KING HUSAYN OF JORDAN: TRADITION AND CHANGE IN MODERN MIDDLE EASTERN MONARCHY
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Universi^ MicrOTlms International 300 N. Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
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Peck, Brian MacLellan
KING HUSAYN OF JORDAN: TRADITION AND CHANGE IN MODERN MIDDLE EASTERN MONARCHY
The University of Arizona M.A. 1985
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International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
KING HUSAYN OF JORDAN: TRADITION AND CHANGE IN MODERN MIDDLE EASTERN MONARCHY
By Brian MacLellan Peck
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL STUDIES In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate C allege
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
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APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:
L.'-i 1-^ nfe L. W. ADAMEC ' Date Professor of Oriental Studies TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page ABSTRACT iv I. INTRODUCTION . 1 II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 4 Abdullah and Talal: 1921-1953 4 Husayn; 1953-1985 12
III. THE ARMY AND THE THRONE 16 The Army in Jordan: 1921-1985 17 The Zerka Incident and "Black September" .. 21 Army-Throne Relations 25
IV. THE POWERS OF STATE AND THRONE 33 Traditional Political Thought 35 The Constitution and the King 37 Characteristics of Rule in Jordan 40
V. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MONARCHY 44 Religion and the Throne 44 Royal Marriage 48 Succession in Jordan 50
VI. HUSAYN AS MONARCH 56 VII. MONARCHY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 62 VIII. CONCLUSIONS 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY 74
iii ABSTRACT
This paper is an examination of the system of monarchy as it exists today in the Middle East, using the example of Jordan. The changes that have occurred in the traditional authoritarian system are explored and evaluated within the context of the monarchy's ability to meet the needs of the modern nation-state. This paper also demonstrates that the reasons behind Jordan's long survival can be linked directly to the monarchical system. Another aspect that is explored is the similarities between the system of monarchy and the other governmental systems of the Middle East.
iv CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The onset of the First World War signaled more than the collapse of Prince Metternich's "Congress Europe". It also marked the beginning of the end for four of the world's great imperial powers, and relegated some of the most historied collectionc of royal regalia to the status of museum pieces. Hand-in-hand with this came the rise of an anti-monarchical movement in the West, led by President Wilson and the United States Congress. This anti-monarchical movement was, however, not new to the United States, but has been a powerful under current in its foreign policy since the American Revolu tion and its attacks on George III of England. Yet, it has only been since the end of World War I that the idea of the anachronism and obsolescence of monarchy has come to be an eccepted addition to western political thought. Despite this attitude, monarchy continues to exist as a viable entity. To ignore an institution because we see it as obsolete will not make it disappear or negate its influence. Rather our own ignorance will have been magnified and we will be presented with the danger of
i 2
being unable to comprehend the developments in a state because we have blinded ourselves to its basic dynamics. This paper is an attempt to understand those dy namics as they apply to the state of Jordan. One of the main regions of monarchic survival today lies in the Middle East. This is an area that has one of the longest traditions of organized monarchy in the world,
and continues to rely on personal authoritarian rule in both its monarchies and "democracies". Jordan is one of these. Established in 1921, Jordan has survived not only as a nation, but also as a system of government little changed since its founding. This in a region wracked by war, revolution and civil strife. Modern scholars are quick to attribute this success to the quality of leadership in Jordan. Although this factor can not be ignored, it is difficult to imagine that this alone can account for the survival of a state that has spanned a period of more than sixty years and three
monarchs. A period that included five major wars in the region, one ruler assassinated, one ruler deposed due to mental health and numerous assassination and coup at tempts. This idea of qualitative leadership appears to have been chosen because the only other alternative is to admit that the system of monarchy is a viable and applic able system in the modern nation-state. 3
/ The understanding of a modern Middle Eastern monarchy is the major purpose of this paper. The Jordanian monarchy being used by example. The basic structure of the monarchy exhibits certain characteristics in the relation ship between the throne and the six main elements of army, state, religion, royal marriage, succession and the role of the monarch. Each of these will be examined in relation to traditional practices and theories and its character istics as they apply to the Jordanian state. It is imperative that we understand the dynamics of Islamic, or Middle Eastern, monarchy as they also form the underlying dynamics of the other states in the region. In view of this the structure of the Jordanian monarchy will be examined in relation to the other states of the region to show the similarities that exist below the surfaces of Middle Eastern governments. CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This chapter is given in order to present an overall historical view of Jordan, it is intentionally brief. The main purpose is to set the paper in its proper historical perspective and present to the reader a chronological
reference point for the events which will be discussed in relation to the topic. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first deals with that period prior to King Husayn's succession. The second is a brief summary of events since his succession. This second section deals only briefly with the events as those of importcince to the discussion will be covered in greater detail as they apply.
Abdullah and Talal;1921-1953
In 1921 the state of Transjordan came into exis tence. Its founding was the result of one man, Abdullah
bin Husayn, the son of Sharif Husayn of Makka. The year before Faysal, Abdullah's younger brother, was forced off the throne of Syria by the French. In an attempt to recover his brother's throne, Abdullah had marched north
4 5 from the Hijaz. Stopping in Ma'an to recruit troops Abdullah was persuaded by the British to cease his march on Syria. In exchange for this the British recognized the "fait accompli" of Abdullah's occupation of the region, granted him the title of Amir and made the territory of Transjordan a separate entity from the mandate of Palestine. Abdullah's march on Syria had represented an at tempt to fulfill a major aim of the Hashemite family; an independent Arab kingdom comprising the Hijaz, Iraq and "Greater Syria" (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans- jordan). Although the British failed to go through with their pledge to Sharif Hussayn of Makka in helping to achieve this, Abdullah never gave up the dream of a "Greater Syria" with himself as its head. Abdullah always believed, as his father had and his grandson does to this day, that "the true destiny of the Arabs was unity under 1 Hashemite rule". Prior to the establishment of Transjordan, and the First World War, the territory of the East bank of the Jordan river had been a small Ottoman governorate within the Vilayet of Syria. During the Ottoman period the region had never been under effective control and the government
1. Grossblatt. "The Role of the Hashemite Family in Contemporary Arab Politics", p. 73 6 was unable to gather taxes or raise military levies from among the Bedouin, who comprised the majority of the 2 population. The Bedouin tribesmen were in constant conflict with the Ottoman authorities, who were forced to resort to such measures as the transplanting into Trans- jordan of a Circassian community that provided a cavalry regiment to protect the settled areas from Bedouin 3 raids. This cavalry regiment later came to form the core of the Royal Guard under Abdullah. When Abdullah, and the British, came upon the scene little had changed. Abdullah found himself faced with, not only pacifying the region, but also assembling an entire governmental structure where none had existed before. This was complicated by the fact that Transjordan was an area where "the attitudes of obedience had to be developed among people unaccustomed to 4 abide by law and order".
To help pacify the region, and maintain internal order, the British established the Arab Legion in 1921. And further, in 1926,- the Transjordan Frontier Force
(TJFF) was set up to protect the borders. The TJFF was
2. Aruri. Jordan; A Study in Political Develop ment (1921-1965), p. 15. 3. Vatikiotis. Politics and the Military in Jordan, p. 70-71, footnote. 4. Aruri, p. 3. 7 composed mainly of seconded units from the RAF and under direct control of the British. From 1921 to 1930 the policy of the government was to concentrate on maintaining order in the towns and villages, while paying subsidies to the Bedouin tribal Shaykhs to control raiding. As a result the Arab Legion maintained a policy of recruiting troops from the settled areas only, and until the 1930s no 5 Bedouin ever served in the Legion. This pacification policy came to an end in 1930 when the British government brought in a tribal expert from Iraq, John Bagot Glubb. John Bagot Glubb, or "Glubb Pasha" as he is better known, innacted a system whereby the Bedouin were to police them selves. To do this he created a purely Bedouin rapid 6 strike force known as the Desert Patrol. Glubb's policies had such an astonishing success that, due to his efforts,. the Bedouin today comprise the main support to the throne. In 1928 the Anglo-Jordanian Agreement was signed, in conjunction with this an organic law was promulgated for the state. Together, these two documents had the effect of giving the Amir total power over his people, and 7 the British the power to control the Amir. The Organic Law had made the government responsible to the Amir, and
