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Introduction by Tugrul Keskin and Najın al-Din Youseti Reflections on Democracy, Non-Violence and Political Change in han by N ader Hashem i -Page 3 An Interview with hanian Political Scientist Hossein Bashiriyeh by Danny Pastel -Page 6 The role of religious agents in modern by Wladiıllir van Wilgenburg- Page 24 Identity Narratives among Second-Generatian Iranians ın the United States by Sahar Sadeghi - Page 28 Writers' Inferno, Ivay laDatseva-Page 32 h·an-Yemen Relations and Regional Implications by Ladan Yazdian- Page 39 Reconstructions, Reform and Ahınadinejad: h·an 's Political Revolutions 1989-2009 by Marcus W. Darsen-Page 44

Photojournalist: S asan Afsoosi - [email protected]

Thirty Years after the : goveınment, but the controversy was little more than Islam, Democracy and . the Crisis of eplıemeral and posed no serious challenge to the Legitimacy governınent's autlıority . However, the latest allegations and the ensuing protests in Telıran and The 2009 presidential election in h·an marks an epoch other ınajor cities struck an unprecedented blow to not only in Iranian history but in the Middle East as the legitiınacy of the entire political system, which whole. For the fırst time after the 1979 revolution, the has over the past three decades relied on people's three defeated candidates with extensive votes to meet the exigencies of a republic. revolutionary credentials openly challenged the validity of the election, accusing the government of While the protests started with a siınple slogan massive fraud that had resulted in the reelection of - "where is my vote?"-they ostensibly targeted the incurnbent president Mahmud Ahmadinejad. To ınore than a seemingiy fi"audulent election. Indeed be sure, the previous election (2005) was not entirely they called into question the Iegitimacy of a devoid of controversy as the candidate Mehdi government that could no langer be trusted with Karıub i had leveled fraud accusations against the safeguarding people's rights and interests. The 2009

[ ı ] Counter-Revolution and Revolt in Iran and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran, by " introducing democratic An Interview with Iranian Political theories and ideas to a generatian of Iranian Scientist Hossein Bashiriyeh intellectuals and political figures who latter played significant roles in the democı·atic and reform By Danny Postel mavement. "(2)

Author, Reading 1'Legitimation Crisis" in Telu·an Sadly for those of us not literate in Persian, only one http://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssjte/metadata.epl? of his numerous books is available in English: the mode=synopsis&bookk~y=211444 monumental State and Revolution in Iran, a largely Contributing Editor, Logos: A Journal of Modern Gramscian analysis of the Iranian Revolution Society & Culture published in 1984 - alas, Jang out of print and http://www. logosjournal.com/ extreınely difficult to find (only a single used copy is dannypostel@gmai I. com available viaAmazon and not one via Powell's). (3)

Hossein Bashiriyeh is one of His books in Persian include Revolution and Political post-revolutionary Iran 's key Mobilization (1991 ), Political Sociology (1993), political thinkers. Known as the Histmy of Political Thought in the 20th Century father of political sociology in [Volume I, Marxist Thought, Volume ll, Liberal and Iran, he has influenced, through Conservative Thought] (1994-96), The Kingdam of his voluminous writings and his Reason (1993 ), Civil Society and Political 24 years teaching political Development in Iran (1998), New Theories in Political science at the University of Science (1999), Sociology of Modernity (1999), The (1983-2007), both the State and Civil Society (2000), 20th Century Theories study and practice of politics in of Culture (2000), Obstacles to Political Development Iran. in Iran (200 1), Lessons on Democracy for Everyone In his recent book Iran 's (2001), Political Science for Eve1yone (2001), An Intel/ectual Revolution, Mehran Kamı·ava deseribes Introduction to the Political Sociology of Iran: The Bashiriyeh as "one of the country's most influential Era of the Islamic Republic (2002), and Transition to and most serious thinkers and analysts." Bashiriyeh's Democracy: Theoretical Issues (2006). two and a half decades as a scholar and mentar in Iran ' Kaınrava writes His translations from English to Persian include Hobbes's Leviathan, Barrington Moore's Social have left indelible marks on successive generations of Origins of Dietatarship and Democracy, Hubert politica1 science graduates, many of whom have gone Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow's Michel Foucault, Beyand on to become academics themselves or have secuı·ed Structuralism and Hermeneutics, and Robeıt Holub's policy-making positions in the state bureaucracy.(l) Jiirgen Habermas: Critic inthePublic Sphere.(4)

Bashiriyeh has figuı·ed critically in Iranian public life, Among the subjects Bashiriyeh explores in his 2003 says Ali Mirsepassi, author of Intellectual Discourse essay calleetion Reason in Politics aı·e the Frankfurt School, liberalism and anarchism, Weber and Islam,

[ 6] and class struggles, political ideology and identity­ basicaily authoritaı·ian electoral theocracy had been building after the Iranian Revolution. ınore or less experiencing a number of crises, a:ffecting its bases of power: ideological-authoritarian regiınes, In the summer of 2007 Bashiriyeh was fıred from the generally speaking, may develop erises in the sphere of University ofTehran (the handiwork of the "Committee their ideologkal legitimacy, adıninistrative efficiency, of Cultw·al Revolution and Pmges of Universities"). internal elite cohesion, and coercive capacity. If all (5) The previous year, President Ahmadinejad had these erises occw· at the same time, the situation may be chaUenged Iran's university students to "scream" and deseribed as revolutionary; out of these erises emerge ask, "Why are there liberal and secular professors in the necessaıy ingredients for a political opposition too, universities?"( 6) i.e. mass discontent, ideology, leadership and organization. Bashiriyeh has since taken a position in the Department of Political Science at , where he So for a revolutionary situation to devetop at least eight teaches courses on Middle Easteın Political Systeıns , factors are required: the fom regime factoı·s (erises) and Islamic Political Thought, Social Theoıy and the the four revolutionaıy-movement factors. Obviously all Middle East, the Politics of Modern Iran and these factors aı·e dialectically interrelated and enhance Comparative Revolutions. each other. In the case of the Iranian regime before the election, I would say that a considerable degree of the The following interview was conducted via e-maiJ first two erises bad alı·eady come about, but the erisis of between Jw1e and August of 2009. unity and cohesion had been contained sirice 2004, and there was no erisis of coercion or doruination at all. I Danny Postel: As the anthor of a classic study of the think that the afteımath of the eleetion signifıed a quite Iranian Revolution (The State and Revolution in Iran), unprecedented erisis of elite cohesion and unity, :further and given your recent comparative work on intensifying the erises of legitimacy and efficiency. "transitional situations," what are your impressions of Never before had an internal rift caused such a laı'ge­ what's been happening in Iran in the afterınath of the scale mass mobilization of opposition. June 12 presidential election?2 Some have argued that we are witnessing "a great eınan~ipatoıy event" (Slavoj In the specifıc case of the Iranian regime, a ınore or less Zizek)(7); "something quite extraordinaıy, perhaps chronic erisis of legitimacy had been caused by a even a social revolution" (Hamid Dabashi); a "velvet number of factors and developments. Four major coup" (Anoush Ebteshami); "the fınal acts of a ca uses can be identified: (1) the rise of a mo re protracted war for the control of the Iranian republican interpretation of the dominant Islanlist economy" (Behzad Yaghınaian); even an atteınpt to ideology; (2) the contradictory nature of the abolish the people (Pepe Escobar).(8) How would you Constitution, in terms of seeking to combine theocratic characterize the situation? and democratic principles of legitimacy; (3) an increasingly noticeable gap between ruling-class Hossein Bashiriyeh: I think that the aftermath of the practice and its legitimizing ideals; and (4) a w idening election constituted a catalyst for a potentially gap between public opinioıı and official ideology as a revolutionaıy situation facing a government caught in a result of the increasing secularization of social values nwnber of crises. More specifically, it has signifıed a and attitudes. In any case even if the elected offices fatal erisis of cohesion and unity. Of couı·se the may be said to be periodically legitimized by popular

