The Rebel Iron Fist:
Reframing Violence as a Condition for Rebel Governance
Panthea Pourmalek
POLI 492 – Undergraduate Thesis
The University of British Columbia
April 2021
Co-Supervisors:
Dr. Allen Sens and Dr. Gyung-Ho Jeong
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Abstract Conventional and tired characterizations of civil wars invoke images of endless chaos and relentless violence perpetuated by armed groups. In reality, civil wars are defined by unique forms of wartime social and political order, and are anything but chaotic. This study focuses on ‘rebel governance’ as a specific rebel-civilian sociopolitical relationship in which rebel groups participate in the administration of civilian affairs. Using disaggregated data on rebel governance in 122 civil wars, I examine the relationship between the character of rebel governance used by rebel groups and the use of violence against civilians. Contrary to existing characterizations of rebel governance, the results of the large-N analysis show rebel governance, particularly the provision of social services, to be positively related to conflict violence. Through further qualitative analysis of governance provided by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), I point to the necessary role of violence in the administration of rebel governance and rebel group capacity as two preliminary explanations for the observed relationship.
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Acknowledgements
My most sincere appreciation goes out to my co-supervisors Professor Allen Sens and Professor
Gyung-Ho Jeong for their continuous support and enthusiasm for this project. I would also like to thank my parents for passing down to me their love for learning, and Professor Yves
Tiberghien for fostering this love throughout my final years at UBC.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“I myself sat in my medical exams at the time in Jaffna. I could do the government or the parallel
LTTE exam. That was all there in the early 1990s.”
This is a description of the medical education infrastructure of Jaffna, the capital of the
Northern Province of Sri Lanka, at the peak of control by a notoriously violent rebel group, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1024). How was it that a rebel group known for extreme and destructive violence against civilians, was mandating standardized examinations for medical students?
Conventional and tired characterizations of civil wars invoke images of endless chaos and relentless violence perpetuated by armed groups such as the LTTE. In reality, civil wars are defined by unique forms of wartime social and political order, and are anything but chaotic. This study examines ‘rebel governance’ as a particular wartime socio-political order in which rebel groups fulfill various functions of governance, such as the provision of social services, as well as the creation of judicial, political, and electoral institutions for civilians that reside in rebel-held territories. Rebel governance is an immensely valuable conceptual tool for expanding understandings of the relationship between civilians and rebels beyond the perpetrator-victim dichotomy. This study aims to add greater depth to existing conceptions of this relationship by considering variety within rebel governance, creating potential for capturing meaningful differences in the character of governance across conflicts, and the impact it may have on the reality of armed conflict in civil war.
As rebel groups provide governance, they challenge the legitimacy that governments draw from being the sole provider of governance within a set territory. When rebel control is legitimized through governance, they may find violence a less necessary mechanism of asserting 4 authority and control over civilians. Existing conflict literature points to rebel groups who provide rebel governance as less likely to employ extreme forms of violence against civilians.1
This study will build on this stream of rebel governance literature by considering (1) whether restraint in using extreme violence necessarily translates to less violent conflicts, and (2) whether particular functions of governance are especially effective at reducing conflict violence, asking:
How does the character of rebel governance used by rebel groups impact their use of violence against civilians?
The findings of this study were three-fold. First, quantitative analysis using disaggregated data on rebel governance found rebel governance to be positively related to conflict violence.
The character of rebel governance did in fact matter - rebel groups who provided social services, including healthcare, education, and humanitarian relief, were most strongly associated with higher conflict violence. The total number of governance functions provided by rebels was also found to be to positively related to conflict violence. These primary findings indicate that rebel governance does not make conflicts less violent, even if existing literature indicates that rebel groups providing governance employ less extreme forms of violence. Second, qualitative analysis of the case of the LTTE found violence and coercion to be a necessary condition for rebel governance. More violent groups can more easily push civilians to accept rebel rule and service provision, allowing for longer-lasting and more expansive rebel governance. Finally, and most importantly, qualitative evidence suggested that rebel groups that do not have to choose between rebel governance and military advancement due to resource or capacity limitations, can partake in widespread governance and intense armed warfare simultaneously. Ultimately, the findings indicate that, contrary to existing understandings of rebel governance, rebel violence
1 Extreme violence defined as massacres, scorched earth policies, deliberating bombing or shelling of civilian targets, and forced expulsions as per Stanton (2016). 5 and rebel governance are not zero-sum. Governance can exist alongside violence, be reinforced by it, serve as a conduit for it, or fulfil a strategic role within broader military aims or objectives.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Social order in civil war
Civil war is commonly defined in conflict literature as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity, between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006, 5). In civil war, parties are in fundamental political disagreement
(Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015, 2), and engage in protracted violence with the goal of obtaining or maintaining political and territorial control (Kasfir 2015, 24). Rebel groups ranging from former military, to guerillas, and other combatants violently oppose the state government and its armed forces. Conventional understandings of conflict often inaccurately characterize rebel warfare as unbridled violence taking place in the foreground of a disorderly conflict. In reality, violence and order can, and do, coexist in civil war. Easier access to civilian resources, support, and recruits serves as an incentive for rebel groups to provide some semblance of wartime social order (Arjona 2016, 50). In doing so, they gain an advantage in competing against the state government in a process of state-building (Kalyvas 2006, 218; Stewart 2018). To understand the role of rebels in relation to wartime social order, it is necessary to first uncover how they interact with civilian societies.
2.2 Rebel governance
Rebel governance is a specific rebel-civilian sociopolitical relationship in which rebel groups participate in the administration of civilian affairs. Rebel governance is a historically present and common phenomenon, with most rebel groups dedicating a portion of their resources to some form of governance (Kasfir 2015, 26; Mampilly 2015, 2). Rebel governance can range from 6
“creating minimal regulations and informal taxation to forming popular assemblies, elaborate bureaucracies, schools, courts, and health clinics” (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015, 1). In a seminal work on the phenomenon, Kasfir outlines three necessary conditions for rebel governance: (1) control of territory, (2) a civilian population residing within said territory, and
(3) violence or the ongoing threat of violence (Kasfir 2015, 21). Naturally, there is great diversity and creativity in rebel governance, both across groups, and within the same group over time
(Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015, 18; Mampilly and Stewart 2021, 8).
For rebel groups, rebel governance serves two key purposes. First, it creates potential for garnering civilian compliance and cooperation in a way that reconciles domination with consent
(Loyle 2021, 108; Mampilly 2015, 13). Many scholars present rebel governance as a particular type of social contract specific to the context of civil war (Arjona 2016; Grynkewich 2008;
Wickham-Crowley 2015). On one hand, rebel groups may rely exclusively on violence as means of obtaining what they need from civilians. On the other, civilians may voluntarily provide support or resources to rebels in exchange for a service of value. Rebel governance occupies a place between these two extremes, where voluntary civilian obedience is present alongside some level of rebel coercion and violence. Civilians can participate in rebel governance to serve personal interests such as financial gain, because they have been convinced by rebel revolutionary rhetoric, or to ensure their own safety (Kasfir 2015, 32).
Second, rebel governance allows rebels to delegitimize state authority over civilians.
Successful governance can persuade civilians to cease or reduce collaboration with the state government (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015, 3). By providing competing or better services, rebels highlight state inefficiency and inability, and provide an alternative source for the same services (Grynkewich 2008, 353). As the civilian social contract with rebels is strengthened, the 7 social contract between the civilians and the state government begins to fracture. Here, the element of civilian agency in rebel governance appears most clearly. Civilians exercise some level of agency in choosing which social contract to enter into, consent to, or continue to support.
Whichever entity is selected as party to the contract is legitimized, and can benefit from civilian support and resources. It is important to note that while both the state and rebels can partake in the provision of governance, only the state enjoys the external and internally recognized authority to be considered a government (Mampilly 2015, 3).
2.3 Gaps in the literature
Addressing rebel governance in conflict literature is important, as it allows scholars to find new avenues to understand variation in rebel group behaviour, and by extension, variation in the very nature of civil war. The existing literature on rebel governance can be categorized into three main thematic groups. The first seeks to explain variation in rebel group governance by considering institutional differences (Mampilly and Stewart 2021), geographic trends (Arjona,
Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015), degree of civilian representation (Arjona 2016), and the inclusivity of rebel governance services (Stewart 2018). The second group use governance as the explanatory variable for rebel group behaviour during civil war, addressing the relationship between governance and military strength (Stewart 2020), and rebel use of violence against civilians (Stanton 2016). The final group focus on the impact of rebel governance on post- conflict processes such as state-building (Podder 2014), democratization (Huang 2016), and peace negotiations (Heger and Jung 2017).
The current study will build on the existing body of research in three dimension. First, by providing an internally varied conceptualization of the broader concept of rebel governance.
