DOCSLIB.ORG

The Age of Balance Sheet Recessions: What Post-2008 U.S., Europe and China Can Learn from Japan 1990-2005

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Age of Balance Sheet Recessions: What Post-2008 U.S., Europe and China Can Learn from Japan 1990-2005 The Age of Balance Sheet Recessions: What Post-2008 U.S., Europe and China Can Learn from Japan 1990-2005 Richard C. Koo Chief Economist Nomura Research Institute Tokyo March 2009 Exhibit 1. US Economy Is Deteriorating Rapidly (%, Seasonally adjusted) (%, Seasonally adjusted, inverted) 86 3.5 4.0 84 Unemployment Rate (right scale) 4.5 82 5.0 80 5.5 78 6.0 6.5 76 7.0 74 7.5 Capacity Utilization 72 (left Scale) 8.0 70 8.5 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Sources: US Department of Labor, FRB 1 Exhibit 2. EU Economic Sentiments Are Worsening (Seasonally adjusted) 120 115 Euro Area Economic Sentiment 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 Ifo Business Climate 75 70 65 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Source: Ifo Business Survey, European Commission 2 Exhibit 3. Exports and House Prices Are Falling in China (y/y%) ($ bil., Seasonally Adjusted) 25 140 20 House price in Shenzhen (left scale) 120 15 10 100 5 80 0 -5 60 -10 40 -15 China's exports ($ bil., right scale) -20 20 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Note: Seasonal adjustment by Nomura Research Institute. Sources: Nomura Research Institute, based on National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), People’s Republic of China, and Bloomberg. 3 Exhibit 4. Japan’s Industrial Production and Employments Are also Weakening (Seasonally adjusted) (Seasonally adjusted, 2005=100) 1.2 115 Industrial production (right scale) forecast 110 1.1 105 1.0 100 0.9 95 0.8 90 85 0.7 80 Job offers to applicants ratio (left scale) 0.6 75 0.5 70 0.4 65 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Note: The forecasts are calculated from METI's survey on planned production. Sources: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 4 Exhibit 5. Low Interest Rates Have Failed to Revive Economies or Asset Prices (%) 8 Aus tralia 7 UK 6 5 4 EU 3 US 2 Japan 1 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sources: BOJ, FRB, ECB, BOE and RMB Australia. As of Mar. 18, 2009. 5 Exhibit 6. Features of Balance Sheet Recession z A balance sheet recession emerges after the bursting of a nationwide asset price bubble that leaves a large number of private-sector balance sheets with more liabilities than assets. z In order to repair their balance sheets, private sector moves away from profit maximization to debt minimization. z With the private sector de-leveraging, even at zero interest rates, newly generated savings and debt repayments enter the banking system but cannot leave the system due to the lack of borrowers. The sum of savings and debt repayments end up becoming the leakage to the income stream. z The deflationary gap created by the above leakage will continue to push the economy toward a contractionary equilibrium until the private sector is too impoverished to save any money (=depression). z In this type of recession, the economy will not enter self- sustaining growth until private sector balance sheets are repaired. 6 Exhibit 7. US Demand for Funds Is Falling Sharply (D.I.) 30 housing 20 IT bubble small firms bubble collapse collapse 10 0 -10 large and middle-market firms -20 -30 stronger demand for funds -40 weaker demand for funds -50 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Source: Nomura Research Institute, based on FRB, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices . Note: D.I. are calculated from the answers to the question, "Apart from normal seasonal variation, how has demand for C&I loans changed over the past three months?" D.I. = ("Substantially stronger" + "Moderately stronger"×0.5) - ("Moderately weaker"×0.5 + "Substantially weaker") 7 Exhibit 8. US Housing Price Futures Moving Closer to the Japanese Experience (US: Jan. 2000=100, Japan: Dec. 1985=100) Futures 260 Composite Index Futures US: 10 Cities Composite Home Price Index 240 (as of Sep. 19, 2007) 220 Japan: Tokyo Area Condo Price (per m2, 5 months moving average) 200 180 160 Japan: Osaka Area Condo Price 140 (per m2, 5 months moving average) 120 Composite Index Futures (as of Mar. 18, 2009) 100 80 A fall in actual prices to the bottom for future prices would bring house prices 60 back to level of Dec. 2002 40 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 US 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Japan Sources: Bloomberg, Real Estate Economic Institute, Japan, S&P "S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price Indices", as of Mar. 18, 2009. 