[ 7] elections (although elections are controlled), the Ayatollah Khomeini himseli But as mentioned, never unelected offices are no doubt subject to an erosion of before 2009 had internal divisions led to such a mass legitimacy as a result of the foıu· factors I've outlined. political mobilization and ınassive repression. From As I will explain later, I think the grave erisis of the beginning, the lslamic state witnessed internal cohesion and unity resulting from the June election divisions over economic policy, the interpretation of has also actualized the wıderlying erisis of legitimacy. Islan1ic law, emphasis on the Islamic vs. republican nature of the Constitution, and so on. In the 1980s two In terms of a erisis of efficient management, I would parties emerged: the Paı-cy of Iradition and the Party argue that the Islamist government has suffered from a of Klıomeinists; the former supported non­ chronic erisis of effıciency throughout its rule; the intervention in economic affairs and a traditionaHst more recent intensification of the erisis since 2005 has jurisprudence; the latter advocated economic resulted from irregular and erratic economic policies intervention and redistribution, as well as a dynamic and practices, political nepotism and general jurisprudence - but this division was contained as a ınismanagement. The adoption of a politically useful result ofKhoıneini's arbitration. discourse of alms-based Islamic welfare policy by the Fundaınentalist faction in power has, according to Then in the early 1990s a new division emerged expert views, caused economic disruption, inflation, within the Paı'ty of Islamic Iradition itself, as the recession and more unemployment. Irregular ruling elite under Rafsanjani sought to modernize the redistributive policies, price intervention, and a Es laınic state and to readjust it to the requirements of reduction in interest rates have contributed to the globalization. That internal division did not lead to critica! situation. Obviously in the absence of a erisis popular mobilization, as the ıuling elite succeeded in of cohesion and elite unity, econornic problems may containing the rift as an internal affair. The division have no political outcornes, but as rifts develop within within the ruling paıties and elites was intensified the regime, they may expand the possibility of from 1997, when the old Khomeinists came to power political mobilization by opposition forces. However, and sought to democratize the Islanıic state by in the actual mass political mobilization in the augmenting its republican aspects. That division led to aftermath of the eleeti on, the motivating force was not the political activation and mobilization of new the economic conditions, but rather what I consider to ıniddle classes, the rise of new parties and violent be a sense of political frustration and ineffıcacy confrontation. However, from 2004 the core derical mainly on the paıt of the urban middle classes, who elite, led by the office of Leadership, sought to found their vote aııd their political paıticipation to be minimize internal divisions by ousting the supporters of no consequence in changing the political situation. of modernization and deınocratization from power and The mass mobilization resulted from a gap between by creating new political formations and alllaı1ces, rising political expectations and the outcome of the especially the Party of Fundaınentalism (Paıty of e]ection - a gap which has become very intolerable Principles). The power bl oc since 2004 has been indeed. occupied by an alliance of the Fundamentalist and Traditionalist-Conservative parties to the detriment of But the real meaning of the a:ftermath of the June the Reformists. Given the controlled nature of populaı· election seems to me to lie in the unprecedented elections in the country, the ruling factions have now intensification of a erisis of cohesion and unity. Such a sougbt to retain their positions by what the reformists erisis had emerged aııd persisted in the 1980s under regaı·d as an electoral coup followed by repression.

[ 8] •

What is meant by an electoral coup is in fact a Iate authoritarian regiıne - does not come about easily or "political abortion" or an "abortive coup" preventing frequently; it is only rarely and under exceptional the reformist baby from coming into life. circumstances that political leaders or paıties succeed in call ing people onto the streets in Imge numbers, as So on the whole I think developınents since June 12 happened for a few days following the Jwıe 12 can be understood and explained in terms of a grave election in Iran. Given this, we need to know what erisis of elite cohesion and unity, which has not been those exceptional circumstances and conditions that solved by arbitration as in previous episodes, but has make mass ınobilization possible aı·e. been met with violence and repression. GeneraJly there is little doubt about the vital importance of internal Since mass mobilization is a raı·e occmrence in the divisions and opposition for change under ideological politics of authoritarian regimes, it foUows that its regimes such as the Islaınic Republic, paıticularly in outbreak cannot be explained by reference to the absence of any organized external opposition. "ordinaıy" situations prevailing under those regimes, However, the issue of disunity has not led to a erisis of such as economic problems and crises, goveınment coercion and domination; there are no apparent rifts incapacity, general mass discontent, or political witbin the armed forces, no riva( military force, and repression. Although these may constitute the eventual the niling elite's will to power and repression seems to ingredients of the mobilization episode, the be intact. But erises of cohesion cause other problems mobilization itself requires spec ifıc mechanisms in for ideological regimes, such as fmther undeımining order to coın e about; it is through these mechanisms regiıne legitimacy, paving the way for the organization that those raw elements may be aıticulated. As the of.popular discontent, and providing leadership and history of mass mobilization shows everywhere, the ideology, as other necessary ingredients of a phenoınenon is not a mechanical one, resulting from revolutionary situation. soıne "objectively" undesirable socio-economic and political conditions per se; it is the "subjective" At any rate, the aftermath of the June election can be chaııneling of those objective conditions which is the understood in terms of the intensifıcat i on of internal key element. divisions and polarization between ıuling factions. But unlike previous episodes, it has.Ied to the mobilization In general, three rather comp l ementaıy theories have of popular opposition on a very large scale. The been advanced in order to explain why and bow mass higlıest degree of internal division in the regime's rnobilization becomes possible: first the theory that histoıy has now been reached, causing polarization, regaı·ds mass mobilization as a raı·e and exceptional confrontation, and an expanding circle of "counter­ psychosocial or existential condition which results revolution." from the development of an intolerable gap between populaı· expectations and the possibility of ıneeting DP: As you observe, never before in its 30-year them. From this psychosocial perspective, for histoıy had the Islamic Repubüc seen such mass example, persistent poverty or persistent prosperity do political mobilization. So why now, in your view? not lead to mass action; rather it is going fi:om prosperity to poverty or from poverty to prosperity that BB: Obviously mass mobilization or the ınobiüzat ion creates the gap between expectations and the of a large number of people for political pmposes - possibility of meeting them. According to this faınous especially in a polarized form and under an Davies J-Cuı·ve theory, collective action may take

