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SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the 28th of MAY, 1946 by Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, 29 MAY, 1946

The War Office, May, 1946 OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL NORWAY, 1940. PREFACE BY THE WAR OFFICE. including 3rd May. This report is divided into Of the two expeditions which the United four Parts as under: — Kingdom and France sent to Norway in April, PART I.—General Summary of Events. 1940, one to Northern Norway and one to PART II.—Operations in the Namsos area. Central Norway, the following despatch covers PART III.—Operations in the Andalsnes the latter from the beginning of operations. area. In Central Norway two main landings were PART IV.—Conclusions and lessons. made, one in the Namsos area by a force under I am indebted for Part II of this report to the command of Major-General A. Carton de Major-General Carton de Wiart and for Part III Wiart, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and one to Major-General B. C. T. Paget and Brigadier in the Andalsnes area by a force under the H. de R. Morgan, who have provided me with command, first of Brigadier H. de R. Morgan, the necessary material for them. D.S.O., and later of Major-General B. C. T. Paget, D.S.O., M.C. On igth April, 1940, Lieutenant-General H. R. S. Massy, D.S.O., PART I. M.C., was instructed to assume the appoint- GENERAL SUMMARY OF EVENTS. ment of Commander-in-Chief of the forces operating in Central Norway. He exercised this i. When the original plan for operations in command from his Headquarters in the United Southern Norway was made, the landings at Kingdom as the course of events did not per- Andalsnes and Namsos were intended as diver- mit the opening of a Headquarters in Norway. sions to a main attack to be made on Trond- heim. When the landings at Andalsnes and When the decision to withdraw from Central Namsos were effected without loss, and our Norway was taken on 27th April, 1940, it was troops advanced inland from these bases, it was agreed to press on with operations against decided that Trondheim might be captured by Narvik, and the force in Northern Norway com- a converging movement instead of by a prising British, French and Polish troops suc- hazardous direct attack from seaward. ceeded in capturing the town of Narvik before It was'hoped too that sufficient troops could it, in turn, had to be withdrawn at the begin- be put into Andalsnes to stiffen Norwegian ning of June, 1940. resistance in the South, and thus -put a limit to The following despatch was submitted to the the German advance from Oslo. Secretary of State for War on i^th May, It was against this background that I was 1940 by Lieutenant-General H. R. S. instructed on I9th April to assume the appoint- MASSY, D.S.O,, M.C., Commander-inr ment of Commander of the North-Western Ex- Chief, North Western Expeditionary Force. peditionary Force and to form my Headquarters •with a view to taking command as soon as I have the honour to submit my report on possible of the operations in progress North the operations in Central Norway, up to and and South of Trondheim. 2598 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 My instructions, as I understood them, were necessary maintenance personnel could be to capture Trondheim, and I decided that the landed. The support provided by the Royal first step towards this end must be to stop the Navy consisted of fighters from H.M.S. " Ark German advance from Oslo, and then to plan a Royal " and " Glorious," which were to deliberate combined operation for the capture operate over the ports, and torpedo bombers, of Trondheim itself. which were to attack the enemy aerodromes in I record below a narrative of the operations the neighbourhood of Trondheim and his ships which took place and the various decisions in that harbour. Anti-aircraft cruisers and arrived at as the turn of events required. I sloops were also allotted to .give protection to have purposely kept this report as short as pos- the Base Areas. sible, fuller details on subjects which may 3. On the 23rd, General Paget and his staff require consideration will be forwarded sepa- with Brigadier Hogg and Brigadier Richards rately to the War Office. left for Norway. During this day news was 2. In accordance with my instructions I received from General Carton de Wiart that assumed direct control of operations on 22nd Brigadier Phillips had succeeded in extricating April. In view of the fact that my Head- the I46th Infantry Brigade which, supported quarters were still in the process of forming and by the French, was occupying a position cover- were not in a position to operate as such, ing Namsos and Bangsund. orders were issued by my Staff in collaboration On this day too British troops on the with the Staff of the War Office. This unusual Southern Sector had withdrawn as the result and difficult position was made workable by the of heavy enemy attacks to hold a line South co-operation and assistance not only of the of Tret ten, and behind them an effort was Military Operations Directorate but also of the being made to re-organise Norwegian troops in numerous War Office branches which were the sector. During the whole of this day and necessarily consulted and whose aid was the next both Base Areas were continually invoked during the period of operations. bombed, as were forward troops and the com- Briefly, the situation in Southern Norway munications between them and the Base. when I assumed command was as follows: — In the area South of Trondheim Brigadier 4. On the evening of the 24th, the 2&3rd H. de R. Morgan with the I48th Infantry Fighter Squadron, R.A.F. (18 Gladiators) was Brigade (1/5 Leicesters and 8 Foresters) was flown ashore on Lake Lesjaskog. It was how- in the Lillehammer area South of Dombas ever immediately spotted by tile enemy who in touch with Norwegian troops. The ship commenced bombing next morning and con- carrying Brigadier Morgan's first-line trans- tinued it throughout the day. It is understood port had been sunk. He was therefore bereft that, in spite of valiant efforts by the pilots of essential fighting equipment, including anti- and ground staff, but few of them were able tank guns. In the Namsos area, North of to take off, and were quite insufficient to hold Trondheim Major-General Carton de Wiart off the innumerable enemy bombers who had under his command Brigadier C. G. attacked the aerodrome continuously. Phillips' I46th Infantry Brigade (4 Lincolns, 5. On the 25th April, I was directed by the 1/4 K.O.Y.L.I., and Hallams) and one demi- Chiefs of Staff to submit an appreciation on brigade of Chasseurs Alpins commanded by the situation in Norway. As it appeared to General Audet. The I4oth Infantry Brigade me then, the possibility of landing further was in contact with German forces near troops or of maintaining the troops then ashore Verdalen, 45 miles North-East of Trondheim. depended entirely on our being able to obtain The Chasseurs Alpins were in the vicinity of control of the situation in the air. In my Namsos. appreciation I stated this fact and gave it as Major-General B. C. T. Paget had been my opinion that should adequate air support selected to command the British forces operat- be available I had no reason to suppose that ing South of Trondheim, and on this day he we could not hold our existing positions against was -handed iny instructions, a copy of which is the Germans, and at a later date eject them "attached to this report at Appendix "A." from Trondheim. Without it I had little doubt Accompanying him to assume control of the that any further operations would become im- Base Area^of Andalsnes and to make a plan possible and that we should be compelled to for its derelopment as a base were Brigadier evacuate our forces from Southern and Central D. McA. Hogg, D.A. and Q.M.G. of Force Norway. I further stated that should evacua- Headquarters, and Brigadier D. J. R. Richards tion -be decided upon it would have to be done as Air Defence Commander to plan the air at short notice and that all necessary plans defence of the Base Area. for this operation must therefore be made with- During this day news was received that the out delay. I requested that the Inter-Service I4&th Infantry Brigade had been attacked on Planning Staffs should be directed to make the the previous day, the 2ist April, by enemy necessary preparations forthwith. I was not landed from a cruiser and destroyers, and^tfiat aware when this appreciation was written 'that Steinkjer had been heavily bombed. The base the attempt to establish the Gladiators ashore at Namsos was now being regularly bombed had failed. and General Carton de Wiart reported that the During this day, the I48th Infantry Brigade maintenance of his force in this area was was withdrawn to Otta and it became evident becoming difficult and that, unless some respite that the I5th Infantry Brigade, which had from the enemy bombing could be gained, it sailed under General Paget's orders, part on might well become impossible. Bombing of 22nd and part on 24th April, would be required Andalsnes was also taking place and consider- to hold Dombas and Opdal if the process of able damage had been done. Arrangements putting further troops ashore in the Andalsnes were then made with the Royal Air Force to area was to be contemplated. Instructions to land Gladiators on a frozen lake at Lesjaskog, this effect were sent to General Paget in amplifi- between Andalsnes and Donibas, as soon as the cation of his original instructions in Appendix SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 2599 "A." The situation at Namsos did not mate- 8. During the 28th, plans for the evacuation rially alter during this or the following day, were concerted with Admiralty representatives though bombing of this port and Andalsnes and orders were issued to both General Carton continued. Both towns had been completely de Wiart and General Paget as to how the destroyed, and as the nights were getting evacuation was to be carried out. The evacua- shorter, the amount of unloading which could tion of the French was commenced on the night be undertaken was becoming progressively less. of the 