Policy Briefing Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°10 Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 11 May 2006 Haiti after the Elections: Challenges for Préval’s First 100 Days I. OVERVIEW Deep structural challenges still threaten what may be Haiti’s last chance to extricate itself from chaos and despair, and action in the first 100 days is needed to René Préval’s inauguration on 14 May 2006 opens a convey to Haitians that a new chapter has been opened crucial window of opportunity for Haiti to move beyond in their history. political polarisation, crime and economic decline. The Security. It is essential to preserve the much 7 February presidential and parliamentary elections improved security situation in the capital since the succeeded despite logistical problems, missing tally sheets end of January. In large part the improvement stems and the after-the-fact reinterpretation of the electoral from a tacit truce declared by some of the main law. There was little violence, turnout was high, and the gangs – especially those in Cité Soleil – whose results reflected the general will. The 21 April second leaders support Préval. The new administration round parliamentary elections were at least as calm, and and MINUSTAH should pursue efforts to combine although turnout was lower, the electoral machinery reduced gang violence with rapid implementation of operated more effectively. During his first 100 days high-profile interventions to benefit the inhabitants in office, the new president needs to form a governing of the capital’s worst urban districts. Urgent action partnership with a multi-party parliament, show Haitians is needed to disarm and dismantle urban and rural some visible progress with international help and build armed gangs through a re-focused Disarmament, on a rare climate of optimism in the country. Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program. Préval has a strong base in the parliament, although his Policing. To deal with the threats posed by Lespwa party has no majority and will need to reach out organised criminal elements and drug-traffickers, to form legislative alliances if it is to make good the chance the Haitian National Police (HNP) need to be to overcome the divisive factors that have kept Haiti the reformed, professionalised and strengthened. The hemisphere’s poorest country and a perennial candidate government and MINUSTAH must agree on for failed state status. The new president also needs to implementation of the Security Council mandate choose a strong prime minister who is both committed to for UN vetting and supervision of the HNP. A first his program and acceptable to a broad range of opinion. priority will then be to purge it of corrupt officers Both are essential steps if the paralysis that has afflicted and break up the police cells with links to criminal recent parliaments is to be avoided. elements and political factions. That force, including the coast guard, will have to grow to some 15,000 The Préval presidency likewise is dependent on strong by the end of Préval’s term. international support. As president-elect he has travelled to the neighbouring Dominican Republic; to Brazil, Chile Political cohesion. Urgent measures are needed and Argentina; to the UN and to Washington; and to to help repair a social fabric badly damaged in Cuba, Venezuela and Canada. He has called for the UN recent years by political polarisation, deepening peacekeeping mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) to remain antipathies between the mass of the population and has appealed before the Security Council and the and the elite, worsening poverty and a generalised Organisation of American States (OAS) for long-term sense of hopelessness. These include: development aid. A ministerial conference in Brasilia on quickly meeting some of the high expectations 23 May is an opportunity to spell out his priorities to the of the Préval supporters but also reaching international community and will be followed by a donors out to organised middle and upper class and pledging conference in Port-au-Prince in July. Préval’s business sectors who voted against him but call for a 25-year governance and development pact is who in turn have the obligation now to meet ambitious but should generate at least a consensus on the him halfway; long-term nature of the peacebuilding enterprise. Haiti after the Elections: Challenges for Préval’s First 100 Days Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°10 Page 2 using the World Bank-sponsored Poverty by a transitional government headed by the then Supreme Reduction Strategy Plan to provide the Court chief justice, Boniface Alexandre, as president foundation for the national dialogue that never and Gérard Latortue as prime minister. The UN Security materialised under the transitional government, Council authorised deployment of a Multinational Interim one encompassing the substantial participation Force that was replaced in June 2004 by a Brazilian-led of the poor, grassroots community groups and peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH.1 In June 2005, women; and it was enlarged, and as of 31 March 