5. Vatikiotis, p. 69. 6. Glubb. The Story of the Arab Legion, p. 92-93.
7. Aruri, p. 77. 8 the Anglo-Jordanian Agreement gave the British control over Transjordan's finances, military and the tribes. To the British, and Amir Abdullah, the formation of a consti tutional system was meant more to lend a respectable air to the government than to actually allow popular partici- 8 pation in its functioning. This remained true even following the constitution of 1946, While this latter did theoretically transform Transjordan into an independent constitutional monarchy, in all reality Abdullah's power 9 changed little. Until 1948 Abdullah ruled what has been 10 called a "grand patriarchal system". And although repre sentative government was the image being projected, one
has but to look at the membership of the parliaments from 1931 to 1946 to see that only thirty-six prominent fami- 11 lies are represented. Following the annexation of the West Bank area of
Palestine, in 1948, Transjordan was renamed as "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan". In December of that same year Abdullah had been proclaimed "King of all Palestine"
8. Ibid., p. 74. 9. Ibid., p. 89. 10. Sharabi. Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century, p. 181. And, Grossblatt, p. 78-79. 11. Abu Jabar. "The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in Political Develop ment", p. 226. 9 12 by the Congress of Jericho1 This title was dropped in 1949 due to its explosive political nature. With the annexation of the West Bank came an infusion of an alien population, forming a well developed urban middle class, that had no real ties to Transjordan and significantly outnumbered the population of the East Bank. This influx of Palestinians brought about an increase in constitution alism, as they were unwilling to accept totally the patri archal system into which they were thrust. With this increase in constitutionalism the patriarchy began to fade. For "as a king grows more constitutional he becomes less accessible. Layers of bureaucracy come between the 13 monarch and his [subjects]". The final blow to the patriarchy was delivered with a bullet when in 1951, while going to Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Abdullah was assassinated. Abdullah's death brought about a major crisis in Jordan. This was not the assassination itself, but the accession of Abdullah's son Talal to the throne. The exchange of power was not the main question here, rather, it was the state of Talal's health that presented the problem. For many years prior to 1951 Talal had been
12. Arab World File (FMA), Jdn-1101/1. Here after cited as FMA. 13. Grossblatt, p. 80. And, Aruri, p. 89. 10 subjected to periodic bouts of insanity, and, at the time of his father's death he had been undergoing treatment in Europe. The nature of Talal's succession, and the medical problems encountered during his short reign, allowed for the rise of a palace system of power,' composed of govern ment ministers, military officers and the royal family, to replace the now vanished patriarchy. Before his death, Abdullah had shown concern over the succession. He had judged his son incapable of ruling and had favored his grandson Husayn to succeed him. How ever, in the end he had left the final decision of succes- 14 sion to his Prime Minister, Tawfiq Abul-Huda. This placed tremendous power in the hands of Abul-Huda. Under the brief regency period, and later after Talal's succes sion, Abul-Huda and the "Palace Group" were able to put forth a new constitution. This constitution showed the susceptibility of the Palace Group to popular pressure, and for the first time "allowed the people and their representatives to participate in the political system and to exercise restraint on the h^ herto unchallenged 15 executive authority". Also included in the new consti tution was a article that allowed for the removal of a
14. Faddah. The Middle East in Transition; A Study of Jordan's Foreign Policy, p. 164-165. And, Aruri, p. 90. 15. Aruri, p. 91 and p. 93. 11
monarchf by parliament, on the grounds of mental ill- 16 ness. This article, along with the circumstance of his position, gave Abul-Huda the power of "kingmaker". In that same year of 1952 he exercised this power and the neces sary steps were taken to remove Talal from power and place his eldest son, Husayn, on the throne. In 1952, at seventeen, Hussein was still several months away from his eighteenth birthday when he could assume his full constitutional powers as king. During this period a council of regency would rule. Upon the initia tive of the Palace Group it was decided that the time would best be spent in finishing Husayn's formal education. In a region where "control of the state means control of the army", and therefore, "leadership has to be both civil and military", it was important that Husayn have a competent background in the functioning of the 17 Jordanian military structure. With this in mind, it was decided that he should attend the famous Sandhurst Military Academy in England. This would not be the first time that Husayn had studied in England. He had also attended Harrow SChOO 1 along with his cousin King Faysal II of Iraq
is. The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Article 28m. And, Hussein. Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 31. 17. Sharabi, p. 9. Husayn; 1953-1985
King Husayn succeeded to the throne of Jordan in
April of 1953. His elevation to power came during a period of great turmoil in the region. The year before his suc cession, in 1952, the monarchy in Egypt had fallen to a group of young army officers led by Gamal Abd al-Nasir. Within the next six years Jordan would face two major coup attempts and the Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family would come to a violent end in the military coup that overthrew their monarchy. Throughout this period Syria experienced several coups and counter coups, and Egypt would be faced with the tripartite aggression of Britain,
France and Israel. Upon assuming full ruling powers Husayn began a program of liberalization and democratization. Heavily influenced by Western ideals, he supported such concepts of political freedom as the party system and free press. To accomplish his aims he challenged the Palace Group by removing Abul-Huda and appointing a more liberal prime 18 minister. After this the Palace Group faded into the background. Following a brief, and violently unsuccessful, experiment with rapid democratization, Husayn reappointed
Abul-Huda and continued his reforms at a slower pace. In
18. Snow. Hussein; A Biography, p. 52. And, Aruri, p. 106. 13 1955 he was married to Dina Abdul- Hamed, a great-grand niece of Sharif Husayn of Makka. This marriage, primarily dynastic in nature, did not last but eighteen months due to Dina's constant interference in affairs of government, 19 among other factors.
Among rising Arab nationalist pressure , King Husayn removed Glubb Pasha from the command of the Arab Legion in 1956, a position he had held since 1939. In the following year a National Socialist government was elected in Jordan. In April of 1957, unable to work with the new government, Husayn dissolved it. The response was a coup attempt led by Ali Abu Nuwar, the new commander of the army. This, plus the general unrest that had been created by the opposition parties, led to the banning of all parties in that same year. A condition that still exists. In 1958 there was another coup attempt. This was in close association with the over-throw of the monarchy in Iraq. The events that occurred in the years 1956-1958 hardened Husayn's earlier liberal attitudes, and from that time 20 onward little pretense was made of democracy. Another response to these events was a purging of nationalist forces from government and military posts, and their re placement with loyal East Bank and Bedouin subjects.
19. Snow, p. 65-66. 20. Ibid., p. 115. 14
Ibrahim Hashem, a leading Muslim jurist and a member of the Hashemite family, was chosen to administer the new 21 government. Royal power had been reasserted. Along with this reassertion of royal authority the patriarchal pat tern began to reappear in Jordan. The period from 1958 to 1967 was one of relative peace. While border incidents occurred with Israel and propaganda between Arab states reached a peak, no real major crises arose. In 1961 Husayn again married. This time it was to the daughter of a British airforce officer in Jordan, Antoinette, Gardiner. Toward the close of 1966 and into 1967 incidents with Israel increased, and in June of 1967 Israeli forces invaded, and seized, the Sinai from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank and Jerusalem from Jordan. The impact of this on Jordan was tremendous. She had lost a major part of her productive land and was further burdened by a new influx of refugees unto the East Bank. From 1967 to 1970 this refugee problem was compound ed by the presence in Jordan of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), who had made the country their major base. As the PLO grew in strength it began to view Jordan's attempts to restrain it as anti-Palestinian. As a result the PLO began to turn on the government with the
21. FMA, Jdn-1103/1. And, Aruri, p. 144. 15 intention of bringing it down. This situation led to the showdown of September of 1970, when the Jordanian army drove the PLO from the country. Since that time Jordan has experienced little in the way of civil unrest. The only major "political" events that has occurred since that time was Husayn's marriage to Alia, a member of the prominent Tuqan family of the West Bank aristocra cy, in 1973 following his divorce of Antoinette Gardiner in the previous year. And following Alia's death in 1977 Husayn married a Lebanese American. Other than these events, and an overall improvement of relations with the PLO and other Arab countries, there has been no major political realignment within the country. CHAPTER III
THE ARMY AND THE THRONE
In modern usage the word "sultan" denotes a secular Middle Eastern ruler. This, however, is not the original meaning of the term. Rather, it is an ancient Aramaic word 1 for power, or might, and is so used in the Qur'an. The term sultan did not come to be applied as a title for a ruler until the rise of the Seljuk dynasty in the eleventh century A.D. This shift in meaning is not surprising. For, in the tradition of the Middle East, control of the state 2 is exercised through control of the army. And what does the army represent but might and power. In Jordan the control of the army consists of the maintenance of an elite Bedouin core dominating the strategic elements of infantry and armor. These tribal Bedouin troops form a mercenary army within the larger national army whose sole allegiance is to the ruling Hashemite house, and who compose the major support of the regime. There are some scholars who hold that the Jordanian monarchy's dependence on Bedouin tribal support is unique
1. Hughs. A Dictionary of Islam, s.v. "Sultan". 2. Sharabi, p. 9. 17 3 to the region. To the contrary, Jordan is but one of several Arab monarchies in the region who rely on such tribal support. Moreover, these monarchies are following a traditional pattern of power in maintaining this relation ship between the military and the throne. Jordan, there fore, is in no sense unique in its reliance on tribal support, but is simply the "finest honed example" of those 4 Arab monarchies who form such relationships. Before beginning the discussion on this relation
ship it will be useful to look at the developments in the army in Jordan since its founding, and to briefly look at a couple of examples of how the tribal support for the regime manifests itself when the throne is threatened.
