fail as many of the indigenous applicants “lacked the knowledge of what was intended and there was a lack of jobs immediately in sight for people who complete rural training” (1948, 55). The material used in syllabuses (under CRTS) had been hastily prepared without particular reference to local conditions (“A Proposed 12-Year Plan for the Development of Agricultural Education in Papua New Guinea”, PX 1-3-44) and it was no surprise there were losses of approximately 75% of CRT’s trainees at Wewak due to resignation, failures, and desertion. Indigenous farmers who returned to their villages also failed to influence local agriculture (Annual Report Sepik District 1950, PX 38-2- 1E). Formal rural education in the Territory ended in 1952, when agricultural training came under the auspices of DASF Agricultural Extension and moved completely away from the control of the Education Department.
69 CRTS was established for the benefits of indigenous peoples who served with the Australian Forces during World War II and was eventually open to all indigenous people of the Territory who wished to achieve and were adaptable for training (“Australia’s Policy in Relation to External Territories” (1950) cited in Jinks, B., Biskup, P. and Nelson, H. (eds.) (1973) Readings in New Guinea History, Angus and Robertson: Sydney, p. 341).
148 The Farmer Training Scheme initiated during the 1950s and 1960s differed from, but became complementary to formal training. The Farmer Training Schemes were “on the spot training” by Didiman who gave demonstrations and instruction to local farmers who visited stations or while patrolling the districts of the TPNG. The Farmer Trainee Scheme was essentially short-term, practical rural teaching. Participation was voluntary and the classroom was the field. The potential class was the total rural population of two to three million people (Lynn 1949, 5). Another difference was that Farmer Trainees could not become DASF employees. They were a link between the European extension staff and the indigenous farmer. Cottrell-Dormer (1956, PX 1-4-65A) noted the importance of this link, noting that “without local leaders and helpers we cannot implement an effective extension program, nor can our leaders and helpers be effective if they do not understand what is expected of them”.
Formal agricultural training for indigenous farmers began with the establishment of an indigenous Agricultural Training School at Mageri in 1952. Mageri was selected in September 1952 as the centralised location for providing instruction to students drawn from all districts in the Territory (DASF Annual Report 1963-64, 127). The broad aim of the centre was to improve the agricultural practices of the Territory by training selected indigenous students on an improved form of agricultural enterprise, away from the perceived wastefulness of cultivation practised by indigenous farmers (Agricultural Training Centre Mageri: Progress Report 1956, PX 7-1-7). In the initial years, the course was open to indigenous people with a minimum education of Standard V and was gradually raised to Standard IX after 1959 (1956, PX 7-1-7). The curriculum included six months of agricultural theory followed by another six months of practical experience at Madang Agriculture Station (Dwyer 1954, 2). It was a systematic approach to agriculture based on theory and practice (DASF Memorandum “training Natives in Farming” 1953, PX 1-3-51). The trainees who graduated from Mageri were prepared for work as lower intermediaries in agricultural extension allowing them to be either employed by DASF in a field capacity or to return to work in their own communities DASF “Report for the 6th Months Ending 31 Dec 1955 on Native Agricultural Extension, AA series A518 item C2/1/1). The success at Mageri led to the establishment of further agricultural training schools throughout the Territory. In 1956, J. O. Smith, under the direction of the Minister of Territories, carried out a review of Agricultural Training in the Territory, covering agriculture in schools as well as vocational instruction and professional and sub-professional training. The Smith Report incorporated information
149 prepared by DASF on forward planning for an Agriculture College. The Minister approved the Report in 1957 and an action plan was implemented in 1958. This included provision for:
(a) Farmer training centres to be erected or expanded at Madang, Goroka, Mt Hagen, Popondetta, Kuiaro, Taliligap, Oriomo, Kerema, Kapogere, Bainyik, Kavieng, Sohano and Mendi. Courses of nine to 12 months’ duration were to be held continuously at extension stations and centres. Villagers were to be given instruction, demonstration and practical experience in the cultivation of the crops suited for their area. In addition shorter courses were to be given on occasion on specific subjects such as rubber bud-grafting, animal husbandry and copra production. A thousand farmer trainees were to be processed each year through extension stations and centres (DASF Annual Report 1963-64, pp. 127-129).
(b) A sub-diploma institution to be erected at Popondetta in the Northern District. Work commenced on the Popondetta Agricultural Training Institute (PATI) in 1962, while at the same time, Mageri began its first two-year course. PATI opened its doors in 1963 with the transfer of students from Mageri. There were 33 students in 1963. Mageri became the rubber training school for the Territory in addition to being the Extension Centre for the mid-mountain areas of the Central District, Papua (DASF Annual Report 1963-64, pp. 127-129).
(c) A Diploma Level institution was to be built at Vudal, New Britain. Vudal was situated twenty-six miles from Rabaul and was eventually opened in 1965 and signalled the completion of the ‘Smith Report’ plan. It was modelled on Australian Agricultural Institutions such as Hawkesbury Agricultural College (NSW) and Dookie Agricultural College (Victoria) (DASF 1965, 2). It provided for a three- year course in theoretical and practical agriculture for students who had attained the NSW Intermediate Certificate or its equivalent (DASF Annual Report 1964- 65, 134).
Indigenous agricultural training in the TPNG was based on the belief that there was a need for a useful education which could be applied to the natural way of life of the people, and from which they could derive immediate practical results. Agricultural training also dovetailed with a major aspect of the Australian Administration’s policies in catering for indigenous peoples’ welfare and developing their economic wellbeing and creating a transition from subsistence farming to agricultural self-sufficiency. It was a
150 policy based on community-based development and the belief that indigenous farmers would incorporate new methods or substitute them for old ones. This was seen as national development and nation building at three levels:
(d) Higher training aimed at producing a local supply of professional and semi- professional agriculturalists for the territory’s future needs, both private and public.
(e) Training of indigenous intermediaries for assistance in agricultural extension programs.
(f) Training for indigenous farmers to increase the numbers of expert farmers in rural communities (Division of Agriculture and Marketing, “Five Year Plan 1962/3- 1966/67” 1962, 21).
In 1961, Hasluck acknowledged that two indigenous students were receiving post- leaving certificate education. Both these students had been previously trained through DASF with one in second year at Gatton Agricultural College, Queensland, and one in first year agricultural science at the University of Sydney (Hasluck 1962, 11). Papua New Guineans took advantage of the new opportunity, and agricultural training and education became a means for individuals to advance their status and transition into the cash economy. The promotion of wellbeing and the improvement of the quality of life which the scheme took as its goal were in this sense, secondary benefits. Women were excluded from agricultural training programs until the 1970s.
5.2 PATROLS
Patrolling throughout the TPNG was not confined to DASF. Patrols were also conducted by District Services, Department of Health and the PIR (McCathy 1963; Sinclair 1981, 1988; Souter 1998; Gammage 1998; Moore 2003). However, a large proportion of extension work in the field was carried out by agricultural patrols, or visits to villages and individual farms. It was during these patrols by Didiman, that farmers were encouraged to visit agricultural extension stations and centres, to join the Farmer Trainee Scheme, to receive seeds and or watch a demonstration on a particular crop culture. Didiman distributed improved seed and planting material among indigenous farmers but this was a flawed scheme and Didiman realised its ineffectiveness.
151 Didiman on patrol held agricultural meetings within villages to promote cash crops, taught people to mark out gardens for cash crops, established nurseries, corrected plant culture techniques, and brought awareness of the presence of diseases and pests, supplied information about agricultural policies and the reasons for them, and listened to any concerns of the indigenous regarding agricultural problems (Willis 1963-64, Patrol Reports). It is difficult to measure the success, or impact, of these activities due to the lack of consistency of contact with indigenous farmers by Didiman. This lack of regular and meaningful contact was noted by one Didiman who claimed that “it was difficult to maintain contact with people” either due to staff shortages, staff changes and staff being on leave (Kundiawa Annual Report 1958-59, PX 19-1-9F). Didiman were frustrated with not being able to visit, talk to and maintain regular visits.
There were some complaints from indigenous farmers. A report on the Madang District noted that indigenous farmers located on Karkar Island and in the Ramu area were “increasingly demanding further assistance” from Didiman but as one Didiman noted these demands could only be met by staff increases (Madang Annual Report 1958-59, PX 19-1-9F). Didiman liked patrolling, but their influence was probably partial, limited to the time period they were present, and only effective when seen along with the Kiaps and the missions. Another objective of patrols by Didiman was to collect data on the extent of land population pressures, particular in the Highlands and for the gathering of the annual census (Montgomery 1960, 6). Didiman perceived over-population as a problem in such areas as the Highlands as a deterrent to agricultural extension programs. As one Didiman stated, regarding over-population in the Chimbu sub-district, “there are several alternatives [to over-population]; industrialization, an agriculture revolution or resettlement” (Kundiawa Annual Report 1958-59, PX 19-1-9F). He conceded the best course of action would be resettlement but he also acknowledged that “the utmost caution and diplomacy” must be used in this approach.
Didiman also collected anthropological and ethnographical data, which they used to assess the agricultural potential for a particular area and to gauge the attitude of the indigenous towards agricultural development (Administratation Press Release No.66 1956, AA series A518 item C2/1/1). The Didiman’s Patrol Reports, although they were not trained in anthropology and ethnology, contained detailed references to the state of health of the people, linguistic groupings, education level and outlook, diet, land tenure
152 and customs, living standards, outside influences, subsistence crops, pests and diseases, plant culture techniques, animals, topography, soils, and climate.
Up until the early 1950s, DASF patrolling by Didiman was at a minimum because the Division of Extension did not have the staff or the supplies to conduct patrols of any great length of time. In 1947, Dwyer, then Chief of Division of Extension stated in reply to requests, that there was a distinct lack of patrol gear not only for Didiman but also for other departments as it was “unobtainable in government stores in Australia” (PX 25-E-1). He also noted “it had not been possible to obtain staff for some districts in New Guinea, such as New Ireland, and many other districts in Papua” (PX 25-E-1).
After 1950, patrolling began to dominate the work of Didiman in the field due to the increase of trained staff and the availability of young agricultural cadets. In 1954, Didiman were patrolling in eight districts (“Re-organizationand Classification of DASF” 1959, AA series A452/1 item 1959/2709). Two years later in 1956, there was at least one Didiman allocated to every district except for the Southern Highlands. A total of 2,032 days had been spent on patrols (Advancement of Native Agriculture, AA series 518 item C2/1/1). Didiman increased patrolling after 1959 when Hasluck approved plans for DASF to increase the time spent on agriculture patrolling up to 75 per cent (The TPNG Handbook Parliamentary Delegation 1960, 20). The primary purpose of the Didiman’s patrol reports was to feed information to DASF headquarters.
Reports were virtually the only way senior agricultural officers in Port Moresby could evaluate what was happening in a district and what the Didiman in the field were achieving in regards to policy and extension techniques. Senior officers relied on these reports in order to make policy and it was through these reports that new extension programs were initiated, changed or modified. Patrols were an attempt by Didiman and DASF to gain a deep understanding of conditions and life styles of rural people. J.K. Murray noted, “No Administration can be successful … Unless it has staff which knows the people” (Murray nd, UQFL91, Box 20).
There was a marked increase in patrolling by Didiman in all districts from the year ending July 1958 through to the year ending June 1960. Didiman patrols had trebled. This increase in patrolling meant that more attention was given to individual farmers (Shand and Straatmans 1974, 178), although in the Southern Highlands, Western Highlands and Eastern Highlands most of the patrolling was confined to making day-to-
153 day contact with the people in so-called ‘unrestricted’ areas (Shand and Straatmans 1974, 178). The eventual opening of all Highland districts saw a rapid expansion in patrolling and this led to greater indigenous participation in extension activities.
Patrols by Didiman in the 1960s became more objective regarding their purpose. They varied widely from district to district due to soil type and terrain. A patrol by a Didiman in the Watabung and Upper Asaro census division in the Eastern Highlands included compiling the village agriculture census, supervision of land clearing, fencing, marking and shading of all coffee gardens for the later transferring of seedlings. A Didiman reported that he contacted a great majority of the 7,225 people in the Watabung area and 12,500 people residing in the Upper Asaro (Eastern Highlands Annual Report 1958-59, PX 19-1-9F). This meant that he saw, or was seen by up to a 100 people each day, of the 20,000 people on a patrol lasting 183 days. Many patrol reports submitted to Konedobu regularly stated that “a great majority of people” in areas patrolled were contacted. It could be assumed that these figures were at times unreliable due to time constraints by Didiman. There were also indigenous people living in the bush who were unaware of Didiman patrolling in their area.
The objective of the patrols differed. For instances David Montgomery, spent 160 days patrolling the Bena Bena Census division where his patrol concentrated on planting coffee; 320 acres were planted by this patrol in the 1958/59 wet season. It was found in this census division that there was a “great demand for a cash income and coffee was the best source of income” (Eastern Highlands Annual Report 1958-59, PX 19-1-9F). On this patrol, Montgomery also attempted to indentify a basic pattern of land tenure used by the Bena people.
In other areas, such as the Gulf District, patrols were in the “nature of survey patrols”. Reports noted that previous patrols by Didiman had “not brought about desired results” (Annual Report Gulf District 1959, PX 19-9-9F). A Didiman noted that the “Gulf District locals were slow to move and seemed to resent change in their village life” (1959, PX 19-9-9F). In some districts, due to lack of staff, no regular patrolling programme could be initiated (1959, PX 19-9-9F). In the Minj sub-district, patrolling by Didiman had different objectives. Patrols in the Banz-Lower Jimi area in 1959, checked out the feasibility of establishing trial coconut and coffee blocks and if warranted, such trials were to be established (Report Native Agriculture Development, Minj Sub-District
154 1959, PX 19-1-9F). This also meant pig-proof fencing had to be erected around the trial plot of land. Subsequent patrols to the area were made to ‘plant up’ trial areas previously surveyed by the Didiman (Minj Sub-District 1959, PX 19-1-9F).
Reports by one Didiman did not provide sufficient data on indigenous agriculture and, in 1947, the Director of DASF complained about patrol reports on Karkar Island. To rectify these glaring inadequacies, the Chief of the Division of Extension sent copies of another Didiman’s patrol report stating it “should prove a good guide as to the type of information required” (Division of Extension to DASF Madang 1947, PX 25-D-1).
The following patrol maps illustrate the variety of terrain patrolled by Didiman (see Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, pp. 157-159.). Patrols were carried out on foot or in government boats. Patrol maps were an important part of a Didimans’ patrol as they allowed headquarters to be able to visualise the route taken, be aware of the terrain encountered and have an idea of how long future patrols would take. Patrols also gathered considerable amount of basic information, useful contacts and extension leads for future work. Patrols were also a way to note where villages and other hamlets were situated in a sub-district or district. They illustrated familiarisation of areas by Didiman moving into new areas, and suggestions on the introduction of cash crops ideal for the area concerned. Patrols also allowed indigenous employees of DASF, field workers and trainees to become familiar with an area.
Patrolling by Didiman was learnt on the job and there was no manual or text on what was required. New recruits were taken on patrol by more experienced Didiman and basically ‘shown the ropes’. Didimisis, Marggie van Schilfgaarde, claimed “there was no checklist of directions” for patrolling, and instead she relied on “one asking questions about how, what, where, when, why and with whom” (email, October 29, 2006).
Increased patrolling saw a change in the extension activities of the Didiman. In the mid to late 1950s Didiman patrols became geared to the introduction of better cropping through the development of subsistence smallholder farming, and then from the late 1950s onwards, towards “project-related” patrolling. This last phase entailed organisation of Rural Progress Societies and the marketing of cash crops in targeted, specific areas throughout the Territory. This meant that Didiman had to accept changes in their own role, to be flexible and quick learners, as their work took on new directions and went from simple demonstrations and giving out seeds on patrol, to organising large
155 projects, training programs, surveys and report writing, and teaching about market economies. The Didiman had become key players in engineering Australian policy and, in many cases, they responded to the task, adapted new roles and absorbed new ideas coming from overseas, Australia and Konedobu. Other Didiman slipped, and left the TPNG.
156
Figure 5.2 Patrol Map of Koiari Sub District, Central District 1949 Source: Sogeri Agriculture Station Monthly Report June 1949, Map of Koiari Sub District, Central District. This area was patrolled in 1949 by Didiman P. H. Broagrath, PNGA 25-A-1.
157
Figure 5.3 Patrol Map of Normanby Island, Milne Bay District 1957 Source: Patrol Report No. 1 57/58 on Normanby Island from 19.6.57 to 29.7.57 Milne Bay District Patrol route taken by Didiman K. S. Cole, PNGA 32-1-22.
158
Figure 5.4 Patrol Map of Saidor Sub District, 1960 Source: Patrol Report No. 25 1960/61, Mot Census Division of Saidor Sub District 12th May to 3rd June 1961 by Didiman R. McCormac (AO), J. M. McEwan (AO) & A. E. Cooke (Cadet), PNGA 32-1- 27.
159 Table 5.2 Patrols by Didiman in all Districts, 01/07/1958 to 30/06/1960
District Number of Patrols 01/07/1958 31/12/1959 30/06/1960 Western 4 0 24 Gulf 5 3 16 Central 6 8 27 Milne Bay 23 26 24 Northern 6 57 69 Morobe 24 70 102 Madang 16 6 31 Sepik 22 28 56 Eastern Highlands 25 26 76 Western Highlands 6 2 13 Southern Highlands 1 0 2 Manus 7 11 38 New Ireland 15 31 59 New Britain 15 9 36 Bougainville 1970 771 2872 Total 194 280 601
The above chart illustrates the increased patrolling by Didiman in a two-year period. This suggests an increase in DASF staff and can be seen to correspond to Hasluck’s plans for DASF to increase patrolling in 1959 (see page 153) for the advancement of rural farmers. The chart also identifies areas of greater agricultural activity due to the amount of patrolling in these areas and the lack of patrolling in less developed areas. It also shows the uneven distribution of Didiman working throughout the Territories.
The Didiman’s role in patrolling was categorised by DASF into three main types. The regular patrolling of areas under DASF influence involved village meetings, advice, distribution of planting material, the establishment of observation blocks and, where indigenous people requested and where it was considered suitable, the formation of a Rural Progress Society. The second role was when Didiman patrols involved the inspection of new areas at the request of the indigenous farmer, especially in the home villages of the DASF labourers. The third involved explorations of new agricultural areas and the recruiting of at least two indigenes from each village visited (for farmer training) (Annual Report Sepik District 19.50, PX 38-2-1E). In some areas, particularly in the
70 TPNG Native Affairs Annual Report Summary of Agricultural Patrols 1958/59, PNGA 19-1-9C. 71 TPNG Advancement of Native Agriculture, Table B Summary of Agricultural Patrols 30/6/59- 31/12/59, PNGA19-1-19G. 72 Report ending 30/6/60, “TPNG Agricultural Extension Work and Advancement of Native Agriculture”, Agricultural Extension Patrols 30/6/1959-30/6/1960, PNGA 19-1-9C.
160 Morobe District, the system of patrolling was revised. Due to staff shortages, the standard patrol was set aside and stationary patrol posts were established instead. This idea relied on a central village that had rest house facilities where Didiman would spend two weeks conducting agricultural extension. From this central location, the Didiman’s presence spread by word-of-mouth to people in the surrounding villages. This system of patrol posts operated in the Lae Coastal Division and the Morobe South Coast. However, in the Kotte Division in the 1960s, Didiman reported that they were spending a maximum of only one day in each village for the purposes of the cash cropping census and general meetings of villagers in which cash cropping and marketing and cultural techniques were explained (Extension Patrol No. 54, Kotte Division - Warea Area 1961-62, PX 32-1-24). Didiman conceded that this amount of time was ineffective for demonstrations and for maintaining contact with individual farmers. These were the same problems encountered by Didiman on patrol in the 1950s (Extension Patrol No. 54, Kotte Division-Warea Area 1961-62, PX 32-1-24). In 1962, a Didiman recommended that Didiman in the Kottte Division spend at least seven days in each village (Extension Patrol No. 54, Kotte Division-Warea Area 1961-62, PX 32-1-24).
The length of patrols by Didiman varied from district to district and was dependent on the objectives of the patrols. Small patrols were only of one-day duration to surrounding villages near agricultural extension stations and centres and were referred to as ‘day visits’. In 1960, in the Wau area Didiman took up 143 days to patrol the whole area (Annual Report Wau 1960, PX 38-2-1). By 1964, difficulties of patrolling and contacting of people in isolated areas was still apparent. A complaint from a District Agricultural Officer to a Didiman pointed out that his patrol of the Trans-Fly and Suki Census Division “took almost two months to contact less than three thousand people or one twentieth of the District population” ( District Agricultural Officer Daru to George Greenwood re: patrol report Trans-Fly and Suki Census Division 1964-65). Patrols could extend for a period of 57 days, other patrols were longer lasting up to 183 days, but, generally, the length of a patrol was between14 and 21 days. It was assumed that Didiman on stations would patrol at least three weeks of every month. Patrols in the Highlands were conducted on foot, while around the coast and major rivers such as the Sepik and Fly Rivers, patrolling was carried out by a combination of boat, or canoe and walking. Carriers were recruited from villagers and paid either in stick tobacco, salt or money depending on what village people preferred. In some cases the shortages of these
161 goods curtailed the amount of patrolling by Didiman (Monthly Report Northern District January 1948, PX 25-E-1).
In 1962, the carriers’ rate of pay became more formalised. The accepted rate for carriers was 3d. every twenty minutes, 9d. an hour or 6/- for an eight-hour day (General Extension Program Western District, PX 1-2-2). Going from point A to B to C, carriers from village A would carry to B village and B village would carry to C village and so on. However, obtaining carriers could be difficult. For example, Didiman patrolling from Garaina to Morobe along the Waria Valley confirmed the presence of indigenous entrepreneurs who “were distinguishable by a rapacity and money-mindedness which were unequalled in other parts of the Territory” (Patrol Report from Garaina to Morobe (Waria Valley) 1950, PX32-3-2). The presence of a small number of private gold prospectors before the war and the presence of American troops during the war meant that local people were in a well-informed position and were not slow to take advantage of Didiman patrols in their area (Patrol Report from Garaina to Morobe (Waria Valley) 1950, PX 32-3-2). Recruiting of carriers was easier if police accompanied the patrol, but Didiman felt that the police were not necessary.
In the Western Highlands District, full-scale patrols wherever possible were done jointly with Department of Native Affairs (DNA) and Public Health Department (PHD) (General Extension Program Western District, PX 1-2-2). This policy had been enforced since 1959 when DNA ‘opened’ the highlands. Up to 1949, “The post-war administration was still concerned with pacification” (Nelson 2005, 29)73 and the only areas in the TPNG that had reverted to civil control were Papua and south of the Markham, Huon Peninsula, Madang and Sepik districts, Manus district, Kieta, New Britain and the Gazelle Peninsula, and New Ireland (Murray 1949, 24). The Western Highlands was one of the last areas to be pacified by the Australian administration. Kiaps and Didiman on patrol in the Western Highlands relied on contact with the rural people through DNA Tax Census activity.
Joint patrols by Kiaps and Didiman also gave the people a chance to observe the Administration working together (General Extension Program Western District,
73 Pacification was the term used for extending Australian control throughout the TPNG. This involved patrolling of frontier areas by Kiaps, members of DNA. Kiaps set up new patrol posts, stopped local warfare, provided initial health services, and in general allowed the people to be familiarised with the presence of Administration Officers and their objectives.
162 PX 1-2-2). However, for some indigenous people, devotion to missionary activities meant paid work for the Administration played second fiddle. A Didiman noted the work and effort devoted to constructing churches in areas where missions were well- established (Patrol Report 1962-63, Komba/Selepet Census Divsion, PX 32-1-24), commenting that the people were prepared to spend their money on sheets of iron and wood planks for the mission, rather than on warm clothing (Patrol Report 1962-63, Komba/Selepet Census Divsion, PX 32-1-24). In some instances Didiman on patrol found pockets of villages where the villagers worked for no payment. For Didiman this practice by villagers was not acceptable. As one Didiman stated “if we are to help the people to raise their standard of living, we must get them thinking of values”, arguing that “by not paying carriers we lose out on the first step in achieving a move to a cash economy” (Patrol Report Upper Nankina Census Division, No. 6 1958/59, PX 32-1-27).
Patrol gear varied depending on what and where the Didiman went. Along the river systems, Didiman wore plastic sandals due to the amount of swamp-walking involved. Mosquito netting was imperative. A ‘banana’ chair was used not only to sit on in canoes but also used as a bed. Figure 5.5 (page 165) illustrates the type of watercraft commonly used on river patrols. These were open platoon style watercraft with split bamboo flooring and canvas chairs for seating which could be easily removed and carried to villages away from rivers. All gear was stored in patrol boxes at the back of the watercraft for easy access. Figure 5.6 (page 165) was a photo taken by Didimisis Maggie van Schilfgaarde while patrolling in the Milne Bay District. Not only was van Schilfgaarde accompanied by a Didiman (seen in the right hand corner of the photo and wearing a white hat) but also her patrol was accompanied by a large number of indigenous women carriers. The number of carriers is contrary to the numbers needed for patrols where no Didimisses were present becomes obvious through Figure 5.6 (page 165) and Figure 5.7 (page 166). These photos acknowledge that DASF and Didiman were conscious about the protection needed for Didimisses while on patrol. In all figures the ubiquitous patrol boxes are much in evident and illustrate the different clothing necessary for the diverse terrain found in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.
Bedding consisted of blankets and camp stretchers. Didiman carried other essentials on patrol including plates, cups and cutlery, and saucepans and sometimes a kerosene stove if cooking on an open fire was not possible. Didiman also carried pressure and hurricane lamps, torches, changes of clothing and washing gear. Food consisted of flour, rice,
163 sugar, tea, coffee, powdered milk, tinned meat and vegetables. Along the coast where fish could be bought, bartered or caught, or where vegetables were grown, particularly in the Highlands, it was possible to lessen the load of food rations. A first aid kit was a necessity and consisted of sulphur tablets for dysentery and tropical ulcers, anti-malaria tablets, plasters and bandages, sutures, iodine, fungicides, liniment, and panadol. These were basic medicines to ‘get you out of trouble’ (David Willis, email, June 25, 2007). Agriculture supplies carried on a patrol included spades, shovels, bush knives, axes, pruning saws and secateurs, marking out ropes for coconut, cocoa and coffee planting, seeds, sprays, booklets and instruction material. This equipment was needed for village agricultural demonstrations. Communication with base was through two-way radios. As these needed recharging, generators were also carried on patrols. The gear was stored in specially built patrol boxes with handles that could be threaded with a stick and carried on the shoulders of the porters. Some patrols were resupplied by aircraft drops. Similar to the Kiaps, the amount of cargo the Didiman took on patrol, governed the number of carriers, canoes or boats needed and the length of the patrol74.
