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Haiti's Elections

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Haiti's Elections Policy Briefing Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°9 Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 25 November 2005 Haiti’s Elections: The Case for a Short Delay I. OVERVIEW Haiti (MINUSTAH), to end the internal Haitian disputes and delaying tactics. Not only presidential but also parliamentary and local candidates have to The transitional Haitian government’s postponement of be finally confirmed, voting centres set up, ballots presidential and parliamentary elections to 27 December printed, voting officials hired and trained, and leaves it still unlikely that a new and legitimate international observers enlisted for the entire process government can be installed by the constitutionally from campaign through the inevitable appeal of the mandated target of 7 February 2006. Rather than rush results. the elections over the Christmas holidays – risking low If the process falters again, options begin with turnout, insufficient international observation, and not a new Security Council resolution mandating a enough time to fix serious organisational and security virtual international takeover of the election problems – the government and the international process. This should authorise – in the event that community should ensure a credible procedure by electoral misconduct involves corrupt practices, delaying the process one month, with the transfer of criminal links or support for violence – targeted power taking place in March 2006. sanctions against those responsible, including review of their travel visas, assets and financial Nearly 75 per cent of the eligible voters have been holdings in all countries. Given the many influential brought on to voter rolls, presidential and parliamentary Haitians with dual citizenship in the U.S., France campaigns are in motion, and a strong manager finally has and Canada, the threat of that action might well been appointed to orchestrate the election. Unfortunately, encourage the kind of cooperation that has been a convergence of other factors has offset those gains. Few lacking in the transition to date. of those registered voters have received their voter ID cards, and violence and insecurity are daily concerns Security. MINUSTAH needs to begin in many areas. In addition, last minute qualifying of implementing the existing Security Council presidential and parliamentary candidates has added to mandate for disarmament and demobilisation of public confusion, civic education has been minimal and armed groups, starting in carefully selected towns almost no one has been hired yet to count ballots. Those in the countryside and in urban neighbourhoods. failures have led to two postponements already. At the same time, the UN Police (UNPOL) should exercise their vetting authority under that mandate Delays and uncertainties have hindered campaigning. A and direct the Haitian National Police (HNP) final decision on qualified presidential candidates was to suspend and detain all officers identified by made only on 11 November. Two contenders were UNPOL as responsible for criminal violence. If the disallowed because of dual citizenship, while the delays transitional government continues to block that (some intentional) largely resulted from power struggles action, the Security Council will need to respond among elements of the transitional government, opposition by giving MINUSTAH full control of the police. by criminal and political gangs, and bureaucratic snags. The international community has been too slow in To strike a direct blow at the spoilers involved in finding the right mix of carrots and sticks to force not smuggling and customs evasion, at least one port merely timely but, far more importantly, credible elections. should be placed in international hands. That also might cut suspected financing of some political Once the first, essential step of a month’s postponement candidates by criminal networks. To demonstrate is taken, action is needed on three fronts for successful that MINUSTAH has the muscle for these actions, elections: the U.S. should announce it has designated an “over the horizon” force of ship-based Marines to Electoral restructuring. Immediate, meaningful assist if necessary. pressure is required from the international community, primarily the UN, the U.S., France, Political accords. If the elections are to be seen as Canada and the Latin American governments opening a new chapter of political opportunity, forming the UN Mission for the Stabilisation of Haiti’s Elections: The Case for a Short Delay Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°9, 25 November 2005 Page 2 efforts should be renewed to pursue a national governance pact. Reconciliation has been sorely missing from the transition process. Building on the election code of conduct the parties already have signed with MINUSTAH’s support, a focus on the post-election government could send a message that the old political stalemate has been Haiti’s Elections: The Case for a Short Delay Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°9, 25 November 2005 Page 3 international observers, political parties, and media.7 Security Council react if its