The Army in Jordan; 1921-1985
As stated ' in Chapter II the Jordanian army was established in 1921, under the name of the Arab Legion, to maintain internal security in the newly formed Amirate of Transjordan. The primary area of recruitment for the Legion at this time was from the populations of the set tled portions of the country. The Bedouin were not allowed to join until the 1930s as they were viewed at first as a
3. Such as Nyrop, et al. Area Handbook for Jordan, p. 97. 4. Axelrod. "Tribesmen in Uniform", p. 44. 18 major threat to the internal stability of the country. This situation changed when, in 1930, John Bagot Glubb was brought in to raise a Bedouin force similar to that which he had formed in Iraq. This Desert Patrol, as it was called, was meant as a force to help bring about the pacification of the Bedouin, halt raiding and generally police the great expanse of desert that made up much of Transjordan. By appealing to traditional tribal patterns of loyalty, honor and justice, and by demonstrating that if the Bedouin did not undertake to police themselves other non-tribal forces could be found who would, Glubb was able to expand the Desert Patrol into a well organ ized, disciplined and effective mobile strike force which 5 helped to bring about pacification quickly. By using tactics of pacification that implemented traditional Bedouin value systems, he quickly gained great respect and admiration not only for himself but also for the govern ment. In response, the Bedouin began to shift their primary loyalties from tribe and family to the ruler, as a 6 form of premier shaykh. Beginning in the 1930s the Bedouin began to enlist in the Arab Legion proper, and by 1940 came to dominate
5. Glubb. The Story of the Arab Legion, p. 92-93, p. 102 and p. 218. 6. Vatikiotis, p. 5. 19 the military in Jordan. The Desert Patrol, still basically a police unite, had always been a highly mobile strike force similar to a tribal raiding party made up largely of camel mounted troops. This began to change after 1937 by the addition cf armored cars which transformed the Desert Patrol into a modern mobile mechanized strike force. The effectiveness of this force was demonstrated in campaigns in Iraq and Syria at the start of World War II. During the Second World War and up to 1948 much of the mechanized
units of the Desert Patrol were incorporated into the Legion proper. The Arab Legion, however, continued to be an elite ground force meant to insure internal stability and remained as such until 1948, when war broke out in
Palestine. Following the war in Palestine in 1949, and the annexation of the West Bank, Palestinians and townsmen began to play a more prominent role in the army. This came about primarily because of an expanding technical service, and with this the need for an educated officer corps to deal with the needs of a modern military establishment. The Bedouin seldom possessed the educational background necessary for officer training and because of their scorn for manual labor remained aloof from the technical branches of the service. Due to this the educated urban types began to dominate the officer corps and the 20
technical fields. However, since the mechanization of the Desert Patrol the Bedouin had dominated the armored units of the army, as soldiers not mechanics, and continue to do 7 so to this day. Thus, with the influx of townsmen and Palestinians into the army, the "elite" character of the Legion disappeared, although the Bedouin continued to comprise a highly mobile ground force at its core. From before 1948 to 1956 the Arab Legion had grown from a force of approximately 5,000, mostly Bedouin, troops led by a select group of British officers to a modern army of 8 25,000 troops composed mainly of Palestinians. In 1956 the Arab Legion suffered a major blow. Due to rising nationalist pressures. King Husayn dismissed John Bagot Glubb from command of the Legion. Into the positions left open by him, and other departing British officers, came many nationalist and Ba'athist Arab officers. These included mostly educated urban officers such as Ali Abu Nuwar, the new commander of the army.
After this time the army "ceased to be the exclusive 9 instrument of the monarchy". The introduction of the nationalist officers into high positions of command drew the Arab Legion, now renamed the Jordan Arab Army, into
7. Vatikiotis, p. 25. 8. Shairabi, p. 185. 9. Aruri, p. 131. -21
the political arena. The end result of this was an attempt by some of these officers to stage a coup using the army, 10 in 1957. This coup was a complete failure and only resulted in a major purge of the army and civil government of nationalist forces, and the placing in command of the
army of a powerful Bedouin tribal leader, Habis al-Majali, 11 whose loyalty to the regime was unquestioned. Since that
time" Bedouin tribesmen have come to occupy a dispropor tionate share of the senior command positions in the—army and no Bedouin officer has ever been implicated in a plot 12 against the throne.
The Zerka Incident and "Black September"
There are two major events that clearly demonstrate the role of the Jordanian army as a preserving factor of the monarchy. The first of these was the attempted coup of
1957 by Ali Abu Nuwar. And the second was the crises of "Black September" in 1970. Both of these events severely threatened the survival of the regime, and were only prevented from succeeding by the unswerving loyalty of the army.
10. This will be discussed at greater length later in the chapter. 11. Aruri, p. 143-144. And, Snow, p. 133.
12. Nyrop, p. 77. And, FMA, Jdn-1401/1. 22
The first of these events, the coup attempt by Ali Abu Nuwar, occurred in April of 1957. The many political developments leading up to the coup are not of importance 13 to us here. All that we need to know is that the major factor behind the coup was the swift rise to command positions of many educated urban officers among whom were many idealistic Arab nationalists. The leader of the coup attempt was the commander of the army, Ali Abu Nuwar.
The first overt action in the coup occurred on April 8, 1957, when the First Armored Car Regiment sur rounded Amman, ostensibly carrying out training exercises. Unknown to the regiment, Abu Nuwar was using their presence to preasure the king into reinstating the recent ly dismissed National Socialist government. Abu Nuwar claimed he could not be responsible for the army's actions if the government was not recalled. King Husayn refused to consider this veiled threat. On the thirteenth of April Ali's cousin, also a military commander, ordered a Bedouin infantry brigade to move to an isolated desert location where a celebration was to be held. They were to leave their weapons behind. This attempt to immobilize a loyal unit that could endanger the coup failed. The brigade
13. The following sequence of events, and details, of this coup were drawn from: Glubb. A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 433-439. And, Hussein, p. 137-151. 23 suspected a trap and refused to obey the order. A showdown occurred with the artillery regiment commanded by Ali's cousin and fighting erupted. The king, who had been alerted earlier to a possible coup by a Bedouin officer, drove out to the military camp at Zerka where th-e fighting was taking place and through his presence brought it to a halt. This ended the attempted coup and Ali Abu Nuwar fled the country, along with several other officers. Ali Abu Nuwar's coup failed primarily because he was unable to gain support from any but a few officers, mainly in the technical branches of the army. The troops that he needed most were the Bedouin infantry and armored brigades, but was unable to gain any support from their officers, and it was a Bedouin officer who alerted Husayn to the plot. This inability to gain Bedouin support stems from the tribesmen's distrust of politicians and military officers who come from the larger urban centers and the
West Bank. The second event, in which the military played a decisive role in preserving the monarchy, occurred in 14 September of 1970. This threat to the throne came in the form of an attempted takeover of the government by the
14. Information on this event was drawn from; Snow, p. 216-237. And, Black September. 24 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), known today as "Black September".
From 1967 until 1970 there occurred a marked in crease in paramilitary and political activity by the PLO in Jordan, aimed at bringing down the government and transforming the country into a military base for the recapture of Palestine. This in large was due to the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, and the resulting influx of refugees. This contributed to a growing sense of despair and frustration among West Bank Palestinians of ever returning to their homeland, compounded by Jordan's attempts at restraining the PLO from raiding into Israel. The result was a dramatic increase in lawlessness and contempt for the government by some elements among the refugees. In September of 1970, following several small out breaks of fighting between the PLO and the army, matters came to a head. A radical faction of the PLO highjacked three jetliners and landed them at an abandoned airfield in Jordan on September the sixth. Prior to this event,
King Husayn had attempted to arrive at a peaceful settle ment to the differences between the government and the PLO, but had been unable to succeed. As September ap proached the Palace Group had continually urged Husayn to settle the situation with the use of the military. The 25 army too had advocated a military solution. The Bedouin troops were so set on this type of solution that Husayn was forced to restrain them in person several times, and was once threatened with being placed in "protective custody" while they saved his throne for him. However, on September the fifteenth Husayn finally moved. A mostly Bedouin armored brigade was ordered into Amman to drive out the PLO. Over the next year in a series of cautious moves the army drove all remaining PLO elements from the country. This action against the PLO is a perfect example of the army's support for the regime. Not only were many of the officers and soldiers prepared to drive the PLO from Jordan at the command of their king, but they were also prepared to remove this threat to the throne even if it required going against his wishes. Another interesting point to this incident is that of Jordan's 55,000 man army only a very small percentage deserted to the PLO. A sig nificant fact as the Palestinians formed a major per centage of the troops.