[ 9] place at the point where the gap is most intolerable. So As the unexpected election results were announced, the the theoretical dispute and debate concerniııg whether it atınosphere changed completely and a mood of public is abject poverty or prosperity that leads to insurrection despair and anger replaced the exuberant mood of hope is thus resolved. Anather major theoretical debate has and expectation. The focus on a single issue - the been going on concerning whether mass collective rigging of the election - polarized the population, action becomes possible in a mass society or in a leading to mass street demonstrations against the society experiencing the development of a ci vii society; manipulation of the election. The fırst week after the this dispute is similarly resolved in the themy of election witnessed the height of the gap mentioned segınented civil society, according to which there is no above. The leaders of the movement were also possibility for mass political mobilization in arepressed successful in concentı·ating and focusing on the single mass society on the one hand, and there is no need for issue of fraudulence. The second week, however, such a ınobilization in a fully grown and developed witnessed a rather different situation as the Supreme civil society, on the other; so it is under conditions of Leader vowed, in the Friday prayers, to suppress any segınented civil societies that mass mobilization of the street demonstration and endorsed the official election type we have witnessed in Iran may come about. A results as accurate. So on the wbole the gap resulting third, political, theoıy relates the possibilily of mass from rising political expectations and bopes for action and mobilization to internal ruling elite disunity. freedom and change, on the one hand, and the anger, In the specific case of Iran in June 2009, a combination disappointment and indignation caused by the of these three factors nıade the large-scale mobilization manipulation of the election, on the other, was the ofthe people possible. reason for the mass mobilizations which have had no precedent during the 30 yeaı·s of Islamic ıule in the First, an intolerable gap resulted from nsıng countıy. In the weeks since, however, the sense of expectations before the election and violent repression anger has been gı·adually replaced by a sense of feaı·, as after the election. The result was public indignation and the security forces have shown no sign of mercy in anger on an unprecedented scale. Obviously the rising ruthlessly and violently cıushing any public gathering expectations were political in nature, not economic (as or demonstı·ation. in the theory nıentioned above). For a few weeks, a large, mainly urban middle-class-based socio-political Regardiııg the second factor - the civil society vs. movement emerged around the two reformİst mass society debate - I would argue that candidates (Moussavi and Karroubi), mobilizing a large developments during the so-called Reconstruction segınent of the population in the name of the Green Period from 1989 to 1997, as well as the Reform Period Movement for reform and change. The period of the fl·oın 1997 to 2005, had to a certain degree paved the electoral campaign was marked by festivities, public way for a slow tı·ansition from mass society to a discussions and gatherings, heated debates, hopeful segmented civil society. The emergence of civil projections for change, intriguing TV debates between associations, independent student organizations, presidential candidates, popular excitement, relative associations of writers and journalists, a rather press freedom, critique of goveınment performance, independent press and increasing independence of aı·ts political publicity and propaganda, and the reactivation and culture from government control were all signs of ofpolitical groupings and paı·ties. this transition from mass to civil society, albeit in a circurnscribed way.

[lO] A number of similar (though much more limited) perception was that the movement enjoyed the tacit collective actions and mass protests had already support of soıne Conservative parties who had become occW'red during the Reconstruction and Refoım periods disenchanted with the economic and foreign policies of (like the uprisings in Islamshahr, Qazvin, Mashad and the ruling Fundamentalist faction. And finally, on a the 1999 Student Uprising, known as 18 Tir), but the third level, signs of some emerging divisions within the recent mass ınobilization was very different in nature, ru li ng Fundamentalist faction, in parliament and scope, intensity of government reaction, and outside, and reluctance on the part of many particularly in terms of its consequences in discJosing Fundaınentalist MPs to support the cunent president's the real character of the polltical system for the candidacy, might have been fuıther encow·aging for the majority of the people. The violent confrontation took suppoıte r s of the opposition ınovement. Of COW'Se, place on a mass scale; the lines of division between the following the announcement of the eleeti on results, and government and the public opposition were clearly w ith increasing polarization of attitudes, some of those drawn; and a state of disillusion came about. On the more secondary rifts would disappear as the other hand, it seems that the civil-society base of the Conservative and TraditionaUst paıties would ıush to mass mobilization was not wide or strong enough to the supporl of the govemment and the position of the sustai.n the opposition mavement - though the role of Supreme Leader at a time of deep erisis threatening the political repression has been much more decisive ın very existence of the Islamic regime. this regard. On the whole, although such an occasion for mass ı Finally, the widening divisions within the ıuling elites ınobilizat i on had been dreamt of by the extemal or and popular awareness thereof were highly effective in even internal opposition groups for a long time, it had generating the public outbuı·st. Internal disunity took not been planned in any way; rather, it was the result of place on a number of levels: fırst, despite sharp a rare political conjuncture - as is the case with differences between the ruling Fundamentalists and the alınost all revolutionaıy situations. contending Reformists, the Reformist candidates had been approved by the Council of Guardians; and the DP: The other night at a panel discussion on the Refonnists obviously confırmed their allegiance to the situation in Iran lıel d in Chicago, the sociologist Constitution and the theo<:ratic system; all this Ahmad Sadri argued that we are witnessing the (apparently) provided a margin of safety for the public "beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic."(9) Do to come out on the streets and demonstrate in large you agree? numbers; in this way they were supporting some of the candidates and political figures who had, presumably, HB: In order to begin to think about any breakdown, been endorsed by the core clerical elite. we need to know the consequences of the recent erisis and confrontation for the political system; that is, we At a second level, emerging signs of division between need to ask what ditference the recent developments the Fundamentalist faction in power and the have made to the regime in teıms of the eight various Traditionalist-Conservative parties within the power analytical factors I laid out eaı·lier. The consequences of bloc (especially between Rafsanjani and the the recent erisis and confrontation are manifold; and we Fundamentalists) generated the expectation (or perhaps need to assess the durability of the governınent in terıns the illusion) that the Traditionallst-Conservative clerics of these consequences. would actively suppoıt the Green movement; so the