Conflict scholars have emphasized a need for future research to capture the “greatest range of 8 empirical variation” within rebel governance (Kasfir 2015, 42), as well as the relative importance of different dimensions of rebel governance for civilians (Cunningham and Loyle 2021, 11). This study will respond to this demand by disaggregating governance into specific functions, such as policing, legal services, education, healthcare, diplomacy, and so forth. In doing so, it will capture variety within rebel governance across different conflicts and rebel groups. Second, this study will further explore the utility of conceptualizing rebel governance as a social contract. The social contract approach asserts that civilians will accept rebel governance if they find the services provided by the rebels to be valuable enough to justify accepting rebel control. Do civilians care more about a security apparatus, social services, or representative institutions? Do civilians find value in comprehensive governance? The formulation of thematic exposure variables in this study aims to capture whether the character or breadth of rebel governance can influence its perceived value for civilians.
Finally, this study will build on existing research examining the use of violence by rebel groups as related to rebel governance. Stanton (2016) found rebel groups with governance institutions to be 1.2 to 2.5 times more likely to refrain from using extreme forms of violence against civilians (massacres, scorched earth policies, deliberating bombing or shelling of civilian targets, and forced expulsions) (Stanton 2016, 5, 100). However, the results of this research are limited by the narrow definition of extreme violence. It is possible for rebel groups to refrain from using extreme violence, but continue to carry out large-scale violence using more moderate techniques. Further, it is possible that rebel group behaviours will contribute to violence against civilians by aggravating their state opponents, extending the conflict, and increasing the civilian losses resulting from the actions of both parties. Within the Stanton framework, it is possible for a rebel group to be categorized as exercising restraint while engaging in a long war that brings 9 about significant civilian devastation. To mitigate this issue, the current study will redefine the outcome of interest from rebel group restraint to conflict violence. Additionally, the disaggregation of exposure variables will allow for a more detailed examination of the relationship between governance functions and violence established by Stanton, and is able to capture the possibility that different governance functions are related to violence differently.
2.4 Theory and Hypotheses
Building on Stanton’s (2016) findings, the current study examines whether some functions or characters of rebel governance are more effective at reducing rebel violence against civilians, asking the question:
How does the character of rebel governance used by rebel groups impact their use of violence against civilians?
The two hypotheses used are based on the characterization of rebel governance as a social contract, and attempt to engage with the value civilians see in the types of services or institutions provided by the rebel groups. Given the exchange that occurs within the social contract, some governance functions, particularly those that involve the provision of social services (education, healthcare, welfare), may be more likely to generate and maintain civilian consent to rebel rule, reducing the need for the use of violence.
H1: Civil wars with rebel groups who provide social services for civilians are less violent.
It is also possible that a more robust governance, with a larger number of governance functions or more breadth, will be a better competitor for state governance, preventing civilians from returning to the state, and reducing the need for the use of violence.
H2: Civil wars with rebel groups who provide a larger number of governance functions are less violent.
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
The objective of this study is to determine the relationship between the character and breadth of rebel governance and the intensity of conflict violence, using a mixed-methods approach. The first component is a quantitative analysis capturing variations in the character of rebel governance across different civil wars. The second component is a qualitative analysis that will
(1) examine the directionality of the relationship between rebel governance and conflict violence, and (2) provide explanatory evidence for the quantitative results through a case study of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The mixed-methods research design is commonly used in the literature on rebel governance, and is crucial for examining contextual details that cannot be captured by quantitative data alone.
3.1 Quantitative analysis
3.1.1 Model I
The units of study for this research are individual civil wars, ranging from 1950-2006, with variable data sourced from three conflict datasets. After merging the two main datasets, the current study contains 122 cases of war for the primary outcome variable ‘deaths’, and 87 cases of war for the secondary outcome variable ‘displacements’, serving as indicators of conflict violence. The full list of conflicts included can be found in Appendix A. In coding the datasets, a civil war is defined as an armed conflict involving a state government and at least one non-state opposition group that is political nature, and has sustained violence throughout (at least 1000 in the first three years and 500 deaths in any 30-year period following) (Doyle and Sambanis 2006;
Huang 2016).
This study uses total deaths and total displacements as measures of conflict violence for each civil war. The Doyle & Sambanis (2006) peacebuilding dataset (DS2006) is used for the 11 primary outcome variable ‘deaths’ and the secondary outcome variable ‘displacements’.
Exposure variables in this study indicate different governance functions, and are taken from the
Huang (2016) rebel governance dataset (RGD). The exposure variables include (1) executive leadership, (2) legislature or regional councils, (3) court or a legal system, (4) civilian taxation system, (5) mandatory boycott of state taxes, (6) police force, (7) education system, (8) healthcare system, (9) humanitarian relief, (10) media or propaganda, and (11) foreign affairs or diplomacy. RGD codes each governance function as present if it was provided by the major rebel group(s) active in the civil war.
The covariables used in this study were drawn from the source datasets, with the goal of controlling for the material, spatial, ideological, and political variations across conflicts and rebel groups. The initial batch of potential covariables can be summarized into five categories. First, development indicators such as illiteracy rates, rates of infant mortality, GDP per capita, or primary resource exports. These covariables aim to control for differences in development across conflicts, as variation in the existing level of state infrastructure and governance services can alter civilian demand or acceptance of rebel governance as an alternative. Second, covariables capturing rebel group character, such as ideology, sources of income, ethnic-based or secessionist aims, and warfare technology. This set aims to control for the effects of other rebel group traits on their provision of rebel governance. The third group considers the character of the state government through indicators such as military size, and dependence on foreign aid. These covariables control for variations in state capacity for providing governance, as well as differences in the nature of state interaction with rebel groups. The fourth group capture variations in time and space through covariables such as conflict duration, geography, and topography. The most notable of this set is conflict duration, as longer conflicts often results in a 12 greater number of total deaths and displacements. The final group of covariables considers international involvement such as peacekeeping operations, and UN or non-UN interventions.
The aim here is to capture differences in rebel group behaviour stemming from direct or indirect interactions with international actors or audiences. Of these 39 potential covariables included in the datasets, those with p<0.2 in bivariable analysis continue to the multivariable analysis step.
In this step, covariables were further narrowed down in three ways: (1) testing collinearity, (2) en bloc selection excluding any with p>0.05, and (3) using stepwise entry of covariables to maximize model fit.
The final covariables used for the two outcome variables are as follows: For primary outcome ‘deaths’: (1) infant mortality rate at start of war, (2) rebel group dependence on resources obtained through a coup as a means of financing, (3) rebel group dependence on natural resources as a means of financing, (4) conflicts starting after 1989, (5) conflict duration,
(6) number of previous civil wars in country, and (7) Marxist rebel ideology. For secondary outcome ‘displacements’: (1) number of non-UN intervention missions, (2) former colony of
France, (3) post-Cold War conflict, (4) rebel group dependence on resources obtained through a coup as a means of financing, (5) rebel group dependence on natural resources as a means of financing, (6) rebel group dependence on crime as a means of financing, (7) government dependence on foreign aid, and (8) signing of peace treaty ending war. A more detailed explanation of data selection and cleaning procedures can be found in Appendix B.
3.1.2 Model II
Building on the results of the first model, a second model was created with two goals: (1) to introduce new variables demonstrating rebel group capacity, and (2) to test for potential interaction effects. The Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan (2009) non-state actors in armed 13 conflicts (NSA) dataset was used for additional variables included in this model. A detailed description of this model can be found in Appendix C.
3.2 Qualitative analysis
This sections draws on existing literature on civil war or rebel governance to offer four potential causal explanations relationship observed in the quantitative portion. The casual logic of each potential explanation is outlined in detail in the qualitative analysis section of the study. Three key conditions were considered in the selection of the case study used. First, the rebel group should provide a large variety of governance functions. This allows the study to capture any meaningful difference between different functions of governance provided by the same group.
Second, the rebel group should be active in a conflict with high conflict violence. This element is necessary in order to more closely examine the observed relationship between governance and conflict violence. Finally, the rebel group should be active over a long period of time, in order to examine temporal variations in governance and violence that were not captured by the quantitative data. The case study of the LTTE meets all conditions: The group provided 9 of the
11 governance functions used as explanatory variables, are notorious for continuous violent behaviour in the Sri Lankan civil war, and were active for over three decades (from 1976 to
2009).