In many areas of the Territory patrolled by the Didiman, the existing, traditional agricultural skill of the indigenous farmer was evident and little could be done to enhance their methods of agriculture except to introduce better varieties or species of indigenous food crops such as yam, taro and Kaukau, and to introduce European foods such as peanuts, maize and other various vegetables to their diet. In the Eastern Highlands in the Chimbu Valley due to the difficulties associated with the steepness of the terrain, the people had evolved and adopted a system of land use to overcome problems associated with these slopes (Montgomery 1960, pp. 6-7).
74 The information on patrol carriers and patrol gear was supplied by an ex-Didiman; Dave Willis who patrolled in coast, river and highland areas of the TPNG during the 1960s.
164
Figure 5.5 Didiman George Greenwood on patrol along the Fly River, Gulf District, 1960s Photo courtesy of George Greenwood
Figure 5.6 Didimisis Maggie van Schilfgaarde patrolling on Misima Island, Milne Bay, 1960s Photo courtesy of Maggie van Schilfgaarde
165
Figure 5.7 Didiman George Greenwood patrolling in the highlands 1960s Photo courtesy of George Greenwood
A system of terracing was used in subsistence gardens. Its purpose was twofold. The main function was to prevent soil loss by sheet erosion and so water runoff during heavy rains was checked and only allowed to continue to move slowly down slopes. This also increased water absorption into the soil and left a small build-up of topsoil on the terraces. The terraces were constructed of split timber planks and branches of casuarinas. One Didiman commented, “the steepness of some slopes would make an Australian soil conservation expert to shudder” (Patrol Report Inland Wedau Region of Babiara sub- District, Milne Bay, No.1 1958/59, PX 32-2-21). Although food gardens were often cultivated on slopes of up to forty-five degrees, a Didiman noted care was taken to prevent excessive soil erosion” (Patrol Report Inland Wedau Region of Babiara sub- District, Milne Bay, No.1 1958/59, PX 32-2-21). This form of soil conservation and land use, mainly for subsistence gardening, led a Didiman to concede that “there appeared to be little that can be done to improve the existing system”75. In 1966, Lea (1966, 1) noted “on the whole, the indigenous systems of land use were better suited to local physical conditions than anything that was devised to replace them by DASF and the Didiman’s extension activities”76. In 1965, DASF acknowledged the skill of indigenous farmers and declared the main work of the Didiman was now “to encourage the expansion of cash
75 Didiman in the Highlands area during 1950s. 76 Lea was a lecturer in Geography at Monash University in Melbourne.
166 crops to increase the living standards of the people” (DASF Annual Report 1965-66, 137). DASF acknowledged that indigenous adaptations of traditional farming practices over generations had reduced soil erosion and prevented soil deterioration (DASF Annual Report 1965-66, 137).
It was discovered through a number of research projects and through Didiman patrolling that many inland people lacked protein in their diet (Patrol Report Abua sub-District No. 15, 1959-60, PX 32-2-31). Didiman introduced food crops such as peanuts and soybean to combat protein deficiency. The main effort in attacking protein deficiency was through livestock production (DASF Annual Report 1966-67, 153). Cottrell-Dormer and Jack Murray saw the relevance of introducing a cattle industry into the TPNG to increase protein into the diet of the indigenous farmer. Improved pig and poultry strains were introduced for this purpose. In 1948, a Didiman reported the need for “a more vigorous pig program” in the Sepik District and noted the area had become “completely denuded of pigs during the war years” (Annual Report Sepik District 1948, PX 38-2-1E). Cattle introduced in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea by the Germans, were estimated in 1911 to number 1,866. A breeding station had been established at Kieta on Bougainville (DASF Annual Report 1961-63, 2-3). The majority of these cattle were Jersey and Guernsey cattle and as milk producers it was found their yield was low. Cattle were also used on plantations to reduce maintenance costs by feeding on the ground cover. They also provided a proportion of rations for labourers. In 1929, livestock numbered 13,757 cattle of which 1, 419 were classed as working cattle. By 1940, the number of cattle within the Territory had reached 20,494 (DASF Annual Report 1961-63, 2-3). It was not until 1956 that a livestock extension programme for indigenous smallholders was introduced (McKillop 1976a, 30). Extension activities of Didiman later included the instigation of cattle projects where applicable and an advisory service on livestock production.
Villagers on the coast supplemented their diet with fish and traded dry fish with villagers living away from the coast. However, Didiman noted in patrol reports that in areas of lower altitude, rural people were in some instances, suffering from permanent food shortages. In the Middle Waria and Garaina Area, the cultivation of subsistence crops such as kaukau often failed due to irregular maintenance of the rotational plantings of crops (Patrol Report in the Garaina Area and from Garaina to Morobe 1955, PX 32-3- 12). In these instances where indigenous subsistence gardening practices were causing
167 food shortages, Didiman became involved in promoting the idea of a continuous planting program. This was done through the introduction of better species of kaukau and the introduction of peanuts and maize and, in some areas, rice. During periods of food shortages, rural people ate what was commonly referred to as ‘bush’ foods and included sago, bananas and pawpaw. The local Didiman encouraged the Waria and Garaina to cultivate these foods as part of their normal cultivation practices. Most Didiman agreed the reliance on one crop in subsistence gardens by indigenous farmers was responsible for periodic food shortages.
The scattered population of the Territory was affected by underpopulation in some areas and overpopulation in others and was not evenly spread. Didiman found it difficult and time consuming to contact small isolated pockets of the populace living in mountain ranges and on off-shore islands. The isolation of some villages was realised by DASF and Didiman in that there was little they could do about these isolated populations that had little or no contact with the Administration. To overcome isolation, the Department of Native Affairs and Didiman tried to enforce amalgamation as in the instance of two villages in the Markham Headwater census Division (Patrol Report Markham Headwater Census Division No. 1 1962-63, PX 32-1-24)77. Other villagers moved spontaneously for more arable land or to be closer to an extension station or centre (Annual Report Central District 1962-63, PX 38-2-1). It became a practice of Didiman to suggest to headquarters the movement of people and resettlement to areas where land was more suitable for cash cropping.
In the area of Oro Bay (Northern District) the Akarara people had very little suitable land due to the steep nature of the terrain (Patrol Report Popondetta, Northern District, No.7 1963-64, PX 32-1-A) and in the Milne Bay District, around Ikara and Bowadi there was limited flat or sloping ground and it was noted the Upper Chimbu Valley was unlikely to develop a cash crop, especially coffee because the land at an altitude of between 4,600ft and 7,800ft had slopes sometimes exceeding a 50% gradient (Montgomery 1960, 1-9).
Didiman noted that, in mission areas, there was a centralisation of populations in large villages along central patrol routes. In the upper Nankina Census Division (Patrol Report No. 6 1958-59, PX 32-1-27), a Didiman noted that although the movement of people
77 This patrol was the first for DASF through this area. The amalgamation of the villages of Dumununa and Numbugu had previously been initiated through DNA who had been patrolling the area as early as 1945.
168 was probably instigated by indigenous missionaries, it had been continually fostered by DNA officers patrolling the area. He stated that although the concentration of the population into large villages aided DNA staff in contacting people who would otherwise be scattered throughout the area, it was not a viable strategy for the introduction of cash crop projects (Patrol Report No. 6 1958-59, PX 32-1-27). After an assessment of land adjacent to these large villages, a Didiman observed that although the land was at present adequate for feeding the population, it was “not adequate for a cash crop to be introduced to aid economic development” and “eventually the people will be forced to return to more inaccessible areas where both types of cropping could be carried out without interfering with each other” (Patrol Report No. 6 1958-59, PX 32-1-27).
On Manus, Didiman noted agricultural expansion was limited due to heavy rainfall, high humidity and a generally broken terrain. A programme for economic agricultural development on Manus was then devised and included the improvement and extension of indigenous owned coconut groves, and the introduction of new crops such as cocoa as a subsidiary cash crop for copra. The presence of the RAN and RAAF on Manus created a local market and allowed for the development of mixed farming projects such as pigs and poultry and fruit, and although it was found that rice could be produced on Manus, the amount grown was not enough to sustain an industry. Didiman in the field thought that if rice was accepted into the diet of the people, little or no surplus for sale would remain (District Agricultural Station, Lorengau, Manus District to A/Administrator 1952, PX 1-2-2F). The Acting District Commissioner stated that in regards to Manus the “choice was between virtual stagnation and a very vigorous effort on the part of the Administration to stimulate enterprise”. He also noted that “on a short term basis it did not matter very much what happened in Manus” but in the long view, he did not “see why any part of the Australian Territories should not be encouraged, or if necessary compelled to contribute to its fullest capacity to the national wealth” (District Agricultural Station, Lorengau, Manus District to A/Administrator 1952, PX 1-2-2F). Manus District remained a copra producing area of the TPNG78.
Field operations were affected in other districts by epidemics and by a lack of labour. In the Northern District, minor epidemics of influenza killed people already weakened by the effects of other diseases such as pneumonia, malaria or dengue. Didiman patrolling
78 By the mid 1960s, Didiman realized that for the development of a cash crop economy, it was necessary to have access to un-tenured, unoccupied arable land, and if land was not opened for development the policies of the Australian Administration were doomed to failure.
169 through the Managalasi reported that older Managalasi men thought that sickness was caused by the government, blaming men going away to work on plantations and being killed, or men taken away by District Native Affairs and placed in gaol, or by going away for education (Patrol Report Managalasi, Northern District No. 11 1962-62, PX 32- 1-23). Recruitment by the government, private enterprise and missions also affected the population of the Kotte Census Division. A Didiman on patrol, in 1958, reported that fifty percent or more of the labour potential was absent from villages (Patrol Report Kotte Census Division No. 3 1958, PX 32-1-25). A Didiman noted that, in the Milne Bay District in Mila, a sharp drop in population was caused by illness and the subsequent emigration of dependents (Patrol Report Ealeba Census Division, Buhutu Census Divsion and Samarai Sub-District, No. 1 1960-61, PX 32-2-21). Didiman commented on the declining subsistence garden production and failure to take up new crops or agricultural expansion. Didiman could do little to arrest population decline.
Through patrolling, Didiman identified rural people interested in economic development and in learning new agricultural methods, but in many areas they found there was little interest in economic cash cropping. For example, in the Northern District in the Aiga, Iawabuia, Dawari and Binandere Census Divisions (Patrol Report No. 13 1962-63, PX 32-1-A), farmers would not deviate from their ancestral customs. Cash crops had been introduced in this area previously. Cocoa was first introduced in 1954, but due to lack of Didiman and supervision no attention was given to these cocoa trees until 1958-59. In Aiga, the attitude of the people towards cash cropping was desultory and new crops were unkempt, neglected and only a token effort had been made in maintenance. A Didiman, patrolling this area in 1962/63, stated “the greater part of blame was on DASF, due to past staff shortages” (Patrol Report No. 13 1962-63, PX 32-1-A). He went further stating that
No Didiman had made regular or frequent visits to the area. It was rare to find any one officer to have visited the area twice. Instruction and advice given by visiting officers varied due to personal bias and had led to a certain amount of confusion and scepticism and consequently no action by the farmers was ever taken. (Patrol Report No. 13 1962-63, PX 32-1-A)
He also noted that the Extension Centre in the area had been regarded more as a social and cultural centre by the previous agricultural field worker and, as a consequence, little or no agricultural extension work had been conducted and he adopted the exceptional approach of warning the farmers who owned neglected cocoa gardens that they would be punished and their gardens destroyed if immediate work on the gardens were not taken
170 (Patrol Report No. 13 1962-63, PX 32-1-A). The response from DASF District Headquarters was direct and clear. This action “taken against certain growers was unacceptable”, and “destroying gardens as punishment was unlikely to improve growers’ attitudes towards cash cropping and the Department in general” (Ponodetta Northern District from Chief of Division, “Comments on Patrol Report No. 13” 1962-63, PX 32- 1-23). DASF advised that a more positive approach to this problem would result after the improvement in advisory services in the area.
In other sub-districts of the Northern Districts, such as Popondetta, Didiman noted indigenous farmers did have a general understanding of the value of money, but they were reluctant to do more than was absolutely necessary to raise their living standards through cash cropping (Patrol Report Popondetta sub-District No. 14 1963-64, PX 32-1- A). Many mistook the ‘cash crop’ idea and thought that if they owned a few coffee trees they would be wealthy (Patrol Report No. 14 1963-64, PX 32-1-A). The price of coffee also affected the growers, and when prices fell, coffee groves were not harvested and others were abandoned. The general attitude was one of ‘wait and see’ what crop the Didiman could introduce to make them rich. Disinclination towards labour in the ‘government’ fields in general was found in other districts.
In the Morobe District, frustrated Didiman thought the general attitude encountered by the people in the Hute, Yamap, Musim and Kaiwa Census Divisions was a preference to listening to Didiman and arguing rather than actually doing any work in the production of coffee (Patrol Report Hute, Yamap Musim Kaiwa census Divisions No. 3 1962-63, PX 32-1-24). In the Finschhafen sub-Division, Didiman reported that people were conscious of change and desired money, but “they were prepared to wait for it to come to them rather than do anything resembling work to obtain it” (Patrol Report Kalasa Census Division No. 4 1962-63, PX 32-1-24). Didiman realised that enthusiasm was not likely to be maintained indefinitely.
Didiman’s frustration with the attitude to cash cropping as “a lot of hard work without any apparent gains” was found in all districts of the Territory and Didiman realised that their ambition to introduce cash cropping would become synonymous with failure. Dave Murrie noted, “It was quite natural that enthusiasm would tend to decline in villages where the period of anticipation and day-dreaming was over and hard work was then the order of the day” (Murrie’s comments on Patrol Report Western District No. 10 1965-66,
171 and Kiunga Patrol Report 1965-66, PAX 32-1-24). He also observed “the trend in most developing countries appeared to be that development was not even” and “there was a need felt by the indigenous farmers, followed by a surge of enthusiasm which when satisfied would decrease, followed in time by another surge as further needs were felt” (Murrie’s comments, PX 32-1-24). The Acting Chief of the Extension Division in 1955 stated that “extension must have a program presented in such a way that it can motivate and activate the people in the desired direction” (Chief of Division to Director DASF, “Agricultural Extension” 1955, PX 1-2-1-2). He acknowledged that
extension must recognize and use information gained from research, and information gained from local knowledge, understanding and experience of the people. Such recognition was basic to extension work and without these in appropriate quantities; extension had no standing in the eyes of the farmer. (“Agricultural Extension” 1955, PX 1-2-1-2)
The judgement by Didiman that villagers were apathetic to change was the result of patriarchal systems operating among villages. The actions of the young men were controlled by the older men of the community. For example, a patrol report from Morobe in 1963 noted that, young men who visited agricultural stations, extension centres and returned to villages “full of enthusiasm” for establishing cash crops but often found their attempts to initiate change were frowned upon by the elders (Patrol Report Timbe census Division, Morobe District 1963, PX 32-1-27). Didiman were obstructed by Christian teachings when some missions and their followers abstained from caffeine and this abstinence interfered with the Didiman’s coffee extension programs. In particular, the SDA did not approve or encourage the growing of coffee by villagers (Patrol Report Oriomo/Bituri census Division No. 3 1963/64). Didiman also discovered in some SDA Mission areas, indigenous people were abstaining from eating meat, leading to a high carbohydrate diet (Greenwood 1963).
The introduction of a monetary system to replace the exchange of shells or pig tusks was often hindered by ‘garden-magic’ which was practised extensively throughout the TPNG. It was hard to find an area that was not to some extent influenced by ‘garden- magic’ in the preparation, planting and harvesting of gardens. In 1964, a Didiman patrolling the Trans-Fly and Suki Census Divisions, noted the regularity of ‘garden- magic’ (Patrol Report Western District No. 1 1964-65). He thought that F. E. Williams’ book in 1933, Papuans of the Trans-Fly79, had detailed much of the ‘garden magic’ practised and with the exception of one, he “found every one of these practices was still
79 See Williams, F. E. (1936), Papuans and the Trans-Fly, Clarendons Press: Oxford, pp. 315-333.
172 being carried out” (Patrol Report Trans-Fly and Suki Census Divisions Western District No. 1 1964-65).
Didiman relied heavily on the teachings of missions for the eradication of these practices but they also realised that, at times, ceremonies and superstitions surrounding indigenous gardens were not detrimental and in some cases involved techniques for increasing water absorption and crop fertilisation, and soil erosion prevention (Patrol Report Kewowoki to Ondoro No.4 nd, PX, 32-1-25). A Didiman patrolling Warea, Finschhafen, “having seen people of the Milne Bay and Sepik who had much mission contact”, observed that “old customs were generally maintained side by side with Christianity” (Extension Patrol Kotte Division, Warea 1962, PX 32-1-25). This was in contrast to Hasluck, who in 1961 had claimed “primitive beliefs and codes would gradually give way to new codes and a new order” (Hasluck 1961, 17). Patrolling by Didiman enabled change to happen, but not without obstacles and indifferences that seemed insurmountable to young Australians thrust into the turmoil of establishing colonial rule in the rural areas of the TPNG, at the same time as a major social and economic revolution in terms of land use.
One Didiman noted “patrolling is a bit of all right and is certainly the best way to see the country” (Cummings at Kairuku to Conroy 1947, PX 29-1-3). However, the complete or even partial change of indigenous agriculture to a Western form of farming was unlikely to eventuate due to the strength of local custom, poor transport and marketing infrastructure, the terrain, lack of arable land and because indigenous food gardens were fragmented rather than consolidated and usufruct rights and land tenure systems were complex and rigid. Many areas remained untouched by patrolling Didiman because of staff and equipment shortages and there was often inadequate follow up advice on cash crops leading to unsatisfactory planting, harvesting and general maintenance. The post- war rhetoric of the Australian Government of a “new deal” and improved dietary needs were not going to be achieved. The development of intensive farming through the introduction of cash cropping was a dream.
The next section will discuss relationships between cash cropping and the creation of simple marketing societies. This policy relied on individual landownership and modified land tenure within the TPNG, and eventually, it led to indigenous farmers entering into the cash economy on their own land with their own crops.
173 5.3 DIDIMAN AND SMALLHOLDER FARMERS
In 1946, Cottrell-Dormer envisaged the development of a nation of smallholder peasant farmers for Papua New Guinea80. Smallholder farmers are “rural cultivators who practised intensive permanent diversified agriculture on relatively small farms” (Netting 1993, 2). These newly created, small farms would be either operated by a family, on a community basis or by individuals on leased community land.
Worldwide, smallholders produced a significant percentage of subsistence food crops as well as a small amount of food as a cash crop (Netting 1993, 2). The policy introduced in the TPNG by Hasluck in 1958 agreed that “the growing of food crops was a useful beginning in cash cropping” but stipulated a programme for the encouragement of rice growing, “not only as a local food crop but one that would allow an entrance into a world economy” (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 4 1958, PX 1-1-39). Hasluck noted that rice imports to the TPNG along with the high costs of freighting rice totalled £1 million a year. He pointed out that the Territory was quite capable of growing rice for its own needs and for export (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 4 1958, PX 1-1-39). He claimed that “rice may come to represent one of the main economic opportunities for people who stay on the land” (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 4 1958, PX 1-1-39). Rice production expanded through smallholders and out in the field, right from the early days, Didiman pushed the smallholders into rice production. The Wewak Monthly Report in July 1949 (PX 25-E-1) stated that “emphasis would shortly be placed on the need to encourage rice production”. Didiman also introduced or encouraged rice growing in the Sepik District, where over forty villagers were soon growing rice. Rice production in the Northern District already had been instigated on the Gona Mission. The main area of rice production for domestic use and the export market was situated in the Mekeo. Rice seed from Mekeo was distributed to other rice growing areas when DASF found after trials, that Mekeo seed was the better variety. By 1953, 98% of rice grown in the Amele area was Mekeo rice (Monthly Report Madang March/April 1953, PX 25-D-1).
A year later, Hasluck introduced another policy, this time based on subsistence farming running parallel to food production for commercial use (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 1 1959, PX 1-1-39). This policy endorsed a programme of double cropping for indigenous farmers that was not exclusively a food crop but was to include permanent
80 See Chapter 4, p. 83.
174 tree cropping such as cocoa, coconuts and rubber, and, later, pyrethrum (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 1 1959, PX 1-1-39). In 1959, Hasluck stated that
on the one hand the purpose is to improve the food supply of those people still living in villages and on the other hand it is the intention to use this native agricultural extension work as part of the much more intensive work in which we have to do from now onwards in providing a better economic foundation for the life of the Territory (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 1 1959, PX 1-1- 39).
He noted that the indigenous farmer had the land and manpower, and a tradition of gardening. He further claimed that the TPNG’s economic strength would increase when local production could supplement imported food stuffs and when local production became available for export (Agricultural Extension Circular No. 1 1959, PX 1-1-39).
Hasluck was confusing agricultural improvement with economic development. DASF acknowledged the importance of maintaining subsistence agriculture but the emphasis was on developing managerial ability in specialised cropping to the level at which the TPNG could be regarded as economically independent. Out in the field, Didiman were more prosaic. They knew that changing the status of indigenous agriculture from a purely subsistence system into a commercial enterprise was not going to occur quickly, easily, and in some cases, not at all. Hasluck’s rhetoric in Canberra was far from the reality of fieldwork, where a hundred Didiman faced one to two million subsistence farmers. DASF released an extension programme based on Hasluck’s policy to create a year round domestic supply as well as introduced crops and stock for production and sale (DASF Agricultural Extension Program released for 959/61, PX 1-1-39). This was not a new policy. Didiman reached as many farmers as possible, but McKillop (1976) noted that “unofficially extension officers tended to direct their efforts to the few growers who more closely met their western models of what a smallholder plantation should be like”. This was a practical realisation, that rather than whole scale change, these ‘better’ growers could be an example to others. However, the ‘progressive farmer approach’ by Didiman left other indigenous farmers isolated from economic development because they were not given further administration support for their agricultural endeavours. It also caused the voluntary movement of villagers to more arable land for cash cropping which then increased the size of districts the Didiman had to access. The lack of free, arable land meant that most were never able to enter into any form of cash cropping for export.
175 Despite all the obstacles, farmers began to modify their farming techniques to include cash cropping. In the New Britain District, Didiman reported the introduction of peanuts not only for nutrition, but also for barter (Agricultural Extension Report New Britain 1947, PX 32-12-1)81. A major outside influence in New Britain was the legacy of the Japanese regime, under which indigenous farmers were made to cultivate extensively, including double cropping (Agricultural Extension Report New Britain 1947, PX 32-12- 1). However, they were also prevented from harvesting anything for their own consumption or sale without permission from the Japanese Imperial Forces. These experiences of cultivating and double cropping meant New Britain farmers became “fairly independent, self-supporting individuals” (Agricultural Extension Report New Britain 1947, PX 32-12-1).
After the War, many smallholders within the Gazelle Peninsula “made a spontaneous decision” to plant cocoa on a large scale and were responsible for the development of the “Native Cocoa Project” (Native Cocoa Project, Gazelle Peninsula 1957, PX 24-1-19). Those smallholders producing copra also felt a ‘distinct need’ for a second economic crop (Native Cocoa Project, Gazelle Peninsula 1957, PX 24-1-19). At this time, European planters influenced farmers to establish and interplant cocoa. However, as one Didiman discovered, older copra producers “appreciated market values and trends under adverse circumstances” (Native Cocoa Project, Gazelle Peninsula 1957, PX 24-1-19). The pre-war copra slump and diminished returns greatly influenced this decision.
In the Sepik District, Didiman discovered other enterprising indigenous farmers. In 1949, a man called Tiru, of Ramu, had established six acres for the purpose of producing crops for sale to the Europeans in Aitape (Inspection Report Aitape Agriculture Station, Sepik District 1949, PX 33-12-1). Tiru had observed Europeans rotating crops and planned to do the same. A Didiman noted that, although Tiru had no idea of the principles involved, he had radically departed from the normal subsistence agricultural system (Inspection Report Aitape Agriculture Station 1949, PX 33-12-1). The Dutch along the border with the Western District had also influenced smallholders. In 1956, one farmer stated he had received coconuts and peanuts from the Dutch while another had received some rice seed from Merauke (Patrol Report Western District No. 1
81 Marr noted that peanuts had been first introduced to local farmers as early as 1933. By 1936, peanuts had spread to all villages and had become an important item in their diet.
176 1965-66). One Didiman suggested that if “the Dutch remained a few years more, the people would be growing rubber trees” (Patrol Report Western District No. 1 1965-66).
The operation of developing double cropping or part subsistence/part commercial among indigenous farmers became known as a progressive farmer approach (McKillop 1976, 24). There was a tendency in some quarters of the Administration and Australian Government to regard subsistence agriculture as an “unfortunate legacy of the Territory’s primitive past” and it was only of interest “in the speed it could be eliminated” (Anon 1967, 54). But just before independence, Shand and Straatmans noted that the approach of encouraging production for the market within the existing framework of village social and economic organisation appeared to be appropriate for the circumstances (Shand and Straatmans 1974, 177). The system of subsistence farming allowed for a labour reserve to be available for cash cropping, and Cottrell-Dormer considered the encouragement and assistance given to individual farmers by Didiman “as desirable for individual smallholders” (Cottrell-Dormer to Higaturu Popondetta 1948, PX 24-E-1).
The introduction of a livestock industry into the TPNG was also seen as imperative as the Commonwealth Nutrition Survey classed “lack of foodstuffs of animal origin as an outstanding feature of the dietary needs of indigenous communities” (Conroy and Bridgland 1950, 74). The goal was for a self-sustaining smallholder herd leading to a national beef cattle industry. Didiman promoted farm methods (intensive farming) rather than ‘open range’ holdings (extensive farming) (Department of Territories 1953, 42). DASF argued that although the TPNG had large tracts of land available, communications were either poor or not available. The fattening of cattle was more conducive under conditions of small farms and in most of the potential grazing areas, water and pasture was adequate. Didiman also thought that under intensive management, fodder production and diseases (such as internal parasites) could be controlled (Department of Territories 1953, 42).
The approach to cattle production for smallholders was on a communal basis as it was thought it could be “more closely supervised” (ASOPA No. 1 Senior Officers Course 190, 115). However, McKillop noted that “the emphasis on communal herding could be traced to a desire to control distribution rather than an ideological commitment to farming systems” (1976, 30). He further stated that communal herding could be traced
177 back to “the paternal instinct of colonial administrations”, but he also conceded that close supervision overcame “the fear of exotic diseases” (1976, 30).
