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Home , Aid, Fatima Jibrell, Somalia Governorate

REVIEW OF COORDINATION FOR

FINAL REPORT

PETER WILES

with

Khalif Hassan Farah

and

Adar Abdisalaam Bakard

OCTOBER 2004

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people and organisations have contributed to this review. Thanks are due to all participants for their contributions of time and insights.

Special mention should be made of those who contributed to the extensive logistics required for the review, including the Head and Acting Head of the SACB Secretariat and their colleagues, the EC Somalia Unit in Nairobi, the SACB Field Officer and her colleagues in Hargeisa, the staffs of CARE Somalia and the EC Liaison Office in Bosaso, CARE Somalia in Garowe, ACF in Wajid, ADRA in Hudur, SC-UK in Belet Weyne and CRD in .

Finally, thanks must go to the members of the Review Working Group for their work, inputs, support and understanding throughout the review process and to Khalif Farah and Adar Barkad for their collaboration and important contributions.

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT ARE THOSE OF THE MAIN AUTHOR AND IN NO WAY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OR POLICIES OF THE SACB OR ANY OF ITS MEMBER AGENCIES OR ORGANISATIONS.

CONTENTS

Acronyms

Map of Somalia

Executive Summary i

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Background 1 1.2 Methodology 1 1.3 Constraints 2 1.4 Introduction to the Report 3

2. Somalia – overview 4

2.1 Introduction 4 2.2 The Somalia Context 4 2.3 The Aid Context 6 2.4 The Funding Context 7 2.5 Nature of the Somalia Situation 11

3. Aid coordination –issues & lessons 14

3.1 Introduction 14 3.2 Definitions 14 3.3 Literature on Coordination 15 3.4 Overview and Trends 17 3.5 The Nature of Coordination 19 3.6 Types & levels of coordination 20 3.7 Ingredients for Successful Coordination 22 3.8 Obstacles to Coordination 22 3.9 Post-Conflict Transition 23 3.10 Relationship to & Political Actors 26 3.11 Conclusions 28

4. The Development of the SACB & aid coordination 28

4.1 Introduction 28 4.2 Overview 28 4.3 SACB’s Location 29 4.4 Aims & Objectives 30 4.5 Guiding principles of the SACB 30 4.6 Overall Strategies 33 4.7 Peace Dividend 35 4.8 Other Coordination Mechanisms 37

5. SACB structures 39

5.1 Introduction 39 5.2 SACB Membership 40 5.3 Executive & Steering Committees 41 5.4 The EC / UN relationship 43 5.5 Security Management 44 5.5 The Consultative Forum 44 5.6 Sectoral Committees, Working Groups and Task Forces 45 5.7 The Health Sectoral Committee & Working Groups 46 5.8 Governance Sectoral Committee 48 5.9 Humanitarian Response Group 49 5.10 Other SACB Committees and Working Groups 44 5.11 Secretariat Support to the Committees 51

6. Somali Participation in the SACB 53

6.1 Overview 53 6.2 54 6.3 55 6.4 South/Central Somalia 55 6.5 Conclusions 55

7. Field Coordination 57

7.1 Overview 57 7.2 Somaliland 57 7.3 Puntland 58 7.4 Wajid/Hudur 59 7.5 Belet Weyne 59 7.6 Mogadishu 59 7.7 OCHA and the SACB 60 7.8 Conclusions 61

8. The SACB Secretariat 63

8.1 Staffing and Management 63 8.2 Secretariat Costs 64 8.3 Tracking Assistance 66 8.4 Information & Communication 66 8.5 Advocacy 68

9. Conclusions 60

9.1 SACB’s Strengths and Weaknesses 69 9.2 Why Effective Aid Coordination is important for Somalia 70

10. Recommendations 71

10.1 Introduction 71 10.2 Some Guiding Principles behind the Recommendations 71 10.3 Options for the Future 72 10.4 Scenarios 73 10.5 Opportunities and Threats 77 10.6 Mandate & Aims 78 10.7 Revised SACB structure 78 10.8 SACB Sectoral Committees and Working Groups 80 10.9 Improving Somali Participation 81 10.10 Field Coordination 82 10.11 Transition (Scenario 2) 83 10.12 Somaliland Scenarios 84 10.13 Communications 84 10.14 Secretariat 85 10.15 Follow-up to this Report 86

Bibliography 87

Annex 1 Terms of Reference 93

Annex 2 Timetable & List of Interviewees 98

Annex 3 SACB’s Mandate, Mission, Aims & Objectives 106

Annex 4 Composition & Remit of Somali Donor Group 109

Annex 5 SACB Executive Committee – Draft ToR 110

Annex 6 General Conditions of SACB Membership 113

Annex 7 SACB Regional Consultative Forums 114

Annex 8 SACB Field Liaison Officer 115

Annex 9 Head of SACB Secretariat 117

Annex 10 Outline of New Secretariat Posts 118

Annex 11 Lessons from Other Contexts 119

ACRONYMS

AAH Aktion Hilfe ACF Action Contre la Faim ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency AET Africa Education Trust AHLC Ad Hoc Liaison Committee ANDP Activists Network for Disabled Persons AREU Research and Evaluation Unit ATA Afghanistan Transitional Administration BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BVO Barwaqo Voluntary Organisation CAP Consolidated Appeals Process CCA Common Assessment CCM Country Coordination Mechanism CCS Committee of Concerned Somalis CEFA European Committee for Training and Agriculture CHAP Common Humanitarian Action Plan CINS Cooperazione Italiana Nord Sud COOPI Cooperazione Internazionale COSONGO Consortium of Somaliland Non-Governmental Organisations COSV Coordinating Committee of the Organisation for Voluntary Service DAREEN Dareen Rural Relief and Development DDR Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration DFID UK Department for International Development DHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs DIMU Data and Information Management Unit DRC Danish Refugee Council DRSG Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General EC European Commission ECHA Executive Committee for Humanitarian Action ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Committee ECSU European Commission delegation Nairobi, Somalia Unit EU FAO United Nations and Agriculture Organisation FEWSNET and Early Warning Network FGM Female Genital Mutilation FOPAG Forum for Peace and Governance FSAU Assessment Unit GAVI The Global for and Immunisation GB Great Britain GFATM Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria GOS of Sudan GSC Governance Sectoral Committee GTZ German Agency for Technical Assistance HAVOYOCO Hargeisa Voluntary Youth Committee HEPG Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group HIF Hiran Inter-Agency Forum

HQ Headquarters HRG Humanitarian Response Group IAC International Aid Community IAS International Aid IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IDP Internally displaced person IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International Non-governmental Organisation IPF IGAD Partners’ Forum IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks JAM Sudan Joint Assessment Mission JARP United Nations Joint Action and Recovery Plan JLC Joint Liaison Committee LACC Local Aid Coordination Committee LICUS Low-Income under Stress MDG Millennium Development Goal MSF Medecins Sans Frontièrè NGO Non-governmental Organisation NOVIB Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Bijstand OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in PA Palestinian Authority PCP Principled Common Programming PENHA Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation PRSP Reduction Strategy Papers RDC Regional Development Committee RWG Review Working Group SACB Somalia Aid Coordination Body SC-UK Save the Children SDG Somali Donor Group SNRC Somalia National Reconciliation Conference SOWRAG Somaliland Women’s Research and Action group SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SRCS Somalia Red Crescent Society SRSG Special Representative of the UN Secretary General SWAP Sector-Wide Assistance Programme SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats TA Technical Assistant TAPA Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan TNG Transitional National Government ToR Terms of Reference UN United Nations UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNCU United Nations Coordination Unit UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDG United Nations Development Group UNDOS United Nations Development Office for Somalia UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDRO United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation UNHCR United High Commissioner for Refugees UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia UN RC/HC United Nations Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator UNSCO Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process UNSECOORD UN Security Coordinator UNV United Nations Volunteer USAID Agency for International Development VSF-S Veterinaires sans Frontieres - Suisse WAWA We are Women Activists WFP WHO World Health Organisation WORDA Women Rehabilitation and Development Association WSP -Torn Societies Project

Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

REVIEW OF AID COORDINATION FOR SOMALIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

The SACB Executive Committee set up a Review Working Group in 2003 with representatives from its constituent groups, donors, NGOs and the UN agencies. The mandate of the working group was to examine and review the SACB structures, processes, procedures, data and information flows and documentation at all levels and make recommendations to the SACB Executive Committee for approval. In order to facilitate the review, an international consultant was commissioned to write this report, developing recommendations for the Review Working Group on the future of the SACB.

The review was based on as wide consultation as possible, involving a total of over 150 semi-structured interviews and discussion group meetings with a wide range of stakeholders including donors & embassies, UN agencies & programmes, international and multilateral organisations, international NGOs, Somalia NGOs and civil society organisations, Somali administrations / ministries & political groupings and former key participants in the SACB. Field visits were made to Somaliland (Hargeisa), Puntland (Bosaso, Garowe) and to South Central Somalia (Belet Weyne, Wajid, Hudur, Mogadishu) and this work was facilitated by two international consultants.

Somalia provides a challenging & unpredictable operating context for aid agencies. Both Somalis and international aid staff express their frustrations at the difficulties of providing assistance to Somalia, reflecting more than 10 years of political impasse for Somalia and declining international interest. Many Somalis are critical and sceptical about external assistance, partly arising from the experience of the UNOSOM period in the 1990s when large quantities of aid were diverted to and their . They tend to see the aid agencies as wasteful, self-serving and remote.

The report looks at general issues and lessons arising from aid coordination in other protracted conflict contexts, including Afghanistan, Sudan and West Bank and Gaza.

2. SACB - OVERVIEW

The SACB’s mandate derived from the 1993 conference. Only the SACB survives from the original structures envisaged in the Addis Ababa declaration. The Somali structures of development committees never materialised as originally planned and the UN Development Officer for Somalia (UNDOS) became a controversial body within the UN Somalia system and was closed in 2001.

The SACB’s overall mandate and role have not been reconfirmed or revised by the international community in the light of the evolving Somalia context since 1997.

The SACB works on the basis of voluntary involvement and commitment of its members and on the basis of consensus. It is somewhat unique in an international aid structure in providing equal access and membership for the three groupings of members, donors, UN agencies and NGOs.

i Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

The SACB is a Nairobi-based entity and much of its activity takes place there, although efforts to support and strengthen field-based coordination efforts have been discussed since 1999 and some of the SACB’s sectoral committees have tried to meet regularly within Somalia. The SACB draws a lot of criticism, particularly from Somalis, for being Nairobi- based but there is little practical chance of a move to Mogadishu until political and security conditions improve.

SACB is defined in its Handbook as a platform for coordination of international aid to Somalia. It provides a forum for all partners to discuss humanitarian, rehabilitation and development issues. The SACB also offers the opportunity to share information on trends in security, governance, and peace and reconciliation efforts, on an apolitical basis and provides an opportunity to promote better understanding of the complex situation in Somalia.

The SACB has developed a series of codes of conduct and guiding principles to inform the work of aid agencies. It is not clear how these documents hang together, whether any hierarchy is involved or whether any have been superseded. They have been drawn up by the SACB without consultation with any Somali authorities and little appears to have been done to disseminate and promote these key SACB documents. None of the codes and guidelines appear to be living documents that are being regularly used by SACB members.

The SACB has made considerable progress in developing sectoral strategies, but there is a lack of an overall, over-arching strategy for international assistance for Somalia. The peace dividend approach has been a central plank of the international aid community’s assistance for Somalia. This review found that, while the peace dividend approach is still considered to be in place, in practice it has not monitored or evaluated, nor has there been any substantial discussion about it within the SACB committees. In addition, there is widespread misunderstanding about what the peace dividend approach means and considerable scepticism about its appropriateness.

3. SACB STRUCTURES & FUNCTIONING

It is a principle of the SACB that membership and most of its committees are open to all agencies concerned with aid to Somalia, including Somali NGOs. In practice, Somali NGO attendance is very limited because of the difficulties of expense, access to air travel, time and visas. Somali authorities are not represented in the SACB structures. Occasionally representatives from some Somali authorities have attended or been invited to meetings in Nairobi. When SACB meetings have been held in Somalia, the authorities have been fully represented.

Participation in the SACB is mainly from ‘western/northern’ agencies and donors. For example, involvement by Arab donor states, agencies and multi-lateral bodies has been almost non-existent. Participation by and contact with African entities such as IGAD and the African Union has also been very limited.

The SACB Executive has not carried out areas of its mandate such as discussion of a longer-term policy framework and the peace dividend approach, nor has it monitored the implementation of the various SACB codes and guidelines. In its genesis, the SACB Executive was regarded as a donor forum. However it is clear that it does not effectively

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary fulfil that function. There is little or no coordination by donors on programme and funding issues.

As with the Executive, the Steering Committee has not taken up cross-cutting issues or provided strategic guidance and coherence. Most key issues coming to the Committee are referred up to the Executive Committee. Both Committees lack leadership and drive and are under-performing.

The dynamics between the leaderships of the EC and the UN for Somalia have dominated the history of the SACB. Both entities have signalled a weakened interest in the SACB in the last two to three years, coinciding with changes in leadership. Unless there is a strong commitment and vision and leadership from the top of the EC and the UN in relationship to the SACB, the latter will continue to weaken.

The SACB Consultative Forum is important in that it is open to anyone to attend and therefore in theory provides an element of consultation with and accountability to Somalis who can attend meetings in Nairobi. However, if the Forum is meant to be a consultative body for the SACB, it lacks bite with little feedback going to the Executive.

The SACB sectoral committees and their associated working groups are generally seen by those involved in member agencies in Nairobi as the most valuable parts of the SACB’s activities and seen as the core of its work. These committees are valued for providing:

- Forums for information exchange between agencies - Forums for presenting projects, peer comment, sharing lessons, including feeding back from programme evaluations - Mechanisms for establishing sectoral guidelines and strategies - Sounding boards - Platforms to discuss issues - Information and briefing resource for new staff , agencies and consultants - A project vetting process for some agencies - Commissioning structures for sectoral consultancies (e.g. on the environment) - In the case of the Health Sectoral Committee, substantial resources for Somalia have been mobilised from GAVI and GFATM.

The SACB Health Sectoral Committee is the only Sectoral Committee to have a dedicated support secretariat comprising a technical qualified and experience Health Sector Coordinator and a Project Assistant. The Committee’s achievements have been partly due to the role of the dedicated technical advisor supporting the strong commitment of a number of key agencies involved in both the funding and the implementation of health programmes.

The question arises as to whether other SACB sectoral committees should have technical coordination support along the lines of the Health Sectoral Committee. The review’s conclusion is that there should be more senior support available for the committees, but that the appointment of, say, four dedicated sectoral specialists would not be justified in terms of cost.

The assumption of the Country Coordinating Mechanism role for the Global Fund is also a unique feature of the Health Sectoral Committee. It is to the enormous credit of the SACB

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary that it has been able to fulfil this role in the absence of mechanisms that would normally have a major role for a central government.

The Secretariat’s support work for the SACB committees is much valued. It generally provides a predictable and reliable service.

Both the SACB and its members have failed to inform and communicate effectively about the nature and scope of assistance to Somalia and the SACB has not developed any kind of overall communications strategy.

4. SOMALI PARTICIPATION IN THE SACB

The proposals that came out of the 1993 Addis Ababa conference envisaged the SACB supporting and working with District and Regional Development structures in the absence of a functioning central government. Those structures did not come into being and the SACB has over the years struggled with ways of creating effective relationships with the various and varied regional administrations that exist in Somalia.

During its field visits, this review found widespread ignorance and misunderstanding and often negative views of the SACB and its role from both Somali officials in the various administrations and Somali NGOs and other civil society organisations. SACB is perceived sometimes as donor or a body that controls the flow of resources to Somalia. The power of SACB and its role are often over-estimated, being seen by some as a government in exile in Nairobi and a talking shop that excludes Somalis and is never seen on the ground. For some Somalis, the SACB encapsulates the distrust, suspicion and frustration that they have about international aid in general. They feel the agencies are self-serving and wasting money in Nairobi intended for Somalia.

Despite these often vociferous criticisms of the SACB, almost no one in Somalia suggested that the SACB should be got rid of. Inevitably the SACB serves as the target for any criticisms of the international community, but there is also a realisation that, in the absence of a central Somali government and current weak international commitment to Somalia, the SACB could also play an advocacy role for Somalia.

The international community has a responsibility to coordinate its assistance to Somalia in an open manner, responsive to the needs and priorities of the Somali people. Its strategies and plans should be based on full consultation with the communities involved and with the appropriate local and regional authorities. Somalis also need to recognise that it is legitimate for the aid community, both international and national, to have its own coordinating forums that then engage with authorities, with civil society and communities.

The priorities for the SACB are:

1. To better explain its role and the modes of operation of its members 2. To strengthen dialogue and consultation within Somalia, where possible in a structured way with the local administrations 3. To encourage SACB member organisations in their own consultative processes to explain the SACB’s role and also encourage Somali participation.

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

5. FIELD COORDINATION

Conditions and context for aid coordination within Somalia vary considerably. As with most agency work, coordination functions are disrupted by security events resulting in periodic withdrawals of international staff from some areas and relocation of offices and programme work in others.

The SACB’s presence and support role to coordination work through the Somaliland government ministries and with the aid agencies is generally welcomed and is reckoned to have helped improve the coordination work of some of the line ministries. Unfortunately, this work has been hampered by the lack of a counterpart and sometimes unconstructive attitudes within the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination.

In Puntland, government coordination structures are weak. Some SACB sectoral committees met in Puntland from time to time, but these were disrupted by the political instability of 2001/2002. Generally, there is a sense in Puntland that inter-agency coordination has been weakened by the 2001/2002 disruptions.

OCHA’s role in field coordination has generally been appreciated in Somalia, particularly in relation to the drought in Sool / plateau and other emergency responses, and also to the fact that it has field staff with a designated coordination role. However, the review found many international and national agency staff who are not clear about the respective coordination roles of OCHA and the SACB.

Detailed proposals for a SACB field structure were drawn up in 1999 but never fully implemented. In the meantime OCHA filled the vacuum in field coordination arrangements left by the SACB. The pros and cons of whether OCHA, the SACB or some combination should carry out field coordination functions was, it seems, never fully debated, nor earlier proposals for SACB field coordination looked at again.

The SACB model, for all its imperfections and slowness, is based on an inclusive vision of coordination providing a relative neutral forum without organisational biases. There is the danger of a mismatch between the relative neutrality and inclusiveness of the SACB framework and the focus of OCHA on and within the UN system. The SACB also aims to cover the full spectrum of aid activities from humanitarian relief work to development. OCHA has a global mandate for UN humanitarian coordination often in close coooperation with NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Nevertheless, the reality of the situation is that OCHA now has a network of field staff established and the way forward in strengthening field coordination will need to be practical and pragmatic.

Field coordination meetings are usually limited to information exchanges and discussion of common operational issues such as security. There is less focus on programming and implementation, partly it seems because field staff often feel disempowered and subject to decisions made by their agency HQs in Nairobi.

Interaction with and flows of information between the field and Nairobi are generally weak.

Somali NGOs are generally marginalised in field coordination structures, although some of their umbrella organisations are growing in strength and capacity.

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

6. CONCLUSIONS

SACB – SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES • Survived 10 years • Lack of Somali participation • A mechanism that provides relatively equal • Generally weak role in field coordination status for donors, UN and NGOs (partial exception of Somaliland) • Provides a framework / reference point for • The Executive and Steering Committees agencies and donors, particularly in both punch below their weight (e.g. in sectoral areas areas of policy and cross-cutting issues) • Enables voluntary coordination to happen • Has developed codes and guidelines but • Developed strategies and standards in some generally these have not been promoted or key sectors monitored • Provided a joint response mechanism to • Donor coordination is weak deal with security incidents • The SACB Executive does not effectively • Provided a framework with which to fulfill function as a donor forum engage Somali administrations • The SACB has not been able to • Provides open access & a good deal of consistently engage with Somali transparency (less so on outcomes) administrations (Somaliland and Puntland) • Provides a programme vetting framework • SACB has poorly communicated itself and & a tool for those agencies committed to is widely misunderstood in Somalia transparency, learning and advocacy • Has not fully realised its advocacy • Has been able to provide GAVI and potential on behalf of Somalia GFATM country coordination mechanisms • Lack of structured management support to • Provides some institutional memory the Secretariat & currently weak • The Consultative Forum and nearly all the • Emphasis on Nairobi-based meetings is SACB committees are open to any partly unavoidable, but severely limits organisations working in Somalia, Somali participation including Somali NGOs. • Too many meetings • The Secretariat has supported a predictable • Too much time spent on information & reliable framework of coordination exchange meetings and email lists for inter-agency • HSC peer review pressure has created communication resistance from some agencies • Health Sectoral Committee demonstrates value of having dedicated technical advisor

The Review notes that the SACB has been weakened in the period since 2002, mainly due to a lack of leadership and vision from the key players, the EC and UN. The Secretariat has also been weakened during 2004 due to understaffing.

It is important to point out that the SACB is always bound to be a reflection of its members, their strengths, weaknesses and priorities and above all, their commitment to effective aid coordination. It is also always going to be a reflection of complexities and fragmentation of the Somali context.

The future of the SACB depends on the vision, drive and commitment of the key players, the UN group and the EC, with supporting commitment from other SACB members. This is the bottom line for the SACB. Taken together, the overall commitment of SACB’s members will reflect the importance given to Somalia and the plight of its people, whatever the outcome of the current peace talks.

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

It remains to be seen whether the international community at large can respond appropriately to the challenges that Somalia will throw up. It could be that the two ‘systems’ and ‘cultures’ are worlds apart and will continue to grind uneasily against each other. As in other protracted conflict situations, aid agencies, both international and national, may be left trying to pick up the humanitarian pieces in the absence of effective and just political settlements.

Somalia is a prime example where ‘Western’ aid systems are trying to operate across global geopolitical and religious fault lines that have widened substantially since 9/11 2001. However, it does seem that carefully handled, there might be opportunities for ‘Western’ and Arab and Islamic aid agencies to meet and develop better mutual understanding.

International aid coordination mechanisms are never perfect. The international aid system contains too many built-in dysfunctions and conflicting and differing forces at work. However, the SACB, with its imperfections, has been recognised internationally as a mechanism that offers a model of coordination based on voluntarism and equal participation of donors, the UN and NGOs.

Given the fragmented nature of Somalia, the SACB can continue to play a role in the aid context in fostering all-Somalia discussion and standards. SACB and its members have an opportunity to engage with non-traditional aid players, such as those based in Arab countries or with Islamic identities. The SACB can play a key role in the early stages of Somalia’s reconstruction, if a viable central government takes shape.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

The report looks at various scenarios that the SACB may have to respond to in the future. For all scenarios, the unpredictability of the Somalia, the regional and the international contexts means that the SACB will need to respond to rapidly changing circumstances.

The proposals build on the SACB’s strengths rather than creating a new structure.

All opportunities should be taken to shift the balance of discussion and consultation to Somalia and to the Somalis in order to bring issues and experience up from reality on the ground.

The main recommendations contained in the report are outlined here:

1. This report is not suggesting major changes to the SACB’s remit. Its mandate and aims should be re-stated, clarifying its role as a body that supports and facilitates international aid coordination in the closest possible cooperation with Somali administrations and Somali civil society. It does not seek to replace legitimate Somali administrations and has a temporary existence until internationally recognised government is fully established in Somalia

2. SACB should develop structured links with IGAD, probably through the Partners’ Forum, and with the African Union and Arab League (since Somalia is a member of both), while recognising SACB’s non-political status.

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

3. A strengthened SACB should be re-launched and re-mandated at a high level international meeting, such as the donor meeting to be held if there is a successful peace settlement and a central government established.

4. A Somali Donor Group should be formed with five members selected to sit on the SACB Executive Committee.

5. The Executive Committee should be revamped as a vigorous body to lead the SACB’s activities, respond to members’ issues and concerns and to discuss substantive coordination issues.

6. The Executive Committee should review the various instruments drawn up by the SACB, such as the Code of Conduct, Policy Framework for Continuing Cooperation in Somalia and the Guiding Principles of Operation, and decide which are still valid and should be promoted and disseminated.

7. The Steering Committee should be dissolved. The five existing Sectoral Committees and the HRG should report straight to the Executive Committee.

8. The SACB should develop an overall strategy framework for assistance to Somalia.

9. The SACB will continue to have an open, voluntary membership, but members will be expected to follow the General Conditions of Membership.

10. Each SACB Sectoral Committee, working group and task force should review its methods of working looking to increase Somali participation, efficiency and effectiveness.

11. SACB members should seek to increase Somali participation in the SACB through their own channels and with their Somali partners. The SACB will encourage good practice in this area.

12. After consultation with the SACB Consultative Forum, it is proposed that the frequency of meetings in Nairobi should be reduced to three or six monthly. The emphasis should shift to holding Regional Consultative Forums in Somalia, probably on a six monthly basis.

13. Every priority should be given to using Somali human resources in the SACB’s activities, including the human resources available from Somali intellectuals and consultants.

14. The SACB should give careful and constructive inputs and responses to planning and policy documents developed by Somali administrations.

15. The SACB’s channels should be used for the circulation of appropriate documents and studies originating from Somali sources.

16. The SACB should appoint a minimum of three SACB liaison officers to support coordination in the field and facilitate links with Nairobi, one of them for Somaliland.

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

17. A pragmatic way forward would be for OCHA to lead field coordination in areas of Somalia where humanitarian action predominates with back-up and close liaison with the SACB. The SACB can support coordination in conjunction with administrations in more stable areas (such as Somaliland and Puntland) where SACB members are more engaged in rehabilitation and development work. An alternative suggestion is that SACB takes the lead in supporting field coordination in Somalia generally, working closely with OCHA whose staff would focus on humanitarian preparedness and response and intra-UN humanitarian coordination.

18. The roles of SACB & OCHA in field coordination should be discussed, clarified and agreed based on the outcome of agreements about field coordination responsibilities.

19. The SACB’s Field Coordinator in the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination should continue, with a joint SACB / Somaliland government review of the project during 2005.

20. The SACB should explore the possibilities of running a similar exercise, as in Somaliland, in support of the Puntland authorities’ coordination efforts.

21. The report makes a number of recommendations for developing SACB’s information and communications.

22. The SACB Secretariat should be strengthened to support a more proactive role for the SACB, particularly in the event of a transition to a central government in Mogadishu. The Secretariat will support the strengthened Executive Committee, the streamlined activities of the SACB’s other committees and the upgrading of the SACB’s role in field coordination.

23. The post of Head of Secretariat should be upgraded.

24. A new post of HQ Liaison Officer is intended to increase support to the Sectoral Committees, help to improve Somalia/Nairobi/Somalia links and flows of information and the interface between sectoral and area-based coordination activities.

25. In the follow-up to this report, the document should be widely circulated and the Review Working Group should draw up a plan of follow-up action and implementation which, among other things will include clear statements of which recommendations are recommended for acceptance by the Executive, the reasons for rejection of others, and a timetable.

A number of additional recommendations are made in the event that there is a transition process involving the formation of a central government in Mogadishu.

1. Also as a matter of urgency, the SACB Executive should open a dialogue with the forthcoming Transitional Federal Government.1

1 Perhaps the SACB could hold a briefing reception to invite these parties, using the publication of a report as a peg.

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Executive Summary

2. Support and find ways to build the capacity of whatever structure the new government decides to set up to coordinate assistance (possibly a cell within the Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Planning or attached to the Prime Minister’s Office). The function should be an integral part of wider plans to build the new government’s structures and capacity.

3. The Executive in conjunction with the SACB’s Sectoral Committees and the HRG should develop a position paper with proposals for the SACB’s role in transition based on this review and work that is already being done in other quarters.

4. On the assumption that Somaliland continues to assert its non-recognised independence, SACB’s role will continue as now in support of the Somaliland government’s aid coordination efforts strengthened by the posting of an SACB Field Liaison Officer

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Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004

REVIEW OF AID COORDINATION FOR SOMALIA – FINAL REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

This review grew out of discussions held in 2003 by the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) Executive Committee and Chairs of the Executive and Steering Committees with the aim of exploring the different views and perceptions on joint collaboration. The mandate and the scope of the review were defined in the “Process Outline” endorsed by the Executive in October 2003.2

The Executive Committee set up a Review Working Group (RWG) with equal representation from the constituent communities of the SACB, the donors, NGOs and the UN, to manage the review process supported by an external consultant. The mandate of the working group is to examine and review the SACB structures, processes, procedures, data/information flows, and documentation at all levels and make recommendations to the SACB Executive Committee for approval.

After an open recruitment process, the international consultant was contracted in February 2004 and started work in Nairobi on 1 March 2004. The consultant’s remit was to facilitate the review and develop recommendations for future of aid coordination for Somalia, undertaking a detailed analysis and providing the RWG with options for the way forward (see Annex 1 for the ToR). The scope of work included a review of lessons learned from other international aid coordination structures operating in similar situations and a thorough going review of the SACB and how it functions.

1.2 Methodology

The review mission took place between March and June 2004. The schedule was revised and extended during March in order to cope with postponement of the international consultant’s travel schedule caused by the fatal attack on a GTZ vehicle in Somaliland on 19 March 2004. The revised schedule also allowed more time for stakeholder interviews and for the recruitment of Somali consultants (see Annex 2 for the full schedule).

Given the large number of stakeholders relating to the SACB, the emphasis of the review methods was on as wide a consultation as possible. This consultation involved a total of approximately 150 semi-structured interviews and discussion group meetings with the following range of stakeholders:

- Donors & embassies (11)3 - UN agencies & programmes (12) - International and multilateral organisations (7) - International NGOs (37) - Somali NGOs and civil society organisations (76) - Somali administrations / ministries & political groupings (24) - Others, including former key participants in the SACB (11)

2 SACB - Process Outline, SACB Executive Committee, 22 October 2003. 3 Including 14 interviews with EC Somalia Unit staff.

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A selection of 11 SACB committee meetings were attended and the international consultant was able to sit it on an Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners' Forum and an IGAD Facilitation Committee meeting in Nairobi during June. The international consultant met Somali faction leaders, traditional leaders and civil society groups attending the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC)4 in Mbagathi, Nairobi.5 A full list of interviewees is given in Annex 2.

