Perspectives on the Nordic Model and the Economics of Innovation☆
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Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 3–16 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Public Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jpube Leaders and followers: Perspectives on the Nordic model and the economics of innovation☆ Joseph E. Stiglitz ⁎ Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, 212 Uris Hall, New York, NY 10027, United States article info abstract Article history: What kinds of social and economic systems are most conducive to innovation? We formulate a simple model in Received 2 December 2013 which countries can close the gap with the technological leader, but where the cost of doing so may be so high Received in revised form 3 September 2014 that the country chooses to remain laggards. Observed disparities in productivity may be the result of a recogni- Accepted 17 September 2014 tion that the cost of closing the gap exceeds benefit and there may therefore exist an international equilibrium in Available online 13 October 2014 which there are leaders and followers. Even if it is granted that the United States is the leader and Scandinavia are Keywords: followers, there are theoretical grounds for arguing that the Nordic model may in fact be better for innovation, Technological change suggesting that if the US adopted some of the Nordic institutions, innovations would be higher, and societal wel- Research and development fare would be improved even more. Leader–follower © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Scandinavia US 1. Introduction This paper asks three central questions: There are marked differences in productivity across firms and coun- (a) What kinds of policies and institutional arrangements—what tries. We look up to the “leaders,” those who are at the technological kind of economic systems—are most conducive to being an inno- frontier and who are pushing that frontier ever forward. The laggards vation leader—not just obtaining patents, but designing an inno- are urged to emulate the leaders. And yet, it is not apparent that it is op- vation system that generates large and persistent increases in timal for them to do so. The lagging countries benefit from the lower standards of living? Is it cut-throat competition? Or is the more prices that result from competition among the leaders. And both lagging gentle Nordic model, in which government takes on a larger countries and firms can benefit from the learning that results from the role and in which a broad array of policies provides social protec- investments in R & D and innovation of the leading firms, with far tion and results in less inequality, more conducive to innovation? lower expenditures. (b) Should we expect that the policies of the follower differ from Even if profits at firms or standards of living in countries that are per- those of the leader, and if so, in what ways? Can we explain the sistent leaders were persistently higher than those of firms that were successes of the Nordic model as a result of its policies being persistent followers, it would not mean that the followers should well adapted for the leader, or for the follower? change their corporate or national strategies. For there is a cost to catch- (c) Can there be an equilibrium in which some countries persistently up—large investments in learning—and these costs may well exceed the remain leaders, and others followers? If so, can we say anything differences in profits. about the nature of the equilibrium and the kinds of policies pur- sued by each in that equilibrium? Acemoglu et al. (2012) have recently put forward the hypothesis that the Nordic welfare model may be all well and good for the follower, but ☆ This paper is part of a broader work on innovation, undertaken with my colleague the American style of cutthroat capitalism, with its high level of inequality Bruce Greenwald, and of a more long standing research agenda undertaken with Partha Dasgupta and Giovanni Dosi. This paper in particular builds off of Greenwald and Stiglitz and strong incentives, is better suited for the countries at the frontier. (2006, 2014). My debt to each is gratefully acknowledged. I am greatly indebted to Karle While contentions of such a broad sweep are hard to evaluate with any Moene, Brett Gordon, Martin Guzman, and two referees for their helpful suggestions. I precision, similar sentiments have played a central role in policy debates also wish to acknowledge financial support from the Institute for New Economic and therefore it is important to assess them, marshaling whatever theo- Thinking (INET) (INO12-00039), and research assistance from Laurence Wilse-Samson, retical, empirical, and historical arguments can be brought to bear on Feiran Zhang, Sandesh Dhungana, Eamon Kircher-Allen, and Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey. ⁎ Tel.: +1 212 854 1481. the issue. We thus begin with a general theoretical analysis (in E-mail address: [email protected]. Section 2) of why (i) unfettered markets are not likely to engage either http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.09.005 0047-2727/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 4 J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 3–16 in the optimal level or direction of innovation; and (ii) why government that the endogenous market structure and the associated levels and pat- policies—including those that have characterized the Nordic countries— terns of innovation arrived at by the market (which may be a monopoly can and should play an important role. We follow this with a broad histor- or an oligopoly) can be improved upon by government intervention. ical discussion and a closer look at (a) whether it is as clear as, say, It should come as no surprise that markets are not efficient, since, Acemoglu et al. suggest that the US is in fact the technological leader; with or without patents,3 social and private returns to innovation are and (b) if so, to what that should be attributed. Section 3 provides an his- markedly different, partly because of the difficulties of appropriating torical perspective on the U.S. experience. all the returns to innovation—knowledge spillovers are pervasive; part- Section 4 turns to the formulation of a leader/follower model in ly because much of the returns that are appropriated are rents that oth- which there is a steady state with constant growth characterized by per- erwise would have accrued to other firms. Imperfections of risk and sistent differences in standards of living, without any convergence. capital markets and of competition are other market failures that are in- This analysis turns on its head a central contention of neoclassical herently associated with innovation; firms have incentives to innovate growth theory since the work of Solow (1956), arguing that countries in ways that enhance and extend their market power.4 with different initial conditions should converge. In fact, the evidence Most fundamentally, knowledge can be viewed as a public good, and on convergence has been disappointing.1 Our theory explains this ab- the private provision of a public good is essentially never optimal. While sence of convergence. intellectual property may enhance the appropriation of returns, in doing In the leader–follower equilibrium, it is optimal for laggard countries so, it introduces a static inefficiency, in the restricted use of knowledge. to remain laggards, and never catch up. They sufficiently benefit from The myriad of ways by which private and social returns to innova- the dissemination of knowledge from the leader that it doesn't make tion (with or without patents) differ lead to systemic inefficiencies, sense for them to make the “Big Push” to join the club of leaders. But, ex- both in the level and direction of innovation.5 In the most innovative cept in some limiting cases, the followers are not fully passive—they economies, governmental policies mitigate the consequences of these pursue policies designed to close the gap between themselves and the market failures. leader, but even as they do so, the leader pursues policies that open the gap further. Not surprisingly, even though both leaders and fol- 2.2. Translating innovation into higher living standards lowers pursue “innovation” policies, the policies that are optimal for each can be markedly different from those of the leader. We end the sec- While it is often taken for granted that innovation makes society as a tion with a discussion of several examples of such differences, but ob- whole better off, this may not be the case. Some innovations may de- serve that the Nordic model may (with suitable adaptations) be crease the demand for some factors (unskilled labor-saving desirable not only for leaders, but also followers. innovations6), even as they increase the productivity of others. The re- We should emphasize at the onset that while we talk about leaders sult is that some groups may be better off, others worse off. Innovation and followers, our characterization is too stark. Knowledge is multi- is not, in general, Pareto improving; and if those made worse off are dimensional. Some firm/country could be on the knowledge frontier poor individuals, social welfare is worsened, if we evaluate the change along some dimension, but well within the frontier on another. That is with an inequality averse social welfare function. Typically, the winners certainly true among countries that claim to be “at” or “near” the frontier, could compensate the losers, but in most societies, they don't. As a result implying that they have a considerable amount to learn from each other. most citizens can be worse off (cf. the US). Indeed, recent research has shown how in the presence of imperfect and costly labor mobility, all (or almost all) individuals can be worse off. 2. Market failures and innovation theory and policy If, for instance, there is labor saving innovation in some sector at a fast enough pace (outpacing the growth of demand), employment and 2.1.