Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan: an Update Tribu Et État En Iran Et En Afghanistan : Une Mise À Jour

Home , Basseri, Shahsevan, Sur (Pashtun tribe)

Études rurales

184 | 2009 La tribu à l'heure de la globalisation

Tribe and state in Iran and Afghanistan: an Update Tribu et État en Iran et en Afghanistan : une mise à jour

Richard Tapper

Édition électronique URL : https://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/10461 DOI : 10.4000/etudesrurales.10461 ISSN : 1777-537X

Éditeur Éditions de l’EHESS

Édition imprimée Date de publication : 7 avril 2009 Pagination : 33-46

Référence électronique Richard Tapper, « Tribe and state in Iran and Afghanistan: an Update », Études rurales [En ligne], 184 | 2009, mis en ligne le 01 janvier 2011, consulté le 21 septembre 2021. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/10461 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesrurales.10461

Iran and Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th cen- turies, the time was now ripe for stock-taking and generalization, and an attempt at system- atic comparison within a historical perspective, both between Afghanistan and Iran and also with other areas of the world. By the time of the conference political upheavals in both countries had given the topic added interest and contemporary relevance. There had been the sort of tribal resurgence that so often in the past had accompanied such upheavals. Among the initial problems N SUMMER 1979, the late David Brooks faced by the new Islamic Republic of Iran and I convened a conference in London was resistance on the part of regional, ethnic on the theme of ‘Tribe and state in Iran and tribal minorities. Within the country, sub- I stantial numbers of pastoral nomads settled and Afghanistan, 1800-1980’. Each of us had conducted ethnographic fieldwork during the over the previous decades had resumed their 1960s in one of the major tribal groups in former way of life, and tribal leaders long used Iran, David among the Bakhtiari and myself to exile in the West had been welcomed back. among the Shahsevan, and we had both made In Afghanistan, following the socialist coup in extended studies of the histories of these April 1978, successive governments had failed groups. In 1970-1972, I had also worked with to win popular support, and an insurgency of Durrani tribes people in northern Afghanistan. Islamic and tribal elements was spreading. The idea for the conference was born in Tehran in late 1977, as we discussed our reac- Tribes, Nomads, Pastoralism and the State tions to the Festival and Seminar on Popular In planning the conference, we were aware Traditions that we had just attended in Isfahan. of two major questions that would need to be The tribes had featured prominently in the addressed: the definition of ‘tribe’, and whether Festival, and it was clear that the Iranian gov- tribes could be defined or even discussed ernment now considered them to be ‘safe’ apart from the state – we had both partici- enough to promote as cultural curiosities, as pated in debates over tribe-state relations, a tourist attraction as well as grist to the eth- and were convinced that – at least in these nographers’ mill. It was no longer mentioned two countries – any discussion of the nature that some tribes had once posed a political of either tribe or state, now or in the past, threat to the state. David and I felt that, in must include a discussion of the relationship view of the considerable amount of research between them. that had been done over the last two decades The old anthropological question, ‘What is on the ethnography and history of the tribes of a tribe?’ could not be avoided: there was

Études rurales, juillet-décembre 2009, 184 : 33-46

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... 34 considerable diversity of opinion, both among entrenched in both academic and administra- anthropologists and historians, and among tive discourses in many parts of the Middle those studying Iran and Afghanistan, not to East, is of ‘tribe’ as the political and socio- mention their subjects, as to what constituted cultural dimension of pastoral nomadism, such a ‘tribe’. Moreover, standard anthropological that the category of ‘the tribes’ is convention- notions of ‘tribe’ bore little relation to the ally synonymous with ‘the nomads’. 2 But groups so labeled in these two countries, or there is nothing in either pastoralism as a sys- indeed to the Middle East generally. The clas- tem of production or nomadism as a mobile sical model of tribal society in the Middle way of living that necessarily leads to organi- East, conforming with Durkheim’s notion zation in tribes, whether defined politically in of ‘mechanical solidarity’, was of egalitarian terms of territory and chiefship, or culturally descent groups. This criterion best fits Arab in terms of common descent. tribal societies, where genealogies are partic- Numerous observers have noted how the ularly extensive; a classic example is the Rwala, geography and ecology of most Middle East- a ‘tribe’ of some 250,000 souls, though some ern countries favour pastoral nomadism. The even larger non-Arab groups such as the terrain and climate made large areas unculti- Bakhtiari (500,000) of Iran or the Durrani vable under preindustrial conditions, and suit- Pashtuns (over 2 million) of Afghanistan have able only for seasonal grazing; and as only a been called ‘tribes’ on the same grounds. small proportion of such pasture could be Many proponents of this view would deny the used by village-based livestock, vast ranges term ‘tribe’ to any group without a descent of steppe, semi-desert and mountain were left ideology. to be exploited by nomadic pastoralists. Such Others, however, saw tribes as essen- nomads until very recently numbered tens of tially territorially distinct political groups and millions, and almost all were organized politi- expected them to be led by chiefs; they applied cally into tribes under chiefs. Equally, tribes the term ‘tribe’ to almost equally large groups that lacked unifying descent ideologies and 1. Other writers (such as myself), however, are unwil- were heterogeneous in origins and composi- ling to take either extreme position, and refer to these tion, such as the Qashqa’i, the Khamseh or larger groups (whatever their apparent basis) as ‘confe- the Shahsevan in Iran. At this level of major deracies’, locating ‘tribes’ at a lower level of political cultural-political groups of 100,000 or more structure, that of first or second order components, people, then, there was disagreement as to numbering at most some thousands of individuals. whether the term ‘tribe’ is applicable on the Such tribes commonly (but still by no means always) combine territorial and political unity under a chief with grounds of culture (a descent ideology) or an ideology of common descent. political structure (chiefship and/or political- 1 2. This notion is held by numerous historians and other territorial unity). writers, who also assume tribes to be descent groups, Another notion that is no part of standard often borrowing from anthropology the term ‘segmen- anthropological definitions but is strongly tary lineage’. See my comments [Tapper 1990].

