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USA V. Pen Register
Case 4:06-mj-00356 Document 13-1 Filed in TXSD on 07/19/06 Page 1 of 35 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE § UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER § AUTHORIZING (1) INSTALLATION AND USE OF A § PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE §MAGISTRATE NO. H-06-356M OR PROCESS, (2) ACCESS TO CUSTOMER § RECORDS, AND (3) CELL PHONE TRACKING § OPINION This opinion addresses two significant issues concerning law enforcement access to certain dialing and signaling information in the hands of telephone companies under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). The first is whether the Government may obtain “post- cut-through dialed digits” containing communication contents under the authority of the Pen/Trap Statute.1 The second is whether limited cell site information may be obtained prospectively under the dual or hybrid authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).2 These questions arise from a recent governmental application for a court order authorizing installation and use of a pen register and trap/trace device, access to customer records, and cell phone tracking. The court initially granted this order in part, denying access to the dialed digits as well as the limited cell site authority. In response to the Government’s informal request, the court agreed to reconsider the dialed digits ruling and invited full briefing by the Government as well as interested parties. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and Center for Democracy and Technology have filed 1 18 U.S.C. -
An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Updated October 9, 2012 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41733 Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Summary This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also appends citations to state law in the area and the text of ECPA. It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys’ fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. -
Problems with Extending EINSTEIN 3 to Critical Infrastructure1
Can It Really Work? Problems with Extending EINSTEIN 3 to Critical Infrastructure1 Steven M. Bellovin2, Scott O. Bradner3, Whitfield Diffie4, Susan Landau5, Jennifer Rexford6 1 Introduction Effectiveness should be the measure of any deployed technology. Does the solution actually solve the problem? Does it do so in a cost-efficient manner? If the solution creates new problems, are these easier and less problematic to handle than the original issue? In short, is the solution effective? In the rush to protect the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks, effectiveness was not always the primary driver in determining the value of the systems being proposed. In this context we consider the potential extension to the private sector of EINSTEIN 3, a federal program to detect and prevent cyber intrusions. Providing services to the public is a fundamental role for U.S. federal civilian agencies, and beginning in the mid 1990s, many agencies turned to the Internet. This shift was not without problems. While confidentiality, integrity, and authentication dominated early federal thinking about computer and Internet security, the threats agencies faced included phishing, IP spoofing, botnets, denials of service (DoS), distributed denials of service, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Some exploits were done purely for the publicity, but others had serious purpose behind them. By the early 2000s, the growing number of attacks on U.S. civilian agency systems could not be ignored, and in 2004 the U.S. began an active effort to protect federal civilian agencies against cyber intrusions7. This 1 The authors would like to thank Matt Blaze and John Treichler for various insights and suggestions in the writing of this paper, and we would also like to acknowledge multiple useful conversations with Sandy Bacik, Tahir El Gamal, and Vern Paxson. -
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
All redacted information exempt under b(1) and/or b(3) except where TOP SECRETIIHCSIfCOMIPITIINOFORN otherwise noted. !'ILEO KAREN E. SUTTON, CLERK UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT U.S. Foreign lntelllgsnce Surveillance Court WASHINGTON, D.C. Docket Number: PRITT MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND FACT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES TOP !lECRETlIHCSJICOl\:UNTHNOFORN Derived from Application of the United States to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the above-captioned matt~ filed Dealassify ealy tl1'6ft the detetnhnatioll of the Pxesident. 1871 (c) (2) PRODUCT I ON JULY 2009 2405 'fell SECR£THHCS/fCOP,H~ITmIOFORN : . ! INTRODUCTION (U) One of the greatest challenges the United States faces in the ongoing conflict with_ "is finding operatives of the enemy. As the Court is aware' ,that task is complicated by terrorists' exploitation of Interne! e-mail as a favored means of communication. -- , .' TOP 8ECRET/fHC8NCOMIl'ffi'A'IOFORN 1871 (c) (2) PRODUCT I ON JULY 2009 2406 TOP SECR:ETffHCSHCOMINT/fNOFORN LI. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF, Director, NSA 'If 6 I(Attaclunent A to the Application) (hereinafter "DIRNSA Dec!. "). Unless the United States finds a way to sort through that data to identify terrorists' cornmuniical:iotls, . be losing vital intelligence that could prevent another deadly terrorist attack. (TSNSlitNF) The attached Application for pen registers and trap and trace devices works within the traditional authorities provided by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to capitalize upon the unique opportunities the United States has for identifying communications 0_' The collection sought here will make possible one of the most powerful tools that the Government can bring to bear to discover enemy ,communications: meta data analYSIS. -
Fiber Optic Communications
FIBER OPTIC COMMUNICATIONS EE4367 Telecom. Switching & Transmission Prof. Murat Torlak Optical Fibers Fiber optics (optical fibers) are long, thin strands of very pure glass about the size of a human hair. They are arranged in bundles called optical cables and used to transmit signals over long distances. EE4367 Telecom. Switching & Transmission Prof. Murat Torlak Fiber Optic Data Transmission Systems Fiber optic data transmission systems send information over fiber by turning electronic signals into light. Light refers to more than the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum that is near to what is visible to the human eye. The electromagnetic spectrum is composed of visible and near -infrared light like that transmitted by fiber, and all other wavelengths used to transmit signals such as AM and FM radio and television. The electromagnetic spectrum. Only a very small part of it is perceived by the human eye as light. EE4367 Telecom. Switching & Transmission Prof. Murat Torlak Fiber Optics Transmission Low Attenuation Very High Bandwidth (THz) Small Size and Low Weight No Electromagnetic Interference Low Security Risk Elements of Optical Transmission Electrical-to-optical Transducers Optical Media Optical-to-electrical Transducers Digital Signal Processing, repeaters and clock recovery. EE4367 Telecom. Switching & Transmission Prof. Murat Torlak Types of Optical Fiber Multi Mode : (a) Step-index – Core and Cladding material has uniform but different refractive index. (b) Graded Index – Core material has variable index as a function of the radial distance from the center. Single Mode – The core diameter is almost equal to the wave length of the emitted light so that it propagates along a single path. -
Observing Photons in Space
—1— Observing photons in space For the truth of the conclusions of physical science, observation is the supreme court of appeals Sir Arthur Eddington Martin C.E. HuberI, Anuschka PauluhnI and J. Gethyn TimothyII Abstract This first chapter of the book ‘Observing Photons in Space’ serves to illustrate the rewards of observing photons in space, to state our aims, and to introduce the structure and the conventions used. The title of the book reflects the history of space astronomy: it started at the high-energy end of the electromagnetic spectrum, where the photon aspect of the radiation dominates. Nevertheless, both the wave and the photon aspects of this radiation will be considered extensively. In this first chapter we describe the arduous efforts that were needed before observations from pointed, stable platforms, lifted by rocket above the Earth’s atmosphere, became the matter of course they seem to be today. This exemplifies the direct link between technical effort — including proper design, construction, testing and calibration — and some of the early fundamental insights gained from space observations. We further report in some detail the pioneering work of the early space astronomers, who started with the study of γ- and X-rays as well as ultraviolet photons. We also show how efforts to observe from space platforms in the visible, infrared, sub-millimetre and microwave domains developed and led to today’s emphasis on observations at long wavelengths. The aims of this book This book conveys methods and techniques for observing photons1 in space. ‘Observing’ photons implies not only detecting them, but also determining their direction at arrival, their energy, their rate of arrival, and their polarisation. -
Designing a Free Space Optical/Wireless Link
