Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice
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Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions--And from Miranda Paul G
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 88 Article 2 Issue 2 Winter Winter 1998 Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions--And from Miranda Paul G. Cassell Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions--And from Miranda, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497 (Winter 1998) This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/98/8802-0497 TI' JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW& CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 88, No. 2 Copyright 0 1998 by Northwestern Unh-rsity, School of Law PrinW in U.S.A PROTECTING THE INNOCENT FROM FALSE CONFESSIONS AND LOST CONFESSIONS-AND FROM MIRANDA PAUL G. CASSELL" For most of the last several decades, criminal procedure scholarship-mirroring the Warren Court landmarks it was commenting on-spent little time discussing the guiltless and much discussing the guilty. Recent scholarship suggests a dif- ferent focus is desirable. As one leading scholar recently put it, "the Constitution seeks to protect the innocent."' Professors Leo and Ofshe's preceding article,2 along with ar- ticles like it by (among others) Welsh White and Al Alschuler,4 commendably adopts this approach. Focusing on the plight of an innocent person who confessed to a crime he5 did not com- mit, they recommend certain changes in the rules governing po- " Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law ([email protected]). -
N.2 Definition of Conviction April 2019
Immigrant Legal Resource Center, www.ilrc.org § N.2 Definition of Conviction April 2019 § N.2 Definition of Conviction Table of Contents I. Definition of Conviction; Limited Effect of Rehabilitative Relief II. When Rehabilitative Relief Works: DACA and Lujan-Armendariz III. Not a Conviction: Pretrial Diversion under Cal Pen C § 1000 (2018) IV. Former California DEJ and Pen C § 1203.43 V. Not a Conviction: Juvenile Delinquency DisPositions VI. Not a Conviction: California Infractions? VII. Not a Conviction: Direct APPeal of Right? VIII. Not a Conviction: Vacation of Judgment for Cause IX. Convictions: Court Martial; Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity How to Avoid or Eliminate a “Conviction” for Immigration PurPoses Most (although not all) immigration consequences relating to crimes require a conviction, as defined by federal immigration law, not state law. If your noncitizen client does not have a conviction for immigration purposes, their immigration case might be saved. This section discusses which dispositions in California criminal courts amount to a conviction for immigration purposes, and how to avoid or eliminate a conviction. Warning: Immigration Consequences Even Without a Conviction. Some immigration penalties are triggered by evidence of conduct or findings, even absent a conviction. A noncitizen might be found inadmissible if immigration authorities have evidence that the person engaged in prostitution1 or ever participated in drug trafficking or money laundering.2 The person might be inadmissible or deportable if they are or were a drug addict or abuser.3 Even a civil finding that a noncitizen violated a domestic violence stay-away order, in any way, makes the person deportable.4 In those situations, avoiding a conviction is a good step, but will not necessarily protect the person. -
Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings Daniel S
MEDWED_TRANSMITTED.DOC2 2/26/2008 1:51 PM The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings Daniel S. Medwed∗ INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 493 I. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PAROLE ................................................ 497 A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF PAROLE ................................ 497 B. PAROLE RELEASE DECISION-MAKING: CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS AND POLICIES .................................................................................... 504 II. THE EFFECT OF PAROLE RELEASE DECISION-MAKING NORMS ON THE INNOCENT ............................................................................................... 513 A. PAROLE: AN INNOCENCE OPTION OF LAST RESORT ............................. 518 B. PRESSURE ON INNOCENT INMATES TO “ADMIT” GUILT ........................ 523 III. ADMISSIONS OF GUILT AND THE PAROLE RELEASE DECISION RECONSIDERED ....................................................................................... 529 A. THE DANGER OF ASSUMING THE LITIGATION PROCESS ACCURATELY FILTERS THE GUILTY FROM THE INNOCENT ......................................... 530 B. POTHOLES ON THE PATH TO REDEMPTION THROUGH THE PAROLE PROCESS ........................................................................................... 532 IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM .................................................................... 541 A. LIMITATIONS ON THE SUBSEQUENT USE OF STATEMENTS FROM PAROLE HEARINGS ........................................................................... -
A Federal Criminal Case Timeline
A Federal Criminal Case Timeline The following timeline is a very broad overview of the progress of a federal felony case. Many variables can change the speed or course of the case, including settlement negotiations and changes in law. This timeline, however, will hold true in the majority of federal felony cases in the Eastern District of Virginia. Initial appearance: Felony defendants are usually brought to federal court in the custody of federal agents. Usually, the charges against the defendant are in a criminal complaint. The criminal complaint is accompanied by an affidavit that summarizes the evidence against the defendant. At the defendant's first appearance, a defendant appears before a federal magistrate judge. This magistrate judge will preside over the first two or three appearances, but the case will ultimately be referred to a federal district court judge (more on district judges below). The prosecutor appearing for the government is called an "Assistant United States Attorney," or "AUSA." There are no District Attorney's or "DAs" in federal court. The public defender is often called the Assistant Federal Public Defender, or an "AFPD." When a defendant first appears before a magistrate judge, he or she is informed of certain constitutional rights, such as the right to remain silent. The defendant is then asked if her or she can afford counsel. If a defendant cannot afford to hire counsel, he or she is instructed to fill out a financial affidavit. This affidavit is then submitted to the magistrate judge, and, if the defendant qualifies, a public defender or CJA panel counsel is appointed. -