Field visits were made to Somaliland (Hargeisa), Puntland (Bosaso, Garowe) and to South Central Somalia (Belet Weyne, Wajid, Hudur, Mogadishu). Two Somali consultants worked with the international consultant during these visits and made, Adar A. Barkad for Somaliland and Khalif H. Farah for Puntland and South Central Somalia. The selection of locations was chosen to provide a range of different contexts within Somalia and was also governed by security assessments. Because of security advice the international consultant did not visit Mogadishu and consultations there were carried out by the Somali consultant. The review covered Arab, Islamic NGOs, and professional associations in Mogadishu as they were not met in other parts of the country. The local consultant was also able to attend weekly security meetings by INGOs, EU, and UN agencies in Mogadishu.

In order to extend the range of consultation, both in terms of informants and detailed questions, a questionnaire was also sent to the whole SACB emailing list to supplement the information gathered from interviews and discussion groups.

A wide range of documentation was consulted, including minutes and papers of the various SACB committees and working groups, some SACB archival material as well as literature from aid coordination experiences in other areas of the world (see Bibliography).

Throughout the assignment, the international consultant reported to and was guided by the Review Working Group.6 As part of the review process, the international consultant presented initial conclusions and recommendations not only to the working group but also to meetings of the SACB constituents – donors, the UN Country Team (UNCT) and the NGO Consortium – and to the SACB Executive Committee, prior to drafting the report.

1.3 Constraints

The fact that the SACB had not been fully reviewed before in its ten year life, the large number of stakeholders, the large number of issues arising and the complexities of the Somali context meant that the scope of the review mission was challenging. Inevitably there are some areas of enquiry that may not have been covered as fully as was originally planned.

As noted above, fluctuating security conditions in Somalia required flexibility of timing during the mission and resulted in the international consultant not being able to visit Mogadishu. For security reasons, locations such as Kismayo and Baidoa could not be visited during the review.

4 Also referred to in the text as the Somali peace talks. 5 Thanks are due to Khalif Hassan Ahmed of NOVIB for organising this consultation. 6 The funding and contractual arrangements for the consultancy were provided by the European Commission Somalia Unit, Nairobi.

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For various technical reasons, the questionnaire mentioned in above was delayed and did not reach out to as many recipients as originally planned. In addition the response proved very low.

The review took place against changing contexts. During the early part of the work the prospects for the success of the SNRC were not regarded as good, but this outlook changed and SACB members became increasingly occupied with the consequences of the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu. Within the SACB, the Head of the Secretariat left in April 2004 and the post filled by an Acting Head. During much of the period of the review, the future of the Health Sector Coordinator was uncertain due to funding issues.

Changes in and extensions to the review schedule in addition to the scale of the work contributed to a substantial delay in the production of the final report.

1.4 Introduction to the Report

The primary readership of this report is the Review Working Group of the SACB Executive Committee, but, given the interest shown in the review, it has been written for a wider constituency. In particular the report attempts to give some global contextual background to aid coordination issues so that coordination for Somalia in general and the SACB in particular are put in some kind of perspective.

Section 2 gives an overview of the Somalia and the aid context with discussion about its classification in terms of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development modes of response.

Section 3 looks at aid coordination issues and lessons in other contexts of complex emergencies and post-conflict transition.

Section 4 provides an overview of the SACB, its aims and objectives and guiding principles, as well as other coordination mechanisms.

Section 5 deals in detail with SACB structures and Section 6 looks at Somali participation in those structures.

Section 7 looks specifically at coordination mechanisms within Somalia itself.

Section 8 covers issues relating to the SACB Secretariat.

Section 9 describes the report’s conclusions and findings and looks at the importance of aid coordination for Somalia.

Section 10 covers recommendations.

In the report, Somalia is used to describe the area within internationally recognised boundaries that includes Somaliland and Puntland.

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2. SOMALIA OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This report does not attempt a full analysis of the complexities of the Somalia context and there is a wide range of documentation that can provide that information (see bibliography). The following section merely tries to sketch in some major features of the context, particularly for those who may be unfamiliar with Somalia.

2.2 The Somalia Context

Since the that led to the collapse of the Syad Barre government in 1991, the famine between 1991 and 1993 that probably killed 300,000 people and the unsuccessful international interventions between 1992 and 1995, Somalia has been characterised by complex political, economic and social changes, fragmentation and the collapse of central state institutions.

Somaliland declared its independence as a republic in 1991 and, although not recognised internationally, has developed its own political and governmental structures. North-East Somalia declared the ‘Puntland State of Somalia’ in 1999 and has also developed its administrative structures while wishing to remain part of a federal Somalia. Both Somaliland and Puntland have remained relatively stable, although Puntland went through a period of political instability in 2001/2 and its administration remains weak. Relations between Somaliland and Puntland have been strained almost to the point of open conflict over disputed areas of the Sool/Sanaag plateau.

In South/Central Somalia the situation has been extremely fluid with continuing low levels of conflict in different parts of the region. Some semblance of district and regional administrations has existed, but these entities have usually remained very weak and disrupted by outbreaks of conflict. Successive attempts at the re-establishment of a central government in Mogadishu have failed. The most significant attempt, the 2000 Transition National Government (TNG), failed to gain control of all but parts of Mogadishu and did not gather widespread international support.

As this report was being finalised the SNRC was reaching its final stages at Mbagathi in , overseen by the regional grouping of states Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). A Transitional Federal Government is scheduled to be formed in September 2004.

Internationally, Somalia has been relegated to a low priority. The current peace talks have received little or no international media coverage. Since the attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, Somalia has not figured highly in United States’ declared “global war on terror” in spite of increased concern about ‘failed states’ being potential safe havens for terrorists. The main point of interest for European in relation to Somalia remains the issue of refugees and asylum seekers in their countries.

Although levels of conflict have declined from the 1990s and some areas of Somalia have experienced relative peace for extended periods of time, the potential for instability and conflict throughout the country remains high.

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Somalis have responded to the absence in most areas of government services and by the development of private services in areas such as education, telecommunications, money transfer, transportation, electricity, health and veterinary services. from the Somali diaspora have been important in financing some of these initiatives as well as providing key support to many families.

Parallel to the development of the private economy has been the growing strength of civil society groups in Somalia including professional associations, business associations and chambers of commerce, private universities, community-based organisations, women’s organisations and NGOs. An example is the Civil Society in Action Forum in Mogadishu that acts as peace catalyst. The forum draws fifty-six organisations from universities, schools, medical doctors, media, women groups and other peace and human rights activists.

A number of studies, including Gardner and El Bushra, have highlighted how conflict and economic degeneration have given women increasing importance in economic activities outside the home.

Somalia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. It is no longer ranked in the UN’s Human Development Indicator table because of the lack of reliable statistics. The last Human Development report for Somalia was published in 20017 although the UNDP/ Somalia Watching Brief Socio-Economic Survey 2002 has provided some updated information.

TABLE 1: SOMALIA – SOME BASIC INFORMATION 8

Area 637,657 square km Population 6.38 million Population density 10 persons per square km Population growth rate 2.76% IDPs 300,000 Refugees and Somali diaspora Over 1 million Livelihoods 59% nomadic, semi-nomadic or agro- pastoralism; 17% agriculture; 24% urban GNP per capita US$ 200 Remittances Over US$500 million Average life expectancy 47 years Infant mortality rate 132 per 1,000 live births Under-five mortality rate 224 per 1,000 live births Maternal mortality rate 1,600 per 100,000 live births Adult literacy 19.2 % Gross primary school enrolment 16.9 % (boys 20.8 %; girls 12.7%) Sources: UNDP Human Development Report 2001; UNDP/World Bank Somalia Socio-Economic Survey 2002

7 UNDP 2001. Human Development Report Somalia 2001. 8 At this time, all data relating to Somalia must be treated as approximate.

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2.3 The Aid Context

Somalia provides a challenging & unpredictable operating context for aid agencies. Fluctuating security conditions often disrupt programme activities, sometimes requiring relocations of offices and the withdrawal of international staff. In many most areas of Somalia, international aid workers travel with the protection of armed guards.

The relatively stable situation in Somaliland has been more conducive to the implementation of rehabilitation programmes but the killings of international aid staff there has disrupted agency work and led to the strengthening of security arrangements for aid workers.

The Kenyan government prohibition on Somali passports in 2004 has been another obstacle for Somalis wanting to travel to Nairobi and created further obstacles for aid agencies working in Somalia.

There has been a decline in the number of international NGOs working in South/Central Somalia since the mid 1990s,9 although judging from SACB documents it seems that the overall number of agencies working throughout Somalia, including Somaliland, may have stabilised during the 2000s.

Much of the operational work in Somalia is carried out by international and Somali NGOs. Security restrictions on international staff mean that the Somali staff of international organisations play an important role in maintaining programme operations.

Both Somalis and international aid staff express their frustrations at the difficulties of providing assistance to Somalia, reflecting more than 10 years of political impasse for Somalia and declining international interest. Many Somalis are critical and sceptical about external assistance, partly arising from the experience of the UNOSOM period in the 1990s when large quantities of aid were diverted to warlords and their militias. They see the aid agencies as wasteful, self-serving and remote.10 There is also distrust of Somali NGOs.

International agency staff also express their frustrations at the difficulties of working in Somalia including the challenging and sometimes dangerous attitudes of local warlords and clan leaders to issues such as recruitment and vehicle hire and the limitations of usually having to travel with armed guards. The working conditions can make it difficult for agencies to recruit and keep staff.

Reflecting Somalia’s low priority, many donors and agencies, including INGOs and some UN agencies do not have specific policy documents or strategic plans for Somalia, although a number of INGOs noted that they were working on them. Exceptions include the EC, USAID, SCUK, UNICEF and the World Bank. The discontinuation of the position of EC envoy also reflects the diminishing importance of the Somali conflict on the agendas of the international community and the EU.11 However, in the case of the EU, the Cotonou Agreement has enabled increased funding to be made available to Somalia.

9 Bradbury, Coultan. 10 Interviews; Bayne, S. 11 Bayne, S.

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The World Bank has selected Somalia as one of its ‘Watching Brief’ countries12 and also as a ‘Low Income Countries Under Stress’ (LICUS) country in 2003.

2.4 The Funding Context

International donor assistance to Somalia is monitored in the annual SACB Donor Reports. There is a general view amongst aid agencies that funding for Somalia has declined over the years. While undoubtedly there was a post-UNOSOM decline in the 1990s, the figures for recent years do not support that continuing trend (Figure 1). Similarly, the OECD/DAC figures show a decline until 1999 and then rise thereafter (Figure 2).13 The CAP figures show a relatively level trend of actual contributions, creating a frustration amongst UN agencies that there is not more support forthcoming from donors, particularly during 2004 (Figure 3). Responses to the CAP have been lower than the global averages.

Figure 1: Assistance to Somalia 2000 - 2003 (Source: SACB Donor Handbooks)

300

250

200

150 US$ (million)

100

50

0 2000 2001 2002 2003

12 Other Watching Brief countries include Haiti, Burma and Sudan. 13 The compatibility between the SACB and the OECD/DAC figures is not known, but the calculations are likely to be made on different bases. The DAC figures include more data from Arab countries. Randal in Harmer, Macrae (ed.) note that measuring the levels and types of spending in protracted crisis is a difficult business.

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Figure 2: Development & Emergency Assistance to Somalia 1995 - 2002 (Source: OECD/DAC)

250

200

150

US $ (million) 100

50

0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Figure 3: UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals 1998 - 2004 (contributions for 2004 until August 2004)

160

140

120

100

Shortfall 80 Contributions US $ (million) $ US

60

40

20

0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

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Figure 4 gives some idea of the distribution of assistance by region between 2000 and 2003.14 Figure 5 shows the relative apportioning of funding between humanitarian and development assistance, while Figures 6 and 7 give the regional allocations by humanitarian and development funding for 2003. These figures must be treated with some care since they rely on the donors’ own classifications of humanitarian and development assistance, depending on which budget lines they are able to draw on.

Figure 4: Distribution of Total Assistance by Region 2000 - 2003

140

120

100

80 Countrywide Somaliland Puntland South/Central US$ (million) 60

40

20

0 2000 2001 2002 2003

Figure 5: Humanitarian & Development Assistance to Somalia

250

200

150

Humanitarian Development US $ (million) 100

50

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 Figures from SACB Handbooks. 2002 breakdown not available)

14 Figures for 2002 not available.

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Figure 6: Humanitarian Assistance by Region 2003

30000000

25000000

20000000

15000000

10000000

5000000

0 Somaliland Puntland South/Central Country-wide

Figure 7: Development Funding by Region 2003

60000000

50000000

40000000

30000000

20000000

10000000

0 Somaliland Puntland South/Central Country-wide

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According to the SACB figures, the EC and the USA are the major donors to Somalia, including US contributions of food aid. If one takes into account levels of technical assistance, diplomatic and political engagement and strategic planning, the EC is the dominant donor.

Figures from OECD/DAC for 2001-02 give the following donor league table for official development assistance to Somalia:

TABLE 2: Top 6 donors 2001-02

Arab Countries 29% USA 27% EC 24% 19% 18% 13%

The SACB figures available for aid flows do not generally include private or governmental assistance from Arab states and institutions.15 Much of the assistance going to Somalia from Arab and Islamic sources is invisible to the ‘western’ system of humanitarian and development assistance.16 The two worlds exist in Somalia but rarely meet.

As noted elsewhere, the amount of official assistance to Somalia is dwarfed by the level of remittances which is estimated at over US$ 500 million per year.

A comparison of per capita aid expenditure in protracted crisis countries in 2002 showed that in the African group of countries, Somalia ranked fifth out of eight in terms of per capita aid expenditure (Randal in Harmer, Macrae (ed.)).

2.5 The Nature of the Somalia Situation

Somalia is often referred to as an example of a failed state. However, state structures have not completely collapsed in all parts of Somalia and there are widely varying adaptations to the absence of a functioning central government. Fractured or fragmented state may be a better description. Others use the term fragile. “Fragile states are understood as meaning countries facing latent or protracted conflicts (including situations of war), as countries emerging from conflict (with major uncertainties on their future stability), or as countries indirectly affected by regional conflicts.”17

Categorising Somalia in aid terms presents difficulties. Parts of it show the features of a complex emergency, defined by the IASC as “a humanitarian crisis … where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.”

15 Egypt is an exception. 16 Tufts 2004. 17 Bourque; Sampson.

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In other work, Somalia is classified as a protracted crisis, defined by Harmer, Macrae (ed.) 2004 as, “those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of their livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity or willingness to respond to or mitigate the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection.”

The working conditions for international aid agencies with the need for armed guards, sporadic evacuations of international staff etc would support this classification. However the reality of many micro-contexts of very varying and shifting degrees of political stability and conflict means that it is unwise to generalise. Most notably, Somaliland shows characteristics of an autonomous state, albeit lacking in international recognition. Many assistance programmes there are couched in terms of post-conflict rehabilitation and development, rather than humanitarian responses.

In some other parts of Somalia the aid discourse is also carried on in terms of rehabilitation and development, notwithstanding the fact that funding may come from humanitarian budget lines and programmes may be disrupted by localised conflict and take place in a context where there is no central government.

Interviewees reflected the issue of defining Somalia’s aid status, some believing that the international aid response was mainly humanitarian in nature, others seeing it primarily in rehabilitation and developmental terms. Still others felt that these definitions were unhelpful and even irrelevant in the Somalia context, given that responses need to deal with both short and long-term needs and issues. In the Afghan context, it has been noted that habitual distinctions between humanitarian and development activities make little sense and are unhelpful for a protracted crisis.18 In some documents, the UN has defined different zones in Somalia – crisis, transition and recovery.19

An evaluation of the EC programme notes that adverse factors combine to place any type of assistance in Somalia on the very threshold of the grey zone between relief and rehabilitation. Two to six years of continuous involvement in water, sanitation and hygiene is normally needed for sustainability – how much can this happen in Somalia? Both ECHO and the EC Somalia programme are therefore bound to operate on the verge of their respective (EU) mandates and should coordinate closely and pragmatically...20

Defining Somalia’s status in the aid world may seem an academic exercise, but it does impinge on the SACB, given that the principles underlying humanitarian and development modes of assistance differ, although work has been undertaken to incorporate development perspectives into humanitarian work and there is convergence through concepts such as livelihoods approaches. However, Harmer, Macrae (ed.) 2004 point out that the relationship between developmental and humanitarian action has mainly focused on conceptual, managerial and organisational divisions, but much less on important structural differences between relief and . A set of guiding principles for is not replicated in the development sphere.

18 Donini, Dudley et al. 19 UNSG report Aug 99. 20 ECHO UNICEF evaluation 2004.

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As noted in Section 4.4 SACB documents fluctuate in their references to humanitarian responses on the one hand and rehabilitation and development work on the other.

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3. AID COORDINATION – ISSUES & LESSONS

3.1 Introduction

This section aims to give an overview of some of the issues and lessons arising from studies and debate on aid coordination, drawing from humanitarian, post-conflict and development contexts. More detail from coordination experiences in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sudan and the West Bank and Gaza can be found in Appendix 11.

3.2 Definitions

The discussion on both humanitarian and development aid emphasises the importance of coordination for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of international assistance. In general, the aid community is in favour of good coordination but, as Donini has noted, it is a term that is much used, abused and misunderstood.21

A dictionary definition of coordination is:

To bring the different elements of a complex activity into harmonious or efficient relationships; negotiate with others in order to work together more effectively.22

The UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies defines it as:

The harmonious and effective working together of people and organisations towards a common goal.23

One report notes that coordination involves a commitment to a simple objective: the harmonisation of planning and action in order to achieve an agreed goal in an effective and efficient way.24

The above definitions all use the word ‘harmonious’ (or ‘harmonisation’) although sadly that state of affairs rarely exists in coordination mechanisms, particularly in complex emergency and post-conflict situations, where institutional priorities and inter-agency competition can prevail.

A commonly accepted, but more complicated, definition for humanitarian coordination is:

The systematic utilisation of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning (2) gathering data and managing information (3) mobilising resources and assuring accountability (4) orchestrating a functional division of labour in the field (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and (6) providing leadership. Sensible and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action.25

21 Donini. 22 Oxford Concise Dictionary. 23 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies 2nd edition. 24 WHO E Timor. 25 Minear cited in Strand.

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There does not seem to be a widely used definition of coordination in development contexts. One description is thus:

Aid coordination is the process of planning international assistance so that it supports national goals, priorities and strategies; avoids duplication and overlapping efforts; and minimises the burden of aid integration into recipient institutions… Aid coordination comprises the functions and processes involved in establishing an effective division of responsibility among donor agencies (multilateral, bilateral and international NGOs) and hence among their aid programmes to the country.26

There is no major difference in definition between coordination for humanitarian and development contexts, except that the latter, not surprisingly, contains a more robust reference to national goals and to recipient institutions.

More recent emphasis on concepts of transparency, accountability and lesson learning that coordination can support are generally absent from these definitions.

In the context of this review, a synthesis of the above definitions can be considered, bearing in mind that there are developmental as well as humanitarian contexts in Somalia:

Aid coordination for donors and implementing agencies in Somalia involves the systematic use of a variety of instruments in order to implement humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance in a coherent, effective and efficient manner.

Such instruments include:

1. Strategic planning 2. Gathering data, managing information and sharing lessons learned 3. Mobilising resources 4. Promoting adherence to international and locally developed guidelines and standards and promoting accountability 5. Orchestrating a functional divisions of labour in order to avoid gaps, duplication and overlapping efforts and minimise the burden of aid implementation on recipient institutions 6. Negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities, supporting national, regional or local goals, priorities and strategies where these exist 7. Providing leadership.

3.3 The Literature on Coordination

There is a considerable literature on aid coordination, both in humanitarian and development contexts, and to a lesser extent on post-conflict transitions. However there are some shortcomings:

• In the humanitarian arena there has been an emphasis by many major multi-country studies (e.g Reindorp; Donini) on coordination from the UN perspective.

26 Cowi UNDP.

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• One study on developmental coordination notes that lessons from participating in various kinds of coordination activities are fragmented… Most experiences from aid coordination are not documented. This means having to rely partly on less well-documented and less formal but more relevant verbal information and less formal and more descriptive material such as working papers and consultancy studies.27 • There is also a sense that reports focused on coordination as a topic can create their own distortions, unless coordination is clearly seen as a means to an end.28 Programme evaluations can often provide some useful observations on coordination from a more user- and field-orientated perspective. This report has therefore looked carefully at the limited number of programme evaluations that have been made available. • Given that coordination is often a disputed area, judgements about ‘success’ or ‘failure’ will depend on who one talks to and their organisational experience and background. Thus it probably pays to be cautious in learning lessons from other settings unless the analysis and findings have a strong degree of independence and take a comprehensive view undistorted by institutional perspectives. • Across the board, there is little work done on the costs of coordination, let along questions of cost-effectiveness. Disch notes in the developmental context that both donors and aid recipients are spending considerable resources on aid coordination activities. The trend seems to be towards an increase in these levels, yet relatively little is known about the outcomes and impact of these efforts. • There is little written on coordination from a host government or civil society context.29 • As has been mentioned in Section 1, there is no established, agreed methodology for conceptualising coordination and evaluating it.

27 Disch. 28 Van Brabant; Wiles – Review Inception Report. 29 Van Brabant.

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3.4 Overview & Trends

It is beyond the scope of this report to do a full review of trends and issues in aid coordination.

On the humanitarian side a great deal has been written since the first Gulf War in 1991 and in particular since the failures in international coordination during the in 1994. The major multi-agency, system-wide evaluation of the Rwanda emergency emphasised that aid cannot be used as a substitute for political action.

The increasing diversity of actors in humanitarian responses, including peacekeeping forces, private contractors has been one of many incentives to improve international coordination and coherence. Another has been the increasingly dangerous operating environment for humanitarian workers with increasing numbers of targeted attacks for political reasons, not just ‘traditional’ reasons of theft. Humanitarian workers no longer work on the assumption that, generally, their presence and role will be accepted and respected by belligerent groups. 30 There is a growing concern that intensified interactions with non-humanitarian actors and the increasing trend to use the military in ‘humanitarian’ work threatens the impartiality of humanitarian action.31 In the donor arena, there are trends to increasing bilateralism in responses to humanitarian emergencies and increasing operational or semi-operational presences in some situations.32

Improving humanitarian coordination has been an important focus of the UN system, particularly since Resolution 46/182 of 1991 that created the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the IASC, and led to the replacement of UNDRO by DHA. As part of the UN reform process the UN Secretary General replaced DHA with OCHA with a streamlined focus on coordination, advocacy and policy development.33 The UN Secretary-General reports regularly to ECOSOC on progress in improving humanitarian coordination. A particular feature of UN reforms and the Brahimi report has been a focus on increasing coherence in international responses where UN peace keeping forces and other international military assets are deployed and where the UN is playing a key political role in post-conflict situations, particularly Kosovo and East Timor.34 The shift to coherence has provoked the concern that aid is being co-opted for political and military ends. In terms of coordination tools, a great deal of work has gone on in the UN system to improve the CHAP/CAP as both a planning and coordination mechanism as well as a fundraising document.35 In the donor arena, work is being done on improving responses through the good donorship initiative.

Since the Rwanda emergency a wide range of coordination structures has been deployed in countries such Sierra Leone, , Burundi, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Sudan and Afghanistan have seen two of the largest and longest standing humanitarian aid coordination arrangements. Before the Taliban regime was ousted,

30 ECOSOC 2004: Strengthening coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the UN. 31 IASC Review. For example the military Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan that are tasked with security and reconstruction activities. ECOSOC 2004. 32 ODI. 33 Reindorp. 34 Brahimi, L.2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations A/55/305 S/2000/809. United Nations. New York. 35 This work includes piloting the CAP Needs Assessment Framework and Matrix (NAFM).

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Afghanistan saw one of the most ambitious experiments in strategic coordination, coupled with principled common programming.

On the development side, work on coordination and overall aid management has been led from a donor perspective by the OECD/DAC, the World Bank and the UNDG/UNDP. A wide range of planning tools has been developed to improve donor and agency coordination including Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (World Bank/IMF), the Comprehensive Development Frameworks and Country Assistance Strategies (World Bank), the Common Country Assessment and UNDAF (UN). These instruments reflect the view that development cooperation should be centred around national development programmes owned and managed by national institutions. Donors must offer assistance to the recipient government for the building of capacity in national institutions for effective aid management.36

A recurring theme both in the development and humanitarian worlds has been the weakness of donor coordination. This has been taken into the work being done on good donorship by OECD/DAC. Other approaches to coordination include an increased emphasis on budgetary support to national governments and pooled funding through mechanisms like Sector Wide Assistance Programmes (SWAPs).

The EC has developed an emphasis on the three “Maastricht C’s” – coherence, coordination and complementarity. Coherence is taken as meaning integrated approach to external relations, security, economic and development policies.

Work on improved coordination has also been subsumed in the move towards the harmonisation of the approaches of multilateral and bilateral development institutions and multilateral financial institutions following on from the Monterrey Consensus March 2002.37 Harmonisation, seen as a reincarnation of the concept of aid coordination, holds donors and partners accountable to aligning development around national priorities and systems to achieve the MDGs…. It is about how to work more efficiently and effectively for development impact.38 The 2003 Rome declaration on harmonisation states: “We attach high importance to partner countries’ assuming a stronger leadership role in the coordination of international assistance and to assisting in building their capacity to do so.”.

Other evidence of the movement to closer inter-agency relations is the recently agreed strategic partnership agreed between the EC & UNDP intended to strengthen both organisation’s ability to deliver efficient, high quality aid to developing countries, particularly in the areas of governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.39

Another coordination trend is towards global standing agreements or statements of partnership between agencies and bodies that can be invoked when appropriate. Examples include, in the humanitarian context, the WFP/UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Working Arrangements for Refugee, Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Operations40 and the EC / UN 2001 Communication on “Building an Effective Partnership

36 Cowie UNDP. 37 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, 25 Feb 2003: 38 UNDP/UNDG. 2004. Responding to Rome. 39 EC Press release June 2004: 40 UNHCR Handbook. Memorandum revised with effect from 31 March 1997.

18 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 with the United Nations in the Fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs” in the development field.41

To an extent the analysis of coordination in the humanitarian and development contexts remains separated, particularly in case studies, in spite of the growing recognition of the need for linkages and the understanding that the relief, rehabilitation, development contexts are often not a sequential continuum, but co-existing and shifting in many conflict or post- conflict situations.

Harmer, Macrae (ed.) 2004 note that the pressure has increased on mainstream development actors such as UNDP and the World Bank to engage more and earlier in ‘difficult’ environments. This has been driven partly be global security concerns and partly by the benchmarking of the Millennium Development Goals.42

3.5 The Nature of Coordination

One study describes the reality of coordination as a constantly shifting compromise between opportunity-grabbing and systemisation. On one hand, coordination is a manifestation of power.43 It does not happen unless it is in the immediate or ultimate interests of a sufficient number of organisations, regardless of whether these interests include the best way to address vulnerability, or the best way to maximise funding or profile. As power shifts, opportunities for coordination grow and recede. Other the other hand, without attempts to define and systemise organisational response capacities, opportunities can not be maximised or sustained.44

The following observations, adapted slightly from Van Brabant also help to describe the realities of coordination:45

• Coordination efforts should start from the premise that coordination is not an end in itself, but an attempt to enhance the quality of the international interventions in and on these conflicts. • Coordination therefore is an ongoing activity… a process rather than a blue print. Key to ‘success’ is intellectual leadership, more than institutional leadership. • As Stockton also points out, striving for total consensus among a large number of agencies, many of whom may have no clear policies, is a misplaced objective.46 More realistically the coordination process seeks to create a ‘critical mass’ of leading agencies, whose improved analysis and increased effectiveness makes them more influential in the debates and decisions about interventions. • Qualities of a good coordinator include intellectual leadership, adopting coordination by argument. This requires a thorough understanding of the situation, of different perceptions of it, and of the organisational incentives that work against coordination. This style of coordination involves identifying topical issues, offering convincing analysis, raising key questions and exploring the best ways forward.

41 .European Commission (COM(2001)231) 42 Also citing Macrae et al. 2004. 43 Noted by several humanitarian and private sector commentators – see for example Moore. 44 OCHA E Timor evaluation. 45 Van Brabant. 46 Stockton.

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• Coordinators need to be able to run effective meetings. There are few things quite as prevalent and motivation-killing as ineffective meetings. Meetings need to be well prepared, ensuring that the right people attend, managing it to produce results etc. Coordinators need to understand the mandates, cultures and operational practices of the actors involved. Experience of other coordination situations is also helpful. • A climate has to be fostered whereby critical review is no longer perceived as threatening. • The coordination forum should be the central repository of reviews and evaluations and a local of interagency learning.

The debate about whether coordination can be achieved by command or by consensus continues. Some commentators believe that the most effective coordination will be achieved by command arrangements, including the central controlling of funds. 47 In the complex emergency context, Donini and Ockwell note that coordination without carrots or sticks is a thankless task. Unless the coordinating body has some authority and/or control of the purse strings..it is unlikely that coordination can go beyond a facilitating role which may or may not produce the desired cohesion.48

However most observers seem to agree, sometimes reluctantly, that establishing more formalised coordination arrangements has proven difficult, not least when different types of humanitarian agency are represented in a common coordination body or the humanitarian situation is highly politically charged. Coordination requires agencies to show a large degree of willingness to contribute towards a common goal. In the end it may largely depend on the ability of individuals to build the necessary trust to be allowed to facilitate such a fragile process. Successful coordination is also about the allocation of the necessary time and resources for coordination activities, and that agency staff with the necessary authority within their organisation to participate in meetings and common strategy development.49

A theme that comes out in relation to both humanitarian and development coordination is the tendency towards complexity. Disch notes in the development context that there can be a bewildering array of coordination activities in any one country including. Disch further notes that in no country the study is aware of is there a good overview of all of these coordination activities in terms of participation, frequency, agendas, much less regarding outcomes/results and costs. The complexity and sheer number of such coordinating activities poses a serious strain on both donor and recipient resources.50 An observer on Afghanistan noted that the coordination structures were of such complexity that he could find no one to explain them clearly.51 (See also Appendix 11).

3.6 Types & Levels of Coordination

As mentioned earlier, there is no agreed common framework for analysing coordination. The spectrum of arrangements between voluntary coordination and mandatory coordination have been described in various ways, reflecting varying degrees of intensity of and commitment to coordination (Table 3).

47 The idea of a common humanitarian fund has not been widely supported and could not be implemented for Afghanistan. 48 Donini, Ockwell. 49 Strand. 50 Disch . 51 Schenkenberg.