Army-Throne Relations
The relationship betv;een the army and the throne in Jordan is neither a unique nor recent development in the 26
Middle East. The dependence of a regime on a tribal security force is a common characteristic of the Arab monarchies today, and similar examples can be found in the preimperial Muslim dynastic states. The characteristics of this relationship between tribal forces and the state are as follows. There is generally a close relationship between the ruler and the tribal units based on religious grounds. The tribal forces are offered good pay, modern weapons and an honorable career that upholds many traditional tribal values against 15 change wrought by rapid growth and modernization. And lastly the identification of the tribesmen with the ruler, 16 whom they view as being a warrior like themselves. The support of the ruler, by the "tribal forces, takes the form of "deterring unrest and, failing this, suppressing unrest 17 when it occurs". In exchange the ruler fulfills his role as a secular and religious tribal leader, and grants privileges to the tribesmen not offered to the rest of the populace. As stated above these characteristics are not unique to Jordan. This relationship can be seen in Morocco where the Alawi Kings rely on Berber tribal support in
15. Axelrod, p. 44-45. 16. Vatikiotis, p. 25.
17. Axelrod, p. 44. 27 both the army and in high government positions. Also in
Saudi Arabia where the royal family is supported by an entirely Bedouin national guard which equals the regular army in strength, and in the Gulf States where mercenary 18 tribal forces are the norm. In each of these countries, as in Jordan, the tribal forces owe allegiance to the ruling house alone and not to that abstract loyalty of the nation. And each can be said to be following a traditional pattern which extends back to the pre-imperial Muslim 19 states of the late sixteenth century. All of which were military and tribal in origin. "From antiquity, the power of rulers was dependent 20 on two pillars — the army and the clergy". In Jordan these two "pillars" are inseparable. The loyalty of the Bedouin to the Jordanian Hashemite house is, to a large degree, prompted by religious feeling. The position of the Hashemite family in the Arab world is due to their descent from the Prophet Muhainmad. This heritage allows the Hashemites a special place in the Bedouin's allegiance.
18. Axelrod, p. 25-26.
19. Hurewitz. "Military Politics in the Muslim Dy nastic States", p. 96-97. 20. Khadduri. Political Trends in the Arab World, p. 134. 28 This is admirably demonstrated by the following quote from a Bedouin tribesman of Jordan. We believe with all our hearts that the king is a direct descendent of Mohammad. We will brook no arguement on this point. ...We protect the king not because he is our ruler but because he is the symbol of our state. ...The king is the symbol of purity and the worship of God. And so the preservation of the Hashemite line is the guarding of our religion, our heritage, and our continued existence.21 This view is encouraged by the Hashemite family. They hold that the army "must defend the Islamic faith in the tradi- 22 tions of the Prophet's conquering legion". This was further elaborated by Amir Abdullah in an address to his troops, where he stated; "Your link with the ~rmy of the 23 Prophet lies in your relationship with me". Another tradition that survives today in Jordan, is 24 that of the ruler accompanying his troops into battle. Amir Abdullah led his father, Sharif Husayn's, troops in battle in the Arab Revolt. Today his grandson, King Husayn, follows this "warrior" tradition and was the only ruler in 1967 • to have "personally" taken part in the conflict, and has expressed his preference to being in the field with his troops than cooped up in the war room at
21. Nyrop, p. 67. 22. Axelrod, p. 27. 23. Ibid., p. 27. 24. Khadduri, p. 134. 29 25 command headquarters. Nor was he alone in this. So many members of his family were in uniform in 1967, that a saying arose in Amman that said: "The king has gone into 26 battle taking his whole family with him". This aspect of the Jordanian monarch and his family contributes greatly to their prestige among the Bedouin. As stated in Chapter II the Bedouin did not come to form a major support group to the throne until after 1930. Who then formed the main military support to the regime in its early years? Excluding the British, the major "native" support was the Circassian cavalry that dated back to the Ottoman period. This regiment, which had been established by the Ottomans to protect the settled areas from Bedouin raids, came to form the core of Amir Abd-ullah's body guard. This is important because by looking at the composition of the Royal Guard one can trace the shift to Bedouin support. Under Abdullah the Circassians formed the royal guard. It was during his reign that the pacification of the Bedouin took place. Before which they were consid ered a major threat to the government. By the time of
Husayn's reign the Bedouin had come to form the majority component of the Royal Guard. And in 1956 Sharif Nasir,
25. Vance. Hussein of Jordan; My "War" With Israel, p. 89-91. 26. Ibid., p. 91. 30 the king's uncle, formed a new Royal Guard armed with the best weapons he could find and mostly drawn from the 27 village of Shubak in Southern Jordan. This continued until 1966 when all of the Royal Guard came from Shubak. This is not to say that the Circassians ceased to be a major support group. To the contrary, the Circassians today still form, along with the Bedouin, a core group in 28 the army and high government office. Thus, if compo sition of the Royal Guard is an indication of which group comprises the throne's main support and to what extent, then from looking at the Royal Guard in Jordan we can say that the development of the Bedouin as the primary support of the regime was not completed until King Husayn's reign.
We should note here that the Bedouin in the Jordanian military form, in some aspects, a mercenary army. These troops owe no loyalty to the state but to the ruling house alone. They therefore cannot be considered a part of a "national" army. Their rewards are monetary, educational, social and to some degree religious. And lastly not all of the Bedouin troops are from Jordan. Until 1956, over half of the Bedouin tribesmen in the army were from outside Jordan, drawn by its professional nature
27. Snow, p. 95 and p. 104. 28. Sharabi, p. 185. 31 29 and reputation. This essentially mercenary nature can also be said to be traditional to the region. "In Jordan, as in almost every other Arab country, the strength as well as the weakness of the established 30 regime lay with the army". Thus it is imperative that the throne insure the military's allegiance. In Jordan this has been accomplished by tying the survival of the regime to the survival of the Bedouin elite in the army. The Jordanian government has integrated the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribesmen into the structure of the state as a disciplined, professional military force who have trans formed their "tribal collectivity and esprit de corps" into a bond of allegiance to the king as a paramount 31 chief. In return for this the Bedouin are given a special status that sets them apart from the normal citizen. As a result, the end of the monarchy would almost surely end this privileged status. The response of the Bedouin, when the safety of the throne is threatened, we have already seen in the first part of this chapter. It should also be noted that the Bedouin units of the army have never hesitated to use force against civilians when
29. Vatikiotis, p. 145. 30. Sharabi, p. 185. 31. Vatikiotis, p. 5. 32 32 the regime was threatened. It is highly probable that this unswerving loyalty has produced a "psychological element", with regard to the army, that has caused appo- nents of the government to carefully consider their ac tions lest in the end they have to face hardened Bedouin 33 troops. This relationship between the army and the throne has led one scholar to state that: One cannot contemplate a political system in Jordan that is not based on a strong ruler..., supported by an army ...that is stead ily becoming more professional in its outlook and ethos, and one that still comprises a mobile ground force, constituting an elite within the military institution.34
32. Vatikiotis, p. 98. 33. Axelrod, p. 44. 34. Vatikiotis, p. 140. CHAPTER IV
THE POWERS OF STATE AND THRONE
As shown in the previous chapter, the primary basis for legitimacy and power in Jordan lies with the army. But what are the legal and constitutional bases? Where do the theoretical and actual bounds to the king's power lie, and how is that power exercised? What, in other words, charac terizes the functioning of the monarchy in Jordan? The founding of the state of Transjordan came about as the result of Amir Abdullah's attempt at realizing the Hashemite dream of an independent Arab kingdom. Until 1948 the political system of this country was that of a grand patriarchy, in which Abdullah ruled as the sole authority in the state. This personal rule, while possessing a western parliamentary facade, was based on the traditional authoritarian patterns of the region. Amir Abdullah ruled as a tribal patriarch over his Jordanian family. His power was only tempered by his nominal British overlords and traditional Arab-Islamic views on the proper conduct of rulers. With the death of Abdullah the personal rule of the patriarchy faded to be replaced by an coalition of the power elite, known as the "Palace Group". This group, formed of top ministers, military officers and leading
33 34 members of the royal family, promulgated a constitution which led to an increase in democratization in Jordan. During the reign of King Talal, and the two regency periods bracketing it, the Palace Group became more en trenched. Upon the succession of King Husayn in 1953, the Palace Group was pushed into the background, but did not completely disappear. Following this Husayn embarked on a path of rapid liberalization and democratization. This came to an end with the events of 1956-1958. Since that time democratic advances have been slow, and the power of the throne has been raised to levels approaching those of pre-1948. In Jordan it is believed that the king rules fairly 1 autocratically. Though bound on the surface by all of the trappings of a parliamentary democracy, the realities are such that the monarch rules with almost unlimited power. To those aware of the history and traditions of the region this should come as no surprise. For, beneath the Western parliamentary facade, the basic dynamics of government are 2 those derived from traditional Arab society. In the func tions of power there are several areas to be examined. The first of these is traditional political thought, second is
1. Vatikiotis, p. 153. 2. Khadduri, p. 40. 35 the constitution and last is the meshing of the two, and their implications.