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... (defined in political terms) have commonly Explaining Variation in Tribal Organization 35 also had a pastoral economic base and led a The conference amply justified our hopes for nomadic way of life. a diversity of perspectives and fruitful discus- But an insistence that tribes in the Middle sion. In the long ‘Introduction’ to the resultant East were necessarily pastoral nomads, orga- volume I drew some comparative conclusions nized in descent groups, ignores major tribal based on a reading of the papers in the light groups in Anatolia, Iran, Afghanistan and of developments in Afghanistan and Iran since indeed several Arab countries, which often the conference. 3 included both settled cultivators and pastoral In both Iran and Afghanistan, tribal groups nomads and were complex and heterogeneous had been notorious as makers and breakers of in composition. Thus, most of the Pashtuns of kings, and dynasties of tribal origins had ruled Afghanistan are (and have always been) farm- both countries until well into the 20th century. ers or traders, with little or no leaning to pas- Both states had ‘tribal problems’; and the toralism or nomadism, and well-known groups tribes in each had ‘state problems’. Histori- in Iran such as the Qashqa’i, Bakhtiari, Kurds, cally, tribes and states formed a single sys- Baluch, Turkmen and Shahsevan have been at tem: until recently, no state was without tribal least partly settled agriculturalists. Of course, elements, no tribe existed without relations to by conventional anthropological definitions, at least one state. many of these groups were not tribes at all, Empirical tribal groups in Afghanistan and but ‘chiefdoms’, or even ‘protostates’. Iran conformed to no single pattern of organi- Any coincidence between nomads and zation. None of the following were universal tribes (whether descent-based, or led by chiefs) features: pastoral economy, nomadic or semi- was not so much a causal relation as a func- nomadic movements, descent group organization of relations of both with central states. tion, centralized chiefship, egalitarian ideol- Settled state administrations intent on regis- ogy. Nor did conventional images of tribes tering and taxing the inhabitants of territories conform to a single stereotype. Afghan tribes which they claimed to control have classically were renowned as hardy, independent, war- had ambivalent attitudes to both tribespeople, like mountain villagers, farming barren fields, with their personal allegiance to each other or and rigorous if not fanatical in their devotion to chiefs, and nomads, with their shifting resi- to Islam. The tribes of Iran by contrast were dence. Many earlier states, however, were understood to be pastoral nomads, organized themselves founded on military forces drawn from pastoral nomadic tribes, often organized in military units of tens, hundreds and thou- 3. See my ‘Introduction’ [Tapper ed. 1983: 1-82]. I sands. Rulers have fostered pastoral nomad- have elaborated some of the main arguments in various publications [Tapper 1991], which despite its publica- ism in strategic parts of their territories, and tion date, was the first draft of some of the argument, have frequently created tribes, tribal organiza- having been written and submitted [1975, 1994, 1997, tion and tribal chiefs. 2002, 2008].