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TABLE 3: Levels of Coordination between the Voluntary and the Mandatory

Spectrum of Donini USAID Disch Coordination Consensus: Leadership is Information exchange Consultation/ information Voluntary essentially a function of the sharing: No formal capacity to orchestrate a commitments or decisions ¦ coherent response and to although an intention or ¦ mobilise the key actors desire that the consultation ¦ around common objectives will lead at least to ¦ and priorities. informal understandings of ¦ improved practices along some defined dimension. ¦ ↓ Division of labour – some Cooperation: More ¦ shared planning strategic in nature. ¦ Policies, priorities and ¦ principles are discussed with intention of arriving ¦ at some harmonisation. ¦ Requires a degree of trust ¦ and consensus ¦ Common frameworks – agree Collaboration: A ¦ policy objectives in a sector conscious effort to ensure that implementation ¦ activities run smoothly eg ¦ budget support, sector- ¦ wide funding ¦ ↓ Command: involves strong Monitoring performance – leadership and some sort of agreement when success has Mandatory carrot or stick52 been achieved

Different roles of aid coordination have been defined as follows:

• Information sharing (including information gathering) • Sharing (and/or jointly conducting) analysis, monitoring and evaluation • Aligning with common objectives and strategy (even if wider and longer term goals are hard to agree, this may be possible at sector level and over the short term) • Prioritisation & resource allocation • Joint funding and/or implementation of projects and programmes • Joint representation • Wider advocacy, dissemination53

The UN humanitarian system sometimes distinguishes between strategic and operational coordination (Lautze).

52 A stick might be access to funds only if agreed policies are adhered to. A carrot might be access to common logistics and communication facilities. 53 Lister, Le More.

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3.7 Ingredients for Successful Coordination

The following suggests some of the ingredients of successful coordination:

1. Agencies can be persuaded to coordinate where coordination clearly adds value – the crucial ingredient here is effective leadership. The intellectual route with managerial and analytical skills that offer clarity, structure and direction involves having: • Competence, management skills, dynamism and vision • Coordination is carried out by those without vested institutional interests, provide services to the whole system and for whom coordination is a full-time job. • Need for skilled and adequate staff. For an organisation to develop a collaborative ethos, the choice of staff is critical.54 • Accountability • A service-orientated approach. • Focus on the beneficiaries.55

2. Contexts where agency and personal relationships have been built over time.

3. Organisations coordinate when they have corporate policies on coordination that are implemented in the field.

4. Dedicated human and financial resources for coordination purposes.

In addition to the above, Fowler notes, in the NGO context, that coordination works best when:

• An agency is prepared to take the lead by investing in the required human capacity. • The individual(s) leading the body has the right personality for the setting. • There is no competition between the coordinating body and its members. • Coordination is treated as a learning process.56

3.8 Obstacles to Coordination

There is a long list of reasons why good coordination can be difficult to achieve:57

1. Assertion of organisational independence, mandates and governance can be given as reasons not to participate fully in coordination mechanisms.58 2. Management obstacles: absence of accountability, ‘adhocracy’ masked as flexibility gives emphasis to personalities, can lead to innovation, but negatively, the weak management associated with adhocracy allows the incompetent to underperform. 3. Most organisations have internal coordination problems which can absorb time and energy. Similarly, agencies working in coalitions or will probably spend a good

54 Ball, Campbell. 55 Adapted from Reindorp. 56 From Fowler, acknowledging a contribution from Bennett. 57 Taken from van Brabant 58 Van Brabant reckons that too much is made of ‘mandate’ issues. This usually smacks ..of mere organisational self-interest, with disregard for the interests of the intended beneficiaries.

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deal of time on internal coordination before getting round to external coordination commitments. 4. Very few organisations have a strong institutional position on coordination. As a result it is often left to management and staff at all levels to prioritise or not. This can explain why coordination commitments of an agency or donor can suddenly change when the leadership changes, although there may not necessarily been any policy change within the organisation as a whole. 59 5. Competition between agencies for funds. Inter-agency competitiveness and distrust continue to pose obstacles to improved strategic coordination. Fund-raising and visibility pressures amplify competition between agencies, undermining effective collaboration and thus impeding strategic coordination.60 6. Personality differences between key players. 7. Governments may wish to thwart coordination e.g. to keep donors divided, perhaps to mask bad policies and . 8. Coordination of aid can also be hindered if the host government lacks capacity and is itself poorly coordinated internally and, for example, government ministers cannot agree on priorities.61

3.9 Post-Conflict Transition

Studies on post-conflict transition situations have been mainly written from a UN or donor perspective. As with humanitarian and development work on coordination, little has been written specifically about the issues of coordination in transition from the perspective of the national or local authority that should be taking over responsibility.

A 2003 report by UNDG/ECHA on transition issues gives a working definition of transition:

“For the UN, transition refers to the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity”. 62

It is a period during which an often weak government will be seeking to establish itself and can be a period of unprecedented international attention in terms of UN, donor and aid agency involvement.

The inadequacies of the international system in transitional contexts are noted in the IASC Review 2003. To date no mechanism has been identified in or outside the UN that effectively links these actors (donors, international financial institutions, UN, development agencies, UN political and peace keeping missions, the Security Council, NGOs, affected governments and outside experts) in a coherent process.63

A number of studies emphasise that there is not a continuum, either linear or uni-directional, in most transition contexts and there can often be a no war / no peace situation.64 Planning in

59 Or as van Brabant points out, the representative of an agency in one country may be acting as a major opponent of coordination, while the same agency in another country is taking the lead. 60 Lautze. 61 Lack of government capacity – this can be magnified by agencies’ unwillingness to allow government to coordinate and overburdening of officials with missions, documentation etc. 62 UNDG/ECHA. Working Group on Transition Issues. February 2004. 63 External Review Of The IASC. 2003. 64 EC LRRD – An Assessment 2001; Higazi; UNDG/ECHA 2004.

23 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 transition should anticipate that things may get worse before they get better. Consolidating peace is the overarching aim of transition.

The UNDG/ECHA report offers definitions of the different modes of response, often operating together in a transition context:

• Emergency relief: immediate, survival assistance to the victims of crisis and violent conflict. The main purpose is to save lives • Rehabilitation: overlap with relief and objectives normally targeted for achievement after two years. Principal aims are to initiate reconstruction of infrastructure at national and local levels. Programmes are increasingly under local control, approaches such as cost recovery, revolving funds are introduced. Disaster preparedness and mitigation schemes are included. • Development: have long-term objectives and presume conditions of security and a functioning administration pursuing national objectives and strategies in partnership with external actors. • A recovery approach focuses on how best to restore the capacity of the government and communities to rebuild and recover from crisis and prevent relapses. Recovery seeks not only to catalyse development activities but also to build upon earlier humanitarian programmes to ensure that their inputs become assets for development.

The UNDG/ECHA report notes that each transition situation is unique, that there is danger of replication and there can be no standard response to countries in transition. It finds a strong consensus that flexibility in the use and tailoring of existing coordination tools for transition is required, rather than the development of new tools. Flexibility and the lack of one ready- made model for coordinating external assistance in post conflict/peacebuilding situations is reiterated in a USAID paper on donor coordination, adding somewhat pessimistically that a characteristic transition situation that includes an unwieldy number of actors and agendas and very low levels of trust.65

65 USAID paper on donor coordination 2000.

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The UNDG/ECHA report found a lack of coherence between various elements of the UN responses, partly due to a lack of a shared understanding of context and events and unity of purpose.66 It noted that:

• Transition activities must be field-driven from conception to implementation and based on a common analysis, a system-wide assessment of needs and a clear identification of the potential role of the UN. • Need for new funding measures to cover the ‘gap’ between emergency and development funding, suggesting that donors should consider ways of applying “good donorship” principles to better address the needs of countries undergoing a transition from relief to development.67 • Need for greater clarity and agreement between the UN system and the World Bank on their respective roles. • Promoting national ownership of transition processes at central and community levels, including through capacity building is fundamental to a successful transition. • Needs to be single coherent strategy based on shared contextual analysis.

Transition contexts are noteworthy as being a period when aid organisations will need to reassess their programmes, their priorities and their roles. This applies to NGOs and the RC/RC Movement, as well as to the UN. In pre-transition situations, NGOs, and donors, will often have been used to direct funding relationships without a framework of national policies. NGOs will find donor attention and funding turning to developmental modes and away from a reliance on NGOs for programme implementation. However the UNDG/ECHA report also notes that there are missed opportunity of NGOs being involved in transition planning and development planning exercises. Schiavo-Campo points out in a World Bank-focused report that because post-conflict reconstruction is inherently a top down process, caution must be exercised lest existing NGO activities and local structures are inadvertently suffocated by the reconstruction assistance.

Further points that arise from the literature include:

• Priority must be given to supporting the development of government capacity for aid coordination and management. 68 • The importance of common, widely shared needs assessment process.69 • Structures and mechanisms that were useful at the peak of the crisis will need to be phased out or adapted as their utility decreases or becomes redundant. The three case studies in Donini demonstrate that effective coordination obeys the law of diminishing returns.70 The transition process is not necessarily linear: the motto of the coordination entity should be “adapt or die”

66 The UNDG/ECHA report looked at Afghanistan, Angola, the Great Lakes region, the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and Timor Leste (East Timor). 67 Various donors, including , ECHO, the EC, the Netherlands, Norway and the World Bank have developed mechanisms to deal with the funding gap between relief and development activities (Harmer, Macrae (ed.); UNDG/ECHA 2003) 68 Schiavo-Campo, S. 2003. Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations. CPR Working Paper No. 6. June 2003. 69 The World Bank has jointly funded with UNDP a study to develop a multilateral needs assessment in post- conflict situations. 70 Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda.

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• Insufficient donor coordination in post-crisis situations reduces the efficiency and impact of the assistance provided, thereby increasing the political risk”.71 • There can be a tendency to create over-complicated coordination structures, particularly in high-profile post-conflict situations and, indeed in, development contexts too.72

The complexities of post-conflict transition are emphasised in lessons from a study on Angola.73 In the post-ceasefire context, coordination and facilitation of humanitarian action may be even more complex than coordination during conflict and times of acute humanitarian needs, partly due to the influx of new players. Given the complexity of peace and our limited grasp of the dynamics of transition, planning and strategising for the future and for the transition is critical.74

Annex 11 has more information about coordination experiences from Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sudan and West Bank & Gaza.

3.10 Relationships with Military and Political Actors

The IASC paper ‘Civil-Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies 2004’ provides a general reference for humanitarian practitioners and focuses on relationship between humanitarian organisations and official military forces. As noted earlier, there is increasing concern within the humanitarian community about the deployment of military assets in ‘humanitarian’ roles. In Afghanistan, coalition forces are involved not only in sporadic humanitarian-type activity, but also reconstruction activities with aim of getting provincial authorities into line and boosting the authority of the central government (Strand).

In there has been a further blurring of the lines between humanitarian challenges on one hand and political and military factors and actors, on the other. The blurring of lines and the constriction of humanitarian space in Iraq and Afghanistan have sharpened divisions among aid practitioners, as the debate on the relative merits of principled versus politicised illustrates.75

The focus of the Brahimi reforms within the UN system have been aimed towards better coherence towards peace building. The aim is for a politically informed humanitarian response and a political response informed by humanitarian concerns. (Macrae & Leader 2000 Shifting Sands)

Van Brabant notes that coordination for humanitarian space requires that humanitarian and political and military strategies meet and that meeting needs a coordination structure of some kind.

71 ECDPM 9 72 e.g. Afghanistan. Disch noted in Mozambique in a development context a bewildering array of meetings. 73 Ball and Campbell. 74 The Angola report recommended that all future UN humanitarian coordinators should be supported by a policy advisor throughout their tenures. 75 Tufts April 2004.

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3.11 Conclusions

Some common themes do come out of coordination experiences, including:

• The importance of coordination: in spite of the international community’s difficulty in coordinating within itself and with national and local players, there is a continued emphasis on the importance of effective coordination at all levels from the strategic and policy to field implementation. • The importance of context and history: in fragile or fragmented state situations, ready- made coordination templates cannot be applied. The coordination mechanisms should be built on a responsiveness to the specific context and the existing structures and should be kept as simple as possible. • At any place on the humanitarian / development / development spectrum, every effort should be made to include and encourage the ownership by local or national authorities, along with the involvement of civil society, in the planning and implementation of assistance programmes. In stable contexts, development coordination is increasingly been seen in context of partnerships.76

76 E.g. DAC 1996 21st C cited in Disch 11: External partners should provide reliable and appropriate assistance, adhere to guidelines for effective aid, support capacity building to avoid aid dependency, and work for better coordination among the external partners. Also: Joint OECD/DAC, World Bank, UNDP statement December 1999 on Development Partnership Forum in Paris December 1999 entitled From Aid Coordination to Development Partnership.

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4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SACB & AID COORDINATION FOR SOMALIA

4.1 Introduction

This section begins with a brief historical overview of the SACB’s development. It then looks at the SACB’s aims and objectives, its guiding principles and overall strategies. The issue of the peace dividend approach is discussed. The section then looks at the SACB’s approach to security issues. Finally other coordination mechanisms in Somalia are looked at.

4.2 Overview

The SACB was proposed in the December 1993 declaration from the Addis Ababa international conference on Somalia and established in Nairobi in early 1994. Unfortunately there is no overall history of the SACB. This section looks at some key features of its development.

The SACB’s mandate derived from the Addis Ababa conference and was reviewed and renewed during subsequent international SACB Main Body meetings.77 However there has not been any similar high level SACB meeting since 1997.

In the absence of central government structures in Somalia, the Addis Ababa declaration also envisaged the setting up of Regional Development Committees (RDCs) to prioritise development activities and an umbrella Development Council made up of representatives from the RDCs. The SACB would work with this counterpart structure, coordinating international assistance within the framework set up by the Development Council. Thus, in the original vision of the Addis declaration, Somali involvement was not forgotten.

A further element of the arrangements was the role of UNDOS, acting as a secretariat for the Development council, providing analysis and research information on policy and operational issues and also acting as the secretariat for the SACB.78

The SACB was established in order to facilitate donors in developing a common approach for the allocation of resources for Somalia. From the outset, it was envisaged as having the broad participation of donors, UN agencies and programmes and NGOs.

The EC, particularly under the then Special Envoy, was the leading force during the first years of the SACB’s life, occupying the space left by a weakened UN in Somalia following the withdrawal of UNOSOM and the general decline in international interest in Somalia. The SACB was reported to be a vibrant body during the mid 1990s.

However, tensions and strains between the EC and the UN leaderships have been a key dynamic in the life of the SACB. At times relationships have been nothing short of appalling. As with other coordination structures, these tensions have also been closely linked to key

77 Geneva November 1994; Rome May 1997. 78 One of the objectives of UNDOS was to support the SACB and Somali efforts towards the establishment of functioning public institutions and economic instruments (SACB Plan of Action. Nairobi. February 1994).

28 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 personalities, as well as to organisational priorities. These tensions are discussed in Section 5.3.

Observers generally point to the period between 1999 and 2002 as being the most stable for the SACB with a Danish diplomat as chair of the Executive and the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (UN RC/HC) very actively involved in the SACB.

Some important issues and features come out of the brief overview given above:

1. Only the SACB survives from the original structures envisaged in the Addis Ababa declaration. The Somali structures of development committees never materialised as originally planned.79 UNDOS became a controversial body within the UN Somalia system and was closed in 2001. 2. Without a SACB Main Body meeting since 1997, the SACB’s overall mandate and role have not been reconfirmed or revised by the international community in the light of the evolving Somalia context.80 3. The SACB works on the basis of voluntary involvement and commitment of its members and on the basis of consensus. Words such as ‘forum’ and ‘platform’ are often used to describe it. 4. It is somewhat unique in an international aid structure in providing equal access and membership for the three groupings of members, donors, UN agencies and NGOs, although the two main committees, the Executive and Steering, are traditionally held by a donor and the UN RC/HC respectively. 5. The SACB has an openness and transparency that is possibly also unusual. Any agency can become a member without any conditions and attend nearly all the meetings. The Consultative Forum is open to the public. Minutes of all meetings are publicly available on the website.

4.3 SACB’s Location

The SACB is a Nairobi-based entity and much of its activity takes place there, although efforts to support and strengthen field-based coordination efforts have been discussed since 1999 81 and some of the SACB’s sectoral committees have tried to meet regularly within Somalia (see Section 7).

The SACB is located in Nairobi because the majority of its international members have their offices there for security, logistical and communications reasons. Some agency and donor offices have responsibilities for other countries in the region apart from Somalia. For many SACB members, it is politically impossible or difficult to be based in any part of Somalia while the current political fragmentation prevails.82

The SACB draws a lot of criticism, particularly from Somalis, for being Nairobi-based but there is little practical chance of a move to Mogadishu until political and security conditions improve. It is interesting to note that the one functioning Somali national humanitarian body, the Somali Red Crescent Society, also has its central base in Nairobi.

79 Although various types of authority did develop, most notably in Somaliland and Puntland. 80 Bradbury & Coultan noted that the SACB lacked legal status but there are certainly other international aid coordination structures that do not have a legal status. 81 SACB. Draft SACB Proposal for Improved Field Coordination. Undated but probably 1999. 82 WHO has drawn criticism for relocating its Somali HQ to Hargeisa.

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4.4 Aims & Objectives

The SACB has been described in various ways since 1993 (see Box 1).

BOX 1: HOW THE SACB IS DESCRIBED

¾ SACB is proposed with the aim of facilitating donors in developing a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources available for Somalia. It envisaged broad participation of donors, UN agencies and programmes, NGOs etc (Addis Declaration 1993).

¾ SACB provides a forum for the coordination of activities in the areas of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Coordination takes place in a voluntary fashion based on the common goal of ensuring the maximum effectiveness and efficiency of limited donor resources. (2nd SACB meeting Nairobi 18-19 April 1994)

¾ The SACB is a voluntary coordinating body, which provides a framework to develop a common approach for the allocation of international aid to Somalia (SACB leaflet - August 1999).

¾ SACB – a platform for coordination of international aid to Somalia. It provides a forum for all partners to discuss humanitarian, rehabilitation and development issues. The SACB also offers the opportunity to share information on trends in security, governance, and peace and reconciliation efforts, on an apolitical basis and provides an opportunity to promote better understanding of the complex situation in Somalia. (SACB Handbook 2004)

These statements are generally descriptive in nature and lack tighter defined statements of mission, aims and objectives.

4.5 Guiding Principles of the SACB

The SACB has developed a series of codes of conduct and guiding principles to inform the work of aid agencies (see Box 2).

BOX 2: SUMMARIES OF SACB GENERAL CODES & GUIDELINES

Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia, 8 February 1995 (plus clarification)

International assistance to Somalia is founded on the basic principle that responsibility for its effective execution shall remain with the Somali people. It is expected, therefore, that responsible Somali authorities will assume their proper role to ensure that conditions exist for the effective implementation of aid activities.

Donors and other international partners are prepared to consider rehabilitation and development assistance in areas where a number of conditions are fulfilled. The following principles, drawn up by the SACB, define the circumstances required for the successful and sustainable implementation of rehabilitation and development assistance. The same principles are also applicable for humanitarian assistance with due regard to its particular nature.

(The Code then outlines the responsibilities of aid agencies and of Somali authorities)

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The SACB will monitor closely the implementation of this Code and advise donors and other international partners to take appropriate action whenever deemed necessary, including suspension of activities.

Final Document Fourth SACB Meeting (Rome 29-30 May 1997) Relates to ‘The Strategy of the International Community on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia’ by Deputy Chairman of the SACB Executive, Brauzzi (not seen).83

SACB Policy Framework for Continuing Cooperation in Somalia, December 2000

The SACB aims for a common approach in the provision of support to the emerging TNG, installed in August 2000, and continuing support to regional administrations. In an effort to ensure that the SACB partners will be able to address the demands of a post- conflict transition in a coordinated manner, a Policy Framework for continuing cooperation in Somali has been developed.

The Framework re-emphasises the SACB’s Code of Conduct and Peace Dividend approach.

Goals and Principles of SACB Partners: Three goals –

• Help ensure the protection of civilian populations and the provision of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups that cannot be adequately supported by Somalia communities and authorities. • Build capacity for self-reliance in Somalia, including the opportunity for each individual’s and community’s full and independent participation in political and economic governance • Promote sustainable development of livelihoods within an environment of peace and stability

Principles: • Somali partnership • Impartiality – SACB partners will provide assistance throughout the country, subject to the availability of resources, according to the urgency of humanitarian needs and the prospects for peace and development • Peace Dividend Approach – SACB partners will provide resources in quantity and quality that meet the different capacities of Somali authorities and local communities to use those resources for the public benefit, particularly through the promotion of inter-agency development programming in areas of peace and stability. SACB partners will refrain from increasing the flow of aid resources in a manner that will exacerbate conflicts and/or create an unsustainable economic situation. • – SACB partners will seek to cultivate legitimate political cooperation between Somali authorities and the Somali communities they represent, particularly through the promotion of good governance and respect of international law by all Somali authorities and non-state actors. The document then lists a number of principles to be observed by SACB partners including enhancing decentralised, area-based coordination in areas of peace and stability to improve the strategic nature of development planning; ensuring coherent, integrated aid planning and programming leading to complementary paths of development across all areas of Somalia.

83 Referred to in Bayne.

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The provision of aid by SACB partners to any given area of Somalia is contingent upon the commitment and ability of the relevant Somali authorities to ensure that the following Minimum Standards of Operation are met:

• Security • Freedom to allocate resources in coordination with relevant Somali authorities and SACB partners • Free access to monitor implementation • Free relations with Somali authorities, non-state actors and communities • Aid agencies can deliver relief and development assistance in an independent and impartial manner…. • International conventions and protocols …

Endorsed as an instrument of dialogue by the SACB Executive Committee, 21 December 2000.

SACB Guiding Principles of Operation 2002

The Guiding Principles provide a framework for the interface between international aid representatives and local authorities in Somalia.84 Refers to the SACB Code of Conduct and Working Arrangements

Role of the Authorities

Role of international aid community – provide assistance and protection to vulnerable populations …. according to the well-established principles of humanitarian action – impartiality, proportionality, neutrality, accountability, transparency, participation, peace and reconciliation, coordination and unity of purpose

• Privileges and Immunities of the International Aid Community (IAC) • Premises and facilities • Recruitment of personnel • Information sharing – the IAC shall share basic operational and project information with authorities and local communities. As a standard procedure all agencies shall ensure the widest consultation with authorities and local communities before embarking on any new project. (Details of basic information are spelt out)

• Status of the Agencies of the IAC • Freedom of entry and exit • Assessments, distributions and monitoring and aid • Settlement of disputes

84 UN Somalia CAP 2003

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Annexes: • Definitions • Statement of Principles of Humanitarian Action – these general principles complement the more specific guidelines and principles outlined in the SACB Policy Framework. It then defines the various issues listed earlier.

By undertaking aid operations in Somalia, aid agencies shall hold themselves accountable to the highest professional and international standards such as embodied in the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response and the NGO and Red Cross Movement Code of Conduct.

Endorsed by the SACB Executive Committee June 27 2002.

A number of issues arise from SACB documents outlined above:

1. It is not clear how these documents hang together, whether any hierarchy is involved or whether any have been superseded. 2. The scope of the documents is described in different ways: • The 1995 Code refers to rehabilitation and development assistance and says that the same principles apply to humanitarian assistance with due regard to its particular nature (emphasis added) • The 2000 Policy Framework refers to both humanitarian and development work. • The 2002 Guiding Principles appear primarily to deal with humanitarian assistance, although it does refer back to the earlier SACB policy and code. 3. These documents have apparently been drawn up by the SACB without consultation with any Somali authorities (although they have been used in negotiations). There seems little point in trying to dictate minimum standards of operation to Somali authorities without some dialogue taking place. 4. Little appears to have been done to disseminate and promote these key SACB documents. The UN CAP 2003 said that plans were underway to translate the 2002 Guiding Principles into Somali, alongside a comparative analysis of the humanitarian elements of Islamic teachings in an effort to build awareness of their purpose among local authorities, as well as among agency and UN partner staff. There is no evidence that this has been done. Many interviewees were unaware of the documents and there is no sign that SACB members have been active in disseminating them. 5. The SACB Executive Committee has not monitored their implementation. 6. There is reference in the 2002 Guiding Principles to international standards such as Sphere and the NGO Red Cross/Red Crescent Code of Conduct, but there is little evidence that they have drawn on the experience of other codes and guidelines in other parts of the world.

In short, none of the SACB codes and guidelines appear to be living documents.

4.6 Overall Strategies

The SACB has made considerable progress in developing sectoral strategies. SACB members have not, however, developed an overall, over-arching strategy for international assistance for Somalia. So there exists a gap between the code, the policy and the guidelines looked at in the previous sections and the various sectoral strategies. This lack of an overall assistance strategy is probably due to the difficulty in any complex and fragmented situation, let alone

33 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 one like Somalia’s, of developing a useful document that goes beyond generalities and platitudes.

The nearest to an overall strategy is the CAP / CHAP that is primarily seen as a UN document for the purposes of fundraising, although some NGOs participate in it and their increased participation has been encouraged. However, it does not have the wider ownership that an equivalent SACB document would have and also its emphasis is towards the humanitarian rather than the rehabilitation end of the spectrum. The UN CHAP /CAP 2004 has references to SACB throughout and the SACB organogram and guiding principles are included in the appendices. Many of the sectoral sections refer to an alignment with SACB strategies. The 2003 CAP noted that its sectoral strategies were developed in consultation with the SACB sectoral committees and in many cases are direct reflection of these strategies.

The EC Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002 – 2007 is a key document because of the importance of EC funding. Its long-term objective is “to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and to promote a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society in Somalia.” The intervention objective is to support sustainable improvement of the livelihood of the Somali people – by enhancing food security and economic growth – and their improved access to basic public and social services as well as the establishment of good governance.

The UN Joint Action and Recovery Plan (JARP) for Somalia 2002 – 2003 is a strategic framework for UN assistance in Somalia Sept 2002. Use was made of frameworks established by the SACB and the annual inter-agency consolidated appeal (CAP) for Somalia. The JARP is in line with the SACB and CAP frameworks but is differentiated in that it is a multi-year strategic framework, specifically for the UN and has been extended until the end of 2004. It is envisaged as a precursor of a UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) leading to a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), also using the WB/UNDP Socio- economic survey 2002.

Priority areas: • Protection and integration • Primary-level and vacational education • MCH and communicable diseases • Food security • Gender and human rights as cross-cutting themes.

In the absence of an overall national partner, the JARP acknowledges the importance for UN agencies to continue to develop partnerships with the broader aid community through the mechanisms of the SACB and with regional and international bodies not represented in the SACB such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), IGAD, the African Union and the Arab League.

The SACB should seek to establish an overall aid strategy document for Somalia in consultation with those Somali authorities that exist, taking into account existing plans and policies that they may have. However the practicalities of developing this strategy will depend on political developments in Somalia and whether it will be in the context of the

34 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 formation of national recovery plan to be implemented by a Transitional Federal Government.

4.7 The Peace Dividend

The peace dividend approach has been a central plank of the international aid community’s approach to assistance for Somalia. However, as Box 3 shows, descriptions of the approach have sometimes been somewhat oblique.

BOX 3: PEACE DIVIDEND STATEMENTS IN SACB DOCUMENTS

• Although not specifically mentioned in the 1993 Addis declaration, the document does note that “security and stability are prerequisites for investment in reconstruction and rehabilitation.” Humanitarian assistance will remain unconditional. • The 1995 Code of Conduct also does not mention the peace dividend as such but says that “international partners are prepared to consider rehabilitation and development assistance in areas where a number of conditions are fulfilled.” The Code introduced the possibility that activities could be suspended in areas where the Code is not observed. • The 1997 Strategy of the International Community on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia’ … developed prior conditions and formalised the concept of the peace dividend approach: “Rehabilitation and development programmes should aim to address the root causes of the Somali crisis. Peace, security and the existence of Somali authorities at the local and regional levels are prerequisites for the provision of rehabilitation and a development assistance approach. This “peace dividend approach” aims to ensure that international assistance is not only relevant to local efforts of reconstruction but also to peace building.”(SACB Executive Committee 1997)85 • The 2000 SACB Policy Framework re-emphasises the peace dividend approach: “SACB partners will provide resources in quantity and quality that meet the different capacities of Somali authorities and local communities to use those resources for the public benefit, particularly through the promotion of inter-agency development programming in areas of peace and stability. SACB partners will refrain from increasing the flow of aid resources in a manner that will exacerbate conflicts and/or create an unsustainable economic situation.” • The 2002 SACB Guiding Principles of Operation do not specifically refer to the peace dividend approach.

In policy statements, the peace dividend approach is often linked with the building block approach to peace building.86

The peace dividend approach has been an underlying strategic approach of the EC’s aid interventions, using an area-based approach for the implementation of activities. This means that the position of a particular geographical area on the Relief to Development Continuum, a main principle of the Commission’s programme, determines what kind of interventions are supported and how they are implemented…Combining these approaches was and continues to be a success, allowing the Commission the necessary flexibility in responding to the wide- ranging variety of needs while achieving increasing involvement of beneficiaries.87

85 Bayne. 86 IGAD report 1999 Annex to UN S-G Report 21: adopted at IGAD Heads of State Djibouti March 1998; US Government Integrated Strategic Plan for Somalia.2001 – 2003. 87 EC Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002 – 2007. Feb 2002

35 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004

The 2003 evaluation of the EC Somalia programme notes that no definition of the peace dividend is given in the EC strategies, although there are suggestions that it provides both a basis to protect peace and to create an enabling environment for the assistance.88 The 1999 EC Strategy states that the peace dividend is needed now more than ever before because of the need to protect peace in many geographical areas and that …external assistance needs to play a role of support to positive change. The 2002 – 07 strategy refers to …creating a relatively favourable environment for aid delivery based on the peace dividend approach. There is a further definition provided by the EC that is consistent with this …peace dividend approach which intends to support areas in which basic standards of governance and security are assured.89 The evaluation also noted that there was no evidence that the EC’s project partners had implemented the peace dividend.