28th /29th and arrangements were made for the evacuation of the remaining troops 6. During 26th April the situation at Namsos from Namsos to be completed on the nights of did not materially alter. From reports re- the ist/2nd and 2nd/3rd May. Plans for the ceived from -the South however it became in- evacuation of Andalsnes were for the evacua- creasingly obvious that in the face of artillery tion to be carried out on two nights, ist/2nd, and mortar fire and incessant bombing, to none and 2nd/3rd May, but the plan was made suf- of which the Allied troops .could effectively ficiently elastic so that if necessary the process reply, the German advance could not be of evacuation from this latter port could be put stopped. General Paget stated it as his forward 24 hours. It had been planned when opinion that his troops could not endure for the force was evacuated from Namsos that a more than four days unless adequate air sup- rearguard should fall back by land to Mosjoen port was forthcoming. During the whole of retiring in the face of the enemy, and that in this day the bombing of Andalsnes and Namsos the meantime a party should be sent by sea continued and the possibility of these ports to ensure holding the latter port against enemy being rendered inoperative as bases had to be troops landed by parachute from the air, and faced. During the afternoon I became aware orders to this effect were issued. General of the previous day's failure of the Gladiators Carton de Wiart opposed this plan on the to operate from a shorebased aerodrome, and it grounds that owing to lack of petrol and trans- then became evident to me that the chances port and more important still, the fact that of our getting any air support which would the road during the thaw was practically im- enable us in any way to compete with the passable, the operation would be likely to end German air menace had practically vanished. in disaster. I was convinced that evacuation would there- Subsequent telegrams did not induce him to fore be necessary. I reported my views ver- alter his view and even the passage by the bally to the C.I.G.S. who informed me that land route of a small party of French Chasseurs the Chiefs of Staff had that morning been was by him deemed impossible. My final wire considering the possibility of re-instituting a on this subject was to the effect that if in the modified operation for the direct attack pn opinion of General Audet the retirement of a Trondheim, and had come to the conclusion small rearguard of French Chasseurs by the that it would take some ten days to mount. land route was impossible, this operation was I understood from him that, in view of the not to take place. It was evident that, if situation, the Chiefs of Staff were not prepared French Chasseurs could not retire along this to recommend this course to the Government route, the Germans could not advance along as they doubted, as I did, whether the forces it. In the event no withdrawal by land did in Southern Norway could hold on long enough take place, though this was an error as the to enable the operation to be put into effect. Germans have since made full use of this route, 7. Accordingly next morning, 27th April, I and have advanced so rapidly along it that our wrote an appreciation of the situation which troops in Mosjoen have not had time to get convinced me that evacuation was necessary properly established and it is more than likely and that there were two main ways of doing that we shall not be able to hold the place. it. In the first case, as we' had few stores and 9. During the 29th the situation on the little heavy equipment ashore we might, by Namsos front did not alter. Forces operating means of a rapid evacuation of personnel only, to the southward were withdrawn to a position cut our losses to tile lowest level. In the 3 miles south of Domb&s which position General second, by continuing to send anti-aircraft Paget proposed to hold until -the night of the guns and artillery, and possibly subsequently 30th/ist to cover the evacuation. On this day further infantry, we might be able to hold the owing to urgent representations from Andalsnes position for some time longer. This however it was decided to make the dates of evacuation would undoubtedly involve the loss of large from this port the nights of 30th/ist and quantities of valuable material and certainly ist/2nd and the necessary arrangements for heavy casualties in personnel. The period shipping were made accordingly. Further re- could not be sufficient to allow of any direct quests that long range bombers should be attack on Trondheim being planned and directed against the enemy troops and his Lines mounted. In my opinion the correct solution of Communication were made to the Air was a rapid withdrawal with the object of Ministry who were, however, as far as I am reducing our losses to the lowest possible aware, unable to comply with them. During figure. : the day however Blenheim fighters were That evening I was sent for to report to .the despatched to the area and their presence re- Military Co-ordinating Committee. My report sulted hi the immediate disappearance of enemy was in terms similar to those I have stated bombers for the period during which the above and the Committee agreed that the Blenheims were able to remain over the area. evacuation was to take place and approved 10. In the early hours of the 30th April a instructions (App. " B ") -given to me for the party of 340 personnel, mostly wounded, were purpose. To relieve the pressure on General embarked on H.M.S. Fleetwood from Andalsnes Paget's force the Air Ministry were requested and at 1900 hours H.M.S. Janus embarked 100 to attack with bombers the Germans in the men and two Bofors guns at Namsos and con- Gudbrandsdal valley and their communica- veyed them during the night to Mosjoen, where tions, but this was found impossible. they arrived on 2nd May -having been delayed Az 2600 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 by dense fog. During the nights 3oth/ist and Bangsund, the remainder of 14601 Infantry ist/2nd evacuation was successfully carried out Brigade getting ashore during the I7th April. from Andalsnes. On ist May tiiick fog off By the igth April, this brigade having moved Namsos prevented the ships entering the har- Southward from Namsos, was disposed as bour. The whole evacuation of Namsos was follows:— however successfully carried out on the Advanced Brigade Headquarters at night of the 2nd/3rd, the last ship leaving at Steinkjer. 0220 hours, and a total of 5,400 having been embarked during that night, an operation for One battalion—about Steinkjer. which the greatest credit is due to the Naval One battalion—in the area South of forces employed. Steinkjer including Verdal and Stiklestad. 11. During the whole of the 3rd the convoy One battalion—in the area North of was continually bombed on its passage across Steinkjer including Bangsund. the North Sea. It has been reported to me These dispositions gave General Carton de that one German aeroplane continually Wiart control of the roads and railways leading shadowed it whilst relays of bombers came up, Northwards from Trondheim, and placed him presumably directed by the shadowing aero- in a favourable position to co-operate with any plane. That the losses were not heavier than direct attack on Trondheim which might be they were is evidence of remarkable luck. The developed from seaward. presence of some long range fighters during the 16. During the night of i9th/2Oth April the day would have been invaluable, but none were 5th Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs Alpins arrived available owing to question of range. in Namsos under General Audet, but with the indifferent port facilities there it was impossible PART II. to clear the two small jetties during the hours OPERATIONS AT NAMSOS. of darkness. Consequently on the following 12. On I4th April Major-General Carton de morning the large quantity of supplies, muni- Wiart was informed by the War Office that it tions and stores lying at the jetties was spotted had been decided to land an allied expedition by enemy aircraft, and for two hours the quay, in Central Norway, and that the operation was station and western half of Namsos town were to be carried out independently of the landings heavily bombed. The station and most of the already begun in the Narvik area. town were destroyed, and one of the two jetties was badly damaged. 13. Major-General Carton de Wiart was given written instructions (Appendix " C ") on I4th The French Demi-Brigade was put into April appointing him in command of the Allied billets and bivouacs close round Namsos, and, forces being despatched to Central Norway, and while they were settling in, General Carton de his role was defined as "to secure the Wiart visited the headquarters of I46th Infantry Trondheim area." He was informed that the Brigade at Steinkjer and met there the com- Royal Navy were making preliminary landings mander of the local Norwegian forces. So far in the Namsos area with landing parties about no British troops had been in contact with 300 strong in all, in order to seize and hold German land forces. points at which disembarkation of Allied forces 17. At about 0600 hours on 2ist April an might subsequently take place. enemy detachment of some 400 men landed The written instructions suggested the initial at Kirkenesvaag and began to advance on landing of army formations should be in the Sandvollan and Strommen. Other German Namsos area and that this should be carried landings were carried out at Hylla and Trones- out by I46th and I48th Infantry Brigades and tangen, and an attack was directed on Verdal. Chasseurs Alpins, after the Royal Navy had The enemy land forces were supported by war- cleared the Trondheim fjord of German vessels. ships operating in the Trondheim fiord. It must be mentioned here that at the time These German landings presented a serious these instructions were issued. I46th Infantry threat to the flank and rear of I46th Infantry Brigade was at sea with orders to land in the Brigade who were severely hampered by having Narvik area; that I48th Infantry Brigade (less no artillery and by their inability to move any- one