8 Exhibit 9. House Prices and Rents Diverged substantially during Housing Bubble (91/1Q=100, Seasonally Adjusted) 250 200 21% House prices ? 150 100 Rents 50 A 21% decline would bring house prices back to level of 2003 Q4 0 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 Note: Seasonal adjustment by Nomura Research Institute. Source: Nomura Research Institute, based on Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) house price index and US Department of Labor CPI. 9 Exhibit 10. Americans Spent $1.5trn that Should Have Been Saved Savings shortfall = $1,544bn ($bn, seasonally adjusted) (%) 120 6 Saving rate (right scale) 100 5 80 4 Amount needed to lift savings to 4%* (left scale) 4.5 60 3 years at this rate 40 2 20 Actual savings (left scale) 1 0 0 -20 -1 -40 -2 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Note: Average savings rate for US households in1997-98. Source: Nomura Research Institute, based on US Department of Commerce data. 10 Exhibit 11. Japan’s GDP Grew even after Massive Loss of Wealth and Private Sector Rushing to Pay Down Debt (Mar. 2000＝100) (Tril.yen, Seasonally Adjusted) 600 800 Nominal GDP (Right Scale) 550 700 500 600 Real GDP (Right Scale) 450 500 400 400 Land Price Index in Six Major Cities (Commercial, Right Scale) 350 300 down 87% Last seen 300 200 in 1973 100 250 0 200 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Sources: Cabinet Office, Japan Real Estate Institute 11 Exhibit 12. Cumulative Capital Losses on Shares and Land since 1990 Reached $15 Trillion or 3 Years Worth of Japan’s GDP (Tril. yen) 400 (Capital Gain) Land Shares 0 -400 Equivalent ¥1,500 to $45 trillion trillion loss -800 in the US -1200 Land and Shares Combined (Capital Loss) -1600 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Source: Cabinet Office, Japan "National Accounts" 12 Exhibit 13. Balance Sheet Problems Forced Japanese Businesses to Pay Down Debt even with Zero Interest Rates Funds Raised by Non-Financial Corporate Sector (% Nominal GDP, 4Q Moving Average) (%) 25 10 CD 3M rate (right scale) 20 8 Borrowings from Financial Institutions (left scale) 15 6 Funds raised in Securities Markets (left scale) 10 4 5 2 0 0 -5 -2 -10 -4 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Sources: Bank of Japan, Cabinet Office, Japan 13 Exhibit 14. Japanese Government Borrowed and Spent the Excess Savings of the Private Sector to Sustain GDP (Tril. yen) 100 Government Spending 90 80 total additional 70 deficit 90-05 ¥315 trillion 60 50 40 Tax revenue Bubble Collapse 30 20 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan Note: FY 2008 includes supplementary budget, and FY 2009 is just initial budget. 14 Exhibit 15. With Government Borrowing and Spending the Increase in Private Sector Savings*, Large Deficit Does Not Mean Higher Interest Rates (% of GDP) (%) 180 9 Balance Sheet Recession 160 8 Japanese Government Debt as Percentage of GDP (left scale) 140 7 Yields on 10year JGB (right scale) 120 6 100 5 80 4 60 3 40 2 20 1 0 0 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 * Household savings plus corporate debt repayment Sources: Cabinet Office, Japan, Japan Bond Trading Co., Japan Securities Dealers Association 15 Exhibit 16. Japanese Companies Made Huge Progress in Reducing Debt Overhang (Yen tril., Seasonally Adjusted) (as a ratio to nominal GDP, %) 450 90 400 Credit Extended by the Banks to 85/4Q Corporate Sector 350 as a Ratio to Nominal GDP (Right Scale) 80 300 250 70 200 150 Credit Extended by the Banks to Corporate Sector 60 100 (Left Scale) last seen in 1956 50 0 50 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Sources : Bank of Japan, "Loans and Discounts Outstanding by Sector" "Loans to Individuals", Cabinet Office, Japan "National Accounts" Notes: 1.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Fortnightly Market Wrap up Spring Week Edition 31 March 2013