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... 36 into strong centralized confederacies under raids on vulnerable trade routes or wealthy powerful and aristocratic chiefs, and notori- urban centres, or across international borders. ous for their ignorance of or indifference to Alternatively, state rulers appointed or Islam. Both stereotypes contained some truth, approved tribal chiefs. Where the state was but they disguised a wide range of empirical weak, it might have to buy the chiefs’ loyalty variation between the extremes of the power- with subsidies; where it was strong, it could ful, centralized tribal chiefdoms of Western demand taxes and tribal military levies. State Iran with their broad pastoral bases, and control over the tribes fluctuated over time. the independent, hardy, egalitarian Pakhtun Tribal groups, in their turn, could adapt and mountain villagers of the eastern borderlands integrate, or practice avoidance and – in of Afghanistan. Ernest Gellner’s terms [1983] – ‘divide that There had been several attempts to iden- ye be not ruled’. A strong state cannot toler- tify ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors in these ate such diffusely-organized ‘jellyfish tribes’ varied patterns of tribal organization and lead- as Malcolm Yapp called them [1983]; in ership, and to apply a range of theories of order to control or destroy them it must first evolutionary and cyclical change to the tribes provide them with a backbone in the form of Iran and Afghanistan. of chiefs. For instance, in his classic study of At the local community level, the common the Basiri tribe of Southwest Iran, Fredrik form of leadership was that of greybeard Barth made an important analytical distinction elders, with little power or authority of their between, on the one hand, the local pastoral own. Above that level, leaders of tribes and communities (of some 20-30 families) whose confederacies displayed some combination of organization and structure were generated by internal factors such as the pastoral ecology elements of two ‘ideal types’, ‘the brigand’ and economy; and, on the other hand, the and ‘the chief’. The former depended for tribe and the Khamseh confederacy of which authority over his followers on being able to it formed a part, a political superstructure ensure a flow of booty; the latter was more organized by or in response to external factors likely to inherit his position or to rely on gov- such as settled society, neighbouring tribes, ernment appointment. A third type of leader and agents of the Iranian state [1961]. emerged at different historical junctures: the Others showed how competition for pas- mullah or Sufi sheikh or pir, whose authority toral and agricultural resources both within over his followers was primarily charismatic and between local communities led to the for- and spiritual, though undoubtedly some fol- mation of rival blocs. Rivalry and conflict were lowers were motivated by expectations of commonly mediated by independent religious booty, as well as respect for the leader’s holy leaders. Formal political chiefship emerged lineage. Actual leaders were likely to combine only in conditions of surplus production, or elements of these ideal types of authority. where a dominant chiefly group could be sup- The history of tribe-state relations in Iran ported by external resources, for instance by and Afghanistan showed evidence of processes

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... of both evolutionary and cyclical or alternat- ecological limitations, state pressures or inher- 37 ing change. There were instances of state for- ent contradictions, the ‘pure’ tribe is an empiri- mation among tribes, but also of devolution cal impossibility. Most groups that were termed or retribalization, for example following the tribes had some form of segmentary descent dissolution of the Kurdish emirates in the ideology as the basis for political loyalties, 19th century. Cyclical processes too were evi- but all used other principles too, to guide dent in the history of tribal chiefly and royal action and association at different levels of dynasties in these two countries, conforming organization. All tribal groups in Iran and to the well-known and much-discussed model Afghanistan had a territorial dimension, though derived from Ibn Khaldun. they tended to ascribe common descent to all In summarizing the material from Iran and those who, by whatever means, had acquired Afghanistan, I suggested that the most useful rights in their territory. But there were several way of conceptualizing ‘tribe-state relations’ tribes, especially in Iran, which did not even was not as an opposition of substantive social, pretend to an ideology of common descent, economic and political structures so much as organizing as explicitly political local groups with a common leadership; in these terms, an opposition of tendencies, modes or models they were proto- or ministates within larger, of organization, not just analytically distinct empire-like states. The strength of egalitarian but consciously experienced as a tension within ideals varied widely, as did the extent of ine- the tribal groups and states discussed. As quality in practice; even the most egalitarian bases of identity and political allegiance and tribal groups displayed some inequalities of behaviour, ‘tribe’ gives primacy to ties of wealth (however narrow) and leadership roles kinship and patrilineal descent, while ‘state’ (however lacking in authority). Conflict over insists on the loyalty of all persons dwelling material interests, between rivals or between within a defined territory, whatever else their rich and poor, was endemic to all tribal groups; relation to each other. ‘Tribe’ stresses per- and ‘anti-segmentary’, territorially-based blocs sonal, moral and ascriptive factors in status, and factions were regular tribal phenomena. while ‘state’ is impersonal and recognises The ‘pure’ state is similarly impossible. contract, transaction and achievement. The Citizenship (that is, in premodern Iran and division of labour in the tribal model is ‘natu- Afghanistan, subjection to the ruler) is acquired ral’; in the state model it is complex. The through a mixture of territoriality and descent. tribal mode is socially homogeneous, egalitar- In other words, there is state within every ian and segmentary; the state is heterogene- tribe, and tribe within every state; state is ous, inegalitarian and hierarchical. partly defined in terms of tribe, tribe in terms The opposition between these two models, of state. Most empirical tribes and states are their confrontation with each other and with various forms of hybrid, such as chiefdoms, social reality, creates a tension, a dialectic with confederacies or tribal states. Tribal states take varying resolutions. Thus, whether because of different forms. Every state must boost its