If one uses the EC criteria in which rehabilitation can take place in Somalia, it is not certain that any part of the country would measure up:

• Peace & stability must exist in the form of existing local authorities capable of responding when the security is at stake in order to achieve a sustainable level of security by way of: - Absence of interclan fighting - Adequate response by local authorities to serious incidents - Freedom of access - Armistice • A system of law & order enforced by local authorities and in line with human rights principles • An ongoing agreement between groups within the area • Readiness to be engaged in a partnership in the implementation of interventions…90

In practice this review has found that, while the peace dividend approach is still considered to be in place, it is not monitored, has not been evaluated, nor has there been any substantial discussion about it within the SACB committees.

In addition, there is widespread misunderstanding about what the peace dividend approach means and considerable scepticism about its appropriateness. A range of questions have been raised:

1. Is the peace dividend approach mainly a reward to areas of relative peace and stability? 2. Is it meant to encourage neighbouring areas to move towards peace and stability? If so, is there any evidence that this works? 3. Is it being used as an operational tool to “allow” agencies to work where there are windows of opportunity in terms of security. 4. How is “peace” defined? How are the conditions measured to decide when the peace dividend approach can be started? 5. Bayne notes that some of the major constraints to the sustainability and effectiveness of international interventions in Somalia have been the lack of formal recognition of emerging administrative structures and of modalities for engagement with unrecognised administrations. If the existence of responsible Somali authorities is a prerequisite for investment in rehabilitation and development, then it is important that assistance is

88 Ecodes 2003 89 EC 2447th Council meeting – General Affairs and External Relations Brussels 22/7/02 (ref 10945/02) 90 EC Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002 – 2007. Feb 2002.Annex 3, 8

36 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004

provided to those structures through which stability is maintained. Providing assistance solely through local groups or via NGOs risks undermining the local authorities… The application of the peace dividend can lead to tensions and divisions. This fits with the findings of this review’s field work. 6. There is a danger that the peace dividend approach could be applied to humanitarian responses, contradicting basic humanitarian principles. MSF formally withdrew from the SACB in July 2001, fearing that continued cooperation through the SACB would be in conflict with the organisation’s principles of neutrality and impartiality. This concern primarily focused around peace-building efforts by some agencies and proposed support for the TNG.91 7. Does the peace dividend exaggerate the importance and the leverage that aid has in Somalia? Remittances are estimated to far exceed the amount of foreign aid that Somalia receives. 8. Finally, the concept that aid can play a significant part in building peace in Somalia may be emphasised in the absence of political progress and greater international involvement. Is this another example of aid agencies and aid being used as a substitute for international political action?

This report proposes that the SACB’s Executive Committee needs to commission a review of the peace dividend concept and the issues raised above. This could be done in the context of a review of the SACB’s existing guidelines and policy documents and the development of an overall aid strategy.

4.8 Other Coordination Mechanisms & Structures

There are a number of other Nairobi-based coordination structures relating to Somalia. Coordination mechanisms in Somalia are dealt with in Section 7.

Donors On the political side, the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) has focused mainly on support for and monitoring of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC).92 On the aid side, the SACB Executive Committee is the main forum at which donors can meet, although as will be discussed later (Section 5.2) discussion on coordination issues is limited. Member states of the European Union meet with the EC Somalia Unit (ECSU) from time to time to discuss the EC’s Somalia programme.

NGOs The NGO Consortium has a membership of over 85 organisations and is open to both international and national NGOs. In collaboration with the SACB, it produces an annual report of NGO activities. The ECSU has regular un-minuted meetings with the INGOs that are funded by the EC.

The UN System

OCHA has the UN General Assembly mandate for the coordination of humanitarian aid within the UN system and in liaison with other players including INGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. UNDP has a global mandate for the coordination of

91 MSF 11 July 2001 cited in Global IDP database: http://www.db.idpproject,org 92 The IPF is chaired by Italy and its members include 13 European governments, , USA, EC, World Bank and UNDP. Source: IGAD website.

37 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 development aid with partner governments. The main UN coordination mechanism for Somalia is the post of RC/HC. The RC/HC convenes regular UN Country Team meetings.93 Within that framework, the UN agencies convene various thematic groups.

Under the HC, OCHA provides coordination leadership in the humanitarian area. Until 2002 OCHA staff worked in support the UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) providing field coordination services and support to the RC/HC.94 In 2002 the UNCU label was replaced by OCHA functioning in its own name. There appears to be little reporting on these changes in SACB meetings or in the UN Secretary General’s reports to the Security Council.

The Secretary-General’s reports also had increasingly sparse references to the SACB. An outside reader would never guess that, as members, the UN agencies were to a varying extent deeply involved in the SACB.

93 The World Bank does not attend these meetings. 94 2003 CAP: UNCU established in Dec 1994 primarily responsible for facilitating and stregthening coordination within the UN system and within the broader humanitarian community in Somalia. The UNCU provided field level coordination plus support to HC to provide coordinated responses.

38 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004

5. SACB STRUCTURES

5.1 Introduction

Figure 8 below outlines the SACB’s structure.

FIGURE 8: SACB COORDINATION STRUCTURE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CONSULTATIVE FORUM (Policy) (Public Discussion)

STEERING COMMITTEE (Inter-sectoral Coordination)

Education Food Security & Governance Health & Nutrition Water, Sanitation & Rural Development Infrastructure

Table 4 below outlines the SACB’s structure of committees and working groups in early 2004, summarises their functions and chairing arrangements.

TABLE 4: SACB COMMITTEES & WORKING GROUPS AS AT MARCH 2004

Structure Function (summary) Chairing & Membership95 Executive Committee* Review aid policies and provide policy Acting Chair: Head of EC guidance delegation Monitor implementation of the Code of D. Chair: UN RC/HC Conduct Membership: Any donors Exchange information on security and political that provide substantial matters funding; App. 5 members of the UNCT including UNPOS; World Bank; 3 or 4 members of the NGO Consortium; invited observers Consultative Forum An ‘open’ forum providing briefing on political Chair: CARE & security developments, the humanitarian situation, proceedings of the Executive & Steering Committees, and sectoral issues.

95 In most cases the chairs of SACB committees and working groups are named individuals. For the purpose of overall analysis the person’s agency or position is given. (See Section 5.7 for discussion on chairing).

39 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004

Structure Function (summary) Chairing & Membership95 Steering Committee* Provide strategic guidance to, and ‘act on’ Chair: UN RC/HC operational issues identified by the Sectoral D. Chair: NGO Committees Consortium Facilitate information sharing and field Membership: Chairs/ co- coordination or deputy chairs of Strengthen relationships with regional sectoral committees (2 per authorities committee); three persons Strengthen SACB sectoral strategies & nominated by UN standards, and encourage harmonisation agencies (incl. chair); Identify gaps in provision of assistance three persons nominated Guide Humanitarian Response Group, a sub by the NGO Consortium committee of the Steering Committee (including deputy chair); ICRC as observer. Humanitarian Response Group Chair: OCHA Membership: As appropriate for the agenda Sectoral Committees Sectoral Committees.97 (Chair/ Working Groups & Working Groups96 Deputy Chair)

Education (Co-Chairs: SCUK; Ad Hoc Task Force UNICEF) Food Security and Rural Agriculture Development (Co-Chairs: ECSU; CARE) Food Aid Flood Governance (Co-Chairs: ECSU; Civil Society** CARE) Rule of Law and Protection** Gender and Human Rights Micro Finance (** - dissolved in June 2004) Health * (Chair: ECSU; Nutrition D.Chair: UNICEF) Malaria General Health Sector meeting Health Information System Tuberculosis Reproductive Health and Safe Motherhood HIV/AIDS & Female Genital Mutilation Extended Programme of Immunisation Outbreaks Control Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Infrastructure (Chair: UNA; D.Chair: UNICEF) Notes: The committees marked * have restricted membership. The chairing arrangements shown are as per the SACB Handbook 2004 by organisation, although SACB Committee posts are elected by the committees on the basis of the person, not the organisation.

5.2 SACB Membership

It is a principle of the SACB that membership is open to all agencies concerned with aid to Somalia, including Somali NGOs. The majority of committees and working groups are open to all agencies. The exceptions as noted in Table 4 above are the Executive, Steering Committees and the Health Sectoral Committee.

96 Each Sectoral Committee is underpinned by a number of Working Groups which report to the Sectoral Committee concerned. 97 Mandate and function varies according to sector or area of concern.

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The members of the SACB committees are listed in the SACB Handbook. There is no consolidated membership list as such98 and there are no conditions or fee for membership. In this situation it is not always clear whether agencies are SACB members or not. In line with its normal principles the ICRC has the status of observer member in the Executive Committee. As mentioned in Section 5.8, the MSF group of agencies left the SACB because of its perceived political stance in relation to the TNG. Both MSF and the ICRC participate in sectoral committees as they see appropriate.

The SACB’s approach to membership by aid agencies, NGOs and donors is therefore ‘light’ and inclusive. Any body registering an interest with the Secretariat is regarded as a member. This report proposes that this approach to membership should continue, but suggests that member agencies should be expected to adhere to some general conditions (See Section 10 and Annex 6).

Although the SACB sectoral committees and the Consultative Forum are open to Somali NGOs, attendance is practically very limited because of the difficulties of expense, access to air travel, time and visas for most of the meetings that are held in Nairobi.

Somali authorities are not represented in the SACB structures. Occasionally representatives from some Somali authorities have attended or been invited to meetings in Nairobi. When SACB meetings have been held in Somalia, the authorities have been fully represented (See Section 6)

As noted elsewhere, participation in the SACB is mainly from ‘western/northern’ agencies and donors. For example, involvement by Arab donor states, agencies and multi-lateral bodies has been almost non-existent. Participation by and contact with African entities such as IGAD and the African Union has also been very limited.

5.3 Executive & Steering Committees

There is a general sense that both the Executive and Steering Committees have under- performed.

Much of the Executive Committee’s time is taken up with security and political updates and reports from the Steering Committee. Probably the Executive has been most effective in reacting to security incidents and deciding on SACB responses on behalf of the aid community. The Executive has not carried out areas of its mandate such as discussion of longer-term policy framework, including the peace dividend approach, and monitoring the implementation of the various SACB codes and guidelines.

There appear to be a number of reasons for this under-performance:

• Some donors regard it mainly as a briefing session to get political and security updates. • The EC delegation’s drawing back from a whole-hearted commitment to the SACB (see Section 5.4) • The Executive is seen by some participants as dominated by the EC, citing amongst other issues the fact that when the EC Head of Delegation is not able to attend a meeting, one

98 The SACB Directory approximates to a membership list, but includes observers such as ICRC and MSF.

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of the EC Somalia Unit’s heads has chaired, instead of the designated deputy chair, the UN RC/HC. • The apparent lack of any self-evaluation, for instance at the end of each year, as happens with the SACB sectoral committees. • Lack of joint leadership by both the chair and deputy chair working together. • On occasions, the Executive Committee is seen by the UN agencies as the forum in which to press the case for more funding. The Executive should certainly be the forum to discuss funding issues and trends (another area that it does not in fact cover), but the dynamics of a joint donor, UN and NGO group trying to lead an effective response to Somalia’s enormous needs are weakened by funding appeals.

The position of the donors in the Executive Committee relates to the wider issue of donor coordination. In its genesis the SACB Executive was regarded as a donor forum with UN and NGO participation. However it is clear that it does not effectively fulfil that function. There is little or no coordination by donors on programme and funding issues. Reflecting a frustration about the lack of funding for Somalia, some feel that the donors “hide behind the SACB”.

The External Review of the IASC notes that donors play a prominent role in the SACB, a structure similar to the Afghanistan Support Group a donor body that oversaw the Strategic Framework approach in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that managed assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. The IASC notes that the strong role of the donors has a major advantage in creating direct political links between the UN and the donors, in ensuring deep donor engagement, and in creating fora for real coordination among donors themselves. The donors’ role in chairing the SACB and directing much of the work of the sectoral committees has however raised concerns among UN agencies, in particular on the question of the appropriateness of the UN being ‘directed’ by a handful of member states. This is a view shared by the current UN RC/HC who is particularly concerned about the power exerted by the EC through the SACB.

In terms of leadership of the Executive, the EC could be seen as being in a ‘no-win’ situation. On the one hand being accused of domination, on the other the Head of the EC Delegation clearly stated that he was acting chair until this review was completed, because it was not felt appropriate for the major donor to chair the committee.

The other element in relation to the donors and the Executive Committee is the fact that both the UN and the NGO groupings represented have their own coordination bodies, the UNCT and the NGO Consortium. The donors do not have an equivalent group and the Executive is effectively open to any to attend.

The Executive also does not monitor the work of the SACB Secretariat by, for instance, reviewing a work plan.

A good deal of time of the SACB Steering Committee meetings is taken up with report-backs from the sectoral committees. As with the Executive, there appears to be little real discussion about cross-cutting issues or provision of strategic guidance and coherence as its ToR require. Most key issues are referred up to the Executive Committee. As with the Executive, the Steering Committee lacks leadership and drive.

Broadly therefore the SACB general committees are under-performing and lack leadership, particularly at the level of strategic coordination.

42 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004

Evaluating the flood response in 1997, Bradbury & Coultan noted that the UN Humanitarian Coordinator was central to the operations’ achievements but felt that a personality-dependent system of coordination was also a reflection of a weakness inherent in coordination mechanisms in the wider aid system in Somalia. However, from the evidence globally, there does seem a general, if reluctant, recognition that personalities do play a key role in most voluntary coordination systems.

5.4 The EC / UN relationship

As has been mentioned earlier, the dynamics between the leaderships of the EC and the UN for Somalia have dominated the history of the SACB. Given the UN’s global mandate for coordination functions, both in humanitarian and development contexts, it is not surprising that there should be frustration over a structure that expects those functions to be mediated in a forum with strong donor and NGO representation. However, the UNCT is divided in its attitude to the SACB. Some of its members, notably UNICEF and also FAO, are strongly committed to the SACB mechanism and see that their commitment which costs time and money as furthering their programme aims as well as honouring organisational commitments to coordination. Other UNCT members, particularly WFP and WHO, have been much less enthusiastic, seeing at various times interference with their mandates and apparently questioning the need for an element of accountability given by the SACB sectoral committee system.99

In terms of the UNCT leadership, there was a substantial change in attitude to the SACB after the previous RC/HC left in 1992. He saw a UN commitment to the SACB as an important way of furthering the UN’s key roles, including its coordination mandates. The current leadership has reduced that commitment, feeling that the UN is putting more into the SACB than it gets out of it and, as mentioned above, wary of compromising the UN’s position by close association with donors. Other signals of a lessened commitment to the SACB have included:

• An email by the RC/HC to the SACB Steering Committee stating that he did not see any reason why the SACB Health Sectoral Committee should have a paid coordinator to support it, when none of the other SACB sectoral committees have such a post. • A proposal to shift the management umbrella of the SACB Secretariat from UNDP to UNOPS. The UN says that this change is merely one of administrative convenience, but some SACB members feel that it does not reflect the UNDP’s coordination role and has sent the wrong signal. • OCHA’s move to run most of the field coordination structures without a full considered discussion within the SACB of all the options was also seen as a sign of marginalisation of the SACB.

On the EC side, there has also been a cooling towards the SACB:

• The ECSU’s Technical Advisors have been asked to reduce the amount of time they spend on work related to the SACB committees.

99 See ECHO UNICEF evaluation 2004:32 noting WHO absence.

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• The EC’s decision to end the funding of the Health Sector Coordinator post was seen as a signal of declining commitment, although the EC has pointed out this was a technical decision taken because of EU contract regulations.

There is a sense that because the EC now has substantial funding for Somalia, has its own strategy to implement and a significant involvement in most sectors in Somalia, it needs the platform that SACB provides less than it did in the past.

With both the EC and the UN it is interesting that changed attitudes to the SACB both happened with a change of leadership. Without there being any clear organisational changes of policy, this seems to underline the view that coordination structures are very dependent on key personnel.

In terms of the relationship between the leaderships of the EC and the UN, these are certainly not as bad as they have been at some points in the SACB’s history. Nevertheless, there are issues of concern between the two entities and it is unfortunate that the two parties have not been able to sit and discuss them.

This review makes the fundamental point that unless there is a strong commitment and vision and leadership from the top of the EC and the UN in relationship to the SACB, the latter will continue to weaken.

5.5 Security Management

As mentioned above, the SACB’s Executive Committee has given, not surprisingly, a particular emphasis on security issues. The SACB provides the vehicle through which the aid community can express its views and act on specific security problems. The actions that can be taken after security incidents are limited – mainly withdrawal of international staff and letters to the responsible Somali authorities asking that action be taken to bring the perpetrators to justice and that secure conditions be provided for aid workers.

As noted elsewhere, the aid community has relatively little leverage in relation to Somalia which perhaps underlines the importance of unified stands by donors and agencies when security incidents occur. The SACB Executive has had some success in achieving this unity, although it is also clear that some agencies prefer to take unilateral action by, for example, returning to an area before the decision for a general return has been agreed.

5.5 The Consultative Forum

According to its ToR the SACB Consultative Forum in Nairobi provides an opportunity to exchange information on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Somalia. It may also debate themes of general interest and be an advocate for the expansion of successful approaches to improving social and economic welfare of the Somali people.100

The Consultative Forum is important in that it is open to anyone to attend and therefore in theory provides an element of consultation with and accountability to Somalis who can attend meetings in Nairobi. In practice, much of the time at its monthly meetings are taken up with reports from UNSECOORD and UNPOS on security and political issues and report backs

100 2004 SACB Handbook.

44 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 from the SACB committees. There have been attempts in the past to stimulate discussion on issues, perhaps by having a guest speaker. However, these have not successfully energised the Forum which does not often have substantive discussions.

A significant number of attendees at the Consultative Forums are from agencies that participate in other SACB meetings and already have or can get the information from other sources. However there are also some Somali attendees, such as intellectuals or business persons in Nairobi, for whom the Forum provides some access to the international aid world.

If the Forum is meant to be a consultative body for the SACB, it seems to lack bite with little feedback going to the Executive.101 While acknowledging that the Forum contributes to the SACB’s transparency, this review questions whether there is a need to have monthly consultative forum meetings and whether more substantial six monthly meetings might not be more effective. This proposal is linked with the recommendation that SACB Consultative Forums should be held in regions of Somalia.

5.6 The Sectoral Committees, Working Groups & Task Forces

The SACB sectoral committees and their associated working groups are generally seen by those involved in member agencies in Nairobi as the most valued parts of the SACB’s activities and seen as the core of its work.102

Broadly, the sectoral committees and working groups are valued for providing:

- Forums for information exchange between agencies - Forums for presenting projects, peer comment, sharing lessons, including feeding back from programme evaluations - Mechanisms for establishing sectoral guidelines and strategies - Sounding boards - Platforms to discuss issues - Information and briefing resource for new staff , agencies and consultants - A project vetting process for some agencies - Commissioning structures for sectoral consultancies (e.g. on the environment) - In the case of the Health Sectoral Committee, substantial resources for Somalia have been mobilised from GAVI and GFATM.

Not surprisingly, given their largely voluntary nature, the performance of the SACB sectoral committees and groups varies. Factors that appear to contribute towards concrete outputs and more effective coordination are:

• The quality of the leadership in terms of mobilising involvement and focusing direction • Quality of the chairing, including focussing discussion on key issues, aiming for action points that can be followed up • Preparation and follow-up

101 A recent exception to this passive situation was the debate at the Consultative Forum in March 2004 around the conduct of this review which led to the recruitment of Somali consultants to work with the international consultant. 102 The perceptions from Somalia dealt with in Section 6.

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• Attendance by senior members of staff of the key agencies in the sector with appropriate technical knowledge

There are also criticisms of inefficiencies of the SACB sectoral committees and groups:

• Too much time spent on detailed information exchanges that could be covered in other ways. • Not every committee needs to meet monthly.103 The frequency of meetings should be adjusted as appropriate to the agendas, the amount of work delegated between meetings and urgency. It may often be a more efficient use of time to have less frequent meetings, even if these are denser and longer than the current ones. However, it is important that meetings are regular, predictable and planned in diaries well ahead. • Varying composition of attendees in terms of both seniority and level of up-to-date knowledge about Somali.

A significant number of interviewees in Nairobi pointed to the SACB Monthly Meeting Calendar on their office walls and said there were too many meetings. While this may be true and recommendations from this review should result in some reductions and rationalisations, it would be wrong to take a simplistic view of this issue. If there are good justifications for these meetings, if they are well run and if members are committed to producing outcomes, then meetings can be justified. The SACB is, after all, dealing with many highly complex issues in a complicated and demanding environment.

5.7 The Health Sectoral Committee and Working Groups

The Health Sectoral Committee of the SACB is different in several ways from the other sectoral committees:

• It is the only Sectoral Committee to have a small dedicated support secretariat comprising a technical qualified and experience Health Sector Coordinator and a Project Assistant.104 • It is the only Sectoral Committee that has a restricted membership with detailed conditions of membership and operating regulations.105 • In order to maintain openness, there is also an open Health Sector General meeting that usually meets just before the HSC.

The Health Sectoral Committee shows a number of noteworthy achievements including:

1. Strategy development, both generally for the health sector and for HIV/AIDs 2. Strenuous efforts to involve Somali health ministries where they exist and Somali health professionals by regular Health Sectoral Coordination meetings within Somalia and wide consultation during strategy development 3. In the absence of other structures, enabling Somali to access the GAVI and Global Fund funds, acting as the quasi Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) for the latter.

103 The Education Sectoral Committee meets bi-monthly. 104 As from June 2004, the post of Project Assistant works within the SACB secretariat as a whole and provides support to other committees as well as the health sector. 105 2004 SACB Handbook.

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4. Developing a health sector institutional memory, partly in the person of the Health Sector Coordinator who has long experience in Somalia, and by careful collection of documentation over the years.

It is clear that the achievements and drive of the HSC have been due to having a dedicated technical advisor time maximising the strong commitment of a number of key agencies involved in both the funding and the implementation of health programmes.

However, the Health Sectoral Committee has also been the subject of considerable controversy. The Committee has pushed farthest within the SACB framework in the direction of mandatory coordination, including vigorous criticism of agencies that are seen not to be participating and/or acting unilaterally. Much of this argument has revolved around WHO Somalia. It is not for this review to arbitrate in the details of a particular case, but it seems that following factors are relevant:

1. It is clearly untenable for a credible health coordination mechanism not to have the full- blooded participation of WHO, given its global mandate. 2. In a voluntary coordination system, disagreements between members or between a member and a staff member of the Secretariat need to be managed diplomatically, by encouraging involvement and inclusiveness. The role of coordinators, whether paid or voluntary, is to bring people and organisations together within a context that observes organisational mandates and independence. 3. At the same time, members of the SACB should respect a commitment to participate fully in the coordination mechanisms that have been agreed for the Somalia situation, observing the globally recognised importance of information sharing, coordinated responses, transparency and accountability. This means a degree of peer review and of being called to account if issues coordination and performance issues arise that affect the system as a whole. 4. Within the SACB there should be a dispute solving mechanism, should two parties be unable to resolve their differences through a normal process of professional discussion. This mechanism will need to be led by the Executive Committee and involve the appointment of a small group of arbitrators agreed to by both sides.

There are a number of more general features of this type of situation: • Resistance is inevitable if the coordination mechanisms pushes too far in the direction of coordination by control and is likely to counter-productive, unless there is a root and branch reform of the international humanitarian aid and development system. • Disagreements within the HSC show the sensitivity of the role of chairs. The chair should not be using his/her position to represent his agency, or if that is necessary from time to time, then it should be clear that hats are being changed.

The assumption of the CCM role for the Global Fund is also a unique feature of the HSC. It is to the enormous credit of the SACB that it has been able to fulfil this role in the absence of mechanisms that would normally have a major role for a central government. It is particularly noteworthy that this and the development of the HIV/AIDS strategy have been drawn up with the agreement of the various administrations within Somalia.

The CCM role of the SACB HSC is primarily a mechanism for collective oversight. It is a role that will have to be continually carefully explained as it is likely to be seen as one in which the SACB is controlling the distribution of funds.

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Some members of the HSC feel that there is an unnecessary overlap between the HSC and the General Health Sector meeting with a lot of the information being repeated. Consideration needs to be given to whether the two meetings could be merged. The CCM role of the HSC is demanding and requires commitment and continuity. It is suggested that this work should be managed by small sub-committee reporting to the HSC.

If the HSCs are merged as proposed above, the detailed oversight of the Health Sector Coordinator’s work plans might be delegated to a small sub-group.

5.8 Governance Sectoral Committee

The Governance Working Group was established in early 2000 within the SACB Local Administration Sectoral Committee and upgraded to be the fifth of SACB’s core sectoral committees in early 2002.

At an early stage in its life the Governance Sectoral Committee (GSC) was perceived by some as moving into overtly political territory, particularly related to the recognition of the TNG. This caused the MSF agencies to leave the SACB, although they still participate in technical discussions at a sectoral level. The Executive Committee, bearing in mind its non- political role as an aid coordination body, required that the GSC become a more technical committee focusing on coordination and information sharing.

The GSC has struggled to find an appropriate role and in mid 2004 was in the process of reconsidering its strategy. At the same time, because of low attendance the Civil Society and Rule of Law and Protection decided to dissolve, while the third Governance working group on Gender and Human rights is being revalidated.

Also in the same period, two temporary task forces on community-based peace building and demilitarisation have been established under the aegis of the GSC.

To a certain extent, this fluidity in the make up of the GSC and its working groups reflects natural “market forces” as differing priorities are seen as important.

There appear to be a number of reasons why the GSC has had difficulties in defining its role:

1. Governance is a less clearly established, recognised and understood “sector” than, say, education or health. Governance has not been defined. 2. The GSC has to been looking at a wide range of different topics, many of which are cross-cutting and should, ideally, be integrated across the more traditional sectors. 3. There may be overlaps with other forums such as the UNCT theme groups.

The draft paper on the SACB Governance Committee Strategy (2004) proposes that the GSC will cover the following areas:

A. Governance including: Local governance and urban planning; elections; public sector

B. Rule of Law including: Law enforcement; judiciary; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)

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C. Civil Society including: Support to civil society organisations; partnership issues

D. Human rights and Protection Issues including: Vulnerable groups (children, refugees, IDPs, returnees); advocacy; monitoring mechanisms.

E. Capacity Building as a mainstreamed issue.

This remains a very wide spread of important and large topics. It may make sense to see them as two groupings:

1. Capacity and Institution Building Sectoral Committee

2. Human rights, gender and protection as a standing working group reporting to the Executive Committee.

5.9 Humanitarian Response Group

The SACB’s main focus since 1994 has been on rehabilitation and development issues. The floods of 1997 proved difficult within the SACB context, but reportedly prevented major contradictions between intervening agencies in the field and enhanced a quick, united response.106 Bradbury & Coultan found that there was a lack of a mechanism within the SACB to monitor and take timely action. Agencies were ill-prepared for a major rapid onset . No task force existed to deal with preparedness issues. A flood response Coordination Committee was formed including USAID, ECHO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FSAU, ICRC. The Committee presented a report and plan of action to an expanded meeting of the SACB executive to get SACB endorsement and ensure donor funding. The coordinated response was undertaken in the name of the ‘Somalia Inter-Agency Coordinated flood Response’. The overall coordination of the response was generally judged to have been effective. This was seen by Bradbury & Coultan as a successful combination of strategic and operational coordination. A common framework of consent for the intervention was achieved.

The post flood evaluation found that the SACB fulfilled a crucial role in garnering the support of donors and ensuring the inter-agency character of the operation. The main partners in the operation concluded that “the SACB represented a unique institution for mobilising resources, funds, leadership and coordination for this operation”.

The Humanitarian Response Group (HRG) was established in 2002 by the UN HC and OCHA in order to ensure that there was a dedicated mechanism linked to the SACB to respond to emergencies, in addition to the existing specific SACB task forces on cholera and floods. The aim of the HRG is to strengthen monitoring, analysis and the response capacity of the SACB to emergencies complementing and responding to alerts from the sectoral committees when cross-sectoral action is required.107 The HRG reports to the SACB Steering Committee.

OCHA administers a Humanitarian Response Fund which is managed by the UN HC with an advisory board made up of UN agencies and NGO Consortium representatives.

106 EC Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002 – 2007. Feb 2002. 107 SACB Handbook 2004.

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The HRG differs from other SACB standing committees and working groups in a number of ways:

• It is an ad hoc committee that only meets when necessary. • The HRG is chaired by the UN HC or his designate, usually the head of OCHA. There is not a system of co- or deputy chairing. • The Group is convened and facilitated by OCHA in close collaboration with the SACB Secretariat. • Membership of the HRG varies according to the subject matter under discussion. There is no specific membership list in the SACB Handbook.

The HRG has been particularly active in coordinating the response to the Sool / Sanaag plateau drought.

There is evidence that the HRG operates in a somewhat semi-detached from the SACB. The lack of fixed circulation list has sometimes led to a concern that some agencies have not been informed about meetings.108 There have also been disconnects with the SACB Secretariat in terms of the circulation of documents including the minutes of HRG meetings, not all of which were posted on the SACB website.

It is clear in the Somalia context that there should be close coordination and links between any humanitarian responses undertaken and longer-term work. However it is also important that the international community maintains a robust humanitarian response capacity in keeping with global obligations and standards in the unstable context of Somalia.

It is therefore proposed that the HRG should not only respond to immediate issues but support and monitor longer-term issues, such as disaster preparedness, major disaster response mechanisms and capacity and advocacy on humanitarian issues.

5.10 Other SACB Committees and Working Groups

It is not possible to cover all the committees and working groups in detail. It is proposed that there is a period of self-evaluation overseen by the Executive Committee, taking into account the overall findings and recommendations of this review.

There are a wide range of practical measures that should be considered in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the various groups. There should also be allowance for committees to adopt arrangements that suit themselves best. One size does not necessarily fit all.

A range of practical suggestions relating to meetings can be found in Recommendations 10.7. These can be synthesised with the considerable experience that the SACB already has and can be found in other sources.109

108 For example, as noted in the minutes of November 2002 HRG meeting 109 The SACB has supported training in running and chairing meetings for government officials in Hargeisa. See also UNHCR handbook; Reindorp.

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On the issue of chairing, there has been considerable discussion about whether the persons chairing SACB committees do so in their own right or as representatives of their organisations.

It is generally recognised that personal skills of chairing and leadership, as well as technical knowledge, are important for successful coordination work. It therefore seems correct that it is the individuals rather than their organisations that are chosen. Sometimes it may be appropriate for the representative of a particular organisation with a leading role in a sector to take the chair, but the organisation in question needs to ensure that they have someone with good chairing skills. So both the person and the organisation can be important but a good chair from a smaller organisation is probably less damaging than a poor chair from a larger organisation.