The development of adapted types of cattle in the TPNG was based upon two breeds. These were the American Brahman and Afrikaner (Zebu) (Anderson 1961, 113). Livestock from Erap Low Lands Experiment station provided breeding stock to the Markham Valley (Annual Report Morobe District 1962-63, PX 25-D-1) while stock from the DASF Baiyer River centre supplied indigenous people living in the Highland Districts (Annual Report Mt Hagen 1962-63, PX 38-2-2). Didiman assessed the land’s location near villages and the clan boundaries of the claimant, planned the construction of a five acres night or home closure, the building of race and crush yards and made plans for an improvement of pastures. Animal husbandry training programs for indigenous farmers were held at Erap where they learnt to handle yearlings, breed heifers, and lectured in general husbandry (Annual Report Morobe District 1962-63, PX 25-D-1). Farmers eventually purchased cattle for their smallholdings at an initial price of £120 for four cows (Annual Report Goroka 1962-63, PX 25-D-1). However, the price of cattle was often out of reach for the majority of farmers. Rural people either did not have the capital or did not possess the land for such schemes (McKillop 1976, 31). Livestock cattle programs within the TPNG remained small and developed unevenly.
One of the major changes brought about by the introduction of cash cropping was a tendency towards a more sedentary lifestyle. The introduction of cash crops such as coffee resulted in the indigenous farmers remaining at one village site. Didiman observed that subsistence farmers had a tendency to move their village when establishing a new garden. In some cases, a new area was used for a period of one year and after several years the villagers travelled great distances from the village to obtain suitable garden sites on new ground (Patrol Report Madang District 1949, PX 33-8-1). It also meant farmers could use any new spare land around the village for cash cropping. The introduction of better varieties and farming techniques meant land left fallow was used for cash cropping (Kimber 1967, 100).
Didiman in the field were also caught up in the bigger task of marketing produce to enable smallholders to access markets. Cottrell-Dormer initiated the creation of a simple cooperative known as Rural Progress Societies (RPS). These societies provided a means whereby indigenous communities organised themselves for the purpose of adopting new
178 methods and techniques, and gaining experience in the processing and marketing of primary products (Cottrell-Dormer 1949, 1). Cottrell-Dormer envisaged these societies as a “first step in development of the true cooperative” (1949, 1). They were first established in the Mekeo region in 1948 as an experiment in social and economic development and then became the blueprint for all RPSs formed throughout the Territory. The most salient point of the RPS was that they were to “encourage the people towards self-reliance” and to gradually replace indigenous concepts of farming with Western concepts (Cottrell-Dormer 1949, 1).
When villagers were provided with the opportunity of gaining experience in commercial enterprises and technological innovation, Cottrell-Dormer claimed RPS had a special value in agricultural extension and as early as 1949 it became an integral part of extension policy (1949, 9). RPS was an organisational device to solve a local production problem within the capabilities of farming groups. It only worked when communities agreed to pool their resources for the necessary purchases of costly equipment. This equipment included rice, cocoa, rubber and coffee processing plants, copra driers, and marketing services (DASF 1967, Section G). The involvement of indigenous smallholders in the processing and marketing of their produce also meant a change to the organisation of the Division of Extension. The Division of Extension was renamed the Division of Extension and Marketing in 1953, and developed specialised departments dealing with training, processing, marketing and mechanisation (Annual Report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea to the United Nations 1959-60). Although the Department of District Services (DDS) operated cooperative societies under their own Co-operative Section, DDS anticipated that RPS would be a “means to overcome the disabilities” within their own organisation (Cottrell-Dormer 1950, PX1-3-31). Cottrell- Dormer and DASF expected the RPS to be absorbed later into the Co-operative Section “as a major plank in their own platform” (Cottrell-Dormer 1950, PX1-3-31).
Ultimately, RPS became forerunners to Co-operative Societies and were seen as “initially transitory … which may develop into private companies or continue as registered Co-operative Societies” (DASF Extension Manual of Procedures 1967). Didiman gave assistance in the initial stages of a RPS, but this assistance was withdrawn as the Society consolidated and was able to carry its own costs and responsibilities. The societies were registered under the Native Economic Development Ordinance and submitted a six-monthly trading accounts and balance sheets to the Registrar of Co-
179 operatives. It was usual for a DASF Didiman or DDS Co-operatives Officer to continue to assist in technical matters and the preparation of returns. In 1962, RPS became known as Rural Economic Development Societies (DASF Agricultural Circular No.8 1962, PX 1-1-39A).
Many of DASF cooperatives failed. In 1958, the people belonging to Baiteta RPS decided not to move towards a commercial venture (Patrol Report No. 6 Ambenob Council 19661-62, PX 32-1-27). When Didiman discovered the rice mill was only used occasionally for milling small quantities for villagers’ own consumption, one of the reasons given was that smallholders producing rice in the surrounding area felt the mill was situated too far from their crops. The mill was a two and a half hour walk from their rice fields, but one Didiman thought that this distance was not a hardship (Patrol Report No. 619661-62, PX 32-1-27). The rice was left unharvested.
The Bogia RPS, formed in 1953, also ran into trouble, when milling and bag charges were not charged for rice taken back to villages for local consumption (Patrol Report Awar, PX 132-1-2). The problem of unpaid mill charges was also noted within the Bagasin RPS (Patrol Report Yal-Bogati Area No. 14 1956-57, PX 32-1-27). The lack of constant, close supervision by Didiman was also a cause for the demise of some RPSs. Lack of supervision by Didiman on RPSs in the Madang district eventually saw a decline in rice production and a Didiman reported it “was disheartening to see progress stopped” (Madang Monthly Report October 1954, PX 25-D-1). Many RPS were not capable of diversifying to other crops and remained one-crop societies, while for others the set-up costs involved were so great that the assistance from government departments such as DASF and DDS outstripped returns and the scheme was not commercially viable. The RPS scheme was the first practical move away from a purely subsistence economy to the earning of a cash income. Some RPSs survived to become co-operative societies registered with the co-operative section of DNA.
Didiman realised that helping indigenous farmers and their RPS relied on the construction of a road to enable the farmers to get their cash crops to markets. Transportation of cash crops for milling or markets was a constant and major problem. For example, Ambunti (Sepik District) was so isolated that long distances to markets made any form of cash cropping difficult (Annual Report sepik District 1955-56, PX 32-2-1E). The problems of distance in some cases led to the spoiling of produce and
180 in turn caused a lack of enthusiasm by the indigenous farmer. In the Morobe District around Finschhafen, it was a three-day walk to the coast from the nearest coffee producing village. The villagers hoarded the coffee and as a result it deteriorated through insects and fungal attacks (Patrol Report Finschhafen Coffee Patrol 1954, PX 32-1-3). In the Komba/Selepet census district (Patrol Report No. 61962-63, PX 32-1-24), to get coffee out and sold at Kalalo, it was a six-hour walk over a 7,500ft mountain.
Copra produced in the Morehead River area (Western District) was left to rot when the boat never arrived. Didiman reported on the ill-will created over this incident (Patrol Report for the North Fly and Elavala River area, Western District 1965). Bougainville also had transport problems (Annual Report Bougainville 1959-60, PX 38-2-1). There were no wharves along the entire coastline in the Buin sub-district and all produce was surf loaded after land haulage by either tractor or trailer. The distance of haulage to the coast was great in some instances. At Nagovisi, produce was hauled for 100 kilometres, Siwai, 60 kilometres haulage and from Buin another 20 kilometres. It also involved hazardous river crossings that caused high overheads on transport. From the Nagovisi- Buin loading point there were 12 river crossings, and from Siwai-Buin there were four.
The Milne Bay district was affected by the lack of a regular shipping service. Although commercial shippers did pick up some copra, they would not call in anywhere unless there were at least twenty bags of copra to be delivered to the Copra Marketing Board (CMB) in Samarai. This problem was solved to a certain extent by creating a central collection point. However, there were claims that some European planters “had succeeded in giving masters of vessels sufficient encouragement to avoid collection points and leave the copra behind” (Annual Report Milne Bay District 1959-60, PX 38-2-1). This caused great animosity between traders, shipping companies, European and Papuan planters and the buyers. Papuan farmers felt the buyers never paid reasonable prices and cheated them of full payment. They preferred to allow the copra to rot rather than to sell it on to traders. The traders, who had been long established in Milne Bay, felt that, due to the services ‘bestowed’ on the people over the years, the people were obliged to trade with them. Didiman, caught in the middle, reported the indigenous farmer only saw the trader as a “person who has been living off them for years” and felt no need to deal with them (Annual Report Milne Bay District 1959-60, PX 38-2-1).
181 If they had alternative transport, villagers could sell directly to the CMB for a better price for their copra. Didiman Kevin Tomlin82 noted, “the traders were living in fast crumbling empires and the people are dissatisfied” (Annual Report Milne Bay District 1959-60, PX 38-2-1). This meant that extension activities in regard to copra production and marketing became ‘bogged down’ in a stalemate between the indigenous farmer and the traders. By 1962, in Milne Bay, a government vessel was still unavailable, so mission vessels carried the bulk of the copra on a purely business basis (Annual Report Milne Bay District 1962-63, PX 38-2-1).
Improvements in transport were slow but in some areas a small network of roads was gradually created to service inland areas and wharves and jetties were built around coastal ports for cash crop collection. The South Coast/ Waria (Lae Coastal division) developed a bulk centre for produce at Bau Island at the mouth of the Waria River. Bau Island had its own wharf and a jetty sufficient to facilitate port of call by regular coastal small ships. Regular and reliable transport increased the production of copra due to quick shipment to Lae (Annual Report Lae Coastal Division 1960-61, PX 38-2-1).
In the Southern Highlands the construction of three airstrips able to take DC-3s ensured the district’s produce was able to get to markets (Annual Report Southern Highlands 1959/60, PX 38-2-1). The construction of a network of roads north of Mendi in the Karint and Upper Mendi census division and new roads from Ialibu and Kagua opened up isolated areas creating a greater potential for cash cropping (Annual Report Southern Highlands 1961, PX 38-2-1). The Sepik District also benefitted from the development of a new road system and greater maintenance of existing roads. Maintenance was by voluntary indigenous labour rather than through contract payment. Didiman reported that voluntary supervision work on the roads enabled indigenous people to realise the importance of roads and the necessity for their regular and proper maintenance if produce was to get to markets (Annual Report Bainyik agricultural Station 1959/60, PX 32-2-1). Rice grown in Dagua was transported out by the farmers using canoes, some with four masts, while the Roman Catholic Mission in the Sepik supplied two Auster aircraft and a number of small ships for the transportation of local vegetables grown in outlying areas to be delivered to the government store in Wewak for sale (Annual Report Sepik 1950/51, PX 38-2-1E). In some cases Didiman directly assisted farmers in road building. Didiman patrolling through Milne Bay District helped villagers to build all-
82 Tomlin was the District Agricultural Officer in Mine Bay at the time.
182 weather roads through swampland by laying logs side by side over existing tracks and then digging deep drains on both sides of road, spreading the mud from the drains onto the logs to form a surface (Patrol Report No.1 of Census groups in Sineada sub-District, Milne Bay District1960-6, PX 32-2-21).
In 1954, DASF tried using donkey teams to get coffee out to markets in the Finschhafen sub-division (Patrol Report Finschhafen Coffee Patrol 1954, PX 32-1-3). Although the donkey teams were not successful due to the wetness of the track, the teams were used in other parts of the Morobe District with some success. In 1956, a team of donkeys was used for haulage in the Erap-Irimu census division (Patrol Report Erap-Irimu Census Division 1956, PX 32-1-24). A donkey team of nine donkeys operated between Erap Livestock station and Doandak via Naramonkei and Arawandei, while another four donkeys were utilised between Doandak and Labiagap. These teams had some success in getting indigenous produce out of rough terrain to a depot for shipment to markets.
The RPS, from innovation and conception, played a significant role in DASF and Administration policy for economic development and agrarian reform. From their conception as an experiment in social and economic development, the RPS began to proliferate throughout the TPNG and many became registered under the Native Economic Ordinance, later to be replaced by Co-Operative Societies Ordnance 1965. An examination of DASF Annual Reports from 1963 to 1969 revealed that RPS increased from 16 to 44. The DASF Extension and Procedure Manual claimed that “it was the task of the Didiman to form RPS in areas where this form of organisation would be of value to the farming community” but this actually meant cajoling, ordering or bribing indigenous farmers to create organisations to which they would belong and through which they would develop a sense of formal order. This suggests agrarian reform was not essentially for the benefit of the people but so the Australian Administration would appear to have discharged their colonial responsibilities of “rural betterment” for the “material wellbeing” of their subjects. The RPS programme encouraged rapid change in traditional societies and in the process imposed a Western capitalistic ideology and with it all the implications of entrepreneurial individualism. That is, RPS played a role in the process of breaking down traditional beliefs and customs.
Didiman discovered that communally-based agricultural projects created a new set of problems. In the Bundi Census Division, land for subsistence gardening was leased by
183 the Dindinagoi people from the Gegeru. In trying to introduce cash cropping to the Dindinagoi, Didiman were faced with resistance from the original Gegeru landowners, who jealously or vindictively “would not allow any cash cropping on their land” (Patrol Report No. 13, Bundi Census Division of Madang Central 1958/59, PX 32-1-2). The leasing of land for projects from landowners caused many problems for Didiman because, when crops began to reap good harvests, there was always a dispute between landowners and the lease-growers regarding the profits.
Another problem with communal projects encountered by Didiman was the distribution of profit according to work rates. It was found that some worked harder than others in the field and there was no way to divide profits from the crops in proportion to the work done by a few when the profits were being claimed by many. Throughout the colonial era, it was often suggested that traditional systems of tenure be replaced with a system of individual land titles as an incentive for individual farmers to increase their production of cash crops. Didiman also reported that communal farming did not raise the standards of living for rural people, although nutrition did improve. The next section will discuss the inevitable changes made to traditional land tenure by the Administration including rationalisation of individual farming rights and resettlement schemes for progressive farmers.
5.4 LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES
Hasluck considered customary land tenure83 was a stumbling block for “the indigenous farmer who was ready to work land for a cash crop income” (1976, 319) and that the system of land tenure underpinning a subsistence economy was not effective for the development of a cash crop economy. Generally, the argument put forward was that customary land tenure did not provide a large enough area of land to sustain an economic crop linked with an export market or with a local and domestic market. Hasluck stated the “response to opportunity and the eventual drive to fuller use of land came from an
83 For more on customary land tenure see Barrie, J. W. (1956) “population-Land investigation in the Chimbu Sub-District”, Papua New Guinea Agricultural Journal, vol. 11, pp. 45-51; Crocombe, R. G. (1964)” Communal cash cropping among the Orokaiva”, Australian National University New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin, no. 4; Crocombe, R. G & Hogbin, g. R (1963) “Land, work and productivity at Inoda” Australian National University New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin, no. 2; Jackson, G. (1965) “Cattle, coffee and land among the Wain” Australian National University New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin, no. 8; New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition Report (1947) Dept of Territories, Canberra; Rimoldi, M. (1966) “Land Tenure and land use among the Mt. Lamington Orokaiva” Australian National University New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin, no. 11. van Rijswijk, O.
184 incipient capitalism rather than from communal effort” (1976, 319). Although the Australian Administration believed and promoted the belief that indigenous people in the TPNG should remain on their customary landholdings, development became paramount and plans were laid to include a change in terms of occupancy. Land tenure conversion schemes were recommended by the Administration for the encouragement and establishment of RPS. Problems related to absentee landlordism, ownership of crop produce and general land rights by clan members motivated the movement towards individual land rights and fragmented land use patterns by indigenous farmers. This also caused problems for Didiman wanting to centralise technical advice and the marketing of produce. To give advanced farmers an opportunity to develop individual holdings under secure tenure, Didiman through agricultural extension activities attempted to modify the traditional land tenure system. This was the underlying rationale behind land settlement schemes.
The first land settlement schemes conducted by the Administration, with technical agricultural input from Didiman, were started under the patronage of local native government councils. David Fenbury, the chief architect of these councils, argued that the target of local government policy was “the systematic development of native agricultural potential” (Wright 2002, 194; Fenbury 1956, AA M331/1 35). Fenbury (1947, 5) disagreed with Cottrell-Dormer’s vision of a nation of smallholder peasants and saw it as a myth. Fenbury contended that “the ideal of the sturdy peasant proprietor, farming his piece of tribal land ... is a rosy dream incapable of being realized”. Fenbury devised what he called a “deliberate policy of destroying customary land tenure” (1956, Pacific Manuscript Bureau (PMB) No. 629, 27).
The Native Village Councils Ordinance 1949 empowered councils to organise, finance or engage in any business or enterprise and to collect taxes. It was also a move by the Australian administration to move closer to Lugard’s model of administration based on “indirect rule” in terms of policy for the development of agriculture. Fenbury assumed councils, once established as elected area bodies, would support the administration’s plans for agrarian reform. In 1952, the Administration began to experiment with individual title to land for villagers wishing to resettle and engage in cash cropping, in what became known as the Vudal scheme. The Administration released approximately 1,000 acres to the Council with a ninety-nine year lease. Five hundred acres was
185 reserved for subsistence gardening. In promoting the scheme, the DNA had three main objectives:
(a) to provide a safe volcano emergency retreat for population living around the Rabaul caldera;
(b) to try and educate the Tolai population into becoming expansion-minded, relieving pressure on the ancestral lands;
(c) to launch a first practical experiment in individual lease-holdings for commercial agriculture, using permanent tree-cropping cultivation (cacao) as the initial point of entry (“Policy Workshops – Land Tenures,” Nov. 1960, AA Series A452 item 1969/3617).
Other land settlement schemes under local government councils included the Ambenob scheme under the Ambenob Local Government Council in 1956, Madang District and the Warangoi Scheme under the Vunamami Council in 1957. The original concept of these schemes was plantation-based. Didiman assisted councils in the initial surveys and continued to give technical advice on cacao culture and fermentation processing and disease and pest control. They were in effect demonstrating the advantages of adopting cash cropping. These projects were aimed at the introduction of large plantings of permanent tree crops but were also perceived as an experiment in individual land tenure. They met with limited success.
Cheetham noted, in 1963, that some failures were caused by the lack of adequate advisory services and credit facilities and that many taking up leases had a misconception about the nature of rights associated with leasehold (1963, 71). For Didiman it meant their extension activities were pushed towards the progressive farmer, concentrating their efforts in areas where they were likely to achieve higher economic returns. The establishment of cacao plantations on Local Government Council land available for lease to neighbouring farmers enabled administrative control over indigenous households to be extended. It organised production and processing along lines designed to yield a high-quality product.
Settlement schemes were part of a long-term strategy of the Australian Administration to introduce a single system of land holding regulated by the central government by statute and providing secure individual titles. Hasluck wanted Didiman to help in identifying advanced farmers and encourage them to take up individual holdings, and to take all
186 necessary steps to ensure each individual farming venture in a settlement project was economically successful. It also became the work of the Didiman to accept applications for land registrations while on patrol and Didiman became classified as “Accounting Officers”. By 1958, the Administration had introduced another series of land settlement schemes that was not solely based on a one-crop plantation style. These schemes included a farmer’s nuclear family and supported both subsistence and cash cropping on each individual’s block of land (Cheetham 1963, 72).
The land tenure issue continued until 1960, when Hasluck laid down broad principles to be adopted as a basis of policy to land holdings by indigenous farmers (Statement by Hasluck, Minister for Territories in the House of representatives, 7th April 1960, cited in DASF Manual of Procedures, Section G C 1 Land). He wanted the administration to provide secure individual registered titles after the pattern of the Australian Torrens Land Title system. Hasluck also wanted the Administration to issue and register land titles, and for indigenous land to be acquired only by the Administration. Indigenous people had to be willing to sell land (Statement by Hasluck, Minister for Territories in the House of representatives, 7th April 1960). Keeping within Erskine’s proclamation, “your lands will be secure” (see Chapter 3), Hasluck stated in regards to land tenure conversion there would be no lessening of respect for indigenous ownership of land. He argued these steps towards the breakdown of customary land tenure were taken “in order to facilitate the better use by the indigenous people of the available land, the more orderly handling of all land transactions and facilitating of the better use of the resources of the Territory” (Statement by Hasluck, Minister for Territories in the House of representatives, 7th April 1960).
The guiding governing principle for the Administration and Australian government under the United Nations trusteeship had been to safeguard land resources in the interests of the Territory and its people. Australia had acknowledged an obligation to safeguard all land for the time when it would be needed by the people. However, the Australian Administration could not see how a viable agricultural economy could be achieved without the removal of, or a modification of, customary land tenure. The Administration’s dream for land tenure conversion was large areas of cash crops under the guidance of Didiman (McKillop 1976, 24)84. This was perceived by the
84 The introduction of coffee growing projects in the Highlands from 1953 onwards, by Didiman, did lead to an enthusiastic response by indigenous farmers but a demand for the new crop, far outpaced the ability of Didiman to supervise plantings.
187 administration as a way to fulfil trusteeship obligations of safeguarding land for the people and at the same time increase revenue, export earnings, land capabilities and land utilisation. The Australian government’s economic development policy through agriculture had become entrapped by the notions of trusteeship.
Didiman pointed out that cacao originally planted in large-scale estates operated under Local Government Councils (LGC) “was not as cost effective as in small-scale indigenous settlement schemes” (Spinks, Langton and Gray 1964, 200). Contrary to administration policy and rhetoric, Didiman also became exasperated with LGC run plantation style cash crop production and felt that extension methods were being ignored. Some recorded their anger that this did not ‘follow the book’ and would shock extension workers in Australia (Ryan1954, Field Officers Journal entry no.3155/1954). In the field, it was the practical problems that worried Didiman. For example, Didiman felt that more effort was needed in keeping plantations clean and there were not enough ordinances available to force people to follow basic rules of plantation hygiene to prevent disease outbreaks (Ryan1954, entry no.3155/1954). These were the practical considerations of a policy talked about in distant Canberra, far from the fields of the TPNG.
To secure farming blocks under individual land title, it was necessary for farmers to have access to some form of credit. Special loan agencies were necessary to provide access to credit. Trading banks and commercial houses operating in the TPNG did not regard the financing of individual farmers as an attractive proposition. This was due to the small amounts that needed to be borrowed and worries that farmers had no experience in handling credit (Cheetham 1963, 74). Didiman assisted in indigenous applications and in the subsequent release of loan funds as part of their extension duties. Didiman included the use of credit as part of education programs on farm and business management and sponsored applications for credit when they thought it was warranted. DASF perceived that active involvement of Didiman in credit facilitating as making the extension work of Didiman more effective. It also meant that Didiman maintained a close supervision of the finances of indigenous farmers, which according to DASF, normal banking institutions could not provide (DASF Manual of Procedures, Section G D 1). Developmental credit for farmers was usually available through the Natives Loans Board but was later regulated through the Papua New Guinea Development Bank (DASF Manual of Procedures, Section G D 1; Cheetham 1963, 7; McKillop 1976, 33). This bank was created by Ordinance as a corporate body separated from the Administration
188 and its function was to facilitate loan proposals from indigenous farmers (DASF Manual of Procedures, Section G D 1). Just before independence, Crellin noted that the bank was thought of as a catalyst that would speed up the transition to a cash economy (Crellin 1972).
The land tenure conversion scheme and consequential development of land settlement schemes was an inexpensive but convoluted and controversial way for the administration to increase economic development. The use of LGC as arbitrary directors of agricultural reformers did not progress as planned and money the administration needed to spend on land purchases to support the scheme would have been an expensive proposition. But the experiment in individual land rights became a reality for some individual farmers, leading to their involvement in land settlement schemes, land conversion and rural credit. No longer were Didiman in the field concerned only with crop improvement but became more concerned with the individual farmer who was most likely to succeed in a commercial enterprise. Didiman, advised by Hasluck, the Administration and DASF, found that it was their duty “to assist in these schemes in every way and wherever possible to carry out these missions” (McKillop 1976, 32). Land Tenure Conversion might have created communal mixed farming and the Extension Bulletin in 1976 claimed that “Land Tenure Conversion will enable the development of small mixed farms of 10 to 20 acres with closely integrated cash cropping” and that “the goal of cash cropping would seem to be the establishment of family mixed farming” (McKillop 1976, 32).
In practice, Didiman now had a direct and paternalistic hold over the indigenous farmer as they could enforce guidelines for land settlements and resettlement schemes. They measured out the blocks for smallholders, helped with credit applications and advised on where and how the money should be spent and what crops to be grown or livestock kept. Didiman had become agents of development policy. The land settlement schemes also showed that Hubert Murray’s original idea of village development was still valid in the post-war Administration and that Cottrell-Dormer’s post-war vision of agricultural development was still alive. However, this new role meant Didiman became removed from many sections of the rural population. By concentrating their efforts on the ‘progressive’ farmer, Didiman now concentrated on areas of greatest potential, delivering a development package to few rather than all. This approach meant Hasluck’s policy of even development within the TPNG was untenable.
189 5.5 CONCLUSION
Agricultural extension stations and centres, and patrolling were the two main ‘tools’ facilitated by Didiman to implement their work within the TPNG. They used the agricultural stations as a base to make initial contact with rural people and it was there that they introduced a more intensive form of agriculture to the farming communities located nearby. Didiman made contact with villagers in outlying areas and made suggestions about the post World War II rehabilitation and later aided smallholders to develop small enterprises.
Patrolling by Didiman was driven primarily by the administration’s policy of cash cropping for economic development. Thus, on one hand Didiman patrols stimulated interest in cash cropping through promotional work and by the distribution of planting material and information on production and process methods, but on the other hand it was inadequate because of the transitory, temporary and irregular nature of patrolling. There was also a tendency by Didiman to ignore isolated farmers and concentrate on nearby smallholder farmers. Staff shortages also meant the exclusion of some communities and uneven schedules of patrolling. One Didiman felt that “Extension had fallen down by too great a concentration of verbal advice”. Patrolling and visitation schemes were ineffective, but the cause probably lay in the inadequate training of Didiman. One Didiman stated that prior to his first patrol, carried out in 1963, he had “never seen coffee grown anywhere before” and was “unable to assess the potential for coffee as a cash crop in the area” (Patrol Report No.2 Oriomo/ Bituri Census Division, Western District, 1963/64).
Added to frustrations of staff shortages, poor transport to facilitate patrols and at times inadequate patrol gear, Didiman had difficulty persuading farmers to change or modify their traditional systems of agriculture. The influence of DNA and missions on indigenous farming techniques also frustrated Didiman in their attempt to change village lifestyles and practices. Guidance by Didiman was not sufficiently concentrated to ensure that recommended practices were implemented.
Agricultural stations and patrols were supposed to be exemplary sites, where Didiman could demonstrate and facilitate change. The Australian Administration asserted that development had to include the rationalisation or Westernisation of farming practices, but it was unrealistic to expect Didiman to have a thorough understanding of the diverse
190 local social, cultural and political conditions, or the ecosystems, topography, and geography of a tropical zone quite unlike their homelands in Australia. Many Papua New Guineans also were not concerned about the accumulation of individual wealth but rather were constantly redistributing it to kin and clan. People who had entered the cash economy wanted to, were required to, and were still able to return to their subsistence agriculture. Didiman were constantly challenged by cultural variables such as values, beliefs and customary patterns of social interaction. Grossman noted that these cultural variables were persistent, static and powerful barriers for change within indigenous communities (Grossman 1984, pp. 315-316).
