FICHA PAÍS Mali República De Mali

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

FICHA PAÍS Mali República De Mali OFICINA DE INFORMACIÓN DIPLOMÁTICA FICHA PAÍS Mali República de Mali La Oficina de Información Diplomática del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación pone a disposición de los profesionales de los medios de comunicación y del público en general la presente ficha país. La información contenida en esta ficha país es pública y se ha extraído de diversos medios, no defendiendo posición política alguna ni de este Ministerio ni del Gobierno de España respecto del país sobre el que versa. FEBRERO 2021 ficado (0,7%), otros (6,3%) (estimación 2009). Mali Religión: 93% musulmanes, animistas 7%, cristianos 2%, ninguna 2%, (est 2018). Moneda: Franco CFA (1 euro = 655,957 FCFA). Forma de Estado: República multipartidista. Grupos étnicos: bambara (33%), peul (13%), sarakole/soninke (9%), senufo (9%), dogon (8%), malínke (8%), songhai (5%), bobo (2%), , tuareg (1%), otros malienses (6%), otros países de la CEDEAO (0,4%), otros (0,3%). (Fuente: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/mali/#people-and-society) ARGELIA 1.2. Geografía La superficie del país es llana, con mesetas y llanuras en las que apenas destacan algunos promontorios. Las mesetas del sur y del suroeste alcanzan MAURITANIA los 640 m de altitud en Sabadugu y están surcadas por valles fluviales. Las del sureste y el este se caracterizan por pequeñas colinas que alcanzan al- titudes entre los 305 y los 520 m. Las amplias llanuras del Tanezruft y del Tombouctou Taudeni, en el norte, se adentran en el desierto del Sáhara. El suroeste y la Gao Ménaka región central del sur están formados por las llanuras del valle superior del río Níger. Aproximadamente una tercera parte del Níger circula por Mali, en Kayes Motpi una extensión de 1.800 kilómetros, y allí forma un delta interior. Las creci- NÍGER Ségou das periódicas y la formación de suelos fértiles han convertido el delta del Kita SENEGAL Níger en una zona de particular importancia agrícola. El río Senegal recorre BAMAKO Koutiala BURKINA FASO una porción del oeste de Mali. Bougouni Sikasso GUINEA BENIN El territorio del país cubre tres zonas muy diversas, tanto por sus condiciones GHANA SIERRA climáticas como por la vegetación característica en esas latitudes: la sudane- COSTA DE MARFIL TOGO LEONA NIGERIA sa, la saheliana y la sahariana. La primera zona, en el sureste, se caracteriza © Ocina de Información Diplomática. por un promedio anual de precipitaciones comprendidas entre los 500 mm Aviso: Las fronteras trazadas no son necesariamente las reconocidas ocialmente. y 1.300 mm y por temperaturas medias que oscilan entre los 24 y los 30ºC. La zona del Sahel bordea el Sáhara al norte y se caracteriza por recibir una 1. DATOS BÁSICOS media 200-500mm de precipitaciones anuales y unas temperaturas que os- cilan entre los 23 y los 36ºC. En el norte predomina un clima desértico, con ausencia de lluvias, extrema sequedad y temperaturas que alcanzan los 47ºC 1.1. Características generales de día y descienden hasta los 4ºC por la noche. Nombre oficial: República de Mali (République du Mali). 1.3. Indicadores Sociales Superficie: 1.240.192 km2. Población: 19.553.397 (estimación 2020). Índice Desarrollo Humano (IDH): puesto 184 (2018). Límites: Situado en África occidental, sin salida al mar. Limita al Norte con Densidad de población (hab. por Km2): 15,6 (2018). Argelia, con Mauritania y Senegal al Oeste, con Guinea y Costa de Marfil al PIB per cápita (paridad poder compra): 2.280 US$ (2018). Sur y con Burkina Faso y Níger al Este. Índice de GINI: 33,02 (2010). Capital: Bamako 2.285.408 habitantes en el distrito de Bamako. Tasa de analfabetismo: 38,7 de la población mayor de 15 años sabe leer y Otras ciudades: Sikasso, Kayes, Mopti, Ségou,, Gao, Koutiala. escribir. 