Traditional Political Thought
In the Middle East visible power has always been a major legitimizing force. So much so that it became an accepted belief that "tyrrany is preferable to anarchy" 3 and "any effective ruler must be obeyed". This principle of legitimacy found support in such men as the fourteenth century Muslim jurist Ibn Jama'a, who held that if a ruler imposes himself on the people by his might and his armies without any bay'a [oath of alle giance] or nomination by his predecessor, then his bay'a is lawfully contracted and obedience is compulsory.4 Another major theme was strict obedience to the ruler. The ninth century scholar Ibn Ali al-Rabi considered it of the "utmost importance" that the subjects obey and help the 5 ruler to unite and organize the state. This view was given the weight of religious sanction with the tradition of the Prophet that states;
3. Sharabi, p. 13 and p. 338.
4. Ibid., p. 14. 5. Sherwani. Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration, p. 49. 36
He who obeys me obeys God, and he who disobeys me disobeys God;and he who obeys the amir obeys me, and he who disobeys the amir disobeys me.6 Another similar tradition says: He who dislikes an order of his amir should withhold himself from opposition, for he who rebels against the King for a span of days dies the death of jahiliyyah.7 Both of the traditions connect disobedience to the ruler as disobedience to God. The above are part of the traditional bases for legitimizing rule- But what are the traditional beliefs and practices which check the abuse of power by a Middle Eastern monarch? The first and foremost of these is the strong Islamic belief in justice. The great Muslim theolo gian al-Ghazali (d. 1111) held this characteristic to be of such importance in a ruler that it occupies a large portion of his Book of Council for Kings. To al-Ghazali the ruler is "he who awards justice, and does not perpe- 8 trate injustice". And, the statement, "sovereignty en dures even when there is unbelief, but will not endure when there is injustice", has been attributed to the
6. From the Jami of al-Bukhari, as quoted in A Manual of Hadith, p. 396. 7. Ibid., p. 397. 8. al-Ghazali. Ghazali^s Book of Councel for Kings, p. 46. 37 9 Prophet. All of these demonstrate the importance of this idea in traditional thought. The other important check on the ruler's power was the accessibility of his person to his subjects. Many of the great political thinkers of the Middle East considered access to the ruler as the only way to insure justice, prevent corruption in government and provide the monarch with an accurate picture of the condi- 10 tion of his realm. According to al-Ghazali,
The Arabs have a saying that nothing is more damaging to the subjects and more prejudicial and sinister for the king than royal inaccessi bility and seclusion; and that nothing impresses the hearts of the subjects and officials more than ease of access to the king. [A fact] of which he must never be heedless if the prestige of the monarch is to be maintained and if he is to reign undisturbed.il These are two of the major traditional checks to the power of the ruler in the Middle East. Although these placed no real restraint on the limits of power they did provide a limited check on its abuses.
The Constitution and the King
In Jordan today there is a check to the power of the ruler that derives from western thought. This is the
9. al-Ghazali, p. 46. 10. Ibid., p. 94. And, Nizam al-Mulk, as quoted in Sherwani, p. 128. 11. al-Ghazali, p. 95. 38 constitution. Although the constitution under Amir Abd ullah merely confirmed his power, this is not quite the case today. But, neither does the constitution limit the king's powers as much as may at first appear. In the 1920's parliamentary democracy was estab lished in Jordan in order to make the new state more presentable to an increasingly democratic world. Today this is still largely the case, although the constitution of 1952 added several features to limit the king's power. None-theiess the king continues to be the major holder of power in the state. While the constitution describes the source of all power as being the "nation" (Article 24), it should be realized that King Husayn, to paraphrase Louis XIV of France, is in effect the nation. His presence is felt in all branches of the state. He exercises direct control of the military (Article 32). He appoints,and dismisses, all cabinet ministers, members of the Senate and all judges (Articles 35,36,39). He also promulgates, approves and enforces all Acts of Parliament (Article 31). Furthermore, he may call and dismiss Parliament (Articles 78,81,82). All of which he does by royal decree. But, perhaps the most far reaching powers are those dealing with martial law and rule by decree (Articles 124,125,92). According to these the king may, during a state of nation al emergency, declare martial law, suspend the consti tution and issue decrees bearing the force of law, all 39
without support of parliament. Also, under the last of these articles, the king may issue by decree act of law during that period when the parliament is not in session. These decrees, however, must be submitted to parliament for approval when it reconvenes. This power takes on special importance during periods such as 1974-1984 when 12 the Parliament did not meet at all. There are two recognized court systems in Jordan, the civil and the religious (Article 104). Both of which ultimately derive their powers from the king. The civil courts handle the civil and criminal cases, and apply to all Jordanians. The religious courts apply themselves to .personal status, religious and social matters. The religious courts are composed of separate tribunals repre senting each of the religious communities. This system, known as the millet system, can be traced back to the 13 Ottomans and from them to the early Califates. The legal system in use in Jordan is a modification of traditional and religious law as laid down in the Ottoman "Digest of 14 Civil Law". The king's powers in the area of the
12. Deadline Data on World Affairs, Jordan, January 5, 1984. 13. Aruri, p. 49. And, Sharabi, p. 39. 14. Khadduri, p. 241-242. 40 judiciary include appointing and dismissing judges, except those in the non-Muslim religious courts (Articles 27,99). And the power as final court of appeal. This from his powers to grant royal pardons, amnesties and commuting any sentence (Article 38). The king's control over the court system is the least of those he possesses.
Characteristics of Rule in Jordan
Nizam al-Mulk, the great statesman of the Seljuks and political thinker, had said; The ruler should try and rule according to the Law laid down in the Qur'an and the Traditions, but apart from this the king should have the power of issuing proclamations according to the needs of the moment.15 As shown above the constitution gives the Jordanian monarch this power. And this power is wielded by the king with the assistance of several powerful elements in the country. Aside from the army, these include the royal family, palace staff, old East Bank clan and tribal leader's, aristocatic West Bank families and ex-Palestine 16 civil service employees. All of which, including ex-army officers, together form the pool from which the monarchy draws its ministers and Senate members. Many of whom had
15. Sherwani, p. 126. 16. Nyrop, p. 146. And, Abu Jabar, p. 229. 41
trained under the rule of Amir Abdullah. This group also tends to make up a significant portion of of the lower house of Parliament. King Husayn's western training had given him many views on parliamentary sovereignty and democracy that differed distinctly from his grandfather and his Arab- 17 Islamic education. Nevertheless Husayn has relied on many of the men who trained under his grandfather to implement his policies. This was especially true following the events of 1956-1958. But to believe that these men ever exercise any real power is to misunderstand the structure of the Jordanian monarchy. While their opinions and advice may have some effect on certain policies, the primary purpose of the Council of Ministers is to imple- 18 ment royal policy. Nor do the social segments of the country expect to be included in the decision making process. The end result is that a "strong" cabinet has come to mean loyalty to the king, and tends to reflect a 19 balance of power which is favorable to the throne. This is equally true in both foreign and domestic policy. The king has often acted as his own Prime Minister and demon-
17. Faddah, p. 302-303. 18. Khoury. "Leadership in Crisis", p. 125-126. And, Aruri, p. 189. 19. Khoury, p. 126. 42 strated repeatedly that foreign policy rests exclusively 20 in his hands. Although from the information supplied above it appears that the king rules with a great deal of power, we should not assume that Jordan is an absolutist system.
Because, the people actually vote.; on occasion a veto is overridden or a government is forced to resign. Anti-government editorials appear in newspapers, and people make speeches and criticize. There are no large scale concentration camps and no organized system of violence by the govern ment. 21 Furthermore the king has shown a concern for the well- being of his people by re-instituting the traditional practice of free access to the ruler. The power held by King Husayn is very much like that held by his grandfather. While the constitution places controls on Husayn that did not exist in Abd ullah's reign, the basic structure is still the same. Power in Jordan and the way in which it is exercised follow a strong traditional pattern. The parliamentary system instead of being in opposition to it has come to be an added support for the traditional patterns, while adding some checks that did not exist in the past. The
20. Aruri, p. 189. And, Faddah, p. 300. 21. Abu Jabar, p. 243. 43 exercise of power in Jordan then, is characterized by a traditional system working in harmony with a western elec tive system. CHAPTER V
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MONARCHY
Several other aspects of the Jordanian monarchy exist which exert some influence on its ability to func tion. None of these aspects, except one, has any influence on the day-to-day operations of the state. At certain times, however, any one of these may come to occupy a dominant position in the political sphere and produce an impact with far reaching results to the regime. These aspects are religion, royal marriage and the succession. Of the three only religion exerts a constant influence on the monarchy. All of these aspects, however, are important to the long term survival of the monarchy.
