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The Project Gutenberg Ebook of Sextus Empiricus and Greek Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism A Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Bern By Mary Mills Patrick Cambridge Deighton Bel & Co. 1899 2 Preface The following treatise on Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism has been prepared to supply a need much felt in the English language by students of Greek philosophy. For while other schools of Greek philosophy have been exhaustively and critically discussed by English scholars, there are few sources of information available to the student who wishes to make himself familiar with the teachings of Pyrrhonism. The aim has been, accordingly, to give a concise presentation of Pyrrhonism in relation to its historical development and the Scepticism of the Academy, with critical references to the French and German works existing on the subject. The time and manner of the connection of Sextus Empiricus with the Pyrrhonean School has also been discussed. In study of the works of Sextus, the Greek text of Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, 1842, has been used, with frequent consultation of the text of J.A. Fabricius, 1718, which was taken directly from the existing manuscripts of the works of Sextus. References to Diogenes Laertius and other ancient works have been carefully verified. The principal modern authors consulted are the following: Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie, II. Auf., Hamburg, 1836-38. Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, III. Auf., Leipzig, 1879-89. Lewes, History of Philosophy, Vol. I., London, 1866. Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, IV. ed., translated by Morris, 1871. Brochard, Les Sceptiques Grecs, Paris, 1877. Brochard, Pyrrhon et le Scepticism Primitive, No. 5, Ribot's. Revue Phil., Paris, 1885. Saisset, Le Scepticism Aenésidème-Pascal-Kant, Paris, 1867. Chaignet, Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs, Paris, 1887-90. Haas, Leben des Sextus Empiricus, Burghausen, 1882. 3 Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems beiden Alten, Berlin, 1884. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften, Leipzig, 1877-83. Pappenheim, Erläuterung zu des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneischen Grundzügen, Heidelberg, 1882. Pappenheim, Die Tropen der Greichischen Skeptiker, Berlin, 1885. Pappenheim, Lebensverhältnisse des Sextus Empiricus, Berlin, 1887. Pappenheim, Der angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos, Berlin, 1887. Pappenheim, Der Sitz der Schule der Griechischen Skeptiker, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, I. 1, S. 47, 1887. Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus, London, 1869. My grateful acknowledgments are due to Professor Dr. Ludwig Stein, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bern, for valuable assistance in relation to the plan of the work and advice in respect to the best authorities to be consulted, and for its final revision. 4 CONTENTS Chapter 1 The historical relations of Sextus Empiricus Introductory paragraph. –The name of Sextus Empiricus. His profession. – The time when he lived. – The place of his birth.--The seat of the Sceptical School while Sextus was at its head. –The character of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Chapter 2 The position and aim of pyrrhonic skepticism The subject-matter of the Hypotyposes. –The origin of Pyrrhonism.--The nomenclature of Pyrrhonism. – Its criterion. – Its aim. – epochê and ¢tarax…a.– The standpoint of Pyrrhonism. Chapter 3 The sceptical tropes Origin of the name. –The ten Tropes of epochê. –The First Trope. –The Second Trope. –The Third Trope. –The Fourth Trope.--The Fifth Trope. – The Sixth Trope. –The Seventh Trope. –The Eighth Trope. –The Ninth Trope. –The Tenth Trope. –The five Tropes of Agrippa. –The two Tropes. –The Tropes of Aenesidemus against Aetiology. Chapter 4 Aenesidemus and the philosophy of Heraclitus Statement of the problem. –The theory of Pappenheim. –The theory of Brochard. –Zeller's theory. –The theory of Ritter and Saisset. –The theory of Hirzel and Natorp. – Critical examination of the subject. Chapter 5 Critical examination of pyrrhonism 5 Pyrrhonism and Pyrrho. – Pyrrhonism and the Academy. Strength and weakness of Pyrrhonism. –The subject-matter of the Hypotyposes. – The origin of Pyrrhonism. –The nomenclature of Pyrrhonism. – Its criterion. – Its aim: ™poc» and ¢tarax…a . –The standpoint of Pyrrhonism. 