4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
4.1 Model I
For primary outcome deaths: The coefficient for all eleven governance functions is positive, indicating a positive relationship between governance and conflict violence. This relationship is only statistically significant (at p<0.05) for exposure variables ‘executive leadership’, ‘education system’, and ‘media and propaganda’. To examine the effect of social services, the thematic 14 governance variable ‘social services’, encompassing education, healthcare, or humanitarian relief was also tested. There was a statistically significant positive relationship between this variable and the outcome variable ‘deaths’. Were civil wars with rebel groups who provided social services for civilians less violent? The answer to H1 is no - they were not less violent. In fact, they were more violent in terms of deaths. The formal representation of the regression model for relation of outcome ‘deaths’ with exposure variable ‘social services’ and covariables can be seen below: log(deaths) = α + β1social + β2infst + β3coup + β4natural + β5decade_cop90 + β6duration_inyr + β7strata + β8marxist + error
To examine the effect of breadth of governance, the total number of governance functions provided in each was used as another form of the exposure variable. This variable was also found to be positively related with outcome variable ‘deaths’ at a statistically significant level. Were civil wars with a greater total number of governance functions less violent? The answer to H2 is no – they were not less violent. In fact, civil wars with rebel groups providing a higher total number of governance functions were more violent in terms of deaths.
Table 1 reports the regression results for all governance variables and outcome variable
‘death’, including individual governance functions, the thematic social variable, and the variable for total number of governance functions.
[insert table 1 here]
For secondary outcome displacements: While the coefficient for all eleven governance functions is positive, indicating a positive relationship between governance and conflict violence, none are related to the outcome variable ‘displacements’ at a statistically significant level. The thematic variable ‘social services’ is also not related to this outcome variable at a statistically significant level. Were civil wars with rebel groups who provided social services less violent? The answer to 15
H1 is no – they were not less violent in terms of displacements. The formal representation of the regression model for relation of outcome ‘displacements’ with exposure variable ‘social services’ and covariables can be seen below: log(displacements) = α + β1social + β2nonunops + β3colfra + β4postcw + β5coup + β6natural + β7crime + β8foreign_g + β9treaty + error
The exposure variable ‘total number of governance functions’ was also not related to the outcome variable ‘displacements’ at a statistically significant level. Were civil wars with rebel groups providing a greater total number of governance functions less violent in terms of displacements? The answer to H2 is no – they were not less violent.
Table 2 shows a summary of regression results for all governance variables and outcome variable ‘displacements’, including individual governance functions, the thematic social variable, and the variable for total number of governance functions.
[insert table 2 here]
The quantitative findings indicate that the provision of social services did not make conflicts less violent in terms of deaths or displacements. On the contrary, the provision of
‘executive leadership’, ‘education system’, and ‘media and propaganda’ were associated with more deaths. Additionally, the findings indicate that the provision of a greater number of governance functions also did not make conflicts less violent in terms of deaths or displacements. Civil wars with rebel groups that provided a higher number of different governance functions were in fact more violent in terms of deaths.
4.2 Model II
The inclusion of ‘number of rebel troops’ and the interaction term for ‘number of rebel troops’ and exposure variables in the second model for the primary outcome ‘deaths’ increased the 16 model fit significantly. The R-squared values for this model are an average 0.16 higher compared to the first model, indicating that the new model is able to better capture variation in the data.
The results of this model were largely consistent with the first. A statistically significant positive relationship was found between outcome variable ‘deaths’ and exposure variables
‘executive leadership’, ‘education system’, and ‘healthcare system’, as well as the thematic variable ‘social services’. Table 1 includes the results of model II alongside those of model I, showing minor variation in statistically significant findings. Thus, the answer to H1 remains negative. Civil wars with rebel groups who provided social services for civilians were more violent in terms of deaths. In answering H2, the findings indicate that the provision of a greater number of governance functions also did not make conflicts less violent in terms of deaths. In fact, conflicts with rebel groups providing a higher total number of governance functions were associated with more deaths. The consistent results of the two models offer complementary support for the findings of this study, as model I includes a large number of cases (n=122), while model II captures greater variation in the data for a smaller number of cases (n=78).
The increase in R-squared values also demonstrates that the variable ‘number of rebel troops’, which is an indicator of rebel group capacity, is in fact related to phenomenon at hand.
These results encourage the strong consideration of rebel group capacity in the qualitative component of the study, as a potential explanation for the positive relationships observed in the quantitative component.
4.3 Limitations
The quantitative results of this study are produced under four major limitations. First, the accuracy of data of on civil wars is limited due to the inherent difficulty of data collection during conflict and socio-political unrest. Data on governance tends to be underreported and under- 17 collected, due to a preference to highlight and sensationalize more violent rebel group behaviour
(Heger and Jung 2017, 1235). Some rebel groups have further incentives in hiding political functions of their governance from media and international attention (Huang 2016, 61-62).
Second, the coding for governance functions in this study considers only the presence or absence of governance, and not the quality (effectiveness) of governance functions, limiting the amount of variation in governance that is captured by the data. Third, the data used for both the exposure and outcome variables does not capture variation over time, within each individual conflict.
Temporal variation will be considered to an extent within the qualitative component of the study.
Finally, this study did not utilize a comprehensive model including all governance functions and covariables. A greater number of cases2 would be required for the statistical model to successfully detect existing patterns in the data.
5. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
5.1 Direction for qualitative study: Potential explanations for quantitative findings
The results of the current study do not fully corroborate or contradict the findings of Stanton
(2016), as that study focuses specifically on the severity of violence. Nonetheless, the quantitative results have found a relationship contrary to the broader characterization of rebel governance as related to a reduction in conflict violence. The qualitative component of this study will thus have two aims: (1) to assess the directionality of the relationship between social services and conflict violence, and (2) consider potential explanations for the positive relationship observed between rebel governance and conflict violence.
This section will consider four potential causal explanations. The primary explanation considers rebel group capacity as an explanatory variable taking the form of military capacity,
2 Following the statistical rule-of-thumb of 10 lines of data per added variable, a model including 11 governance functions and 7-8 covariables would require 180-200 lines of data. 18 resource-based capacity, organizational capacity, or some combination of all three. Resource- based and financial capacity is important as it ensures the military survival of rebel groups and directly contributes to an increase in military capacity (Cunningham and Loyle 2021, 5).
Increased military capacity can take the form of a greater number of rebel troops, as well as increased cohesion in leadership and command. High capacity rebel groups can better absorb resources, while maintaining their military organization and discipline (Staniland 2012, 174).
Highly-organized and high capacity groups are more successful at both service provision and carrying out violence against civilians (Heger and Jung 2017, 1207-1208). The quantitative findings of this study further encourage the relevance of this explanation. The significant relationship between the governance function ‘executive leadership’ and conflict violence, as well as the increase in regression model fit following the inclusion of capacity variables corroborate the relevance of capacity to the exposure and outcome variables at hand.
Additionally, the positive relationship between the total number of governance functions and conflict violence indicates a potentially important role for rebel group capacity, as higher capacity groups are likely better able to provide a large variety of governance functions.
Potential explanation 1: Rebel groups with higher military or resource-based capacity are both capable of providing more governance functions, and perpetuating more violence.
The second explanation considers temporal variation in rebel group governance and violence. Rebels can provide governance from the very start of conflict, institute governance at a mid-point, and even abandon institutions that no longer serve their objectives (Kasfir 2015, 41).
Civil war itself often occurs in a syncopated pattern, alternating periods of intense violence and relative peace (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015, 2). Thus, groups participating in bursts of highly intense and violent conflict can also provide governance in periods of relative peace. 19
Potential explanation 2: Rebel groups create governance functions in long periods of relative peace, even if they enact significant harm on civilians during short periods of heightened violence.
The third explanation considers conflict through the lens of the state-rebel dyad. Rebel groups and state governments compete for territory and civilian support, both of which can be secured or legitimized through the provision of governance (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015,
1). While armed conflict threatens state legitimacy through breaking the monopoly on the use of violence (Grynkewich 2008, 351), rebel governance threatens the civil legitimacy of the state.
The institution of widespread governance by rebel groups is likely to be perceived as a heightened threat to legitimacy by state governments, who may in turn further escalate the conflict and push rebel groups to continue or increase violent behaviours.
Potential explanation 3: State response to the perceived legitimacy threat of widespread rebel governance will escalate conflict and cause rebel groups to be more violent.
The final explanation returns to the core conceptual definition of rebel governance provided by Kasfir (2015) by considering the extent to which rebel violence is a necessary condition for successful rebel governance. In many cases, accepting rebel governance is only possible because civilians are coerced or threatened with violence if they defy rebel rule. Rebel governance can only exist as part of, or companion to, a broader military strategy (Huang 2016,
52).
Potential explanation 4: Violence, or the threat of violence, are a necessary element of rebel governance that is fulfilled best by rebel groups that are more violent.
5.2 The case of the Tamil Tigers
The following section will explore the case study of The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), a secessionist rebel group active on the Northern and Eastern parts of the island of Sri
Lanka from 1976 to 2009. The group was comprised of ethnic Tamils, who made up roughly 20 one-fifth of the population of the Sri Lanka (Whittaker 2012, 82). The LTTE were known for their complex schemes of violence, crime, and propaganda, as well a rigid and well-organized military structure that allowed them to wage a long campaign of violence, fighting against a large number of Sri Lankan armed forces and Indian peacekeepers(Sauerborn 2017, 181, 187). The group also administered a diverse set of governance functions, providing 9 of the 11 governance functions included in the quantitative component of this study. In tracing the behaviour of this group, both as perpetrators of violence and providers of governance, this section will assess plausibility of the four potential explanations for the quantitative results.