Religion and the Throne
There is a major factor in Middle Eastern society that underlies and influences nearly all aspects of life. Its impact has been felt in such simple areas as family to those as complex as government. This factor is religion., and the dominant religion of the Middle East is Islam. Islam so completely encompasses the culture in the region that attempts at creating a secular state, where the
44 45 majority of the citizens are Muslim, have never been 1 completely successful. For in Islam there is no independent political theory, ...every thing related to government and state falls within the religious domain; a distinction between secular and religious does not exist.2
Jordan is no different in this than any other government of the region. In recognition of this Islam has been declared the state religion in the constitution (Article 2). As seen in the previous chapters religion plays a role in the both the military and ,in a modified form, in the legal system. In the context of these, and in the society at large, the position of the monarch in respect to religion is twofold. Firstly is the king's position as a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. Secondly is his posi tion as "Commander of the Faithful" and "Defender of the Faith". As discussed in Chapter III a large part of the Bedouin's loyalty to the king stems from his descent from the Prophet. The ruling family is a branch of the Hashemite clan. The Hashemites trace their descent from the Prophet through his daughter Fatima, and her two sons 3 Hasan and Husayn. Members of this family were, and in
1. Turkey is of course an exception to this. 2. Sharabi, p. 11. 3. Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. Ill, p. 262. 46 many countries of the Muslim world still are, granted the honorary titles of Sharif (Noble) and Sayyid (Lord). The former is given to descendents of Hasan and the latter to those of Husayn, the two sons of Fatima. The Jordanian 4 branch of the Hashemite family claims descent from Hasan. Although the position of the Hashemites has de clined, in the social sense, at one time they were consid ered the "lords of lords, the aristocrats of aristocrats" 5 and "the grandest family of Islam". To this family had been granted one of the most prestigious positions in Islam. The guardianship of the holy city of Makka. From the twelfth century until 1924, when Ibn Sa'ud invaded the Hijaz, the Sharifan branch of the Hashemite clan had 6 supplied the Grand Sharifs of Makka. The last of these was Ali, Amir Abdullah's older brother. Even considering the decline in the Hashemite families position, areas such as Jordan continue to be regions where the name carries respect. This was amply demonstrated in the quote of the Bedouin given in Chapter III. The same sentiments are true of members of the government, such as Marwan Kasim, Chief of the Royal Court, who has called the Hashemite family
4. Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 263-264. 5. Morris. The Hashemite Kings, p. 4. 6. Ibid., p. 66. 47
"the custodians of the noble heritage of Islam and the 7 finest Arab traditions".
The titles "Commander of the Faithful" and "Defender of the Faith" are not in use by the Jordanian monarchy. The ideals and duties that they represent, how ever, are. These two titles imply the duties and ideals of supporting Islam and its community, upholding its laws and protecting it from physical and ideological forces which may threaten it. These implied duties have been considered in the past to be basic requirements for any Muslim ruler. The Great Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun expressed these requirements as follows. He whom God has chosen as ruler must protect his community from external aggression, preserve order, and enforce the laws, in order to prevent the enroachment by any one on the rights of others.8 In Jordan these requirements are met in two ways. By legislation and the army. In the legislative arena these requirements have been carried out in several ways. The first was the pro clamation of Islam as the state religion and the estab lishment of religious courts. Next is the use of a legal
7. Marwan S. Kasim, Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court. 8. Ibn Khaldun. An Arab Philosophy of History, p. 115. 48 system based on modified religious law. in order to protect the community from ideals contrary to the teach ings of Islam, such as communism, the king has several times used his powers of censorship, and has banned polit- 9 ical parties. In the area of physical threat the king maintains direct control over the army, which has been used several times to counteract internal, as well as external, threats.
Royal Marriage
In a monarchical system marriage can be a very powerful tool. As such, regardless of the political role of the spouse, marriage always carries with it the burden of a state decision and not a simple personal matter. By the single act of marriage a ruler can sway an entire population to his support, or alienate it entirely. The present ruler of Jordan has entered into marriage four times to date. Of these one was dynastic, one political and two of a "personal" nature.
King Husayn's first marriage took place in 1955 to Dina Abdul-Hamed, a great-grand niece of Sharif Husayn of Makka. This marriage was primarily of a dynastic nature,
9. FMA, Jdn-1101/1. And, The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Article 15iv. 49 aimed at strengthening the Hashemite line. This marriage resulted in only one child, a girl, and broke up after 10 eighteen months. Husayn's second marriage occurred in
1961. His new bride was Antoinette Gardiner, daughter of a British officer in Jordanian employ, who took the name of Muna al-Husayn. Despite King Husayn's assurances that his private life had no political effect, there was strong 11 criticism of this marriage to a non-Muslim foreigner. This reaction was compounded by the fact that she was British. Another problem was children. While Muna had converted to Islam for the purposes of this marriage, this conversion was very suspect. This is particularly impor tant in relation to her offspring and the succession. This will be discussed in the following section. Husayn's mar riage to Muna broke up in 1972. His following marriage in 1973 was one of his greatest political triumphs. This marriage was to a Palestinian, Alia Tuqan. Alia was a member a family which was one of the monarchy's major 12 supporters on the West Bank. This marriage benefited the monarchy in several respects. First Alia was an Arab and a Muslim. This may have helped to offset the alienation
10. Snow, p. 56-66. 11. Alberts. "King Hussein of Jordan; The Consummate Politician", p. P27. 12. Nyrop, p. 14G. 50 which resulted from his marriage to Muna. Second she was a Palestinian, which provided a closer tie to the king and his Palestinian subjects. This latter also presented the possibility that a child from this marriage could one day sit on the Jordanian throne. Husayn's last marriage occur red after the death of Alia in 1977. This was to Lisa Halabi, an Arab American. Though his second marriage to Muna can be regarded as the rash action of a young and inexperienced ruler, to what can be ascribed second seem ingly inadvisable marriage? Perhaps the answer lay in the fact that with the succession in Jordan secure and over a decade of stability behind this last marriage would lack many of the political implications found in the earlier ones. This would seem to be the case as no major outcry occurred as had in 1961. One of the main factors in the impact of a royal marriage is the question of the succession.
Succession in Jordan
In the Islamic Middle East there has never been a set principle of succession. Several different patterns have developed, but none have come to occupy a recognized place in political practice. This lack of a succession principle has played a major role in the rise and fall of 51 dynasties throughout Islamic history. Today, the monar chies of the Middle East, with Jordan among them, are still effected by this. Jordan has been relatively lucky in regard to this, as it has only experienced two succes sions in its sixty-four year history. With both of these falling in a three year period. However, a succession related crisis did present itself in the early 1960s. In this section the problems relating to the succession ques tion, as it relates to Jordan, will be discussed; as well as those measures taken by the monarchy to resolve them. In the era of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates it was understood that every ruler had more than one son capable of ruling. But, lacking a set of principles gov- 13 erning the succession the result was often civil war. Those few times when the succession went smoothly the sons of the Caliph usually succeeded each other beginning with the oldest. A succession principle did eventually come to 14 be accepted, that was by seniority. The problem with this, however, was that no distinction was made between oldest among tribe, family, cousins or brothers. Thereby doing little to halt the bloodshed. Later, during the pre- imperial Muslim states (ca. 1700), the succession princi ple hovered between "elective" and hereditary monar-
13. Bligh. From Prince to King, p. 7. 14. Ibid., p. 8. 52 15 chies. These monarchies also suffered from violent and disorderly succession. The interesting aspect of these states was the "electoral college" that was composed of the dead ruler's wives, concubines, eunuchs of the harim, administrative and palace staff, religious leaders and
princes; all working in varying combinations with high 16 level military commanders. Ultimately the candidate for
the throne with the strongest military support won. These were some of the traditional patterns of succession. Among the Hashemites in Iraq, the Hijaz and Jordan
the principle of primogeniture has been the predominant 17 system. The Jordanian constitution implies such (Article 28), but also allows for the monarch to choose his own successor by royal decree. The two instances that a new ruler has ascended the throne in Jordan it has been through primogeniture. However, both successions also have an elective element as well. Prior to his death in 1951, Amir Abdullah had 18 expressed concern over the succession. Following the principle of primogeniture his eldest son Talal would be the next king. Talal's mental illness, however, left
15. Hurewitz, p. 98. 16. Ibid., p. 98. 17. Bligh, p. 10. 18. Faddah, p. 164-165. 53
Abdullah in doubt as to his abilities to rule. While he favored his grandson Husayn, in the end he left the decision up to his prime minister, and incidentally the Palace Group. In this succession, and the one following it, Talal's half-brother Naif was not considered as a 19 serious candidate as only his father was a Hashemite. The second succession was that of Husayn. There were no major problems linked to this succession. Both of these successions had an "elective" nature. In both cases the succession was decided by the prime minister, parliament and the Palace Group, though they operated using the principles laid down in the constitution.