It also seems that the model of two co-chairs can be a good one, so that joint responsibility for the work involved is taken. Given the importance of continuity chairs should be allowed two year terms, but with reconfirmation after the first year. The changeovers of co-chairs should be staggered as is done with the committees now to avoid major discontinuities if both change at the same time.

5.11 Secretariat Support to the Committees

The Secretariat’s support work for the SACB committees is much valued. It generally provides a predictable and reliable service the importance of which should not be under- estimated. The nuts and bolts of coordination administration such as up-to-date membership lists, set schedules for meetings, available meeting rooms, the prompt circulation of minutes etc are all important. The Secretariat operates good practice in terms of an action checklist for each committee in order to ensure that all the necessary support work has been carried out within an acceptable timetable.

The successful operation of the SACB committees depends on the time given by staff of its members. In a strengthened Secretariat, the staff should be able to provide more support to the committees in terms of following up issues, gathering information, making cross-sectoral links and facilitating links and flows of information to and from field coordination bodies.

The question has also been discussed as to whether the SACB sectoral committees should all have technical coordination support along the lines of the Health Sectoral Committee. A variety of different views were expressed about this. There is general view that the health sector is a particularly complex one with a wide range of issues to be covered and that full- time support is needed, particularly in the light of the demands of the CCM role for the GFATM. Members of the other committees had mixed views about whether the equivalents to the Health Sector Coordinator were needed.

This review’s conclusion is that there should be more senior support available for the committees, but that the appointment of, say, four dedicated sectoral specialists would not be justified in terms of cost. Also an enlarged technical resource within the SACB Secretariat might lead to the dangers of it becoming an independent entity. When specific technical inputs are required that are not available amongst committee members, the current practice of hiring consultants for specific pieces of work seems appropriate.

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Some argue that the SACB will perform poorly while it relies on the voluntary contributions of agency and donor staff to run most of its committees in addition to their “normal” jobs. However, this begs the question of whether a commitment to a coordination function like the SACB is a voluntary ‘add-on’ or should actually be seen by its members as part of their joint responsibilities and should be supported in agency and donor policies and management systems.

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6. SOMALI PARTICIPATION IN THE SACB

6.1 Overview

As mentioned in Section 4.2, the 1993 Addis Ababa international conference that established the SACB included a range of Somali participants. The proposals that came out of that conference envisaged the SACB supporting and working with District and Regional Development structures in the absence of a functioning central government. Those structures did not come into being and the SACB has over the years struggled with ways of creating effective relationships with the various and varied regional administrations that exist in Somalia.

The main SACB initiatives to increase Somali participation have been the Consultative Forum meetings held monthly in Nairobi (see Section 5.5) and holding of some Sectoral Committee meetings on a rotating regional basis in Somalia (see Section 10 below). Somali attendance is obviously limited at the Consultative Forum to those in Nairobi or with access to it.

During its field visits, this review found widespread ignorance and misunderstanding and often negative views of the SACB and its role from both Somali officials in the various administrations and Somali NGOs and other civil society organisations. The majority of local NGOs and local institutions know very little or nothing about the SACB. Most were not aware that attendance at Sectoral Committees was open to Somali NGOs, although this is, of course, of little practical use to most Somali NGOs who do not have the means to get to Nairobi.

SACB is perceived sometimes as donor or a body that controls the flow of resources to Somalia. The power of SACB and its role are often over-estimated, being seen by some as a government in exile in Nairobi and a talking shop that excludes Somalis and is never seen on the ground.

For some Somalis, the SACB encapsulates the distrust, suspicion and frustration that they have about international aid in general. They feel the agencies are self-serving and wasting money in Nairobi intended for Somalia.

There are a number of reasons for these perceptions and for the gap in understanding:

1. Many Somalis have had a negative experience of international assistance being squandered during the UNOSOM period. 2. There is a deep frustration and sense of disempowerment at the situation where much of the country is held hostage by warlords, lacks effective government and the international community is seen to have forgotten Somalia. 3. For those Somalis aware of the peace dividend approach, some feel that it does not work and others that assistance and support to peaceful areas has not been forthcoming. 4. The SACB and its members have not been effective and energetic in explaining its role. The website is not well known for those that have access to the internet. Information from the SACB often does not reach the staff of international agencies and rarely the members of Somali organisations. Materials like the SACB handbook, donor reports had not been seen by most interviewees.

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5. The SACB Secretariat has had a very limited presence in Somalia, but also its member agencies have done little, it seems, to promote and explain it. With a few exceptions, field staff of SACB member agencies are also not well informed or briefed about the SACB by their Nairobi offices. Some international staff share the negative views of many Somalis. 6. Its location in Nairobi, along with the head offices of many of its members, creates access and communication problems, particularly in northern Somalia. These problems have been exacerbated in 2004 by the Kenyan ban on Somali passports. 7. Somali stakeholders feel that SACB, in its present situation, has little relevance to the Somali context ; for instance the education sector in Somalia is run mainly by private associations and Arab NGOs who have no contact with SACB education committee. Medical associations also feel that any health policy which does not incorporate them will not reflect Somali realities.

Despite these often vociferous criticisms of the SACB, almost no one in Somalia suggested that the SACB should be got rid of. Inevitably the SACB serves as the target for any criticisms of the international community, but there is also a realisation that, in the absence of a central Somali government and current weak international commitment to Somalia, the SACB could also play an advocacy role for Somalia.

6.2 Somaliland

Official views in Somaliland about the SACB often reflect the political stance on independence. The SACB is seen by some as one of the obstacles to getting international recognition, continuing to deal with Somalia as one country, as reflected in its title. This is exacerbated by the SACB’s location in Nairobi which tends to be seen as alignment with South/Central Somalia and also making it very difficult for Somalilanders to visit.110

The SACB is seen as controlling aid allocations (the “government in exile” idea). Government officials also feel that Somaliland is treated unfairly and the international aid community has not sufficiently recognised the achievements in creating a functioning government and keeping a good level of peace and security. They feel that the SACB and agencies in Nairobi have not differentiated enough between conditions in Somaliland that are suitable for developmental interventions and the rest of Somalia. As with other regions of Somalia, there is a view that Somaliland is receiving less assistance. There is also feeling by some government ministers that the international community has not given due recognition to the Somaliland Strategy for Economic Recovery and Poverty Reduction Plan 2004 – 2006.

However, some Somaliland ministers and officials acknowledged that the SACB had been helpful in establishing a presence in Hargeisa with a field officer based in the Ministry of Planning. Those line ministries that have been involved in SACB sectoral meetings and workshops were also positive about those initiatives and regretted that they had been in abeyance recently, partly due to the restrictions at various times on travel of international staff.

110 A substantial number of Somalilanders consulted thought that the SACB should move to, or have a base in, Addis Ababa.

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There are a number of reasons why the SACB’s relationship with the Somaliland government has been weak:

1. The SACB’s Executive and Steering Committees have not consistently worked at developing regular contacts with the Somaliland authorities. The main contacts have been fitful and often in negative circumstances around security incidents. Although it is too early to confirm, the series of high-level meetings started after the killings of two GTZ personnel in March 2004 between a team from the SACB’s Executive and the Somaliland government seems to indicate that sustained contact can lead to dialogue and better mutual understanding.

2. On security issues members of the Somaliland government feel that they have achieved a good degree of peace, security and stability particularly in relation to the rest of Somalia and to many other countries in Africa. They feel that sometimes the aid agencies exaggerate the security incidents.

3. The international agencies working in Somaliland find themselves at the sharp end of the international impasse over the state’s self-declared independence. Until there is a resolution of this situation, the SACB has to continue its function as the aid coordination body for the whole of Somalia.

6.3 Puntland

Many of the issues relating to the SACB’s relationship with Somaliland are also relevant to Puntland, although the Puntland State is not seeking independence from Somalia. The SACB and its members’ engagement with the Puntland authorities was seriously disrupted during the period of political instability in 2001/2002. Some of the SACB sectoral committees’ relationships in areas such as health were badly affected.

6.4 South/Central Somalia

The fragmented nature of control and authority in South and Central Somalia has meant that the SACB has been less able to hold any of its sectoral meetings in the region than in Puntland and Somaliland. There were efforts to provide a forum for the burgeoning civil society organisations in Mogadishu to meet with the SACB in Nairobi but this was apparently not followed up at the SACB end.

6.5 Conclusions

The international community has a responsibility to coordinate its assistance to Somalia in an open manner, responsive to the needs and priorities of the Somali people. Its strategies and plans should be based on full consultation with the communities involved and with the appropriate local and regional authorities.

Somalis also need to recognise that it is legitimate for the aid community, both international and national, to have its own coordinating forums that then engage with authorities, with civil society and communities.

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There is a need to explain the reality that most international agencies, particularly those with a mandate to cover the whole country, will not relocate to Somalia until there is a prospect of medium to long term peace and stability.

The priorities for the SACB are:

4. To better explain its role and the modes of operation of its members 5. To strengthen dialogue and consultation within Somalia, where possible in a structured way with the local administrations (See Section 10.8) 6. To encourage SACB member organisations in their own consultative processes to explain the SACB’s role and also encourage Somali participation.

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7. FIELD COORDINATION

7.1 Overview

It is difficult to give a definitive assessment of the effectiveness of field coordination in Somalia. In terms of strategic coordination, Section 5 above has shown that there has been progress in some sectors in developing common approaches and priorities, although it is not known to what extent individual programmes adhere to these policy frameworks. There has been less work, if any, on joint programming on an area basis.

At the operational level, there is no widespread evidence of project duplication. This may be a result of good coordination and is also due to the fact that in many parts of Somalia there are few agencies working and resources are very limited. In terms of gaps, this is almost certainly a much larger problem because of the low level of assistance to Somalia and the difficulty of access in insecure areas. There is still concern that agencies can sometimes operate in the same area with different approaches, particularly to practical but highly sensitive questions of community contributions and staff salaries.

Conditions and context for aid coordination within Somalia vary considerably. In some regions (particularly Somaliland and Puntland) administrations are playing, or seeking to play a lead role. In much of South/Central Somalia, local administrations are weak and have extremely weak capacities, powers, resources and political credibility in the absence of electoral processes and a functioning central government.

With the exception of Somaliland, the number of international agencies in any one area is small so, even if formal coordination is weak, agencies are often regularly in touch with each other, particularly on security issues and to organise themselves if there is emergency, such as an influx of IDPs. However, the number of Somali NGOs and other civil society organisations has generally grown and these are often not included in coordination structures.

As with most agency work, coordination functions are disrupted by security events resulting in periodic withdrawals of international staff from some areas and relocation of offices and programme work in others. This is probably the major factor limiting the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms.

In areas where there are regular and established international agency coordination meetings, the convening of those meetings is carried out by OCHA field officers, or in some situations by UN or NGO focal points. The EC has Liaison Officers based in Hargeisa, Bosaso and Mogadishu that are primarily concerned with liaison with local authorities and with EC- funded agencies.

7.2 Somaliland

Somaliland government coordination of rehabilitation and development programmes is overseen by the Ministry of Planning. Line ministries then organise their sectoral coordination meetings. This work is supported and facilitated by the SACB Field Officer located within the Ministry of Planning who works with counterparts in each of the ministries, building capacity and skills to run efficient coordination meetings.

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Before the security restrictions that started in March 2004, some of the SACB sectoral committees met regularly in Hargeisa with their respective Ministries. The SACB Steering Committee also met there in May 2002.

OCHA has a field office in Hargeisa and both the UN agencies and INGOs in Hargeisa have focal points. The Heads of Agencies meeting meets every month, primarily composed of INGOs, sometimes with attendance by UN agencies. Its agenda is mainly concerned with operational issues such as security and taxation, rather than programme coordination. OCHA has been leading coordination on the response to the drought in the Sool / Sanaag plateau.

Local NGOs do not have a specific coordination forum of their own and do not attend the Heads of Agency meetings. However some coordination takes place through the work of LNGO umbrella groups such as Consortium of Somaliland Non-Governmental Organisations (COSONGO) and Nagaad. A broader Civil Society Forum is also developing in Somaliland.

There are a number of important dysfunctions relating to the various coordination structures in Hargeisa:

1. Coordination between government ministries is weak with the Ministry of Planning not yet playing an effective and respected role. Internal communication and coordination within ministries can also be weak. 2. The interaction between the Ministry of Planning and the aid agencies is not always constructive. The Ministry has sometimes appeared to want to be more controlling than the agencies are prepared to accept and complains that they do not get much, if any, information from the agencies. 3. Somaliland NGOs are mainly excluded from coordination forums. 4. Some key INGOs working in Somaliland do not have offices in Nairobi. This means that information flows to and from the SACB structures are further weakened. 5. The NGO Consortium’s focal point agency does not have an office in Nairobi, so another channel for information to and from the SACB via the NGO Consortium is weakened.

The SACB’s presence and support role to coordination work through the government ministries and with the aid agencies is generally welcomed and is reckoned to have helped improve the coordination work of some of the line ministries. Unfortunately, this work has been hampered by the lack of a counterpart and sometimes unconstructive attitudes within the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination.

7.3 Puntland

In Puntland, government coordination structures are weak. Some SACB sectoral committees met in Puntland from time to time, but these were disrupted by the political instability of 2001/2002. A NGO coordination meeting met on a monthly basis in the past, but since the political crisis in 2001/2002, the forum was suspended. The meetings were chaired by CARE and involved some local networks such as We are Women Activists (WAWA) and Talowadag. OCHA organises bi-weekly inter-agency drought response meetings which are chaired by the Minister of Planning since late 2003. There are informal sectoral coordination meetings between line ministries and the INGOs/ UN agencies. There is also a cholera task force which brings together UNICEF, WHO, the Somalia Red Crescent Society and Aktion Africa Hilfe (AAH) in Garowe.

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EC has a Liaison Officer based in Bosaso who is primarily concerned with monitoring the situation in Puntland and liaising with and monitoring EC funded programmes.

Generally, there is a sense in Puntland that inter-agency coordination has been weakened by the 2001/2002 disruptions, although OCHA has been leading on drought response coordination. The division of the NGO/UN agencies between Garowe and Bosaso also makes coordination more difficult.

7.4 Wajid/Hudur

A monthly inter-agency meeting is rotated between Hudur and Wajid. OCHA organises the meetings, prepares agendas and minutes and the chairmanship is rotated between agencies. In the past the local authorities attended these meetings but later on suspended their participation. These meetings were initially launched to respond to the emergency situation in the region when IDPs who fled from Baidoa arrived in Bakol region. Issues relating to car hiring, employment, salary scales, per diems, airport security and other security related matters are discussed in the meeting. Sectoral meetings such as cholera task force and agricultural working groups were initiated but gradually declined. No local NGOs attend the inter-agency meetings. The group of international agencies operating in Bakol region have started their own forum in Nairobi which operates outside the formal SACB structure, but liaises with the SACB Secretariat.

7.5 Belet Weyne

In Hiran, there are general-interagency and sectoral meetings. The general Hiran Inter-agency Forum (HIF) is chaired by OCHA; the sectoral one is chaired rotationally and does not involve OCHA. The HIF was initiated by a coordination of head of agencies in Nairobi which drew the TOR with the help of SACB. The sectoral meetings have declined as some focal agencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO and WHO moved out of the region.

7.6 Mogadishu

In Mogadishu there are several coordination forums:

• UN agencies forum chaired by OCHA; • Weekly security meetings held and chaired rotationally by the INGOs and UN agencies the latter being represented by OCHA and UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD). • Weekly cholera task force facilitated by WHO attended by UN agencies, INGOs and some local NGOs working in the health sector; • Health/ nutrition monthly meetings organised by the TNG Ministry of Health but facilitated by WHO and attended by selected UN and international organisations including Arab agencies operating in the health sector. • There is also bilateral coordination between some UN agencies such as UNICEF and WFP and their local and international partners. • Civil society organisations have a semi-formal Civil Society in Action forum that acts as peace catalyst. The forum draws fifty-six organisations from universities, schools, medical doctors, media, women groups and other peace and human rights activists. The forum has secretariat meetings weekly and larger assembly meetings on a monthly basis. The forum plays an important role protests against attacks on civilians and kidnappings

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using media, protests and public rallies. They also encourage positive developments at the peace process at Mbagathi.

7.7 OCHA and the SACB

The OCHA role in field coordination has generally been appreciated in Somalia, particularly in relation to the drought in Sool / Sanaag plateau and other emergency responses, and the fact that there are field staff with a designated coordination role.

However, the review found many international and national agency staff, who are not clear about the respective coordination roles of OCHA and the SACB.

The SACB’s lack of direct involvement in field coordination has been of concern to its members for many years. Detailed proposals were drawn up in 1999 for implementation of a field structure but never implemented, presumably because of lack of Executive Committee will. An SACB field officer, based in Nairobi, did support coordination work and acted as a travelling liaison person. This post was suspended in April 2004 when the Head of the SACB Secretariat left and the post holder took over acting in that post. Also, as mentioned above, the SACB developed its field office post based in Hargeisa from 2003 onwards.

Up until 2002, UN humanitarian coordination functions were carried out in the field by the UNCU with staff provided by OCHA. In 2003, following the arrival of a new UN HC/RC and Head of OCHA and, it seems, encouragement from OCHA headquarters, the UN coordination functions were reviewed and restructured. OCHA proposed to fill the vacuum in field coordination arrangements left by the SACB and circulated a proposal for consultation that was discussed by the SACB.111 As the 2003 CAP described it, UNOCHA would build capacity within Somalia to improve field coordination on the ground, providing a core strategic field coordination support structure would feed into the Nairobi-based SACB structure.

The OCHA proposals were based on an assumption that the SACB would remain primarily a Nairobi- based body. However the proposals lacked a full discussion of a number of issues, including the respective mandates of OCHA and the SACB and to what extent OCHA’s humanitarian remit stretches into rehabilitation and development programmes. The pros and cons of whether OCHA, the SACB or some combination should carry out field coordination functions was, it seems, never fully debated, nor earlier proposals for SACB field coordination looked at again.

In some ways, a discussion about which body supports field coordination in Somalia is of little importance as long as it is done effectively. However, the current arrangements do raise some issues.

The SACB model, for all its imperfections and slowness, is based on an inclusive vision of coordination providing a relative neutral forum without organisational biases. There is the danger of a mismatch between the relative neutrality and inclusiveness of the SACB framework and the focus of OCHA on and within the UN system.

111 UNCU/OCHA. Concept paper: Field Coordination System for Somalia (undated) and Action Plan for Strengthening Field Coordination in Somalia.

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The SACB also aims to cover the full spectrum of aid activities from humanitarian relief work to development. OCHA has a global mandate for UN humanitarian coordination often in close coooperation with NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. But the question arises as to whether it should play a leading role in coordination, say, in Puntland across the full spectrum of assistance activities covered by SACB members, or be primarily concerned with humanitarian issues and responses.

Finally, different organisational support structures between Nairobi and the field levels of coordination are likely to be dysfunctional. This has already been shown by the fact that the circulation of field coordination minutes to the SACB Secretariat has sometimes been haphazard.

Nevertheless, the reality of the situation is that OCHA now has a network of field staff established and the way forward in strengthening field coordination will need to be practical and pragmatic.

7.8 Conclusions

Although, as has been noted earlier, coordination arrangements in Somalia are very context- specific, there are some general features that can be noted:

1. Coordination meetings are usually limited to information exchanges and discussion of common operational issues such as security. There is less focus on programming and implementation, partly it seems because field staff often feel disempowered and subject to decisions made by their agency HQs in Nairobi. 2. Interaction with and flows of information between the field and Nairobi are generally weak. The direct linkages between coordination structures in Somalia and the SACB Secretariat and committees varies. In some cases, minutes from field coordination meetings are sent to the Secretariat and issues raised in the relevant committees. In other cases, the link does not seem to exist. The “gap” between the field and Nairobi (and vice versa) is as much an agency problem as SACB’s. The back-up mechanism should be that SACB member agencies raise issues arising from the field at SACB meetings. This does not always happen. The distribution of minutes from field coordination meetings can be haphazard.112 3. Somali NGOs are generally marginalised in field coordination structures, although some of their umbrella organisations are growing in strength and capacity. Given the growing networks of Somali civil society organisations and Somali NGOs seeking direct access to donor funds, it seems increasingly important that local NGOs and other relevant civil society groups are included in inter-agency coordination meetings. International agencies may also need to continue to meet to discuss specific practical issues of concern to them. 4. The review found that many Somali NGOs and some INGOs are not aware of or do not have links with the NGO Consortium in Nairobi. The NGO focal point system appears weak. 5. In parts of Central / Southern Somalia there are weak civil administrations, sometimes relics of UNOSOM structures, as well as traditional leaders. Agencies often consult with these entities, particularly in sensitive areas such as employment and vehicle hire. However they are rarely included in inter-agency discussions and little is yet being done

112 Unlike the minutes of the SACB committees that are publicly available on the internet, minutes of many past field coordination meetings can be difficult to find.

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to build their capacities or provide even minimal support. This is a complex issue beyond the scope of this review, but in terms of coordination a number of Somali and international informants noted the dangers of international agencies focusing mainly on strengthening civil society and ignoring local administrations.

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8. THE SACB SECRETARIAT

8.1 Staffing and Management

The staffing of the SACB Secretariat is shown in Table 5 below. The major recent change in staffing has been the recruitment of a UN Volunteer as Field Officer in Hargeisa in 2003.

TABLE 5: Secretariat Staffing (as at August 2004)

POSTS Head of Secretariat (currently Project Analyst acting) Project Analyst Secretary (vacant – being recruited) Data Base Expert Project Assistant (x2) Office Clerk Field Officer, Hargeisa (UNV)

Health Sector Coordinator

From interviews with staff members and observations made over a three month period during 2004, it is clear that the Secretariat does not generally have spare capacity.113

The supervision of the SACB Secretariat by the Executive Committee is unstructured. Generally, the Head of the Secretariat and her staff get on with their work, seeking guidance from the chairs of the various committees when necessary. The Executive does not receive any work plans or reports from the Head of the Secretariat.

If the Secretariat is to take on a more proactive role in a revitalised SACB, it will be necessary for work plans to be drawn up, so that the work can be prioritised and focused.

The position of the Health Sector Coordination office within the Secretariat is for historical reasons, somewhat anomalous. Until April 2004 the Health Sector Coordinator was contracted by the EC Somalia Unit as a technical advisor to support, advise and service the SACB Health Sectoral Committee. The Coordinator and Health Sector Project Assistant have worked as part of the Secretariat but outside the formal management structure led by the Head of the Secretariat. The Health Sector Coordination office reports to the Health Sector Committee that manages the Coordinator’s work and agrees and monitors his work plans and receives monthly progress reports.

With the ending of the EC funding in April 2004, the Coordinator is now contracted by UNOPS with funding from UNICEF, ECHO and DFID. The rest of the Secretariat staff are contracted to UNDP although it has been proposed by the UN RC/HC that the administrative support for the rest of the Secretariat should also be transferred to UNOPS. The Project

113 It should be noted that the Secretariat was understaffed during the period of this review, because of staff leaving.

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Assistant now works generally for the Secretariat, so that the committee support work load can be shared between two staff members.

While maintaining accountability to the HSC and bearing in mind proposed changes to the Secretariat, it makes sense for the Health Coordinator to be fully integrated into the Secretariat management structure. Strategic priorities, guidance and accountability can still be provided by the Health Sector Committee.114

As mentioned earlier, the UN RC/HC proposed that the management support for the Secretariat should be transferred from UNDP to UNOPS. From a technical point of view this change might make sense in view of the fact that UNOPS is specifically designed to provide management and support services and its Nairobi regional office has recently been strengthened. However it would seem to make sense to maintain the direct link with UNDP and the UN RC/HC, given the respective responsibilities for coordination. There are also a number of technical areas where there is a shared or common interest such as resources and information management.

If the administrative burden of supporting the Secretariat is problematic for UNDP, one solution might to buy in UNOPS’s technical support, but retain the Secretariat under UNDP’s programme umbrella.115

8.2 Secretariat Costs

Table 4 below outlines Secretariat costs for 2002, 2003 and the budget for 2004.

TABLE 4: SACB SECRETARIAT COSTS (US$)

General Secretariat Health Sector Coordination 116 2002 2003 2004 (2004 budget) (budget) Personnel 117 132,653 139,981 258,100 195,000 Office expenses 118 25,715 23,986 77,575 14,500 Travel 119 4,187 15,086 21,500 7,000 Office Equipment 12,143 13,806 56,706 6,500 Other 8,040 20,023 Admin & Operational Services 10,964 13,837 25,224 TOTALS: 193,702 226,719 439,105 223,000 Sources: UNDP Annual Reports; SACB Secretariat Note: Substantial increase in 2004 budget due to: 1. Personnel: full costs of Field Support Coordinator in Hargeisa; additional post of Project Analyst in support of field coordination; additional costs of sectoral consultants (US$ 44,100);

114 See discussion of a similar issue in the notes on coordination in the West Bank /Gaza – Annex 9. 115 UNOPS has indicated that this type of arrangement is possible. 116 The Health Sector Coordination costs have been budgeted separately because of distinct EC financing and contractual arrangements up to March 2004. 117 Includes consultant costs. 118 Includes meeting costs. 119 Includes vehicle rent.

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2. Office expenses: increased office maintenance & security costs; increased publication and translation costs; items included in ‘Other’ line in 2002, 2003; 3. Office equipment: move to new premises and associated costs; Hargeisa office set up and running costs.

Figure 8 below shows the proportion of contributions to the Secretariat budget from the EC, Italy, USA and Denmark for 2004. The Health Sectoral Coordinator is funded separately with contributions from UNICEF, DFID and ECHO.

It has not been possible to compare the SACB’s Secretariat costs with those of equivalent entities in other complex emergencies. It is unlikely that comparisons would be very helpful, given the widely differing contexts and histories.

Little work appears to have been done globally on evaluating the cost effectiveness of coordination work. The real costs of the SACB are, of course, very much higher than the costs of the Secretariat. It might be possible to estimate the SACB’s annual real costs, taking into account estimates of staff time. However it is not clear that this would be useful, as there is nothing to compare it with and it would be difficult to calculate the opportunity costs if staff of SACB member agencies spent less time involved in SACB coordination meetings and did other work.

The other part of the cost effectiveness equation is the cost of poor coordination in financial terms (overlaps, lack of efficiency, damage control), human terms (populations missed out or poorly served) and security indiscipline.

Taking 2003 figures, the SACB Secretariat costs less than 0.2% of the total assistance provided to Somalia. This does not seem an excessive figure.

Figure 8: Donor Contributions to SACB Secretariat Budget 2004

Denmark 9%

USA 17%

EC 55%

Italy 19%

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8.3 Tracking Assistance

An important function of aid coordination mechanisms is to support government systems for tracking, monitoring and analysing flows of international assistance. In the Somalia situation, the responsibility falls to the international community until there is a functioning central government.

The SACB’s annual Donor Reports provide a systematic description of international assistance to Somalia, both by donor and by programme and enable some comparisons to be made over time. The Reports are noteworthy for attempting to track private funding through INGOs. The Donor Report is valued as a useful overview of international assistance to Somalia,120 although assistance from Arab donor countries, with the exception of Egypt, is not recorded in the SACB system.

The other financial tracking systems are provided by OCHA for the CAP and by OECD/DAC’s global system.

It will be important that the SACB funding data can form the basis of a nascent central government aid monitoring and reporting system, that it fits with international standards for financial reporting set by OECD/DAC and with any systems used to track responses from future donor pledging conferences for Somalia.

It would therefore be useful to carry out a detailed review of the Donor Report with user feedback and looking at whether the database needs to be adjusted to international norms.

8.4 Information & Communications

Both the SACB and its members have failed to inform and communicate effectively about the nature and scope of assistance to Somalia. This is a problem not limited to Somalia.121 In the case of the SACB, there are some useful information tools. The SACB Donor Report has been mentioned above. When viewed together with the NGO Consortium Handbook, these two annual handbooks provide a comprehensive view of the activities of donors and aid agencies in Somalia. The SACB Directory is a basic but important information document.

The SACB Annual Handbook is extremely useful for those who need to know about how the SACB works, its history and scope. However, there is a sense that it has become stuck in a rut. It is proposed that a ‘light’ user review be carried out to see whether it should be developed and can be revitalised. Possibly the historical archive sections should now be summarised or produced as a separate resource. Summaries of the various sectoral strategy documents could then be included.

The SACB website is also an important resource with access to a wide range of SACB documents including sectoral strategies and meeting minutes. The impression from interviews was that this site was under-used and needed to be promoted. According to the SACB Secretariat website usage between April and June 2004 averaged 370 visits per day. Statistics have not been kept before so it is not possible to analyse trends in usage or to

120 Findings from interviews. The EC cites the donor report in its 2002 – 2007 strategy paper. 121 The humanitarian community must better communicate its purpose and objectives to local populations. ECOSOC 2004.

66 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 compare with other Somalia related websites including those of the UN agencies. There is a need to expand the number of links provided by the website. They should presumably include the websites of the SACB’s member agencies.

The SACB project matrix, found within the website, is a key coordination tool that enables anyone to search aid programmes by agency, location or sector. Again, this needs to be more actively promoted. As with the whole website, it is vital that it is kept up to date and that agencies contribute to it.122

The SACB has not developed any kind of overall communications strategy:

• There is no up-to-date explanatory leaflet about the SACB. • None of the key SACB documents is in Somali. • The main mode of regular communication is by committee minute. This is not effective for those who need to have highlights pinpointed and contents summarised. The monthly SACB update newsletter did fulfil that role to some extent but has fallen by the wayside in 2004 due to staff shortages. • The SACB does not have any kind of accountability document, such as an Annual Report, that could report back on the SACB’s work and summarise some of the outcomes of international assistance. • SACB information and the website is essentially directed towards its members and towards Somalia. Thought should be given to whether audiences in the diaspora should be a target.

Apart from the website, most of the SACB’s routine communication is done by email using a system of email lists for each committee and working group and also for general information. This system provides a very useful resource for agencies wishing to distribute information, including reports and job vacancies.