In 1973, Ben Finney noted that Highlanders emphasised individual achievement, competition and accumulation, which made them receptive to commercial cash cropping (Finney 1973, 124). The Highlanders were not an isolated case, as the Tolai of New Britain also embraced cash cropping. Despite this enthusiasm, Didiman were also confronted with world fluctuations in copra, cocoa and coffee prices. Some Didiman perhaps thought that in subsistence agriculture the surplus of labour and land available for economic development were “awaiting catalysts of monetary exchange to enable the rural farmer to combine both subsistence and cash cropping into productive forms” (Anon. 1967, 51). For Didiman in the field, the best way to win friends and influence leaders was by producing returns through the western monetary system. Access to a monetary system was essential for Didiman to bring about economic development through agriculture and was a prerequisite for large-scale development.
The Administration, DASF and Didiman failed to change land tenure. In 1960, the Australian government grandly and opportunistically announced a long-term policy stating it would “introduce a single system of land holdings regulated by the Administration and providing for individual titles along the pattern of the Australian freehold system” (Anon. 1960, 15). The subsequent introduction of land settlement schemes, land tenure conversion and credit facilities meant that Didiman’s extension activities became directed towards the introduction of large scale agricultural schemes. If successful, these schemes would have organised the rural population into “productive units for market oriented crops”; an impossibility in the village, clan and social structure that prevailed in the 700 different language groups that were joined loosely under the TPNG banner.
191 The next chapter will discuss the formation of the Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (DASF). It will also examine the problems faced in implementing a doctrine of agriculture that the Australian Government was intent on following to bring about economic development to the joint Territories of Papua New Guinea.
192 CHAPTER 6: ADMINISTRATION, POLICIES AND DASF 1946 – 1972
On 4 July, 1945, the Minister for External Territories, E. J. Ward, declared that the Australian Government was not satisfied with the policies for the Territory prior to the war. Apart from gratitude that the people of Australia owed to the people of New Guinea, he stated that the Australian Government now regarded it as its duty to improve indigenous living and economic standards by providing facilities for better education, health, economic activities and by giving indigenous people greater participation in the wealth of their country and its government (Ralph 1978, 425).
After World War II, the Australian government acknowledged the importance of agricultural development as a means of providing income, employment and foreign exchange for dependent countries. For the combined administered Territories of Papua and New Guinea, this meant a newly created Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (DASF). In keeping with Australia’s international obligations under the United Nations Trusteeship (Faulkner and Mackie1933, 5), the Commonwealth Government declared that the “Territories must be developed … and that the natives will be given better health, better education and an opportunity to share a greater extent in the resources of the country” (Ward 1945 AA series A2700/1). This was reiterated in a press release by the Australian Prime Minister when he stated that the economy of the Territories “will be native and European industry with the limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare of the native generally” (Press Statement by the Australian Prime Minister 1945, AA Series A2700). However, Australia had not previously matched promises with action and J.K Murray noted, “the pre-war Australian governments had shown faint interest in native advancement” (Murray 1971, 181) and Lord Hailey declared “prior to World War II, the history of the area maybe said, not unfairly to reflect the outlook of a government which had no traditional experience and of a public with no noticeable interest in the conduct of the native” (cited in preface of Mair 1949).
Hasluck, later in charge of the TPNG, also noted the inexperience of Australia in colonial administration. He admitted, “the combined strength of both Papua and New Guinea public servants before the war was only about 450 administrating officers, working with a combined budget of £670,000” (Hasluck 1976, 18). This can be
193 compared to the budget for the TPNG in the years 1950 ($11,097,000.00) 1957 ($27,473,000.00) and in1969 an estimated $152,850,000.00 (Downs 1980, 122-123). This showed a lack of commitment by the Australian government in administrating a dependent Territory. For most of the indigenous people of both Territories, the Australian Administration’s only visible presence was an occasional patrol by Kiaps, mostly in maintaining law and order. The new so-called “native” policy had an impressive set of goals: to confirm possession of indigenous land; to demonstrate how to make reasonable commercial use of native land; to encourage habits of industry; to improve agriculture, sanitation and hygiene; to increase literacy in English; to provide a general education and an opportunity to learn a trade and to prevent the spread of endemic and imported diseases (Tate 1971, 43-44). Lists similar to this had been made in colonies ever since the end of World War I changed the colonial map.
During the post-war period the planning and organisation of DASF was under its first Director, William Cottrell-Dormer, who immediately set about creating an ambitious scheme for the encouragement of indigenous production that was to include post-war rehabilitation, the improvement of subsistence farming and the introduction of cash crops for export and domestic markets. Cottrell-Dormer laid out the organisation and functions of the department, which did change over time due to policy changes coming directly from Canberra and the Department of External Territories (often referred to as “Territories”), but the initial structure and divisions remained.
6.1 ORGANISATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHANGES IN DASF 1946-1972
The plan put forward by Cottrell-Dormer for gradual development of “Native Agriculture” sat comfortably with the policies for development set by the Australian Commonwealth Government (Ward 1945, AA series A2700). Australia had already abandoned the use of compulsion and indentured labour in line with most colonies after World War II. Cottrell-Dormer (1946, AA Series 1838/1) defined agriculture policy for the Territories in keeping not only with Australia’s commitments under the UN, but also with the idealism of the time. He considered the broad policy of DASF should be aimed at the improvement of nutrition and the living standards of the indigenous people by teaching and encouraging them to take full advantage of their potential natural resources. Borrowing policies from the administrators of other dependencies and colonies, he was of the opinion that these aims could not be achieved unless “people were settled on the
194 land” which they already were, but he envisaged an elimination of the shifting agricultural practices and its replacement with a new farming system (1946, AA Series 1838/1). This was such a massive exercise in comprehensive social engineering that Cottrell-Dormer probably knew it could not be implemented, but his views reflected the idealism of post-war planners in the colonies who could see that changes were needed. For example, Cottrell-Dormer proposed a territory in which families were securely settled on smallholdings, using new techniques, growing new foods, producing a diversity of cash crops and raising domesticated animals (Harris 1988, 137).
Cottrell-Dormer (1946, 2), maybe naively, imagined that DASF would “guide the indigenous people in their advance from their primitive form of agriculture to farming systems which will make possible the development of the community envisaged”. His vision of agricultural development had been described as revolutionary (Harris 1988, 137), as “mixed farming systems for smallholders have not been devised for this Territory” (Cottrell-Dormer 1946, 5). Depending largely on his experiences in Tonga and the effectiveness of smallholder farming by Tongans85, Cottrell-Dormer, proposed that smallholder farming would lead to the development of export industries. These had been spoken about, experimented with and researched in the pre-war years, such as coffee, tea, cocoa, quinine, rubber and spices (Cottrell-Dormer 1946, 1). The difference was that in the post World War II era, a new wave of modernisation and a re-thinking of colonial policies was occurring, and schemes considered before 1939, became possible after 1945.
The administration offices, including Cottrell-Dormer’s headquarters were based at Konedobu. The offices of DASF housed four sections at Headquarters, Division of Plant Industries, Division of Animal Industries, and the Division of Fisheries. These were the research and resources divisions, while the newly created Division of Extension’s function was in the social context of rural development (Cottrell-Dormer 1964, 2, UQFL124, Box 5). The office building was E- shaped surrounded by a verandah. The left hand side of the E was the director and secretary’s offices. The central leg of the E contained Administration and clerical offices. The right hand of the E contained Soil Science, Animal Industry and Plant Industry. Extension and Inspection Officers were on
85 Cottrell-Dormer became an agricultural research officer with coconut companies in the British Solomon Islands. During World War II, he served as the Director of Agriculture in Tonga, where he was responsible for the introduction of the modern marketing of copra. As a consequence of legislation, the Tonga Copra Board was established in 1941, which became the sole buyer of copra.
195 the Director’s side with the whole building facing low gardens and lawns. The building was low-set, on three feet high stumps and the windows were louvres (see Figure 6.1 below).
Figure 6.1 Sketch of DASF Headquarters, Konedobu Source: Sketch of DASF Headquarters courtesy of R. Curtis ex-DASF, Division of Extension, 86 December 2007 .
In July 1946, Cottrell-Dormer submitted to Territories in Canberra, under instruction and with the advice of the administrator, a proposed organisational diagram of DASF (see Figure 6.2, page 201. It was intended to be flexible as it was thought that it would eventually be necessary to modify the department due to the increasing number of personnel. The ultimate aim of DASF was to develop industries (indigenous and/or European) that would also be able to contribute towards the cost of the upkeep of technical services (McKillop 1981, 240). By 1947, the setup of DASF was approved in principle (Memorandum from Acting Government Secretary to the Administrator 1947, “Acting Appointment- DASF”, PX 1-1-5) In 1948, Cottrell-Dormer, addressing the Conference of District Officers, stated the functions of DASF fell into the headings of training, research, extension, production and marketing and that in order to perform those functions it would be necessary to develop an almost entirely new department (Cottrell-Dormer 1948, 60). To accommodate this work, Cottrell-Dormer proposed to reorganise the department into five sections or divisions. These were to be known as the Divisions of Animal Industry, Plant Industry, Fisheries, Agricultural Extension and Production and Marketing.
86 Robert Curtis drew this sketch from memory in December 2007. He was a Dookie Agriculture College Diplomate who worked with DASF, Division of Agricultural Extension 1954-1966. His postings included Goroka, Lae, Rabaul and Bougainville.
196 The Division of Animal Industry dealt with research in connection with all aspects of animal diseases, parasites and breeding methods with a view to developing a livestock industry in the Territories that would be suitable for permanent mixed-farming. Animal quarantine, stock abattoirs and control of stock movements came within the scope of this division. It also provided technical advice to farmers and plantation operators. The Chief of the Division, Mr. W. Granger87 identified three quite specific projects, clearly influenced by post-war planning. They were the replacement of pigs lost as a result of the war88, the development of livestock-raising and the development of production under European direction to provide meat for the Territory and for export. It was intended to import high-grade stock from Australia such as pigs, poultry and cattle, and to establish large breeding stations for breeding and distribution to the local populace. Granger stated the short-term policy of the Division of Animal Industry was the fulfilment of promises made to indigenous people during the war by service personnel. The long-term policy was to encourage indigenous people to develop animal husbandry (Granger 1948, 63).
The Division of Plant Industry was concerned with the study of economic plants and the introduction of new crops. It was responsible for plant introduction and quarantine, the breeding of new varieties, the study of soils, plant disease and pests, and climate. The division also investigated agricultural and horticultural methods of harvesting, processing, storage and the evaluation of food and other plant products. By 1948, the division was operating two agricultural experimental stations.
Japanese soldiers had used the Agricultural Experiment Station at Keravat, near Rabaul during the war as a camp and food garden89. It later became known as the Lowlands
87 Granger had a degree in Veterinary Science and animal husbandry, had been attached to the military during the war in civil affairs and had UNRRA experience in South East countries and China before becoming Chief of Division of Animal Industry (See Memorandum from DASF, Port Moresby, 20th August 1949 to Government Secretary, Port Moresby, “Food and Agricultural Organization: Technical Assistance of Economic Development”, PNGA 1-1-13. 88 According to T. Fry, in all military areas throughout the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, “pigs were almost extinct as an article of native food supply” (Fry, T. (1946) “Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea Today”, Journal of Pacific Affairs, vol.19, No. 2, 150. See also W. E. H. Stanner (1953) The South Sea in Transition, Sydney, pp .87-88. Stanner stated at the Barry Commission (1944) an estimated loss of 100,000 pigs during the war. 89 This station was seriously damaged by the Japanese who had uprooted whole blocks of pedigree cocoa, coconuts and other crops and at the same time destroyed the results of years of work by Larry Dwyer who had been largely responsible for the development of greatly improved strains and varieties of this crops before the war (Broadcast Address by DASF- Tuesday 5th November 1946, Port Moresby).
197 Agricultural Experiment Station (LAES) under the supervision of Frank. Henderson90. It was intended that all field officers of DASF would undergo training at Keravat. The second Agricultural Experiment Station was based at Aiyura, near Kainantu in the Central Highlands. This station provided for the introduction of crops suitable for higher altitudes. The DASF officer in charge was Aub Schindler91. One of these crops was tea, as it was identified as a suitable crop for commercial development in the highland areas of the Territory. Cottrell-Dormer stated in regards to tea, “regardless of what may happen in the world markets, there should always be a market for tea in the Territory and in Australia” (Cottrell-Dormer 1948, pp. 61-62). He also acknowledged the research and development work on blue mountain coffee at Aiyura. The Plant Industry Division’s role included soil analysis, product analysis and the analysis of animal material for fertilisers.
The Division of Fisheries function was to increase the commercial and domestic catch of fish available for the improvement of indigenous nutrition. This was to be done through expanding indigenous knowledge of commercial fishing methods. This division was also charged with the introduction and breeding of fresh water fish for establishment in swamps and rivers. It also included encouragement and development of marine industries, such as fresh, smoked or canned fish, trochus and other shellfish as well as beche-de-mer. The Division of Fisheries also organised indigenous fish markets and supply of marine foods to inland tribes by trade or barter. This division also carried out research, including a survey of principal species of marine flora and fauna in the salt and fresh waters of the Territory and a study of species most likely to be of commercial value.
The Division of Agricultural Extension’s main function was field-testing and the application of available knowledge in agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry. It was aimed at developing permanent mixed-farming systems for indigenous
90 Frank Henderson (OBE, BSc. Ag.) was educated in Broken Hill, New South Wales and Sydney University. Before the War he worked with the NSW Department of Education before moving to New Guinea in 1936-41 where he worked with the New Guinea Agriculture Department. During the war he was with the RAAF (1942-45) and later with the PNG Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries as an agronomist in charge of the Lowlands Experimental Station at Keravat (1946-48). Between 1948-1952 he was the economic botanist with DASF before becoming Chief of Division of Plant Industry in 1952-53. In 1954-59 he was the Acting Director of DASF moving to Director in 1959. He later resigned from DASF to take up the position of Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs) for PNG in 1966-69. He was a Member of the Legislative Council and House of Assembly in PNG from 1961-1969. He died in 1969 and is buried in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. 91 B. Ag. Sc. Agronomist. By 1949, Aub Schindler had been stationed in Aiyura for five years. He replaced the late Bill Brechin who had worked under the previous Director of the Department of Agriculture in New Guinea, George Murray before the War.
198 smallholdings and included the improvement of indigenous nutrition and the fostering of indigenous export and other industries. The division was also responsible for the establishment of District Agricultural Stations. By 1948, the Division of Agricultural Extension was operating agricultural stations at Lae, Madang, Wewak, Aitape, Sohano, Popondetta and Sogeri, and stations were planned for Lorengau, Buin, Maprik, Namatanai and Kairuku (Correspondence from the Administrator to the Secretary, Department of External Territories 29th Oct. 1948, PX 1-2-2). Other functions of this division, included field advice to plantation owners and operators, vocational training in co-operation with the Department of Education and Missions, and the organisation of Agricultural and Industrial Shows, rural competitions and rural clubs. Cottrell-Dormer’s insistence on a Division of Extension was one of the conditions on which he accepted the position as director. He perceived extension work as the main concern of agricultural development as “without it the Department of Agriculture could not justify its existence” (Cottrell-Dormer 1949).
The Divisions of Animal and Plant Industries co-operated with Agricultural Extension for the development of permanent mixed-farming systems, relying on conserving soil fertility and increasing productivity. They provided technical advice to Europeans and seed and other plant material to the Division of Extension for distribution to indigenous farmers and others.
The main function of the Division of Production and Marketing was grading, as well as maintaining a high standard for marketable primary products. This was done through the development of indigenous agricultural companies (internally and for export industries). This role included the establishment and supervision of Commodity Marketing Boards and the organising and supervision of indigenous co-operative societies, as well as the organisation of indigenous produce and livestock markets. Other functions of this division included the organisation of government plantations, and the importation of seeds, fertilisers, insecticides and fungicides for resale and distribution throughout the Division of Agriculture Extension. It also was responsible for the operation of trade stores where commercial interests were not prepared to operate as well as the import and/or manufacturing of agricultural implements for hire or for sale to smallholders or indigenous co-operatives societies (“Organization of DASF”, May 1946, AA series A518 item F852/6/7; Cottrell-Dormer 1948).
199 In 1953, the Division of Production and Marketing was abolished and joined Agricultural Extension (“Classification of DASF”, AA series A452 item 1957/382; PX 1-3-31, 1953). This later led to a name change for the Division of Agricultural Extension to include marketing: it became known as the Division of Agricultural Extension and Marketing (“Department of Territories Public Service of Papua New Guinea to DASF concerning structure of DASF” 23 Nov. 1960, AA 452 Item 1959/2709).
Headquarters staff, which consisted of a director, private secretary and clerical staff, administered these five main divisions of DASF. The Konedobu offices translated Australian administration policies, managed the staff and projects, and controlled expenditure and regional planning. Headquarters also included the Publicity Branch responsible for the editing of publications in English, basic English, and vernacular. The Publicity Branch also arranged departmental radio broadcasts for indigenous people and the operations of mobile extension units, which included films, film-strips and loudspeaker talks on agricultural subjects. Advertising Territory products overseas by posters, displays, and press articles also came under the jurisdiction of this branch.
200
Figure 6.2 Organisational Chart of DASF 1946, A518/1, item F852/6/7, AA Canberra
By 1952, the Division of Plant and Animal Industries had expanded rapidly and had taken on board responsibility for agricultural and pastoral research. The main stations carrying out this work were: (a) Lowlands Agricultural Experiment station (Keravat);
(b) Lowlands Agricultural Experiment station (Epo);
(c) Highlands Agricultural Experiment station (Aiyura) altitude 5,500-6,000ft;
(d) Laloki Plant Industry and quarantine station.
Subsidiary stations dealing with research were also located at:
(e) Bubia Agricultural Station via Lae;
201 (f) Garaina Tea Plantation, via Lae, attitude 2,000ft;
(g) Kapagere plant Industry Centre via Rigo.
The Division of Agricultural Extension was also running smaller District Agricultural Stations. These were for testing of crops and demonstration rather than for research and were situated in the following Districts:
(h) Madang District Agricultural Station;
(i) Amele Rice Project;
(j) Bainyik, Sepik District;
(k) Dagua via Wewak;
(l) District Agricultural Station Lorengau;
(m) District Agricultural Station Popondetta;
(n) Inawaia and Beipa, subsidiaries to the Mekeo (Memorandum for the Government Secretary from DASF 1952, PX 1-1-113).
The functions of DASF also included a more general development including land utilisation, plant protection and resource surveys. The Territory of Papua and New Guinea had been divided into fifteen districts, but in order to assist the delivery of extension activities, the territory was split into five main regions by DASF. These regions were the:
(o) Outer Island Region consisting of Manus, New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville Districts. The Regional Agricultural Office (RAO) was based in Rabaul. The first appointed RAO was Fred Kleckham;
(p) New Guinea Mainland and Coastal Region, consisting of the Sepik, Madang and Morobe Districts, with the Regional Agricultural office in Lae. The RAO was Roy Vicary;
(q) New Guinea Highlands Region consisting of the East, West and Southern Highland Districts with the Regional Agricultural Office in Goroka. The RAO was Ron Carne;
(r) Eastern Papua Region consisting of Northern and Mine Bay Districts with the Regional Agricultural Office in Samarai. The RAO was Bill Cottrell-Dormer;
202 (s) Western Papua Region consisting of Western, Gulf and Central Districts. The RAO was based at DASF Headquarters in Port Moresby (“Regional Agricultural offices” 1955, PX 1-2-2).
By 1963, these regions were reduced and reorganised further into four regions. These were Papua, New Guinea coastal, New Guinea highlands and New Guinea islands. Each DASF region operated under a semi-autonomous organisation under the control of a RAO who was responsible for directing the activities of the Division of Extension and Marketing. The Division of Extension and Marketing was the only division represented in all 15 administration districts (DASF Annual Report1963-64, 8).
Specialist researchers in tropical crop production, plant pathology and entomology, livestock, and soil chemistry conducted their work on agricultural experiment stations and later passed on the results of this research to Didiman in the field. As noted by Lynn, “only proved results from experiments have a place in the extension program and extension work must be supported by continuous research” (Lynn 1949, 10). The framework and structure of DASF accentuated this link. Agricultural extension was the link between research and government policy, and the link between the indigenous farmer and his soil, his crops and his livestock. The structure of DASF reflected this linkage. The inclusion of marketing within the agricultural programme allowed the indigenous farmer to understand and access the wider markets beyond their district, beyond the TPNG and in the wider world.
While DASF was establishing its original structure and deciding on areas of responsibility, and roles, the administration of the TPNG itself, was being formed, and making its presence felt in Port Moresby. In March 1949, Port Moresby was officially designated as the capital (Stuart 1970, 152). According to Ian Stuart (1970, 152), Port Moresby was the final choice for the capital for the two Territories as building had already taken place to provide accommodation for the provisional administration and there were no comparable facilities in other towns. The only other towns considered as capitals were Lae and Rabaul, both in the old Mandated Territory of New Guinea.
Bombing during the war had razed both towns and the army had removed much of their infrastructure such as Quonset huts, trucks and warehouses (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979, 105). Consideration also was given to the fact that Port Moresby was in the Australian Territory, while the other two were under the jurisdiction of the United
203 Nations. J. K. Murray had entertained the idea of the capital being in Wau in the highlands, but when Hasluck became Minister of Territories (1951), he told Murray to “forget about Wau” as Port Moresby had better communications to Canberra and that time would be better spent improving the facilities at Port Moresby, such as the harbour, housing, office buildings, power station and town water supply (Hasluck 1976, 30). A survey of Port Moresby showed that buildings previously occupied by the Papuan Administration bore traces of the occupation of troops, some buildings had been bombed, and others were in disrepair (Hasluck 1976, 30).
Accommodation for offices and living quarters were found at Konedobu where ANGAU had their headquarters and were eventually taken over by the Australian civil administration. Konedobu was approximately two miles from Port Moresby town centre. Walter Cuthbertson, a surveyor from Adelaide, had first surveyed Konedobu in 1886 but only the main thoroughfare, Spring Garden Road survived from his original survey (Stuart 1970, pp. 42-43). It was on this road that Australia, after World War II, established administration offices and it became the home for the Departments of the Government Secretary, Education, Public Health, Native Labour, Treasury, District Services and Native Affairs, Lands, Mines and Surveys, Forests, Agriculture Stock and Fisheries, Audit and Police Headquarters and Stores (Jinks ,Biskup and Nelson 1973, 333). Port Moresby became known as a public service town with Konedobu being the centre of the Administration and according to Ian Stuart “the local wits” began circulating an official Public Service prayer that summed up conditions in the newly developing administration: O Lord, grant this day we may make no decisions, Neither run into any kind of responsibility, But that all our doings may be ordered To establish new departments Forever and ever, Amen. (Stuart 1970, 154)
DASF noted the lack of commitment to work by Didiman stationed at Konedobu. In 1949 it was reported that Didiman were failing to report their movements outside of the office and a “general amount of slackness appeared to be creeping into the office” (DASF Circular Memorandum to Extension Officers at Division Headquarters, Port Moresby 1949, PX 1-2-2). Didiman were warned to strictly adhere to Administration hours of work, which were from Monday to Friday, 8am to 12noon and from 1.30pm to 3.30pm and, on Saturdays, from 8am to 12noon.
204 Along with other newly formed administrative departments, DASF also noted shortages; not only shortages in staff but also shortages in housing, food supplies, power and electricity (Stuart 1970, 147)92. Murray (1971, 182) noted that these shortages were a “developing danger” to the morale of the civil service and there was a potential risk of losing people whom departments could not replace, due to the fact that they were not used to living under those conditions93.
One of the main problems was housing. After a mass meeting in Port Moresby by officers of the administration protesting against the conditions, Public Works began to design and build “paper houses” (Murray 1971, 182). Single accommodation was supplied, namely in the form of hostels which generally were self contained with a single bedroom, kitchen and bathroom and toilet off the lounge room. These hostels were located throughout Port Moresby and became known as the ‘Stables’ at Paga Hill, ‘Paper Town’, which was a wartime hostel near Ela Beach, ‘New Town’ near Konedobu and ‘RAAF Barracks’. There was segregation of accommodation for males and females (Bob Curtis, ex-Didiman, email, 5 November, 2007; Murray 1971, 182; Stuart 1970, 124; Hasluck 1976, 20). At Kaevaga, the two hostels built to accommodate single Administration Officers were ‘House Champion’ and ‘House O’Malley’. These were the sites of a ‘suburb’ of new paper houses, often referred to as ‘New Town’ (Murray 1971, 182). This form of accommodation became colloquially known as Dongas (Sturat 1970, 263) and remained as the main form of single accommodation in Port Moresby for not only DASF officers but also all administration officers.
Hasluck, on his first visit to the TPNG, as Minister of Territories in 1951, noted the lack of infrastructure within the capital, particularly the lack of a modern wharf and airstrip, an acute shortage of decent housing and that the offices of public servants were little better than unventilated sheds. Hasluck declared that the Dongas were little better than floored huts, while the hostels were badly built and badly run (Hasluck 1976, 19). The water and power supplies were not only deficient but also erratic. He also noted that the indigenous people around Port Moresby were living in squalid humpies. On his return to Australia, Hasluck believed that something had to be done about these glaring
92 See also memorandum from Cottrell-Dormer to “All DASF Staff”, 17 December 1946, Ref. No. 1508, UQFL124. Cottrell-Dormer acknowledges the difficulties for staff in relation to housing, supplies, transport and labour. 93 In 1950, Cottrell-Dormer stated that the shortage of housing also affected staff shortages, which, in turn, was making it impossible to start new projects or provide technical assistance throughout the Territory (see DASF to Secretary of Planning and Development, Port Moresby, “Departmental Development Planning - 7 Years”, PNGA File 1-1-105.)
205 deficiencies within the capital if he was to recruit and hold public servants in the Territory. He also felt that the administration under J. K. Murray, had accomplished little in the five and a half years since the end of the war (Hasluck 1976, 20; Jinks 1979, 15).
In defence of J. K. Murray, Jinks suggested that the extent of war damage, not only to Port Moresby, but the whole of the TPNG had never been appreciated and, although war material had been left behind, much of it was useless for reconstruction purposes. This was because most of it could not be transported elsewhere and the War Disposals Commission had sold off most of the useful stores (Hasluck 1976, pp. 20 & 29) 94. The United States of America also sold war surplus from Manus and elsewhere to the nationalist Chinese, to support their struggle against the communists in China.