battalion) was diverted to Andalsnes; that where off the roads on account of the deep I47th Infantry Brigade never sailed from the snow. United Kingdom. During the afternoon of 2ist April enemy 14. On the evening of i5th April General aircraft' were also active; Steinkjer was bombed Carton de Wiart, with a junior staff officer, and reduced to a flaming mass of ruins, and the arrived at Namsos in a flying boat to confer roads from Steinkjer to Verdal-and Stiklestad with the naval landing parties wiho had akeady were machine-gunned and bombed. established a footing there. The flying boat 18. In view of these events and the inability and the destroyer " Somali " lying in the of the British infantry to operate off the roads, Namsen Fiord were repeatedly attacked by General Carton de Wiart decided to withdraw German aircraft with bombs and machine- I46th Infantry Brigade into a position north of gun fire, and General Carton de Wiart's staff Steinkjer where its flanks could not be officer was wounded. Meanwhile I46th Infantry threatened, and issued orders to that effect. Brigade had been ordered, while at sea, to go During the withdrawal a German destroyer to Namsos instead of Narvik, but it was evident was very active with its gun fire, and enemy that the landing of these troops direct from mortar and light artillery fire was directed upon transports was not a feasible operation at the British battalions. In addition 4 Lincolns Namsos, and that they would, have !to bje were attacked about Steinkjer by German ski transferred to destroyers at Lillesjone and then troops and had somewhat heavy casualties. taken to Namsos on two successive days. By 24th April the Brigade was established in its 15. On i6th April the first -battalion arrived new position north of Steinkjer, having carried and were disposed to cover Namsos and out the withdrawal in very trying conditions. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 2601

. 19. On 23rd April General Carton de Wiart the rearguard to remain at Grong was left sent a signal to the War Office that evacuation entirely to his discretion. I have referred in from Namsos might be advisable, since the scale Part I to the abandonment of this operation. of enemy air attack was heavy and he had On the 3Oth April, a party of 100 French received no further information about the pro- Chasseurs and a British detachment with two posed landing of an Allied force at Trondheim. Bofors guns was sent by destroyer to Mosjoen. In reply General Carton de Wiart was in- Throughout that day, enemy aircraft were again structed by Headquarters North Western Ex- active and sank H.M.S. " Bittern ' and two peditionary Force to keep his force in being and, trawlers. to remain on the defensive in the Namsos area. 24. On ist May all arrangements were made - 20. For the first time on 25th April British to evacuate. the French contingent, and by aircraft appeared over Namsos. These belonged 2115 hours all were ready on the quayside. But to the Fleet Air Arm, but three were forced to no transports or destroyers arrived owing to land owing to lack of petrol. Their interven- thick fog in the Namsen Fiord, and the evacua- tion, though temporary, had a beneficial effect tion had to be postponed for 24 hours. on the air situation, but since their effect could not be sustained, enemy air activity was again 25. On 2nd May General Carton de Wiart unhampered during the next few days. was asked to carry out the evacuation in one On account of the deep snow, which pre- night if possible, instead of two, as the vented movement off the roads, it was not until Admiralty were anxious to complete the task 26th April that a reconnaissance party of the with all speed. R.A.F. started to search for landing grounds After consultation with Admiral Vivian it in the Namsos area. was agreed that all troops could be got away 21. On the following day the advanced party on the night 2nd /3rd May but that no stores of General Carton de Wiart's staff arrived. or equipment could be saved. Until now he had made use of the services 26. By 0150 hours on 3rd May all troops of Captains Fleming and Lindsay (of the Mili- except a small rear party were re-embarked tary Intelligence Directorate) and of one General and the convoy sailed from Namsos. Staff Officer who had reported for duty on 23rd At 0220 hours the destroyer " Afridi " took April at Namsos. off the rear party. In the same ship as the advanced party of At 0430 hours the usual German air recon- the staff there arrived a Royal Marine Howitzer naissance came over Namsos and sighted the battery, a field ambulance, a dock labour com- convoy which was now well out to sea. pany, representatives of the base sub-area Between 0800 hours and 1530 hours wave organisation, rifles and ammunition for the after wave of enemy bombers attacked H.M. Norwegians, and many other natures of stores, Ships and the transports. No transport ship but owing to the fact that the quay side was was hit, but the French destroyer " Bison " already piled high with French stores and that and H.M.S. " Afridi " were sunk fighting ta a French ship was still alongside the one usable the end. The losses might well have been far jetty unloading transport and equipment, only heavier, for there were no air forces supporting the party of headquarter staff, a portion of the the convoy. howitzer battery (but no ammunition) and some dock labour could be got ashore. COMMENTS. 22. Such was the situation at Namsos when 27. In view of the instructions issued to him on 28th April General Carton de Wiart received and -the size of the force which according lo the message that the evacuation of Namsos had those instructions was eventually to be placed been decided on in principle. at his disposal, General Carton de Wiart's At a meeting with Admiral Vivian (Flag action in pushing straight ahead towards Trond- Officer commanding 20 Cruiser Squadron), heim was justified. Had he been aware of the General Audet and Brigadier Phillips, he limited forces which were actually to be placed decided to plan for evacuation on two succes- at his disposal and of the fact that the direct sive nights. In the meantime it was possible attack on Trondheim was not to take place, to send away one French battalion on the night his advance would undoubtedly have been a 28th/29th April in an empty ship. more methodical one, and his position at It was decided that the French contingent Steinkjer would have been consolidated before should re-embark before the British, but that a further advance would have been considered. the French would leave some ski troops to The position of the I46th Infantry Brigade, operate with the British rearguard. The prob- with its head at Verdalen and its right flank able dates for evacuation were the nights of open to attack from the Fiord by sea-borne ist/2nd and 2nd/3rd May. troops, was, as events proved, a somewhat On the night 28th /29th April a battery of dangerous one. Bofors guns was landed at Namsos. These The withdrawal of this Brigade when guns were unfortunately without predictors. attacked was cleverly planned and executed 23. On the following day General Carton de and reflects great credit on Brigadier Phillips Wiart received the message instructing him to and the troops under his command. send a detachment to Mosjoen by sea and to 28. I have already commented in Part I, post a rearguard at Grong which would delay paragraph 8, on the decision not to dispatch a the enemy for as long as possible and then with- force by road to delay the enemy in his advance draw Northwards overland to Mosjoen. on Mosjoen after the final evacuation took At first he appears to have been in some place. The importance of this operation was doubt as to whether the rearguard at Grong strongly stressed in several telegrams from these was intended to comprise his whole force, and headquarters, its feasibility could only be left he referred the matter to this Headquarters. to the judgment of the man on the spot. In The reply made it clear that the strength of this case an error of judgment was made. 2602 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 PART III. the Norwegian troops who were tired out. He OPERATIONS IN THE ANDALSNES AREA. hoped that the arrival of the British troops would lend fresh heart to his force and conse- 29. The area of operations was confined to quently he required Brigadier Morgan to attach the Gudbrandsdal valley betwen the base at his troops under direct command of Norwegian Andalsnes and Lake Mjosa, a distance of some formations. The force was moved by train 140 miles. Except in the area of Lesjaskog, to the Lillehammer area during igth and 2oth and at its Southern end, where there are roads April, where it was placed under command on either side of Lake Mjosa, the valley is 2nd Norwegian Division. seldom more than a mile wide and in places narrows to a few hundred yards; along the 33. On 2ist April, it was Ho move forward in whole length of the road, river and railway three groups to take up previously reconnoitred interwine. The valley is flanked with moun- positions south of Lillehammer and on either tains and hills which are covered in snow at the side of Mjosa Lake. high levels. The side roads and tracks leading Owing to a German attack during the after- into the valley are for the most part impassable noon these groups never reached these positions at this time of the year, except to ski troops, and orders were issued for a withdrawal at of whom the enemy were reported to have a oioo hours, 22nd April, to the high ground considerable number. Scattered along the valley between F&lberg and Lillehammer. During this throughout its length are wooden farm build- withdrawal a party of 5 officers and 50 men, ings and occasional villages or small towns 1/5 Leicesters, was cut off and lost. such as AndalSnes, Lesja, Domb&s, Otta, 34. On 22nd April our position was heavily Ringebu, Oyer and Lillehammer. attacked from the air and with 3.7 inch howitzers and 4 inch mortars. Shortly after 30. It would be difficult to imagine a Line of mid-day the Germans succeeded in working Communication more exposed to ah* attack, to round the Eastern flank and a daylight with- which it was continually subjected during the