[ll] perhaps the allegations of the Reformist candidates My general arguınent has been that if the political would have been corroborated). The Supreıne Leader's system had previously experienced any sort of crisis, it endorsement of the official election results - even is now intensifıed and has gone tJu·ough a qualitative before the partial recount, which he had himself change. In terıns of ideological legitiınacy, the allawed - caused the sense of illegitimacy to spread, preexisting defıcit has now become a first-degree erisis in the eyes of the protestors and opposition, from the of legitimacy. The lslaınic Republic claimed, from its government to the entire polltical system. inception, to be at least paıt l y based on popular support and consent; one could argue that in the canception of Furthermore, the Supreme Leader's rather explicit the Islaınic Republic, "Republic" as the noun is ınore permission for the ruthless suppression of any essential than "lslamic" as the adjective of that noun demonstrations, and their actual violent suppression, (at Jeast in the Persian language this is the type of further intensifıed the erisis and deficit of legitimacy. perception we have about nouns and adjectives). If previously therc was a second or even thlı·d degree Elections have been held regularly and even the erisis of legitimacy, in the sense that the pollcies of the Supreme Leaders have considered elections and government had faced popular objection, now with the popular participation as a major basis of the political recent turn of events a fırst- degree erisis of legitimacy system. Of course, as we k:now, elections in the Islamic has come about, throwing into question the legitimacy Republic are restricted in the sense that all candidates of the en tire system. in all elections have to be declared as qualified by the Council of Guardians, whiclı is the legislative arın of In terms of legitimacy, therefore, the recent the Supreme Leader. In any case, according to the confrontation has bad several consequences. Firstly: it opposition, which enjoys a mass following, even the has sornewhat exposed or uncovered the nature of the institutionally restricted elections have not been power structure; previously the Supreme Leader had respected by the regime itself. been regarded (at least by the politically uninforıned or misinformed) as being neutral in factional rivalı·ies and During the June election, all four candidates had been as standing above the various factioos likean impartial endorsed by the Council of Guardians and indirectly judge; but this illusion was shattered by the Leader by the Supreme Leader; yet popular support for the himself when he announced that he had personal two Reformİst candidates has increasingly been political preferences and actually supported the cun·ent regarded by the regime as counter-revolutionary, and government and policies and would endorse them at as we have seen, peaceful protesters have been beaten any price. Previously there was a disagreement and crushed for legally protesting against the official concerning the role and position of the Supreme election results. In the eyes of supporters of the mass Leader; some political activists and comınentators Green Movement, they had done nothing except regarded him as politically weak or impartial; legaliy protest against the election results, but they accordingly, he did not have a base of social support were treated ruthlessly and violently (even the Council for himself, despite his great institutionaJ powers, and of Guardians itself admitted that on the basis of a so he had to adjust to the pollcies of whatever partial recount some tlu-ee mHlion votes had been government was in power (Rafsanjani's from 1989 to manipu lated; and if a full recount had been allowed, 1997 and Khataıni's from 1997 to 2005).

[ 12] But in fact, he COltliTIDntatı

[13] Authoritarian regimes usually attempt to compensate unity of the ruling elites is being damaged as for the loss of ideological legitimacy either by antagonistic rifts are eınerging, firstly between resorting to more coercive and repressive measures or Reformİst and Fundamentalist paıties, secondly within by turning to ınore public we1fare services. In the case the clerical institutions, and thirdly within the militaıy of Iran after June 2009, what has happened is the elite. More indications of increasingly antagonistic expansion of the coercive dimension or base of the rifts are eınerging eveıy day. reginıe as a compensation for the legitimacy deficit. This in itself means a transfoımation in the character It seems that the Reformİst paıties are not to be or type of the regime, which is becoıning more tolerated any more, as lıundreds of party teaders and militaristic; a militaristic language is now utilized by meınbers are being detained and imprisoned.(ll) They the aımed forces in reference to the opposition aı·e alı·eady disqualified as illegitimate aııd counter­ moveınent. This tendeney is of vital significance for revolutionaıy parties; in fact it seeıns that political the future couı·se of developments, if the political party activity will becoıne meaningless in the system is to remain in place. Given the prevailing emerging power stnıcture; so the reforınist paıties wi!J economic situation mentioned above, as well as the definitely fınd themselves in an entirely different limited ınanagerial capability of the government, there situation and consequently will have to adopt new is little chance of success for any attempt at positions, if they can continue to exist at all. The compensation for the loss of legitimacy tmough the Paıticipation Front has been hit the hardest. There are expansion of the puhlic sector and provision of also some indications of growing division within the welfare; indeed, the system had alı·eady been suffering clergy associated with the Supreme Leader and the from a erisis of efficient management. more independent-minded eledes in Qom, who have tacitly or explicitly opposed the crackdown.(I2) There Out of the four main bases of regime stability - are even soıne signs of dlvision within the legitiınacy, efficiency, elite unity, and coercive Revolutionaıy Guards; in the early years there were capacity - it seems that only the tatter has remained soıne differences of opinion between the commanders functioning, at least for the time being. The unity of of the Western and Southern waı· fronts; following the the nıling elites of the Islamic Republic has also been crackdown an open Jetter has been written by a soınewhat damaged. To be sure, factionalism, as number of older commanders to the Supreme Leader, discussed above, had always existed among the ruling questioning his endorsenıent of the election results elites. Interventionism vs. non-interventionism, socio­ before full investigation and the violent repression of economic modeınization vs. adlıerence to tradition, the protest demonstrations. Stili it seems that the and Islamizatian vs. democratization have been some regime's point of strength lies in its coercive capacity of the major points of cantention in the life of the and the unity of its coercive forces, at a time when the Islaınic Republic over the last 30 years. But in a sense, legitimacy of the politica1 system is coming under all these cleavages and rifts had been non­ question. So in responding to your question, the antagonistic; the significance of the recent strengths and weaknesses of the regime should be confrontation is that it has turned non-antagonistic taken into account. divisions and rifts into antagonistic ones. Several moderate and reformİst parties which had been Likewise, we need to take into account the state of the regarded as members of the family of the Revolution opposition movement, its strengths and weaknesses. are now being castigated as counter-revolutionary. The