Some interviewees complained that they were flooded with SACB emails, being on various different lists. The Secretariat tries to keep the email lists up to date and people can be taken off them by request. Apparently it is not technically possible through the current UNDP server system to have an automatic system of signing in and out of email lists using passwords. It seems worth investigating whether there is a system which would reduce the servicing work required by the Secretariat and lessen the frustration of those who get too many emails. Of course, some also complain about getting no emails, not being aware that the system is open to anyone who contacts the Secretariat.

During this review the President and the First Deputy Prime Minister of the TNG were reported on the BBC Somalia service as making highly critical statements about the SACB. These statements were widely heard and often mentioned during interviews in Somalia, demonstrating the wide coverage and credibility that the service has.123 It seems very important that the SACB should also use this communications channel and those of local radio stations, even if only to provide responses to critical and sometimes misleading

122 In August 2004, the project matrix did not have any project information about UNESCO, UNHCR and WHO. 123 Hornafrik.com. Report on the Serious Consequences of the Lack of Cooperation between the TNG and SACB. It proved impossible to track down a transcript of the President’s statement.

67 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 statements. Presumably there are a number of services available to the Secretariat in Nairobi that provide a daily summary of Somali media coverage in both English and Somali.

8.5 Advocacy

SACB’s advocacy work has mainly involved responses to security incidents and alerting the aid community to potential natural disasters. In the area of resource mobilisation, the SACB has had a major success in enabling funds from GAVI and the GFATM to be released for Somalia.

Somalia has had a very low international profile during the 2000s. For example, there appears to have been almost no international media coverage of the peace talks in Kenya that may be reaching a conclusion in September 2004. There does not seem to be any proactive work being done to change that situation. In some complex emergencies, INGOs can be relied on to carry out information and advocacy work, lobbying their governments and feeding stories to the media.124 There is no INGO Somalia lobby group. This may be partly because agencies such as GB that have a strong policy and advocacy focus have a small presence and in Oxfam’s case, only in Somaliland.

NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands) has been running a very efficient information service covering the SNRC talks and IRIN provides coverage on Somalia and a number of UN agencies have regular information bulletins, but there is not any distillation of this information focused outwards to policy makers and the international media.

Collectively, the SACB has not looked at whether any collaborative efforts could be undertaken to raise Somalia’s profile and get more funding for it. Donor members might not be too keen about supporting work that would end up in their in-trays as requests for more attention to Somalia. Nevertheless, there is an expectation by Somalis that the SACB has a responsibility to spotlight their situation internationally and seek more assistance.

SACB’s role in advocacy work would need to be limited to aid /humanitarian related issues, but perhaps could produce a short annual report – a kind of ‘State of Somalia’ document. This would also serve an accountability purpose of reporting back an overview of the SACB’s activities.

124 An example of this is the long-running British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG).

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9. CONCLUSIONS

9.1 SACB’s Strengths and Weaknesses

This review shows that the SACB has both substantial strengths and weaknesses and Box 4 below attempts to summarise these. In spite of the weaknesses, many of which are well- known, the SACB has shown notable resilience and exhibits strengths which can be built on. It is important to point out again that the SACB is always bound to be a reflection of its members, their strengths, weaknesses and priorities and above all, their commitment to effective aid coordination. It is also always going to be a reflection of complexities and fragmentation of the Somali context.

International aid coordination mechanisms are never perfect. The international aid system contains too many built-in dysfunctions and conflicting and differing forces at work. However, the SACB, with its imperfections, has been recognised internationally as a mechanism that offers a model of coordination based on voluntarism and equal participation of donors, the UN and NGOs.

BOX 4: SACB – SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES125

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES • Survived 10 years • Lack of Somali participation • A mechanism that provides relatively equal • Generally weak role in field coordination status for donors, UN and NGOs (partial exception of Somaliland) • Provides a framework / reference point for • The Executive and Steering Committees agencies and donors, particularly in both punch below their weight (e.g. in sectoral areas areas of policy and cross-cutting issues) • Enables voluntary coordination to happen • Has developed codes and guidelines but • Developed strategies and standards in some generally these have not been promoted or key sectors monitored • Provided a joint response mechanism to • Donor coordination is weak deal with security incidents • The SACB Executive does not effectively • Provided a framework with which to fulfill function as a donor forum engage Somali administrations • The SACB has not been able to • Provides open access & a good deal of consistently engage with Somali transparency (less so on outcomes) administrations (Somaliland and Puntland) • Provides a programme vetting framework • SACB has poorly communicated itself and & a tool for those agencies committed to is widely misunderstood in Somalia transparency, learning and advocacy • Has not fully realised its advocacy • Has been able to provide GAVI and potential on behalf of Somalia GFATM country coordination mechanisms • Lack of structured management support to • Provides some institutional memory the Secretariat & currently weak • The Consultative Forum and nearly all the • Emphasis on Nairobi-based meetings is SACB committees are open to any partly unavoidable, but severely limits organisations working in Somalia, Somali participation including Somali NGOs. • Too many meetings • The Secretariat has supported a predictable • Too much time spent on information & reliable framework of coordination exchange meetings and email lists for inter-agency • HSC peer review pressure has created communication

125 See Section 10.* for Opportunities and Threats.

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• Health Sectoral Committee demonstrates resistance from some agencies value of having dedicated technical advisor

The Review notes that the SACB has been weakened in the period since 2002, mainly due to a lack of leadership and vision from the key players, the EC and UN. The Secretariat has also been weakened during 2004 due to understaffing.

The future of the SACB depends on the vision, drive and commitment of the key players, the UN group and the EC, with supporting commitment from other SACB members. This is the bottom line for the SACB. Taken together, the overall commitment of SACB’s members will reflect the importance given to Somalia and the plight of its people, whatever the outcome of the current peace talks. Recent history (e.g. Afghanistan) indicates that so-called ‘failed’ or ‘fragmented states’ are ignored by the international community at its own risk.

It remains to be seen whether the international community at large can respond appropriately to the challenges that Somalia will throw up. It could be that the two ‘systems’ and ‘cultures’ are worlds apart and will continue to grind uneasily against each other. As in other protracted conflict situations, aid agencies, both international and national, may be left trying to pick up the humanitarian pieces in the absence of effective and just political settlements.

Somalia is also a prime example where ‘Western’ aid systems are trying to operate across global geopolitical and religious fault lines that have widened substantially since 9/11 2001. However, it does seem that carefully handled, there might be opportunities for ‘Western’ and Arab and Islamic aid agencies to meet and develop better mutual understanding.

9.2 The Importance of Aid Coordination for Somalia

Section 3 of this review outlined the emphasis being put on effective coordination in both the humanitarian and development environments. There are some particular reasons why coordination is important in the Somalia context:

• Lack of central government and effective local administrations in many areas means that the aid community’s own transparency and accountability mechanisms are more important than in ‘normal’ stable country situations • Relative to some other chronic complex emergency countries there are limited resources that need to be effectively coordinated. • There could be an influx of agencies & donors if there is a settlement that will put extra pressure on coordination mechanisms.126 • The insecure and volatile operating context in Somalia requires agencies to coordinate carefully together. • A number of Somali interviewees stressed the importance of the SACB in providing an opportunity for all-Somalia discussion on development issues, counteracting the trend to fragmentation. • Credible information & information systems can be used for advocacy purposes which are much needed to raise the profile of Somalia.

126 Strand noted in Afghanistan that aid coordination became increasingly important as the number of aid donors, funding levels, channels and implementers multiplied and the danger of overlapping and duplication increased.

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10. RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Introduction

For all scenarios, the unpredictability of the Somalia, the regional and the international contexts means that the SACB will need to respond to rapidly changing circumstances.

The detail of this report’s recommendations will need to be scrutinised and validated with care in the follow-up process led by the Executive Committee’s Review Working Group. There are no magic wands to be waved. Judgements will have to be made about the practicality and the realism of the proposed changes. For this reason, the pros and cons of some recommendations will be given below.

10.2 Some Guiding Principles behind the Recommendations

• The proposals build on the SACB’s strengths rather than creating a new structure.

• All opportunities should be taken to shift the balance of discussion and consultation to Somalia and to the Somalis in order to bring issues and experience up from reality on the ground.

• Recommendations relating to the SACB’s structures and functioning should concentrate on moves to increase efficiency and effectiveness and to minimise complexities.

• The benchmarks for coordination activities should be that they improve the quality of assistance outcomes for Somalis and support aid agencies and administrations in the effective and efficient provision of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance.

• Structures are important, but there is danger of getting fixated on them. Strand points out in the Afghanistan context that in the end, aid coordination is more about willingness to find workable solutions than about ways of establishing rigid management structures, about willingness to seek innovative and multiple ways of assisting Afghans, and about making agencies and authorities accountable to the Afghans rather than focusing solely on credibility with donors. Only when there is a shared goal and a strong commitment to the intended beneficiaries are aid coordination entities likely to meet the high expectations their presence generates.

• The recommendations are mainly aimed towards the SACB Executive Committee, supported by the Review Working Group, for implementation.

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10.3 Options for the Future

There are four main options for the SACB’s future:

1. No change: existing modes of operation, structures and Secretariat continue. This is not considered a viable option. It is likely to lead to further weakening of the SACB and its demise. If the SACB died, unofficial and ad-hoc coordination structures would develop and at some stage a new coordination structure would be re-invented.

2. Limited change: implement low-cost recommendations in this report that streamline and improve the working of the committees and the management of the Secretariat. Some additional elements of Option 3 may also be implemented, depending on commitment and resources.

3. A strengthened SACB: involving a revamping of the SACB committees, the Secretariat and the role in field coordination.

4. A strengthened transitional SACB: (as in Option 3 above), geared to a transition phase in support of a central government in Mogadishu.

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10.4 Scenarios

The scenarios outlined below are based on those described in the UN CAP 2004 with some revisions approved by the Review Working Group.

BOX 5: SCENARIOS FOR SOMALIA DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE IMPLICATIONS FOR SACB SOMALIA 1. SNRC is • Government will be weak, • Spate of planning & assessment • SACB will need to be strengthened rapidly to successful and will struggle to establish activities, arrival of new agencies, deal with rapidly developing responses, possible transitional control of the country and readjustments to the new situation influx of $ and agencies federal will have severe capacity & • World Bank and UNDP will play roles • Under strong leadership, its role and mandate government & resource limitations in medium to long-term planning within the overall international architecture for parliament • Establishment of peace • Donor conference within six months of Somali reconstruction will have to be re-defined established in throughout the country will settlement and confirmed Mogadishu depend on leaders’ • Agencies work to scale up responses, • Demands on it for information, briefings, commitment to the develop both short and medium term guidance, sharing of strategies will increase settlement, the plans greatly effectiveness of peace • Emphasis on capacity building of • The SACB should advocate for a Somali voice to keeping operations and the nascent Somali institutions be heard in aid planning and implementation development of government • Issues of civil / military relationships • SACB will need to develop & negotiate its control and services & potential politicisation of aid will strategy and plans for a 3 – 5 year transition • Levels of conflict could need to be managed phase as the new government develops its increase as parties on the • Danger that commitments to develop capacity ground adjust to post-talks Somali ownership will be weakened by • Some adaptations of its structures may be needed realities influx of external assessment missions, e.g support for an aid coordination cell in the agency headquarters more engaged government than before • Capacity for coordinated humanitarian responses will remain for some time, not only in the case of renewed conflict but also in response to natural disasters.

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2. Interim • A reversion to scenario 3, • A mix of scenarios 1 & 3– primarily • SACB will have to react flexibly to unpredictable government is although a government with scenario 3 circumstances established, but limited authority over parts fails to establish of south/central Somalia control over the (i.e. more strength than the country TNG) might continue • Levels of conflict could increase as parties on the ground adjust to post-talks realities • Likely to be increased humanitarian need 3. Mbagathi • Levels of conflict could • Existing modalities of assistance • SACB’s role & mode of operation will continue peace talks fail - increase as parties on the programmes to continue as now status quo ground adjust to post-talks • Possibility of increased humanitarian • Recommendations for streamlining SACB will continues realities needs still be relevant • The ground will be ripe for • Security situation could worsen, • Proposals for increasing dialogue with Somalis both local and regional leading to less humanitarian access and strengthening field coordination also remain opportunism • Increased focus on local peace relevant • Fundamentalist groups may building initiatives (bottom-up • Some strengthening of the Secretariat, if grow in strength and approach). resources and commitment allow increase attacks against • Increased efforts at integrated • Increased need for SACB to support advocacy Western agencies and programme approaches at local levels work on behalf of Somalia personnel The situation in Somaliland may relate all of the above scenarios depending on its reaction to developments in the rest of Somalia. In the event of a government in Mogadishu, it is assumed that the option of Somaliland rejoining Somalia will not occur in the medium term (3 – 5 years). Some scenarios are given below: A. Situation in • Reasonable degree of • Aid modalities will continue largely as • SACB will continue to strengthen support to Somaliland stability now members and dialogue with the authorities continues as • Government capacity • Danger that focus of aid agencies • SACB will have a responsibility to ensure now remains weak in the will shift away from Somaliland to that Somaliland is not neglected. absence of international South/Central Somalia recognition & support

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B. Somaliland’s • Somaliland starts to • Growing humanitarian needs • Capacity building work and dialogue with internal situation resemble fragmented • Worsening security situation authorities will decrease / stop deteriorates with situation of south/central • Less opportunity for rehabilitation & unrest and Somalia development work violence C. Relations • Possibility of open conflict • Growing humanitarian needs • As above between with the rest of Somalia • Worsened security situation Somaliland & the new government in Mogadishu deteriorate If a government is established in Mogadishu, the SACB will need to develop a dual coordination role vis a vis the authorities in Mogadishu and Hargeisa. This would not be a political role, but attempting mainly at the sectoral level to maintain contacts between technicians, dialogue on common issues and maintenance of common standards in the event of the eventual reunification of the country.

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The options for the SACB and the scenarios outlined above are not rigidly linked. To some extent there are ‘mix and match’ options. However the correlation might look as in Box 6 below.

BOX 6: SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS

SCENARIOS (10.4) OPTIONS FOR THE SACB (10.3) Scenario 1: Central government established Option 4 Scenario 2: Government established, but fails Options 2 or 3 (reversion to Scenario 3) Scenario 3: Peace talks fail Options 2 or 3 Somaliland Scenario A: status quo See 10.12 below Scenario B: increasing internal instability Scenario C: open conflict with the rest of Somalia

In practice this report provides a menu of recommendations that can be used, depending on the reaction and commitment of the SACB’s members. The bulk of the recommendations relate to Option 2 and can be used selectively with other scenarios.

10.5 Opportunities and Threats

OPPORTUNITIES THREATS All Scenarios All Scenarios • Given the fragmented nature of Somalia, • Lack of commitment & leadership from the SACB can continue to play a role in the SACB members, particularly the UN & the aid context in fostering all-Somalia EC, results in failure to strengthen the discussion and standards SACB and reconfirm its importance & role • SACB and its members have an opportunity to engage with non-traditional aid players, such as those based in Arab countries or with Islamic identities • SACB can exploit its position to advocate on aid issues for Somalia

Scenario 1 Scenario 1 • Play a key role in the early stages of • The SACB is not accepted by the new Somalia’s reconstruction, if a viable central government during the transition period government takes shape • The SACB is marginalised by other players • The SACB will still be needed after the in a competitive scramble for profile, new Somali government emerges in order position and funding. to ensure government respect for principles and standards of aid delivery, monitor possible misuse of aid and provide technical support to new Somali aid coordination structures.

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10.6 Mandate & aims

26. This report is not suggesting major changes to the SACB’s remit. Its mandate and aims should be re-stated, clarifying its role as a body that supports and facilitates international aid coordination in the closest possible cooperation with Somali administrations and Somali civil society. It does not seek to replace legitimate Somali administrations and has a temporary existence until internationally recognised government is fully established in Somalia (for details please see Annex 3).

27. SACB should develop structured links with IGAD, probably through the Partners’ Forum, and with the African Union and Arab League (since Somalia is a member of both), while recognising SACB’s non-political status. Representatives of those entities should be invited to attend the SACB Executive as observers and SACB briefing sessions should be organised on a six monthly or annual basis (in the latter case, perhaps using the publication of the Annual Donor Report as the peg).

28. A strengthened SACB should be re-launched and re-mandated at a high level international meeting, such as the donor meeting to be held if there is a successful peace settlement and a central government established.

10.7 Revised SACB Structure

1. A Somali Donor Group (SDG), along the lines of those for other countries, should be formed. This forum along with the UNCT and the NGO Forum will provide members for the SACB Executive Committee. (For remit of the SDG – see Annex 2). The SDG is recommended because the current SACB Executive Committee does not satisfactorily fulfil the donor forum function and because the Executive should primarily focus on dialogue and coordination activities that attempt to bring coherence to donor, UN and NGO policies and work. There is a danger that the formation of the SDG could lead to a weakening of donor interest and involvement in the SACB.

2. The Executive Committee should be revamped as a vigorous body to lead the SACB’s activities, respond to members’ issues and concerns and to discuss substantive coordination issues:

• Normal meetings should probably take place bi-monthly (with special meetings in between, if needed), but will probably need to be longer than the current ones • Membership of the Committee will be made up from representatives of the SDG, UNCT and NGO Consortium (proposed five from each grouping), plus ex officio members (UNSECORD) and observers (including ICRC) • The chair, co-chair or deputy-chair of each of the SACB Sectoral Committees will also be members of the Executive, acting in their SACB capacities and not as representatives of their agencies /organisations • Depending on political developments in Somalia, the Executive will invite participants from administrations in Somalia • Observers should be invited from bodies such as IGAD, the African Union and the Arab League • The position of Chair of the Executive Committee should be recognised as one that requires a significant commitment of time and requires a person of appropriate

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experience and seniority, as well as chairing skills. It is likely that a donor would supply this person as a significant part of its contribution to assistance to Somalia. The Committee would have two co-chairs, one from the UN group and one from the NGO group. The Chair and the two co-chairs would be expected to work closely together, particularly in urgent action required when it is not possible to convene the full committee and also in relation to management of the Secretariat and any disputes that might arise within the SACB. Past experience suggests that Chair from donor country that is not a dominant donor and also is not closely associated with Somalia’s recent and colonial history, i.e someone with a degree of neutrality in the Somalia context would be appropriate. • The Executive would delegate issues requiring more consideration to time-limited working groups / task groups

(For the Executive Committee’s proposed ToR and further details, see Annex 3)

3. The Executive Committee should review the various instruments drawn up by the SACB, such as the Code of Conduct, Policy Framework for Continuing Cooperation in Somalia and the Guiding Principles of Operation, and decide which are still valid and should be promoted and disseminated.

4. The Steering Committee should be dissolved. The five existing Sectoral Committees and the HRG will report straight to the Executive. This recommendation is proposed in order to remove a tier from the SACB structure and emphasise the central responsibility of the revamped Executive Committee. It can be argued that this recommendation risks losing the operational hub of the SACB’s structures. However, the Steering Committee has not functioned in that role for a number of years. This proposal is aimed at creating a more tightly managed and focused SACB and seems appropriate for the current Somali context. It is possible that the decision to get rid of the Steering Committee will need to be revisited if the operating conditions in Somalia change significantly. Alternatively the Executive Committee might find it necessary from time to time to establish working groups or task forces on specific operational issues as and when needed.

5. The SACB should develop an overall strategy framework for assistance to Somalia. This document should provide guidance to SACB members and support, take into account and not replace any strategies and planning frameworks developed by Somali administrations. Rather than duplicating existing work, the possibility should be explored with SACB members and particularly with OCHA of developing the CHAP/CAP process in order to fill the strategy document gap.127 This could be done by developing the CHAP into a separate stand-alone SACB strategy document, incorporating rehabilitation and development content, pulling in work from the SACB sectoral committees, Somali administrations and agency strategy documents. Discussion of this proposals could include, from the UN point of view, a review of the Somalia CAP to determine why response levels are low.

The alternative is that the SACB undertakes its own strategy process.

127 This recommendation mainly applies to Scenario 1 – a continuing lack of a central government. In the event that there is a government, it will lead on the development of a reconstruction strategy.

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6. The SACB will continue to have an open, voluntary membership, but members will be expected to follow the General Conditions of Membership (see Annex 4). The Secretariat should draw up a definitive list of members.

10.8 SACB Sectoral Committees & Working Groups

1. In the light of this review, each SACB Sectoral Committee, working group and task force should review its methods of working, looking at the following areas:

• Although the Committees need to retain flexibility and also respond to developments, efforts should be made draw up indicative work plans for 12 month periods, including outlining priorities and plans for meetings to be held in Somalia. • Increased emphasis on outcomes and follow-up, including regional assessments of any coordination issues that need attention • Frequency of meetings - do they need to be held every month? Would less frequent higher quality, better planned meetings be appropriate as has been found by the Education Sectoral Committee?). It remains important for meetings to be scheduled well ahead and in a predictable manner so that members can plan their diaries accordingly • Content of meetings - can time spent on information exchanges be reduced? Can there be more emphasis on substantial discussion and specific themes? • Outreach strategy (how can the committee better root its work in the Somali reality? e.g. feedback from coordination meetings in Somalia; rotating meetings in Somalia; inviting key Somali interlocutors and resource persons • What support is required from the Secretariat? • For working groups, do these need to be continuing meetings or can they be time limited?

2. The CCM role of the Health Sectoral Committee should be taken by a CCM Task Force reporting to the HSC with its composition agreed by the HSC, taking into account GFATM regulations and commitments.

3. The CCM role of the SACB HSC is a role that will have to be continually carefully explained as it is likely to be perceived as one in which the SACB is controlling the distribution of funds.

4. The HSC should come into line with other SACB sectoral committees and have one open meeting, removing the distinction between the HSC and the Health Sector general meetings.

5. The Governance Committee should consider dividing itself into:

A. Capacity and Institution Building Sectoral Committee B. Human rights, gender and protection as a standing working group reporting to the Executive Committee.

5. With the removal of the Steering Committee, the SACB’s Humanitarian Response Group (HRG) will report to the Executive Committee. In line with other SACB committees and groups, the HRG should have one or two co- or deputy chairs and a published list of its core membership in the SACB Annual Handbook. At the moment it

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is described as an ad-hoc group, meeting when a specific emergency situation needs attention. It is proposed that the HRG should be strengthened in order to give due ongoing attention to humanitarian issues. In addition to its current role, it should:

• Promote disaster preparedness and prevention planning and capacity building with SACB members working with and through the Sectoral Committees.

• Promote international humanitarian principles, standards and codes of conduct amongst SACB’s members.

10.9 Improving Somali Participation

This issue will need a multi-pronged approach and some proposals are included in other parts of these recommendations:

1. Each SACB Committee should develop its strategy for Somali consultation & participation with the Executive monitoring, encouraging and promoting good practice and minimum standards. As noted earlier the Executive Committee will lead this process in relation to Somali authorities. These strategies will include holding meetings regularly in Somalia on a rotating basis, inviting participants to Nairobi meetings for specific meetings and seeking to improve their receptivity to field-based information, requests and initiatives

2. SACB members should seek to increase Somali participation in the SACB through their own channels and with their Somali partners. The SACB will encourage good practice in this area.

3. NGO Consortium should look at strengthening Somali NGO participation in its work in order to foster links to the SACB

4. After consultation with the SACB Consultative Forum, it is proposed that the frequency of meetings in Nairobi should be reduced to three or six monthly. The emphasis should shift to holding Regional Consultative Forums in Somalia, probably on a six monthly basis (see Annex 5 for details)

5. Every priority should be given to using Somali human resources in the SACB’s activities, including the human resources available from Somali intellectuals and consultants.

6. The SACB should give careful and constructive inputs and responses to planning and policy documents developed by Somali administrations.

7. The SACB’s channels should be used for the circulation of appropriate documents and studies originating from Somali sources.

8. This review found that many Somali NGOs’ and administration officials’ access to the Internet is limited for a variety of reasons and therefore access to on-line information such as the SACB’s website is difficult or non-existent. More analysis is needed about the reasons for these difficulties and whether jointly international agencies can improve

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the situation, perhaps by providing dedicated high-speed links that can be shared with Somali agencies.

10.10 Field Coordination

Recommendations in this area are made on the basis of the following factors:

• That field coordination structures are fragile and prone to disruption. Agency field staff are coping with many different and difficult issues and need coordination mechanisms that support them and are not onerous in terms of time • That agencies can be supported in collective representations with local authorities on a range of practical and programming issues • Communications between Somalia and Nairobi and vice versa can be weak and continual support and facilitation is needed by the SACB, its members and others responsible for coordination • The SACB needs to be represented to Somali authorities and civil society.

1. The SACB should appoint a minimum of three SACB liaison officers to support coordination in the field and facilitate links with Nairobi, one of them for Somaliland (see Annex 6 for ToR)

2. A pragmatic way forward would be for OCHA to lead field coordination in areas of Somalia where humanitarian action predominates with back-up and close liaison with the SACB. The SACB can support coordination in conjunction with administrations in more stable areas (such as Somaliland and Puntland) where SACB members are more engaged in rehabilitation and development work. An alternative suggestion is that SACB takes the lead in supporting field coordination in Somalia generally, working closely with OCHA whose staff would focus on humanitarian preparedness and response and intra-UN humanitarian coordination.

3. The roles of SACB & OCHA in field coordination should be discussed, clarified and agreed based on the outcome of agreements about field coordination responsibilities.

4. Given that human resources are limited and that disruptions are caused by staff turnover, security restrictions etc, the EC, OCHA and the SACB should look at the ToR of their respective field /liaison officers to see whether mutually cooperative roles can be developed. At the simplest level, this might involve an agreement that if one agency is committed to convene and support a field coordination meeting, her/his colleagues in the other agencies will provide back up in the event of absence.

5. The SACB’s Field Coordinator in the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination should continue, with a joint SACB / Somaliland government review of the project during 2005.

6. The SACB should explore the possibilities of running a similar exercise, as in Somaliland, in support of the Puntland authorities’ coordination efforts.

7. At present the SACB’s structures generally tend to focus on sectoral issues and lack the ability to focus on regional coordination. As noted earlier, there appear to have been few attempts at joint or integrated area planning between agencies. Part of the responsibility

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of the SACB’s liaison officers in Somalia and in the Secretariat will be to act as the SACB reference points for specific regions, to facilitate flows of information both to and from Somalia, bring together sectoral and cross-cutting issues and monitor coordination issues. One could see the development of regional ‘desks’ within the Secretariat.

10.11 Transition (Scenario 1)

The context for the transition to a central government in Mogadishu will be unpredictable, not only because of the volatility of the Somalia situation, but because of the variety of international pressures that will come into play. However well the SACB and its members plan, there is always the possibility of being marginalised by superior forces jostling for visibility and slices of the action.128

The following are some of the factors that need to be borne in mind:

1. Although weak, the new government in Mogadishu will want to assert its independence. Relationships with the SACB will be delicate and their management will partly depend on the extent to which it can establish a supportive dialogue.

2. Coordination needs for Somalia will increase in a transition context. The SACB should be able to play a useful role in support of the new administration in dealing with the arrival of new players, more players, more money and more consultants.

3. The international political community will probably establish a structure of pillars for the reconstruction of Somalia. The SACB should fit into this structure as coordinator for the aid pillar in support of government structures. It is likely that areas such as DDR and some elements of governance will be taken separately.

4. Longer term coordination of reconstruction plans is likely to be led by the World Bank and UNDP.

5. There is likely to be a flood of assessment missions and consultancies. The SACB should be able to play a key role in advising these missions and inserting lessons learned, already established strategies etc. It should also be able to encourage sensitivity to Somali participation and ownership and help to rationalise the number of such missions.

Specific recommendations:

5. As a matter of some urgency, the SACB Secretariat / Executive should concretise links with players such as the IPF, the IGAD Facilitation Committee, the African Union, the Arab League and embassies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, so as to be in the loop on developments of transitional structures and plans.129

128 This section has been prepared while arrangements for post-SNRC coordination structures with a Transitional Federal Government were being planned, but the timing was such that proposals have not been taken into account in this section. 129 Early signs during the period May to July 2004 were that the SACB was not being formally involved in discussions and planning on coordination structures that would be needed if and when a Transitional Federal Government was formed.

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6. Also as a matter of urgency, the SACB Executive should open a dialogue with the forthcoming Transitional Federal Government.130

7. Support and find ways to build the capacity of whatever structure the new government decides to set up to coordinate assistance (possibly a cell within the Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Planning or attached to the Prime Minister’s Office). The capacity building function should be an integral part of wider plans to build the new government’s structures and capacity.

8. The Executive in conjunction with the SACB’s Sectoral Committees and the HRG should develop a position paper with proposals for the SACB’s role in transition based on this review and work that is already being done in other quarters.

9. Keep the SACB project matrix and the website up to date so that it continues to provide a useful reference for all concerned in aid to Somalia.

10. Produce a concise guide to the SACB and an explanatory leaflet with a Somali language version.

11. Further develop a ‘what can we offer mentality, how can we help?’ attitude, both for incoming agencies and the new Somali administration.

12. Liaise closely with information and data providers, such as IRIN, FSAU, FEWSNET, DIMU.

10.12 Somaliland Scenarios

1. On the assumption that Somaliland continues to assert its non-recognised independence, SACB’s role will continue as now in support of the Somaliland government’s aid coordination efforts.

2. As proposed earlier, the SACB’s responsiveness to the Somaliland situation and support to its members working there should be strengthened by the posting of an SACB Field Liaison Officer (see Annex 6).

3. In the event of Scenario 1 (10.4 above), the establishment of a national government in Mogadishu, the SACB will need to consider its role in Somaliland. The SACB should aim to play an important role in maintaining some coherence and cross-fertilisation in technical aid standards across the political divide.

10.13 Communications

1. SACB’s communications need to be developed, including consideration of the following:

130 Perhaps the SACB could hold a briefing reception to invite these parties, using the publication of a report as a peg.

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• Production of an up-to-date leaflet that explains the SACB in both English and Somali • The SACB Annual Handbook should be revamped after user consultation. Consideration should be given to a SACB Annual Report that has an accountability element. The Handbook might remain as a more detailed reference document about the SACB and how it works and including summaries of strategy documents. • There will need to be an assessment of what kind of bulletin the SACB could usefully produce on a regular basis, bearing in mind that such productions can be time consuming. Perhaps a bi-monthly development of the currently defunct monthly newsletter that mainly summarised discussion in the committees, but including news of new publications, evaluations, lesson learned etc. • The SACB Sectoral Strategies should be made more easily available.