    March 31, 2013 WIC Market Wrap-Up Fortnightly Market Wrap Up Spring Week Edition 31 March 2013 Warwick Investment Club Research Team 1 March 31, 2013 WIC Market Wrap-Up The WIC Market Wrap-Up The WIC Market Wrap-Up is published fortnightly by the Warwick Finance Societies’ (WFS) Warwick Investment Club (WIC) Research Team. Receive the Wrap Up via email newsletter by joining the WFS, or look out for archived issues on www.wfsocieties.com. In this Week’s Issue Editorial – page 3 Italy – page 7 Quantitative Easing and the Italian Political Debacle – Balance Sheet Recession Where we stand now By Daryl Chia, Editor-in-Chief By Marco Ross, Co-Editor US Equities – page 4 Renewables – page 8 Spring in the Step of the Dow Has the Sun Set for the Solar Jones and S&P 500 Industry? By Will Caffrey, Analyst By Richard Low, Analyst The Japanese Economy – page 5 Technology – page 9 Manufacturing – Bad signs for Blackberries – Back in season? the Japanese economy By John Peter Ong, Analyst By Eleanor Gaffney, Analyst Research Team Application Essay – page 10 Cyprus – page 6 The Eurozone Crisis The Significance of the Bailout By Jonathan Denham Deal Research Team Application Essay – page 11 By Melson Chun, Analyst The 2008 Global Financial Crisis By Zak Simpson Warwick Investment Club Research Team 2 March 31, 2013 WIC Market Wrap-Up Editorial nominal line under assets and reduced liquidity-related tail risks, but have not translated to a solution that can Quantitative Easing and the bring about robust long term growth. Balance Sheet Recession Alas, the asset reflation and wealth effect of QE is meaningful only in the short term.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding the Global Macroeconomic Challenges
    On time, stocks and flows: Understanding the global macroeconomic challenges Claudio Borio Bank for International Settlements Abstract Five years after the financial crisis, the global economy remains unbalanced and many of the advanced countries are still struggling to return to robust, sustainable growth. Taking a historical perspective, I argue that this predicament reflects a failure to adjust to profound changes in the economic landscape, which have given rise to the (re-)emergence of major financial booms and busts. The economic developments that really matter now take much longer to unfold – economic time has slowed down relative to calendar time – and yet the planning horizons of economic agents have shortened. The key problems arise from the cumulative effects of past decisions on stocks, and yet these effects are treated as short- term flow issues. The risk is that instability will become entrenched in the system. Policy needs to adjust. JEL classification: E30, E44, E50, G10, G20, G28, H30, H50. Keywords: short horizons, debt, financial cycle, banking crises, balance sheet recessions. 2 Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 1 I. The broad canvas .......................................................................................................................... 3 Stylised facts: an economic historian’s perspective ....................................................................... 3 Stylised
    [Show full text]
  • UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT of ECONOMICS LECTURE 25 BALANCE SHEET EFFECTS APRIL 24, 2018 A. Aggregate Demand Or Potentia
    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Economics 134 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Spring 2018 Professor David Romer LECTURE 25 BALANCE SHEET EFFECTS APRIL 24, 2018 I. INTRODUCTION IV. HOUSEHOLD BALANCE SHEETS AND THE GREAT RECESSION A. The housing boom II. KOO’S DIAGNOSIS OF JAPAN’S POOR MACROECONOMIC 1. Mian and Sufi’s hypotheses PERFORMANCE 2. The role of economic fundamentals in house price A. Aggregate demand or potential output? growth B. Credit supply or credit demand? 3. The direction of causation between house prices and C. A “balance sheet” recession credit growth 4. Why did rising house prices raise consumption so III. KOO’S ANALYSIS OF A BALANCE SHEET RECESSION much? A. Koo’s analysis of a balance sheet recession in an IS-MP B. The Great Recession and slow recovery framework 1. Mian and Sufi’s hypothesis B. Is monetary policy effective in Koo’s model of a balance 2. Evidence sheet recession? 3, Discussion C. Is fiscal policy effective in Koo’s model of a balance sheet recession? V. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY D. Is the zero lower bound important in Koo’s model of a balance sheet recession? E. Koo’s evidence F. A balance sheet recession and “debt-deflation” Economics 134 David Romer Spring 2018 LECTURE 25 Balance Sheet Effects April 25, 2018 Final Exam – Basics • Mechanics: • Monday, May 7, 3–6 P.M., 2050 VLSB. • Students with DSP accommodations: You should have received an email from me today. If you did not, please let me know. • Coverage: Whole semester. But: • There will be more emphasis on the material after the midterm.