[14] We need to consider the four factors in relation to the of its leadership. A number of people have eınerged as opposition mavement that has erupted. In analyzing leaders, but as usually happens in such situations, socio-political opposition ınoveınents, as already ınoderate teaders will be gradually replaced with ınore mentioned, we need to exaınine the state of mass radical ones. So far Mossavi, Karroubi and Khatami discontent, the organizational network, the ideology have led the mavement veıy cautiously and moderately; and the leadership of the movement. Concerning on the other band Ayatollah Montazeri has issued a veıy popular discontent, histarical experience shows that s i gnifıcant statement justif).ring public rebellion against potential mass dissatisfaction and discontent in the theocratic system and considering the regime as authoritarian regimes becomes effective when made already deposed because of its unjust and cruel actual through a specific catalyst. Socio-economic and treatment of the protestors.(13) The gradual replacement cultural discontent must become politicized to have of more moderate by more radical leadership would also political effects. What politicized all the pre-exiting mean an escalation in the ideology of the movement, potential discontents was the issue of fraud in the from questioning the election results to questiorung the election as alleged by the opposition candidates veıy legitimacy of the whole power structure. supported by a large popular movement. We have already explained why and how public anger and So two factors stand out as decisive in the outcome of indignation was produced as a result of government the tunnoil: the coercive capacity of the govemınent and actions. Now all the grievances were fınding a political its ability and readiness to use it; and the teadership of focus or epicenter; the annulment of the election was the mavement and its ability and readiness to redefine the fu·st public request, but as intimidation and its ideological objectives and enhance its organizational suppression followed mass demonst:ı:ations, a new capability. cause for anger and fhıstration was added to the initial one, now targeting the leadership of the Islamic DP: Speaking of the teadership of the movement, some Republic. The steam of general public discontent, as it have questioned whether it has any. What do you ınake were, was now fınding a political engine. Thus public of this? Is Moussavi the ınovement's leader, or is he discontent was being organized into a specifıc public being Jed by the movement? To the extent that the demand. As we have seen, public discontent without movement has a horizontal or decentralized structure, do organization and mobilization leads to nothing. In you view this as a weakness or a strength - or neitber? terms of organization, a quite adequate organizational And what does this all portend for the ınovement's network (including the electoral headquaıters, student prospects? organizations, electronic means of communication, the Internet and so on) has emerged and has proved HB: Usually, leaders of revolutionaıy or oppositional capable of providing the necessary rudimentary movements can be class i fıed into three main types: functions. Of couı·se the organizational capability of ideologues; mobilizers/orators; and ınanagers. oppositions has a canverse relation to the coercive Sometimes aJI the three types may merge into a single capacity of regimes. In our case so far, goveınment leader, but most of the time different leaders represent coercion has almost demolisbed the organizational the various types. Ayatollah Khomeini was both an capability of the opposition, but things aı·e not go ing to ideologue and a mobilizer/orator; but the management reınain as they are now. For one thing, the of the ınovement was left to local leaders, as he was in organizational capacity of the opposition is a function exile at the time. Lenin turned out to be a combination

[lS] of the tlu·ee types, as was Mao. In the case of today's mavement or revalt can turn into a revolutionaıy Green opposition mavement in h-an, the role of movement, as was the case with the Puritan leadership is not concentrated in one person, so the Revolution in England and the American Revolution. three leadership functions are not perfonued. There is I think that the Green mavement can resurrect the no ideological leader, in the sense of grand ideals of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, as ideologkal schemes; it is more of a democratic than well as the aspirations of the early phase of the an "ideological" movement; the aspirations of the revolution of 1979. And this would be good enough, mavement are clear enough and same of them can as the most fundamental political conflict and even be traced back to the current Islamic cleavage in h-an s ince the end of the 19th centwy has Constitution. Statements and pronouncements issued been that between autocracy (whether royal or by Moussavi and Karroubi as well as same high­ clerical) and democracy/popular sovereignty. To ranking clerics such as Montazeri, Saanei and become more o:ffensive, however, the ideology needs Kadivar cleaı·ly indicate the movement's ideological to be differentiated from the dominant theocratic aims. tendeney in the constitution; and this is what the current oppositional teadership seems to be rather Oppositional ideologies can be offensive or defensive reluctant to propose. in posture. Revolutionaıy movements usually require an offensive ideology, projecting a completely More recently, however, the office of the Supreme di:fferent or novel socio-political oı·der and stnıcture, Leader has come under attack for canying out whereas defensive ideologies usually present public repression and engaging in illegal acts; two open grievances or complain about the encroachment of lerters reportedly issued by the Assodation of the regime upon the rights of the subject population; Previous Majles (Parliament) Deputies and the defensive ideologies and ideological leaderships aı·e Association of Qom Religious Teachers and Clerics usually characteristics of "revolts" rather than have blamed the Supreme Leader for what has revolutions; peasant revolts, tax revolts, bread riots transpired since June 12 and have declaı·ed him and aristocratic rebellions are usually based on a incompetent to continue as the Supreme Leader defensive ideology. We could call Iran's Green according to the constitution. They have called on the mavement an "electoral fraud revolt." The religious clerical Assembly of Experts to reconsider the revalt or rebellion of 1963 against the Slıah's policies, leader's competence for leadership. If the Assemb1y led by Ayatollah Klıomeini, was a defensive revolt; it of Experts could gain same independence from the attempted to safeguard the Constitution against the office of the Supreme Leader and could represent the modernizing autocratic tendencies of the Shah. In a clergy at large and exeıt control over that office, the sense, the current Green mavement is rather similar deınocratic aspect of the theocracy would be highly to the 1963 revolt, in that it is similarly a protest enhanced; in that case, the independent members of against autocratic and militaristk tendencies and the clergy could emerge as the main leadership group repressive policies in the name of the existing in a would-be transition from absolutist theocracy to Constitution (although the repression now has been constitutional theocracy, or even to a pure and simple much more brutal than it was then). Ayatol1ah democracy. Khomeini had simi!arly asked for the proper implementation of the Constitution. But a defensive With regaı·d to the second function - ınobilization

[ 16] given the state of repression, the current constantly enticing the public in the face of severe opposition Jeadership is severely restricted; the repression and by resaıting to all forms of political existing, rather weak civil society associations have campaign. been further repressed and restricted. There is an obvious connection between repression and Finally, under the cun·ent circumstances I think that ınobilization: with increasing repression, the chances the rise of a dissident cleric, such as Montazeri, at the for mass rnobilization decrease, as the cost of head of the moveınent, could make a great dea! of political activity rises, while less repression on the difference in terms of political mobilization and the part of the regirne, or rnore toleration - or at least realignınent of political forces and actors. vacillation - encourages mass action. In the case of Ayatailah Khomeini and his close assodates in the DP: Several parallels have been drawn between the 1978-79 J'evolution, political mobilization was present events and those of 1978-79, the most facilitated by the fact that they were in exile and obvious being the mass street deınonstrations and the could easily call on the people to rise against the echoes of Allahu Akbar. In fact during the revolution regime and risk their lives in the face of repression. of three decades ago it took much langer - ınany But the current oppositional leadership does not ınonths - for the crowds to grow to the size we saw enjoy the same immunity. They are not ready to go to within a matter of days in June 2009. On the other the extreme in the face of severe repression. Finally, hand, some argue emphatically that this is not a the managerial stnıcture of the leadership is not well revolutionaıy ınoveınent or situation, po~ting to the knit together, again because of repression. As a rule, fact that the "Green Wave" pbenoınenon is bound up opposition leaderships in revolutionaıy movements with the presidential candidacy of a figure gain decisive irnportance and roles under two types (Moussavi) who was operating within the fi:aınework of conditions: fu·st, when the state has more or less of the Islamic Republic.(l4) How do you view this? lost its monopoly on the use of the means ofviolence As a scholaı· of the 1979 revolution, do you see (as in the case of the English, Chinese, Cuban and parallels between the two ınoınents? Nicaraguan Revolutions), and second, when the regime is ina state ofvacillation and besitatian vis-a­ HB: To me it seeıns that the current confrontation vis the use of violence, and as a result the opposition may well turn into a thoroughly revolutionary gets the opportunity to mobilize (as in the case of the situation, given the intensity of popular anger and 1979 Iranian Revolution). As we have alı·eady seen, fi:ustration and the hunıiliating way the goveınment revolutions do not take place merely because there is has responded to it. But there aı·e, as always, both mass discontent and a large opposition mavement siın il arities and differences between the two and a revolutionaıy ideology and leadership; they stili histarical situations; and in any case there is no need do not take place even if, in addition to all that, the for the current confi·ontation to be an exact replica of regime suffers from severe erises of legitimacy and 1979 in order to turn into a revolutionaıy situation; it efficiency and unity. What usually sowıds the death rnay do so on its own rnerits. knell for authoritaı·ian regimes is a erisis of coercion and dornination. Obviously a strong and Now we can elaborate on the similarities and ideologically-dedicated teadership can contribute to differences in terms of the several theoı·etical criteria such a erisis of damination aı1d coercion, by we have already used to explain the nature of the