Australia also lacked the manpower to undertake such a large reconstruction job (Jinks 1979, 16; Strahan 2005). As with other allied nations, after World War II, full- employment in Australia was looked upon as a key economic objective (Witte 1945, 171) and a ‘full employment approach’ was formulated by Chifley in Australia (Chifley 1953, 85). In 1944, H. V. Evatt addressed the Cabinet and stated, in regard to full employment, “that when this had been substantially achieved [we can] consider remaining matters associated with commercial policy” (United Nations Economic Proposals: Full Cabinet Submission, 18 January 1944, DEA, AA series A2700, vol. 8). Nugget Coombs stressed a context of fear stating, “widespread unemployment of 1930s that had impoverished and rendered empty of achievement the lives of many, and it was the fear of its return which governments were most anxious to counter” (Coombs 1981, 6; Crisp 1965, 5). The full employment policy within Australia contributed to the lack of manpower needed for the rebuilding in the TPNG. Murray stated that the Department of External Territories had failed not only him but also the Territory due to its lack of response to requests to make provisions not only for housing but also administration offices (Murray 1971, 182).
A change of Australian Government and a change in administrator eventually meant that Port Moresby developed new housing estates, particularly, the suburb of Boroko and
94 Hasluck was to note “strange tales of the operations of the War Disposals Commission”. He stated that assets from the war had been sold, dismantled, removed or broken up. Private citizens had bought much of these assets and much of the material was awaiting shipment to Australia or elsewhere for speculative sale, although it could have found a good use within the Territory. Hasluck decided later not to pursue the War Disposals Commission because he realised that “it would be a profitless diversion of effort and possibly harm the Territory”.
206 married couples going to Port Moresby were later offered accommodation at Boroko or Murray Barracks. A settlement at Gabutu also developed for Papua New Guinean Administration servants (Stuart 1970, 153). Although most departments, including DASF, employed Papua New Guineans, the majority of indigenous workers were semi- skilled or unqualified and most were employed as gardeners, messengers or cleaners.
R. S. Parker noted that the “administration is most important for the success of any kind of government”95 and this was particularly true with regards to the Territories of Papua and New Guinea where the Administration was synonymous with the government (1968, 187). Hasluck (1976, 17) acknowledged the work of ANGAU and the Australian New Guinea Production Control Board (ANGPCB). He stated that, for the last few years, ANGAU and the ANGPCB had carried out most of the functions of government, managed plantations and coordinated economic services. It was not until the Provisional Administration Act of 1946 that a civil administration provided for the appointment of officers “necessary for the proper government of both Territories” (Hasluck 1976, 17). The original administration set up under the provisional administration consisted of eleven departments; the Departments of Government Secretary (which included the Registrar-General Branch, Crown Law Offices and the Police Force), Treasury (which included the Government Printing Office, Government Stores and the Post and Telegraph Branches), District Services and Native Affairs, Native Labour, Education, Public Health, Agriculture Stock and Fisheries, Trade and Customs (in 1948, this was renamed Customs and Marine), Forests, Lands, Surveys and Mines and Public Works (this operated under the authority of the Commonwealth Department of Works and Housing) (Parker 1968, 193). These 11 departments increased to 16 departments with the appointment of Hasluck as the head of the new portfolio of Territories in 1951. Hasluck encouraged the growth of ‘specialisation’ of Territory departments on the model of the Australian Public Service. Some departments became more independent, such as the Crown Law Office (1950), the Departments of Post and Telegraphs and Public Works (1955), and the Department of Labour and Department of Police (1961). This period also saw the creation of a new Department of Trade and Industry that absorbed the former Department of Customs and Marine.
95 Parker was a Professor of Political Science, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. In 1962, he became a member of the Interim Council of the Administrative College of Papua New Guinea. See Fisk, E. K. (1968) New Guinea on the Threshold, University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh, “Notes on Contributors”.
207 In 1962, the Division of Extension Services in the administrator’s office was given full status as the Department of Information and Extension Services. By 1963, the Administration was organised into 16 departments (see Figure 6.3, page 209). The departments were increased to 18 in 1972 with the creation of the Departments of Defense and Foreign Relations (Ballard 1981, 87) and then, during the period from 1972 to 1975 when the administration was preparing the TPNG for independence, there was rapid increase in the localisation of the Public Service (Parker 1968, 189).
Localisation was the replacement of expatriate staff by indigenous staff and was seen as a corollary of the advance to self-government. However, Paulus Matane noted that localisation did not mean merely the replacement of expatriate officers by local officers. It also meant the providing or creating of communities for local officers to attain the necessary experience or competence in their respective fields so that they could assume responsibility and feel confident in discharging the duties of their office (Matane 1970, 374). In 1970, at the November sitting of the House of Assembly it was moved that “the House requested the Administration to take action to retain senior expatriate officers reaching retirement age for as long as possible, to aid in the overall development of our country” (“Retention of Retiring Expatriate Officers” Motion by Mr. Pangial 1971, PX 1-1-27C).
In 1972, the first Somare Government announced the Eight Aims of the national government and included themes of localisation, rural development, decentralisation, self-reliance and equal distribution of benefits (Garnaut 1981, 163; Kari 2005). The administrative structure relied on department heads, who were entirely expatriates and the Public Service Board reported directly to the Ministry of External Territories.
The Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 made provision for a legislative council and transferred legislative power in regard to the peace, order and good government of the Territory96. However, the Commonwealth Parliament retained the right to legislate directly. The council consisted of 29 members, besides the administrator, of which, 16 officers were from the public service, three nominated Europeans, three nominated
96 The Act provided for the establishment of Legislative Council, on a partly elective and partly nominative basis. The Act stated, “There will be a Legislative Council for the Territory, and that the Council shall commence to perform its powers and functions upon a date fixed by Proclamation. The date fixed shall be as soon as practicable after the expiration of one year after the commencement of this Act” (The Papua and New Guinea Act, No. 9 of 1949, Part V: Legislation, Division 2-Legislative Council, Item 35, 10).
208 mission representatives and three nominated indigenous `representatives and three elected Europeans (Papua New Guinea Act No. 9, 1949, Part V: Legislation, Division 2- Legislative Council Item 35, 10).
Figure 6.3 The TPNG Administration Organisation Chart Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1965) The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, The John Hopkins Press: Baltimore, p. 4.
The three nominated indigenous representatives chosen by J. K. Murray representing Papua, New Guinea islands and the New Guinea mainland (Hasluck 1976, 41)97 were Merari Dickson98, Aisoli Salin99 and Peta Simogun100.
97 Although the three indigenous members were not bound to support the administration’s policy in the council, they had been nominated primarily on their previous record of co-operation with the government (Tate, M. (1971)) “The Question of Development and Nationhood in New Guinea since World War II”, Journal of Negro History, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp.48). It was also noted by Griffin, J., Nelson, H. & Firth, S. that these three men contributed little to the Legislative Council due to that fact that two of them lacked formal education and skill in the language of government (Papua New Guinea: A Political History, (1979) 131). 98 Dickson was a mission teacher of Milne Bay (Kwato Mission) (See Hasluck, P. (1976) A Time for Building, p. 40; Nelson, H. (2005)), “The View from the Sub-District” in Brij V. Lal. (ed), The Defining Years Pacific Islands, 1945-65, Australian National University: Canberra, p.32. 99 Salin was a government school teacher from New Ireland (See Hasluck, P. (1976) A Time for Building, p. 40; Nelson, H. (2005)), “The View from the Sub-District” p.32. 100 Simogun was an ex-policeman and soldier from the Sepik (See Hasluck, P. (1976) A Time for Building, p. 40; Nelson, H. (2005)), “The View from the Sub-District” 32.
209 The Legislative Council assumed office in 1951 and it was the first time, in theory, that indigenous people had a voice in the government of their own country. The Legislative Council continued in this form for nine years until 1960 when the Papua and New Guinea Act was amended to give Papua New Guineans greater representation101. The amendments provided for an enlarged body of 37 members (an increase of eight members), consisting of the Administrator and 14 official members, 12 elected members (six members elected by the indigenous population) and 10 appointed non-official members, of whom five were to be Papua New Guineans. There was no provision for church or mission representatives (Cleland 1971, 216; White1972, 182; Leifer1963, 258).
In 1963, Australia amended the Papua and New Guinea Act to create a House of Assembly consisting of 10 official members, 44 members elected from a common roll and 10 non-indigenous members, which replaced the Legislative Council (White 1972, 185). However, Osmar White (1972, 191) noted that the 1964 House of Assembly had little influence on policies formulated in Canberra by the Department of Territories and implemented by the Administration102. His opinion, shared by many commentators, was that the House of Assembly “was no more than a rubber stamp for items in a programme of hasty change already drawn by the Canberra bureaucracy” (1972, 191).
By 1972, with the third elections of the House of Assembly a political party system had emerged largely due to the influence of the United Nations and the Australian Liberal- Country Party, which was holding office in Australia and was anxious to avoid United
101 The progress of de-colonisation and the demand of the United Nations led the Australian Prime Minister (Menzies) to conclude that Australia should accelerate its programme in the Territory to the extent of considering self-government. It has been suggested by Leifer, that Menzies’ experience at the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in London 1960 was at least effective in his public change on proceeding ‘sooner, not later’ in granting independence. A week after his return to Australia the Prime Minister announced proposed changes to the Papua and New Guinea Legislative Council. At the opening of the reconstituted Legislative Council, Hasluck still insisted, “The stage in progress of political advancement will be set by the response of the people themselves”. This was in contradiction to the fact that Hasluck had been quoted by the New York Times, saying Papua and New Guinea was not ready for self-determination for 30 years. (Cited Leifer, M. (1963)) “Australia, Trusteeship and New Guinea”, Journal of Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 3, p.p 255 & 256. See also Jinks, B., Biskup, P. and Nelson, H. (eds.) (1973) Readings in New Guinea History, Angus and Robertson: Sydney, 372. 102 In February 1963, Mr. John Guise (now Sir) was a member of the Papua New Guinea Legislative Council, visited Australia and spoke on the Australian Broadcasting Commission’s “Guest of Honour Talk”. He stated, “I have sat on the New Legislative Council and the Administrator’s Council since they were founded in 1961. And I can tell you that important policy matters still don’t originate from us. Most of them originate in Canberra with the Minister and the Department of Territories (From a Transcript of the ABC, “Guest of Honour Talk”, broadcast 3rd February, 1963, 2.) See also Leifer, M. (1963) “Australia, trusteeship and New Guinea”, Journal of Pacific Affairs, vol. 36, no. 3, p.261.
210 Nations criticism by being the last of the colonial powers. In 1972, the House of Assembly had started planning for a transfer of authority103. It was during this transfer of power that the localisation of the Heads of Departments within the public service took place. In 1970, the Australian Prime Minister, John Gorton, stated, in regard to self- government for the TPNG,
that the time has come when less should be referred to Canberra for decision and more should be retained for decision by the Administrative Executive and by the Ministerial Members who for the most part make up that Council104.
One of the main objectives was to develop a public service, which would be more and more a service of Papua New Guineans serving their own country (Jinks, Biskup and Nelson 1973, 404). In 1972, Michael Somare, the then Chief Minister, stated, “We do not want an Australian or European-type Public Service, geared to 20th Century technology, nor can we afford to maintain such a Public Service” (Ballard 1981, 75). By late 1972, Somare had initiated an inquiry into the reorganisation of all public service departments. Tony Voutas (1981, 40) suggested this was a political manoeuvre. “Its purpose was to sensitise department heads to the political reality that Somare, not Canberra was determining the pace of change”. Somare and the Australian Administrator began the process of replacing expatriate department heads with Papua New Guinean ministers. In relation to any one department, the Papua New Guinean minister responsible would have final powers of direction over some of its function and in a very short time the expatriate department heads were to disappear, either through retirement or ‘localisation’ or being shifted sideways into ‘special projects’ pending finalisation of the repatriation scheme (Barnett 1981, 75).
By independence in 1975, all expatriate department heads had been replaced by Papua New Guineans.
103 In 1962, the Legislative Council set up a Select Committee to enquire into and report upon the political development of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea. An interim report was issued and received by the Council and the Australian Parliament and served as Australia’s response to the Trusteeship Committee of the General Assembly. The report provided for reform of the Council, which was renamed the House of Assembly. The Australian Government endorsed it and these proposals were seen as an attempt to meet criticisms levelled against Australia by the United Nations in the 1962 Foote Report. See “Interim Report from the Select Committee of the Legislative Council for the Territories of Papua and New Guinea, appointed to inquire and report upon the Political Development of the Territory, Port Moresby, 1962. 104 See “Steps towards self-government”, speech by Prime Minister Gorton at the Papua Hotel Port Moresby, 6th July 1970, Published for the Prime Ministers Department and the Department of External Territories by the Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra, pp. 4,6-7. See also Jinks, B., Biskup, P. and Nelson, H. (eds.) (1973) Readings in New Guinea History, Angus and Robertson: Sydney, p. 410.
211 DASF, together with many other departments, became embroiled in bureaucratic shuffling that was seen as an inevitable consequence of the transfer of power from Australia to Papua New Guinea. Six years later, Bob McKillop noted, “new governments come to power and new policy initiatives were announced, there have been frequent attempts to change the structure of agricultural departments or to introduce new organizations” (McKillop 1981, 239). In 1973, W. L. Conroy (Hasluck 1976, 437)105 the then Director of DASF was transferred to another department and John Natera took up the position, becoming one of the first nationals to head a major department. In 1975, the National Executive Council reorganised the public service and DASF ceased to exist after it was amalgamated with forestry to form the Department of Primary Industry (DPI) (McKillop 1981, 243).
6.2 THE 1960s
In 1963, an economic survey mission to the TPNG headed by Kenneth Iverson, organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)106, suggested a reorganisation of DASF (see Figure 6.4, page 214). The Australian Government endorsed the objectives of the mission’s programmes and accepted the IBRD’s ideas as a working basis in 1965 and they were implemented (“Programs and Policies for: the Economic Development of Papua New Guinea” 1968, 2). The major objectives for DASF now became to:
(a) increase production and exports in order to improve the Territories’ balance of payments and to the greatest extent possible advance the movement towards a more diversified and viable economy;
(b) increase indigenous participation and accelerate the movement of indigenes from subsistence to commercial production;
105 William Lawrence Conroy (BSc. Ag.) did war service with the AIF 1942-46 (Officer Commanding Malaria Control Unit) and became a lecturer at ASOPA from 1946-49. He joined PNG DASF in 1950 and rose to Director in 1964. In 1972 he became Special Adviser on Foreign Affairs and Trade to the PNG government in Port Moresby. 106 The basic objectives of the mission were to undertake a general review of the economic potentialities of the Territories and to make recommendations to assist the Australian Government in planning a development programme designed to expand and stimulate the economy and thereby raising the standard of living of the people. The results of this report were published in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1965) The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, The John Hopkins Press: Baltimore. See also “Programs and Policies for: the Economic Development of Papua New Guinea” (1968) prepared by direction of His Honour the Administrator.
212 (c) provide avenues of self-employment and expanded wage employment in commercial production;
(d) raise farm incomes and increase rural living standards;
(e) expand local food production for subsistence and sale, to reduce the demand for imports, improve the indigenous diet and keep food prices at a reasonable level;
(f) encourage adoption of sound agricultural practices, both to improve productivity and to ensure the best use of agricultural resources (“Programs and Policies for the Economic Development of Papua New Guinea” 1968, 19).
The changes to the structure of DASF on the recommendations of the IRBD meant a policy shift away from the individual indigenous farmer to a more rationalised agricultural development aimed at a small percentage of farmers able to cope with change within their land boundaries. It also fitted in with the world view of agricultural development as big business, one measured in imports and exports, and not on domestic food production alone. In a country such as the TPNG with its lack of arable land, difficult terrain and varying micro-climates, the introduction of a rationalised approach to cash cropping on a plantation style of production was not going to be easy, as land tenure was an enormous obstacle to such change. Not only were the farmers expected to give up subsistence farming land for the production of more economic crops but also there was an immediate need for more mechanised farming and downstream crop processing. The TPNG would need large amounts of private investment for this to happen as the Australian government’s annual grant was spread thin over all areas of administration.
Within the overall structure of DASF, the Division of Animal Industry continued its functions with the exception of animal research. However, the animal husbandry section was enlarged to implement a more extensive cattle program. The IBRD proposed the introduction of a new division, the Division of Research Planning and Evaluation, which would absorb the Division of Plant Industry, and Division of Fisheries. The IBRD saw this new division as one that would “embrace staff with broadly comparable creative interests and thereby provide an environment for fruitful work by competent scientific personnel” (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 1965, 194). The Division of Agricultural Extension and Marketing was changed to the Division of Development and Marketing. This meant the roles of agricultural extension and
213 development were merged within the new DASF structure. This increased the responsibilities of Didiman as no longer did their work focus only on improved food production through modification of rural farming techniques, but now included land utilisation for economic crops for a world market. The roles of the Didiman changed, and with it, the goal of Agricultural Extension.
The chief of each division became known as the Assistant Director and was responsible to the Director, and Regional Agricultural Officers became known as Regional Rural Development Officers. The title of Rural Development Officer continued to be synonymous, at least at Konedobu, with the term ‘Agricultural Extension Officer’ (Didiman).
Figure 6.4 The TPNG Proposed Organisation of DASF Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1965) The Economic Development of TPNG, The John Hopkins Press: Baltimore, p. 195.
214 In reorganising the structure of DASF on the model put forward by the IBRD, the Australian Government essentially reduced the original five divisions into three technical units each with higher status through leadership at assistant director level. The assistant directors participated with the director in defining development objectives and in formulating major programs and as the administrative head of his own division, each was responsible for programme implementation and co-ordination with the other two divisional units.
The original broad functions of DASF put forward by Cottrell-Dormer remained intact. The number of administration districts also changed. The original 15 districts created for administrative purposes was a decentralised system under Resident Magistrates. This followed the British colonial practice and had been introduced by William MacGregor, the first Administrator of British New Guinea (later Papua) in 1888. A similar system had been adopted in the Territory of New Guinea.
By 1942, a uniform pattern of administration had emerged in both Territories with the administration areas referred to as districts (Parker 1968, pp.190-191). In November 1965, the number of administrative districts was increased by three to 18 when the Sepik and New Britain Districts were each split into East and West Divisions and the Chimbu District was separated from the Eastern Highlands (DASF Annual Report 1965-66, 1). The districts were sub-divided into sub-districts which eventually numbered 210. By 1968, DASF had been restructured around the three assistant directors responsible to the director and covering the functional areas of Research and Surveys, Animal Industry and Development and Marketing (Figure 6.5, page 217). There were 16 specialists’ branches. The Assistant Director, Research and Surveys was responsible for Chemistry, Entomology, Pathology Agronomy, Land Utilisation, Fisheries Research and Survey. The Assistant Director, Animal Industry was responsible for Veterinary Services, Animal Production and Veterinary Research. The Assistant Director, Development and Marketing, was responsible for Extension and Development, Special Projects, Education and Training, Marketing and Fisheries Development.
The two remaining branches, the Administrative Branch and the Rural Economics and Commodity Research Branch were the responsibility of the Director (DASF Circular No. 37 1968, PX 1-1-39-Part 9). This reorganisation was approved by the Minister for External Territories (DASF Circular No. 37 1968, PX 1-1-39-Part 9). The changes in
215 structure suggested by the IBRD pushed agricultural extension towards the implementation of agricultural policy and social and political development among rural indigenous people. Agricultural extension now expanded into the field of formal education for indigenous rural people and this had the effect of forcing Didiman from the field and into a more instructional role at home in the stations. Didiman found they were spending more time teaching and less time patrolling. The introduction of formal education within the extension programme meant a policy shift from helping older indigenous farmers with their subsistence gardening to a focus on young men and later women, as specialised agriculturalists where the work would eventually lead them away from traditional farming systems to a cash crop or plantation style of farming. The effect was that Didiman were spread more thinly on the ground.
In 1972, when PNG achieved self-government, DASF was still undergoing a process of reorganisation, to further strengthen the regional structure introduced in 1967 (McKillop 1981, 241). The changes in 1967 had involved a rapid build-up of specialist staff at Konedobu, especially in economic research, training, extension research and planning, and the creation of a team of technical experts in each of the four regional centres (McKillop 1981, 242). The changes made throughout the years that DASF was controlled by Canberra lasted until 1971 when DASF, due to constitutional changes, came under the jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea’s Minister for Agriculture Stock and Fisheries. The minister, Tei Abal, had full ministerial responsibility for agricultural extension services, agricultural training research and technical services in agricultural industries, fisheries and export quality control. In a press statement, in 1972, Tei Abal announced a major pre-independence reorganisation of his department (see Figure 6.6, page 217.) (“Re-organization of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries”, PX 1-1-39 Part 10). The reorganisation provided for two senior positions of First Assistant Director, reporting immediately to the Director of DASF, who would exercise control over two major lines of policy and programme activity of the department.
216
Figure 6.5 DASF Organisational Chart 1968 Source: DASF Circular No. 37 of 1968, “Departmental Reorganisation”, Papua New Guinea Archives file 1-1-39 Part 9
Figure 6.6 DASF Top Structure 1971 Source: DASF Circular No. 24 of 1971, PX 3-2-1
217 One assistant director would manage the technical and research activities, while the other would be responsible for activities relevant to the implementation of the development programme. New assistant directorates were created to deal with programming and policy, rural economics and commodity research, administration and training. Four positions of regional controller were created to report directly to the director and be responsible for the administration of all field activities (“Re-Organization of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries”, PX 1-1-39 Part 10).
W. L. Conroy, then Director of DASF, stated that the new organisation and establishment of the departments had been designed to meet
the rapidly changing constitutional situation in the Territory, to facilitate internal communication in a situation of rapidly expanding and diversifying responsibilities, and to meet the tight planning and budgeting conditions which were expected to dominate the rest of the next decade (DASF Circular No. 24 1971, PX 1-1-39 Part 10; McKillop 1981, 241)107. In this period, Konedobu became increasingly involved with the preparation of policy recommendations and policy advice. At the same time, DASF in a dual role, continued to be responsible for policy advice and recommendations in those functional fields where responsibility was still held by the Commonwealth government.
In 1973, Michael Somare, Chief Minister of Papua and New Guinea, announced the first planning document prepared under the supervision of an elected and responsible government. In regard to agriculture, Somare stated that he “was not turning away from all policies of the past” (DASF Circular No. 24, PX 1-1-39 Part 10). He went further stating that it was only a one-year plan but was to be the forerunner of more over the next five years. He claimed the agricultural programme would reduce the disparities of income between rural and urban dwellers, and give increased opportunities for earning cash incomes to a larger number of Papua New Guineans that would lead to greater economic self-reliance. Somare wanted agriculture to retain its prominent position in economic development within an independent Papua New Guinea.
In 1974, the Agricultural Standing Committee appointed a working committee to report on the abolition or modification of the regional organisation. In 1975, the director
107 McKillop acknowledged the work done by Conroy stating “the reorganization was very much the creation of the director, W.L. Conroy, and based on anticipation that the future political organization of Papua New Guinea would follow a regional basis”, (p 241-42).
218 announced a further reorganisation of the department at headquarters level. The purpose of the review was to rationalise allocation of department functions at the national level to meet political changes and the development of a new constitutional framework for Papua New Guinea, cater for the needs of increased responsibilities, and open up promotional opportunities to staff engaged in rural development work in field situations (McKillop 1981, 243). However, in December 1975, three months after independence, the National Executive Council decided on a major restructuring of the Papua New Guinean public service and this meant the demise of DASF.
6.3 CANBERRA-KONEDOBU AND DIDIMAN
DASF, along with other departments, had been controlled by Canberra and it was criticised not only by journalists but also by ‘old hands’ from the Territory. Derogatory phrases abounded in regard to Canberra’s control within the Territory, such as “dancing like puppets at the end of the 1800 mile strings which stretched from Canberra”, “the dead hand of Canberra” and the “legend of remote control” (Hasluck 1976, 209). But an avenue existed for Konedobu officials to discuss issues raised at either Port Moresby or Canberra and this was achieved through a series of committees and internal networks. The most notable of these being the Inter-Departmental Co-Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Administrator, which met at least twice each month. Unfortunately, this committee had a restricted membership consisting of only the most senior officials, and less frequently with a membership of all departmental heads (Lynch 1981, 21). Lynch (1981, 21) noted that the control of committees from Canberra was such that “even the standards of high school toilets were determined in Canberra”. However, Hasluck in response to these allegations stated,
the laws of the Australian Commonwealth and the Agreement between Australia and the General Assembly of the United Nations in respect of the Trust Territory of New Guinea required some intervention in Papua New Guinea by the Australian Government. (Hasluck 1976, 209)
In 1951, Hasluck began to impose upon the Administration a pattern of centralisation from Canberra because “Papua New Guinea will be administered as a Territory and because expenditure for the Territory will be financed by the Commonwealth Government” (Parker 1968, 195). Centralisation from Canberra became so inflexible that DASF, in June 1954, was reprimanded by the Department of Territories in a Ministerial Schedule. The minister noted that a Policy for Native Agricultural Development by
219 DASF were plans or proposals, not policy as stated by DASF. He went further, stating that departments themselves “do not determine policy” (Department of Territories, Ministerial Schedule No. 1320, 30/6/1954, 2). J. B. Willoughby, Assistant Secretary of Industry and Trade in Canberra, reiterated this in August 1954. He pointed out to DASF that developmental plans sent south were incorrectly described as policies (Ministerial Schedule No. 1372, 11/8/54, “Native Agricultural Extension Work”).
Administrators in Port Moresby were powerless without higher approval from Canberra and powerless locally to remove incompetent or troublesome senior officials. There was also the sense that administration was a monolithic, inflexible organisation in structure, in recruitment and training, in delegation of responsibility, and in the economy of human resources (Nicholson 1970, 184-185). This could be said of the organisational structure of DASF and other departments within the Administration of Papua New Guinea. McKillop (1981, 253) argued that conservative attitudes were built into the management structure of DASF, which gave an over-riding impression of an organisation impervious to change. Changes at DASF, if any, had to occur within a bureaucratic structure. Policy directives from Canberra had a special significance in the Division of Agricultural Extension. Although all Divisions within DASF were of importance to agricultural development within the TPNG, it was agricultural extension and the development of an “extension philosophy” that was relied upon to bring change to indigenous farming communities. This was acknowledged by Cottrell-Dormer, who stated,
research and production are both of great importance in this country but I remain convinced that the greatest need of all is a team of first class extension officers to help our native people.(Cottrell-Dormer 1949, PX 31-1-2)
The importance of an effective agricultural department and its staff had been recognised by the British Colonial Office in the 1930s. Charles J. Jefferies, Assistant-Secretary in the British Colonial Office, quoting the words of Sir Herbert Read, an Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Colonial Office, stressed three features of staffing in colonial agricultural departments. These were that considerable increases in the staff of agricultural departments were inevitable; that the utmost importance must be attached to the quality of the staff and to their professional competence; and that second-rate officers were worse than useless, because they could not handle scientific and technical changes (Jefferies 1938).