    [Show full text]
  • Uncertainty Shocks and Balance Sheet Recessions
    Uncertainty Shocks and Balance Sheet Recessions Sebastian Di Tella∗ MIT Job Market Paper December, 2012 Abstract This paper investigates the origin and propagation of balance sheet recessions in a continuous-time general equilibrium model with financial frictions. I first show that in standard models driven by TFP shocks, the balance sheet channel completely disap- pears when agents are allowed to write contracts on the aggregate state of the economy. Financial frictions still affect the economy, but optimal contracts sever the link between leverage and aggregate risk sharing, eliminating the excessive exposure to aggregate risk that drives balance sheet recessions. As a result, balance sheets play no role in the trans- mission and amplification of aggregate shocks. Motivated by this neutrality result, I consider alternative structural shocks. I show that uncertainty shocks can drive bal- ance sheet recessions, with depressed growth and asset prices, and trigger a “flight to quality” event, with low interest rates and high risk premia. Uncertainty shocks create an endogenous hedging motive, inducing agents to take on aggregate risk even when contracts can be written on the aggregate state of the economy. Finally, I explore the implications for financial regulation. JEL Codes: E32, E44, G1, G12 ∗I am extremely grateful to my advisors Daron Acemoglu, Guido Lorenzoni, and Ivan Werning for their invaluable guidance. I also thank George-Marios Angeletos, Vladimir Asriyan, Ricardo Caballero, Marco Di Maggio, David Gamarnik, Veronica Guerrieri, Leonid Kogan, Andrey Malenko, William Mullins, Juan Passadore, Mercedes Politi, Felipe Severino, Rob Townsend, Victoria Vanasco, Xiao Yu Wang, Juan Pablo Xandri, Luis Zermeño, and seminar participants at the MIT Macroeconomics Lunch for useful suggestions and comments.
    [Show full text]
  • June 2014, Several Central Banks Tightened Considerably on Net: in Turkey, by 400 Basis Points, Including a 550 Basis Point Hike in One Day In
    V. Monetary policy struggles to normalise Monetary policy globally remained very accommodative over the past year as policy rates stayed low and central bank balance sheets expanded further. Central banks in the major advanced economies continued to face an unusually sluggish recovery despite prolonged extraordinary monetary easing. This suggests that monetary policy has been relatively ineffective in boosting a recovery from a balance sheet recession. Emerging market economies and small open advanced economies struggled to deal with spillovers from monetary ease in the major advanced economies. They have also kept their policy rates very low, which has contributed to the build-up of financial vulnerabilities. This dynamic suggests that monetary policy should play a greater role as a complement to macroprudential measures when dealing with financial imbalances. It also points to shortcomings in the international monetary system, as global monetary policy spillovers are not sufficiently internalised. Many central banks faced unexpected disinflationary pressures in the past year, which represent a negative surprise for those in debt and raise the spectre of deflation. However, risks of widespread deflation appear very low: central banks see inflation returning to target over time and longer-term inflation expectations remaining well anchored. Moreover, the supply side nature of the disinflation pressures has generally been consistent with the pickup in global economic activity. The monetary policy stance needs to carefully take into account the persistence and supply side nature of the disinflationary forces as well as the side effects of policy ease. The prospect is now clearer that central banks in the major advanced economies are at different distances from normalising policy and hence will exit at different times from their extraordinary accommodation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Uncharted Economics of Deflation and Balance Sheet Recession
    Balance Sheet Recessions and the Economics of Credit and Debt Richard C. Koo Chief Economist Nomura Research Institute November 14, 2012 How it all started The importance of finance and credit is suddenly gaining attention in economics, I suspect, because the economy is not recovering after four years of zero interest rates and almost astronomical quantitative easing. If the economy did recover after a year or so after the Lehman shock, it would have been business as usual and none of us will be gathering in Waterloo to discuss these topics today. Indeed when the crisis hit, those economists in the mainstream, most notably the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke, commented that the impact of the shock will probably cost the US economy about 0.5 percent of GDP and that the economy should be on its way to recovery within a year. Larry Summers at the White House also argued in early 2009 that a large jolt of fiscal stimulus will pump prime the US economy back to its growth path, after which the President should be able to cut the deficit in half by the end of his four-year term. When the recovery failed to materialize however, things began to change. The Fed, for example, began extending the date of possible recovery, which is a clear sign that they do not know what is going on. Now the FOMC is saying that the Fed will not start raising interest rate until mid-2015 which means that a self-sustaining recovery may not start until 2015.