drawal became imperative if the whole force hours of daylight by means of heavy bombinij East of the river was not to be cut off. and machine gun fire: and there were no means The Norwegians had made no arrangements of protecting it nor of repairing the damage for the occupation of the position in rear, but done to the roads and railway: for this latter the timely arrival of the remaining two com- work reliance had to be placed entirely on the panies of 1/5-Leicesters at the base enabled Norwegians, who did their best with very them to be rushed forward by rail and bus limited resources. The key point of Dombas to positions near Oyer. was completely destroyed by bombing and Otta The Germans made no serious efforts to almost completely so. Large craters on the follow up the withdrawal, being checked by road made motor transport movement in- fire and road blocks. Their aircraft were how- creasingly difficult; it was singularly fortunate ever very active and the force suffered heavy that the railway was not more seriously casualties from bombs and machine gun fire damaged. from the air. 31. The I48th Infantry Brigade commanded The position at Oyer was reached by about by Brigadier H. de R. Morgan and consisting 1800 hours, though battalions and companies initially of 1/5 Leicesters, less two companies, were somewhat mixed. At this hour the force 8 Sherwood Foresters and one light Anti-Air- was some 12 miles in front of any formed body craft Battery, a total of 1,000 all ranks, landed of Norwegians though three squadrons of the from His Majesty's ships in th^e Andalsnes area Dragoons, a motorised machine-gun unit, were on the evening of i8th April. A force of placed under Brigadier Morgan's command, Marines had landed previously to make pre- with orders to report to him at Tretten. liminary arrangements. Brigadier Morgan's 35. During the night 22nd /23rd April the instructions were to land in the Andalsnes area, British force fell back tor-a previously recon- secure Dombas and then operate Northwards noitred position just South of Tretten. and take offensive action against the Germans Owing to this continued withdrawal rations in the Trondheim area. His instructions also had been jettisoned in order to transport troops stated that his force was an independent com- so there was a shortage of supplies. Also posi- mand under the War Office until receipt of tions were not entrenched, as all tools had been further orders. As a preliminary to carrying left behind in the early stages of the with- out his r61e Brigadier Morgan despatched a drawal. Consequently the men were lying in company to Dombas where it arrived at 0400 the open exposed to full view of the enemy air- hours, igth April. craft and to artillery fire. 32. On igth April, the British Military 36. During 23rd April the Germans brought Attache", Lieutenant-Colonel King Salter, repre- up a section of 5.9 howitzers and at least two sented that the Norwegian Army was in urgent tanks. They again started working round our need of assistance, and stated that unless this Eastern flank and a further withdrawal became was forthcoming immediately, the Army would essential. Owing to the difficulties of com- abandon all further resistance. He further munications it is doubted whether the forward stated to Brigadier Morgan that the War Office companies ever received any orders and they had sanctioned the I48th Infantry Brigade were cut off by the enemy getting round behind coming under the command of the Commander- them. in-Chief, Nonvegian Army. Owing to the The withdrawal of the remainder was fol- urgency of the situation Brigadier Morgan lowed up by tanks and aircraft and casualties decided to comply with the Norwegian request were heavy, but the forward companies were for assistance, at the same time sending a signal still holding out and must have inflicted heavy to the War Office for further instructions. losses on the enemy. The Norwegians had The Norwegian Commander-m-Chief's orders taken up a defensive position about Favang were that I48th Infantry Brigade should be and the remainder of the force withdrew sent at once to the Lillehammer area to replace through them during the night 23rd/24th April. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 2603

By this time the I K.O.Y.L.I. from of 26th/27th April by motor transport to Brigade had arrived from Andalsnes and on Dombas through i Y. & L. This latter battalion 24th April reached Otta with orders to occupy was to remain in its present position, reinforced a position behind the Norwegians about Kvam. by one company Green Howards (sent up in During the above period I48th Brigade motor transport from Domlb&s), and thus cover suffered about 700 casualties, while only two the preparation of a strong position just South combatant officers were left with the Leicesters of Otta. and four with the Foresters. The situation on the left flank was causing 37. In the instructions issued to Major- some anxiety, as the enemy were reported to General Paget by Lieutenant-general Massy have reached Alvdal in the Osterdalen valley. on 22nd April (Appendix A) he was given the There were only small detachments of Nor- task of co-operating with the Norwegian Army wegian troops at Foldal and Hjerkinn. Hence in preventing the Northward advance of the it was possible for the enemy to develop a German Army based in Southern Norway, and threat against the Lines of Communications by at the same time in safeguarding his left and way of Foldal, Hjerkinn, Dombfis. Brigadier rear against attack by the German forces in Morgan was, therefore, placed in command of Trondheim and parachute landed detachments the troops in DombUs to organise the defence of the village with his own force (400 strong but on his Line of Communications of over 100 short of officers and weapons) and one company miles. of the Green Howards, who were given the task 38. On arrival at Andalsnes on the evening of blocking the Hjerkinn road. of 25th April, General Paget went forward by The remainder of the Green Howards was car to meet the Commander-in-Chief of the then moved by train at night to Otta to occupy Norwegian Army, General Ruge, who, with a a position South of the village as a firm base staff of about six officers, was then in a small in rear of i Y. & L. farm house on the hillside 10 miles South of During the withdrawal of i K.O.Y.L.I. Dombls. General Paget had been told en several minor demolitions were successfully route by the British Minister, whom he saw at carried out. the Park Royal, Andalsnes, that General Ruge 40. General Paget's object at this stage was was the only man who could keep the Nor- still to stop the enemy. He judged that he wegian forces in the field, and this would cer- could not expect his forward troops to withstand tainly appear to have been the case. General the enemy for more than 48 hours in any one Ruge was gravely concerned about the small- position without any form of artillery and air ness of the British forces and the fact that he support. Planning was therefore directed to was not fully aware of our plans. He said, that delaying the enemy as much as possible so as his own troops were exhausted in trying to hold to give time for the arrival of artillery and air up the German advance from the South pending support. When tiiis should arrive little difficulty the arrival of British reinforcements, and that was anticipated in stopping the enemy. they could fight no more until they had been thoroughly rested, re-organised and re- 41. The withdrawal of i K.O.Y.L.I. was equipped. successfully carried out, and i Y. & L. held the General Paget came to the conclusion that Sjoa position throughout the day. The enemy this was right, and that he could look for very had been slow in following up and did not press little support from these troops. He asked, his attack for the time being, contenting himself however, that Norwegian ski detachments with air and ground bombardment. should be used to protect the flanks on the i Green Howards organised the Otta position high ground as he had no means of doing this for defence, and the preparation of DombSs himself, and General Ruge promised that they defences was continued. Owing to the rocky would do so and would operate under British nature of the ground it was seldom possible to dig and concealment from air was essential. command. General Ruge then said, and later During the morning a report from the French confirmed in writing, that General Paget was 1 to be entirely responsible for the Gudbrandsdal Military Attache again indicated enemy action valley, and also for the protection of the railway from the direction Foldal-Hjerkinn. General from DombSs as far North as Opdal (40 miles Ruge was confident in the ability of his detach- North of Domb&s). ment to hold off any such threats; but General Paget judged that a reconnaissance was desir- During the following day all other Norwegian able in case it became necessary to reinforce troops were withdrawn from the area South of the Norwegian troops. Unfortunately a break- Dom'bas down the Gudbrandsdal valley towards down in motor transport limited this recon- Andalsnes. . naissance to the vicinity of Dombas. 