220 Hasluck (1976, 129) also acknowledged the importance of extension, noting that the adoption of better gardening of new crops, new methods and new implements would be impossible without extension programs in the field. Hasluck leant heavily on DASF and especially Didiman. Hasluck realised that Australian Didiman would one day need to be replaced by indigenous trained agriculturalists. Indigenous agricultural training was not new to the TPNG nor, for that matter, other tropical colonial dependencies. In 1932, Didiman operating from a small Department of Agriculture based in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea initiated a policy of patrols under the slogan “The problem is in the field, not in the office” (McKillop 1976, 14).
The specialist technical and research sections of DASF were primarily concerned with plantation agriculture and plantation managers in the field often formed direct links with Konedobu research staff, but Didiman had chosen to become practical agriculturalists, not bureaucrats. They wanted the freedom of individual initiative and face-to-face contact, not to be sitting in offices surrounded by files. In 1948, Cottrell-Dormer recommended a policy of indigenous agricultural training to
get a sprinkling of trained native people throughout the Territory who will be useful in developing communal projects and the adoption of new methods of agriculture as they were introduced. (Cottrell-Dormer 1948, 55)
However, it was not until 1956, that Canberra initiated a policy for indigenous agricultural training. Hasluck stated “that it was a definite objective of policy to promote training and recruitment of indigenous people for appointment to the Public service of the Territory” (1976, 129). The Public Service Auxiliary Division was created and came into effect in 1957. This meant that indigenous agricultural field workers employed within DASF were given the opportunity to obtain qualifications as Didiman.
To intensify agricultural extension work among indigenous farmers, in 1959, Hasluck designed and approved a three-year plan 1960-1963, aimed at the build-up of extension field staff (DASF 1959, 48). In 1961, Hasluck reorganised the Public Service and abolished the Auxiliary Division, and officers of that division were transferred to suitable positions in the second and third divisions of the Public Service. Hasluck later argued that the policy was for “natives to advance before European settlement advances” (Hasluck 1976, 309). This plan allowed for an increase of an extra 74 European Extension Officers and for a build up of indigenous agricultural assistants. In 1959, there were approximately 180 indigenous agricultural assistants, increasing to approximately
221 300 under Hasluck’s three-year plan. In addition, approximately 1,000 indigenous farmers were trained at agricultural extension centres, which meant that an additional 22 centres were built. The plan also provided for the increase of extension aids such as filmstrips and pamphlets and increased patrolling to provide a greater degree of contact with the agricultural population.
A five-year plan 1962-1963 to 1965-1967 replaced the three-year plan. It intensified agricultural extension work among indigenous farmers. This plan was approved by Hasluck and adopted by DASF and took effect in 1962. The objectives were very similar to the previous plan:
(a) To increase the number of agricultural staff to approximately 240. This was to include indigenous officers engaged on full time extension duties.
(b) To build up a force of indigenous agricultural assistants to 900 so that there would be one to each 2,000 of rural population.
(c) To establish two additional sub-diploma institutions to cater for indigenous youth.
(d) To allow approximately 30 agricultural diplomates to graduate by 1966-67.
(e) To establish approximately 50 agricultural extension centres from which extension staff could operate and at which agricultural demonstrations on a small scale could be conducted.
(f) To provide more visual aid material for use in contact work and agricultural training, including filmstrips and pamphlets dealing with major cash crop processing and various agronomic and crop processing practices.
The new plan provided for an increase in the Division of Extension and additional stations for contact purposes and an increase in formal agricultural education. The plan highlighted the fact that Australia had floundered in the direction for its agricultural policy. It mistakenly put the individual indigenous farmer in the forefront of policy and thought that the way forward in economic development was through education. In theory, an improvement in agricultural techniques based on scientific endeavour was sound, but it was impractical in the TPNG. Hasluck mistakenly continued to believe there was a link between agricultural policy and an improved level of subsistence, a higher standard of living and a rural population trained in the best methods of agricultural practice for their particular area (DASF Annual Report 1961-63, 173). The old banner of ‘responsible colonialism through improved diet’ was also cited by
222 Hasluck. He claimed again that, “the production of food was an essential part of policy for the introduction of a better and more varied diet” (Hasluck 1956, 23).
Meanwhile, at Konedobu, DASF did not operate as a separate authority, but liaised with other departments, although these links were not always congenial. The DASF Manual of Procedures stated that
Agricultural Extension Officers [Didiman] have to co-operate with and receive co-operation from officers of other departments in the field and the Headquarters of appropriate Departments should co-ordinate their actions in order to implement matters of policy. (DASF Extension Manual of Procedures, 1967, section G.A.)
Disagreements about integrating agriculture within the school syllabus created a conflict between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Education because agricultural training was seen as adult training and DASF was, therefore, not to conduct agricultural training courses at the primary school level. This was the jurisdiction of the Department of Education who introduced a rural bias into the syllabus for all indigenous schools and teacher training.
In 1949, the Director of Education, proposed the creation of a position of Supervisor for Rural Education within the Department of Education. However, Conroy, later to become Director of DASF, indicated that agricultural extension and adult education was the realm of DASF and that in “Melanesian communities children and adolescents have no authority in agricultural matters and any attempt to introduce innovations through the children could be socially disruptive” (Dick 1976, 49). By 1959, the Department of Education was no longer including agriculture in school curriculum.
The Department now believed that only low-level technical extension classes in agriculture were needed and that agricultural training schools could absorb students from level six who wanted to pursue entirely agricultural studies (Department of Education, Circular Memorandum No. 48 1959, PX 20-1-40). This did not exclude DASF from participating in the rural syllabus. Arrangements were made for Didiman to give practical demonstrations in school gardens, but, essentially, DASF agricultural training schemes were directed to the indigenous adult farmer (Agriculture Extension Circular No. 2 1958, PX 1-1-39A). According to Gordon Dick (Assistant Director of Agricultural Education and Training, in 1976) this was a “tragedy for both Agriculture and Education
223 as both remained aloof from each other, each jealously informing the other of the boundaries of its domain” (Dick 1976, 50).
DASF also had a close liaison with the Department of District Services (DDS). In 1946, DDS staff replaced ANGAU and continued to help in the Rehabilitation phase of the Australian Administration, especially in the field of agriculture. In 1955, Dwyer reported to the Government Secretary that DDS staff had done much to foster agriculture extension. They had been active in contacting villages and in the distribution of planting material and reporting on agricultural in various districts they patrolled (“Native Agriculture” 1955 AA series A452/1 item C2/1/1).
Didiman with DASF also consulted with the Cooperative Section of DDS and gave advice and assistance where indigenous authorities were interested in progress societies (Dwyer 1953, 4). In 1954, the Director of DASF, Henderson stated there “was a definite role for District Services field staff to assist in native agriculture development” (Henderson 1954, PX 1-2-2H) and went further, noting that a tradition of co-operation between the two departments was well-established with DDS officers including comments on agriculture in their patrol reports which were automatically extracted and sent to DASF headquarters (1954, PX 1-2-2H). However, tensions between the two departments arose over the authority for planning and proposals for economic development. DASF thought that it was “unwise that directives on land use should be specifically included in the instructions of DDS staff or officers, not sufficiently trained in agriculture” (Native Agriculture Extension Work, “Land use in Village Gardens”).
A specific issue revolved around the re-introduction of regulations relating to the planting of domestic crops by indigenous farmers. This issue was raised at the District Commissioners Conference in Lae, 1953 (Report of the 1953 District Commissioners Conference Lae). The conference was unanimous in its opinion that the pre-war policy implemented by field staff of DDS who had instructed indigenous farmers to plant as many coconut palms and other tree crops as possible had proved itself and communities were reaping the benefits of this foresight. The conference resolved that section 79A of the Native Administration Regulation and Section 121 of the Native Regulations Ordinance be re-introduced. This allowed district DDS officers to order the indigenous farmers to plant such economic or food crops, if the officer thought this was desirable for the material or economic benefit for these indigenous farmers. DASF thought this was a
224 dangerous move, as DDS staff were not trained or qualified in identifying the correct crops to be planted, nor for giving the correct instructions on planting.
In 1954, a Ministerial Schedule resolved this problem stating that DASF would “indicate to Officers of DDS the crops which they should encourage and planting techniques to be followed” (Ministerial Schedule No. 1372, 11/8/54, “Native Agricultural Extension Work). The scheme for enforced planting did create problems for DASF, particularly the extensive planting schemes for coconuts which were initiated in the Morobe District (Patrol Report Morobe-Waria 1956, PX 32-1-24). In 1956, Didiman observed that the number of plantings was greater than advised and had been carried out without researching the land ownership (Ministerial Schedule No. 1372). The Didiman felt that the planting scheme had been pushed too quickly, which resulted in other jobs being neglected (Patrol Report Morobe-Waria 1956, PX 32-1-24), such as road maintenance, drainage and clearing. It was also found that the majority of the indigenous farmers had no personal interest in the new plantings and except for fear of the Kiaps and the police, they would not have cared for the plantings and the plots would have become overgrown. It was felt by Didiman that, although the coconut scheme would eventually be a great asset to the people economically and as a dietary supplement, best results could be obtained by trying to encourage the people to realise the importance of economic development. Didiman thought that instilling a general desire to ‘want to work’ for their own financial advancement would be a better approach to economic development than the system of ‘plant that piece of land, or else’ as demanded by DDS, Kiaps and police.
Personality clashes between Didiman and DDS staff also caused friction between the two departments. For example, this became evident in the Buin sub-district in 1958, where Didiman felt that there was “an indifferent attitude of DDS towards ensuring indigenous farmers in the Buin area fulfilled their obligations regarding maintenance of the trunk road linking Buin with Siwai and Nagovisi” (Buin, Monthly Report, August 1958, PX 25-H-1).
Villagers were flagrantly indifferent to their responsibilities for maintenance of roads and Didiman reported that “DNA staff was not particularly concerned” (Buin, Monthly Report, August 1958). The result of bad road maintenance meant that indigenous agricultural produce was held up and could not get to markets. This resulted in some
225 indigenous partisanship between Didiman and DDS staff. Didiman were not held in high regard in Buin while DDS staff was coldly received in Siwai (Buin Monthly Report November 1959, PX 25-H-1).
In 1957, to overcome problems between DASF and other departments in the field, Hasluck inaugurated a scheme of ‘policy workshops’ with selected field officers being brought together with officers from the Department of Territories in Canberra and headquarters staff from Konedobu. The idea was to familiarise officers in the districts “with the broader problems of the Administration and to educate them in administrative measures to handle such problems” (Hasluck 1976, 282). Hasluck perceived these workshops as a way to merge policy with the administration of plans and the application of policy among the departments. The workshops stimulated the thinking of officers and for them to “get together and talk over the outstanding problems of their districts” (Hasluck 1976, 282). The general purposes of the workshops were threefold:
(a) to stimulate members to think about important policy issues and to express their views on these in a systematic ways;
(b) to bring together representatives of different departments to think about problems in the TPNG affecting development; and
(c) to indicate to both the minister and administrator the thinking of officers about some of the major problems and policy issues confronting the Administration (Policy Workshops, PX 1-1-1).
Hasluck‘s principle for the workshops was that “those who were doing should be encouraged to think, and anyone who was thinking should also be directly engaging in doing” (Hasluck 1976, 282). The workshop questions were related to important issues such as economic development and land tenure (Policy Workshops, PX 1-1-1). However, as one Didiman noted, “these workshops were a waste of time” (Mick Belfield, ex-Didiman, telephone, March 2005) because Didiman were needed in the field, not in Konedobu and these workshops did not prevent disagreements between DDS and Didiman. In 1961, Alan Healy (1961), writing for the South Pacific Post, noted that DDS and Didiman continued “to disagree on the organization and control of most agricultural extension schemes”108.
108 Healy was an historian with the Australian National University.
226 Didiman aware of the control on policy by Canberra tried to initiate policy from the field. Didiman knew that DASF at Konedobu had a duty that included making recommendations to Canberra concerning legislation and ordinances, which affected the TPNG. Didiman made suggestions to Konedobu that related to the conservation of natural resources and noted indigenous rural people’s destructive habit of lighting fires. Didiman were aware that anthropologists claimed that the burning of grass and forests was essential to culture and life. Small animals were also caught for food using this method. Didiman found that people were lighting fires for their own amusement and recommended that Konedobu suggest to Canberra an ordinance to the effect that the use of fires be warranted only when clearing land for cultivation (Sepik Annual Report 1950, PX 38-1-2E).
Other ordinances and legislation that Didiman wanted Canberra to implement concerned the cruelty of animals (Sepik Annual Report 1950), Didiman in the field found the practice of killing pigs by slowly roasting them alive and the traditional transportation of pigs by lashing their legs to poles were examples of cruelty and needless waste. Didiman wanted these practices made illegal. Dogs were also a problem for Didiman in the field and they wanted legislation that covered the licensing of all dogs or otherwise to have the dogs destroyed. Dogs were seen by Didiman as starved, neglected and carriers of diseases. Dogs became such a nuisance to Didiman that one pointed out that the dogs only survived for one reason and that was “to frustrate any patrolling officer” (Greenwood 1965).
Didiman were also concerned about the lack of legislation concerning the formations and organisation of Rural Progress Societies (RPS) (Sepik Annual Report 1950). Didiman wanted legal rulings on RPS to define whether banking was to be through the Administration Trust, a suspended account, or through a joint account. Didiman made a recommendation that finance should be through a joint account provided that it was clear of Treasury and District Services interference. Didiman also suggested that they should have the power to recommend any development or expenditures regarding RPS. Didiman also recommended that RPS should be legally recognised and that they had the right to hold the land, incur debts, create credit and generally function as business concerns. Although Didiman recommended many ordinances and regulations, many were ignored. Some were instigated in Canberra, especially those areas concerning
227 controlled burning and RPS. Acknowledgment for these policy changes was never assigned to Didiman.
In 1963, Hasluck was replaced as Minister of Territories by C. E. Barnes. However, a change in minister did not reduce the problems among the Konedobu Departments. In 1964, the new minister issued a statement
that in order to facilitate the desirable co-ordination of the activities of the functional departments in the administrative districts, it is the intention to appoint a District Co-ordinating Committee (DCC) for each district. (see Figure 6.6, page 217) (District Co-ordinating Committees, Administrator’s Circular 1- 57-0 8th September 1965.)
The committee was to provide for an integrated and co-ordinated approach to all Administration developmental activities (economic, social and political). It was to ensure the active participation in partnership of all relevant departments in achieving balanced development including a continuing examination of district developmental needs, the formulation of proposals for new projects or expansion of existing programs to meet those needs, and their submission for consideration to appropriate departmental needs. Each committee was to function under the Chairmanship of the District Commissioner and was to be comprised of senior representatives of departments with a functional role in a district. However, the overall structure of the DCC was confusing and had no direct line of communication to the planning body or the administrator (see Figure 6.7, page 230). Policy was still directed from the top down.
The DCC approach also allowed for a system of decentralisation among departments, especially in regard to development. In 1965, the IBRD visiting mission noted that poor communication, isolation of staff in some districts and the concentration of decision- making in Headquarters at Port Moresby frequently hampered effective administration in districts (IBRD, 1965, p. 46). The feeling of many district field officers, including Didiman, was that the staff at Konedobu and Canberra rarely thought it worthwhile to keep them informed on current and future policy. The policy workshops were seen to be a waste of time by Didiman as the views expressed at these workshops were not heeded or even acknowledged (Parker 1968, 218). The IBRD visiting mission saw the minimisation of district staff input into district programs and planning as a mistake as it did not fully utilise the expertise of the men in the field. The IBRD stated that “it was important that district staff be given authority to make decisions and implement programs and projects which have general approval of the bodies” (1965, p. 46).
228 The DCC proposal eventually influenced the direction of the Rural Development Program (RDP) formulated by DASF. This consisted of a number of district-initiated self-help projects. DASF allowed for projects to be initiated by local government councils, community groups and by the DCC. However, all projects were considered in the light of national planning and policy. The DCC and the RDP schemes allowed for planning and development of rural programs to be instigated not from Canberra, (although approval was still needed) and could be seen to have decentralised the system with rural people themselves having access through their local government councils and other organisations. It was the beginning of a process in which indigenous farmers could suggest what plans and programs were needed in their various districts. However, a Didiman based in Kerema in 1966 reported to Konedobu that the “perverse and petty attitude demonstrated by the District Commissioner”, and his “lack of co-operation had reached a stage where the District Commissioner had made no attempt to hold a meeting of the DDC” (Ryan 1966, PX 1-2-2). This Didiman was not concerned with Administration problems but was more “concerned in proving to the people that existing facilities of the administration were provided to bring about the maximum possible economic development” (Ryan 1966, PX 1-2-2). The lack of a DCC meeting meant that there could be no progress for the district and for the people to participate in their own development.
229
Figure 6.7 Symmetric System of Decentralisation Sources: DASF Agricultural Extension Manual 0f Procedures, Section G.
230 6.4 CONCLUSION
The organisation of DASF had evolved alongside broad changes in development policy and as a result of Australia’s marginally greater interest in the fate of the TPNG. The function and organisation of DASF gradually allowed for the localisation of the department through the training of indigenous farmers who were to become the backbone of the post-1975 Department of Primary Industries. It also changed the workplace for Didiman and meant a more concentrated effort on economic crops that distanced them from the indigenous subsistence farmer and his everyday needs. Many indigenous farmers remained isolated from the mechanisms of DASF due to distance or because their land was not chosen for specialised projects. Cottrell-Dormer’s vision for indigenous farmers residing on small, mixed farming plots became lost and buried under a ‘national’ economic development programme that strategised a more complete Western form of agriculture, based on the plantation system, far removed from the traditional subsistence garden plot. What is most clear is that Konedobu was separated from farming, not only by distance, but also by a labyrinthine management structure, looking more towards Canberra, than towards Mekeo, Keravat or the Sepik. Although ruled from Konedobu, Didiman felt that there was a strong emphasis on the importance of work in the field, contacting people, looking and listening carefully and patiently, finding out, reporting, face-to-face communication, consulting and negotiating, building and inspecting. The Didiman worked under an organisation that was structured from the top down. It was inevitable that this hierarchy was going to leave men in the field isolated from policies formulated at the top and far removed from the field. However, the Canberra-Konedobu structural limitations were not that absolute and the Administration had a level of autonomy, because the generalist administrators in Canberra had limited capacity to analyse the complexities of Papua and New Guinea agriculture.
There was little initiative shown at Konedobu, because officials from DASF headquarters in Port Moresby were isolated, both physically and culturally, from the day-to-day operations of the district office and research station. This meant that individual field officers had a high degree of latitude in formulating their own programmes. The opportunity to ‘get on with it’ and make decisions without resorting to Konedobu was a gap that many Didiman exercised to the full. They had daily contact with the grass roots farmers. It also meant that Didiman had a direct influence over the indigenous farmer. It was the Didiman who brought pressure to the indigenous farmer on what, how and when to grow a specific crop, whether the availability of credit would be
231 forthcoming and who was to get access to training. The changes brought about by the reorganisation instigated by the Australian Government, the TPNG Administration, and the IBRD had the effect of increasing the power of the Didiman in the field.
The complete divorcing of agricultural extension from scientific and research programmes changed the face of agricultural extension and it was no longer solely focused on the improvement and modification of traditional farming techniques. Didiman were now on a programme based on cash cropping for local and export earnings for an emerging nation and became entangled with special projects geared towards economic crops.
The next chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of an agrarian policy for economic development by the Australian government in the TPNG. It will also discuss the effectiveness of agricultural extension activities by Didiman in introducing land use modifications and reforms applicable to a developing nation. It will also examine the success and limitations of Didiman in the field in implementing Australian policy to indigenous farmers and the effect of these changes on their traditional farming, and customs and belief systems.
232 CHAPTER 7: DIDIMAN AND THE IMPACT OF AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
The plan for economic development by the Australian Government through indigenous agriculture in the TPNG was implemented by young Australian men known as Didiman. Canberra’s and the Konedobu’s administration policy regarding DASF and, in particular, the Division of Agricultural Extension focused on raising the level of subsistence farming and encouraging indigenous economic development through the medium of cash crops. The duties of Didiman included extensive patrolling, economic surveys, land utilisation examinations, discussions with indigenous people on potential crops and land use, demonstrations and lectures. Didiman also prepared reports on “such matters directed from the senior Agricultural Officer of the District”, managed, maintained and supervised agricultural stations, and trained indigenous agricultural assistants (DASF “Statement of Duties” 195, AA series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4).
The Didiman introduced agricultural development through the modification of agricultural practices by indigenous farmers. The British Colonial Office and the Lever Smith Act 1914 from the United States of America were important precursors of agriculture extension in the TPNG. The modification of agriculture was borrowed directly from other colonial administrations.
In the 1950s, agriculture was perceived as the only direction for development to be achieved. This was due to the fact that developing countries, such as the TPNG, had no infrastructure and no secondary industries, but did have land. This land was already being cultivated, but the methods were perceived by the Australian Administration as primitive in terms of soil conservation and productivity. Subsistence methods were economically unviable for world markets. The focus on agriculture in colonies to fulfil the obligations of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations, therefore, placed the Didiman in a classic colonial dilemma—introduce change in the interest of the indigenous people or introduce change in order to establish a cash crop-export economy.
After World War II and the introduction of the United Nations, Australia became a leading advocate for implementing the principles of trusteeship, but the United Nations Trusteeship was an exacting international obligation; one which demanded reports on what Australia was doing to prepare the TPNG for self-government or independence, how Australia was promoting the economy of the TPNG, and the extent of its education
233 and social welfare programmes. In contrast, the TPNG was seen as a market for Australia’s commodities and a source of agricultural imports. The Australian Bureau of Agriculture and the Interdepartmental Committee were “initially enthusiastic about the prospects of the Territory and its potential contribution to Australia’s economy” (Ref required). However, underpinning the agricultural potential for Australian markets, the TPNG was also important “not only to protect the indigenous people but also to protect the strategic security of Australia” (Wright 2002, pp. 65-80). The Territories were always perceived as a strategic area for Australia’s security. Agricultural development was a secondary goal.
In the TPNG, J. K. Murray stated that “there was no future for a nation of hewers of wood and drawers of water” and there was no future for the people of the TPNG unless “they are taught something better and have the opportunities associated with secondary and tertiary industries” (nd “Potentialities”, FLQ 91, Box no.3).
Changes in agriculture were regarded as essential if diets were to be improved, if a surplus was to be produced and if the economy was to enter a phase of self-sustained growth. The development of agriculture seemed to be a panacea; from today’s perspective it was unrealistically called upon to relieve household poverty, the drudgery of manual labour, ill health and early death. However, the Australian colonial administration was limited by legal rules embodied in the United Nations (Nicholson 1970, 183). The Australian Administration had to acknowledge customs which courts, perhaps, did not recognise as law. Hasluck reiterated this by noting that the Administration had to consider “the wisdom of harsh disruption of indigenous social organization and sudden breakdown of their social cohesion” (Hasluck 1976, 130). Didiman worked under policy and laws from Canberra, but also village custom. They also had to overcome their own metropolitan training and upbringing. Didiman were directed to not interfere arbitrarily or unnecessarily with the ‘constitutions’ of various societies and tribes which made up the combined trusteeship and territory of the TPNG. Didiman also worked in a post-World War II era, in which development and welfare targeted the ‘peasant producer’.
Canberra’s agricultural policies were ambitious and fraught with problems relating to logistics. The policies were well-intentioned and based on criteria of benevolence underpinned by economics. Didiman and Didimisses directed their attention to farmers
234 who would progress but this meant leaving others behind; others who did not fit Canberra’s policy.
Didiman had a basic diploma or degree in agriculture yet were expected to create a nation of ‘peasant farmers’ and elevate the ‘native’ to the full stature of citizenship (Wright 2002, 77). This vision was embedded in a scheme by William Forsyth, who joined the Department of External Affairs in 1942 and retired in 1969. He called for a modified collectivisation under the direction and control of the Australian Government (Wright 2002, 74). It was a concept that Cottrell-Dormer embraced. However, to achieve this aim, it was necessary to employ a team of Australian agriculturalists.
The principles of agricultural extension, through the combination of scientific research and education, suggested that colonial powers could advance agricultural methods within their colonies. Didiman in the TPNG were the distant workers for this centralised policy. They were in the front line for the transformation of agriculture. Didiman were the advisers, the technicians and the middlemen, operating between agricultural research and the indigenous farmers and their communities. Didiman helped the farmers to identify problems and find solutions. It was a top-down structure.
The economist and researcher, Fritz von Fleckenstein, argued that “agricultural planning could not be done” from above because the official policy makers in Canberra and Konedobu could not possibly understand the conditions in the field where agricultural change was taking place and were far removed from the everyday field work of the Didiman (Von Fleckenstein 1980, 74)109. It was the Didiman who were aware of the physical capabilities of the districts, the effects of the pressure of populations on land, the complexities of land tenure, the effects of transport and marketing costs and the effects of the modification of agricultural practices on farming communities. Yet there were few avenues for their advice to reach Konedobu or Canberra.
A visiting South Australian agriculturalist, Herriot, noted that Didiman had done well to develop “some estimate of the TPNG’s physical resources and economic potential” and appreciated that it was “important to have a good understanding of the community” (Agricultural Extension Conference 1957). Didiman and Didimisses did met these two criteria, but Didiman faced adversity in the field in attempting to influence indigenous
109 Von Fleckenstein was formerly with the New Guinea Research Unit (1971-1974) and the University of Papua New Guinea Economics Department (1975-1977).
235 farmers to change their agricultural methods. Didiman found that they could not always direct this change, especially when the suggested new crops and techniques were obscure, of little immediate benefit or traditional practices dominated.
Canberra’s policies allowed the rural farmers to retain their land, but the push for export produce placed in jeopardy the production of food crops within the TPNG. In these instances, Didiman tried to awaken a desire in the people to accept change. Didiman found that they could do nothing in the TPNG farming communities without establishing a trusting relationship, but this was difficult due to the movement of Didiman from one area to another. Staff shortages within DASF meant that very few Didiman were based continuously in one district, sub-district or census division.
The shortage of Didiman and Didimisses was a problem that the Australian Government was aware of as early as 1952, when Lambert conceded that “practicality and financial considerations will of course limit us to something less than that scale of operations” (Lambert 1952, AA series A452 item 1957/382). Didiman did not have the means to get crops to markets and Australia had not developed land, sea or air communication networks that were essential to fully capitalise an entry into the world markets. The idea that economic development through agriculture would aid in developing primary industries was also flawed. Entry into wage-labour in the agricultural sector of the TPNG never eventuated. Picking coffee beans or tea leaves was not seen as a sustainable wage for a family and may have been seen as a cause for urban drift by the rural people looking for wage-earning work.