Episode Fourteen: Legal Process Hello, and Welcome to the Death
Episode Fourteen: Legal Process Hello, and welcome to the Death Penalty Information Center’s podcast exploring issues related to capital punishment. In this edition, we will discuss the legal process in death penalty trials and appeals. How is a death penalty trial different from other trials? There are several differences between death penalty trials and traditional criminal proceedings. In most criminal cases, there is a single trial in which the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty, the judge then determines the sentence. However, death penalty cases are divided into two separate trials. In the first trial, juries weigh the evidence of the crime to determine guilt or innocence. If the jury decides that the defendant is guilty, there is a second trial to determine the sentence. At the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors usually have only two options: life in prison without the possibility of parole, or a death sentence. During this sentencing trial, juries are asked to weigh aggravating factors presented by the prosecution against mitigating factors presented by the defense. How is a jury chosen for a death penalty trial? Like all criminal cases, the jury in a death penalty trial is chosen from a pool of potential jurors through a process called voir dire. The legal counsel for both the prosecution and defense have an opportunity to submit questions to determine any possible bias in the case. However, because the jury determines the sentence in capital trials, those juries must also be “death qualified,” that is, able to impose the death penalty in at least some cases. -
The Civilian Impact of Drone Strikes
THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS Acknowledgements This report is the product of a collaboration between the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict. At the Columbia Human Rights Clinic, research and authorship includes: Naureen Shah, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Rashmi Chopra, J.D. ‘13, Janine Morna, J.D. ‘12, Chantal Grut, L.L.M. ‘12, Emily Howie, L.L.M. ‘12, Daniel Mule, J.D. ‘13, Zoe Hutchinson, L.L.M. ‘12, Max Abbott, J.D. ‘12. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict. Liz Lucas of Center for Civilians in Conflict led media outreach with Greta Moseson, pro- gram coordinator at the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School. The Columbia Human Rights Clinic and the Columbia Human Rights Institute are grateful to the Open Society Foundations and Bullitt Foundation for their financial support of the Institute’s Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, and to Columbia Law School for its ongoing support. Copyright © 2012 Center for Civilians in Conflict (formerly CIVIC) and Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America. Copies of this report are available for download at: www.civiliansinconflict.org Cover: Shakeel Khan lost his home and members of his family to a drone missile in 2010. -
Manitoba Police Boards: Policy and Procedure
2018 Manitoba Police Boards: Policy and Procedure Manitoba Police Commission 8/1/2018 Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 5 Chapter 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Policing Officials and Agencies ....................................................... 7 2.1 Role of the Minister of Justice ................................................................................................................ 8 2.2 Role of the Director of Policing .............................................................................................................. 8 2.3 Role of the Manitoba Police Commission .............................................................................................. 8 2.4 Role of Police Board................................................................................................................................ 8 2.5 Role of Municipal Council ....................................................................................................................... 9 2.6 Role of Police Chief ................................................................................................................................. 9 2.7 Role of Police Officer ............................................................................................................................. -
MISCARRIAGES of JUSTICE ORIGINATING from DISCLOSURE DEFICIENCIES in CRIMINAL CASES A. Disclosure Failures As Ground for Retria
CHAPTER FOUR MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE ORIGINATING FROM DISCLOSURE DEFICIENCIES IN CRIMINAL CASES A. Disclosure Failures as Ground for Retrials: Common Law Standards and Examples This chapter will delve more deeply into one of the most fundamental causes of miscarriages of justice in (international) criminal cases, namely failure on the part of police and/or prosecution to timely, adequately and fairly disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the judge, juries, and defense. The U.S. National Registry of Exonerations (NRE) which keeps count of exonerations in the U.S. from 1989 onwards, does not – in its offi- cial counting – include cases of group exonerations due to police and prosecutorial misconduct. In its June 2012-report the NRE counted 901 exonerations, the number has risen to 1,000 exonerations only five months later.1 The report discusses cases of at least 1,100 defendants who were exonerated in the so-called “group exonerations”. These exonerations were the consequence of the revelation of gross police misconduct in twelve cases since 1995 in which innocent defendants had been framed by police officers for mostly drug and gun crimes.2 Yet, most of the group exonera- tions were spotted accidently, as the cases are obscure and for some of the scandals the number of exonerees could only be estimated; these num- bers are not included in the 1,000 exonerations the registry counted on 30 October 2012.3 In many cases it will be hard to establish that police or prosecutorial misconduct did in fact occur; a conclusion that was also drawn by the NRE. This chapter will delve into cases where misconduct did come to light while analyzing the criminal law proceedings which led to these errors. -
Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest Bennett L