    [Show full text]
  • Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures Rates and Extraordinary Central Bank Manoeuvres
    e Six years after the Global Crisis, the recovery is still anaemic despite years of near-zero interest Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures rates and extraordinary central bank manoeuvres. Is ‘secular stagnation’ to blame? Secular Stagnation: This eBook gathers the thinking of leading economists including Larry Summers, Paul Krugman, Robert Gordon, Olivier Blanchard, Richard Koo, Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Caballero, Ed Facts, Causes and Cures Glaeser and a dozen others. A fairly strong consensus emerged on four points. • Secular stagnation (SecStag) means that negative real interest rates are needed to equate saving and investment at full-employment output levels. • The key worry is that SecStag will make it hard to achieve full employment with low Edited by Coen Teulings and inflation and financial stability using macroeconomic policy as it is currently structured Richard Baldwin and operated. • It is too early to tell whether secular stagnation is to blame, but uncertainty is not an excuse for inaction. Policymakers should start thinking about solutions; if secular stagnation sets in, today’s toolkit will be inadequate. • Europe has more to fear from the possibility of secular stagnation than the US, given its slower overall growth and its lack of pro-growth reforms and more constrained policy framework. The authors point to two classes of solutions: ‘Prevention’ (raising long-run growth potentials) and ‘symptomatic treatment’ (raising the inflation target to alleviate the zero lower bound problem, and using fiscal policy to
    [Show full text]
  • THE DYNAMICS of BALANCE SHEET RECESSIONS This Box Reviews the Underlying Dynamics of Ireland’S Post-Crisis Balance Sheet Recession
    Endorsement and Assessment of Macroeconomic Forecasts BOX D: THE DYNAMICS OF BALANCE SHEET RECESSIONS This box reviews the underlying dynamics of Ireland’s post-crisis balance sheet recession. This remains a significant downside risk to the current macroeconomic forecasts. There are a number of adverse feedback loops that typify a post-crisis balance sheet recession (Figure D1).30 Stressed balance sheets in the Government, financial and non- financial sectors tend to interact in ways that slow post-crisis growth. Starting with the Government sector, Ireland’s gross debt as a share of GDP rose from about 25 per cent at the end of the boom to close to 125 per cent today. A significant proportion of this increase was due to the direct costs of covering losses of the banking system, with the remainder due to the sharp rise in the deficit as the economy contracted and property-related revenues collapsed. These debt and deficit developments – together with uncertainty about future prospects – led to a loss of the Government’s market borrowing capacity, which in turn fed back to the banking system (through lost credibility of liability guarantees, the credibility of capital backstops, and direct losses on Government bonds) and also to the real economy (through the need for pro-cyclical retrenchment and heightened uncertainty).31, 32 The two- way interaction between the Government and the banks is sometimes referred to as the “diabolic loop”.33 A feature of a balance-sheet recession is that households and businesses attempt to repair their balance sheets by curtailing spending, reducing debt and selling assets (Koo, 2009).
    [Show full text]
  • The Crisis of Over-Accumulation in Japan
    Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2015 Vol. 45, No. 2, 311–325, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2014.936026 The Crisis of Over-Accumulation in Japan BILL LUCARELLI School of Economics and Finance, Faculty of Business, University of Western Sydney, Australia ABSTRACT Japan has now been mired in economic stagnation, punctuated by recurrent reces- sions, for the past two decades. What are the causes of this longstanding malaise? Is it merely the natural consequence of financial retrenchment and the onset of a pervasive “liquidity trap” after the collapse of the “bubble” economy in the early 1990s, or does the present slump signify a more profound historical phase of structural decline? The aim of this study is to provide several tentative hypotheses. In the first section, some of the possible causes of this phase of prolonged stagnation will be examined. The next section provides a theoretical treatment of the dynamics of debt-deflation from a Minsky-Fisher perspective. The final section evaluates whether the historical evidence lends credence to the debt-deflation thesis. KEY WORDS: Over-accumulation, excess-capacity, debt-deflation, finance, labour Japan’s descent into a prolonged period of economic stagnation over the past two decades has provoked perennial debates over the causes and dynamics of this phase of secular stagnation. The aim of this article is to examine the persistence of Japan’s mediocre economic performance from a Fisher-Minsky perspective. In other words, to what extent is it possible to characterise this stagnationist phase in terms of the debt-deflation theory of depressions. A similar analysis has been recently articulated by Richard Koo (2008)in which he describes Japan’s longstanding malaise as a “balance sheet recession” driven by the large Japanese corporations (keiretsu) and the banks as they pursue a strategy of deleveraging in order to restore their respective balance sheets from the accumulated debt incurred during the previous “bubble economy” of the 1980s.