2006 had 8,903 uniformed personnel – 7,151 troops, 1,752 police – discouraging at all costs any early return to supported by more than 2,000 local and international Haiti of former President Jean-Bertrand civilian personnel. It is headed by the Special Aristide, which would undermine the new Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Juan government and instantly reignite political Gabriel Valdés.2 turmoil. Economic renewal. Préval has declared his belief The transitional government failed to fully establish its that economic development is heavily dependent authority in most provinces, where during 2004 and on private investment, which requires at least the early 2005 armed former rebels and ex-members of the promise of improved infrastructure and the social Haitian Armed Forces (ex-FAd’H) acted unlawfully as and political stability provided by good governance security providers. From the end of September 2004, and solid institutions. A first step is to look at ways armed gangs were increasingly active in many of the to resolve the electricity supply crisis in the capital. capital’s poor neighbourhoods. Many of the gangs were Education and employment-generation also are manipulated by factions sympathetic to former President key areas for immediate investment, particularly Aristide, others by anti-Aristide groupings, drug-traffickers when students in some schools are being expelled or other criminal organisations and, in at least one instance, because their parents, hit by high prices and even elements of the business elite. Violent gang clashes economic stagnation, cannot pay for uniforms and over urban turf, politics and criminal enterprises and with school fees. MINUSTAH and the police (HNP) claimed hundreds of 3 Préval should press the World Bank, perhaps with lives. the support of the Inter-American Development Bank, to help put in place systems for economic In early 2005, MINUSTAH finally deployed country- governance that would allow him to make good wide and with a more robust approach ousted the armed on his promise to root out corruption in public former rebels and ex-FAd’H from provincial towns. The administration. He also needs to concentrate new transitional government began distributing compensation policies and programs on improving the lot of payments to former soldiers in lieu of back-pay for the ten Haiti’s poor majority, particularly the traditionally years since the FAd’H was disbanded. Disarmament and neglected rural poor. demobilisation of the ex-FAd’H has been extremely limited, however, so these groups retain a potential for Judicial Reform. All structures related to the rule destabilisation in some communities. The security situation of law need comprehensive reform if there is to be deteriorated in Port-au-Prince, as gang activity and serious investment in Haiti. A joint international and crime spread from the poor neighbourhoods, and for much national judicial panel should be formed to review of 2005 the city was in a state of siege. A new phenomenon quickly cases of political prisoners and those being – kidnapping for ransom – reached epidemic proportions detained without trial. Significant numbers of the in mid-year and again in December. 85 to 90 per cent of prisoners who have not yet been tried have been in jail longer than they would have Although the organisation of elections for a new president, been if given maximum sentences for their alleged a parliament, municipal mayors and local government crimes. Justice reform is a long-term task but it must councils and assemblies was one of the transitional start the day the Préval government takes office and government’s main tasks, the process ran into innumerable have full international support. difficulties. Half a dozen dates for the presidential and legislative elections were announced, then postponed. Partisan and personal rifts and disorganisation within the II. BACKGROUND nine-person Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) accounted Faced with the prospect of large-scale clashes following 1 UN Security Council Resolution 1529, 29 February 2004. an escalating political crisis, former President Aristide was 2 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/facts. pressured to leave the country on 29 February 2004, and 3 See Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Report N°13, his Fanmi Lavalas party government collapsed, replaced Spoiling Security in Haiti, 31 May 2005. Haiti after the Elections: Challenges for Préval’s First 100 Days Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°10 Page 3 for most delays. There were initially dysfunctional refusals Préval’s prospects were enhanced by disqualification – on to coordinate with the OAS, which controlled voter grounds of dual citizenship, forbidden by the constitution registration, and with MINUSTAH, which was responsible for elected officials – of Dumarsais Siméus, a multi- for security, provided technical electoral assistance, millionaire Haitian-American businessman popular due to managed the finances, hired personnel and possessed his ‘rags-to-riches’ history and lack of ties with established virtually all logistical resources.