[insert figure 1 here]
5.2.1 Historical context: A civil war with colonial roots
From 1505 to 1948, Sri Lanka – known then as Ceylon – was subject to rule by Portuguese,
Dutch, and British colonial powers. The recent ethnic history of Sri Lanka is grounded in the period of British rule lasting from 1796 to 1948. Upon their takeover, the British forcefully relocated Tamil people from the adjacent Tamil Nadu province of India (also under colonial control) to Sri Lanka to work on plantations, expanding the existing population of Tamils on the island (Mampilly 2015, 98). The Tamil were given British education, which elevated their access to work within the colonial civil service, as well as other high-paying English jobs in other sectors (Sauerborn 2017, 82). The Tamils spoke Tamil and practiced Hinduism, while the
Sinhalese spoke Sinhala and were Buddhist (Mampilly 2015, 97). However, it is crucial to recognize that the harsh divide between the two groups was predominantly a product of socio- economic and power imbalances introduced by the colonial system, rather than pure ethnic difference (Sauerborn 2017, 182). It was such that at the time of independence in 1948, the
Tamil minority were higher-educated, and held better paying jobs than the Sinhalese. 21
Much of the behaviour of the new independent government can be seen as a direct response to this disparity. Immigration acts were passed to revoke or deny citizenship to Indian- born Tamils, and new policies pushed Tamils out of civil service and military positions
(Mampilly 2015, 99-100). The 1956 Sinhala Only Act made Sinhala the official language, effectively barring Tamil access to higher education and government jobs (Sauerborn 2017, 183).
The 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act was used to target young Tamil men, who were then subjected to torture and violence (Whittaker 2012, 87). The above exclusionary policies created tensions between the Tamil and Sinhala people, reaching an ultimate breaking point in the 1983 killing of thirteen government soldiers in Jaffna, the capital of the Northern Province. Three days of anti-Tamil riots ensued in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombia, as well as elsewhere in the country (Flanigan 2008, 501). The riots targeted Tamil homes, factories, and businesses, with mobs resorting to extreme violence, rape, and the murder of several thousand Tamil (Bloom
2007, 52; Mampilly 2015, 102). The riots were followed by a mass exodus of Tamil from the south of the island, with some resettling in the North and East of the country, and the wealthy and educated leaving Sri Lanka altogether (Bloom 2007, 54; Mampilly 2015, 103). The extreme and sudden violence of the ’83 riots occupy a unique place in the collective memory of the
Tamil, and serve as a turning point in the relationship between the ethnic minority and their
Sinhalese counterparts, as well as Sri Lankan state (Bloom 2007, 52).
5.2.2 The rise of the LTTE: Consolidating power and ideology
Even prior to the riots, an array of militant and guerilla groups had emerged in response to the perceived and real mistreatment of the Tamils. The most predominant of them all was the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a Marxist group that lasted until 1972, when the majority of its members were imprisoned or killed (Samaranayake 1997, 99, 108). The LTTE was 22 established in 1976 by charismatic leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, emerging as the most powerful of over 35 ‘tiger’ insurgent groups, and became the dominant rebel group in Sri Lanka by 1983
(Samaranayake 1997, 108-109; Sauerborn 2017, 184-185). From their initial rise to dominance and throughout their decades of activity, the LTTE consistently worked to eliminate competition from other Tamils, and were extremely harsh on those who showed support for other militant factions (Mampilly 2015, 108-109; Sauerborn 2017, 181).
Compared to other groups like the JVP, the LTTE were more secessionist in nature
(Samaranayake 1997, 99). Their ideology drew on anti-colonial roots to produce a blend of ethnonationalism and socialism, with an ultimate goal of creating Tamil Eelam – a distinct Tamil homeland situated in the North and East of Sri Lanka (Frerks and Terpstra 2017; Samaranayake
1997, 99, 109, 112). The fight for Tamil Eelam was characterized as a “people’s war” in which the heroic rebels fought to overthrow the Sri Lankan government forces with the continued moral support of the Tamil people (Samaranayake 1997, 113). Of course, this ideological approach was limited – not all ethnic Tamils supported the LTTE’s vision of ethnic justice (Fuglerud 2009,
207).
5.2.3 The military face of the LTTE
The LTTE were known for their comprehensive, complex, and often extreme approach to political violence. The group evolved from conducting sporadic assassinations, executions, and terrorist attacks in their early days to employing characteristic guerilla and conventional ground warfare against Sri Lankan state forces and Indian Peacekeepers (Samaranayake 1997, 115-116).
The LTTE were remarkably advanced militarily, and at their peak had over 20,000 troops, a navy with ships, submarines, and a distinct sea cadre, an air force capable of conducting air raids, intelligence capacities, and an infamous suicide commando group known as the “Black Tiger 23
Squad” (DeVotta 2009, 1023; Flanigan 2008, 501; Frerks and Terpstra 2017, 286; Mampilly
2015, 94). In fact, the LTTE became known for their use of asymmetric warfare and suicide bombings, and assassinations of high-profile politicians like Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa (DeVotta 2009, 1021-1023; Sauerborn 2017,
188). The LTTE did not refrain from attacking civilian targets, particularly civilian cultural and heritage sites (Sauerborn 2017, 187).
The LTTE was present primarily in the country’s Northern and Eastern provinces, large parts of which it grew to directly control starting in the early 1990s (Stokke 2006, 1037). Power was always centralized in the North, while control in the East was shorter, more fragmented, and treated as a secondary component of the group’s territorial ambitions (Fuglerud 2009, 206;
Mampilly 2015, 124). Rebel-held territories were surrounded by militarized borders, with checkpoints for entry (Florea 2020, 1005; Mampilly 2015, 93). LTTE control was strongest in major cities, and was present parallel to government authority in other areas (Mampilly 2015,
118). At its peak, the military, territorial, and political control of the LTTE was characterized by some as a de facto state (Florea 2020).
5.3 LTTE governance
5. 3.1 Temporal variation in governance
To conceptualize the evolution of LTTE rebel governance over time, it is helpful to separate the three decades of LTTE activity into three distinct periods. The first lasted from the 1976 creation of the group to the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It began with a distinct shift from peaceful protest to political violence in pursuit of Tamil independence (Mampilly 2015, 102), saw the LTTE consolidate power among other rebel groups (Mampilly 2015, 102-103), and begin to engage in conventional warfare alongside older guerilla tactics (Frerks and Terpstra 24
2017, 286). In 1987, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords initiated the introduction of the Indian
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) into territories with rebel presence, with the ultimate goal of disarming the LTTE (Bloom 2007, 56; Mampilly 2015, 104). However, both the LTTE and the
Sinhalese Sri Lankan armed forces grew intolerant of Indian presence on the island, and collaborated toward the withdrawal of IPKF in 1990 (Bloom 2007, 57; Mampilly 2015, 104).
The support LTTE had previously enjoyed, both from the government of India and the provincial government of neighbouring Tamil Nadu, were reduced significantly, and halted fully after the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister in 1991 (DeVotta 2009, 1041). Further, the Northern region of the island previously occupied by the IPKF, was left in control of the LTTE (Mampilly
2015, 106). The loss of state support paired with heightened territorial control created a need for the LTTE to foster control of civilians in the region, and propelled them toward mass institution of rebel governance.
The second period lasted from the Indian departure in 1990 to the 2002 signing of a ceasefire agreement between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. It was in this period that the LTTE reached their apogee as rebel rulers (DeVotta 2009, 1023; Mampilly 2015, 109). The specific governance institutions created during this time will be discussed in detail in the following section. In 1998, newly elected prime minister Chandrika Kumaratunga initiated peace talks, that despite numerous barriers, came to fruition in a 2002 Permanent Ceasefire Agreement
(Mampilly 2015, 106-107). While the ceasefire resulting from the agreement would not last long, the LTTE did use this period of relative peace to regroup and re-arm (DeVotta 2009, 1023). The ceasefire allowed the LTTE to further centralize their administration in the north, and presented a new governance challenge: dealing with post-conflict aid pouring into the region from NGOs and IOs (Mampilly 2015, p. 123). 25
The third period thus began in 2002, and lasted until the 2009 military defeat of the
LTTE by the Sri Lankan state forces. During this time, the LTTE’s territorial and civilian control increased even further, becoming the “de facto government administrating body for the island’s northern and eastern provinces” (Flanigan 2008, 511). This trend was interrupted by two key events, both taking place in 2004. First, after decades of being considered second to the north, the eastern part of LTTE split from the group under the leadership of LTTE general Karuna
Aman, at points even collaborating with the Sri Lankan government (DeVotta 2009, 1036,
1041). Second, a large tsunami majorly disrupted civil and military life on the island. The government response to the tsunami was slow, and left many NGOs no choice but to collaborate directly with the LTTE for the distribution of aid (Sindre 2014, 11-12). The organizational contribution of the LTTE post-tsunami aid was notable for its ability to show that the rebel institutions of governance were more organized and efficient than those of the state, and were able to work with international actors. This final iteration of LTTE governance, however, was short lived. From 2007, the Sri Lankan state waged a heavy military campaign against the group, killing Prabhakaran, and decimating the LTTE by 2009 (DeVotta 2009, 1023; Mampilly 2015,
107).