Session: 2247 Designing A Free-Space Optical/Wireless Link Jai P. Agrawal, Omer Farook and C.R. Sekhar Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Technology Purdue University Calumet Abstract This paper presents the design of a very high-speed data link between two buildings in a University campus that will operate at gigabit rates. The project uses a cutting edge technology of eye-safe laser communication through free space. This is an all-optical design is future-proof in regards to technological advancement in the rate of data transmission and introduction of newer protocols. The two buildings are approximately 500 meters apart. The free-space optical link uses 1550 nm wavelength in normal usage but has a wireless link operating at 2.4 GHz as the back-up. The line of site alignment will be achieved using telescopes initially but will have automatic tracking alignment system. The wireless back-up link is used only in very dense fog conditions. This paper presents the design of only the free-space optical connection, some parts of which are implemented in laboratory setup. I. Introduction The technology of establishing a high-speed networking between two buildings or campuses is one of the three: 1) copper wire, 2) wireless and 2) optical fiber technology. The copper technology is low-speed, labor-intensive and requires a regime of permissions. The advantages are high reliability and full availability. The wireless technology uses a few GHz carrier, is medium speed (up to few Gigabits per second), has small link span and requires a regime of licenses. Advantage is the ease of deployment. -
Fiber Optics
FIBER OPTICS Prof. R.K. Shevgaonkar Department of Electrical Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay Lecture: 25 Fiber Optic Link Design Fiber Optics, Prof. R.K. Shevgaonkar, Dept. of Electrical Engineering, IIT Bombay Page 1 The design criteria for a fiber optic link design procedure is mainly divided into broad categories which can be further subdivided as shown by the tree diagram below: Bit Rate (Dispersion Limitation) Primary Design Criteria Link Length (Attenuation Limitation) Modulation format eg. Analog/Digital Fiber Optic Link Design System Fidelity:BER, SNR Additional Design Cost: components, Parameters installation, maintainance Upgradeability Commercial Availability Figure 25.1: Fiber Optic Link Design Criteria The primary design criteria signify the most basic and fundamental information parameters to be made available by the user to the designer for designing a reliable fiber optic link. The first important information to be specified by the user is the desired bit rate of data transmission. However, the dispersion in the optical fiber exerts a limitation on the maximum achievable and realisable data rate of transmission. The next intricate information to be provided for the design process is the length of the optical link so as to enable the designer to ascertain the position of the optical repeaters along the link for a satisfactory optical data link. Along with the primary design criteria, there are some additional parameters which facilitate better design and quality analysis of the optical link. These factors consist of the scheme of modulation, the system fidelity, cost, upgradeability, commercial availability etc. A fundamental and very simple point-to-point optical communication link can be schematically drawn as shown in the figure below. -
Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities
Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities (name redacted) Legislative Attorney (name redacted) Legislative Attorney November 9, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL33424 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities Summary Public interest in the means by which the government may collect telephone call records has been raised by revelations in recent years regarding alleged intelligence activity by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). According to a USA Today article from May 11, 2006, the NSA allegedly sought and obtained records of telephone numbers called and received from millions of telephones within the United States from three telephone service providers; a fourth reportedly refused to provide such records. Additionally, a series of reports issued by the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG), most recently in January of 2010, indicate that, between 2002 and 2006, consumer records held by telephone companies had been provided to the FBI through the use of “exigent letters” and other informal methods that fell outside of the national security letter (NSL) process embodied in statute and internal FBI policies. The Supreme Court has held that there is no Fourth Amendment protection of telephone calling records held in the hands of third party providers, where the content of any call is not intercepted. However, this report summarizes existing statutory authorities regarding access by the government, for either foreign intelligence or law enforcement purposes, to information related to telephone calling patterns or practices. -
Arctic Connect Project and Cyber Security Control, ARCY Informaatioteknologian Tiedekunnan Julkaisuja No