[17] situation. So :first, in terms of a erisis of legitimacy, it obviously in contradiction to the ideals of a popular seems that the Islamic regime has been depletiog its revolution which was supposed to restrict the power own legitiınacy from within, by violating its own of the ıu l er; and it points to the more general and ıules: the reforrnist candidates had been allawed to lıistorical problem of legitimacy as far as the stand for election but tlıen peacefu1 protests on the theocracy is concerned. But there is a more mundane paıt of their suppoıters regarding the disputed results sense of a legitimation erisis usually felt by the are violently and brutally suppressed. The Shah's general run of the people, and that is when instead of regime at the time was facing the opposition of an persuasion, force is used to keep a people in its place; outside cantender in Khomeiııi, one who would and this is exactly the meaning of the erisis of norınally be repressed by an authoritarian regime. So legitimacy as it is unfolding. The erisis of legitimacy for such a regime, the Shah's repression could seem as a major ingredient of a revolutionary situation has ınore "normal" (ooıms of repression) than the Islamic become grave. regime's repression, as it is repressing an opposition which is an insider, or part of the family, as same say. A clear difference between the two histarical From anather perspective, legitimacy has also situations is to be found in the rulers' will to something to do with longevity and durability; the repression. The shah's regiıne, after an irıitial period imperial monarchy had been in place for 2,500 years, of suppression, lost its will to power and gradually whereas Islamic theocracy has been around only for shifted to a policy of moderation, toleration and 30 years. Obviously the lnstitutioıı of Persian compromise: the Shah's hearing of the message of the monarchy had been in a state of erisis since the Iate revolution, the negotiations with the National Front, 19th century, leading to the Constitutional Revolution the Baldıtiar regime, the Paris negotiations, the (1906-19 ll), which provided a eriteri on for gauging Shah's flight and so on; apparently the Caı·ter human the legitimacy of the system, i.e. the Shah was to rights policy and U.S. pressın·e (in the cantext of reign and not rule, and the breach of the constitution differences of interest and opinion between in this regard was a sure sign of the royal Washington and Telıran following the oil embargo of government's erisis of legitimacy. 1973) had sometlıing to dowith the loss of the will to repression. But so far the Islamic regime's will to A siınilar argument could be and has been developed repression has remained fırın; maybe it is still too in the case of the Islamic Republio, in the sense that early to judge, given the circular nature of the Sovereign Theologian (or Supreme Leader) demonstrations and protests taking place every now should stand above factional coııflicts. However, and then, in a fashion reminiscent of the events of there is a great dea! of difference between the 1978. In terms of U. S. -Iran relations, it seems that constitutions of 1906 and of 1979 in that the latter is the current admiııistration 's approach may have evidently not constitutionalist but absolutist: there is contributed to the will to suppression. no real separation of powers and the Ruling Jurist (or Supreme Leader) has supremacy over the three Tb e decline or continuation of the will to suppression branches of government. So we cannot speak of a is paıtly a result of the state of unity witlıin tlıe ruling deficit of Iegitimacy only in this very technical and group; in the case of the Shah's regime, elite unity restricted sense, since the Ruling Theologian both was in a sense damaged by the Caıter human rigbts reigns and rules. This in itself, on the other hand, is policy, and tl1e Shab vacillated between repression

[18] and relative toleration. As we have already seen, some In terms of ideology, it seems that the cuıTent major signs of division within the ruling elite of the confrontation is more spec ifı c in nature than was the Islamic Republic are also eınerging. Once begun, such case with the slogan of "Jslamic Republic" in 1978-9. divisions and rifts are bard to contain; they tend to Indeed its spec ifıcity makes it non-revoluti onaıy, since escalate and drag aU political actors into the abyss. (at least as far as the top leaders are concerned) its aim Hence the current confi·ontation seems increasingly to is to annul the disputed election; however, as with the be creating a revolutionary situation. early phase of the 1978-9 revolution, the moderate opposition was calling for the implementation of the Differences also exist in terms of the nature of the constitution and a constitutional monarchy; obviously opposition. In teıms of popular discontent, a similar it was the leadershlp of Ayatailah Khomeini whlch pattern has occurred, a pattern I have already explained made the difference, call ing for a complete revolution in terms of the J-Cuı·e theory. In the case of the Shah's - soınetbing the reformist teaders have not been regime, a long period of economic stabiJity and growth willing to take up; the most they have caUed for so far from 1962 to 1976 was fo llowed by a sharp reversal is the holding of a referendum for endorsing or and downturn, creating an intolerable gap between annulling the election results (which has to be allawed popular expectations and government capabilities. In by the teaders ofthe Islam ic Republic). the case of the Islamic Republic, the same pattem has come about albeit with a different content, whlch is not So, on the whole it seems that some of the ingredients economic but political: a long period of moderation of a revolutionaıy situation have ab·eady come about and relative toleration under Rafsanjani and Khatami but some atlıers have not (yet) materialired. fi:om 1989 to 2005 (the post-Khomeini period) was foJ!owed by a sharp reversal and downtuın under the DP: What do you make of the respanses of certain m i litaristic-fundaınental i st regime of Ahmadinejad. leftists in the Western Hemisphere to the eve ııts The specter of its repetition in June 2009 caused unfolding in Iran - from the likes of Jaınes P etı·as widespread fear, anger and dread and led to the defending the official election results and disıni ssing confi·ontation. any doubts about theü· authenticity as an imperialist "l10ax" to MRZine (the online organ of the venerable socialist magazine Monthly Review) openly defending Ahmadinejad as an anti-imperialist to Hugo Chavez embracing Alunadinejad as a "revolutionaıy" ally and the Foreign Ministry of Venezuela denouncing the Iranian street demonstrations:

The Bolivarian Goverrunent of Venezuela expresses i ts fırın opposition to the vicious and unfounded campaign to discredit the institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, unleashed from outside, designed to roil the political climate of our brother country. From Venezuela, we denounce these acts of interference in the internal affairs of the Islamic Republic oflran, Photojournalist: S asan Afsoosi - [email protected]