A consideration of the civil war in Sri Lanka over time can certainly shed insight onto the nuances of LTTE rebel governance. While the LTTE did experience phases of relative peace and increased violence (Levey, Shellman, and Young 2013), they did not correspond cleanly to the creation or provision of rebel governance. The temporal variation in governance, however, was associated with key events or changes in the context of LTTE activity. Moments of crisis, such as large political shifts or natural disasters, can provide the impetus for groups to broaden, deepen, or institutionalize their governance. For the LTTE, the loss of the Indian alliance created 26 momentum for widespread institution of governance, and formalization of the role of the LTTE in the north and east. The 2004 Tsunami created demand for efficient governance that was capable of working with international actors. The LTTE met this demand by re-orienting and evolving existing institutions of governance. It is important to note that the LTTE continued to fight state forces on the military front, throughout all three periods outlines above Thus, the second potential explanation, concerning increased governance in periods of relative peace, was not observed in the case of the LTTE. While war was in fact syncopated, governance and institution building did not move along with the military rhythm.
5.3.2 Rebel Capacity and Hybrid Governance
Over the course of the years, the LTTE instituted and fulfilled a variety of governance functions, including civil administration, policy services, judiciary, education, healthcare, taxation, and aid distribution. The provision of public goods brought stability into LTTE held territories
(Mampilly 2015, 94).
LTTE governance began with the institution of the Tamil Eelam Economic Development
Organization (TEEDO), an entity created to coordinate development in areas of rebel territory damaged by conflict (Mampilly 2015, 110). Individual TEEDO commissions evolved into thematic agencies, and eventually ministries (Mampilly 2015, 110). Prabhakaran led the Central
Governing Committee, under which individual secretaries – known as porupalar – lead ministries of “finance, justice, protection…, economic development, health, and education”
(Mampilly 2015, 111).
The earliest governance functions fulfilled by the LTTE were policing and the judiciary.
Starting in 1991, police stations were created and staffed with former combatants, and fulfilled services ranging from traffic control to intelligence collection (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1015; 27
Stokke 2006, 1026-1028). Local courts and village mediation courts were established as early at the 1980s (Stokke 2006, 1027). However, these basic judicial institutions faced issues of legitimacy for civilians, as they did not rely on a set legal code, and were staffed by former civil servants and educators (Stokke 2006, 1027). In response to civilian dissatisfaction, the LTTE created a law college in 1992, a penal code in 1994, and a series of district courts, high courts, courts of appeal, and a supreme court (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1016 ; Loyle 2021, 124;
Mampilly 2015, 117). The LTTE move to legitimize this dimension of governance in the eyes of civilians demonstrates the influence of civilian opinion on rebel governance. The resulting legal and judicial legitimacy served the LTTE well, as courts were used to deny non-Tamils access to land in the Northern province, directly resisting the state’s Sinhala relocation efforts (Mampilly
2015, 118). The courts, police, and other legal infrastructure also facilitated direct and indirect taxation, including income, property, transaction, and vehicle registration taxes, as well as customs fees – all intended to restrict and control the movement of goods and people (Goodhand,
Hulme, and Lewer 2000, 400; Stokke 2006, 1034). While evidently created and expanded to serve the strategic needs of rebels, the LTTE security apparatus was also shaped by the demands of the civilians residing in rebel-held territory.
The provision of healthcare, education, and aid by the LTTE occurred in a very different context than the group’s security functions. Tamil areas of Sri Lanka were fit with good education infrastructure as a remnant of colonial times (Mampilly 2015, 120). For areas under rebel control, the LTTE established the Tamil Eelam Education Council (TEEC) to coordinate matters of education with the state government in the province, and to ensure educational continuity and a high standard of education during periods of intense conflict (Mampilly 2015,
121). In these areas, school administration was appointed by and funded by the state government, 28 but worked under the direction of the LTTE (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1024). State and rebel education infrastructure existed in parallel and in conjunction. A medical student interviewed by conflict scholars recalled having both the option of writing LTTE medical exams, and their government counterparts (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1024).
The case of healthcare rings similar to that of education, although healthcare proved to be a much more challenging service to provide. The LTTE and the government did not collaborate on the provision of healthcare. Rather, healthcare provision existed as a constantly shifting patchwork of jurisdictions. In the North, the LTTE controlled some government-funded hospitals and had some mobile medical units staffed with trained doctors (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1020-
1021). Healthcare provision proved to be especially difficult in areas under full rebel control, as physicians and other medical personnel preferred working in stable and peaceful provinces, and an ongoing government embargo made purchase of health supplies and construction of health infrastructure especially difficult (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1022; Mampilly 2015, 120). In the
East, the government continued to fully provide and administer healthcare in some areas, while other areas were served by Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), and other international organizations (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1023;
Mampilly 2015, 119). Rebel and state governance existed alongside one another, and in some cases interacted, but were not fully collaborative. The humanitarian arm of the rebels, the Tamil
Relief Organization (TRO) provided aid post-natural disasters, and partnered with international organizations like UNICEF and Save the Children (Flanigan 2008, 512-514). Involvement in aid was a crucial mechanism used by the LTTE to demonstrate reliability to international actors
(Mampilly 2015, 126). Beyond security functions, education, healthcare, and aid provision, the
LTTE also regulated exit and entry in its territories, and created institutions for banking, 29 sporting, farming, environmental protection, industry regulation, and construction of infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, and airports (DeVotta 2009, 1033).
An interesting and important dimension of LTTE governance was indeed its hybrid character. The LTTE recognized the value in existing state governance infrastructure, and made the strategic choice to coopt and control them where possible, rather than creating all new parallel institutions (Frerks and Terpstra 2017, 278; Mampilly 2015, 128). Each government administrator had a parallel porupalar, who worked to implement LTTE directives (Mampilly
2015, 111). The government appointees were usually ethnic Tamils pre-approved by rebel authorities, who were paid for by the government but were continuously monitored by the LTTE, implemented state policies only when were permitted by the LTTE, and turned to the LTTE as the final source of decision-making (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1030; Mampilly 2015, 112-115).
This hybrid structure allowed the LTTE to gain the benefits of control and legitimacy, while minimizing the costs of conducting and instituting various functions of governance.
This trade-off serves as a connecting point for both the primary (capacity-related) and third (state response) explanations . To address the potential explanation considering rebel capacity, it is helpful to first consider all the sources of LTTE income. Military resources, such as arms and training, were initially provided to the LTTE by India (Sauerborn 2017, 194) and later by states such as Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia, terrorist groups, and other rebel groups (Bloom 2007, 58; Sauerborn 2017, 193). For financial support, the LTTE relied primarily on a complex overseas resource extraction system that targeted the international Tamil diaspora, and raised millions of dollars in annual funds to support the rebel initiative (DeVotta 2009, 1032;
Fuglerud 2009, 208; Orjuela 2008 , 440-444; Samaranayake 1997, 109; Sauerborn 2017, 194;
Whittaker 2012 , 90). The LTTE also benefitted from local taxation (Samaranayake 1997, 109), 30 and maritime narcotics exports to continental Asia and Europe (Bloom 2007, 58) as other means of financing. The LTTE were a high-capacity rebel group, both in terms of reliable and significant financing, and access to crucial military resources. The ability of the rebels to co-opt government funding toward rebel governance institutions, or to overtake government-funded institutions to serve rebel goals and interests, was an innovative and strategic solution to the question of financing. Exempt from the need to directly finance governance, the LTTE were able to concentrate their vast resources on the military dimension of their operations. It was such that the LTTE continued to wage violent war against the Sri Lankan state forces, with large consequences in terms of civilian deaths, all the meanwhile providing a comprehensive and ever expanding varieties of governance functions. The case of the LTTE illustrates the importance of the capacity-oriented explanation, showing that when sufficient resources are present, rebel groups can simultaneously fund violent warfare and governance.