2. Actively develop the Secretariat resource and information centre, incorporating or closely collaborating with the UNDP Somalia library - emphasising outreach (using the website and CD ROMs & lessons learning). The resource and information centre should become a key repository of evaluations, reports and agency documents (see Annex10).

3. For key communication messages that the SACB and its members need to make, media outlets such as the BBC Somali service and local radio stations are important.

4. The Annual Donor Report should be reviewed in consultation with users and to bring it into line with international OECD/DAC reporting standards.

5. The SACB website, including the project matrix, should be more actively promoted and the number of cross-linkages to other bodies should increased, as well as increasing the amount of resource material available on it.

6. An investigation should be undertaken to see whether the management of the SACB’s emailing lists could be made more efficient and more responsive to user needs.

10.14 Secretariat

1. A strengthened SACB Secretariat is needed to support a more proactive role for the SACB, particularly in Scenario 1. It will support the strengthened Executive Committee, the streamlined activities of the SACB’s other committees and the upgrading of the SACB’s role in field coordination.

2. The post of Head of Secretariat should be upgraded (see Annex 7 for Job Description). The Head of Secretariat will report to the Chair of the Executive and will be responsible for the overall management of the Secretariat and its staff, including field-based staff. S/he will, on occasions, represent the SACB externally.

3. The new post of HQ Liaison Officer (see Annex 10) is intended to increase support to the Sectoral Committees, help to improve Somalia/Nairobi/Somalia links and flows of information and the interface between sectoral and area-based coordination activities.

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PROPOSED SACB SECRETARIAT STRUCTURE

HEAD OF SECRETARIAT

HEALTH SECTOR COMMITTEE & FIELD COORDINATION FIELD COORDINATION RESOURCES & COORDINATOR MEMBERSHIP Somaliland Somalia LEARNING SUPPORT Liaison Officer Liaison Officers Resource and Learning HQ Liaison Officer (2) Manager

Committee Office Field Officer IT Officer Documentalist Support Administration Somaliland (website, databases etc) (Resource Centre) Staff (2) Reception (3) Ministry of Planning Support

4. Outline responsibilities for posts as shown in the above structure are given in Annexes 8, 9 and 10. This can be regarded as an optimal structure and level of staffing. Modifications can be made, depending on requirements and available resources. It is important that the Secretariat does not get to a size where it is weighed down by its own bureaucracy and could be in danger of getting a life and purpose of its own, rather than remaining an instrument to support and service the SACB and its members.

5. The above structure brings the Health Sector Coordinator fully into the Secretariat management structure.

6. It is recommended that the Secretariat remain under UNDP but that if there are administrative resource issues within UNDP, the option of using UNOPS for administrative management should be looked at.

10.15 Follow-up to this report

1. The final report should be distributed widely, including to all those who participated as interviewees.

2. The Review Working Group should draw up a plan of follow-up action and implementation which, among other things will include clear statements of which recommendations are recommended for acceptance by the Executive, the reasons for rejection of others, and a timetable.

3. It may be necessary for members of the RWG to lead on different areas of the recommendations.

4. Temporary management support for the Secretariat should be provided by the Executive Committee / RWG with perhaps one member delegated to provide this support during the period of implementation.

Peter Wiles

October 2004

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ANNEX 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE

AN ASSIGNMENT TO REVIEW EXISTING MODALITIES AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS IN RELATION TO AID-COORDINATION FOR SOMALIA

Introduction

Since 1994 the SACB has been the platform for coordination of international aid to Somalia. It provides a forum for all partners to discuss humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development issues. The SACB also offers, the opportunity to share information on trends in security, governance, peace and reconciliation efforts on an apolitical basis and provides an opportunity to promote better understanding of the complex situation in Somalia. Following on from the vision outlined in the 1993 Addis Ababa Declaration, the SACB today comprises donor governments, UN agencies, inter governmental organisations and international and national non governmental organizations. 131 The SACB comprises the following elements:

Structure Function

Executive Committee Review aid policies and provide policy guidance Monitor implementation of the Code of Conduct132 Exchange information on security and political matters

ConsultativeForum An ‘open’ forum providing briefing on political & security developments, the humanitarian situation, proceedings of the Executive & Steering Committees, and sectoral issues.

Steering Committee Provide strategic guidance to, and ‘act on’ operational issues identified by the Sectoral Committees Facilitate information sharing and field coordination Strengthen relationships with regional authorities Strengthen SACB sectoral strategies & standards, and encourage harmonisation Identify gaps in provision of assistance Guide Humanitarian Response Group, a sub committee of the Steering

Sectoral Committees Sectoral Committees134 Working Groups & Working Groups133 Education Ad Hoc Task Force Food Security and Rural Agriculture Development Livestock Food Aid Flood

131 See Addis Ababa Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, 1st December 1993. This Declaration addresses the SACB’s formation. 132 The SACB has adopted a Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia. 133 Each Sectoral Committee is underpinned by a number of Working Groups which report to the Sectoral Committee concerned. 134 Mandate and function varies according to sector or area of concern.

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Structure Function

Governance Civil Society Rule of Law and Protection Gender and Human Rights Micro Finance Health and Nutrition Nutrition Malaria HIS Tuberculosis Reproductive Health and Safe Motherhood HIV/AIDS & FGM EPI Outbreaks Control Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Infrastructure

The SACB is supported by two projects: the SACB Secretariat and the Somalia Health Sector Coordination Office. The SACB Secretariat is responsible for providing support to committees; support to field coordination; support to the information sharing process; and producing the annual and ad hoc SACB publications including the maintenance of a website and a project database. With a reporting line to the Executive Committee, at least one member of the Secretariat attends all meetings to ensure smooth organisation and compilation of minutes. The Secretariat is co funded by a number of different donors and administered by UNDP Somalia. It comprises seven full-time staff members one of which is based in Hargeisa providing support to the Somaliland Administration in their role as leaders of the coordination process. One full time staff member is responsible for supporting other field based coordination efforts and creating a functional link between coordination efforts in the field and those in Nairobi.

The Somalia Health Sector Coordination Office (SHSC) is responsible for facilitating and providing technical advice to the health sector. With a reporting line to the Health Sector Committee, the SHSC office is responsible for enhancing information sharing; providing support to the development of joint strategies and standards; coordinating emergency preparedness and response; advocating and raising awareness on major health sector priorities for funding allocation; and providing support to local authorities in enhancing zonal coordination. A full time Health Coordinator attends all health sector meetings both in Nairobi and where possible in Somalia. He provides technical expertise and advice to projects in the health sector and to health administrations in Somalia. This project is funded by the EC.

The SACB Executive Committee concluded in March 2003 that “a meeting should be organised between the chairs of the various SACB structures and the UN HC/RC with the aim of explaining to each other the different views and perceptions on joint collaboration”. The Acting Chair was invited to call such a meeting and “develop a common understanding”. On this basis, a meeting was held in May 2003 between the outgoing Chair of the Executive Committee, the Acting Chair of the Executive Committee and the Chair and Deputy Chair of the Steering Committee. The main outcome of the discussion was the need to review the SACB structures and processes. Feedback from the meeting was given to the SACB Executive Committee on 25 June. At its meeting of 23rd July, the SACB Executive agreed that the recommendations made in May could form the basis for the drafting of Terms of Reference for the review process. It was agreed that such ToR would be discussed within the Executive and

94 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 endorsed by the same prior to further progress. The ToR, having been renamed “Process Outline”, were endorsed by the Executive in October 2003. A restricted SACB Working Group was subsequently established.

This assignment is to allow for independent expertise to support the Working Group in its proceedings, notably by facilitating the review of the SACB and making recommendations on the future development in relation to aid coordination for Somalia.

Objectives of the assignment

The assignment is to facilitate the SACB review and the development of recommendations for the future of aid coordination in the case of Somalia. As described in the attached “Process Outline”, a Working Group composed of representatives from the main groupings (donors, UN, NGOs) involved in the SACB is formed. The mandate of the working group is, with the assistance of the consultant, to examine and review the SACB structures, processes, procedures, data/information flows, and documentation at all levels and make recommendations to the Executive Committee for approval.

The consultant with undertake a detailed analysis and provide the Working Group with options for the way forward in aid coordination for Somalia.

The assignment will notably: 1. Through an analysis of international aid coordination examples operating in similar countries of chronic political instability, compare and contrast the primary SACB structures and functions with other international models, and in particular, highlight inconsistencies and anomalies that could inform the review process as well as highlight best practices and success stories.

2. Through consultations with SACB members, non-members and in particular, Somali stakeholders, thoroughly assess and review the current SACB mandate, structure, purpose, and added value, through a rigorous examination of its strengths and weaknesses, its efficiency in achieving its goals and its methods of functioning. This process should also include a profound rethink of the SACB in all aspects of its work, and in particular to focus on the following: a. the roles of the Executive and Steering Committees as well as that of the Governance Sectoral Committee. b. the role of the SACB support projects (SACB Secretariat and Health Sector co-ordination office).

3. Examine SACB’s functional relationship with other coordination bodies in Somalia such as UN OCHA and the NGO Consortium, and in particular examine ways in which field coordination can be enhanced with regard to the Nairobi-based structures.

4. Review the cost implications of the SACB both in terms of time and resources.

5. Examine the long-term validity of the structure, including its sectoral nature and paying particular attention to the system of chairs, institutional nature of participation within the SACB and practical procedures. These issues should be considered in light of the recognition by the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria

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of the SACB as the Country Coordinating Mechanism and the funding approved through the SACB as a result.

6. explore viability of a donor coordination group (including composition, ToR) and its relationship to the rest of the SACB.

7. assess the SACB efforts to enhance coordination in Somalia, and provide suggestions for improved participation of Somali partners.

8. Conduct and present an analysis following adequate consultations and interviews on participation of Somali Civil Society and administrations and provide options for improvement.

9. Examine the name/identity of the SACB.

Methodological aspects

Lines of reporting:

The consultant will be guided and led by the Working Group, which will have the responsibility of endorsing the work plan, relevant reports, and ultimate responsibility to make final recommendations to the Executive Committee for approval.

Review techniques and research methods:

Phase 1 Desk study and interviews with key SACB actors.

• The consultant shall consult all relevant reports and studies available on the SACB. • The consultant shall review and analyse examples of other international aid coordination models operating in similar contexts of political instability and chronic conflict. • The consultant shall interview key SACB actors and non participating agencies within the humanitarian and development community. • The consultant shall prepare a detailed work plan.

Phase 2 Field visits.

To analyse aid coordination issues in Somalia, the consultant shall undertake missions and interview local authorities, representatives from civil society organisations and their related entities, and other SACB users/actors. Additional enquiries with key SACB actors may be necessary to clarify issues arising from field visits.

Phase 3 Analysis and reporting.

• Shortly after the field phase, the consultant shall present the preliminary report in a debriefing presentation to the Working Group. • The draft report shall be presented in a seminar to the SACB Executive and Steering Committees. • The final report will be a stand-alone document with which the Working Group will make final recommendations to the Executive Committee.

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Reporting:

Unless specifically agreed otherwise and in writing, the consultant shall provide the following reports:

• An inception report, shortly before the beginning of the field mission, detailing the approach and an indicative list of stakeholders to be visited. This Inception Report can also help to brief the stakeholders.

• A short debriefing note (or Aide Memoire) on preliminary findings at the end of the field mission, to be presented during the debriefing meeting with the Working Group.

• A first draft of the report to be presented within two weeks from the end of the field mission. Following a presentation seminar to the Working Group, its members will have 2 weeks to consult and comment.

• A final report of maximum 30 pages length plus Annexes, plus an Executive Summary of up to 5 pages with fully cross-referenced findings and recommendations. This report shall take into account the comments made by the SACB actors and the local partners concerned. The report should be presented one week after reception of the comments. The Working Group (ideally in the presence of the consultant) will present the final report to the Executive and Steering Committees.

Expertise required:

International consultant ƒ Higher degree or equivalent in economic/political/social sciences. ƒ 15 years experience in rehabilitation/development. ƒ Work exposure in countries of chronic instability. ƒ Working knowledge of aid coordination mechanisms. In particular, previous direct experience with the establishment, running or review of aid coordination mechanisms would be an advantage. ƒ Experience with the different aspects of the project cycle (from project identification to evaluation). ƒ Working knowledge of Somalia and/or similar complex emergency contexts an added advantage. ƒ Good written and spoken English

Indicative Work Plan and Time Schedule:

The assignment is expected to start in February 2004 with a total of 50 days, including missions to Somalia.

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ANNEX 2

REVIEW OF AID COORDINATION FOR SOMALIA 2004

INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT’S TIMETABLE & LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

DATES LOCA- ACTIVITIES TION Feb 16-21 UK Completion of contractual formalities; flight bookings etc. Feb 23 - 27 UK Work commenced on documentation – Internet searches etc. Interviews with UK based key informants – Mark Bradbury; Randolph Kent; Bernard Harborne; Overseas Development Institute (James Darcy and Adele Harmer) Feb 28 Travel to Nairobi Feb 29 Arrive Nairobi am Mon 1 Mar Nairobi Introductions to SACB staff Initial discussions, Wendy Carson, Head of SACB Secretariat on logistics etc Review Working Group meeting Desk & computer set-up work Tue 2 Mar SACB HIV/AIDS task force meeting Wendy Carson, Head of SACB Secretariat Isabel Candela, Programme Manager, NOVIB & member of Review Working Group Wed 3 Mar SACB Health Sectoral Committee – general meeting Mohamed Abshir “Waldo” – Rehabilitation & Reforestation Concern, member of Review Working Group & consultant Paul Simkin, ECSU & former chair, SACB Governance Sectoral Committee and Mila Font, ECSU & former deputy chair, SACB Civil Society Task Force Roger de Backer, First Secretary, ECSU Thu 4 Mar SACB Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Sectoral Committee Ayham Bayziz, MSF / Holland Wendy Carson, Head of SACB Secretariat Fri 5 Mar SACB Health Sectoral Committee UN Country Team - introduction Hamish Cameron, UN Deputy Field Security Coordinator Gary Jones, Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid Sat 6 Mar Desk work including preparation of Inception Report Sun 7 Mar Ditto Mon Mar 8 Nairobi Dr Imanol Berakoetxea, SACB Health Sectoral Coordinator Tue Mar 9 Dr Mario Maritano, ECSU Rubina Haroon, External Relations/Liaison Officer, WSP International Dr Ibrahim Betelmal, Representative, WHO Somalia Wed Mar 10 SACB Food Security & Rural Development Sectoral Committee El Khidir Daloum, Programme Director, SCUK Meeting with SACB Health Sectoral Committee Thu Mar 11 Parties to the SNRC at Mbagathi, Safari Park and Intercontinental Hotel (list of participants below) Fri Mar 12 SACB Civil Society Task Force Zoe Daniels, NGO focal point, NGO Consortium & CONCERN Worldwide Said Warsame, UNESCO Wendy Carson, Head of Secretariat, SACB

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Mon Mar 15 Nairobi David Bell, First Secretary (Somali Affairs), DFID Nicholas Haan, Chief Technical Adviser, FSAU NGO Consortium meeting Tue Mar 16 Jaqueline Desbarats, Representative, UNFPA Priya Gajraj, Somalia Officer, World Bank Gary Quince, Head of EC Delegation Nairobi SACB Education Sectoral Committee meeting Wed Mar 17 Walid Musa, Senior Political Adviser, ECSU Maura Barry, Somalia Programme Manager / Flynn Fuller, Office Director Burundi, Djibouti & Somalia Programmes, USAID Nick Archer, Food Security Programme Manager, World Concern Thu Mar 18 SACB Steering Committee Vittorio Cagnolati, Italian Cooperation & member of Review Working Group Calum McLean, Chief, UNOCHA Somalia & member of Review Working Group Pippa Alston, Acting Head of SACB Secretariat Pat Johnston, Programme Support, ECSU Fri Mar 19 Nimo Mohamed, Administrator, NGO Consortium Eric Beaume, First Secretary, ECSU Review Working Group meeting Jesper Morch, Representative; Leila Pakkala, Senior Programme Officer, UNICEF & successive members of the Review Working Group Lex Kassenberg, Assistant Country Director, Mon Mar 22 Desk work SACB Executive special meeting Tue Mar 23 Ali Swaleh, UNDP Somalia Resource Centre Mary Kettman, SACB Field Worker, Hargeisa Dr Imanol Berakoetxea Betty Oloo (SACB Health Coordination Office) El Balla Hagona, Country Director, UNDP, Dirk Boberg, Assistant Resident Representative UNDP & Review Working Group member Laura Barnham, Academy for Peace & Development Wed Mar24 Alberto Fait, EC Liaison Officer, Puntland Christoph Langenkamp ECSU Consultation with members of NOVIB Somali civil society group (list below) NGO Consortium emergency meeting Thu Mar 25 SACB Consultative Forum Abdullahi Ga’al EC Liaison Officer, South Central Somalia Manfred Winnefeld, ECSU Fri Mar 26 Isabel Soares, WHO / S Sudan Mon Mar 29 Robert Hauser, Country Director, Leo van der Velden, Deputy Country Director, WFP Somalia Somaliland INGOs Saverio Bertolino, Regional Representative, Sara Reggio, Programme Coordinator, COSV Una McAskell, Geddo Health Consortium Tue Mar 30 Pippa Alston, Acting Head of SACB Secretariat Annmarie Swai, Regional Representative, UNA Ahmed Washington ECLO Somaliland Review Working Group Wed Mar 31 Abdi Mohamed “Baffo”, Coordinator, Fund for Local Initiatives SACB Executive Committee Stephen Cooper, Country Director, ADRA Thu Apr 1 Leila Shamji, Chief, Data & Information Management Unit, UNDP K.N.S. Nair, Programme Coordinator Somalia Watching Brief, UNDP UNDP Somalia Resource Centre Anne Maria Madsen, Counsellor, Development, Danish Embassy Mohamed Elmi, Regional Programme Manager, Oxfam GB

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Fri Apr 2 Mumina Aden, SACB secretariat Giorgio Cancelliere, UNA consultant, (former NGO Focal Point) Jan-Erik Wann, DRC and NGO Focal Point, Hargeisa Mon Apr 5 Nairobi Review Working Group meeting Eric Beaume, First Secretary, ECSU Simone Wolken, Representative, UNHCR Tue Apr 6 Work on ToR for local consultants SACB staff meeting Eve Departure for UK Apr 7 – 30 UK Leave, desk work and telephone interviews with: Henrik Jespersen, former Chair of the SACB Executive; Nigel Nicholson, formerly NGO Consortium Focal Point; Andre LeSage, formerly UNCU/OCHA Somalia; Volker Huels, former chair of SACB WSISC (Review Working Group recruits Somali consultants during this period) Sat May 1 Return to Nairobi Mon May 3 Nairobi Andrea Berloffa, Country Director, COOPI Paul Simkin ECSU Owe Bidelius, Jan Owe Wilback, Zahra Said Nur, Diakonia Tue May 4 Patrick Berner, Food Security Coordinator, FAO Somalia Emergency Unit Chris Print, Project Coordinator, FAO Wed May 5 Adar Barkad, Somali consultant Dirk Boberg, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP UNDP Resource Centre Kelly David-Toweh, Deputy Chief, UNOCHA Somalia Sebastian Groth, First Secretary, German Embassy Hendrika Okondo, Programme Coordinator, UNIFEM Thu May 6 Daniel Duvillard, Head of Somalia Delegation, ICRC Noreen Prendeville, Coordinator Nutrition Surveillence Project, FSAU Sidow I Addou, Representative Somalia, FEWSNET Marcus Betts, UNICEF Douglas Booth, UNICEF Mudiapassamy Devadoss, Head a.i & Programme Coordinator, UNESCO Fri May 7 Eric Beaume, ECSU Alexandra MacKenzie, Second Secretary (Political), Canadian High Commission Dr Ahmed M Hassan, President, Somali Red Crescent Society Ahmed Gizo, Head of Somalia Delegation, IFRC Mon May 10 Hargeisa (With Somali consultant – Adar A. Barkad) H.E. Ahmed H Dahir Elmi, Minister of National Planning & Coordination EC Liaison Office Krishnamurthy Subramaniam, Liaison Officer, UNDP (security briefing) Meeting with UN agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, UN HABITAT, WHO) Tue May 11 Ali Sheikh Mohamed, Coordinator, Ahmed Abdi Bakal, Deputy Coordinator, SRCS Coordination Office, Somaliland Ministry of Health H.E Qasim Sh. Yusuf Ibrahim, Minister of Water & Mineral Resources; Eng: Ali A. Odowa, Director General, Ministry of Water & Mineral Resources Ministry of Education INGO meeting (AET, CARE, DRC, IAS, Oxfam GB, PENHA, SCD) Supper with WSP (Matt Bryden, Raghe, Jerry)

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Wed May 12 Ministry of Pastoral Development Local NGOs meeting (Nagaad, HEAL, COSONGO, HAVAYOCO, FOPAG, HAN, SOWRAG, HAWO, BVO, CCS, Tawakal, WORDA, DAREEN, ANDP, DCA, Candlelight) NERAD OCHA Faadumo Sundi Hassan, Minister of Family Welfare and Social Development ICD Mary Kettman, SACB Field Officer, Hargeisa Puntland Development and Research Centre Thu May 13 Hargiesa Vetaid Academy for Peace & Development Minister of National Planning and Coordination (Departure to Bosaso with Somali Consultant – Khalif H. Farah) Bosaso Alberto Fait, EC Liaison Officer Massimiliano Reggi, Project Manager, Mental Health Project, GRT Abdirisak Ahmed Sheikh, Abdiweli Abdirahman, East Africa University Frid May 14 Abdijabar Dini, CARE Farah Mohamed Yusuf, Minister of Commerce & Industry, Puntland State of Somalia Ibrahim Shire, UNICEF Sat May 15 Fatima Jibrell, Director, Horn Relief Hawa Ali Jama, WAWA Abdirizak Mohamed Ali, UNICEF Abdikarim Mohamed Jama, WFP Ali Mohamed Isse, Secretary General Puntland Chamber of Commerce Abdi Mohamed Aden, National Relief Organisation Ihrahim Aware, Dandor Osman Abshir, Hassan Mohamed, Tadamun Social Society Hassan Mohamed, SEPROG Saddiq Ahmed Bihi, Somalia Organisation for Community Development Activities (SOCDA) Sun May 16 Eng. Adbirahman Said Galayr, Abulkadir Barre Talib - Talo-wadag Mohamed Mohamud Qulhiyo, Ocean Training and Promotion (OTP) Bisharo Awil, Isse Mohamed, Omar Ismail & others, Somali Red Crescent Society Francesco Baldi, Coordinator, Mario Tedo, Programme Manager, CEFA Abdirahman Ahmed, Somali Relief Society/CEFA H.E. Ahmed Igal, Minister of Public Works, Puntland State of Somalia Dr Beppe di Giulio, VSF-S Osman Mohamed, Resource Management Team RMSN Mon May 17 Bosaso / Dr Kamuludin, business man, International Village Garowe Bosaso – Garowe Tue May 18 Garowe Khalif Nur Ali DG Minister of Public Works, Puntland State of Somalia Drs. Said Farah Ahmed, Ahmed Ismail, Dahir Aden Mohamed, WHO Dr Abdi Awad, DG Ministry of Health, Puntland State of Somalia Ahmed Abbas, independent consultant working with PDRC Abdullahi Abdirahman, VDC Saido Hersi Egal, Country Representative, Diakonia Sweden Sirad Aden Mohamed, Somali Red Crescent Society Ali Yusuf Ali, Acting DG, Minister of Planning & Statistics, Puntland State of Somalia Abshir Mohamed Jama, ADRA Mohamud Sheikh Hamud, Abshir Hassan Abshir, KAALO Relief and Development

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Wed May 19 Dr Abdirahman Said (Dhegaweyne)Minister in the office of the President (former DG MOH), Puntland State of Somalia Abdikarim Hussein Duale, FSAU Ali Ahmed Gamude,DG Ministry of Interior, Puntland State of Somalia Mohamed Jabril, DG, Ministry of Education, Puntland State of Somalia Mariam Mohamed + others, Somalia Women’s Association (SWA) Mahad Abshir + others, MUDAN (Network of Youth & Students of Nugal Region) Shukri Salad Weyrah + others, NORDO H.E. Mohamud Warsame Farah, Minister of Planning & Statistics, Puntland State of Somalia (phone interview) Thu May 20 John Dingley, UNDP Mine Action programme Garowe – Nairobi Fri May 21 Nairobi Review Working Group Eddie Boyle, Rule of Law & Security Programme, UNDP Philippe Rougier, ACF Eric Beaume, First Secretary, ECSU Maxwell Gaylard, Resident Representative, RC/HC, UNDP Mon May 24 Wajid Roger Carter, Area Field Security Coordination Officer, UN Somalia Edouard Nizeyimana, Programme Officer, WFP , Agnes Le Leuch, Head of Base,Marco Albertini, ACF

Tue May 25 Isaq Nur Hassan, Abdi Mohamed Aden and others, Wajid District Council, Yusuf HajI Ibraim, Mohamed Aden Borai, Mohamed Aden Isaq, Wajid Youth Development Organisation Wed May 26 Hudur Douglas Abuuru, Water Sector Coordinator, Abdulkadir Diad, ADRA Yusuf Abdi Salah, OCHA Andrau Kimani, Dr. Karim Djibaoui, WHO Abdulkadir Sheikh Hussein, Abah Ali, Faduma Isaq Aden, SRCS Yusuf Mohamed Kheyr, Regional Governor Bakol & Mohamed Moalim Ahmed, District Commisioner Hudur Ingrid Herder, Faisal Abdulkadir, Regina Dehnke & Goran Sveden, MSF-

Thu May 27 Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden & Silvester M, Nzuki, CINS Awliyo Mohamed Yarow, Nurto Molaim Hassan, Habibo Hussein Hassan, Hawo HajI Aden and others, Somali Women’s Group (Bay and Bakol), Mohamed Ahmed Hassan, International Medical Corp Gunter Wessel, Deputy Team Leader, Farming Systems Specialist, GTZ Aden Sheikh Hussein, Mohamed Ahmed Ahmed , BDP Ibrahim Ahmed Aden & Kheyrad Abdulle, NARMIC Abdirahman Shiekh Nur, Lul Isaq Ahmed and others, HAADO Amino Abdirahman Jama, Idiris Mohamed Moalim, CPHR Madobe Sangarey & Ruqiyo Mursal Hassan, DVPC Ahmed Ali Madey & Sidnur Aden, BTC Nur Aden Fayis, SVO. Fri May 28 Abdullahi Mohamud Liban, Salad Yarow Ali, Habibo Sheikh Omar and others, Hudur Water Committee(CBO), Abdiaziz Adam, FSAU Travel to Wajid Sat May 29 To Nairobi

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Mon May 31 Dr. Abdinur Sh. Ahmed & Imelda Kabigten, International Committee for Belet the Development of Peoples (CISP) Weyne Isaq Hassan, HARDO Ahmed Dhubow, Muslim Aid- UK Ibrahim Abdi, Mercy Goup, Mohamed Abukar, Dooyaale Hassan Odowa Hassan, IMC Eimauel Kailie, Peter Waka, Sophie Ayaoo, Saudi Muse, Hassab Abdullahi, SC-UK Tue Jun 1 Abdullahi Mohamed Ali, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA Minya Mugambi & Mohmaed Ali, ADRA Abdi Mohamed Shimoy, Mohamed Ahmed Hundubey, Aabdirashid Mohamed Dhaqane, DRC Abdullahi Halane, WFP Mohamed Hussein, SRCS Mohamed Abdi Hassan, Hiran Public Library Ali Haji Shirwa, Fadumo Nur Mohamed, Osman Abikar, Wish Hassan Moalim, Hiran National NGOs Consortium Wed June 2 Ugas Abdihakim Ugas Mahad, Council of Traditional Chiefs Saleban Mohamed Hilowle, Belet Weyne Deputy District Commisioner , Mahamed Mohamoud (Garar), Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Commisioner of Belet Weyne district, Abdirahman Abdulle Ali, Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim , Ubah Isse Mohamed and others, NABDEEG (CBO) Faduma Aden Abdi, Salad Alas Daud & Ibrahim Haji Abdi, Hiran Women Action for Peace and Human Rights (HIWA), Faduma Hagi Hiran, Hiran Women Association Muse Abdulle Awale, Ibrahim Hussein Wadi and Mohamed Abdi Maow, Safa Marwa Relief & Development Organisation (SAMRADO)

Thu June 3 To Nairobi Fri June 4 Nairobi (Local consultant undertakes Mogadishu consultations during period till 9 June – see list below) Leslye Rost Van Tonningen, CARE Ambassador Calia, Italian Embassy Mon June 7 Preparation for feedback presentations Tue June 8 Hossam Eldin Abd Elaal, Egyptian Embassy Wed June 9 Ambassador Ali Foum, Special Envoy for Somalia, African Union Thu June 10 Bruce Isaacson, Representative FAO Fri June 11 Consultant’s presentation to Review Working Group Emanuele Capobianco, EPI – Polio Officer, UNICEF Mon June 14 Walid Musa, Senior Political Adviser, ECSU Ambassador Kiplagat, Tue June 15 Babafemi Badejo, Senior Political Advisor, UNPOS Wed June 16 Gary Quince, EC Pippa Alston, Mary Kettman Thu June 17 Feedback meeting to donors Fri June 18 Feedback to UNCT David Rendall, Regional Manager, UNOPS Mon June 21 Gael Griette, ECHO Feedback to NGO Consortium Tue June 22 Calum Maclean, Chief, UNOCHA Somalia Informal health group (Leila Pakkala, Emanuele Capobianco, Andrea Berloffa) Wed June 23 Preparation of Draft Report 0

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Thu June 24 SACB Executive Committee - presentation Review Working Group meeting Informal governance group (Isabel Candela, Paul Simkin, Leslye Rost van Tonningen) IPF meeting Fri June 25 IPF Facilitation Group meeting

Mon June 28 Preparation of Draft 0 Tue June 29 Delivery of Draft 0 to Review Working Group Consultant leaves for UK June 29 – July Period for comment on draft 9 Fri July 9 Comments on Draft 0 received Fri Aug 27 Draft 1 sent to Review Working Group Redrafting Mon Oct 4 Final Report sent

INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT MEETINGS WITH THE SOMALI GROUPS IN THE SNRC TALKS, THURSDAY 11, 2004

Factions/Administrations Persons met Venue Somali Reconciliation Col. Shatigudud (RRA) & Eng. KCCT, Mbagathi &Restoration Council (SRRC) Mohamed Naleye (USC/SNA/SRRC –Aidid) Somali Women Resource Center Mrs. Asha Ahmed Abdalla- KCCT, Mbagathi (Politician –TNG) Ms. Ruqia Osman (Civil Society) Administration Mr. Salad Jelle – ( Mohamed KCCT, Mbagathi Dhere`s Representative)

Somali Intellectuals Dr. Mohamed Hersi, Mr. Liban KCCT, Mbagathi Olow, Mr. Ali Hassan Amalow, Dr. Mohamed Abdi Ulusow & Sultan Mohamed Abdi

Somali Youth Members Mr. Abdirizak Mohamed Diriye KCCT, Mbagathi and Mr. Ibrahim Sangur

Somali Civil Society Group Dr. Sharif Salah – Chairman CS KCCT, Mbagathi Executive Committee

Somali Traditional Leaders Omar Ugas, Boqor Mohamed KCCT, Mbagathi Boqor Ali Shire and Sultan Ahmed Jama Transitional National Government H.E Mohamed Abdi Hashi KCCT, Mbagathi (TNG) (Prime Minister) and Abdi M. Ali (Minister) National Salvation Council (NSC) Col. Jama Ali Jama – Safari Park Hotel Representing NSC Civil Society Group 2 Mrs. Zakia Abdisalan, Ms. Hotel Intercontinental Amina H. Elmi and Adv. Gebyow G8 Political Alliance Mr. Moulid Ma`ane (Samo) and Hotel Intercontinental Omar Filish (USC/SSA)

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INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT’S MEETING WITH NOVIB CIVIL SOCIETY GROUP

Asha Selle Dirie, Chairperson, WAWA network, Puntland

Sado Hashi Awad, Executive Director, Nagaad umbrella, Hargeisa

Fadumo Osman Haq, Vice-chair, Amma Mohamed Ali, Administrator, Ahmed Mohamed Ali, Programme Officer, Peace & Human Rights Network (PHRN) Mogadishu

Abdullahi Warsame, Ocean Training Programme (OTP), Puntland

Abdulkadir Khalif Sh. Yusuf, Acting Programme Officer, SOCDA

Shukri Ismail, Director, Candlelight, Hargeisa

Abdi Ali Raghe, Chair, Joint Jubba Region

Hawa Ali Jama, Coordinator, WAWA

Mariam Yusuf Sheik, Executive Director, COGWO

INTERVIEWS IN MOGADISHU UNDERAKEN BY SOMALI CONSULTANT, KHALIF H. FARAH.