(19] while demanding an immediate halt to the maneuvers I think that the leftist respanses you have mentioned to tlu·eaten and destabiiize the Islarnic Revolution.( 15) have forgotten all about the democı·atic dimensions of Marxism and have fallen prey to demagogy in this It's important to note that there have been strong case. They sametimes forget that the extreme Right critical respanses from others on the Left to such and the extreme Left deceptively look alike. In the statements - those of Reese Erlich, Hamid Dabashi, case of Venezuela, a combination of pseudo-leftist Saeed Rahnema, the Campaign for Peace and appraisals and commercial interests have been at Democracy, and others.(16) What is your impression work. The Venezuelan government knows nothing ofthese contending positions? ab out the political situation and public opinion in Iran, which is increasingly turning against the foreign allies HB: To me it seems that such unfavorable reactions to of the Islamic Republic. Russia's suppoıt has already the popular mavement in Iran are not hard to explain. I brought about chants of "Death to Russia" from think they result fi:om three factors: first, ignorance of protesters on the streets of Tehran. and misinformation about the natuı·e of the political system in Iran since the Revolution, the various Regarding more theoı·etical responses, I would say that histarical phases it has gone tlu·ough and the widening the type of class analysis applicable to the case of Iran gap between official ideology and public opinion, in a long-term sense is very different from the type of paıticularly the rapid secularization of society under class analysis usually applied in a short-term sense. the theocracy; consequently such regiınes end up From a long-term histarical perspective, the main being more popular among soıne foreigners than social conflict has been taking place not among the among their own people. Secondly they result fi·oın social dasses belonging to one social foımation, but financial and commercial self-interest and the special between those belonging to two social formations: favorable commercial relations Iran has with some of pre-modern and modern. The histarical meaning of the countries mentioned; obviously they think more of various political developments in Iran should be theiı· own national interests than the interests of the understood in tenns of this undedying conflict: the Iranian people. In my opinion, analyses resulting fi·om Constitutional Revolution sigııified the victoıy of the such positions and interests are not much worth social classes of the modern formatian over the social discussing from an academic point of view. forces of the traditionallpre-modern formation. In its Ideological regiınes tend to create their own satellites own peculiar way, the absolutist state structure of the or close fi·iends, who obviously endorse their policies Pahlavi regime further strengthened the modem social and actions. Here we can add Islamist parties and foımation (albeit in the framework of modernization organizations in the Arab world and tbeir ideological/ fi:om above und er a dietatarship). The traditional commercial ties with the Islamic Republic. Thirdly, social fotces made a comeback after the revolution of such analyses result fi·om the analysts' attachment to 1979 and imposed the traditional politlcal-cultw-al and use of obsolete theoı·etical and canceptual pattern of elitism, authoritarianism, patrimonialism fi·ameworks, divorced fi"om current deveJopments and cultural oı·der, discipline and obedience under the (what Ulrich Beck calls "zombie categories"); as a rule of a theocracy. With the subsequent development result, they accept deınagogical positions at face value of the modern formatian and its social forces, and confuse Fascism with Socialism. advocating the ideas of citizenship, political equallty,

[20] democracy, a con en t an co erent policy of freedom (as partly seen in the Green Movement), the engagement. ... [A] concerted dialogue with underlying contradiction between the world of Iran ... will offer moral and political support coercively-reconstıucted tradition and the democratic for the genuine expressian of the will of the path .is bound to come to a head, as we are witnessing Iranian people at a time when the regime's now. authority is at an ebb. Most important, it will offer Iranians hope. ... if the West keeps DP: There are dlscordant views among progressives on tatking to Iran, it can empower its citizens to wbether the Obama administration should move change their society from tlle ground up, and forward in engaging Iran at present, given the to in:fluence those who have the capacity to circumstances. Some progressives - paı1icularly act fi·om the top down.(l 8) lranians - argue that the U.S. should hold off for the moment on engaging Iran; Kariın Sadjadpour of the What is your view on this question? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently gave expressian to this view: HB: I am definitely in agreement with those arguing against engagement. I too think that engagement For the first time ever, I think we shouldn't even would in a sense grant l egitiınacy to a regime be tatking about engaging Iran, we should take a confi·onting a very deep erisis of l egitiınacy, on the wait and see approach. The strategic imperative one hand, and would alienate a democratically­ to have relations with Iran will always remain, inclined and growing opposition movement, which but let's wait un til the dust settles in Tehran .... expects moral suppoıt from all democratic nations, By prematurely calling for engagement I think on the other. we ıun the risk of demoı·alizing the opposition and the millions of people who took to the I think that now is the worst time for the U.S. streets and who continue to reject the legitin1acy government to pw·sue a policy of engagement, as the of the Ahmadinejad government; we implicitly regime in Iran is at its worst; it should have tried endorse an election that is still being hotly when the Iranian regime was at its best, that is during contested in Telıran and tip the balance ın favor the Khatami presideney (of com·se the Iranlan of the hardliners.(17) fundarnentalist groups were opposed to it at the time). As we all know, rational decision-maklng in general Others - paı1icularly in the American peace mavement and in the field of foreign policy in paıticular should - call for engagement and diploınacy regardless of the talce many factoı·s iılto account - the current post-election aftermath. Thus Reza Aslan, author of political environment, reactions of other decision­ How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the makers, intended and unintended consequences, End ofthe War on Terror, recently argued that one among others - and not j ust react to the policies of a previous riva] administration. One specific factor must not ignore the dramatic oppoıtunities for which needs to be taken into account in this case long-tem1 change in Iran that have emerged as a (regardless of the issues relating to regional and result of this crisis, opportunities to which the intemational secmity) is the impact on the Iranian international community must respond through deınocrat i c opposition in the shoıter as well as the

[ 21] longer run. intellectual-political map? What are, and have been, your main theoretical reference points and Altbough the Iranian government's perception that no influences? There are strong Gramscian flavors in threat now comes from the U.S. under the new yom book State and Revolution in Iı:an, which you administration (unlike its perceptions following the wrote as a doctoral dissertation under the supervision iuvasion of Iraq) may have made it feel ınore of Ernesto Laclau. Has Gramsci continued to comfortable dealing with and suppressing the influence your thinking? Has Laclau? How would opposition movement recently, and the government you characterize the are of your outlook over the last may have thus indirectly benefited from the new three decades? How have your views changed over foreign policy orientation in the U.S., any the course of time? engagement policy would definitely (and this time directly) embolden the government vis-a-vis the HB: I studied the Marxİst lite r atuı·e on political demecratic opposition, which would be another sociology at the where Emesto instance of a familiar foreign policy pattern Laclau and Bob Jessop taught me. I was and have pa ıticularly common during the Cold War era. We all ı·emain.ed interested in many aspects of the political­ remember the case of British and American support sociological ideas of Marx, Gramsci, Poulantzas, •' of the regime of South Africa and its Apartheid Laclau and Barrington Moore, and I have used them system during the Cold War, which played a part in in my works. Later on I developed an interest in the stifliııg the anti-Apartheid movement and which work of Michel Foucault and his analysis of power, endorsed the apartheid regime. On the other hand, the and I have used soıne aspects of his ideas in my more new western foreign policy towards South Africa that recent works. I have always considered these thinkers was gradually adopted towards the end ofthe l 980s, as building blocks for political sociology, an area stili w ith the end of the Cold War situation, contributed to under construction. More recently I have focused on the weakening of the Apartheid regiıne and the political sociology of democratization, especially encouraged the anti-Apartheid movement. More with reference to the Middle East. generally as a rule, if democratization gained pace in ınany paıts of the world in the 1990s, it was partly DP: Wlıat occasioned this shift in your thinking from due to the abandonment of the security-based western a largely Marxist frame of reference to a more post­ foreign policy supporting all soı1s of regirnes opposed Marxist/Foucauldian one? to the Eastern bloc. More precisely, it was not active support for the demecratic oppositions, but rather HB: I considered Foucault's work on discourse and disowning the non-democratic regiınes, that power as a culmination of Marx's understanding of contributed to the transitions. In the case oflran-U.S. ideology and power; soınehow they seemed akin, but relations, the U.S. government has already Foucault's provided a wider scope for application. experienced a sirnilar episode, when it gradually withdrew its support from the Shah's regime and thus Danny Postel is the author ofReading "Legitimation encouraged the anti-Shalı opposition. Crisis" in Tehran: Iran and the Future of Liberalism (2006) anda Contributing Editor ofLogos: A Journal DP: I'd like to close by discussing your iotellectual ofModern Society & Culture. biography. How would you locate yourself on the