39. i K.O.Y.L.I. were thus the most forward 42. Throughout the day the need for recon- Allied troops and were holding a position across naissance aircraft was acute, not only for the valley at Kvam with i Y. & L. in a sup- normal tasks, but also to confirm or deny the porting position some two miles in rear about many alarmist reports received. Sjoa. i Green Howards moved up from At a conference with General Ruge earlier Andalsnes to Domib&s by train joining the in the day it was agreed that the Otta posi- remnants of I48th Infantry Brigade in" that tion was a strong one, on which there should place. be a good chance of holding the enemy until By 1600 hrs. it was obvious that i K.O.Y.L.I. the arrival of guns from the base. could not maintain their front much longer. General Ruge requested that the Otta posi- They had held the Kvam position for nearly tion should be held until a Norwegian detach- 48 hours, in spite of repeated enemy attacks, ment, which had been isolated in the hills West and were constantly subjected to enemy artillery of Tretten, could be withdrawn by the road* fire, air bombing and low flying machine gun leading into the Gudbrandsdal in the area Otta- fire. Brigadier Kent Lemon was therefore Sel. To this General Paget replied that he ordered to withdraw i K.O.Y.L.I. on the night would be prepared, with the situation as it 2604 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 was then, to hold the Otta position for two or forward troops were the heaviest experienced three days, and that he would do his best to up to that time. It was apparent that to hold cover the Norwegian detachment's with- the position until dark and then extricate the drawal. The Otta position required two bat- forward battalions might be a matter of con- talions .to hold it, and as the Y. and L. would siderable difficulty. have found difficulty in defending the Sjoa 46."The time and space problem of the with- position they were ordered to withdraw on the drawal had now to be considered. The major night ayth/a8th to reinforce the Green factors were: — Howards on the Otta position. (a) The- obligation to cover the withdrawal This withdrawal was not as successful as on of all Norwegian troops in this area. the previous night. The enemy had antici- (b) The shipping available on the nights pated it, and made every effort to work round 2gth/3oth April, 3Oth April/ist May, ist/2nd the flank. Parties of the enemy (dressed as May. Norwegian troops) succeeded in cutting otf (c) The withdrawal would be dependent on some of the forward companies, and eventu- one single railway line and one road over a ally only some 12 officers and 300 men were distance of 100 miles. available to assist the Green Howards on the (d) The physical endurance of the troops. Otta position. Many of I Y. and L. who had been thus cut off rejoined subsequently It was obvious from the start that demolition after an adventurous passage of the hills 011 must play a large part in the plan. A vital the flanks of the valley. point was the bridge over the Rostl, gorge be- 43. At about 0500 hours the liaison officer tween Dovre and Otta If this was successfully who had taken up the motor transport for the blown, the enemy would be unlikely to get withdrawal of i Y. and L. returned to General tanks, guns or wheeled vehicles forward of the Paget's headquarters with the news of the diffi- gorge for at least 48 hours. culties experienced by this battalion. In his One section of the 55 Field Company, R.E., opinion the Y. and L. were not in a fit state was withdrawn at once from the forward area to hold their sector of the Otta position, which to prepare the Rost& demolitions, and the com- would have to be held solely by the Green pany of Green Howards, then in concealment Howards. South of Dombas, was sent to cover their pre- This situation necessitated some precaution- parations. ary measures. Movement of troops in the open 47. During the afternoon and early evening or on the Lines of Communication by daylight the Green Howards on the Otta position fought could be justified only as a last resort; but splendidly. One medium and two light tanks there were still some two and a half hours left were destroyed by the 25 mm. Anti-Tank Com- before the usual time of arrival of the German pany. Other targets included reconnaissance morning air reconnaissance. Throughout the parties and groups of enemy in buildings. There operations the enemy was methodical in his is no doubt that the enemy suffered many air action, and his probable active hours could casualties in this battle and his subsequent be forecast with accuracy. actions showed little desire or ability to press 44. The company of the Green Howards in home an attack. It was, however, irritating DombSs was, therefore, ordered into a conceal- in the extreme, owing to lack of artillery, to be ment area some two miles to the South of unable to deal with the German close support Domb£s, with motor transport immediately guns, which came into action in the open, available for a further forward movement if outside the range of British light machine guns necessary. and 3 in. mortars. At the same time the K.O.Y.L.I. in Dorob&s At about 1800 hours the K.O.Y.L.I. were were placed at one hour's notice to move. ordered to occupy the position South of Dom- While these adjustments were being made, bas, which had been reconnoitred in the the first news of the intended evacuation reached morning. headquarters. The War Office telegram re- 48. The plan for the night withdrawal is quested acceptance of a plan or a suggested worth considering in some detail, because it was alternative. General Paget considered he could the first of a series of precarious operations, not answer this without reference to General where the balance between success and disaster Ruge, as the evacuation was not possible with- was extremely slender. out his co-operation. Otta is some 25 miles from Domb£s, where He therefore went to his headquarters and lay the next secure base occupied by the told him frankly the situation, which at the K.O.Y.L.I. The only means of transport avail- first General Ruge was unable to accept. able were the train and a very limited amount Finally, he did so, on General Paget's assur-. of motor transport, both of which had to be ance that British troops would cover the with- wheedled out of the Norwegians. The motor drawal of the Norwegian Army and would not transport was allotted to the rear parties. The relinquish Dombls until this had been effected. train was assembled at Domb&s and the motor 45. Meanwhile the situation of the Green transport at Dovre, with a staff officer in charge Howards and Y. and L. was causing anxiety of each. Both started about 2000 hours. The at the headquarters of the I5th Infantry train ran forward to Rudi and the motor trans- Brigade. Y. and L. had not recovered from port to Formo, both of which were close behind the severe handling they had received during the front line. At about 2030 hours the fighting the previous night's withdrawal, and though slackened on the whole front and the with- Green Howards were in good heart they were all drawal started at 2300 hours, the troops falling too few to cover an extensive position. The steadily back on the train and motor transport enemy had gained contact at 1030 hours, and column. quickly began a methodical bombardment of The train left' Rudi about 0230 hours, and the forward troops with artillery and mortars. the troops detrained into assembly areas at The bombing and the machine gun fire on the Dombas between 0500 and 0600 hours, where SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 2605 they were covered by i K.O.Y.L.I, in position (b) The following were approximate South of Domb&s. strengths:— Demolitions at Rost& and Dovre were blown H.Q. Sickle Force 40 after the rear parties had crossed the bridges. i K.O.Y.L.1 500 i Green Howards 500 49. The breakaway was clean, and the fact Anti-Tank Company 80 that the enemy made no immediate attempt to Section, 55 Field Company ... 100 follow it up was undoubtedly due to the 168 Light A.A. Battery ... 65 reverse he had suffered during the afternoon. H.Q. 15 Infantry Brigade ... 60 The value of the Norwegian Ski Troops Signals, I5th Infantry Brigade... 40 operating on the flanks should be mentioned. Morgan's Force 400 They were the only means of flank protection, and were of great value in guarding against 1.775 surprise. During the night 28th /agth April, many (c) Transport: By Motor Transport. Norwegian troops were withdrawn from the Lines of Communication and there was a possi- "55 Field Company bility of having no troops between Dorobas H.Q. isth Infantry Leave Dombas J Bde. & Sig. Sec. and the base at Andalsnes, some 60 miles 2030 hrs. ] R e a r parties away. K. O. Y. L. L and The obvious danger was that enemy para- Green Howards. chute detachments might land on the Lines of Communication. Brigadier Morgan's force By Train was therefore disposed in detachments at Lesja, "i K.O.Y.L.I. i Green Howards Lesjaverk, Lesjaskog and Verma, with as Leave Dombas much transport for each detachment as lie 2130 hrs. (less rear parties) could raise. Anti-tank Coy. Details R.E. & R.A. 50. During the night 28th/agth April, This plan was communicated to Norwegian General Paget's headquarters moved to G.H.Q. and the necessary details arranged. Botheim. An earlv, reconnaissance made af During night 29th/3oth April the Norwegian the Dombas position disclosed that the detachments at Hjerkum and Foldal withdrew K.O.Y.L.I. was well established there, with the through the British force at Dombas. These Green Howards and Y. and L. just assembling were the last Norwegian troops in the area for in the woods after their train withdrawal. the covering of whose withdrawal General Paget During the morning, General Ruge pointed was responsible. out that he could not withdraw his Foldal de- tachment until the night 29th/30th April. 