48,2% para hombres y 29,2% para mujeres (estimación 2015). Idioma: francés (oficial), bambara (46,3%), peul/fulfuldé (9,4%), dogon Tasa de natalidad: 42,2 nacimientos por cada 1.000 habitantes (estimación 2020). (7,2%), maraka/soninke (6,4%), malinke (5,6%), sonrhai/djerma (5,6%), Fuentes:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact-book/geos/ml.html; www. minianka (4,3%), tamasheq (3,5%), senoufo (2,6%), bobo (2,1), no especi- unicef.org/informacionporpais/estadísticas; www.pnud.org; https://datos.bancomundial.org/ FICHA PAÍS MALI 1.4. Estructura del PIB. 2018 PRINCIPALES IMPORTACIONES EN MILLONES DE US$ Productos derivados del petróleo 918,7 DISTRIBUCIÓN POR SECTORES % DEL PIB TOTAL Bienes de capital 1.002,6 Agricultura 35,6 Bienes intermedios 880,1 Industria 20,6 Fuente: Economist Intelligence Unit 2019 Servicios 43,8 Fuente: Economist Intelligence Unit 2019 2 SITUACIÓN POLÍTICA 1.5. Coyuntura económica 2.1. Política Interior Mali es uno de los países más pobres del mundo, y ocupa el puesto 182/189 en el Índice de Desarrollo Humano 2018. Muy dependiente del sector primario La inestabilidad persiste en el país desde 2012, donde existen principalmen- (agricultura y minería de oro suponen alrededor del 36% del PIB) y con unos te dos escenarios. Por un lado, un escenario en el norte del país, marcado por recursos naturales muy limitados, la economía maliense es el tercer productor las repetidas revoluciones tuaregs que, desde los años 60 y con postulados de oro de África, por detrás de Sudáfrica y Ghana, lo que supone 2/3 aproxima- en ocasiones favorables a la secesión, reclaman una mayor representación damente de sus exportaciones. El sector industrial genera solo el 4% del PIB del norte de Mali en las instituciones, una mayor presencia del Estado y la aproximadamente, Se trata de una economía básicamente rural e informal, prestación de servicios sociales de base para las poblaciones. La conflicti- con aproximadamente un 80% de la población residiendo en las áreas rurales. vidad del norte se trasladó, a partir del 2015, hacia el centro del país, que constituye el segundo de los escenarios indicados. En el centro y este de PRINCIPALES DATOS ECONÓMICOS Mali, el terrorismo yihadista de JNIM y del Estado islámico y los enfrenta- 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019* mientos intercomunitarios entre las etnias peulh y dogon, con sus propias Evolución del PIB (%) 7 6 5,8 5,4 4,9 4,6 milicias de autodefensa, marcan el día a día de las regiones afectadas. PIB por habitante ($) a) 847,2 751,2 779,9 828,5 899,7 PIB absoluto (M $) a) 14.411 13.107 14.103 15.337 17.163 16.500 El avance del yihadismo hacia la capital, Bamako, logró ser contenido con IPC (variación últimos la intervención francesa SERVAL, En la actualidad, las misiones ejecutivas 12 meses, %) 0,9 1,5 -1,8 1,8 2,2 -2 internacionales que se encuentran desplegadas en Mali son: Misión Multidi- Saldo por cuenta mensional Integrada de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en Mali (MI- corriente (% PIB) -4,7 -5,3 -7,2 -7,9 -4,9 NUSMA), la operación Barkhane y la operación Takuba. La Unión Europea Saldo presupuestario (% PIB) -2,8 -1,8 -3,9 -2,8 -4,7 -1,6 cuenta con dos misiones de política común de seguridad y defensa (PCSD): Deuda externa (% PIB) 24,8 28,8 27,8 29,2 29,5 European Training Mission Mali (EUTM-Mali) y European Union Capacity Fuentes: https://databank.bancomundial.org *estimación; a) a precios actuales Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali). 