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... 38 legitimacy, claim the moral allegiance of its In effect, varying articulations of all three citizens, by promoting elements of a common processes – segmentarity, community and bloc national culture and way of life. The most formation, and centralisation/patronage – pro- powerful symbols in a nationalist ideology duce the transformations of tribal society that are shared religion and a concept of mother/ have been observed. The major variable is the fatherland, but insofar as the ideology stresses influence of the state, both as an external common descent or origins (real or fictive, force and as an idea in opposition to the idea plausible or otherwise) it resembles a tribal one. of tribe. The essence of the latter is indeed Some states have claimed common descent or kinship and egalitarianism (the basis of a origins for all citizens and sought to deny or segmentary lineage system), while the state is eliminate any internal ethnic differentiation; essentially territorial (the basis of communi- but most contemporary states have to recog- ties and opposed blocs) and centralized (the nize minorities, which may be tribal in culture basis of patronage). It is in these terms that we or organization, though today they are often can understand both the variations in actual termed ‘ethnic’ or ‘regional’ groups or tribal forms and the changes that have occurred, ‘nationalities’. Other states, controlled by one whether we adopt a cyclical (or oscillation) ‘tribal’ (descent-based) elite, may make no model of change or acknowledge the appar- attempt to disguise cultural differences under ently irreversible (evolutionary) changes that a national ideology, rather reserving privi- have now taken place in the transition from leges and power for the dominant tribal group. tribe to state. Both these modes, the ‘tribe’ and the ‘state’, exist as opposed cultural categories The Return and the Transformation within the experience of individuals, as well of the Tribes as in the structure of systems: dyads from Afghanistan such as khan and khel, qawm and I reproduce these arguments here, because they gund, nang and qalang, resonate with classics seem to me to have lost little of their validity in the anthropological literature such as siba in the intervening thirty years. Yet prevailing and makhzen from the Maghreb, gumsa and notions of Middle Eastern tribes continue to gumlao from the Burma Kachin. They are suffer from some of the misconceptions that not descriptive but cultural categories, idi- my analysis sought to dispel. oms that are inadequate to explain the fluid In the mid-20th century, social scientists and complex workings of actual tribal socie- of all persuasions expected tribal and ethnic ties, let alone the relations of tribe and state. minorities within contemporary nation-states Account must be taken of the formation of to succumb sooner or later to policies of mod- ‘anti-segmentary’ communities at certain levels ernization and national integration, and many of organization, of the patterns of bloc alliances were confident that class would replace eth- among them, and of increasing centralisation nicity as the major dimension of social and involving hierarchical relations of patronage. political identity. Many anthropologists began

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... to regard the study of their traditional subject- In the second case, our terms have to fill the 39 matter – tribal peoples – as an antiquarian impossible dual role of being both tools and irrelevance, turning instead to the newly fash- objects of analysis. Yet successful jargon even- ionable subdisciplines of urban anthropology tually finds its way into popular discourse. and the anthropology of the state. ‘Tribe’, ‘tribalism’, ‘ethnicity’ (and one could These expectations and trends were con- add ‘state’ and ‘race’) are problematic cases founded towards the end of the century by in point. the persistence or creative revival of tribal Let me illustrate by quoting reports from and ethnic minority identities in virtually all three countries that have never been far from the countries of the world, and by increasing aca- front pages of western newspapers since 2001: demic and popular perception of violent inter- 1) ‘Attacks on coalition troops [in Iraq] community conflicts as tribal or ethnic in should be viewed through the prism of tribal nature. Sociologists, political scientists, histo- warfare. This is a world defined in large rians, geographers and others showed renewed measure by avenging the blood of a relative interest in the study of ethnic and tribal (al-tha¯’r); demonstrating one’s manly courage minorities of the ‘Fourth World’ – no longer in battle (al-muruwwah); generally upholding the sole preserve of anthropologists. one’s manly honor (al-sharaf).’ 4 Not least of the problems involved is the 2) ‘Tribal tourism is a means of eradicating question of the categories and terms of descrip- poverty and expanding social justice for it tion and analysis to be employed. Prominent would benefit one of the most deprived social among such terms have been ‘tribe’ and ‘trib- groups. Deputy head of Iran Tribal Affairs alism’. These refer to a category of human Organization for Social and Communications society whose study was once regarded as Affairs, Mohsen Ahmadi, elaborated that sell- largely the prerogative of anthropology, yet ing local handicrafts, artistic works and dairy anthropologists themselves have notoriously products, and renting out tribal tents and lodges been unable to agree on how to define them. would help diversify the tribesmen’s jobs and Small wonder then if historians too, and for boost their economy... Ahmadi pointed to that matter political scientists and others inter- migrating tribes who are scattered almost all across the country as one of the most fascinating ested in tribalism, have differed widely in 5 their understandings of the terms. draws for foreign visitors and anthropologists.’ The initial problem, then – one that is cen- 3) ‘At first glance the election commission’s tral to the discipline of anthropology, even map of Afghanistan appears to be a colour- more central than it is to philosophy – is that, coded layout of the country’s patchwork ethnic groups. On closer inspection, it turns out in our study of human society and culture, we 6 are constantly faced with the inadequacy of to be a display of voting results.’ our technical terms: either they are neologisms, technical jargon; or we try to give technical, 4. Amatzia Baram, New York Times, 28 October 2003. jargonistic definitions to words borrowed from 5. Anonymous, Iran Daily, 20 October 2004. popular discourse. The first case, jargon, by 6. Shoib Najafizada, Agence France Presse Report, its nature, alienates us from popular discourse. 26 October 2004.