    [Show full text]
  • Economics of the Crisis and the Crisis of Economics 1
    Arenas ekonomiska råd Rapport 2 Axel Leijonhufvud Economics of the Crisis and the Crisis of Economics Axel Leijonhufvud, professor emeritus UCLA and University of Trento Economics of the Crisis and the Crisis of Economics 2 Publicerat i oktober 2011 ©Författaren och Arena Idé Arena Idé är en del av Arenagruppen www.arenagruppen.se Arenagruppen Drottninggatan 83 111 60 Stockholm Tel (vx) 08‐789 11 60 Fax: 08‐411 42 42 Arenas ekonomiska råd är en verksamhet inom tankesmedjan Arena Idé. Syftet är att utifrån en radikal och progressiv utgångspunkt bredda den ekonomiska och politiska diskussionen i Sverige. Vi vill skapa en oberoende arena för kunskapsutveckling och förnyelse av den ekonomiska debatten. Arenas ekonomiska råd är ett samarbete mellan Arena Idé och Friedrich Ebert Stiftungs kontor i Stockholm. 3 Axel Leijonhufvud Economics of the Crisis and the Crisis of Economics1 Balance sheet troubles 5 Stability and Instability 5 Markets for produced goods 6 Financial markets 7 Leverage Dynamics: The build‐up 8 Instability and Economic Logic 9 Leverage Dynamics: Unravelling 10 Network structures and instability 11 Corridor stability and bifurcation 13 A Complex dynamical System 13 Financial bifurcation 15 Macroeconomics and Financial Economics: In Crisis? 16 ( 1 ) Unemployment in DSGE: An example 16 ( 2 ) Representative agent models, fallacies of composition and instabilities. 18 ( 3 ) Stable GE with “frictions” vs. instability. 18 ( 4 ) Violations of budget constraints and their consequences 20 ( 5 ) An external critique: Ontology 21 1 Lecture given at the Stockholm School of Economics, September 20, 2011 4 Balance sheet troubles This is not an ordinary recession. The problems unleashed by he financial crisis are far more serious and intractable than that.
    [Show full text]
  • My Plan to Save the World Leading Economist Richard Koo of Nomura Research Institute Sat Down
    My Plan to Save the World Leading economist Richard Koo of Nomura Research Institute sat down with TIE founder and editor David Smick to discuss balance sheet recessions and what policymakers need to do to rescue their economies. Smick: Your 2008 book, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession, was a very important work. What’s the difference between that effort and your most recent book, The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap: A Hazardous Road for the World Economy? What did you need to say that you hadn’t already said? Koo: The purpose of The Holy Grail was to make sure the United States would not make the same economic policy mistakes Japan had made, and would avoid suffering from the disease I call “balance sheet recession.” Against the advice of then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, Japan made a terrible mistake in 1997 in adopting a policy of fiscal austerity. The result was five consecutive quarters of negative growth and a complete breakdown of the banking system. It took Japan ten years to recover from that mistake. Although the United States avoided the mistake, the Europeans walked right into it, which is one reason I had to write the new book. Smick: You mentioned something about New York Times columnist Paul Krugman? Koo: Even though Paul later came to appreciate the need for fiscal stimu- lus, at the beginning he was still very much in favor of action on the mon- etary side. But such a recession—what I call a balance sheet recession, where the private sector got itself involved in a bubble, the bubble burst, RICHARD KOO liabilities remained, asset prices collapsed, and everyone had to repair their balance sheets—only happens once every several decades, but when it happens, monetary policy is largely useless.
    [Show full text]
  • Evenlode Investment View December 2014: from Macro to Micro - by Ben Peters
    Evenlode Investment View December 2014: From Macro To Micro - by Ben Peters Physics to finance I started my previous life as a physicist studying astrophysics. That’s the jumbo form of the science, dealing with how the largest structures in the universe behave. Latterly I became interested in the physics of the very small, quantum mechanics and nano-physics. The problem that physicists have is that the large and small branches of the very same discipline seem theoretically and behaviourally to be like distant cousins rather than the same person. A large part of the effort of modern physics is to determine how to join the very big picture with the very small. It must be possible, the big picture is just lots of little pictures joined together after all. I have been struck recently how we can face a similar challenge in investment. The news is full of the jumbo form of finance, the ‘macro’. People from pub-goers to politicians, to finance professionals love to discuss stats like interest rates, GDP, current account balances, capital formation rates and all manner of other stuff. However, we invest in individual companies, which follow their own particular microeconomics; all of these companies stuck together form the corporate sector, an important part of the macro picture (the others bits being governments and households). Often questions are posed with causality the other way around as well – “how does xyz macro factor affect the companies in your portfolio”? How we deal with the macro whilst operating in the micro at Evenlode is the topic at hand.
    [Show full text]