University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 1982 Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest Bennett L. Gershman Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Gershman, Bennett L., "Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest" (1982). Minnesota Law Review. 890. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/890 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest Bennett L. Gershman* I. INTRODUCTION On November 1, 1973, in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County, Stephen Vitale was arraigned on a charge of armed robbery. According to the complaining wit- ness, Morton Hirsch, Vitale placed a pistol against Hirsch's head, threatened him, and robbed him of over $8,000. The sup- porting affidavit of Police Officer Brian Cosgrove stated that as Vitale was fleeing from the robbery scene, Cosgove arrested him and seized a pistol from him.' On the surface, this proceeding appeared no different from thousands of similar proceedings taking place daily in criminal courts throughout the country. In fact, Vitale, Hirsch, and Cos- grove were undercover agents; New York's Special Anti-Cor- ruption Prosecutor had authorized their activities 2 as part of a program to detect corruption in the criminal justice system. 3 False court documents, false statements made to judges, and * Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. -
The Retributive Philosophies of Executive Clemency
IS THERE JUSTICE IN MERCY? THE RETRIBUTIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY Gina N. Gibbs Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS May 2013 APPROVED: Peggy Tobolowsky, Co-Major Professor and Chair of the Department of Criminal Justice Chad. R. Trulson, Co-Major Professor Adam Trahan, Committee Member Thomas Evenson, Dean of the College of Public Affairs and Community Service Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Gibbs, Gina N. Is There Justice in Mercy? The Retributive Philosophies of Executive Clemency. Master of Science (Criminal Justice), May 2013, 85 pp., 9 tables. Executive clemency is assumed to be a mechanism to correct miscarriages of justice brought about by the criminal justice system, yet little empirical research exists to confirm this assumption. This research study examined the types of rationales cited in 799 cases of executive clemency from six states from 2005 to 2012. Rationales based upon retributive philosophies, in which a miscarriage of justice was cited, were further analyzed. This analysis revealed that only seven percent of all clemency decisions from the examined states cited retributive rationales. Of the fifty-six grants of clemency that cited retributive rationales, most were granted in the forms of pardons. The analysis indicated that executive clemency is utilized as a mechanism to correct injustices, specifically in cases of innocence. This study concludes with a discussion of policy implications and the reliance on executive clemency as a fail-safe to the criminal justice system. Copyright 2013 by Gina N. Gibbs ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I would like to thank my mother and father. -
Published United States Court of Appeals for The
PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 97-4173 MOHAMMAD SARIHIFARD, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (CR-96-332) Argued: April 9, 1998 Decided: August 19, 1998 Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, and CHAMBERS, United States District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation. _________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Chambers wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge Michael joined. _________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Marvin David Miller, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appel- lant. Gordon Dean Kromberg, Assistant United States Attorney, Alex- andria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. _________________________________________________________________ OPINION CHAMBERS, District Judge: I. FACTS Mohammad Sarihifard ("Petitioner") was convicted after a jury trial in the Eastern District of Virginia of perjury before a grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) and making false statements to a government agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The trial judge sentenced Petitioner to twenty-one months in prison pursuant to the federal sentencing guidelines. The charges against Petitioner initially stem from a conversation with federal agents where Petitioner provided the agents with inaccu- rate information. The federal agents were conducting an investigation into alleged money laundering and drug trafficking at Eagle Motors. Eagle Motors was a small used car dealership in Arlington, Virginia, owned by Ali Galadari ("Galadari"). Galadari was a target of the gov- ernment's investigation. -
Reading Entitling the Accused to Exculpatory Evidence
ENTITLING THE ACCUSED TO EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: WHY PROSECUTORS SHOULD HAVE TO DISCLOSE DURING PLEA BARGAINING Emily Clarke* INTRODUCTION Innocent until proven guilty1 is one of the most repeated phrases on crime television dramas and blockbuster thrillers.2 In reality, life is not so simple. While a criminal defendant is not assumed guilty at trial until a jury convicts him, what happens to this presumption for all of the cases that never reach trial? Over the last 50 years, defendants chose to proceed to a trial in less than three percent of state and federal criminal cases.3 The other 97 percent of cases were resolved through plea deals.4 Federal courts are currently split on the stage at which exculpatory evidence must be disclosed under the Brady doctrine.5 The Supreme Court has yet to give an answer as to whether a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to receive exculpatory evidence the prosecution possesses during the plea-bargaining stage or if they only get such evidence if the case reaches the trial stage. While the Supreme Court has yet to take up this question, the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville6 has those in the legal field wondering if it is just a matter of time before we get an official answer. This contribution will first evaluate where courts around the country currently stand on when exculpatory evidence must be handed over. Next, this contribution will argue that based on the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, exculpatory evidence can and should be handed over to criminal defendants before plea bargains are accepted.