1.6. Comercio exterior Tras haberse avanzado hacia la paz con los Acuerdos de Uagadugú de 2013, en julio 2014, auspiciadas por la mediación argelina, se lanzaron negocia- ESTRUCTURA DE LA BALANZA COMERCIAL. (MILLONES $) ciones entre el Gobierno y los grupos armados del norte (Coordinación de Mo- 2015 2016 2017 2018* 2019* vimientos del Azawad -CMA- y Plataforma) para la adopción de un acuerdo Importación FOB 3.192,3 3.402,9 3.599,8 3.664 3.524,3 de paz. La culminación de tales negociaciones tuvo lugar en la firma diferida Exportación FOB 2.716,7 2.826 2.896,3 3.091,2 3.175,6 del Acuerdo de Paz y Reconciliación en Mali en mayo y junio de 2015, cuyo Balanza por cuenta seguimiento de ejecución ha sido asignado desde entonces al llamado Comi- corriente -697,4 -1.015,1 -1.209,9 -996,2 -736,4 té de Seguimiento del Acuerdo (CSA). Fuente: Economist Intelligence Unit 2019 *estimación Principales acontecimientos cronológicos 1.7. Distribución del Comercio por países. 2018 Golpe de Estado del 21 de marzo de 2012 y restauración progresiva al PRINCIPALES DESTINOS DE LAS EXPORTACIONES % TOTAL orden constitucional. Suiza 41,4 Sudáfrica 23,7 El 21 de marzo de 2012, el presidente de Mali, Amadou Toumani Touré (co- Bangladesh 7,9 nocido como ATT), fue depuesto por militares al mando del capitán Amadou Emiratos Árabes Unidos 6,9 Sanogo, que venían protestando por la falta de medios del ejército en su Costa de Marfil 10,6 lucha contra la rebelión tuareg del Movimiento Nacional por la Liberación del Azawad (MNLA). La Junta golpista declaró suspendida la constitución PRINCIPALES ORÍGENES DE LAS IMPORTACIONES % TOTAL y decretó un toque de queda. La Comunidad Económica de los Estados del Senegal 20,9 África Occidental (CEDEAO) condenó inmediatamente el golpe, amenazan- China 16,2 do con decretar sanciones económicas, comerciales y diplomáticas de no Costa de Marfil 10,5 volver el país al orden constitucional. El capitán Sanogo se proclamó jefe Francia 8,9 del Estado y promulgó una nueva Ley Fundamental de 69 artículos. Estados Unidos 4,4 Fuente: Economist Intelligence Unit 2019 El 6 de abril de 2012, tras la mediación llevada a cabo por Burkina Faso (entonces bajo la presidencia de Blaise Compaoré) en nombre de la CE- 1.8.
Recommended publications
  • East Africa Counterterrorism Operation North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress
    EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION NORTH AND WEST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS JULY 1, 2020‒SEPTEMBER 30, 2020 ABOUT THIS REPORT A 2013 amendment to the Inspector General Act established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations and requires that the Lead IG submit quarterly reports to Congress on each active operation. The Chair of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD Inspector General (IG) as the Lead IG for the East Africa Counterterrorism Operation and the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation. The DoS IG is the Associate IG for the operations. The USAID IG participates in oversight of the operations. The Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the DoD, the DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of the operations. The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to: • Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operations. • Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operations through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations. • Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the operations and on activities of the Lead IG agencies. METHODOLOGY To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, the DoS, USAID, and other Federal agencies about the East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation, and related programs.
