Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions--And from Miranda Paul G

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Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Volume 88

Issue 2 Winter

Article 2

Winter 1998

Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions--And from Miranda

Paul G. Cassell

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Recommended Citation

Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions--And from Miranda, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497 (Winter 1998)

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