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... 40 Among other things, these reports indicate, – and others in the region between the Atlan- first, the continuing importance of tribes, tic and the Himalayas – there is no necessary tribalism and ethnicity. But they also show association between pastoralism, nomadism, continuing disagreement as to what these and tribalism. Many known (and probably phenomena are. In Iraq tribalism and tribal many unknown) groups of pastoral nomads identity (as marked by violence and masculine have avoided tribal organization, as a strategy honour) are viewed as at root cultural phenom- to avoid state control. Major tribal societies ena; in Iran, the tribes are seen as peaceful, numbering millions consist of peasant farmers exotic, pastoral nomads, a tourist attraction; in and urbanites, with little or no pastoral or Afghanistan, ethnic groups and tribes display nomadic connections or history. The first their political nature in voting patterns. question proposed for discussion – ‘To what Since the invasions of Afghanistan and extent [does] the evolution of pastoral eco- Iraq such references to tribes and tribalism, by nomic activities in the context of globaliza- journalists, NGO researchers and seasoned tion allow nomadic practices to still occur and academics, have multiplied. Viewed overall, if this way of life, profoundly shattered during they display the same ambivalences that have the past decades [...] eventually contribute to dominated attitudes towards tribes on the part perpetuate some tribal orders?’ – would seem of both foreign observers and Middle Eastern of limited relevance to such examples. urbanites for a hundred years or more. Thus, Similarly, the notion of tribes as stateless the more romantically inclined, who perhaps descent groups may have some validity in idealize the tribes, regard them as the archety- North Africa, but it cannot apply to most pal ‘civil society’, in the sense of a refuge historical tribal groups in Afghanistan, Iran from a failed or oppressive state. Most politi- and beyond. cians and political scientists, on the other The ambiguity in discourses about ‘tribes’ hand, view tribes and tribalism as obstacles to – whether they are pastoral nomads or settled the proper functioning of the state, and in par- farmers, whether they are chiefdoms or descent ticular, to the development of ‘civil society’. groups, cultural or political, even pro-state or Analysts, moreover, are divided between those anti-state – not only divides academics but who see tribes as inherently egalitarian, if not obscures (or fuels) current political debates at democratic, and those for whom tribes are national level about the future role of tribes necessarily feudal, tyrannical and patriarchal, and tribalism. led by powerful chiefs who impose their will Officials – and many academics – have ruthlessly through armed thugs and threaten taken a highly positivist view of tribes, expect- the security of the state. ing them to be mappable, bounded groups, Any notion that there is a necessary histor- with little membership change, and wanting ical association between tribal organization an exact terminology for classificatory and and pastoral nomadism is doubtful, either in comparative purposes. From a government Iran or Afghanistan. For these two countries perspective, even the most autonomous rural

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... populations should have identifiable patterns such ambiguities, and attempts to give them 41 of organization, and leaders who may be – or ‘tribe’ – precision as to either level, func- treated as representatives; if they do not have tion or essence, are liable to be misdirected. these patterns or leaders, they may be encour- A precise terminology may aid comparison, aged to produce them. Some rural and nomadic but is unlikely to explain behaviour or to pro- populations have avoided government control vide an adequate translation of local catego- and exploitation, and even the attention of ries and perceptions. historians, by failing to produce such leaders Such a perspective identifies the categories or recognizable forms of ‘tribal’ organization. ‘tribe’ and ‘tribal’ as ideological concepts But government-created ‘tribes’, whose names and disqualifies them from analytical usage. may appear in the records as such, may exist Any use of these terms, or any ascription of only on paper. Further, tribal names found in a tribal identity, is a political statement that official sources imply a uniformity of socio- defines the speaker and their relation to their political structure which, in so far as it exists, audience as much as it defines the group or may be entirely due to administrative action, individuals so labelled. The same disqualifica- and may disguise fundamental disparities in tion applies to the use of any particular name culture and in forms of social organization. for a population. There are indeed strong conti- A desire to establish a consistent and stable nuities represented in tribal names; but their terminology for political groups has too often content (what it means, for example, to be a obscured the nature of indigenous concepts Kurd or a Pashtun) changes and differs from and terms, which are no more or less precise context to context. For the theorist this is or specific as regards socioeconomic or cultural a fascinating field of investigation. For the features, degree of political centralization, policy-maker it is a minefield. level of organization and so forth, than their In modern times, the nature of the state in English language equivalents such as ‘tribe’, the Middle East has been transformed, and new ‘tribal group’, ‘clan’, ‘lineage’, ‘family’. 7 Even nation-states have been created, with clearly in the most apparently consistent segmentary defined territorial borders and citizenship, terminology, individual terms are ambiguous, centralized administrations, powerful standing not merely about level, but in their conno- armies; state institutions have pervaded whole tations of functions or facets of identity: areas of social, economic and religious life ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘kinship’, ‘cultural’. that were previously not the state’s concern. However, as with equivalents in English prac- In many new nation-states, such as Republi- tice, the ambiguity of the terms and the flexi- can Turkey, Pahlavi Iran, Afghanistan since bility of the system are of the essence in 1880, and Baathist Iraq, new regimes sought everyday negotiations of meaning and signif- icance. Most of the terms that have been 7. The same applies to the English terms ‘state’ and c translated ‘tribe’, such as il, ashı¯ra, oymaq, ‘government’, and their local equivalents (dowlat, hoku- qabı¯la, qawm, tayfa (and their plurals), contain mat).