Date Location Activities

Thu Jun 3 Mogadishu Dr. Mohammed Ahmed (Dhere), Somali National Network of AIDS Service Organizations (SONNASO)/Al-Hayat Group Fri Jun 4 Mohamud Mohamed Khayre, DBG

Sat Jun 5 Abdullahi Mohamed Dayib, Peace & Human Rights Network (PHRN) Ismail Mohamed , African Education Trust Abdulkadir Khalif, SOCDA Abdiaziz Mohamed, OCHA Hassan Ali Keynan, UNHCR Osman Ali & Hassan Guled, UNDP Ahmed Moalim (Descipline), UNICEF Farah Sh. Abdulkadir, Africa Muslims Agency/ Formal Private Education Networks(FPENS) Hassan Sheikh, Somali Institute of Management Development (SIMAD)

Sun Jun 6 Dr. Mohamed Mohamud (Fuje), WHO Jamal Barrow, World Assembly of Muslim Youth(WAMY) Ahmed Abdi, Muslim Aid-UK Abdinasir I. Hussein & Sayidali Hussein, DAWA Batulo Mohamed Mursal, Coalition for Grassroots Women’s Organisations (COGWO) Mon Jun 7 Hussein Iman, Mogadishu University Abdulkadir Yahye, Centre for Research and Development Hussein Salah, Deputy Prime Minister (TNG) Abukar Ga’al & Abbas Mohamud, CONCERN Abdulkadir Mohamed Walayo, East African Media Institution, Somali Chapter

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Tue Jun 8 Abdullahi Mohamed Shirwa, Somali Peace Line Mohamed Mayow, SRCS Prof. Ibrahim Adou, Benadir University Eng. Abdislam Mohamed , Kei Professionals Abdullahi Mohamed (Fanah), EC Liaison Officer Nur Weheliye, DG, Ministry of Planning, TNG Dr. Salad Farah Gutale , Somali Medical Association (interviewed via phone) Wed Jun 9 Saman Mohamed, Minister of State, Ministry of Interior, TNG Hindi Ahmed Farah, Save Somali Women & Children (SSWC) Mohamed Ali Moh’ud, Mercy -USA Abdulahi Abow, ACF Mohamed Ali Mumin, OCHA (interviewed via phone)

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ANNEX 3

SACB’S MANDATE, MISSION, AIMS & OBJECTIVES

1. Existing Statements:

• The Addis Ababa Declaration of December 1993 proposed the SACB with the aim of facilitating donors in developing a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources available for Somalia. It envisaged broad participation of donors, UN agencies and programmes, NGOs etc.

• The SACB was defined at the 2nd SACB meeting Nairobi 18-19 April 1994 as a forum for the coordination of activities in the areas of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Coordination takes place in a voluntary fashion based on the common goal of ensuring the maximum effectiveness and efficiency of limited donor resources.

• The SACB information leaflet of August 1999 explained the SACB as a voluntary coordinating body, which provides a framework to develop a common approach for the allocation of international aid to Somalia.

• The 2004 SACB Handbooks says that the SACB is a platform for coordination of international aid to Somalia. It provides a forum for all partners to discuss humanitarian, rehabilitation and development issues. The SACB also offers the opportunity to share information on trends in security, governance, and peace and reconciliation efforts, on an apolitical basis and provides an opportunity to promote better understanding of the complex situation in Somalia.

2. Proposed re-statement:

By and large, the above statements remain valid.

Mandate

The SACB’s mandate stems from the international conference on Somalia in Addis Ababa in 1993 attended by governments, international bodies and agencies and Somali representatives. The SACB is intended as a temporary, transitional mechanism until such time as a central government of Somalia takes over its rightful role as the coordinator of international assistance to the country.

Mission statement

The SACB is an aid coordination framework voluntarily bringing together donors, UN agencies & programmes, international and Somali NGOs working for a peaceful Somalia free from poverty.

Aim

The overall aim of the SACB is to facilitate the provision of coherent, well-coordinated, good quality international aid to Somalia according to international and locally agreed

107 Review of Aid Coordination for Somalia Final Report October 2004 humanitarian & development standards and codes for the benefit of the Somali people and to support peace building processes and assist in the country’s recovery from conflict.

How it Works

The SACB, in consultation with Somali administrations, civil society organisations and other relevant bodies, provides a platform (a Somali “mat”) for the coordination of international aid to Somalia and a forum for the discussion and sharing of information on humanitarian, rehabilitation and development issues.

The SACB also serves from time to time as a collective voice of its members, advocating for international support to Somalia and on issues such as security for aid workers and aid programmes.

SACB members develop common strategies, guidelines and standards in technical areas in order to support programme implementation. These strategies, guidelines and standards are intended as technical resources for the use of all donors, agencies and administrations and as resources for future central government ministries. They do not override the existing strategies and mandates of agencies and administrations are intended to support such initiatives.

The SACB’s activities and Secretariat are managed by its Executive Committee made up of representatives of donors, UN agencies and NGOs.

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ANNEX 4

COMPOSITION AND REMIT OF THE SOMALIA DONOR GROUP (SDG) – DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. The SDG should be open to all bilateral and multilateral donors committing funds to Somalia for humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance.

2. Representatives of international and regional bodies, such as IGAD, African Union and the Arab League, may be invited as observers if they are not present as donors..135

3. Chairing and secretarial arrangements are to be decided by the members.

4. The SDG will select 5 members to sit on the SACB Executive Committee.

5. The agendas and frequencies of SDG meetings will be decided by the members.

6. It is envisaged that the Group will cover the following in the overall context of political, economic, social and security developments in Somalia:

• Share each others’ policies, strategies and programme information, trends and developments and their alignment with the SACB’s strategies and priorities. • Monitor assistance trends to Somalia (including assisting the SACB Secretariat with the preparation and dissemination of the Annual Donor Report and the proposed SACB Annual Report). • Encourage opportunities to increase the coherence of international assistance to Somalia through mutually supportive and joint programming. • Consider specific issues referred from the SACB Executive Committee. • As appropriate and in coordination with SACB strategies and initiatives, enter into discussions with Somalia authorities. • Considering international policies and practices of good donorship and promoting their implementation and monitoring in relation to Somalia.

135 Donor groups often invite observers from the UN, Red Cross and International NGOs. This may be considered, but perhaps less necessary given the existence and composition of the SACB Executive.

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ANNEX 5

THE SACB EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE – DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Mandate

The Executive Committee’s mandate is given to it by the members of the SACB, based on the mandate given to the SACB by the international community. The Executive Committee leads and guides the SACB in accordance with its mandate and is responsible for its activities and for the management of the SACB Secretariat.

2. Terms of Reference

1. The SACB will monitor political, economic, social and security developments in relation to Somalia.

2. The SACB Executive Committee will meet regularly to deal with substantive operational and policy issues in relation to international assistance to Somalia and the coordination of that assistance. It operates on the basis of consensus, taking into account the respective mandates of its members and their independence.

3. The Executive Committee is responsible for the management of SACB’s response to security situations.

4. The Executive Committee will develop longer-term policies and strategies for humanitarian relief and development.136

5. The Executive Committee will lead SACB’s relationships with Somali authorities and civil society, developing and implementing a dialogue and positive relationships with those entities.

6. In the event that a Somalia central government is established, the Executive will lead the transition process in support of that government, managing appropriate support and handover of functions, eventually reforming the SACB into a new and appropriate aid coordination forum.

7. The Executive Committee will receive, consider and respond to substantive issues from the Somali Donor Group, the UN Country Team and the NGO Consortium and the members of those groups.

8. The Executive Committee will receive, consider and respond to substantive issues from the SACB Sectoral Committees and provide policy guidance.

9. The SACB will receive, consider and respond to substantive issues from the SACB Consultative Forums, including the proposed regional forums.

136 This should include a review of the peace dividend approach.

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10. Monitor the implementation of the Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia and other SACB policies and guidelines as exist and may be developed.

11. The Executive Committee will be mindful that the SACB’s responsibilities are partly based the absence of a central government for Somalia and are therefore temporary in nature.

12. The Executive Committee will lead the process of ensuring that Somali participation occurs in the SACB.

3. Membership

1. Membership of the Committee will be made up of 5 representatives each from the SDG, UNCT and NGO Consortium, plus ex officio members (UNSECORD, UNPOS) and observers (ICRC +MSF).

2. Depending on political developments in Somalia, the Executive will invite participants from administrations in Somalia.

3. Observers may also be invited from bodies such as IGAD, the African Union and the Arab League and other entities as agreed by the Committee.

4. Chairing

1. The position of Chair of the Executive Committee should be recognised as one that requires a significant commitment of time and requires a person of appropriate experience and seniority, as well as chairing skills.

2. The Committee will have two co-chairs, one from the UN group and one from the NGO group. The Chair and the two co-chairs would be expected to work closely together, particularly in urgent action required when it is not possible to convene the full committee, in relation to management of the Secretariat and in relation to any disputes that might arise within the SACB.

3. The Chair of the Executive Committee will be responsible for managing the Head of the Secretariat. (S/he might wish to set up a small sub-committee to support him in this work and provide a reference point for the Head of the Secretariat in the absence of the Chair)

5. Meetings

1. Normal meetings of the Executive Committee will probably take place bi-monthly (with special meetings in between, if needed). They will be carefully prepared in advance by the Chair in consultation with the Co-chairs with substantial support from the Secretariat.

2. The Executive would delegate issues requiring more consideration to time-limited working groups / task groups

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3. The Committee will review the work plans and reports of the Secretariat on six monthly basis.

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ANNEX 6

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF SACB MEMBERSHIP (DRAFT)

The SACB will continue to have an open, voluntary membership without membership fees.

However, member agencies will be expected to subscribe to the following principles and commitments and to ensure that their staff are aware of these principles and commitments.

Members of the SACB are expected to:

1. Abide by the rules, guidelines and codes of the SACB.

2. Show their commitment to the SACB by ensuring that their staff & partners, including staff in Somalia, are well briefed and informed about the SACB and know where to get information about the SACB if needed.

3. Show their commitment to the SACB by disseminating information about it and explaining its role to their partners and, as appropriate, to authorities in Somalia that they liaise with.

4. Encourage and facilitate Somali participation in the SACB

5. Show their commitment to the effective coordination of aid by actively participating in coordination mechanisms at all levels, including openly sharing programme policies, approaches and plans, as well as evaluations.

6. Support SACB initiatives as agreed by the Executive, or the Sectoral Committees or Humanitarian Response Group.

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ANNEX 7

SACB REGIONAL CONSULTATIVE FORUMS – DRAFT TOR

1. The aim of these forums is to provide an inclusive opportunity for SACB members and the Secretariat to meet with Somali stakeholders to discuss issues relating to aid for Somalia on a regional basis. In particular, these forums will provide access for a wider range of Somali civil society players than participates in normal aid coordination mechanisms.

2. SACB Field Liaison Officers will play a key role in preparing and organising these forums.

3. The agendas will be constructed from issues that arise during routine coordination meetings, from issues that the SACB wishes to consult on and issues put forward by stakeholders. The agendas will include a report back from the SACB on its activities and trends in assistance to Somalia.

4. The meetings will also provide an opportunity for SACB members to present their programmes, findings of evaluations etc.

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ANNEX 8

SACB FIELD LIAISON OFFICER (FLO) – DRAFT JOB DESCRIPTION

Number of posts: Three (of which one dedicated to Somaliland).

Grade: ? (international post)

Purpose: To facilitate SACB’s work in the coordination of assistance to Somalia and to support SACB members in their work.

Liaison: The FLO will liaise closely with a wide range of stakeholders, particularly with SACB members, including those from OCHA, the EC and other agencies also responsible for coordination and liaison activities. The FLO will also liaise closely with Somali authorities and other Somali institutions as appropriate.

Reporting: The FLO reports to the Head of the SACB Secretariat.

Responsibilities:

1. Supporting, facilitating and in some cases, carrying out, field coordination activities in close consultation with SACB members 2. Making sure that issues raised for SACB’s attention from the field are taken up in Nairobi 3. Monitoring events and the aid context in the region and reporting to the Secretariat in Nairobi, particularly highlighting aid coordination issues. 4. Explaining and communicating SACB’s role and activities to a wide range of stakeholders 5. As part of 3 and 4 above, liaising with Somali authorities 6. Facilitating flows of information and information resources between Somalia and Nairobi and vice versa. Acting as an outreach point for material from the SACB and member agencies 7. Working in close contact with the SACB HQ Liaison Officer (Annex 10), particularly to strengthen regional coordination activities and facilitate links between SACB’s sectoral coordination activities and SACB members’ work on the ground 8. Organising six monthly Consultative Forums 9. Supporting SACB field visits and those of SACB members & consultants as appropriate. 10. Manage support staff.

Qualifications / experience:

1. 7 years experience of international humanitarian and / or development work including a minimum of three years in Africa, including some demonstrable experience of coordination work. 2. Minimum of two year’s experience of working in or on Somalia in a humanitarian and/or development context.

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Qualities

Coordination skills – inclusiveness, bringing parties together and providing added value.

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ANNEX 9

HEAD OF SACB SECRETARIAT – JOB DESCRIPTION

Overall Job Purpose: In furtherance of SACB’s aims, to manage the SACB Secretariat and to supervise the implementation of Secretariat work plans agreed by the Executive Committee.

Reporting to: The Chair of the SACB Executive Committee

Managing: Staff of the Secretariat as shown in the organogram above

Grade: (senior international post)

Location: Nairobi, with the possibility of relocation to Mogadishu if circumstances permit.

Responsibilities:

1. Drawing up Secretariat work plans and managing their implementation according to overall priorities set by the SACB Executive Committee. 2. Report on the implementation of work plans to the Executive Committee 3. Manage the Secretariat 4. Overall support to SACB’s committees to ensure their smooth running 5. Liaise closely with SACB members, observers and other stakeholders. 6. Re responsible for communicating the purpose of the SACB and by agreement with the Chair of the Executive or the co-chairs, represent the SACB externally, including with the Somali authorities. 7. Managing the SACB Secretariat’s transitional role and arrangements if a national government is set up in Mogadishu 8. Briefing external visitors to the Secretariat on the work of the SACB 9. Carrying out communications and advocacy work as required.

Qualifications /experience:

1. A university degree

2. A higher degree of relevance to international development and or humanitarian work

3. A minimum of 20 years’ experience working in the international development and/or humanitarian aid context, of which a minimum of 5 years in Africa.

4. Three years’ experience of working in or on Somalia in a senior management position

5. Demonstrable experience of aid coordination

Qualities

Leadership, management, coordination skills – inclusiveness, bringing parties together and providing added value.

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ANNEX 10

OUTLINE OF NEW SECRETARIAT POSTS

HQ Liaison Officer

1. Managing support to the SACB Committees and working groups, including administrative staff 2. Providing support to the Sectoral Committees (excepting the HSC) and monitoring discussions of those committees, facilitating cross-cutting linkages, both between Committees and with the Executive 3. Providing a special focus in the Nairobi office for information to and from Somalia, ensuring the smooth flow of information relating to the Committees, following up on issues that arise from the field 4. Working in close contact with the SACB Field Liaison Officers (Annex 8), particularly to strengthen regional coordination activities 5. With the Head of the Secretariat, supporting special task forces or working groups that may be established.

HQ Resource & Learning Manager

1. Develop and manage the Secretariat’s information, communication and learning activities, including the SACB resource centre and its staff (a documentalist) within the overall priorities set by the SACB’s Executive Committee 2. Develop methods through consultative processes for the dissemination of key information and learning material to SACB members and more widely to Somali authorities and civil society organisations. 3. Liaise with SACB members and with other organisations, institutions and individuals concerned with Somalia to gather up-to-date material and to disseminate it. 4. Work closely with agencies such as IRIN.

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ANNEX 11

LESSONS FROM OTHER CONTEXTS

This Annex is to read in conjunction with and as an extension of Section 3 of the main report.

Afghanistan

During the Taliban era, the international community experimented with an ambitious coordination structure operating within a Strategic Framework intended to provide coherence to the international response, particularly between the assistance and political wings of the UN. A Principled Common Programming (PCP) approach was established to guide relationships with the Taliban authorities. Duffield et al could not find evidence that the principle engagement with the Taliban regime had any impact. A critical review (of the Afghanistan strategic framework approach) noted that it yielded an expression of the shared principles and values of the Western community intervening in the Afghan conflict, but was not been based on a sound analysis of the multiple layers of that conflict (van Brabant & Killick 1999). Overall this structure and approach is judged to have been over-ambitious and unsuccessful.137

With the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and the setting up of the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA), the previous coordination structures were reshaped to take account of the new context. Given the scale of the reconstruction task faced by Afghanistan and the need for strong political commitment and leadership, the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group was formed with four co-chairs – US, EU, Japan and Saudi Arabia - to provide overall strategic direction. In Kabul the Implementation Group chaired by the Afghan government and assisted by vice chairs (World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, Afghan Ssupport Group) ensured coordination of reconstruction activities in the field. In addition the Afghan Support Group, comprising donors, UN agencies and NGOs, which had coordinated support over the last years, continues looking at humanitarian issues and interlinkages with reconstruction.138

These structures proved overly complex and have been consolidated under one Consultative Group process with one local Consultative Group for each of the twelve components of the National Development Programme, headed by a Minister with one or two lead agencies. A standing committee will conduct an annual Afghanistan Development Forum. Strand notes that this structure indicates a consultative arrangement where the different actors are brought on board to form a consensus.

Other features of the Afghanistan coordination experience have included:

1. Lack of reliable data on aid disbursements and a proper needs and vulnerability assessment to guide aid prioritisation and allocation have fuelled arguments about uneven distribution of aid. 2. The new government accusing the humanitarian agencies of excessive administrative and operational expense, while it is under-resourced. 3. Fragmented NGO coordination with four different bodies and large numbers of new arrivals. 4. Friction between the ATA and the UN when the latter initiated its own planning and budgeting process, the Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan (TAPA) for 2003.139 5. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), derived from the earlier Strategic Monitoring Unit, has been an independent resource and analysis body, able to carry out system- wide reviews and evaluations.

137 Johnson in ODI/HPN 3 April 2002. 138 EC Afghanistan Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 06. 139 Strand.

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Kosovo

Post conflict arrangements in Kosovo gave roles to each of major players. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a then unprecedented structure with three non-UN organisations (European Union (EU), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO KFOR) within it and led by the UN SRSG. The UNMIK structure consisted of four pillars, each headed by a DSRSG:

Pillar I: Humanitarian Affairs (led by UNHCR) Pillar 2: Interim Civil Administration (led by UN) Pillar 3: Institution Building (led by OSCE) Pillar 4: Economic Reconstruction (led by the EU)

Major coordination problems in Kosovo have been less to do with inter-humanitarian agency relationships and more to do with the humanitarian community’s relationships with the UNMIK structures. If the traditional relief – development gap exists in Kosovo it was partly due to the slowness of UNMIK to take over and Kosova structures to develop and be given responsibility (Reindorp).

Sudan140

Humanitarian coordination for Sudan has been mainly under the aegis of Operation Lifeline Sudan, a long standing UN-led consortium of UN agencies and about 40 international NGOs and indigenous NGOs working with a broader framework of UN coordination, coordinating with the NGO Forum Steering Committee. Members of OLS agree to abide by the Ground Rules for humanitarian action agreed with the government of Sudan in Khartoum and the SPLM in Southern Sudan. A donor principals group comprising donors, UN, NGOs meets monthly in Khartoum and is reflected in Nairobi. A donor group meets fortnightly.141

Lehtinen notes that despite the complex structure of coordination at different levels, there are some constraints on effective coordination in relation to Sudan: • Insufficient strategic coordination and joint planning. Despite frequent meetings of donor representatives, it appears that coordination is often limited to exchanges of information on the security situation and ongoing projects rather than joint ‘strategic’ coordination and planning of activities. • The divide between OLS and non-OLS NGOs can be argued to hamper effective coordination, although different mechanisms for information sharing formally exist. • The institutionalisation of the OLS – a concern that has developed its own agenda?142

The UN has defined the following assistance categories for Sudan, in the context of the Southern Sudan peace process:

• Humanitarian action – immediate life-saving and life-sustaining assistance to vulnerable populations affected by crises, conflicts and disasters, along with associated international protection measures.

• Transitional recovery: The purpose of transitional recovery is to facilitate progression from crisis in a way that enable communities to begin tackling the underlying causes of the crisis and move towards establishing the social, economic and governance foundations for longer-term sustainable development.

140 The review looked at lessons related to the long-running complex emergency in Southern Sudan in the context of nearly completed peace process. (The humanitarian crisis in the region was not looked at.) 141 UN CAP for Sudan 2004. 142 Lehtinen.

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• Quick start: to demonstrate the positive impact of the peace process in key conflict-affected geographical areas and on populations. Interventions should be designed for rapid start-up and include streamlined implementation modalities to ensure timely delivery.

• Capacity building: To assist the Sudanese in preparing for the transitional governments in the pre-interim period, and more generally to develop Sudanese capabilities at institutional, societal and individual levels.

• Programme enabling support. 143

Some observers feel that the Sudanese and their donor partners have been forward-leaning in anticipation of peace.144 There have already been a series of donor coordination conferences. An innovative and ambitious GOS/SPLM joint planning mechanism, the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) has been established to assess needs and draw up interim action plans. The JAM’s emphasis is on openness, transparency, national ownership and cost efficiency (minimising the use of chartered aircraft), being careful to avoid too many missions to overburden communities and agencies in the field. A JAM website is used for information management.

The IGAD Partners Forum Working Group produced a first ‘Planning for Peace’ Framework in March 2002. The Working Group comprised member governments, UN agencies and the EC. Originally the plan was to produce sectoral and geographical priorities, but it became apparent that the project would only have credibility if it is in close dialogue with the Sudanese people i.e. technocrats, politicians, civil society. Progressively the work has become more deeply linked to peace building.145

West Bank / Gaza146

An elaborate set of aid coordination arrangements were developed for the West Bank and Gaza during the 1990s, growing down from the international political negotiation machinery.

WEST BANK & GAZA – OUTLINE OF AID COORDINATION STRUCTURES147

Membership Main Functions Notes Ad Hoc Liaison Canada, EU, Japan, • Coordinate and Since 2001 the AHLC Committee (AHLC) Norway, Russia, promote donor agenda has included Saudi Arabia, US. assistance to the specific issues such as (meeting in the US or Associated Palestinian people fiscal support and usually Europe, once a members: PLO/PA, • Promote transparency budgetary support to year) Israel, Egypt, of donors the PA, damage Jordan, Tunisia and • Foster private sector assessment, emergency the UN trade & investment needs and repair, the Secretariat: World • Donor forum for socio-economic and Bank dialogue on assistance humanitarian situation activities and institutional reform.

143 Office of the UN RC/HC for the Sudan. Donor Assistance Profile for Sudan 2003 – Executive Summary. 27 March 2004. 144 Esposito, Crocker CSIS 2004. 145 IPF Sudan March 2002 146 This section taken mainly from Lister, Le More. 2003. Aid Management and Coordination during the Intifada. 147 This information summarised from Lister, LeMore.

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Joint Liaison Chair: PA • Established as the Now in abeyance Committee (JLC) Membership: local counterpart of because of Israel’s Norway, UNSCO, the AHLC withdrawal from (met about four times a World Bank, EU, • Reporting on the formal aid coordination year) US, Japan, Israel Tripartite Action Plan structures at local level, Secretariat: • Project the abandonment of the Norway. Implementation Issues Tripartite Action Plan • Private Sector and the start of the Development Intifada. • Relations with the AHLC

Local Aid Chair: Norway with Established under the Israel has not attended Coordination co-chairs – World auspices of the AHLC. sinced 2000. Committee (LACC) Bank and UNSCO. Most of the time the Membership: Local Apparently no formal LACC has met (notionally meets reps of AHLC and terms of reference. ‘informally’ as a monthly, less between other bilateral and donor-like forum, but 1999 and 2001, but multilateral donors. Similar agenda to the sometimes with increased in 2002 in Reps of UN AHLC. representatives of the response to the conflict agencies and the PA PA. on the ground. attend as observers The LACC has tended Secretariat: to evolve from a forum Originally World for coordination of Bank and UNSCO development projects jointly; since 2002 a into a large information LACC Secretariat sharing body tackling Office. most issues of concern to the donor and aid community.

Sector Working Donors with Up to 15 SWGs Modified to converge Groups (SWGs) Palestinian established as a with the Palestinian representatives substructure of the LACC Development Plan. invited if to cover different fields of A few SWGs were appropriate. donor involvement, seen as effective clustered under the (health & education), headings of infrastructure, others tended to be productive sector, social large talking shops. sector and institution building. Task Force on Project Members: UNSCO, Established by the JLC to This has meant an Implementation (TFPI) WB, EC & USAID identify and make expansion of its with a rotating recommendations to the mandate to include: (six monthly?) chair. JLC on implementation • Representation of problems, strategic issues the international and sectoral issues for donor community discussion by the SWGs. (including INGOs) with the Israeli Since the Intifada, authorities increasing emergency and • Facilitation of operational issues has led international to international humanitarian organisations to intensify activities,

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their coordination with the particular issues of Israeli government. access and (continued in next column) movement (in liaison with the HEPG – see below. Humanitarian and Chair: EU/EC with • To develop and update Established in 2002 in Emergency Policy UNSCO as deputy a coherent donor order to reinforce Group (HEPG) chair strategy for dealing linkages between Membership: with socio-, (meets bi-monthly) EU/EC, US, and humanitarian institutional reform and Norway, UNSCO, issues humanitarian World Bank (and • To consider policy initiatives. Reports to can be extended if options the LACC. necessary) • Oversee the analysis Secretariat: LACC of the effectiveness of Secretariat, humanitarian supported by programmes OCHA • To identify advocacy issues

Lister and Le More note that influence, strategic positioning, mandate and analytical resources of the LACC co-chairs is not necessarily related to share of financial assistance. “One could argue that the World Bank is better able to play a leading role among donors, both in analysis and in the mobilisation of resources, partly because it is not itself a dominant funding source.” The report suggests that this is in contrast to other countries where, if the World Bank’s share of aid is typically much higher, it is more likely to judge its performance largely on the basis of its own successful disbursements and relations with other donors can be less harmonious. However a World Bank note on aid coordination and post-conflict reconstruction in the West Bank and Gaza reports that there were earlier battles for aid coordination leadership of the AHLC with the EU (World Bank 1999).

A wide range of stakeholders consulted in 2003 acknowledged that aid mobilisation and delivery had been rather effective in an exceptionally difficult period, but the following weaknesses were widely mentioned:

Donors: • Aid bodies too numerous: the structure is cumbersome and confusing • PA insufficiently involved • Too many meetings and processes without necessarily effective follow up and implementation afterwards • Information sharing could be improved by more regular liaising (not least via emails), general use of common data bases and the short fact sheets. • The lack of tracking of donors’ pledges and disbursements is seen as particularly problematic • Coordination and harmonisation at project level is minimal; there is frequent duplication, while some areas, particularly rural areas, are neglected

Palestinians: • Assistance driven too much by donor agendas • PA insufficiently involved • Donors lack strategic vision

INGOs: • Insufficiently involved in overall aid coordination mechanisms

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Lessons from the Sectoral Working Groups (SWGs):

• The education SWG demonstrated that an agency with a clear sector vision, strong leadership and good relations with the Secretariat can use an SWG to good effect.

• Key ingredients for effective coordination were: willingness to work together; clarity of goals; clarity of mandates; availability of resources (human, financial, time), technical competencies of key actors

The 2003 review of the LACC makes a number of recommendations related to the LACC Secretariat:

• It should become more proactive by collecting and synthesising useful information, liaising with the various group chairs, circulating reports, identifying problems and keeping a watching brief on aid coordination in general. • The Secretariat should be strengthened to help to strengthen links between various bodies / working groups • There should be an annual work programme for the LACC office.

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