[22 ] NOTES: lncreasing 1) Mehran Kamrava, Iran :s- Intel/ectual Revolution (Cambridge: Repression," report of the International Campa.ign fo~· Human Cambridge University Press, 2008), 196. Rights in Iran, June 17, 2009 ( www.iranbumanrıghts.or&J 2 2009/06/jocreasjngrepressjon). > E-mail correspondence with author, August 1, 2009. 12) "Qom all ye faithful," The Economist, July 23, 2009 3} Hossein Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran. 1962-1982 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984). ( www.economist.com/djsp l aystoıy.cfm?stoıy id= 14098329 ). 4> Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatoı·ship and IJ) Muhaınmad Sahimi, "Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's Fatwa," Democracy: Lord and Peasani in the Making of the Modern Telu·anBureau, July 12, 2009 (http://tehranbureau.com/grand- World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Hubert L. Dreyfus and ayatollah-montazeris-fatwaD. . . Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and 1•1) See, for example, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, "Iran: thıs ıs not Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); a revolution," Comment is freelguarctian.co.uk, June 23 2009 ( www. guard i an. co.yk/ comme ntjsfree/2009/j un/ 23/ i ran­ Robert C. Holub, Jıiigen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere reyolution-uorest-protest). (New York: Routledge, 1991). . 15) James Petras, "Iranian Elections: The 'Stolen Elections' 5} Roozbeh Mirebrahimi, "University Professors F~red En Masse," Rooz online, September 3, 2007 (www.roozonlme.com/ Hoax" Global Research, June 18, 2009 (www.a'lobalresearch.ca/ jodex php?coorext=va&ajd= 40 8); en~ljsb/news/newsjtem /artj c le/200Vseptember/03 //univerşjty - ı ı Foreign Ministry of Venezuela, "Venezuela Denounces profesşors-fired-en - maşse . html) . . Campaign oflnte1ference against the Islamic Republic oflran," 6)Robert Tait, "lranian president calls for purge of lıberal leeturers " The Guardian, September 6, 2006 June ı 6, 2009 ( www. monthlyrevjew.org/ mrzjne/ (www. euard,jan.cp.uklworld/2006/sep/06/hi&hereducati~n.j~ . yenezuela 170609 html) 16) Reese Erlich, " Iran and Leftist Confusion," 7) Hossein Bashiriteh, "Transitional Situations, Changıng Elıte Configurations and Obstacles to Democratization in Iran." Paper CommonDrcams.org, June 29, 2009 (www.commondreams.or&J presented at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, May yjewn009/06 /28- ı Q); Harnid Dabashi, "Left is wrong on Iran," AI-Aiu·am Weekly, 16- 22 July 2009 ( http:// 1~2006. • weekly.ahram.oJi.e&/2009/956/opS.htm); Saeed Rahnema, "The &) A "great eınancipato1y event": Slavoj Zizek, "Berlusconi in Tragedy of the Lcft's Discourse on Iran," ZNet, July 10, 2009 Telıran " London Review of Books, July 23, 2009 ( www.zmag.org/zne ı:/yjewAajcl e/2ı248 ); Stephen R. Shalom, (www.l;b.co.uk/y3 ı / n ı4/zjze0 ı .ht'?!); "soın~th~~g qui~e Thomas Harrison, Joanne Landy and Jesse Leınisch, "Question extraordinary, perhaps even a socıal revolutıon : Ham1d & Answer on the Iran Crisis," Campaign for Peace and Dabaslıi, "Comınentary: Iran conflict isn't class warfare," CNN.com, June 22, 2009 (www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/ Deınocracy, July 7, 2009 ( www.cpdweb.org/ news/ 2QQ907Q7.sbtml). 06/22/dabashj.i ran.myths/jndex.htınl) ; a "velvet coup": Anoush Ehteshami, "An implausible victory," openDemocracy, June 22, 17) "The Evolving Situation in Iran: Interview with Karim Sadjadpour, associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 2009 ( www. o pe nd emocracy. net/art i cl eli ran-s-e lect i on­ democracy-or-coyp#2); "the fina! acts of a protracted war for the Peace" Midd/e East Progress, July 16, 2009 (~ control of the Iranian economy": Behzad Yaghmaian, "Iran's mjddl~eaştproııress.oJlU2QQ9107/ıhe-eyolyj og-sjtyation-in-iranD. Many Wars," Foreign Policy Journal, June 25, 2009 18 Reza Aslan "Should Obama talk to Ahmadinejad?" Christian Science July 14, 2009 (www.csmonitor.com/ (www.foreienpoljcyjournal.com/2009/06/25/jran's-many-wars); Mo~ilor, 2009/Q714/pQ9sQ2-coop.htm 1). an attempt to abolish the people: Pepe Escobar, "lran's streets are lost, but hope retı1rns, " Asia Times, June 25, 2009 ( www. atjmes . com/aıjmes/Mjdd l e East!KF25Ak02.html). 9) Teach-in on Iran's Struggle for Democracy, School of the Art Institute of Chicago, July 9, 2009. Ahmad Sadri is Professor of Sociology and Goı1er Chair of Islaınic World Studies, Lake Forest College Lake Forest, Illinois, author of Max Weber 3- Socio/ogy ojJ;tellectuals (New York: Oxford University Pres~, ı 992) and co-editor of Reason, Freedom, and Denıocracy ın Islam: Essenlial Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). lO) See Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, J 989). On the MEK's connections to the American neoconservative movement, see Danny Postel, "Tcrrorism Awarcness Indeed," TomPaine.com, October 19, 2007 ( www.ourfuture . org/ blog-eoıry/terrorjsm - awareness- ~ · Photojournalist: Sasan Afsoosi- [email protected]

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