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... 42 ‘national integration’ by imposing a national cutting across religious and regional differen- language and sometimes religion, usually those ces. They had well-tried forms of organiza- of the ruling elite and not always that of the tion that had operated efficiently (and to an majority of the citizens. The state inevitably extent democratically) in previous times of treated as enemies of such ‘national integra- weak state structures. tion’ and state-formation all minority identi- In the Afghan context, ‘the tribes’ usually ties (tribal, ethnic, religious) that claimed the refers to the Pashtuns, who form up to 50% primary loyalties of their members. Many such of the population (some say more, some say tribal, ethnic and religious identities also span less) and at the same time have a similar or state frontiers drawn in colonial times; nota- greater number of fellow tribespeople across bly the large stateless tribal ‘nationalities’: the frontier in Pakistan. Other ethnic groups Kurds, Pashtuns, Baluches and Turkmens. in the country have ‘tribal’ traditions, notably In Iraq, until the mid-20th century tribalism the Shi‘i Hazaras and the Sunni Turkmens and ethnicity were the dominant sources of and Uzbeks of the North, while the main identity and organization. The major ethno- minority, the Tajiks, are non-tribal almost linguistic identities were Arab and Kurd, each by definition. comprising a range of different tribal groups. From 1747 until the 1970s, Afghanistan Religious allegiances (Shi‘a and Sunni and was ruled by Amirs and Shahs from the the numerous small minorities) often cut Durrani Pashtuns, who based their power on across tribal boundaries. Under the UK-backed paying subsidies to tribal elders, especially on monarchy, then the Baath, Iraq underwent the frontier with India/Pakistan. If the tribes ‘modernization’ and nation building in the supported the government, they were left conventional pattern: tribal and ethnic iden- to run the villages their own way – this tities were suppressed and denied. Saddam was broadly true in most of the country, Hussein however promoted his own tribal where, despite an administrative structure of group, and arming and subsidizing the Sunni provinces and provincial and district govern- tribes was a significant element in his post- ors, feudal lords, Pashtun and non-Pashtun, 1991 reorganization, 8 neglected or misunder- controlled local affairs. stood by the occupiers long after the 2003 The importance of ethnic and tribal identi- invasion. Tribal groups have largely reemerged, ties in Afghan politics and society has undoub- with sheiks (usually best regarded as elders, tedly increased since late 1970s. After the not chiefs) expected to represent their followers to the new authorities. In the absence of a credible or legitimate state, especially in the 8. See A. Baram [1997] ; see also R.L. Taylor, ‘Tribal countryside, tribes have offered identity and Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Stra- tegy’, Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Strategic solidarity and all the functions of ‘civil soci- Studies Institute, United States Army War College, ety’ and the state, not least law and order. 2005, available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute. The tribes have been well organized, well led, army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=619.

