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Newsletter 2021 No.2 Update:2021/01/14 Newsletter No.2 January 14, 2021 Prospects & Perspectives In 2020, due to COVID-19’s impact on the world’s economy, Australia raised concerns about China over its handling of the novel coronavirus, questioning its transparency and demanding an international investigation into the origins of the virus. Australia’s demands angered China, who then imposed trade sanctions against Australia. China’s Trade Sanctions against Australia and Its Global Wolf Warrior Diplomacy By Chien-jung Hsu I n 2020, due to COVID-19’s impact on the world’s economy, Australia raised concerns about China over its handling of the novel coronavirus, Newsletter No.2 January 14, 2021 questioning its transparency and demanding an international investigation into the origins of the virus. Australia’s demands angered China, who then imposed trade sanctions against Australia. China suspended imports of Australian products such as barley, beef, coal, lobsters, timber and wine. The punitive measures have dealt a serious blow to Australia, which had sent 39.4% of its exports to China in 2019-2020, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Owing to Australia’s strong economic dependence on China, the impact on Australia could be damaging. China therefore was able to use its so-called “wolf warrior” trade threats against Australia. Two main factors may have resulted in China’s wolf warrior trade sanctions against Australia. First, China has employed a long-term strategy to destabilize the American-Australian alliance, even while Australia further strengthens its ties with US in the Indo-Pacific region. Second, China intends to present Australia as an example to the rest of the world under its global strategy of sharp power and wolf warrior diplomacy. China’s Long-Term Strategy of Dividing the America-Australia Alliance In 2002, China started to push “Neighboring Diplomacy”: a policy the targets of which included Australia and New Zealand. In 2005, China's Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhou Wenzhong, communicated China’s new strategy to Chinese senior officials in Canberra and delivered the CCP’s longer-term goal that was to drive a wedge into the America-Australia alliance. According to Professor Clive Hamilton, those present were given the task of working out how China could most effectively attain a so-called “comprehensive influence over Australia economically, politically, culturally, in all ways.” China would use economic measures to force Australia to make concessions on a range of matters, including military affairs and human rights. Also, Beijing hoped to turn Australia into a “second France,” “a western country that would dare to say ‘no’ to America.” Today, as we review China’s “Neighboring Diplomacy” policy on Australia, it seems to work well, and China has deeply influenced Australian society in many respects. Australia has become aware of China’s strategy and its strong influence on the country and it has formulated policies aimed at restraining China’s influence, such as the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2018 as well as bans on Huawei and ZTE Newsletter No.2 January 14, 2021 from Australia’s 5G network. Australia has further pushed some progressive foreign policies against China. For instance, Australia has become increasingly vocal about China’s more aggressive policy in the South China Sea and its alleged attempts to meddle in Australian political affairs. Second, Australia, together with Japan and India, have become the center of the US’s strategic alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. Third, Australia, Japan and India have agreed to work toward building stronger supply chains so as to counter China’s dominance on trade. Such policies may have infuriated China. In addition, Australia’s concern for recent China-related issues like Hong Kong’s National Security Law, the Xingjiang re-education camps, and, especially, its push for an international probe into the COVID-19 pandemic, will also irritate China. China’s Attack on Australia as an Example for the Rest of the World China’s foreign policy has transitioned from attraction-based soft power to sharp power, leveraging its economic might. The corrosive effects of China’s sharp power are increasingly apparent in a number of crucial domains, including in the spheres of media, academia, culture and publishing, which are fundamental for determining how people in democracies understand the world around them. China’s influence activities aim to limit, or mute, public discussion of issues deemed unwelcome by China and to expand its preferred self-presentation, its monopolization of ideas, its exploitation of partner institutions and its standing. China has cultivated economic leverage as a tool for getting others to play by its rules. The world’s democracies have felt the pain of China’s sharp power over the issues of the Hong Kong protests, Xingjiang re-education camps, and now the COVID-19 pandemic. Along with China’s sharp power strategy, China’s wolf warrior diplomacy opened a brand-new front around the world. Although China’s wolf warrior diplomacy is aimed at its domestic audience, cultivating nationalism through a more aggressive global stance, this wolf warrior diplomacy has also consolidated many overseas Chinese with a stronger China identity. For example, a lot of Chinese Australians helped spread CCP propaganda on social media on some issues, such as the Hong Kong protests; the self-confessed Chinese spy, Wang Liqiang, incident; China’s trade sanctions on Australia; and China’s spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Twitter-war against Australia. Currently, China has turned economic reality to diplomatic advantage. For Newsletter No.2 January 14, 2021 instance, China has been wielding a wolf warrior trade policy against a considerable number of countries, such as Canada, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Norway. Because of Australia’s strong dependence on China, Australia has in particular felt the effects of this. Australia is perceived by China as an essential target both for its close alliance with the US and a soft target for its economic dependence. Owing to Australia’s strong economic dependence on China, China can attack Australia without facing many repercussions and set an example for the rest of the world. Through the cases regarding Australia, we can understand China’s hostility toward democracies and anticipate its next move. First, in political propaganda, the Chinese authorities will routinely direct attacks at its critics through its state-controlled media, and they will use social media, such as Twitter, which is blocked in China, to attack democratic countries. Second, in terms of economic measures, China will play a very clever hand at portraying internal domestic market fluctuations for its own political benefit as an economic weapon to “punish” democratic countries. Although Chinese people may be affected by such trade sanctions, nationalism is still a priority in China. Most importantly, while Beijing is heading quickly toward global leadership, America’s Indo-Pacific strategy will impact China’s global ambitions. China’s sanctions against Australia could be a signal which Beijing intends to deliver to warn America’s allies: wolf warrior diplomacy will be implemented on those countries which affect Beijing’s interests abroad. (Dr. Hsu is Adjunct Research Associate, Monash University) Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or the position of the Prospect Foundation. Newsletter No.2 January 14, 2021 The Prospect Foundation is an independent research institution dedicated to the study of cross-Strait relations and international issues. The Foundation maintains active exchanges and communications with many think tanks of the world. Prospect Foundation No.1, Lane 60, Sec. 3, Tingzhou Rd., Zhongzheng District Taipei City, 10087, Republic of China (Taiwan) Tel: 886-2-23654366 Fax: 886-2-23679193 http://www.pf.org.tw .
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