concerns are not heeded. Canada announced an additional $6.25 million for Jacques Bernard, a prominent and respected banker, was international observers. The EU sent an advance team appointed director general on 18 October with instructions in early November and plans a substantial election to put the process in order. Unfortunately, his authority delegation.8 However, if the 27 December date holds, it is was not defined and he faces some resistance from CEP doubtful that anywhere near the numbers of international members.13 observers required and originally contemplated will actually be available. III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS The CEP’s role has been ambivalent at best.9 Made up of nine members representing parties, churches and other sectors, it is mandated to organise, oversee and A. CALENDAR “assure a transparent electoral process.”10 It was installed in June 2004 even though Fanmi Lavalas Since Crisis Group last reported,14 the national elections (FL), Aristide’s organisation and still a major political were postponed first from 6 November to 20 November group, refused to participate in selecting its members. 2005, then tentatively again to mid-December, and most recently to 27 December, with run-offs on 31 January. From the start, the CEP has been plagued by rivalry, This would allow almost no time for anticipated appeals bureaucratic ineptitude, technical shortcomings and 11 before the proposed 7 February inauguration of the new charges of partisanship and corruption. Perhaps the most president. damaging decision was to permit each counsellor also to manage a department of choice – from communications The initial postponements were essential since registration to electoral affairs and information technology – including was woefully slow, with barely 20 per cent of eligible the details of hiring and budget. The result has been a voters registered in late July (and almost none in the Port- breakdown in the process and a series of postponements, au-Prince slums), virtually no electoral community offices with the Security Council and UN Haiti Core Group established, and not even a tentative list of candidates. 12 expressing deep concern. The question is when does the Mid-December first round was seen as the latest possible date for the first round if the 7 February inauguration was to be kept.15 Many Haitians and internationals believe any further delay is unacceptable, partly because they have 7 Nearly $2 million has been designated for international a vested interest in maintaining the 7 February target as a observation. Nearly all the usual U.S. Agency for International sign of the “success” of the transition. Development (USAID) democracy partners are involved, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International But while all acknowledge it would be desirable to Republican Institute (IRI) and International Foundation for maintain the calendar, many in the international Election Systems (IFES). NDI is to assist domestic monitors community, inside Haiti and out, argue that for the and, with IRI, work with parties; IFES will do international elections to be credible and the outcome legitimate, a first observation. The bulk of direct support is for the UN and OAS. round at Christmas poses too many risks. Something of USAID fact sheet, 20 October 2005. this can be read into the Security Council president’s call 8 Crisis Group interview, Brussels, 8 November 2005. 9 on 18 October for a “feasible electoral calendar” rather Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, October 2005. than one tied to the inauguration date. With the 27 10 Decree for Elections of the year 2005, issued 11 February 2005. December proposal producing second thoughts, a “plan 11 Crisis Group interviews Port-au-Prince, October 2005. B” is being discussed in some quarters – a mid-January 12 Ministerial meeting of the Core Group on Haiti, New York, first round followed by a second round a month later and 17 September 2005, Summary of the Chair: “They...expressed inauguration by early March.16 its concern regarding its tight schedule, and underlined the need to avoid delays”. Statement of the president of the Security Council, 18 October 2005: “The Security Council notes with concern that important challenges to the preparations of the World Bank, and the International Development Bank (IDB). It elections remain yet to be overcome....calls for effective and has met three times. prompt decision making…and urges the Haitian authorities 13 Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, 19 October and to make full use of MINUSTAH’s advice and assistance...to 26 October 2005. finalising a feasible electoral calendar”. The Core Group was 14 Crisis Group Latin American/Caribbean Briefing N°8, established by the Secretary General at the request of members Can Haiti Hold Elections in 2005?, 3 August 2005. of the Security Council to bring together several advisory 15 Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, October 2005. groups within the UN dealing with Haiti, including the “Friends 16 Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, Washington, New of Haiti” made up of the U.S., France, Canada, Brazil, Chile and York City, November 2005.
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