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... Soviet invasion, much of the countryside was religious education. The Taliban saw the 43 controlled by resistance forces, until the vic- tribalism of the 1980s and 1990s mujaheddin tory of the mujaheddin in 1989; the subsequent groups as corruption and lawlessness, and disastrous civil war of the early 1990s led to sought to replace it with ‘pure’ tribal values, the rise of the Taliban. During the years of which they equated with Islam. A CIA officer revolution, invasion, occupation, resistance and who had worked with Afghan fighters during civil war, both Afghan governments and for- the 1980s was reported as saying: eign political analysts insisted that ethnic and [Local Taliban leaders] are tribal chiefs, tribal identity was no longer the key factor in who give themselves Islamist credentials determining political behaviour: rather, we for foreign consumption, but the real should look to ideologies and programmes. source of their power is their tribe [...] Their power does not extend beyond the Since the late 1990s ethnic analysis has influence of their tribe. 11 returned to fashion. The strong identification of the Taliban with the Pashtun (especially When the Taliban leaders were removed, Durrani) tribes, the frequent occurrence of tribal government was resumed in much of apparent ‘ethnic’ massacres by and of the the country, especially the Pashtun areas: Taliban, and bitter conflicts between Uzbeks Some experts say this return to feudal- and Pashtuns, persuaded analysts to dust off ism, where warlords gain power by exer- cising power – relying on weapons and the old maps and once again to discuss ethnic pragmatism rather than ideologies or and tribal identities as determinants of politi- written laws – could endanger the fledg- cal loyalties and conflicts. Since the US-led ling government. But others argue that, invasion in late 2001, political analysis and at least at first, Afghanistan’s best oppor- government and NGO reconstruction efforts tunity for peace is to tap into a traditional infrastructure that may be unstable have sought to take account of ethnic identi- – even brutal – but works. 12 ties and tribal forms of organization. 9 Thus, Scott Baldauf, one of the most per- In 2004 Baldauf wrote: ceptive journalists in Afghanistan at the time, Two and a half years after the fall of the wrote after the 2001 invasion by US-led forces: Taliban, the fight for control of Afghan- istan continues tribe by tribe and village During two decades of war, in the absence of a functioning central government, its duties fell to ethnic or tribal 9. See for example B. Glatzer [1998] and A. Giustozzi leaders. Rural Afghans have long looked [2005]. to such leaders to settle land disputes, 10. ‘Feudal Lords Key to Afghan Peace’, Christian punish crimes, and get their voices Science Monitor, heard. 10 December 21, 2001 (http://www. csmonitor.com/2001/1221/p6s1-wosc.html). The Taliban ranks were drawn from 11. S. Baldauf, ‘Key to Governing Afghans: The Clans’, Durrani and other Pashtuns: but they were Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 2004 (http://www. openly and ideologically ‘detribalized’ by fif- csmonitor.com/2004/0624/p01s04-wosc.html). teen years of civil war, exile, orphanage, and 12. S. Baldauf, ‘Feudal Lords Key to Afghan Peace’.

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... 44 by village. It’s a battle of hearts and resembles that which obtained towards the minds, where the enemy – Taliban and end of the Pahlavi period, for example at the Al Qaeda – know the rules and nuances 1977 Festival of Popular Traditions in Isfa- of tribal society better than the Ameri- cans, and perhaps better than some of han, when the regime celebrated its defeat of the urbanized Afghan officials who now the nomad tribes: tribal cultures were taken rule the country. out of their social and especially political It’s a battle where alliances are made contexts and displayed in public as museum and broken over blood relationships and pieces – a ‘culture bazaar’, as one Iranian tribal feuds, rather than adherence to an extremist form of Islam preached by anthropologist described it [Shahshahani 1986]. Osama bin Laden. The fluid power Now – as then – the tribes are promoted as struggles present an opportunity for the tourist attractions; one can find scores of US to cast its lot with tribal leaders to ‘tribal tours’ websites, offering foreigners get intelligence and secure local protec- nights among the famous groups such as the tion for reconstruction projects. How- Bakhtiari and the Qashqa’i. ever, engaging in tribal politics also risks deepening feuds and undermining Assuming the establishment of strong, the country’s transition to a more mod- autonomous central governments, will this ern, democratic system based on merit domestication of the tribes also be the future rather than blood. for Afghanistan and Iraq? A big assumption, ‘Tribes are arguably more important than perhaps. But what are the processes involved? ever,’ says David Edwards, an anthropologist with extensive experience in In the premodern world, tribal groups in Afghanistan based at Williams College all these countries had contracts with their in Massachusetts. ‘Given the fact that governments, with the state authorities. In the present administration neither is very return for a degree of autonomy, and possibly strong nor has a great deal of legitimacy, 13 subsidy, they ‘protected’ main roads and tribal structures have rebounded.’ trade routes; when strong, the tribes also ‘pro- In Iran, tribal affairs are very different. tected’ cities; the chiefs often settled there. Although there have been recent reports of Before the age of machine-guns, tanks and tribal and ethnic unrest in some remote parts aircraft, tribal militias were the equal of any- of the country, such as Baluchistan and thing the government could muster against them Kurdistan, the armed forces, notably the revo- – indeed successful states employed tribal lutionary guards, have in effect eliminated militias. The 20th century brought new mili- ethnic and tribal politics. Since the revolution tary technologies which tipped the balance, the tribes have been officially redefined as it seemed for good, in favour of the modern- cultural rather than political groups; as col- izing state, leaving the tribes ‘backward’ ourful pastoral nomads with kinship solidar- technologically as well as culturally. But the ity, rather than the political organizations led by powerful chiefs that they were until the 1920s [Tapper ed. 1983]. The situation now 13. S. Baldauf, ‘Key to Governing Afghans: The Clans’.