The willingness of the Sri Lankan state to continue funding governance institutions, even after they were overtaken by the LTTE, can shed light on the rebel-government dyad, and how governments perceive and respond to the legitimacy threat of rebel governance. It would be fair to assume that without government funds, the LTTE would not have been able to at best, provide governance as robust and expansive as what occurred during the war, and at worst, to provide governance at all. Why did the state not cease funding the North and East of the island, knowing that doing so would significantly limit the scope of rebel activity? For the state, financing service provision served as one of the last remaining means of connections to civilians in regions overtaken by rebels. They aimed to use financing as a means of legitimizing their claim to rebel- held territories, and refuting claims of counter-sovereignty put forth by the LTTE, particularly for an international audience (Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1027; Mampilly 2015, 114). Parallel 31
LTTE institutions would have been in direct competition with those provided by the state, and the potential of civilian legitimation of LTTE rule through choosing rebel institutions was an outcome desperately avoided by the Sri Lankan government. As outlined in third potential explanation, the state response to perceived or real threats to legitimacy are an important force shaping rebel governance. In the case of the LTTE, the government response was not simple one of escalated violence, but also one of paradoxical support. In the background of the unlikely governance partnership, the LTTE and state forces continued to fight in the jungle battlefields, and the LTTE continued to target civilians using terrorist tactics, resulting in high levels of conflict violence. An additional insight from the case study can also be found here: rebel governance can occur in partnership with state governance, and exist as part of a hybrid system.
5.3.3 Violence and coercion
Persistent violence or threat of violence is a necessary and defining characteristic of rebel governance. Legitimation and coercion go hand-in-hand – while coercion can produce compliance, legitimation can maintain and even increase it (Frerks and Terpstra 2017, 279). In the case of the LTTE, five different tools of legitimation were paired with coercive and predatory behaviour as a foundation for continued rebel rule and governance. First was the cult of personality formed around the charismatic leadership of Prabhakaran, who had ultimate say and control over both civilian and military (Frerks and Terpstra 2017, 287-300). Second, drawing on ethnic loyalty based on narratives of Tamil nationalism that placed the LTTE “in a nexus of respect and fear” (Frerks and Terpstra 2017, 288; Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1032). Third, the use of propaganda centred around sacrifice that portrayed LTTE militants as heroes and martyrs
(Frerks and Terpstra 2017, 288-300; Frerks and Terpstra 2018, 1036). Fourth, was the symbolic performance of Tamil nationhood through flags, monuments, posters, memorials, public 32 campaigns, news, radio, songs, films, TV broadcasts, and beyond (Frerks and Terpstra 2018,
1034, 1039; Mampilly 2015, 112). Finally, the promise of social reform, with a focus on the inclusion of women in military cadres, and promises of relaxing the strict caste system (DeVotta
2009, 1035; Mampilly 2015, 288-300; Stack-O’Connor 2007).
In conjunction, these five elements legitimized LTTE rule and governance. This is not to indicate that the LTTE did not also use coercion as a key tool. The rebels did not aim to establish a democracy, and were notoriously harsh on dissent (DeVotta 2009, 1031). They made leaving rebel-held territory very difficult, forcefully recruited individuals as labourers and soldiers, conducted mass surveillance, and of course perpetuated continuous intense violence (DeVotta
2009, 1032; Frerks and Terpstra 2017, 288). LTTE rule was “rule through fear” (Frerks and
Terpstra 2018, 1018). A Tamil scholar responding to characterizations of LTTE as benevolent rulers, stressed the importance of recognizing the extreme and controlling nature of the LTTE security apparatus (Sarvananthan 2007). The case of the LTTE’s use of coercion affirms the fourth potential explanation – violence and predatory behaviour were necessary tools in persuading civilians to accept rebel rule and to partake in rebel-provided governance. This element is also connected to the primary explanation – higher capacity groups are more likely to be able to use violence as a threat, and push civilians to accept rebel governance.
5.4 Discussion
The case study of the LTTE sheds more light on the positive relationship observed between rebel governance, and conflict violence, providing evidence in support of first and fourth potential explanations, partial support of of the third, and none supporting the second. The capacity approach shows good explanatory power: high resource and military capacity did allow the rebel group to conduct very violent warfare and provide widespread governance. This high capacity 33 also allowed them to better use violence as a threat, in order to coerce civilians to accept their rule. For the LTTE, violence and predatory behaviour were necessary for establishing and maintaining rebel governance, and even took place through governance institutions the police and judiciary. Thus, the explanation considering violence as a key condition of rebel governance also holds true in this case.
While the evidence from the LTTE does not fully corroborate that state violence and perpetuation of conflict was a direct response to the legitimacy threat produced by rebel governance, the state rebel dyad proved to be valuable in understanding the government response to rebel rule. Since the government funded rebel rule as an attempt to maintain their own legitimacy, they allowed rebels to focus their own funding on the military front. The third explanation considering state backlash to rebel governance thus is partially supported, and could present more strongly in cases of non-hybrid rebel governance. Finally, evidence from this case does not support the second potential explanation, as periods of governance institution and provision did not align with variations in conflict violence.
It is important to note that different case studies of rebel groups and civil wars may present varying and different support for the four potential explanations for the observed positive relationship between rebel governance and conflict violence. Thus, the qualitative findings of this study do not claim applicability to all conflicts, nor for all cases of rebel governance. Rather, the exploration of the plausibility of each explanation can provide a productive starting point for further research on rebel governance as a broader phenomenon, or as exercised by individual groups.
34
6. CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary of findings
The new wave of conflict literature on rebel governance seeks to recharacterize conventional understandings of rebel groups as chaotic perpetrators of violence. This study found that while many rebel groups partook in complex and widespread rebel governance, they did so in the context of intense conflict violence. Building on earlier literature associating rebel rulers with restraint in the use of violence, and using quantitative data on rebel governance and conflict deaths and displacements, this study sought to determine if particular functions or characters of governance were especially effective at reducing conflict violence.
The output of the above study presents four key insights. First, the results of the quantitative analysis showed that the provision of social services is positively related to conflict violence. These findings are especially interesting given that in contrast to other functions of governance such as judicial institutions, policing, taxation, or propaganda services, social services (healthcare, education, humanitarian aid) are less political functions of governance. The functions of governance least intuitively connected to political and military objectives were most strongly related to conflict violence. Second, the total number of governance functions fulfilled by a rebel group was also observed to be positively related to conflict violence. Groups providing a higher number of governance functions were present in conflicts with more intense violence.
These results encourage consideration of some group characteristic that allows rebels to be successful at both governance and military ventures.
Qualitative analysis was employed to further examine this possibility, and considered a set of potential explanations drawn from existing conflict literature. Evidence from the case of the Tamil Tigers sheds light on a key explanatory factor – rebel group capacity, and provides 35 grounds for the remaining key insights. The third insight highlights violence and coercion are crucial and necessary conditions for rebel governance. More violent groups will more easily push civilians to accept rebel rule and service provision, allowing for longer-lasting and more expansive rebel governance. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, rebel groups that do not have to choose between rebel governance and military advancement due to resource or capacity limitations, can partake in widespread governance and intense armed warfare. Violence and governance are not zero-sum – governance can exist alongside violence, be reinforced by it, serve as a conduit for it, or fulfil a strategic role within broader military aims or objectives.
It is valuable to reiterate here, that without civil war and armed violence, there can be no rebel governance. Rebel governance is a socio-political relationship between rebel groups and civilians – actors brought together by the mutual experience of war. While governance provision by rebel groups certainly holds potential to benefit and support civilians, it will take place when it is practically feasible and does not detract from the military aims and strategy of the rebel group.
6.2 Contributions to the literature and direction for future research
The contributions of this study to the ongoing discourse on the relationship between rebel governance and the use of violence in conflict are two-folds. Firstly, this study asserts that rebel governance cannot simply be understood as an alternative to violence as a means to control or subdue civilians. While rebel groups who provide governance functions may be less likely to use extreme violence, more governance and the provision of social services are actually observed alongside higher conflict violence. Thus, the findings of this study emphasize the importance of considering rebel governance within the broader context of rebel military ambitions and aims.
Second, it strongly supports the inclusion of rebel capacity as an explanatory variable. While 36 other studies consider the effect of rebel group capacity on conflict violence or rebel governance, they do not consider the combined effects of all three.
Future research would find value in exploring the triangular dynamic of violence, governance, and capacity. Knowing the relevance of rebel group capacity, determining the how rebel groups decide to allocate resources to violence over governance, governance over violence, or even both contemporaneously can provide a more nuanced and contextual understanding of the relationship between the two variables. It is important to distinguish whether (and in what contexts) rebel governance serves a political aim, a military aim, or both. Future research on rebel governance would also benefit from further consideration of the phenomenon of hybrid governance observed in the case of the LTTE. Is hybrid governance unique to a limited number of groups, or a more widespread dimension of rebel governance? More literature detailing collaboration or cooperation of state and rebel actors on the provision of governance for civilians holds great potential in deepening existing, often dichotomous, understandings of rebel governance.
6.3 Policy implications
This study carries major implications for humanitarian and foreign policy engaging non- state armed actors such as rebel groups, and can provide two policy-oriented recommendations.