    [Show full text]
  • Crossing the Wilderness
    REPORT — SPRING 2021 Crossing the wilderness Europe and the Sahel This report is part of Friends of Europe’s Peace, Security and Defence programme. Written by Paul Taylor, it brings together the views of scholars, policymakers and senior defence and security stakeholders. Unless otherwise indicated, this report reflects the writer’s understanding of the views expressed by the interviewees and participants of survey. The author and the participants contributed in their personal capacities, and their views do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions they represent, or of Friends of Europe and its board of trustees, members or partners. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted, provided that full credit is given to Friends of Europe and that any such reproduction, whether in whole or in part, is not sold unless incorporated in other works. The Peace, Security and Defence programme is supported by the United States government. This report is produced in partnership with Publisher: Geert Cami Author: Paul Taylor Publication Director: Dharmendra Kanani Programme Manager: Elena Saenz-Feehan Programme Executive: Alex O’Mahony Programme Assistant: Krystal Gaillard Editors: Anna Muizniece, Angela Pauly, Teresa Carvalho & Daniel Pietikainen Design: Matjaž Krmelj © Friends of Europe - April 2021 Table of contents Foreword 6 Methodology and Acknowledgments 10 Executive summary 14 No promised land 14 Crisis of legitimacy 16 Instability and intervention 17 Containment, not victory 18 No proxy war, french lead 20 Widening coalitions, endless
    [Show full text]
  • May 2021 Contents
    Security Exchange InTouch Monthly - May 2021 Contents Africa Mali: Coup leaders seize power, again 3 Americas Mexico: Violent campaign undermines election 5 Asia India: Black Fungus outbreak creates new health emergency 7 Europe Belarus: Plane hijacking sparks outrage 9 MENA Israel: The fall of Netanyahu 11 Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. We take measures to ensure that all information is accurate and up-to-date, however we cannot guarantee that any information provided will not contain errors or other such limitations. We do not accept any liability for any loss, damage, or inconvenience whatsoever, caused as a result of any inaccuracies or errors within this information. www.securityexchange24.com AFRICA MALI: Coup leaders seize power, again On 24 May, President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were detained by military officers and taken to a base in Kati outside Bamako. They were arrested following a cabinet reshuffle, which took place without the knowledge of Col Assimi Goita, who led the coup against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita last August. Goita was reportedly angered that Ndaw had replaced members of the junta from the defence and security ministries and replaced them with other members of the military. Goita subsequently declared himself as the transitional president and named Choguel Kokalla Maiga, a leader of the M5 RFP protest movement and former government minister, as the country’s new civilian prime minister. Mali’s constitutional court approved Goita’s appointment and said he should “lead the transition process to its conclusion.” The power-grab has seen Mali suspended from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), which has threatened to impose sanctions against the coup leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • Second Coup D'état Another Blow for Anti-Terror Efforts
    Africa | May 26, 2021 MALI: Second coup d’état another blow for anti-terror efforts The second coup d’état in less than a year is yet another major setback for international efforts to contain the spread of jihadist militants across the Sahel, following last month’s coup d’état over in Chad. The episode showcases, once again, the dilemma international actors, led by France, are faced with: by providing a degree of security, they enable local army officers to focus their energies on seizing political power. While the immediate impact may be limited, the political limbo in Bamako certainly does not help to contain the ongoing proliferation of jihadist groups from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger, and potentially further south into Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. On Monday (24 May), President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were arrested by military officers shortly after announcing a cabinet reshuffle that would have included the dismissal of Defence Minister Sadio Camara and Interior Security Minister Modibo Kone. Both are senior army officers and have been key members of the military junta that had seized power in an August 2020 coup d’etat, but ostensibly handed power to a civilian-led transition government in September. On 25 May, junta strongman Colonel Assimi Goita announced that N’Daw and Ouane had been ousted from office, while suggesting that the transition to civilian rule would go ahead as scheduled, with elections to be held in February 2022. Faced with a general strike over socio-economic grievances and criticism from the opposition, N’Daw’s government had come under increasing pressure in recent weeks, providing an enabling environment for the junta to strike again without having to fear a local backlash.