52. The train conveying the Y. and L. to There could thus be no question of the with- Andalsnes on the night 29th/30th April only drawal of British troops from Dombl-s until reached Lesjaskog, owing to a break in the night 30th April/ist May. This meant the line. There was no train available to take enemy had 48 hours to follow -up from Otta, them on from the other side of the break to and that another battle might have to be Andalsnes, so they marched on. fought on the Dombas position. General Ruge Enemy reconnaissance aircraft and bombers offered the support of a Norwegian Field Bat- were active, but no other special incident tery of four guns, which was gratefully occurred during the day until 1530 hours when accepted. These guns were later to prove I5th Infantry Brigade reported that the enemy most useful. could be seen advancing up the valley from Dovre. The early reports were conflicting, one The enemy was very active all day in the mentioned four battalions, another parachute ah*, bombing and machine gunning all move- troops, a third transport. The force was pro- ment on the Lines of Communication. It was bably the usual reconnaissance detachment, the habit of his bombers to fly direct to their possibly reinforced by machine gun and mortar objective, drop their bombs at the most con- detachments landed by parachutes. This con- venient height, and then on their way home tact, though not unexpected, was undesirably to carry out low flying machine gun attacks on early. There were some five to six hours of the road traffic. daylight left and it seemed possible for the 51. About noon Lieut. Colonel Clarke enemy to stage an attack on the K.O.Y.L.I. arrived from England to say that shipping from which It might be difficult to extricate would be available as follows:— them. Night 2gth/3oth April for 1,000-1,500 53. The K.O.Y.L.I. were extremely well personnel. hidden; it is probable that the Germans were Night 3oth April/ist May for 2,200 per- surprised to find them there at all, and they sonnel. must have been even more surprised when the Night ist/and May for the remainder if Norwegian guns opened fire on their forward necessary. positions. Lieutenant-Colonel Cass command- The plan made as a result of this was to ing i K.O.Y.L.I. had made a very wise deci- withdraw i Y. and L. from DombSs and send sion earlier in the day to withdraw his right them with Base Details on the night 2gth/30th company across the river, as the water level April. had risen considerably, making the river un- fordable for the withdrawal. When later the On night 30th April/ist May:— Germans made contact, they were forced to use (a) I5th Infantry Brigade and all troops rubber boats to attempt the crossing. These (less i Y. and L.) would withdraw from were all destroyed and their crews knocked out. present positions through the Royal Marines The enemy's forward troops were supported (covering Andalsnes) and embark. by a close reconnaissance aircraft, which 2606 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 dropped bombs and flares on likely targets. The tunnel merits description. In it was a Fortunately this aircraft was shot down by our loaded ammunition train; the train which was troops early in the engagement and thus the the only means of reaching Andalsnes, and Norwegian battery was able to shoot un- 1,500 troops, who were packed like sardines molested. and filled the tunnel completely. The tunnel About 1800 hours Brigadier Kent Lemon sent itself ran through the side of a hill and was a reassuring message to the effect that he was bomb proof. confident he could hold the enemy, and that 57. Throughout the morning the men slept, he was adopting an aggressive attitude. The disturbed occasionally by bombing and low train was assembled in the Dombas tunnel, flying machine gun attacks on the entrances to wherein it lay all day. This tunnel was indeed the tunnel. In the afternoon they began to providential throughout the operations. It recover and their spirits were remarkably good, housed trains, rations, ammunition and stores, giving proof once again of the high powers of and was a secure refuge for the Norwegian endurance of the British soldier. station staff, without whose help the system A conference was held at 1600 hours at which could not have been maintained. orders for the withdrawal to Andalsnes were 54. During the afternoon it was discovered issued. The train was to start at 2230 hours that owing to a misunderstanding Brigadier and the rear parties by motor transport at Morgan had withdrawn his anti-parachute 2300 hours. detachments at Lesja, Lesjaverk and Lesjaskog. At about 1730 the engine in the tunnel began This might have had serious results as all to get up steam and the tunnel filled with dense Norwegian troops had also been withdrawn smoke. It was necessary to get the men out from this area. The Anti-Tank Company was of the tunnel and accept the risk of their detec- therefore sent back to occupy Lesja against tion. They behaved very steadily and went parachute attack, and to meet a possible threat quickly outside to disperse. by German ski troops using the Vagamo-Lesja road. 58. At about 1800 hours a message came in Throughout the day there had been con- reporting that the Marines at the head of the siderable doubt as to whether the line was dear Gorge had broken and the enemy had made to Andalsnes; ibut by 1700 hours it was reported contact in some strength. in working order, and the withdrawal started Both K.O.Y.L.I. and Green Howards de- according to plan. The train started a little ployed immediately and the former sent back late, but both it and the rear parties in Motor one company some 2,000 yards up the Gorge Transport got away well and the road and rail- to reinforce a platoon of Green Howards way demolitions West of DombUs were blown. already in position. The train stopped at Lesja to pick up the The Norwegian station-master was asked to Anti-Tank Company and 300 Norwegian get the train ready as soon as possible. He esti- Infantry—the last Norwegian troops to be with- mated that it would be ready by 2000 hours. drawn. Success or failure now depended on the loyalty 55. Headquarters moved back by motor and goodwill of the Norwegian railwaymen. As transport and efforts were made en route -by a precaution the engine driver was placed under telephone to find out the progress of the train. an armed guard. There was no doubt that the These were unsuccessful until Verma (19 miles troops, tired as they were, could hold off the from Andalsnes) was reached. There the un- enemy; but it was necessary that the withdrawal welcome news was learned that there was a should not be interfered with as the train ran break in the line near Lesjaskog. The train had forward up-the valley for about half a mile been wrecked by a bomb crater. Both engines before turning North to Andalsnes. had overturned, the front coach had telescoped At 2030 hours the tram was ready and the and there were a good many casualties. This troops started to entrain. They were very meant that the troops would have a 17 miles steady and ths whole entraining was quickly march to the nearest shelter which was in the carried out covered once more by rear parties tunnel at Verma. whose motor transport was waiting on the road A staff officer was sent to get Marines up below. from Romsdalshorn to cover the Verma Gorge 59. The only remaining anxiety was the and to get as much transport forward as he security of the 300 Norwegian Infantry who could to help the troops in their journey from had entrained at Lesja. Transport had gone Lesjaskog to Verma. up to Lesjaskog to evacuate them early in the 56. At oioo hours the troops set out on their morning, but their subsequent return was not long march to Verma. It was, of course, too confirmed. The train journey was without much to hope that they would gain the security further incident and the troops arrived on the of the Verma tunnel before the early enemy air quay at Andalsnes about 2300 hours to embark. patrols were active, but it was very desirable They were taken on board H.M S. " Birming- that as many as possible should have crossed ham," H.M.S. "Manchester," and H.M.S. the open Lesjaskog plateau and have reached " Calcutta," while H.M.S. " Auckland " re- the comparative safety of the Verma Gorge. mained for the rear parties who were all on The Marines came up about 0530 hours and board by 0200 hours. established a road block near the scene of the Andalsnes had been bombed earlier in the train wreck which they held till 1000 hrs., sub- evening but the actual embarkation was carried sequently withdrawing to cover the first of a out unmolested, and once again thanks are due series of demolitions arranged in the Verma to the Royal Navy for rescuing the Army from Gorge. a precarious situation as they did twenty-five With the aid of some motor transport all the years ago. troops wer.e in the tunnel by 0900 hours, but their destination had been spotted by the enemy COMMENTS.. aircraft and many of them had been subjected 60. Without being unduly wise after the event to low flying attacks on their way back. it is possible to make certain general comments. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 2607 Brigadier Morgan's decision lo exceed his 65. Co-operation with the Royal Navy. instructions and move his forces forward to the I am able to report with confidence that the support of the Norwegians was in the circum- co-operation between the Navy, including the stances entirely justified. Fleet Air Arm, and the Army has been of the Owing (to a misunderstanding the Norwegian highest standard possible. Commander-in-Chief was under the impression Every officer to whom I have spoken is full that Brigadier Morgan's force was under his of praises of the efficiency, the tireless devotion orders. Brigadier Morgan cannot be in any to duty and the complete disregard of personal way blamed therefore for deciding to place safety of all ranks of the Navy with whom they himself under the orders of the Norwegian C. came in contact. in C., and once having done so for employing The whole of the forces operating in Norway his force hi accordance with "those orders. fully realise the deep debt of gratitude they 61. Desire to carry out these orders may, owe to their sister service both for the support however, have led him to adopt tactics which the latter gave them ashore and for the were not the best calculated to enable his force efficiency with which they were withdrawn at to provide the strongest support to the Nor- the end. wegians or to give it the best chance of stop- The arrival of the carriers of the Fleet Air ping the German advance. The Norwegian Arm off the coast, and the operation of the Army was withdrawing in the face of a rapid Skuas and Rocs, gave a respite from bombing German advance. As our Manual on the sub- to the ports, especially Namsos, which was in- ject teaches (Mil. Training Pamphlet No. 23, valuable. The Germans would not face our Part VI Withdrawal,".Sec. 2) "the first step Fleet Air Arm ifighters which were handled in the process of withdrawal will be the estab- with a boldness that was an inspiration to the lishment of fresh troops on a position in the troops who watched their manoeuvres from the rear of those troops which are in contact with ground. the enemy and through which the latter can Similarly the anti-aircraft cruisers and sloops, retire. This position should be at such a dis- though continuously and heavily bombed them- tance that the troops occupying it will be given selves, kept station in the