First, it cautions against the blanket treatment of rebel groups who provide social services as benevolent actors vis-a-vis civilians. Echoing Heger and Jung (2017), rebels who govern well and govern broadly are not necessarily “credible partners” – but rather more formidable opponents, with high resource-based, organizational, and military capacity. Groups providing governance can be subjecting civilians to ongoing violence and cause a great number of civilian deaths, and should not always be rewarded for engaging in the ‘peaceful’ activities of 37 governance. Thus, rebel groups providing rebel governance should be examined on a case-by- case and temporally contextual basis prior to the formation of policies and programs that engage rebel governance functions and institutions. Second, further consideration should be focused on whether rebel groups providing rebel governance are deserving of external support, particularly in terms of financing. In cases where financial resources provided for strengthening social services such as education, healthcare, or aid are used for those very purposes, rebel groups are able to focus their own internal and external revenues on military aims. Policies and programs aiming to benefit civilians through improving access to social services should closely examine the extensive causal implications of introducing funding to rebel groups in the name of better governance. 38
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Summary of regression results for relation of outcome ‘log of deaths’ and governance variables
log of deaths Model I Model II (n=122) (n=78) Variable beta p-value adjusted R- beta p-value adjusted R- squared squared courts or legal system 0.51 0.18 0.29 0.94 0.09* 0.45 executive leadership 0.82 0.03** 0.31 1.39 0.02** 0.46 legislature or regional councils 0.20 0.57 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.43 civilian taxation system 0.46 0.24 0.29 0.48 0.42 0.43 boycott of state taxes 1.09 0.22 0.29 0.27 0.83 0.45 police force 0.49 0.20 0.29 0.61 0.22 0.44 humanitarian relief 1.03 0.094* 0.30 0.94 0.38 0.44 education 0.79 0.041** 0.31 1.48 0.006*** 0.48 healthcare 0.32 0.21 0.28 1.15 0.03** 0.48 propaganda 1.02 0.008*** 0.32 0.43 0.44 0.43 diplomacy 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.49 0.31 0.45 service 0.81 0.029** 0.31 1.21 0.02** 0.47 total governance functions 0.16 0.012** 0.32 0.29 0.007*** 0.48
Significance indicators: p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** Note: Each line shows results for each individual governance function, taken from a full regression table including covariables.
39
Table 2. Summary of regression results for relation of outcome ‘log of displacements’ and governance variables
log of displacements (n=87) Variable beta p-value adjusted R-squared courts or legal system 0.47 0.11 0.34 executive leadership 1.01 0.09* 0.37 legislature or regional councils 0.13 0.69 0.33 civilian taxation system 0.34 0.29 0.33 boycott of state taxes 0.74 0.35 0.33 police force 0.54 0.075* 0.34 humanitarian relief 0.39 0.50 0.33 education -0.07 0.83 0.32 healthcare 0.08 0.81 0.32 propaganda -0.23 0.65 0.33 diplomacy -0.0004 0.999 0.32 service 0.31 0.39 0.33 total governance functions 0.07 0.23 0.33
Significance indicators: p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** Note: Each line shows results for each individual governance function, taken from a full regression table including covariables not shown here. 40
Figure 1. Map of Sri Lanka Note: Rebels were most present in the North and East of the island, particularly in the northern Jaffna peninsula. 41
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Appendix A
Below is a list of the 122 civil wars included in the final merged dataset used in this study.
Table 3. Civil Wars (1950-2006)
Conflict Country Start End Rebel group(s) Year Year ADFL (Kabila) Congo DR 1996 1997 ADFL (Kabila) ANC, PAC, AZAPO South Africa 1976 1994 ANC, PAC, AZAPO Abkhazia & Georgia 1992 1994 Abkhazia Gamsakhurdia Aceh 1 Indonesia 1953 1953 Darul Islam (Daud Buereueh) Aceh 2 Indonesia 1990 1991 GAM Anya Nya Sudan 1963 1972 Anya Nya Attempted coup Dominican Republic 1965 1965 Bosch supporters BRA (Bougainville) Papua New Guinea 1988 1998 BRA Baganda rebellion Uganda 1966 1966 Baganda Baluchistan Pakistan 1973 1977 BNLF Bangladesh secession Pakistan 1971 1971 Mukti Bahini Biafra Nigeria 1967 1970 Biafra Cabinda; FLEC Angola 1994 2006 FLEC Castro revolution Cuba 1958 1959 Castro Revolutionaries, M-26-7 Cedras v. Aristide Haiti 1991 1995 Aristide supporters Chechnya Russia 1994 1996 Dudaev regime Chittagong Hills Bangladesh 1974 1997 PCJSS, Shanti Bahini Cobras v. Ninjas Congo 1998 1999 Ninjas Communist insurgency Myanmar/Burma 1948 1988 CPB (Burma) Communist insurgency Thailand 1966 1982 CPT (Thailand) Communist insurgency Guatemala 1966 1972 MR-13, EGP, ORPA 1 (Guatemala) Communist insurgency Guatemala 1978 1994 MR-13, EGP, ORPA, 2 (Guatemala) Mayan peasants Contras Nicaragua 1981 1990 Contras Croatia/Krajina Yugoslavia 1991 1991 Krajina Darul Islam, PRRI, Indonesia 1956 1960 Darul Islam (Kahar Permesta Muzakkar), PRRI 47
Dhofar rebellion Oman 1971 1975 PFLO Doe v. rebels Liberia 1989 1990 NPFL (Taylor) East Timor Indonesia 1975 1999 FRETILIN, FALINTIL, CNRM Eritrean war of Ethiopia 1974 1991 EPLF independence FARF, FROLINAT Chad 1980 1994 FARF, FROLINAT FLNC; Shabba 1 & 2 Congo DR 1977 1978 FLNC FMLN El Salvador 1979 1992 FMLN FROLINAT, various Chad 1965 1979 FROLINAT FRUD Djibouti 1991 1994 FRUD FSLN Nicaragua 1978 1979 FSLN Faction of Socialist Yemen PR 1986 1986 Ismail supporters Party Fedeyeen; Syria v. govt Jordan 1970 1971 Fedeyeen, PLO GC-TC civil war Cyprus 1963 1967 TMT, Turkish Cypriot Rebels Huks Philippines 1950 1952 Huks Hutu uprising 1 Burundi 1965 1969 Hutu army rebels Hutu uprising 2 Burundi 1972 1972 Hutu rebels Hutu uprising 3 Burundi 1988 1988 Hutu rebels Hutu vs. Tutsi groups Rwanda 1990 1993 RPF Ideological; Tigrean Ethiopia 1978 1991 TPLF Intifada; Palestinian Israel 1987 1997 PLO, UNLU conflict Islamic Jihad Egypt 1994 1997 Gamaat Islamiya Islamist rebellions Algeria 1992 2002 FIS, AIS, GIA, GSPC JVP 1 Sri Lanka 1971 1971 JVP JVP 2 Sri Lanka 1987 1989 JVP KDP, Kurds Iraq 1961 1970 KDP, Kurds KDP, PUK, Kurds Iraq 1974 1975 KDP, PUK KDPI, Kurds Iran 1979 1984 KDPI, Komala Karen rebellion Myanmar/Burma 1948 1951 KNU, KNDO Karen rebellion 2 Myanmar/Burma 1960 1995 Karen movement, NDF, KNU Katanga mutiny Congo DR 1960 1965 Katanga rebels Khomeini Iran 1978 1979 anti-Shah movement Kisangani mutiny Congo DR 1967 1967 European mercenaries, Katanga insurgents Kony, LRA Uganda 1990 1992 Kony, LRA 48
Kosovo Yugoslavia 1998 1999 KLA Krajina, Slavonia Croatia 1992 1995 Krajina Serbs Kurds (Anfal) Iraq 1985 1996 KDP, PUK, Kurdish Front LF; LNM, PSP Lebanon 1975 1991 LNM, PSP LTTE Sri Lanka 1983 2002 LTTE La Violencia Colombia 1948 1966 Liberal insurgents Lissouba v. Sassou- Congo 1993 1997 Cobras Nguesso MFDC (Casamance) Senegal 1989 2004 MFDC MNR rebellion in La Bolivia 1952 1952 MNR Paz MQM:Sindhis v. Pakistan 1994 1999 MQM Mohajirs Maitatsine rebellion Nigeria 1980 1985 Maitatsine movement Matebeleland Zimbabwe 1983 1987 ZAPU, ZANU Montoneros, ERP, Argentina 1975 1977 Montoneros, ERP Dirty War Mosul revolt Iraq 1959 1959 Mosul garrison, Shammar tribe Mujahideen, PDPA Afghanistan 1978 1992 Mujahideen, PDPA Muslim Brotherhood Syria 1979 1982 Muslim Brotherhood Mutinies against Central African 1996 1997 Factional fighting Patasse Republic NLF Vietnam 1960 1975 NLF NPA Philippines 1972 1992 NPA NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; Liberia 1992 1997 NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; LPC; LDF LPC; LDF NRA (Museveni) Uganda 1981 1987 NRA NUFK, Khmer Cambodia 1970 1975 Khmer Rouge, NUFK, CPK Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan 1991 1994 Karabakh Armenian rebels Nasserites v. Chamoun Lebanon 1958 1958 Nasserites Northern Ireland United Kingdom 1971 1998 IRA Ogaden, Somalis Ethiopia 1976 1988 WSLF PKK, Kurds Turkey 1984 1999 PKK, Kurds Pathet Lao Laos 1960 1973 Pathet Lao Peron v. military Argentina 1955 1955 Anti-Peronist rebels 49