The most serious succession question occurred in the early 1960s. Upon his accession in 1953 Husayn, having no heirs, appointed his brother Muhammad Crown Prince. A 20 position he held until January of 1962. In 1962 Husayn's wife Muna had given birth to a son Abdullah, who became Crown Prince. However, this only lasted until April of 1965 when by royal decree Husayn's youngest brother Hasan was appointed Crown Prince. At the same time a royal decree was issued that excluded Husayn's brother Muhammad,
19. Morris, p. 155. 20. Akram Z. Barakat, Director, Jordan Information Bureau. 54 21 as well as Muna's children from the succession. With these moves King Husayn broke with the previous practice of primogeniture. There are several ways of explaining these moves. In 1965 nationalist feelings in the Arab world were run ning high. At the same time Islam was experiencing a conservative resurgence. Considering these two factors it is easy to explain Husayn's moves. Muna was British and had only adopted Islam in order to marry Husayn. A conver sion that must have been very suspect in the religious community. This is important because the constitution states that only a Muslim of Muslim parents may ascend the throne (Article 28e). Another factor to consider, is that Talal's brother Naif was excluded from the succession because both his parents were not Hashemites. Therefore the children of Husayn and Muna might not have met the first requirement and certainly did not meet the second. Another question that arises out of the events of 1965, was why did Husayn exclude Muhammad from the succession when he had already been Crown Prince once before? Two possible suggestions present themselves. The first is that Hasan had in 1965 only recently graduated from Harrow. A school that Muhammad had not been thought qualified to
21. Sinai. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, p. 330-331. And, Nyrop, p. 135. 55 attend. And secondly, there was a question as to 22 Muhammad's health. Since 1965 only one other move has been made to modify the succession. This took place in 1978, when Husayn appointed his eldest son by Alia as second in line 23 to the throne after Hasan. This has two implications. First, this appears to be a move on Husayn's part to direct the line of succession back to his own descendents Second, it also seems to be the fulfillment of that un spoken promise of placing a Palestinian on the throne of Jordan, made when he married Alia Tuqan.
22. Bligh, p. 10. 23. FMA, Biographies 11-J2. CHAPTER VI
HUSAYN AS MONARCH
Having discussed the structure of the monarchy in Jordan, it is now time to take a brief look at how King Husayn fills the role of monarch. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the role of the monarch is military, social and political in nature. King Husayn is soldier, patriarch and statesman. How he fulfills these roles dem onstrates most effectively the all-encompassing nature of the Jordanian monarchy, and emphasizes the bonding force this has on the state. To the army, which comprises the monarchy's main support, Husayn is seen primarily as a warrior. Although in many parts of the world the warrior hero image has disappeared, it continues to exist as a major factor in the Middle East where personal bravery and courage remain 1 the mark of a great man. These are all qualities that have been shown by King Husayn. Throughout his reign, he has continually presented himself in the warrior hero image. He is often seen in uniform. In keeping with this soldier image these uniforms are often of the khaki field
1. Vatikiotis, p. 171.
56 57 type. This is especially true in times of war and civil 2 unrest. For Husayn, however, there is more to this than pure show. Of all the Arab leaders, he was the only one to have participated personally in the battles of the 1967 3 war. And, as mentioned in chapter III, He has demon strated a preference to being in the field with his troops, rather than in the safety of command headquarters. This warrior image also extends to other members of the royal family. Many of Husayn's uncles, cousins and other relations are in the Jordanian military. This image is being built up especially strong around crown Prince 4 Hasan, who Husayn has praised as "a Hashemite soldier". In following the warrior hero image, Husayn has linked himself to the military Jordan as well as improved his image throughout the Middle East. King Husayn's role of patriarch is the broadest. As patriarch of the Jordanian people Husayn promotes the idea of the greater Jordanian family, with himself at its head. He has often been heard to refer to the people as "my 5 family" and through this stress national solidarity.
2. Vance, p. 41. 3. Ibid., p. 41. 4. Speech in the Royal Palace, October 4, 19 65. Arab Political Docviments 1965, p. 355.
5. Aruri, p. 190. 58 Husayn has stressed his patriarchal image in other ways as well. One of these was is the free access to himself and the Prime Minister. This bureau of complaints, or diwan al-mazalim, was instituted in 1959 to draw on a wider base 6 of support for the government. Under this citizens are allowed one day a week in which to present their com plaints directly to the throne, following this traditional principle of free access to the ruler. Another way in which Husayn stresses his patriarchal image is in his position as the highest judge in the land and final court of appeal. King Husayn has treated dissenters in Jordan as 7 simply misguided members of the family. And judges them as such. Two examples of this are the pilots sent to fight in Yemen in the early sixties, and the several men respon sible for attempted coups. The former, who had defected to 8 President Nasir of Egypt, were granted a general amnesty. The latter group involves five currently high government officials who all had at one time plotted the overthrow of the monarchy, but were granted royal pardons and now serve 9 the government faithfully. Among them is Ali Abu Nuwar, the plotter mentioned in Chapter III. King Husayn has also
6. Aruri, p. 179. 7. Ibid., p. 190. 8. Faddah, p. 214. 9. Black September, p. 34. 59 tied himself to this Palestinian subjects by referring to 10 himself as a Palestinian and a "soldier for Palestine". Closely connected to his role as patriarch is his image as a leader of Arab unity. This image expands the patriarchal idea beyond the boundaries of Jordan. As his grand father before him, Husayn sees Jordan as the nucleus 11 of a comprehensive Arab unity. In his Speech from the Throne in August of 1963, Husayn had declared: "From the very beginning, Jordan has been the cradle of all efforts 12 at realizing the aspirations of the Arab Revolt". In an earlier speech he had expressed his position on himself as a leader of Arab unity. I am an Arab and I believe in my nation's goals of Liberty, Unity and Progress. I belong to the Jordanian family which is the heart of the Arab nation and the fortress of its hopes. I am a true Arab and I have inherited from my ancestors the aspirations of my nation, for which they have struggled and sacrificed their blood. As long as I live, I will never betray that trust.13 An attempt at implementing a part of this idea of Arab unity occurred in 1972 with Husayn's United Arab Kingdom plan. This plan called for the uniting of the West Bank
10. Speech to the Palestine National Conference. May 28, 1964. Arab Political Documents 1964, p. 227. 11. Faddah, p. 3 06. 12. Arab Political Documents 1963, p. 349. 13. Ibid., p. 247. 60 and Gaza Strip with Jordan into a single state under his 14 rule. Nothing came of this plan however. The above have been the traditional roles, but
Husayn has one other, that of a modern leader and states man. In this last role Husayn has shown remarkable talent. In the domestic arena he has moved steadily towards democ ratization. With anti-regime activity being minimized by a 15 gradual compliance to internal and external pressure. In the international arena his power to control all aspects of foreign policy has given him the flexibility to main tain a neutral stance and associate only with that bloc or 16 state which will gain him the most advantages. This power also gives him the freedom to utilize his abilities to their fullest, inabling him to adapt to shifts in 17 regional and global power. All of these powers he uses to their fullest advantages which have gained him world wide respect.
As shown above the roles of the King in Jordan encompass all aspects of the state, and through this a bond develops linking them all together in the figure of
14. |m, Jdn-1101/2. 15. Vatikiotis, p. 151-152. And, Aruri, p. 188. 16. Faddah, p. 219-220. 17. Khoury, p. 114. 61 one person, the king. In his roles as soldier, patriarch and national leader King Husayn becomes the symbol of the monarchy and the state. CHAPTER VII
MONARCHY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
There exists in the world today a penchant for applying labels to all things. This is especially true in the realm of politics. Often labels are used to legitimize or condemn a regime. How often have we heard governments refer to dictatorships as republics, or democracies, in order to justify their support of an authoritarian regime? Under such a system of labeling certain forms of govern ment come to be accepted as "good" or "bad". This is very well demonstrated by the case of the Central African Empire. When the ruler of this country had possessed the title of President and the country was called a Republic relations with the West remained good. However, when President Bokassa proclaimed himself Emperor and the country became a monarchy relations with the West became 1 tense and uncertain. But, the reality of the situation was that the structure of power in the country had not changed at all, just the labels. This illustrates one of the great dangers of applying labels. For