    [Show full text]
  • Rising Powers and Foreign Intrastate Armed Conflicts : Trends and Patterns of Chinaâ•Žs Intervention in African Civil Wars
    Lingnan University Digital Commons @ Lingnan University Theses & Dissertations Department of Political Sciences 8-17-2016 Rising powers and foreign intrastate armed conflicts : trends and patterns of China’s intervention in African civil wars Obert HODZI Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol_etd Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Hodzi, O. (2016). Rising powers and foreign intrastate armed conflicts: rT ends and patterns of China’s intervention in African civil wars (Doctor's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol_etd/18 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Sciences at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. Terms of Use The copyright of this thesis is owned by its author. Any reproduction, adaptation, distribution or dissemination of this thesis without express authorization is strictly prohibited. All rights reserved. RISING POWERS AND FOREIGN INTRASTATE ARMED CONFLICTS: TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF CHINA’S INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN CIVIL WARS HODZI OBERT PhD LINGNAN UNIVERSITY 2016 RISING POWERS AND FOREIGN INTRASTATE ARMED CONFLICTS: TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF CHINA’S INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN CIVIL WARS by HODZI Obert A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Lingnan University 2016 ABSTRACT Rising Powers and Foreign Intrastate Armed Conflicts: Trends and Patterns of China’s Intervention in African Civil Wars by HODZI Obert Doctor of Philosophy What influences one state to intervene in another’s intrastate armed conflict? In answering this question, existing scholarship has tended to emphasise the position of the intervening state in the international system; suggesting that, that is the main determinant factor of a state’s external intervention behaviour.
    [Show full text]
  • Amnesty International
    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Amnesty International is a movement of 10 million people which mobilizes the humanity in everyone and campaigns for change so we can all enjoy our human rights. Our vision is of a world where those in power keep their promises, respect international law and are held to account. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and individual donations. We believe that acting in solidarity and compassion with people everywhere can change our societies for the better. Amnesty International is impartial. We take no position on issues of sovereignty, territorial disputes or international political or legal arrangements that might be adopted to implement the right to self- determination. This report is organized according to the countries we monitored during the year. In general, they are independent states that are accountable for the human rights situation on their territory. First published in 2021 by Except where otherwise noted, This report documents Amnesty Amnesty International Ltd content in this document is Internationalos work and Peter Benenson House, licensed under a concerns through 2020. 1, Easton Street, CreativeCommons (attribution, The absence of an entry in this London WC1X 0DW non-commercial, no derivatives, report on a particular country or United Kingdom international 4.0) licence. territory does not imply that no https://creativecommons.org/ © Amnesty International 2021 human rights violations of licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode concern to Amnesty International IndeZ|P1L 102022021 For more information please visit have taken place there during ISB0|021001 the permissions page on our the year.
    [Show full text]
  • Monthly Forecast
    January 2021 Monthly Forecast 1 Overview Overview 1 In Hindsight: Looking Back to Look Ahead 3 Status Update since our Tunisia has the presidency in January. It has cho- meeting on developments in Yemen, and the quar- December Forecast sen to hold an open debate on the challenges faced terly debate on the Middle East, including the Pal- by countries in fragile contexts, in particular on estinian Question. On Syria, there will be a meeting 5 Mali the African continent. Possible briefers include covering the political and humanitarian situations 6 Colombia UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Chair of as well as on the use of chemical weapons. 8 Syria the AU Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat and On African issues, there will be updates on the 10 Maintenance of former President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. activities of UNSMIL (Libya) and MINUSMA International Peace and Tunisia is also organising a debate on threats to (Mali). The Council may also adopt a resolution Security: Challenges international peace and security caused by terror- supporting the compliance of all national and of Maintaining Peace ist acts, focusing on international cooperation in international stakeholders with the 23 October and Security in Fragile combating terrorism, to commemorate 20 years 2020 ceasefire agreement between the parties to Contexts since the adoption of resolution 1373 in 2001. The the Libyan conflict. 11 West Africa and the anticipated briefers are Under-Secretary-General Meetings on situations in South America and Sahel for Counter-Terrorism Vladimir Voronkov and Europe are also expected in January. The Council 13 Counter-Terrorism CTED Executive Director Michèle Coninsx.