Polisario Morocco/Western 1975 1991 SADR, Polisario Sahara RCD v. Congo Congo DR 1998 2002 RCD RENAMO Mozambique 1976 1992 RENAMO RUF Sierra Leone 1991 1996 RUF Rebels v. PRK Cambodia 1975 1991 FUNFINPEC, KPNLF, PDK Red Guards China 1967 1968 Red Guards Rep. Srpska; Croats Bosnia 1992 1995 Serbian and Croatian insurgents Republicans v. Yemen AR 1962 1970 Royalists Royalists Rwandan genocide Rwanda 1994 1994 RPF SPLM, SPLA, NDA, Sudan 1983 2005 SPLM, SPLA, NDA, AnyanyaII AnyanyaII SSDF, SNM, Isaaqs Somalia 1988 1991 SSDF, SNM, Isaaqs SWAPO, SWANU, Namibia 1973 1989 SWAPO, SWANU, SWATF SWATF Sendero Luminoso Peru 1980 1996 Sendero Luminoso Shifta war Kenya 1963 1967 Shiftas Shiite uprising Iraq 1991 1993 Shiite rebels Sikhs India 1984 1993 Sikh insurgents South Moluccas Indonesia 1950 1950 RMS South Ossetia Georgia 1991 1992 South Ossetia South Yemen Yemen 1994 1994 South Yemen Taliban v. Burhanuddin Afghanistan 1992 1996 Taliban Rabbani Tanzanian war Uganda 1978 1979 UNLA, TPDF Tibetan uprising China 1956 1959 Tibetans Transdniestria Moldova 1991 1992 Dniestrians Tuaregs, Maurs Mali 1990 1995 MPLA and factions Tutsi uprising Rwanda 1963 1964 Tutsi rebels UNITA 1 Angola 1975 1991 UNITA UNITA 2 Angola 1992 1994 UNITA UNITA 3 Angola 1997 2002 UNITA UTO, Popular Front Tajikistan 1992 1997 UTO, Popular Front Vieira v. Mane Guinea-Bissau 1998 1999 Mane forces West Papua Indonesia 1976 1978 OPM ZANU, ZAPU Zimbabwe 1972 1979 ZANU, ZAPU 50 post-Koroma coup Sierra Leone 1997 2001 AFRC, RUF violence post-independence Algeria 1962 1963 Political Bureau (Ben strife Bella) re-annexation China 1950 1951 Tibetans
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Appendix B
Below are further details on the quantitative design and data processing used in this study.
Data cleaning and preparation
Of the 151 civil wars included in DS2006, RGD excludes 24 for the following reasons: the war was ongoing as of 2006, had ended before 1950, or did not satisfy the aforementioned definition of civil war. The current study maintains the selection criteria of RGD with one exception: the second Liberian civil war is included as two conflicts due to a distinct period of peace from 1997-1999, in accordance with DS2006 coding. Additionally, the civil war in Chad
(1997-2002) is excluded as it is included in RGD but not included in DS2006. The current study further excludes four wars due to missing or inaccurate values for the primary outcome variable
‘deaths’: Burundi (1991-2006), Ukraine (1944-1950), Liberia (1999-2003), and Indonesia (1999-
2002).
The final merged dataset had missing values for the following covariables: government military personnel, infant mortality, illiteracy, and percent urban population. The missing values were filled using data from the World Bank, various UN agencies, local government data, or other academic sources (Jeffrey 2013; Michael 2005; Savezni Zavod za Statistiku 1991; United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2019; United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 2005; World Bank 2018; World Bank 2021c; World Bank 2021d).
Further, values for the variables GDP per capital at start and end of war, and population at start and end of war were re-entered due to inaccuracy in values from DS2006 and RGD, using data from the World Bank and the Maddison Project (Bolt, Inklaar, de Jong, & van Zanden 2018;
World Bank 2021a; World Bank 2021b).
Bivariable analysis and multivariable analysis 52
Following an initial descriptive analysis step, the bivariable relation of the two outcomes with each exposure variable or covariable was assessed using non-parametric tests, given the non-normal distribution of the outcome variables. The selection criteria for covariable to be included in the multivariable models is explained in the body of the study. Statistical significance level was chosen at 0.05. Linear multiple regression models were used to assess the multivariable relation of the two outcome variables with the exposure variables and covariables. The following items were accounted for in regression models: (1) collinearity of covariables, (2) effect of outliers, (3) model fit, and (4) heteroskedasticity of residuals. In order to reduce heteroskedasticity, robust estimation of variance was used for the outcome ‘displacements’, and both outcome variables were log transformed.
Table 4. Description of Variables
Outcome Variables logdead log of total conflict deaths logridp log of total conflict displacements Exposure variables legal court or a legal system exec executive leadership council legislature or regional councils taxciv civilian taxation system taxrelief mandatory boycott of state taxes police police force humanit humanitarian relief educ education system health healthcare system propag media or propaganda diplomacy foreign affairs or diplomacy 53 service education, healthcare, or humanitarian relief govern total number of governance functions Covariables infst infant mortality rate at start of war coup rebel group dependence on resources obtained through a coup as a means of financing natural rebel group dependence on natural resources as a means of financing decade_cop90 conflict starting after 1989 duration_inyr conflict duration strata number of previous civil wars in country, in years marxist marxist rebel ideology nonunops number of non-UN intervention missions colfra former colony of France postcw post-cold war conflict crimes rebel group dependence on crime as a means of financing foreign_g government dependence on foreign aid treat signing of peace treaty ending war Interaction Variables rebestimate_n estimate number of rebel troops
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Appendix C
Below are further details on Model II, used in the quantitative portion of the study.
Addition of capacity covariables
The Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan (2009) non-state actors in armed conflicts
(NSA) dataset was used to test six new indicators of rebel group capacity as potential co- variables: (1) whether the rebel group had a political wing, (2) estimate number of rebel troops,
(3) strength of rebel group relative to strength of government, (4) strength of rebel group central command, (5) territorial control, and (6) whether the conflict was secessionist in nature.
Of these variables, only ‘number of rebel troops’ was related at a significant level to primary outcome variable ‘deaths’, and none were related to secondary outcome variable ‘displacements’ at a significant level.
The inclusion of this new covariable ‘number of rebel troops’ in the model for primary outcome ‘deaths’ reduced the number of conflicts with available data from 122 to 78, as values for this variable were not available for all civil wars initially included in this study. The set of covariables used in model II for primary outcome ‘deaths’ are (1) infant mortality rate at start of war, (2) rebel group dependence on natural resources as a means of financing, (3) conflicts starting after 1989, (4) conflict duration, (5) number of previous civil wars in country, and (6) number of rebel troops.
In order to maintain the ratio of 10 observations per independent variable in Model II, the number of covariables was further reduced on the basis of statistical relation with the outcome variable ‘deaths’. Stepwise entry of covariables was repeated. Existing covariables ‘rebel group dependence on resources obtained through a coup as a means of financing’ and ‘Marxist rebel ideology’ were dropped to increase the fit of the new model. 55
Testing for interaction effects
Three covariables were tested for a potential interaction effect with the exposure variables for primary outcome ‘deaths’: (1) war duration, (2) infant mortality at start of war (as an indicator of development), and (3) number of rebel troops. Of these three, only ‘number of rebel troops’ shows an interaction effect with the exposure variables at a statistically significant level. Thus, an interaction term for exposure variables and covariable ‘number of rebel troops’ was added to the model.
Four covariables were tested for a potential interaction effect with the exposure variables for secondary outcome ‘displacements’: (1) war duration, (2) former colony of France, (3) post-
Cold War conflict, and (4) number of rebel troops. None had an interaction effect with the exposure variables at a statistically significant level. Thus, the second model was only created for primary outcome ‘deaths’.
The formal representation of this regression model for relation of outcome ‘log of deaths’ with exposure variable ‘social services’ and covariables, where exec*rebestimate_n denotes the interaction terms between the exposure variable and ‘number of rebel troops’ can be seen below: log(deaths) = α + β1social + β2infst + β4natural + β5decade_cop90 + β6duration_inyr + β7strata + β8rebestimate_n + β9exec*rebestimate_n + error