The evidence suggests that Didiman in the TPNG merely applied the four elements common to early extension teaching in Europe and America. These were the knowledge to be extended, the people to be served, creation of a central extension organisation, and the use of an extension agent or contact man (Adams 1982, 1). This was the theoretical framework for extension and the the TPNG is a classic case of its application. The contrary evidence is that the TPNG was so different that it was impossible to be theoretical. The TPNG required practical approaches and practical men and women. Didiman and Didimisses extended new farming knowledge and plant introduction by utilising extension stations and centres and they used patrolling to contact the indigenous farmer, who was the main target for this new introduced knowledge. The creation of extension stations and centres was significant because Didiman conducted simple
236 agriculture education and demonstration programs. Agricultural stations and centres, as much as patrolling, attracted indigenous farmers to the new cash-export use of land.
The Didiman in the field were challenged by the environment, the people and their culture as much as by the policies of the Administration. Hasluck’s policy of even development within the TPNG was never achieved and was inappropriate for the TPNG conditions. For Didiman, the challenge was not the lack of technologies and scientific discoveries needed for economic growth and rural change, but that of converting them into production accomplishments and then using them as an instrument of economic growth and social change (Singh 1981, 15). Didiman, in trying to increase productivity output among indigenous farmers, relied on the theory of diffusion or the belief that innovations diffuse autonomously from those in direct contact with the external sources of information to other members of the community. Didiman knew this and did not focus on more than a fraction of the farmers. This, in effect, left Didiman isolated. At best, they could only convince a small segment of the population that there was an economic advantage to be gained through changed use of the land. The use of diffusion strategies by Didiman led to increased inequality. Didiman found that there was some evidence that the diffusion processes did distribute the benefits of new technology, broke down barriers of tradition and achieved some economic growth. However, Didiman also found that diffusion was limited in its application of advanced agricultural methods to the wider population. Didiman were unable to get remote produce to markets, were unable to change land tenure and were unable to move people around successfully, to maximise export production through resettlement.
Didiman had a tendency to follow the ‘path of least resistance’ and bring together farmers whom they knew were willing to utilise their land for maximum gains. These farmers followed technical advice and were eager for innovations and information. Didiman’s concentration on these progressive farmers led to it being known as the ‘progressive farmer strategy’ and Didiman felt that, by concentrating on a select few, the trickle-down effect or diffused ideas of new farming techniques would reach other farmers. Didiman also perceived these farmers as the future core of the TPNG commercial farmers. Under this scheme, Didiman achieved good results in crop planting numbers and increases in productivity that were reflected in monthly and annual reports. McKillop later claimed that the results of a diffusion strategy within the TPNG had been disappointing, as the trickle-down effect did not materialise because of traditional
237 religious and social barriers and because the practices adopted by wealthy farmers were frequently not relevant to smaller farmers (1981, 125). This was an accurate summary and, although critical of the Didiman’s efforts, McKillop did not deny that Didiman had made a significant contribution. Didiman continued with Canberra’s policy for approximately 30 years; policies that were not challenged, modified or broadened for changing agricultural conditions in the TPNG. In the 1970s, Didiman were still patrolling for the purposes of introducing cash crops, but were doing little for the traditional economy.
The education of women within extension work was limited and, at times, they were ignored. This was a major flaw in Canberra’s policies. In the TPNG, women were the farmers and very little of Canberra’s policies were directed to them. Due to cultural variations, Didiman were in a position where contact with women was at times taboo, leaving a gap within the extension educational process. The imposition of the European view that agriculture is based on men as farmers, and being advised by men in a market place, undermined DASF’s programme. Subsistence food production was considered unimportant at DASF and few resources were allocated in solving the problems of subsistence farmers, who were mainly women. This was noted in articles written in the Papua New Guinea Agricultural Journal. David Potter discerned that only 10 percent of articles appearing in the Journal between the years 1938-1972 were concerned with subsistence agriculture. He noted that the Journal reflected DASF attitudes and policy towards subsistence agriculture (1982, 38). Potter suggested that
the Australian trained, blinkered agricultural professional was either horrified, puzzled, rejecting or uncomprehending when confronted by indigenous agricultural practices. (1982, 38)
This is probably true, as patrol reports indicated the attitude of Didiman towards such practices, but, at the same time, Didiman could not fault other indigenous agricultural practices and saw no need to interfere. Food crops were being adequately produced in most areas.
The lack of Journal articles on subsistence agriculture reflects the departmental attitude and policies towards subsistence agriculture and the main producers of subsistence agriculture—women. Agricultural projects devised by Canberra for women in agricultural development were rare. Didiman directed most projects towards men. This
238 and other issues point to Canberra’s policies being rigid, unimaginative and lacking foresight.
The most common approach to bringing about agricultural change was the package or commodity approach. This meant that DASF followed a dual policy of encouraging a commercial plantation sector and providing settlers with the full benefits of modern agricultural scientific knowledge on the one hand, while promoting a smallholder peasant proprietorship on the other (McKillop, Bourke, Kambori 2002, 1). However, the commodity approach to agricultural extension proved to be insensitive to the needs of the small farmers and to the complexities of their problems, and failed because of the limited experience and training of Didiman. To compensate, DASF developed an in- service training programme for Didiman. However, the programme lacked consistency and many Didiman found that the training was based on a Western system of land rationalisation, where land is owned through a clear-cut title, which did not operate in the TPNG.
Land settlement schemes and land conversion schemes introduced by Canberra and the Administration were intended to ease land population pressure and circumvent problems between traditional land owners. These schemes were based on commodity productivity for an export market. Didiman used the package approach for farmers willing to move or willing to convert land ownership to a single title. It was a Western approach to land ownership and rationalisation. These schemes meant that Didiman became largely preoccupied with seeking out influential farmers who had the resources, or were given the resources, to adopt new and interesting innovations in their farming practices. However, the success of these schemes was limited. Traditional land tenure complexities were never really unravelled by the Administration. The movement of people to new ground for the production of export commodities was not always viewed by the people as a means of improving their standard of living and they were worried about traditional ties with communities left behind. The assumption that resettled farmers would use profits for an improved lifestyle was misguided, as many used profits to invest in traditional lifestyles. Land settlement schemes did provide a way for rural people to educate their children, but many then did return to their traditional land. They did not harbour any sense of true belonging to resettled land.
239 Didiman sensed that, among farmers, there was some resentment towards Didiman because they were being told what to do, rather than being helped to make their own decisions. Farmers also complained about the lack of regular visits or meaningful contact. Didiman knew that their visits to village gardens and other agricultural projects were too brief to allow for meaningful communication and understanding, but they were also hindered by office work. Indigenous farmers would have much preferred the behaviour of the Didiman to be more closely attuned to Melanesian time patterns.
Towards the end of the scheme, McKillop conducted a survey on the type of contact made by Didiman and noted that farmer contact was restricted due to organisation maintenance, such as duties pertaining to staff supervision, preparations of returns and reports as control functions. When Didiman did contact farmers, McKillop found that they were concerned with providing services to the farmer such as rural credit, movement of livestock, produce purchase and farm labour, rather than educational activities such as field days, demonstrations, group discussions, individual advice and public information. McKillop concluded that Didiman spent too much time doing things for the farmer and not enough time teaching them how to do it for themselves.
Eventually, Canberra’s policy directives and the report of the International Rural Development Bank changed the role of the Didiman in the field. In the 1940s, Didiman had been preoccupied with establishing agricultural stations and completing the rehabilitation programme devised by Canberra for the war-affected TPNG. It was not until the 1950s that Didiman began to patrol with any effect among the indigenous people. This contact revealed that indigenous people were ready for change and that change was not detrimental to their traditional subsistence gardening.
Didiman knew that developmental projects had started because administrators or planners felt, on the basis of limited observation that these programmes would help to improve the living standards of the people. They also realised that many programmes would be unsustainable interventions and consequently met with resistance. Most of these programmes or plans were formulated at the central government level and production targets were passed down to district and village. Many of the plans were modified, reformulated, adjusted or distorted by Didiman in the process. Despite this, they were perceived by villagers as yet another Administration activity contributing little
240 to solving problems of survival. Only small sections of rural society participated or benefited in these centrally-planned programmes.
Didiman were young Australians with a background in farming. Regardless of the reasons why they decided to work in the TPNG, many had empathy for their fellow Papua New Guinean farmers. Policies were followed by Didiman, often reluctantly, although it would appear that isolation from Konedobu allowed them to have some degree of autonomy in the field. DASF was not based on a decentralisation structure and this caused a dilemma among Didiman, as promotion could mean a movement away from field activities to office jobs; a move that many Didiman did not want to make. It also meant that promising field officers were ‘tied’ to a desk, while less experienced Didiman were left in the bush with little or no direction.
Australia’s agricultural development policies for the TPNG relied on the men who implemented these policies. Many of the policies were stultifying and improbable, but, at the time, Australia followed other colonial powers in their agricultural development schemes. These policies did produce some beneficial results, albeit slowly, and were often fraught with problems relating to land tenure, population, terrain and cross-cultural contact. There were many failures in attempting to radically change the TPNG’s agricultural land-use pattern. For Didiman, the evidence of their success was at the village garden level, where an increase in plant maintenance and increases in plant production could be seen, together with the increased enthusiasm of rural farmers moving to cash crops. The Didiman bequeathed the TPNG a small export commodity sector; one which probably would not have existed beyond independence. Agriculture did not become the mainstay of PNG’s economy, but it remains evident in domestic, regional and world markets, especially for crops such as coffee, copra, cocoa and palm oil. The perception that the TPNG’s economy could be built on the backs of farmers did not eventuate. Agricultural extension, however, did achieve the expansion of ideas on farming techniques and innovations that the TPNG farmers utilised on their own lands.
This thesis has revealed several gaps by historians and others, in the work and philosophies of the Didiman and Didimisis and there is room for further analysis by Australian, Papua New Guinean or other scholars. Although this thesis is relatively narrow in its scope, there is room for Papua New Guinean historians to re-examine the history of the Didiman and Didimisses and the complexities involved in their work, such
241 as the dynamics between European planters and DASF, between missionaries, Kiaps and other departments of the Administration, which have been largely ignored by Australian and Pacific historians.
Agricultural extension was first applied as a way to introduce agricultural change to farmers in the TPNG, but its application was eventually used in other island colonies, such as the Solomon Islands, however, this has been generally ignored. This thesis acknowledges the motivations and work of Didiman and, later, Didimisses in the TPNG. It highlights the ambitious and, perhaps, misguided agricultural policies of the Australian Administration, but it also begins to fill in the gaps in this neglected area of Pacific history.
242 Epilogue: Reflections
In this thesis, I set out to explore the broad question: How did the principles and philosophies of agricultural extension affect the work of the Didiman on agricultural development in the Territory of Paua and New Guinea?
I found that agricultural extension, as a concept, was implemented conscientiously, enthusiastically and effectively by Didiman working ‘in the field’ in the TPNG, but that the changes they trialled and promoted were often inappropriate or undesired by rural communities. Terrain, transport problems and lack of training also reduced the impact of the Didiman. Only Didiman who had a strong work ethic and were innovative in the field were able to make agricultural extension successful.
Three further sub-questions shaped this research:
(a) How was the development of agricultural policy influenced by the formal colonial bureaucracy?
(b) What concepts, theories and models guided the Didiman’s application of the economic model of development proposed by the Australian colonial administration?
(c) What was the Didiman’s role in the field?
This thesis reveals that Australian policies and the work of the Didiman were driven by worldwide changes in the administration of colonial possessions. Australia, together with other colonial powers, devised ways to develop their colonies towards economic stability and independence. Applying concepts such as extension, agents of change and diffusion were seen as ways for this development to happen. Australia and the TPNG were not outside of the agricultural movement that was sweeping the world. These concepts became the rationale and lingua franca of rural betterment for indigenous people. For the first time, the work of young Australian agricultural officers in the rural TPNG has been revealed and bringing strange new ideas, technology on plants (and animals) to rural villagers. Their role was perhaps unrealistic, but they doggedly pursued their target and, for some, started a lifetime love of the Territory and its people.
I found that I had to focus the early parts of this thesis on the 1900 to 1945 period because of the influence of pre-World War II visions of ‘development’ on colonial
243 agriculture. The study of this earlier era was important as a precursor to the agricultural change, extension, Didiman and indigenous rural betterment as stipulated by the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations after the Pacific War. The League of Nations and the United Nations also influenced many decisions that Australia made concerning the TPNG.
Mostly, I wanted to bring attention to the historically significant, agricultural changes in the TPNG between 1945 and 1965. I concentrated on this period as it was the time when a global shift occurred within colonised countries throughout the world. Many colonies were gaining independence within this period and Australia was very conscious of these changes and could not politically afford to remain aloof from such movements. In response to these movements, I found that Australia was intent on doing whatever was necessary, within its budget, to accommodate international obligations set by the United Nations.
There has been considerable analysis of the TPNG’s quick run to independence from 1960 to 1975, but little for the important period before 1960. I wished to address this imbalance and focus on the 1945 to 1960 era, when large-scale changes were being envisaged, quietly and mostly unnoticed. In the next decade, the 1970s, Australia increased its development budget and was employing more Didiman, promoting land tenure conversion and resettlement programs to push forward the idea of export cropping. Perhaps Didiman were unaware, at the time, that they were the agents of a mass social engineering project, which, had it been successful, would have altered the social fabric of the TPNG.
Overall, this thesis has argued that key agricultural changes were necessary if Australia was to develop the TPNG and lead it to independence. I concentrated on Didiman in this thesis, as they were the men and women specifically employed to contact farmers, diffuse new ideas and educate them on improved crop methods, and introduce export cropping.
My research revealed failures: The impact of agricultural change was limited. Didiman were spread too thinly on the ground and it proved to be inconceivable that a complete change of agricultural practices to Western forms could happen within a 30-year time period.
244 Australia’s top-down structure for policy implementation was inherently weak. Didiman could have contributed much more to policies that were created so far away. The influence of Didiman on rural communities is evident but is localised. Agricultural change influenced only a small number of rural communities across the wider rural landscape. In some ways, this was detrimental to local food crop production and led to further deterioration of the role of women within development.
Many thousands of Australians lived and worked in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea between 1945 and 1975, and many of their stories continue to be analysed by historians. Reminiscences and non-academic books continue to be published but, surprisingly, the work of nurses, teachers, mechanics, radio broadcasters and other frontline Australian labourers, technicians and field workers, have yet to be linked to Australia’s colonial rule in the TPNG and changes that occurred in rural areas of the TPNG.
If this thesis makes Didiman as well known as Kiaps, then it has served a useful purpose.
245 Bibliography:
Primary Documents:
Papua New National Archives (PNGA)
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247 Cottrell –Dormer W. to Professor L. Sharp, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 1957, PX 1-3-29A. Cornell USA, “Staff Overseas Studentship”, (1950) PX 1-3-45. Cottrell-Dormer, W. “Native Agricultural Extension in a New Area”, 2nd Agricultural Extension Conference, Goroka, 2 to 10 Nov. 1956, PX 1-4-65A. Cottrell -Dormer, W. “What is it All About”? 2nd Agricultural Extension Conference, Goroka, 2 to 10 Nov. 1956, PX 1-4-65 A. Cummings D. to Bill Conroy W., Kairuku (1947), PX 29-1-3. DASF to Administrator “Advances to Agricultural Cadets”, (1951) PX 1-3-5. DASF Agricultural Circular No.8/62, “Rural Economic Development Society”, (1962) PX 1-139A. DASF Agricultural Circular No.24 (1971) PX 1-1-39 Part 10. DASF Agricultural Extension Newsletter, May 1949, PX 1-1-63. DASF Agricultural Extension Newsletter, November 1949, PX1-1-63. DASF, Agricultural Extension Program released for 1959/61, PX 1-1-39. DASF “Agricultural Training Centre Mageri: Progress Report 1956”, (1956) PX 7-1-7. DASF to Aiyura “Training of Agricultural Cadets”, (1947) PX 1-3-5. DASF Circular No. 37, “Departmental Reorganization”, (1968) PX 1-1-39 Part 9. DASF Circular Memorandum to Extension Officers at Division Headquarters, Port Moresby (1949), PX 1-2-2. DASF Circular Memorandum, “Location of DASF Staff”, 12 March 1949, PX 1-3-22. DASF Directors’ Address to Mission Conference, (1949) PX 1-4-9. DASF to Government Secretary, 22 March 1948, PX 1-3-2. DASF Memorandum to All Staff, November 14th 1949, PX 31-1-2. DASF Memorandum for Government Secretary Agricultural Extension – Central Highlands, (1950) PX 25-J-1. DASF Memorandum for the Government Secretary “Training Natives in Farming”, (1953) PX 1-3-51. DASF Newsletter, (1961) vol. 1 no. 1, PX 24-1-39A. DASF Newsletter, (1963) vol. 5 no. 4, PX 24-1-39(M). DASF Newsletter (1963) vol. 5 no. 2, PX 24-1-39A. DASF Newsletter, (1964) vol. 6, no. 1, PX 24-1-39A. DASF Newsletter (1965) vol.7 no.1 p. 6, PX 24-1-39A. DASF Newsletter (1971) vol. 2 no. 2, PX 24-1-39. DASF “personnel” (no. date.) PX 1-3-2. DASF “A Proposed 12-Year Plan for the Development of Agricultural Education in Papua New Guinea”, (1953), PX 1-3- 44. DASF to Public Service Commissioner “Re: T.F. Hurrell Cadet Agriculturalist”, (1949) PX 1-3-26. DASF to Public Service Commissioner, “Professional Officers, DASF”, (1954) PX 1-3-2, p. 2.
248 DASF Staff Postings 1/7/47 to 30/11/47”, PX 1-3-22. DASF to Secretary of Planning and Development, Port Moresby, “Departmental Development Planning - 7 Years” (1950), PX 1-1-105. DASF “TPNG Agricultural Cadets” (1950), PX 1-3-5. DASF to The Secretary, Department of Territories (Through His Honor, The Administrator), (1952), PX 1-3-44. Department of Education (1959) Circular Memorandum No. 48, “Schools with Rural Training”, (1959) PX 20-1- 40. Department of Public Service Board to Department Head of DASF, 13 January 1971 “Retention of Retiring Expatriate Officers” Motion by Mr. Pangial, PX 1-1-27C. District Agricultural Officer, Kerema Gulf District to Director of DASF “Agricultural Officers – New Appointees, (1961) PX 1-3-29B. District Agriculture Officer, New Ireland District, Kavieng to Chief Division of Extension, Konedobu, (1960), PX 38-2-1. District Agricultural Station, Lorengau Manus District to The A/Administrator, Government House Port Moresby, September 1952, PX 1-2-2F. District Agricultural Station Wewak to the Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension (1947) PX 25-D-1. Division of Agricultural Extension Dagua via Wewak to Chief of Division Agricultural Extension (1952), PX 25-E-1. Division of Agriculture Extension to DASF Madang, 1947, PX 25-D-1. Division of Agricultural Extension Port Moresby to District Agricultural Officer Wewak, PX 25-E-1. Division of Animal Industry correspondence to Chief of Agricultural Extension, Madang (1947), PX 1-1-63. Division of Extension to Madang, Re: Monthly Reports July/August 1951. PX 25-D-1. District Agricultural Officer, New Ireland to Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension “Native Agriculture Assistance – New Ireland District”, (1956) PX 20-1-40. Dwyer, R.E.P. to Ovenstone W.A. (1947) PX 25-E-1. Dwyer, R. E. P. to Public Service Commissioner (1952) PX 1-3-45. Dwyer, R.E. P. to H. R. Richardson, Principal of Hawkesbury Agricultural College, “Cadetships – Agriculture Colleges”, (1954) PX 1-3-29B. Dwyer, R.E.P. to Public Service Commissioner, (1956) PX1-3-12. Dwyer, R.E.P (Director, DASF) to The Public Service Commissioner, “Recruitment of Assistant Agricultural Officers”, 8 July 1957, PX1-3-29A. Dwyer, R. E. P. to J. A. Lincoln, J.A. (Francis Peek & Co. Ltd) (1958) PX 1-3-29A. General Extension Program, Western Highlands District, PX 1-2-2. Henderson F.C. to the Administration (1954,) PX 1-2-2H. Henderson, F. C. to the Public Service Commissioner (1954) “Agricultural Cadets”, PX 1-3-5. Henderson, F. C. to Administrator, Re: Ministers Letter-Food Shortage, Buin (1954), PX 1-2-2H.
249 Henderson F. C. to Public Service Commissioner “DASF Recruiting Film”, (1960) PX 1-3-29B. Henderson, F.C. to Public Service Commissioner, “Recruitment of Agricultural Officer Grade I” June 1960, PX 1-3-29B. Inspection Report, Aitape Agriculture Station, Sepik District 1949, PX 33-12-1. Lambert to Public Service Commissioner, TPNG, (1954) “Agriculture and Veterinary Cadetships”, PX 1-3-5 Part 2. Letter from DASF Port Moresby to Sogeri Agricultural Station, November 1949, PX 25-A-1. Letter from DASF to District Agricultural Station Wewak, 1950, PX 25-E-1. Letter from Dwyer to the Administrator, “Re: The Integration of New Guinea Agriculture with the Australian Economy”, dated, 9th July 1947, PX 1-1-5. Letter to R.S. Carne in Kenya from Cottrell-Dormer, DASF 14th November 1949, PX 31-1-2. Lincoln, J. A (Francis Peek &Co. Ltd.), to Dwyer, R.E.P.19 December Lowlands Experimental Station Keravat to Director of DASF, “Training of Cadets”, 1947, PX 1-3-5. Marr, C. C., Inspection Report of Rabaul District (1947), PX 33-12-1. Marr C.C. (Acting Chief of Division of Agricultural Extension) to Public Service Commissioner, “Organization and Administration- Cadet Agricultural System”, (1949) PX 1-3-5. Maxtone-Graham, P. L. on Patrol Report from Garaina to Morobe along the Waria Valley, 1950, PX 32-3-2. Memorandum from Acting Government Secretary to the Administrator, “Acting Appointment- DASF” (1947) PX 1-1-5. Memorandum to Chief to Division of Extension from Cottrell-Dormer (Samarai) 20 October 1957, PX 1-3-35. Memorandum from DASF to Madang District Agricultural Station (1947), PX 1-2-2D. Memorandum from DASF to District Agricultural Officer, Manus (1947) PX 1-2-2F. Memorandum from DASF Port Moresby to Wewak Agricultural Station (1947). PX 25-E-1. Memorandum from DASF, Port Moresby, to Government Secretary, Port Moresby, “Food and Agricultural Organization: Technical Assistance of Economic Development” 20th August 1949, PX 1-1-13. Memorandum from DASF to Public Service Commissioner (1954), PX 1-3-2. Memorandum for District Agricultural Officer, Madang from DASF Headquarters, “Inspection of Madang Agricultural Station” (1949), PX 1-2-2D. Memorandum from Dwyer, R. E. P., Chief Division of Extension, (1947) to All Agricultural Cadet, “Training”, PX 1-3-5. Memorandum from Dwyer (DASF) to Government Secretary 9th October 1947, PX 1-3-5. Memorandum from Halligan to Public service Commissioner (1950), PX 1-3-45. Memorandum from F. Henderson (Acting Director, DASF) to Public Service Commissioner regarding “Qualifications for Assistant Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Officers”, 13 August 1956, PNGA file PX 1-3-2. Memorandum for the Government Secretary from DASF (1952), PX 1-1-113.
250 Memorandum from the Office of Administrator to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Aug 22 1947, PX 20-1-40. Memorandum for the Public Service Commissioner for the Director DASF (Dwyer) 30th June 1955, “Regional Agricultural offices”, PX 1-2-2. Monthly Report Buin, August 1958, PX 25-H-1. Monthly Report Goroka, July 1956 PX 25-J-1. Monthly Report Goroka, January 1957, PX 25-J-1. Monthly Report Higaturu, January 1948, PX 25-B-1. Monthly Report Kainantu, 1956, PX 25-R-1. Monthly Report Madang, June 1947, PX 25-1-D. Monthly Report Madang, December 1947 PX, 25-D-1. Monthly Report Madang, 1950, PX 25-D-1. Monthly Report Madang March/April 1953, PX 25-D-1. Monthly Report Madang October 1954, PX 25-D-1. Monthly Report Manus District August 1947, PX 1-2-2F. Monthly Report Northern District January 1948, PX 25-E-1. Monthly Reports, Wewak November/December 1949, PNGA 25-E-1. “Native Cocoa Project”, Gazelle Peninsular, 1957, PX 24-1-19. New Britain Annual Report 1961/62, PX 38-2-2. “Organization and Administration – Cadet Agriculture System”, DASF correspondence to Public Service Commissioner, (1949) PX 1-3-5. Ovenstone to Cottrell-Dormer (1947), PX 25-E-1. Patrol Report No. 15, Abua Sub-Districts, Milne Bay, 1959/60 PX 32-2-31. Patrol Map of Koiari Sub District, Central District, Sogeri Agriculture Station Monthly Report June 1949, PX 25-A-1. Patrol Map of Mot Census Division, Saidor Sub District Patrol Report No. 25 1960/61 PX 32-1-27. Patrol Map of Normanby Island, Milne Bay District Patrol Report No. 1 57/58 on Normanby Island PX 32-1-22. Patrol Report No.13 Aiga, Iawabuia, Dawari and Binandere Census Division, (Northern District) 1962/63, PX 32-1-A. Patrol Report No. 6 Ambenob Council 1961/62, PX 32-1-27. Patrol Report Awar PX 132-1-2. Patrol Report No. 13 1958/59, Bundi Census division of Madang Central, PX 32-1-2. Patrol Report No.1 of Census groups in Sineada sub-District, Milne Bay District, 1960-61, PX 32-2-21. Patrol Report No.1, Ealeba Census Division, Buhutu Census Division & Samarai Sub- District 1960-61, PX 32-2-21. Patrol Report Erap-Irimu Census division, 1956, PX 32-1-24. Patrol report Finschhafen Coffee Patrol, 1954, PX 32-1-3.