Informaatioteknologian tiedekunnan julkaisuja No. 78/2019 Martti Lehto, Aarne Hummelholm, Katsuyoshi Iida, Tadas Jakstas, Martti J. Kari, Hiroyuki Minami, Fujio Ohnishi ja Juha Saunavaara Arctic Connect Project and cyber security control, ARCY Informaatioteknologian tiedekunnan julkaisuja No. 78/2019 Editor: Pekka Neittaanmäki Covers: Petri Vähäkainu ja Matti Savonen Copyright © 2019 Martti Lehto, Aarne Hummelholm, Katsoyoshi Iida, Tadas Jakstas, Martti J. Kari, Hiroyuki Minami, Fujio Ohnishi, Juha Saunavaara ja Jyväskylän yliopisto ISBN 978-951-39-7721-4 (verkkoj.) ISSN 2323-5004 Jyväskylä 2019 Arctic Connect Project and Cyber Security Control, ARCY Martti Lehto Aarne Hummelholm Katsuyoshi Iida Tadas Jakštas Martti J. Kari Hiroyuki Minami Fujio Ohnishi Juha Saunavaara UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ FACULTY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 2019 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The submarine communication cables form a vast network on the seabed and transmit massive amounts of data across oceans. They provide over 95% of international tele- communications—not via satellites as is commonly assumed. The global submarine network is the “backbone” of the Internet, and enables the ubiquitous use of email, social media, phone and banking services. To these days no any other technology than submarine cables systems has not been such a strategic impact to our society without being known it as such by the people. This also means that it is at the same time a very interesting destination for hackers, cyber attackers, terrorist and state actors. They seek to gain access to information that goes through the networks of these continents that are connected to each other with sea cables. The main conclusion Tapping fiber optic cables to eavesdrop the information is a conscious threat. -
Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age (Part 7 of 7)
lossary Access munication, includes any information concerning The technical capability to interface with a com- the substance, purport, or meaning of that commu- munications facility, such as a communications nication. line or switch, so that law enforcement can moni- Call Content Channel (CCC) tor and receive call setup information and call The link between the surveillance switch and the content. law enforcement agency that carries the call con- Actual Capacity tent. The CCC may be a switched connection or a That portion of the Maximum Capacity simulta- dedicated path through the Public Switched Tele- neously required to conduct electronic surveil- phone Network (PSTN), e.g., on a private line. lances at or before a specified date in a given switch as indicated by the Attorney General for all Call Data Channel (CDC) government agencies authorized to do surveil- The interface between the surveillance switch and lance. the law enforcement agency that carries the call set-up data. The CDC may be a switched connec- Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) tion or dedicated path through the Public A system of interrelated computer-based compo- Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) or may be nents linked to a switched or wireless telecommu- separate from the PSTN, e.g., via a private line or a nications network that provides a framework for packet switched network. services, e.g., call forwarding, credit card authen- tication, personal identification numbers, speed Call Setup Data dialing, voice dialing, etc. Includes all of the setup and call release informa- tion received and interpreted by the surveillance Base Station switch as a regular part of processing the call as The common name for all of the radio equipment defined in applicable standards and specifications located at a single site for serving one or several for the services being provided. -
Electronic Surveillance Manual
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL PROCEDURES and CASE LAW FORMS Revised June 2005 (complete in one voliime) FOREWORD This manual was prepared by the Electronic Surveillance Unit, Office of Enforcement Operations, Criminal Division, and is designed primarily to assist federal prosecutors and investigative agents in the preparation of electronic surveillance applications made pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2510-2522 (2001) ("Title III") and associated statutes. It is not intended to confer any rights, privileges, or benefits upon defendants, nor does it have the force of a United States Department of Justice directive. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). In addition to outlining and discussing the statutory requirements of Title III applications, this manual also sets forth the Department's authorization process, provides guidance in filing Title III pleadings before the court, and discusses the applicable case law as well as both novel, and frequently arising, legal issues involved in Title III litigation. Samples of the most commonly filed pleadings follow the text. INTRODUCTION This manual sets forth the procedures established by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to obtain authorization to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2510-2522 (2001) (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 198 6 (ECPA), the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Antiterrorism Act)), the USA-Patriot Act of 2001, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and discusses the statutory requirements of each of the pleadings.