confined waters of the time to devise an effective defence before the Fjords at the ports until their ammunition was position is reached toy the enemy." exhausted and, by doing so, so affected the 62. A more effective solution of the problem accuracy of the enemy bombing with then: fire therefore would have been the establishment that the damage done whilst they were present of the Brigade on a selected naturally strong was much reduced. position some distance in rear of the Norwegians No words of mine can adequately express the where they would have had lime to dig in and gratitude and admiration I feel for the skill organise a proper defence. Such a position in planning and efficiency in execution of the might well have enabled 'the Brigade, ill tasks which the Navy have carried out in sup- equipped as it was, with the aid of proper de- port of the forces in Norway. molitions, to obtain protection against the 66. Armies and Air Support. attacks of Armoured Fighting Vehicles and to The first outstanding lesson of these opera- get sufficient cover to withstand bombardment tions has been the vital need for air support and to hold off infantry attacks for a prolonged for a modern army. period. Behind such a position the Norwegians As in Poland, the Germans have used their would have had a better opportunity to re- air force in the closest co-operation with their organise than was in fact ever given them. military forces. They have been employed in 63. After the arrival of Major-General Paget, three main ways: — I have no detailed comments to make on these (0) In direct support of their forward operations except to say that there is abundant troops. evidence to show that they were conducted with (6) To attack H.Q. and communications, great skill and energy on the part of General (c) To attack Base areas and aerodromes. Paget. The fact that it was possible to with- In the case of (a] high level bombing has draw this force over a distance of 100 miles been employed, but in addition low level bomb- under the conditions which have been described ing with small bombs from as low as 400 feet in this narrative, to fight five rearguard actions and the machine gunning of individual posts and finally to re-embark without enemy inter- ference is in itself a magnificent tribute to the has been undertaken continuously. skilled and determined leadership not only of Headquarters have been unceasingly bombed. the Commander but also of the subordinate It is not known whether the position of these commanders, notably Brigadier Kent Lemon, was indicated by spies or German sympathisers commanding I5th Infantry Brigade and Lieut.- who were working behind our lines, or by Colonel Robinson, commanding i Green direction-finding of the wireless sets operating Howards, and also to the endurance, discipline near these headquarters. The effect of this and fighting qualities of the troops engaged: bombing on the conduct of operations is always also to the fine work of the Royal Engineers serious and may easily be disastrous. The effect in the destruction of communications which on the Lines of Communication was not serious. sucesssfully delayed the enemy for the required Craters were quickly foiled and rails repaired. period. Such bombing is of a harassing value only. Unchecked bombing of communications will PART IV. undoubtedly make supply and maintenance very difficult but it is infinitely less effective CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS. than direct attacks on troops using those com- 64. I now proceed to set down what are, munications. in my opinion, the salient lessons to be learned The attack on the Bases was continuous and from the operations which have terminated with persistent. During the course of one day's the evacuation of Central Norway. bombing of Andalsnes, .which commenced at 2608 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 0700 hours and ended at 2100 hours, some 400 if we are not to remain at a dangerous dis- heavy bombs up to 500 kg. were dropped in advantage. The direction of the two forces in addition to countless numbers of incendiary any theatre of war must be the task of one bombs. The methods employed were high level commander in that theatre if results are to be bombing at between 10,000 and 15,000 feet obtained commensurate with the effort made. and dive bombing from 8,000 to 2,000. 70. The Dangers of Improvisation. As a result the port became unusable by day, wooden quays were destroyed, and stone and A further outstanding lesson of these opera- concrete quays and- their approaches were tions is the grave handicap under which both seriously damaged. In one day one Norwegian the commanders and the troops suffer when torpedo boat, three trawlers and two ferry force and formation headquarters are impro- vised and thrown together at the last moment. steamers were sunk. For this campaign in Central Norway the 67. As has been recounted above, valiant expeditionary force headquarters was ordered to- efforts were made to operate Gladiators from form after active operations, involving British the neighbourhood of Andalsnes. These, how- troops, had begun, and I was charged with the ever, failed because the enemy, having imme- conduct of those operations whilst my head- diately noticed their arrival, bombed the air- quarters was still in the process of assembling. field continuously throughout the day. Had I cannot stress too strongly the dangers of . they succeeded I have little doubt that a such improvisation. It is clear that we were marked change would have come over the taken by surprise by the methods which the whole situation. As I have already reported Germans employed to seize the key points in when referring to the work of the Fleet Air Norway, and consequently we were forced to Arm, the German bomber will not stand up to resort to unorthodox methods of procedure. the boldly handled fighter, and there can be Even if it is hoped that a landing will be no question but that, had these Gladiators been unopposed, efforts to build up the Base and able to keep the air until Hurricanes and sub- Lines of Communication organization must be sequently Blenheims could have operated, the continuous from the earliest possible moment. Allied troops would have had no difficulty in I realise that difficulties arose owing to a change landing the guns and other supporting arms of plan and shipping limitations, but, when they needed and in entirely stopping the Ger- evacuation was decided upon, the organization man advance. at Andalsnes was very incomplete while that 68. It is easy to be wise after the event, but a! Namsos had hardly started. As a result, no it is now quite obvious that the establishment clear administrative picture was ever available of an aerodrome in the face of hostile aircraft as regards either force, the consequences of is a combined operation requiring the most which might have been serious. careful planning. It is quite certain that the functions of 2nd Looking back on this operation it is clear Echelon cannot be carried out in the United that there are several essentials:— Kingdom for a force operating under Nor- (a) Strong A.A. Defences must be estab- wegian conditions. 2nd Echelon for the forces lished before the first aircraft arrives. based upon Andalsnes and Namsos was located (&) All preparations must be made so that in Margate and, as a result of long and un- aircraft can operate in the shortest possible certain communications and of changes in plan, time after landing. was never in touch with the situation. (c) During the period of first arrival, long 71. The least that can now be done is to range fighters or Fleet Air Arm fighters should ensure that this undesirable situation does not be provided to cover the landing. occur again, and that provision is made for a (d) Sufficient aircraft must be landed to force headquarters and certain formations and provide continuous protection for the aero- units and a complete establishment of Base and drome and to provide protection for the Line of Communication units which can be held estabJishment of at least a second aerodrome. as reserve for use in any theatre to which the (e) Bombers should be flown on as soon war may spread, including France if necessary. as the aerodrome is secure. I submit that the nucleus of such a force 69. 'I have already reported that several should be: — requests were made to the Air Ministry for A Corps Headquarters, modified to control Bombers to attack the German Forces moving an expeditionary force. up the Gudbrandsdal valley and the communi- One regular division. cations behind them. One territorial division. This was found impossible, and I am not in A small armoured brigade. a position to question the correctness of this Certain corps troops. decision. Base and Line of Communication units. I can, however, say that had it been possible 2nd Echelon for all the above. to attack the German Army and its communi- If a reserve such as this is to be able to act cations, a direct effect on the operations would swiftly and decisively at any point overseas, have been achieved with a considerable saving there are certain other requirements which must certainly in material. The withdrawal and be met. evacuation could not then have been closely These are: — followed up by the enemy, as in fact it was, (a) Time for training in amphibian opera- and the process of evacuation need therefore tions. hot have been as hurried as it necessarily was (6) A suitable training area. under the existing conditions. (c) An allotment of landing craft and ships I have no hesitation in saying that it is essen- fitted to carry them. tial that a degree of co-operation between the (d) Facilities for studying and practising Army and the Air Force, comparable to that air co-operation, particularly with a fighter which is now the case with Germans, is essential and bomber component. "SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 2609 72. The Provision and Loading of Ships. Brigade were young soldiers or Territorials to • The provision of suitable shipping for an whom these operations were their first experi- •overseas expedition has always been difficult ence of war. These quite inexperienced troops because our merchant