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... Afghan resistance, with the Kalashnikov and enemies’, he was clearly seeking their support 45 the Stinger, restored something of the old bal- for his regime, and in particular for his ance; and they inspired tribal resistances in favoured candidate for president, the incum- today’s Iraq. bent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Generally, tribal forces have proved that The condition of nation-states in the they are still hard to beat on their own terri- 21st century will be largely a function of the tory; but they are amenable to persuasion, to policies of the super-powers (USA, Europe, negotiations of loyalty by diplomatic outsid- Russia, China, India). Where these fail to ers. In the contemporary world of nation- provide what people need: social, political states, whose priorities – whatever the effects and economic security, employment, services, of globalization – still appear to be state- cultural and political expression – and not formation, nation-building and national inte- necessarily ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ as gration, tribal and other minority identities are defined in US terms – tribal and ethnic loyal- clearly still perceived as at least potential ties and organizations are likely to continue to threats to the state. meet these needs. Iran has dealt with these threats, first by I concluded my introduction to The Conflict violence (in the 1920s and 1930s), secondly of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan: by denial (in the 1950s and 1960s), and now ‘Tribalism has its faults and limitations, but by domestication (since the 1970s). That the its provision of social security and its long- domestication is not complete is shown by the term survival value should recommend it as preelection visit to Kurdistan in May 2009 no anachronism in the last decades of the by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamane’i; 20th century.’ [1983: 75] I suggest that the in his speeches, while warning the (mainly events of the first decade of the 21st century Sunni) Kurdish tribes of ‘the plots of the indicate that this was an accurate prognosis.

Bibliography

Baram, Amatzia — 1997, ‘Neotribalism in Iraq: Giustozzi, Antonio — 2005, ‘The Ethnicization of an Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991-1996’, Inter- Afghan Faction: Junbesh-i-Milli from Its Origins to national Journal of Middle East Studies 29: 1-31. the Presidential Elections’. Crisis States Programme Working Paper no Barth, Fredrik — 1961, Nomads of South Persia: The 67. Londres, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics. Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy. Londres, Glatzer, Bernt — 1998, ‘Is Afghanistan on the Brink Allen and Unwin. of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?’, in W. Maley Gellner, Ernest — 1983, ‘Tribal Society and Its Ene- ed., Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the mies’, in R. Tapper ed., The Conflict of Tribe and Taliban. Londres, Hurst: 167-181. State in Iran and Afghanistan. Londres, Croom Helm: Shahshahani, Soheila — 1986, ‘History of Anthro- 436-448. pology in Iran’, Iranian Studies 19: 65-86.

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... Tapper, Richard — 1990, ‘Historians, Anthropolo- Shahsevan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 46 gists and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation 10-24. — 2002, ‘Introduction: The Nomads of Iran’, in the Middle East’, in P. Khoury and J. Kostiner eds., in R. Tapper and J. Thompson eds., The Nomadic Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East. Berke- Peoples of Iran. Londres, Azimuth: 10-39. — 2008, ley, University of California Press: 48-73. — 1991 ‘Who Are the Kuchis? Nomad Self-Identities in (1975), ‘The Tribes in 18th and 19th Century Iran’, in Afghanistan’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological P. Avery, G. Hambly and C. Melville eds., From Nadir Institute 14: 97-116. Shah to the Islamic Republic. Vol. 7 of The Cam- Tapper, Richard ed. — 1983, The Conflict of Tribe bridge History of Iran. Cambridge, Cambridge Uni- and State in Iran and Afghanistan. Londres, Croom versity Press: 506-541. — 1994, ‘Change, Cognition Helm. and Control: The Reconstruction of Nomadism in Yapp, Malcolm — 1983, ‘Tribes and States in the Iran’, in C. Hann ed., When History Accelerates. Khyber, 1838-1842’, in R. Tapper ed., The Conflict Londres, Athlone Press: 188-211. — 1997, Frontier of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. Londres, Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Croom Helm: 150-191.

Abstract Résumé Richard Tapper, Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan: Richard Tapper, Tribu et État en Iran et en Afghanistan : An Update une mise à jour The author reviews his analysis of ‘tribe and state in L’auteur reprend ici l’analyse de « la tribu et l’État en Iran and Afghanistan’ resulting from a conference he Iran et en Afghanistan » issue d’une conférence qu’il convened in 1979. He considers the continuing rele- avait organisée en 1979. Il constate que les thèmes abor- vance of the themes discussed at the conference, given dés à cette occasion sont toujours d’actualité compte the shattering political and social changes over the inter- tenu des bouleversements politiques et sociaux des trois vening three decades, following revolutions in both dernières décennies consécutifs aux révolutions inter- countries. There has been a revival of tribalism, but at venues dans ces deux pays. S’il y a une résurgence du the same time considerable transformation of the forms tribalisme, les formes et fonctions des « tribus » ont and functions of ‘the tribes’. The author repeats his considérablement évolué. L’auteur réitère sa conclusion : conclusion that ‘Tribalism has its faults and limitations, « Si le tribalisme a ses défauts et ses limites, il n’appa- but its provision of social security and its long-term sur- raît nullement comme un anachronisme dans la mesure vival value should recommend it as no anachronism’ in où il pourvoit à la sécurité de ses membres et leur assure the contemporary world. une survie à long terme » dans le monde contemporain.

Keywords Mots clés Afghanistan, state, Iran, nomadism, pastoralism, tribe Afghanistan, État, Iran, nomadisme, pastoralisme, tribu

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