251 Patrol Report in the Garaina Area and from Garaina to Morobe along the Waria Valley, 1955, PX 32-3-1-2. Patrol Report for the Hube area of the Finschhafen sub- District, 1950, PX 32-1-25. Patrol Report No.3 Hute, Yamap Musim Kaiwa census Divisions 1962/63, PX 32-1-24. Patrol Report No.1 Inland Wedau Region of Baniara sub-District, Milne bay 1958/59, PX 32-2-21. Patrol Report No.4 Kalasa Census Division (Arabia coffee growing area, Finschhafen sub- District), Morobe District 1962/63, PX 32-1-24. Patrol Report No. 4. Kewowoki to Ondoro, PX 32-1-23. Patrol Report, No. 6. Komba/Selepet Census Division 1962/63, PX 32-1-24. Patrol Report Kotte Census Division No. 3, Finschhafen Sub-District (1958), PX 32-1-25. Patrol Report Madang District 1949, PX 33-8-1. Patrol Report No.11 Managalasi (Northern District) 62/63, PX 32-1-23. Patrol Report No.1. Markham Headwater census Division 1962/63, PX 32-1-24. Patrol Report Morobe-Waria, 1956, PX 32-1-24. Patrol Report No.7 Popondetta, Northern District 1963/64 PX 32-1-A. Patrol Report No. 14 1963-64, Popondetta sub-District, PX 32-1-A. Patrol Report No. 6 1958/59, Upper Nankina Census Division PX 32-1-27. Patrol Report Timbe Census Division, Morobe District, 1963, PX 32-1-27. Patrol Report No. 14 Yal - Bogati area 1956/57, PX 32-1-27. “Plans for Native Welfare, Social Development and Economic Development”, August 22, 1947 PX 20-1-40. “Plans for Siwai Extension Centre” PX 25-H-1. “Policy Workshops”, PX 1-1-1. Popondetta Northern District to Chief of Division, “Comments on Patrol Report No. 13 1962/63, PX 32-1-23. Press Statement by Tei Abel, Ministerial Member, DASF, 23rd June 1971, “Re-Organization of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries”, PX 1-1-39 Part 10. Public Service Commissioner from Lambert, C. R., Secretary to Minister, “Recruitment of Cadet Agricultural Officers and Graduate Grade I officers” (1958), PX 1-3-29. Public Service Commissioner to Director of DASF, 27 October 1959, PX 1-3-5. Radiogram to District Officer Kairuku “Urgent for Bridgland, re: Graham’s study”, 4 Aug. 1950, PX 31-1-3. Recruitment of Agricultural Grade I” (1958), PX 1-3-29. Report on Native Agriculture Development, Minj Sub-district 1959 PX 19-1-9F. Report of Visit to New Britain District (1947) PX 33-12-1. Report ending 30/6/60, “TPNG Agricultural Extension Work and Advancement of Native Agriculture”, Agricultural Extension Patrols 30/6/1959-30/6/1960, PX 19-1-9C. Resume of Regional Agricultural Extension Activities, Goroka, (1955), PX 25-J-1. Ryan, F. (Gulf district) to Director of DASF (1966), PX 1-2-2.
252 Sepik Annual Report 1947, PX 38-2-1 E. Sepik Annual Report 1948, PX 38-2-1E. Sepik District Annual Report 1950, PX 32-2-1E. Sohano, Bougainville Annual Report (1959-60), PX 38-2-1. Sogeri Agricultural Station Quarterly Report, December to March 1947, PX 25-A-1. Sogeri General report 25/10/48 – 10/1/1949, PX 25-A-1. “Staff Training”, Cadet Agricultural Officers”, DASF (1951), PX 1-3-44. Territory of Papua New Guinea Agricultural Cadets (no date), PX 1-3-5. TPNG Native Affairs Annual Report Summary of Agricultural Patrols 1958/59, PX 19-1-9C. Territory of New Guinea-Interdepartmental Committee, Progress Statement No. 2 and No.3, “The Integration of New Guinea Agriculture with the Australian Economy”, (1947), PX 1-1-5. United Nations Questionnaire on TPNG Land Policy (1952), PX 1-1-193. Wewak Annual Report 1956/57. Wewak Annual Report 1950, PX 38-2-1F. Wewak Monthly Reports, November/December 1949, PX 25-E-1. Wewak Monthly Report July 1949, PX 25-E-1. Women’s Central Committee, 1950, PX 7-1-5.
Australian National Archives (AA)
Administration Press Statement, No. 122 (6/12/62) “Refresher Course for Agricultural Extension Officers” by Acting Director A. E. Charles, series A1838, item 936/16 Part 1, AA Canberra. Administration Press Statement No. 119 (12/8/1964), AA 1838. Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories, “Advancement of Native Agriculture”, 14 April 1960, series A452, item 1963/2761, AA Canberra. “Advancement of Native Agriculture - PNG, A518 item C2/1/1 AA Canberra. Bridgland, L. to Secretary Department of External Territories (1950), AA 518 series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4, AA Canberra. Cottrell-Dormer, W. (1946) “Proposed Policy and Working Plan for the Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries in Respect to Native Agriculture”, Territory of Papua New Guinea – Agriculture, series A1838/1, AA Canberra. Cottrell-Dormer to Administrator (1946) “Organization of DASF” May 21 1946, series A518/1, item F852/6/7, AA Canberra. Cottrell-Dormer to Administrator, “Discussions in Canberra and Sydney 28 October 1947, series A518, item F852/6/7, AA Canberra. DASF to Public Service Commissioner, “Classification of DASF”, 11 August 1953, series A452, item 1957/382 AA Canberra. DASF to Public Service Commissioner, (1959) “Reorganization and Classification of DASF”, series A452 Item 1959/6120, AA Canberra.
253 DASF to Public Service Commissioner (1959), “Re-organization and Reclassification of DASF”, series A452/1 item 1959/2709, AA Canberra. DASF (1955) “Report for the 6th Months Ending 31st Dec. 1955 on Native Agricultural Extension, Series A518 item C2/1/1 AA Canberra. Department Dispatch, No. Hague 17/51, from Australian Ambassador, Netherlands, “Netherlands State College for Tropical Agriculture and Migration to Australia (30 May 1951) series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4, AA Canberra. Department of Territories Public Service of Papua New Guinea to DASF concerning structure of DASF, 23 Nov. 1960, series A452, item 1959/2709, AA Canberra. Department of Territories to Public Service of Papua New Guinea, “Advancement of Agriculture”, series A452, item 1963/2761 AA Canberra. Memorandum for Public Service Commissioner from J. R. Halligan, “DASF-Staff”, 15 December 1949, series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4, AA Canberra. Memorandum from Lambert (Secretary) to Advertising Division Department of Treasury (13 July 1951), series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4, AA Canberra. Memorandum for Public Service Commissioner from DASF, “University Training-DASF” 11 February 1953, series A452/1, item 1957/382 AA Canberra. Personal correspondence from Lambert to Cleland 24 September 1952), series A452 item 1957/382, AA Canberra. Press Statement by Prime Minister, “Papua New Guinea – Commerce and Agriculture”, (1945) series A2700/1, AA Canberra. Press Release, “DASF Holds Senior Training Officers’ Course”, No. 1612, 20/8/71, series A1838, item 936/16 Part 2, AA Canberra. Policy Workshops – Land Tenures, , Attachment No. 2, Existing Land Tenure Conversion Schemes in Papua New Guinea, Nov. 1960, series A452, Item 1969/3617, AA Canberra. Public Service Commission to DASF, (1949) series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4, AA Canberra. Public Service Commission to DASF, “Recruitment of Staff, 15th February 1950, AA 518 item C2/1/1 AA Canberra. Public Service Commissioner to Department of Territories, “Professional Officers of DASF”, 30 October 1958 series A452 item 1957/382, AA Canberra. Public Service Commissioner to Secretary of Department of Territories, “Organization, DASF- Creation of Additional Professional Positions”, (1959) series A452/1, item 1959/2709 AA Canberra. Public Service f the Territory of TPNG, “Statement of Duties”, DASF, series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4, AA Canberra. United Nations Economic Proposals: Full Cabinet Submission, 18th January 1944, DEA, AA series A2700, file vol. 8. Reeve H. H., “Opening of the Kagua Extension Centre”, Administration Press statement No.83 (3/7/1964), series A1838, item 1963/3218 AA Canberra. “Staffing in DASF” from DASF to Public Service Commission, 1951, series A518, item C852/6/7 Part 4, AA Canberra. Stanner W. E. H., “Report on Visit to London, 19th July 1944, Stanner Collection, MS3572, AA Canberra.
254 Territory of Papua New Guinea Administration Press Release No. 66 (1956) “Agricultural Report: Upper Fly and Lake District”, Advancement of Native Agriculture- Papua New Guinea, series no. A518, item C2/1/1 AA Canberra. Henderson, F. (1959) “Reorganization and Classification of DASF”, series no. A518, item C2/1/1 AA Canberra. Territories of Papua and New Guinea – Economic Development of the Territories – Agriculture and Commerce, Full Cabinet Address by E. J. Ward, “Economic Development of Territories Agriculture and Commerce”, 25th July 1945, series A2700/1, AA Canberra. Willoughby (Assistant Secretary) to Minister of Department External Territories, AA 518. Ward, E.J. (1945) “Territory of Papua and New Guinea: Economic Development”, series A2700/1 item AA Canberra.
Fryer Library University of Queensland (UQFL)
Murray, J. K. Manuscript, UQFL91: Letter from Chifley to E. J. Ward, February 1947, Box 3. Murray, J. K. (n.d) “Agriculture Potentialities”, Box 2. Murray J.K, to J. Kerr, J dated August.1947, Box 3. Murray J. K to Professor S. M. Wadham (Professor of Agriculture, University of Melbourne), July 1948, Correspondence, Box 3.
The Allied Landforces (LHQ), School of Civil Affairs (1945-46), “Lectures on Tropical Agriculture”, Box 10. “The Traditions of the Papuan Administration”, Box 2. Trusteeship Discussion Bulletin, Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction, Murray, J. K. Manuscript, UQFL91, Box 4.
Cottrell-Dormer, W. Manuscript UQFL 124: Cottrell-Dormer, W. (1964)”Rural Extension in Papua New Guinea”, International Seminar on Community Development, Armidale, New South Wales, Box 5. Cottrell-Dormer, W. (1951) “Agricultural Projects in the Mekeo”, South Pacific Post, Box 5. Papua-New Guinea: Provisional Administration Act 1945, Second Reading Speech of the Hon. E. J. Ward, Minister for External Territories, Box 1.
Pacific Manuscript Bureau (PMB): “Review of Papuan Rubber Industry” (1947), Dept. of External Territories: Canberra, PMB 12371/8. Fenbury, D (1956) “Notes re. Policy on Native Land Tenure”, Fenbury, D. M., Papers, 1947-1972, Pacific Manuscript Bureau (PMB), No. 629. Fenbury, D, (1956) “Notes on Native policy”, Department of Territories, M331/1 35, AA. Cottrell-Dormer to Feinberg (1947) Pacific Manuscript Bureau (PMB) 629 Mic. 3241.
255 Published Material:
Journal Articles
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Chapters in Books
Bai, B. (1985) “Strategies for Agricultural Self sufficiency in the 1980s” in P. King, W. Lee and V. Warakai (eds.) From Rhetoric to Reality: Papua New Guinea's Eight Point Plan and National Goals After a Decade, University of Papua New Guinea Press: Port Moresby, pp. 326-334. Bailey, K. H. (1928) “Agricultural Development in the Territory”, in Eggleston, F. W. (ed.) The Australian Mandate for New Guinea, Macmillan and Company: Melbourne, pp. 103-107.
263 Ballard, J. A. (1981) “Reforming the Bureaucratic Heritage” in J. A. Ballard (ed), Policy- Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea 1972-177, University Of Queensland Press: Brisbane, pp. 75-94. Barnes, H. (1981) “Women in Highlands Agricultural Production” in D. Denoon and C. Snowden (eds.) A Time to Plant and a Time to Uproot, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies: Port Moresby, pp. 265-284. Barnett, T. E. (1981) “Policy-Making in the Transfer of Powers from Australia” in J. A. Ballard (ed), Policy-Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea 1972-177, University Of Queensland Press: Brisbane, pp. 48-74. Barlett, P. F. (1980) “Introduction: Development Issues and Economic Anthropology” in P. F. Barlett (ed.) Agricultural Decision Making: Anthropological Contributions to Rural Development, Academic Press: New York, pp. 1-16. Bourke, R. M. (1992) “Fifty Years of Agricultural Change in a New Guinea Highland Village” in M. P. Levett, J. Earland and P. Heywood (eds.) Proceedings of the First Papua New Guinea Food and Nutrition Conference: Changes in Food and Nutrition in Papua New Guinea, University of Papua New Guinea Press and Department of Agriculture and Livestock: Port Moresby, pp. 26-53. Bridgland, L. A. 1981. “Cocoa Plantations” in What Do We Do about Plantations ed. M. A. H. B. Walther, Port Moresby: LASER Monograph 15, pp. 12-20. Brown, P. (2001) “Colonial New Guinea: the Historical Context” in N. McPherson (ed.) In Colonial New Guinea: Anthropological Perspectives, University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh, pp. 32-56. Busch, L. and Sachs, C. (1981) “The Agricultural Science and the Modern World System” in Busch, L. (ed) Science and Agricultural Development, Allenheld Osmun: Totowa, New Jersey, pp. 131-156. Chamala, S. (1988) “Extension Approaches for Integrated Rural Development in Papua New Guinea” in S. Silovo and M. Jikian (eds.) Proceedings of the First Papua New Guinea Agricultural Seminar: Agricultural Extension-Its Impact: Focus and Future, Department of Agriculture and Livestock: Port Moresby, p. 1-17. Charles, A. F. (1979) “DASF Food Plant Introduction Work” in K. Willson & M. Bourke (eds), Papua New Guinea Food Crops Conference Proceedings, Department Primary Industries, Port Moresby, pp. 379-380. Christie, M. (1981) “The Human Impact of the Cash Cropping of Coffee in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea: a Case-Study” in S. Hill, J. Elsom, J. Stewart and K. Marsh (eds.) Development with a Human Face: The Human Implications of Scientific and Technological Development, Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra, pp. 51-127. Clarke, W. C. (1978) “Progressing with the Past: Environmentally Sustainable Modifications to Traditional Agricultural Systems” in E. K. Fisk (ed.) The Adaptation of Traditional Agriculture: Socioeconomic Problems of Urbanisation, Development Studies Centre, Australian National University: Canberra, pp. 142-157. Cleland, D. (Sir) (1971) ”An Administrator Reflects” in K.S. Inglis (ed), The History of Melanesia, Second Waigani Conference, University of Papua New Guinea & The Research School of Pacific Studies: Port Moresby & Canberra, pp. 209-228. Crellin, K. G. (1972) “The Use of Credit Facilities in Rural Areas” in Ward, M. (ed.) Change and Development in Rural Melanesia, Australian National University Press: Canberra. Crouch, B. (2002) “Tully, Joan (1903-1973)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 16, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, pp. 420-421.
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Allen-Ovenstone, W. and Williams E. J. (1954) Census of Native Agriculture 1950, Territory of Papua and New Guinea: Report on Conduct of Census and Statistical Analysis, Typescript: Melbourne. Agricultural Extension Conference (1957) “Opening Address by Mr. R. I. Herriot” (Department of South Australia Agriculture), Goroka. Anon (1951) “Agriculture”, The Resources of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, Department of National Development: Canberra, pp. 80-93. Anon. (1940) “Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year Ending 30th June 1939” (1940), New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, no. 2. Anon (1988) Rural Development: World Bank Experience 1965-86 - A World Bank Operations Evaluation Department Study, IRBD: Washington, D. C. Anon (1962) Survey of Indigenous Agriculture and Ancillary Surveys, 1961-1962: Technical Document, Bureau of Statistics: Port Moresby. Anon (1944) “Welfare and Advancement of Native Peoples of the Pacific”, DFAT, Historical Publications vol. 7, no. 26. (http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vVolume/7E1F98EB7E415F 0ECA256B7E001E5C8B ANGAU: Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff: Port Moresby: 7-12 February 1944, Vols. I, II and III.
280 Asian Development Bank (1983) Appraisal of the Cape Rodney Smallholder Development Project in the independent state of Papua New Guinea, Report No. PNG: Ap-15, Asian Development Bank: Port Moresby. Asian Development Bank (1991) Agricultural Development in PNG: Policies and Issues, Some Papers presented at a seminar sponsored by the ADB held in Port Moresby, Asian Development Bank: Port Moresby. ASOPA (1955) Native Economic Development in the Territory of Papua New Guinea, Report No.1, Senior Officers’ Course, ASOPA. (unpublished). Bonniwell, B. A. (1973) “Educational Needs of the Rural Community” in Conference of Principals of Agricultural Colleges, Kerevat, PNG, 17th to 21st September, 1973, DASF: Port Moresby, pp. 93-95. Bourke, R. M. and Kesavan, V. (eds) (1982) Proceedings of the Second Papua New Guinea Food Crops Conference, Port Moresby, Department of Primary Industries. Commonwealth of Australia (1939) Territory of Papua Annual Report for the Year 1938- 1939, Commonwealth Government Printer: Canberra. Conroy, W. L. and Bridgeland, L. A. (1950) “Native Agriculture in Papua New Guinea” in E. Hipsley and H. Clements, Report of the New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 1947, Government Printers: Canberra, pp. 73-91. Conroy, W. L. (1947) Report on Agricultural and Economic Survey - Manus Area, Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries: Port Moresby (unpublished). Conroy, W. L. (1960) “The Evolution of the Agricultural Environment in Papua and New Guinea in TPNG/UNESCO: 94097, Symposium on the Impact of Man on Humid Tropics Vegetation, UNESCO: Goroka, pp, 94-97. Conroy, W. L. (1961) Traditional, Social and Economic Patterns in Relation to Agricultural Extension and Modernization, SPC Working Paper, SPC/AEM/TECH16. Cottrell-Dormer, W. (1960) “Some Thoughts on the Mass Education in Eastern Papua, with Special Reference to Women and Girls”, Camilla Wedgewood Memorial Seminar: Port Moresby. DASF (1965) Agricultural College, Vudal, New Britain Prospectus, Department of Information and Extension Services (DIES): Port Moresby. Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (1961- 76) Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries: Port Moresby. Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries, Land Utilization Section (1949), Native Rural Progress Society - an Experiment in Social and Economic Development, Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, Land Utilization Section: Port Moresby. Department of Territories, (1947-56) Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea, Department of Territories: Canberra. Dick, G. (1976) The Hagen Coffee Grower: an Examination of the Grower's Knowledge of Coffee Cultivation and its Relation to Agricultural Education and Extension, Education Research Seminar, University of Papua New Guinea: Port Moresby, pp 45- 64.
281 Dwyer, R. E. P. (1954) Agricultural Extension and Native Production: Report to the Administration of Papua New Guinea, August 1953 on the Activities of the Division of Agricultural Extension in Regard to Native Agricultural Production, South Pacific Commission, Noumea. Dwyer, R. E. P. (1944), “A Paper on Agriculture”, ANGUA: Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff , Vol. III. Government of PNG (1989) White Paper on Agriculture: National Policies for the Development of the Agricultural Sub-sector, Port Moresby, Department of Agriculture and Livestock, Government Printers PNG: Port Moresby. Hasluck, P. (1956) “Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea”, The George Judah Cohen Memorial Lecture, University of Sydney. Hipsley, E. and H. Clements (1950), Report of the New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 1947, Government Printers: Canberra. Howlett, D. (1963) “Some Agricultural Problems in Papua New Guinea”, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, South Australian Branch. Humphries, W. R. (1944) “A Review of Native Plantations and Some Aspects of their Importance to Papua”, ANGAU: Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff, Vol. III. Interim Report from the Select Committee of the Legislative Council for TPNG, appointed to inquire and report upon the Political Development of the Territory, Port Moresby, 1962. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1965) The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore. Kingston, D. J. (1956) “First Agriculture Contact with the Western Highlands People”, Second Extension Conference, 2nd to 10th Nov. 1956, Goroka, PNG, PNGA 1-4-65. McKillop, R. (1976) “Helping the People in PNG? A Case Study of a Cattle Introduction Program”, in Conference of the Sociological Assoc. of Australia and New Zealand: Bundoora. Malori, A. (1977) “The Failure of the Erap Mechanical Farming Project” in R. Adams (ed.) Socio-Economic Change - Papua New Guinea: Student Research Papers, Unitec: Lae, pp. 222-236. McKillop, R., Bourke, M. & Kambori, V. (2002) “Agriculture Policy Making”, Policy Making and Governance in Papua New Guinea, Australian National University, Canberra. Murray, J. K. (1949) The Provisional Administration of the Territory of Papua New Guinea: Its Policy and Its Problems, The John Murtagh Memorial Lectures for 1946, University of Queensland: Brisbane. Powell, J. M. (1982) “Traditional Vegetables in Papua New Guinea: Retrospect and Prospect” in Proceedings of the 2nd Papua New Guinea Food Crops Conference , eds. Bourke, R. M. and V. Kesavan, 64-77. Port Moresby: DPI. Report to League of Nations on the Administration of Territory of New Guinea (1921), Government Printers: Melbourne. South Pacific Commission (1961) Report of the Agricultural Extension Meeting, Rabaul, TPNG, 15th-27th November, 1961, South Pacific Commission: Noumea. Statement by Hasluck, Minister for Territories in the House of representatives, 7th April 1960, cited in DASF Manual of Procedures, Section G C 1 Land.
282 Stanner, W. E. H. (1944) “Broad Aspects of Colonial Administration”, ANGUA: Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Services: Papers and Discussions, Vol. III. Steps towards self-government”, speech by Prime Minister Gorton at the Papua Hotel Port Moresby, 6th July 1970, Published for the Prime Ministers Department and the Department of External Territories by the Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra. Territory of Papua New Guinea Division of Agricultural Extension and Marketing (1962), Five Year Plan (1962/3 – 1966/67), DASF: Konedobu. The Papua and New Guinea Act, No. 9 of 1949, Part V: Legislation, Division 2-Legislative Council. Thompson, W. H. H. (1944) “A Paper on Rice Cultivation”, ANGUA: Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff , Vol. III. Tothill, J. D. (1938) A Report on Nineteen Surveys done in Small Agricultural Areas in Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe. Transcript of the ABC, “Guest of Honour Talk”, broadcast 3rd February, 1963. Rose, S., M. Quanchi and C. R. Moore (2009) A National Strategy for the Study of the Pacific, AAAPS, Brisbane. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (1945) The Contribution of Extension Methods and Techniques Toward the Rehabilitation of War Torn Countries, USDA: Washington D. C. Williams, F. E. (1933) The Reform of Native Horticulture, Territory of Papua, Report No.14, Walter Alfred Bock, Acting Government Printer: Port Moresby.
Other
Personal Communications with Didiman
Bob Curtis Jack White Dennis Nichols Rinus van Schilfgaarde Margaret van Schilfgaarde (nee Mason) Bill Conroy Dave Willis Dave Marsh David Montgomery Bill Heath Shirley Lamrock (wife of Jack Lamrock) George Greenwood
283 Syd Saville Fred Arndt David Freyne
Private Papers
Curtis, R. private papers: - Circular to All Members of the Papua New Guinea Agricultural Diplomates Association (4th October 1965). - Correspondence from DASF (Lae) to the Director of DASF (Konedobu), 1965. Details on the formation of the Association. - TPNG: Expatriate Agricultural Diplomates Association, August 1965, cover-letter. - Letter from F. X. Ryan to D. Carey, concerning the establishment of a Diplomat Extension Agricultural Association.21/7/1965. - Photo, Kikimunga, 1954, Mekeo Region. - Sketch of DASF Headquarters. Greenwood, G. private papers: - Patrol Report for the North Fly and Elavala River Area, Western District, May 1965 - Photo, patrolling in the highlands 1960s. - Correspondence from Dave Murrie, District Agricultural Officer, Daru to George Greenwood regarding his Patrol Report Trans-fly and Suki Census Division, 1964/65. - Murrie’s comments on Western District Patrol Report No. 10, 1965/66 – Kiunga Patrol Report – Kiu (65/66). - Patrol Report No. 3 1963/64, Oriomo/Bituri Census Division. - Patrol Report No. 2 Oriomo/ Bituri Census Division, Western District, 1963/64. - Greenwood, G. (1963) Report: “Study of Subsistence Agriculture, Western District”, unpublished. Heath, W. private papers: - New View, (1973) Vol. 7 No. 13, pp. 9-12. Ryan, F.X private papers: - Field Officers Journal, entry no. 3155, 9/1954. Van Schilfgaarde, J. C. (Rinus) private papers: - Letter from Minister of Territories, Canberra 27 October 1959 to J. C. van Schilfgaarde on completion of his probationary period with DASF and his appointment to the Public Service of Papua and New Guinea. Van Schilfgaarde, M. private papers: - Photo, patrolling on Misima Island, Milne Bay, 1960s. Willis, D private papers: - “A Study of Subsistence Agriculture”, Angoram, DASF (unpublished) (1963). - “Cash Crop Study - Coffee Project”, Bainyik District Agricultural Station, Sepik District, DASF (unpublished), (1963a). - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report No. 1 Pora Pora and East Coast Census Divisions, Angoram, DASF, (1963b). - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report: No. 5, Kwongai Chimbian Census District, Angoram, DASF, (1963c). - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report: No. 8, 62/63, Karawari Census Division, Angoram, DASF, (1963d). - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report: No. 11, 62-63, Middle Sepik Census Division, Angoram, DASF, (1963e).
284 - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report: No. 3, 64/65, Banaro Census Division, Angoram Sub-District, Angoram, DASF, (1964). - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report: No. 4, 65, Middle Sepik Census District, Angoram, DASF, (1964a). - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report: No. 14 Kwongai Chimbian Census District, Angoram, DASF, (1964b). - “The Initiation Role of Farmer Organization for Rural Development”, Laiagam, Western Highlands District, DASF (unpublished), (1966). - Agricultural Extension Patrol Report: Tambul Push Pyrethrum, Laiagam, Western Highlands District, DASF, (1967). Hogbin, I. Papers, Sydney University Archives, Group No. P.015. Stanner W. E. H., Collection, Australian National Archives, MS3572. Stanner W. E. H., “the Post-War Situation in the South-West Pacific”, an address given at Chetham House, London, Nov. 1947, MS3572, Item 91; MS3572 Series 33, AA Canberra. Wedgewood, Camilla H. Papers (1928-1954) Australian National Library, MS483: Box 7, 21 and 28. PNG Map, PNG AJ, vol 18, no. 1, 1955, p. 1.
Ph. D. Theses
Aitkens, P. N. (1967) Cash Cropping in the Popendetta Subdistrict, MA Thesis, University of Canterbury: Christchurch. Ehrlich, C. (1958) “The Marketing of Cotton in Uganda 1900-50”, unpublished thesis, PhD, London. Finch, J. (1989) “Coffee, development and inequity in the Papua New Guinea Highlands”, New York: unpub. PhD thesis, City University of New York. Jinks, B. (1975) “Policy, Planning and Administration in Papua New Guinea, 1942-52”, PhD thesis, University of Sydney. Kari, S. (2005) PhD thesis, “The Origin and Setting of the National Goals and Principles in the process of writing the Constitution of Papua New Guinea”, PhD Thesis, QUT. Low, D. A. (1957) The British and Uganda, 1862-1900, unpublished thesis, PhD Oxford.
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