1. Crabb. "The Coronation of Emperor Bokassa", p. 25-44.
62 63
the important thing about a government is not what it is called, but how it acts. There are corrupt republican regimes and sound monarchies, and vice versa. ...The quality of a regime should be judged by its deeds and the integrity of its rulers, not by its name.2
Thus the government of a regime must always be observed in the context of its political and social traditions, not those of the observer. The application of labels to the regimes of the
Middle East has created many problems in our understanding of the political dynamics of the region. By applying the labels of "r'^oublic" to Egypt and "monarchy" to Jordan, the one implying democratic the other authoritarian, we have failed to understand the underlying dynamics of each state. While outwardly these two governments appear to be vastly different, in basic structure they are astoundingly similar. This is also true of the other states in the region. The primary similarity of all the regimes in the region is that they are all based on the concept of 3 personal rule. This is in part a reflection of the traditional Arab view of government, as expounded by Ibn Khaldun, that "it is the nature of states that authority
2. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. As quoted in, Lacey. The Kingdom, p. 374. 3. Sharabi, p. 3 and p. 9. 64 4 becomes concentrated in one person". There are many other similarities as well. In both Jordan and Egypt the ruler has the power to appoint his successor. In Jordan this power exists by law, in Egypt it exists by unwritten popular consent. Another similarity is the position of the military. In Jordan the monarch rules fairly autocratically with the assistance and support of a military establish ment. ...In short the regime persists because the military exercises defacto control of the state. Yet when one looks at Iraq, Syria and even Egypt the situation does not appear to be too different.5
And while the Constitution of Jordan gives the monarch a large amount of power, the constitution proclaimed by Nasir of Egypt is not much different. The Egyptian consti tution exploited all the customary conceptions of political terminology. It promised fictitious liberties, styled Egypt as a "Democratic Republic" and proclaimed monarchic powers for a king who, in keeping with customary jargon, was styled as "President".6
Therefore, in the final analysis, the realities of power between the monarchies and democracies of the region of the Middle East are much the same. In applying
4. Ibn Khaldun, p. 114. 5. Vatikiotis, p. 153.
6. Newman. "The New Monarchies of the Middle East", p. 163. 65 labels we must always realize that "democracy, like monarchy, is always an aspect of a particular culture", and "has little meaning when divorced from a particular nationality; it is a cultural trait which distinguishes 7 from others the national group which professes it".
7. Gabriel. The Course of American Democratic Thought, p. 80. CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
The Middle East today contains a large concentra tion of states that possess a monarchical form of govern ment. The same internal dynamics of personal rule that are exhibited by these states can also be seen in the "democ racies" and "republics" of the region. Thus it is important for us to become aware of the characteristics of
/ modern Middle Easter mc ar hy in order to further increase our understanding of the political dynamics of the region. Of the monarchies in existence in the Middle East today, that of Jordan is the best example of what can be called "modern". This is due to the fact that, of the countries in question, Jordan has best adapted traditional patterns of authoritarian rule to the needs of the modern nation- state. During the reign of King Husayn the Jordanian monarchy has been shown to exhibit certain identifying characteristics within the areas of army, state, religion, royal marriage and succession. These characteristics are what identify modern Middle Eastern monarchy as exempli fied by Jordan. Although time did not allow for the 67 confirmation of this view, I believe that these charac teristics may also be applicable to the other monarchies in the Middle East today. The relationship between the army and the throne is characterized by the following points. The army is com posed of two main elements. These are the larger "nation al" army, and within that, an essentially mercenary tribal Bedouin force controlling key elements in the armor and infantry. This latter serves as a private army of the ruler. Its loyalties are to him alone and not to that of the state or nation. This loyalty is marked by the
Bedouin's view of the monarch as warrior, religious notable and premier Shaykh. In exchange for this loyalty the Bedouin receive monetary, educational and social benefits, many of which extend to the army as a whole. The continuance of this loyalty is thus insured by tying the survival of the monarchy to the survival of the Bedouin and army as an elite group in the country. The resulting relationship is that of the army, and more specifically the Bedouin, in the position of a primary support group to the throne. This support has been well demonstrated by the events of 1957 and 1970. The area of the state, or more correctly the con stitutional administrative area, is characterized by a Western parliamentary government overlying a traditional 68 pattern of rule. Under this many of the traditional powers of the monarchy are protected and legitimized by a consti tutional system. The cabinet and legislative branches of the government exist mainly for implementing royal policy. However, while the king possesses many powers known to traditional monarchies, the parliamentary system does provide for a check on the ruler where none existed before. The lower house of parliament is an elective body and, on occasion, has overridden a royal veto. Therefore, the system can be said to be characterized by a tradition al system of rule working in conjunction with a Western parliamentary structure, that is more than simply a facade used to mollify opposition to the government.
In the realm of religion the monarchy exhibits two main characteristics. The first of these is the position of the monarch a religious notable, which stems from his descent from the Prophet Muhammad. This aspect lends a religious quality to his rule and helps to strengthen ties between the throne and conservative elements such as the Bedouin. The other characteristic is that which was de scribed as the monarch's roles of "Commander of the Faithful" and Defender of the Faith". These roles are the monarch's connection to the image of the traditional muslim ruler, and are fulfilled through implementation of modified forms of religious law and the use of religious rhetoric by the king. 69 In connection with royal marriage there is little that can be said to characterize it. Marriage in any monarchy is always a political move. Jordan's present king has been married four times to date. Among these no set
pattern, such as dynastic marriage, has been observed. The question of succession is another matter. While the constitution implies a pattern of primogeniture, and the two successions to date have followed such a pattern, it appears that this will not remain the case. The monar chy in Jordan has shown itself to be susceptible to the problem of there being no set principle of succession in Islam. While the two successions that have occurred were in principle by primogeniture, the deciding authority had been an "elective" body composed of the prime minister and the Palace Group. Also the current crown prince is not the king's son, but his brother. Thus succession in Jordan can be said to be characterized by a pattern of either "election" or, presently, by the monarch's appointing of his successor from among his family though not necessarily
his children. However, there is no real system to insure that his wishes will be respected after his death. This is the same problem encountered in other dynastic muslim states. These then are the basic characteristics that identify Jordan as a modern Middle Eastern monarchy. There is another question that has arisen out of this study. 70
There are some scholars, such as Naseer Aruri, who hold that Jordan has been "unable to create a pattern of social development and a set of institutions capable of ]. meeting the demands of modernization". And others such as Richard Nyrop, Nabeel Khoury and Muhammad Faddah who view Jordan's survival as being based on leadership alone. But this is to disregard all of the evidence to the contrary. As shown in this paper Jordan possesses a highly organized governmental infrastructure, equal to if not exceeding the others of the region. And, while its leadership is of very high quality, it is the system that allows for this lead ership to be utilized to the fullest. Not only has Jordan been able to achieve this, but, it "has emerged in the 1980s as a stable, [and] also central, state" in the 2 region. Furthermore, to condemn Jordan as unviable, is to condemn the other governments of the Middle East as well. For when one looks at the varied political systems of the
Middle East, he is in reality only viewing one system. Each state may have a different name and possess varying types of superficial surface structure, but the ultimate dynamics of all of these states is that of an authoritari an pattern based on the traditional concept of personal
1. Aruri, p. 190. 2. Dawisha. "Jordan in the Middle East; The Art of Survival", p. 73. 71 rule. In effect, all of the Arab governments of the Middle East are monarchies. The system of government, in use in Jordan today, has remained relatively unchanged since the state's founding. The present ruler, King Husayn, has remained in power for over thirty years. This is far longer than any other currently ruling national leader, in the region. This has been attributed by some to the king's abilities 3 alone, while disregarding the system which fostered him. Although one can not discount his abilities as a factor, it must be noted that the state functioned equally well during the uncertain period of King Talal's reign and the two regency periods. This is also true of the early years
of King Husayn's reign, when he was still learning the art of governing. But, to admit that the system of monarchy is the main factor in Husayn's, and Jordan's, survival would be to go against many of the "democratic" West's most closely held beliefs. We are more willing to except Husayn as one of the most brilliant statesmen the world has known, rather than admit that the Jordanian state survives because the system of monarchy works. But, who can say with any degree of accuracy that "democracy" is the best form of government? ...democracy among other things is a feeling and a way of life, not simply a set of practical arrangerents of institutions. Thus, what appears
3. Faddah, p. 308. And, Alberts. 72 on the surface to be undemocratic may be quite the contrary in the proper setting. The methods may differ: that is all.4
In modern terminology Egypt is called a "democratic republic", and Jordan is a "monarchy". But as shown there is in reality little difference. Both of these governments rely on the military for support and the leaders wield large amounts of power. Only the names differ. And, while Jordan will never be called a model for the parliamentary system, it is nonetheless a representative system. Not the classic represen tation, but a "different" and perhaps just as effective system.5 Throughout this paper I have attempted to show the structure of modern Middle Eastern monarchy, with its traditional as well as modern aspects. The main purpose of this paper has been to show monarchy in the perspective of a modern system of government and to dispel the views that we have of this system that date back to earlier centur ies. The system of monarchy has changed with the times as has every other system of government. Those that do not change,do not survive. Monarchy has proved itself in the Middle East as viable form of government in the modern nation-state, and, forms the basic dynamics of all the muslim Arab states of the region. As such we can not
4. Abu Jabar, p. 250. 5. Ibid., p. 250. 73 ignore the system or we lend ourselves to the danger of being ignorant of the basic dynamics of the region's governments. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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