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Communication Control and Its Impact on Political Legitimacy in Four Asian Cities Chua Puay Hoe

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Communication Control and Its Impact on Political Legitimacy in Four Asian Cities Chua Puay Hoe 1 Communication Control and its Impact on Political Legitimacy in Four Asian Cities Chua Puay Hoe Royal Holloway, University of London PhD Thesis 2 Declaration of Authorship I, Chua Puay Hoe, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. Signed: ______________________ Date: __8/8/2020______________ 3 Abstract This thesis examines the relationship between perceptions of communication control and political legitimacy. Four Asian cities (Beijing, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taipei) are compared and analysed as these societies have different levels of governmental influence in the media landscape while having similarities in other aspects. Importantly, the media systems in the societies to be analysed are often ranked vastly different by international civil society organizations. While vastly different in media control policy, these societies are frequently analysed together as they are at similar level of economic development and frequently seen to be of Confucian heritage culture that emphasizes on collectivism and deference to authority. Political legitimacy is the acceptance of and willingness to obey the government, which ultimately is based on the perception of the populace. Legitimacy can be performance-based (ability to deliver the physical needs) or process-based (sound governance system and procedures that are accepted by the people). Freedom of expression and media freedom would be critical elements in process-based legitimacy. Some studies concluded that a controlled media system would result in a trusting public supportive of the government while others show an inverse relationship between media control and political participation. Increase in political participation have been shown to increase political support and hence political legitimacy. So how does the level of communication control affect legitimacy? A survey (n=830) was conducted with university students from the four cities and OLS regression models are utilised for analysis. Perception of economic performance predicts support of government, hence supporting the view of performance legitimacy. Perception of the importance of media freedom predicts support of government for Beijing’s respondents with those placing less importance to media freedom being more supportive of the government. This suggest that respondents from Beijing have internalised and accepted media control as necessary for the country. Assessment of higher level of freedom speech in general significantly predict higher support for the government in Beijing, Singapore and Taipei. This suggest that communication controls that impact on individuals will lower political support. Data from Hong Kong displays quite different results from other cities, suggesting that there are conflicting values amongst the respondents as Hong Kong undergoes transitions in its political landscape. This research also conducted focus groups in the four cities. The data shows that third person effect is common in all cities as most respondents think that some media control is needed as “others” may not have the literacy or ability to critique information. Scepticism is also a common theme across the four cities with respondents from Beijing and Singapore being sceptical of media while respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei are sceptical of the government. This thesis argues that a moderate level of scepticism is beneficial for process legitimacy as scepticism towards the government would push people to monitor the government. Respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei show more willingness to consider contentious policy and think that government cover ups are unlikely with a free press. However, being highly sceptical of media hinders crisis communication and places undue pressure on performance legitimacy. Finally, implications within the context of widespread disinformation and economic slowdown for the cities are discussed. 4 Content Page Chapter 1 Literature Review 5 1.2 Political Dimension 8 1.3 Political Communication 18 1.4 Civic Orientation and Public Sphere 26 1.5 Media Freedom and New Media Ecology 30 1.6 Conclusion 37 Chapter 2 Why Compare 39 2.2 Justification for the selection of cities 42 Chapter 3 Overview of China Context 47 3.2 Citizenship Education 63 3.2 Media 68 Chapter 4 Overview of Singapore Context 82 4.2 Citizenship Education 89 4.3 Media 92 Chapter 5 Overview of Hong Kong Context 102 5.2 Citizenship Education 110 5.3 Media 113 Chapter 6 Overview of Taiwan Context 117 6.2 Citizenship Education 123 6.3 Media 125 Chapter 7 Research Design 132 7.2 Survey Method 144 7.3 Findings and Analysis 145 7.4 Conclusion 149 Chapter 8 Focus Group 153 8.1 The Paradox of Media Freedom 153 8.2 Focus Group Method 155 8.3 Findings and Analysis 159 8.4 Conclusion 191 Chapter 9 Discussion & Conclusion 198 9.1 Legitimacy and Media Freedom 198 9.2 Different Challenges 200 9.3 Civic Responsibility 204 9.4 Scepticism 206 9.5 Way Forward 210 9.6 Future Research 212 Figures and Tables 214 Bibliography 227 5 Chapter 1 1.1 Introduction “Get rid of censorship. The Chinese people want freedom.” The New York Times reported protesters in Guangzhou, China carried that banner at a demonstration that was sparked off by excessive censorship in January 2013. Various other news agencies also reported protests against censorship recently (See for example in Wong, 2013 and BBC, 2013a). Given the widespread use of censorship in China, some might expect the Chinese people to have grown accustomed to censorship. In a quantitative analysis of 44 states, Norris and Inglehart (2010) found that the people in states with restrictive media environment tend to be more supportive of their government as there are no opposing messages that the people in pluralistic environments would face. How then can we explain the increasing protests against state censorship in China? Chen and Shi (2001) on the other hand found that the single editorial policy in China had a negative impact on political trust in the post-Tianamen period. In other words, the propaganda policies failed to manipulate people’s political attitude or shore up political support. For the people in societies with limited media freedom, are the perceptions towards political communication control changing? Restriction of political communication by the government is commonly viewed as unacceptable and against the will of the people. Literature of various fields such as communication, culture and democracy frequently theorised and expound on the importance of freedom of expression in society. In the literature for democracy, many have written on the importance of free speech for citizenship. The unencumbered discussion of public affairs in public sphere is argued to have a positive impact on citizenship. However, the literature on political discussions, according to Conover, Searing and Crewe (2002), is mostly “sustained by political theorists in an empirical vacuum”. In addition, would the process of public discussion that is part of the foundation of democracy also result in positive impact in different governance systems or is it an inculcated value only beneficial to democracy? Other 6 commonly given rationales are that freedom of expression allows the governed to participate and communicate their needs to the government (Norris, 2000; Scheufele, Shanahan, & Kim, 2002) and it could also act as a counterbalance towards those in power by being able to expose misuse of power (Siegle, Weinstein, & Halperin, 2004; Chowdhury, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2010). However, within East Asia, media freedom appears to be the exception rather than the norm. Reporters Without Borders (2012a) declared “Censorship On The Rise In Asia” in its 2012 report on press freedom while in Freedom House’s 2012 report on freedom of the press, most Asian countries are classified as “Partly Free” or “Not Free”, with the exceptions of Japan and Taiwan. In the report on internet freedom by Reporters Without Borders (2012b), 10 out of 12 countries listed as “Internet enemies” are from Asia or the Middle East. The most recent study on internet filtering by OpenNet Initiative (2011) also reported a “trend of increasing controls in the context of growing connectivity is emerging in the region as a whole” (p.233). With increasingly more voices, both outside and within East Asia, calling for media freedom in East Asia, there is thus a need for closer examination of perceptions on political communication control and its impact on governance within the context of East Asia. Keeping in mind that there are countries in East Asia that are authoritarian or of mixed regime, an analytical approach via a liberal democratic lens would thus be incongruous. However, regardless of the type of regime, many would agree that all contemporary states are based on or influenced by the principle of popular sovereignty that requires the consent, explicit or otherwise, of the people to stay in power. Based on this view, popular perceptions on legitimacy of the government would affect the stability and efficacy of governments. Perception of legitimacy is also theorised to increase compliance with government policies and studies have found empirical data supporting the claim (Levi & Sacks, 2009; Tyler & 7 Huo, 2002). As for contributing factors of legitimacy, “good governance, poverty reduction and provision of civil liberties” (Gilley, 2006, p.518) are some of the factors found to have an impact. Other theorists differentiate contributing factors
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