    [Show full text]
  • Development and Security Challenges in the Sahel Region
    MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL GROUP (GSM) DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL REGION Report Ahmet Berat ÇONKAR (Turkey) Rapporteur 042 GSM 20 E rev.2 fin | Original: English | December 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 II. STRATEGIC CHALLENGES .................................................................................................. 2 A. POOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND BAD GOVERNANCE ...................................... 2 B. CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESOURCE SCARCITY ....................................................... 3 C. DEMOGRAPHY AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT ......................................................... 3 D. IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND ORGANISED CRIME .................................................. 4 E. VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS AND ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS........................ 7 III. RESPONSES AND INITIATIVES .......................................................................................... 8 A. AFRICAN REGIONAL INITIATIVES ............................................................................... 9 B. NON-AFRICAN INITIATIVES ....................................................................................... 11 IV. COUP D’ETAT IN MALI ....................................................................................................... 16 V. IMPACTS OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC ON THE SAHEL REGION....................... 17 VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Numéro Spécial /La Crise Au Mali Et Dans
    Numéros / Numbers 5&6, 2020 ISSN 0850 - 8712 Numéro spécial La crise au Mali et dans la région du Sahel Special Issue The Crisis in Mali and in the Sahel Region Ce bulletin trimestriel est distribué à titre gracieux à tous les instituts de recherche et facultés africaines. Il a pour objectif de stimuler la discussion, les échanges d’informations et d’encourager la coopération en matière de recherche. Les communications sur les questions théoriques, les rapports de conférences et séminaires, et les études récentes sont les bienvenus. Dans ce numéro / In this Issue Éditorial, Godwin R. Murunga & Ibrahim O. Ogachi 3 Editorial, Godwin R. Murunga & Ibrahim O. Ogachi 5 Introduction : Mali, la crise de 2020, Amy Niang 7 Introduction: Mali, the 2020 Crisis, Amy Niang 10 1. Éléments du dilemme malien, Abdourahmane Idrissa 13 2. De quoi le coup d’État du 18 août est-il le nom ? Ousmane A. Diallo 15 3. La gouvernance djihadiste : cas de la katiba Macina dans le cercle de Mopti Yida Seydou Diall 17 4. JNIM vs EIGS : aux racines profondes de la divergence, Amadou Diallo 19 5. Struggle, Neglect and Archives, Madina Thiam 21 6. Mali’s Corona Coup of 2020: Untangling a Vicious Cycle, Kodjo Tchioffo 23 7. Les enjeux de la violence dite communautaire au Centre du Mali comme facteur important dans la crise actuelle, Modibo Galy Cissé 26 8. Intervention militaire et constitutionnalisme, Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui 28 9. La problématique de l’inclusivité de la transition politique : une analyse des attentes des Maliens au prisme du diktat de la CEDEAO, Bréma Ely Dicko 30 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Le Journal Du Développement #433 (30 Août 2021)
    L'Hebdomadaire Un Canadien du CICR tué au Cameroun La Revue Indépendante des Professionnels du Développement #433 - Lundi 30 Août 2021 Afghanistan L'ONU se prépare à une "catastrophe humanitaire" Le HCR s'attend à 500.000 réfugiés supplémentaires L’OMS à court de médicaments Plusieurs pays suspendent leur aide COVID-19 Afrique La pandémie a L'Afrique vise l'éradication légèrement accéléré dans le monde cette totale de la poliomyélite semaine Burundi : Le président Le Maroc va vacciner accuse les juges de les 12-17 ans corruption Explosion des cas de grossesses adolescentes Décès au Sénégal de l'ancien président en Afrique du Sud tchadien Hissène Habré www.lejournaldudeveloppement.com Chers lecteurs, Merci pour votre fidélité auJournal du Développement. A l’issue de votre abonnement d’essai gratuit, Le Journal du Développement vous sera proposé aux tarifs suivants : TARIFS D'ABONNEMENT 2015 1 an 1 lecteur 295 € (48 éditions) 2 à 5 lecteurs 590 €* 6 à 9 lecteurs 1.020 €* 6 mois 1 lecteur 190 € (24 éditions) 2 à 5 lecteurs 380 €* 6 à 9 lecteurs 670 €* -30% 1 lecteur 2 à 5 lecteurs ONG de droit /an /an* africain 210 € 420 € 6 à 9 lecteurs 715 €/an* -30% 1 lecteur Consultants Pour un nombre supérieur de lecteurs et parainage 210 €/an d’abonnements en faveur de vos partenaires, nous contacter *Au sein de la même structure Chaque abonnement souscrit correspond au nombre précis de lecteurs. Seul l’éditeur est autorisé à transmettre la revue. Le Journal du Développement est protégé par les lois et conventions internationales sur les droits d’auteurs.
    [Show full text]