6 Chapter 1 The Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus Interest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiricus in recent times, especially, one may say, since the date of Herbart. There is much in the writings of Sextus that finds a parallel in the methods of modern philosophy. There is a common starting-point in the study of the power and limitations of human thought. There is a common desire to investigate the phenomena of sense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to the lower animals, and a common interest in the theory of human knowledge. While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works would form a possible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophical thought, we cannot carry the analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as a whole lacked the essential element of all philosophical progress, which is a belief in the possibility of finding and establishing the truth in the subjects investigated. Before beginning a critical study of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, and the light which they throw on the development of Greek Scepticism, it is necessary to make ourselves somewhat familiar with the environment in which he lived and wrote. We shall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from which he regarded philosophical questions. Let us accordingly attempt to give some details of his life, including his profession, the time when he lived, the place of his birth, the country in which he taught, and the general aim and character of his works. Here, however, we encounter great difficulties, for although we possess most of the writings of Sextus well preserved, the evidence which 7 they provide on the points mentioned is very slight. He does not give us biographical details in regard to himself, nor does he refer to his contemporaries in a way to afford any exact knowledge of them. His name even furnishes us with a problem impossible of solution. He is called Sšxtoj Ð ™mpeirikÒj by Diogenes Laertius1: `HrodÒtou d di»kouse Sšxtoj Ð ™mpeirikÒj oá kaˆ t¦ dška tîn skeptikîn kaˆ ¥lla k£llista' Sšxtou d di»kouse Satorn‹noj Ð KuqÁnaj, ™mpeirikÒj kaˆ aÙtÒj. Although in this passage Diogenes speaks of Sextus the second time without the surname, we cannot understand the meaning otherwise than that Diogenes considered Sextus a physician of the Empirical School. Other evidence also is not wanting that Sextus bore this surname. Fabricius, in his edition of the works of Sextus, quotes from the Tabella de Sectis Medicorum of Lambecius the statement that Sextus was called Empiricus because of his position in medicine2. Pseudo-Galen also refers to him as one of the directors of the Empirical School, and calls him Sšxtoj Ð ™mpeirikÒj3 His name is often found in the manuscripts written with the surname, as for example at the end of Logic II4. In other places it is found written without the surname, as Fabricius testifies, where Sextus is mentioned as a Sceptic in connection with Pyrrho. The Sceptical School was long closely connected with the Empirical School of medicine, and the later Pyrrhoneans, when they were physicians, as was often the case, belonged for the most part to this school. Menedotus of Nicomedia is the first Sceptic, however, who is formally spoken of as an 1 Diog. Laert. IX. 12, 116. 2 Fabricius Testimonia, p. 2. 3 Pseudo-Galen Isag. 4; Fabricius Testimonia, p. 2. 4 Bekker Math. VIII. 481. 8 Empirical physician,5 and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was also an Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and Theodas is difficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass agree that it was about 150 A.D.6 After the time of these two physicians, who were also each in turn at the head of the Sceptical School,7 there seems to have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to believe that this alliance existed until the time of Sextus. The difficulty in regard to the name arises from Sextus' own testimony. In the first book of the Hypotyposes he takes strong ground against the identity of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in medicine. Although he introduces his objections with the admission that “some say that they are the same,” in recognition of the close union that had existed between them, he goes on to say that “Empiricism is neither Scepticism itself, nor would it suit the Sceptic to take that sect upon himself”,8 for the reason that Empiricism maintains dogmatically the impossibility of knowledge, but he would prefer to belong to the Methodical School, which was the only medical school worthy of the Sceptic. “For this alone of all the medical sects, does not proceed rashly it seems to me, in regard to unknown things, and does not presume to say whether they are comprehensible or not, but it is guided by phenomena.9 It will thus be seen that the Methodical School of medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism which is closer than that of the other medical sects.”10 5 Diog. IX. 12, 115. 6 Brochard Op. cit. Livre IV. p. 311. 7 Diog. IX. 12, 116. 8 Hyp. I. 236. 9 Hyp. I. 237. 10 Hyp. I. 241. 9 We know from the testimony of Sextus himself that he was a physician. In one case he uses the first person for himself as a physician,11 and in another he speaks of Asclepius as “the founder of our science,”12 and all his illustrations show a breadth and variety of medical knowledge that only a physician could possess. He published a medical work which he refers to once as „atrik¦ Øpomn»mata,13 and again as ™mpeirik¦ Øpomn»mata.14 These passages probably refer to the same work,15 which, unfortunately for the solution of the difficult question that we have in hand, is lost, and nothing is known of its contents.
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