shipping in peace is de- were rushed into action in an effort to stem the signed either for passengers or for cargo. German advance, when the Norwegian forces Neither of these types is suitable for the carriage were already withdrawing. With their flanks of the large number of motor vehicles now in turned owing to the fact that the exhausted use by the Army. Norwegian troops had been obliged to with- The result, so far as the expedition to draw, and their centre pierced by armoured Southern Norway was concerned, was well- vehicles to which they had no adequate reply, nigh disastrous. Guns were landed without owing to the loss of their anti-tank guns at their detachments and with little or no ammuni- sea, it is not surprising that their casualties tion; vehicles arrived without their drivers. in missing were heavy, and heavier than would Even the essential first line transport of infantry have been the case with more experienced battalions was divorced from its units. troops under more experienced regimental Again I realise that this was due to a certain officers' leadership. extent to a change of plan which aggravated 76. The behaviour of Brigadier Phillips' an already difficult shipping situation, but we I46th Infantry Brigade has been reported as cannot accept a situation which admits of no excellent. When this Brigade, quite un- strategical and tactical elasticity. supported as it was, was shelled and prac- I am convinced that, if troops are proceed- tically cut off by superior enemy forces, it ing overseas to land at a point where they may proved only too clearly that man for man the go directly into action, units must be embarked British soldier is far superior to his German complete with their weapons, ammunition and counterpart. By skilful handling, good disci- equipment, and accompanied in the same con- pline and good fighting qualities the battalions voy by their M.T. with its drivers. of this Brigade extricated themselves from a This object could be achieved in various position which might well have been conceived ways:— as disastrous. The only occasion when confu- (a) By constructing new ships. sion and needless casualties were caused was (b) By altering existing shipping. one which was due to an error of judgment on (c) By loading available ships tactically. the part of an inexperienced company com- I realise that it is uneconomical to keep ship- mander. The fighting qualities displayed in ping idle or available at short notice for a both these Brigades was excellent. The great hypothetical operation, and that at present our importance that these young troops should be resources are inadequate; but I am quite certain given the advantage of the best leadership that that we must find some way out of this diffi- we can provide cannot be over-stated. To culty. It will almost certainly be necessary ensure this a strong nucleus of regular officers to use existing ships with little alteration and in every unit is essential. in that case personnel may have to travel under 77. The I5th Infantry Brigade gave an conditions of extreme discomfort for short account of itself which is in accordance with periods. We must be prepared to accept such the highest traditions of the British Army. conditions. To put our troops ashore under Though bombed, shelled and machine-gunned any other conditions is to court disaster if on without the means of adequate reply, it re- arrival they are required to go straight into pulsed a series of enemy attacks supported by action. tanks with heavy losses in men and tanks to 73. I would further emphasize the grave con- the enemy, at the expense of comparatively few sequences which may arise if a change of plan casualties to itself. In its final withdrawal It is made after troops and stores have been proved that it had nothing to learn in cohesion embarked. Even had the air situation in and marching power from its predecessors, the Southern Norway been favourable to us, the old contemptibles of 1914. order of arrival of troops, weapons and vehicles 78. The Demi-Brigade of French Chasseurs at Andalsnes and Namsos was based on plans under the command of General Audet who were prepared for an unopposed entry into the landed at Namsos were only engaged in patrol country. combats with the enemy. I have received, In the event, the order was such that however, the highest reports of their efficiency, the force that arrived ashore was deficient their cheerfulness and generally excellent bear- of supporting arms and was in no condition to ing, and their hardihood under conditions engage an enemy properly organised and of extreme discomfort which might well have equipped as was the German Army to which shaken the morale of less highly trained troops. it was opposed. I have no doubt but that they would have been, and indeed yet will be, far more than 74. Military Doctrine. a match for the finest troops the Germans can These operations have confirmed the correct- bring against them. ness of the principles, laid down in our train- ing manuals, which should guide us in the 79. I am not delaying this report to include varying phases of warfare. The principles of in it the names of the many different officers war remain, though occasions have undoubtedly and other ranks whose services I desire to occurred where we have not been sufficiently bring to your notice and whose names I will quick to grasp their application to new and forward at an early date. I do, however, somewhat unexpected conditions. desire to put on record now the services ren- dered by Major-General B. C. T. Paget, for the 75. Morale and Discipline. skill with which he conducted operations on Finally I desire to draw your attention to the the southern front from the time he took com- generally excellent beKaviour of' the British mand until the final evacuation. Major-General troops and their leaders, especially their junior A. Carton de Wiart proved that he still pos- officers. Brigadier Morgan's I48th Infantry sesses the energy and dash for which he has 26lO SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946' always been famous. Brigadier C. G. Phillips port for employment on the road L. of C. proved by his handling ot his Brigade during from Geiranger to your forces South of the difficult days of Steinkjer, that he is a Domb&s. commander of marked ability. Brigadier (c) Making similar arrangements at Morgan gave abundant evidence of the capacity Sundalen. for making decisions which is so essential in a {a), (6) and (c) above are in order of priority. commander. Brigadier Kent Lemon proved Brigadier Hogg will be operationally under himself a skilful and determined leader. your orders. 5. On arrival in Norway you will assume command of all British troops in the Country, APPENDIX A. other than those operating under the orders of Major General Carton De Wiart based on Headquarters, 5th Corps, Namsos and those in the Narvik area. 22nd April, 1940. 6. Your task will be to co-operate with the Copy No Norwegian Army in preventing the Northward advance of the German army based on Southern EXPEDITIONARY FORCE INSTRUCTION No. i. Norway. To:—- 7. It will be necessary for you to safeguard Major-Hamar—Elverum. the safeguarding of your forces and your com- (b) The Germans have also landed about munications. 3,000 men at Bergen; at Stavanger, where they have occupied the aerodrome; and at Trond- You will not be under the orders of the heim, where they have between 3,500 and Commander-in-Chief, Norwegian Army. 5,000 men and at least two destroyers. The 9. You should report your situation and your aerodrome at Vaernes, near Trondheim, is also requirements at frequent intervals and all in- in their hands. formation that you are able to obtain. (c) The German force in the Trondheim area Your channels of communication are laid is believed to be disposed as under, but the down in the Outline Plan and first Maintenance numbers may be increased by airborne project (G.S. (P) No. 650). reinforcements. (i) 1,500 in the area Levanger—Verdalen (Sgd.) H. R. S. MASSY, facing the British force based on Namsos. Lieutenant General, (ii) 500 protecting the coast defences at Commander, 5th Corps. the entrance to the Trondheim Fjord about Agdenes. (iii) 200 at Storen (25 miles South of Trondheim) operating in a Southerly direc- APPENDIX B. tion. (iv) 300 operating on the Trondheim— ^INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIEUTENANT-GENERAL Ostersund railway to the East of Trondheim. H. R. S. MASSY, D.S.O., M.C. 2. Allied forces, consisting of 146 Infantry 1. His Majesty's Government have placed Brigade and a demi-brigade of Chasseurs you in command of all British and French Alpins, both under command of Major-General troops operating in Central Scandinavia, ex- Carton de Wiart, are based on Namsos. If cluding any which may be operating in the possible these forces are to be kept in being Narvik area or based on Narvik. These latter in order to maintain pressure against Trondheim will continue to 'be commanded by Major- from the North. General Mackesy under the orders of Lord You have been informed separately of the Cork and Orrery. composition of the British forces now operating 2. The policy of His Majesty's Government South of Domb&s and of the forces to accom- is ultimately to evacuate Central Norway. pany you. 3. Your object, therefore, will be to evacuate 3. A force of Gladiators will, it is hoped, be your troops from Central Norway. ashore by the 25th April. In the meantime a His Majesty's Government do not wish to Carrier with fighter aircraft will be off your impose any delay upon your operations which base at Andalsnes. Contact with these should would be inconsistent with the military security be arranged through Brigadier Hogg at the of your force. They hope, however, that it Base. will be militarily possible to postpone evacua- 4. An advanced skeleton Corps H.Q., under tion until after the capture of Narvik. the orders of Brigadier Hogg (D.A. & Q.M.G.) 4. The final decision as to when the evacua- is travelling with you and will be responsible tion ought to take place rests with you. The for: — final withdrawal and re-embarkation, however. (a) Organising the Base at Andalsnes and is a joint operation, for which Admiral organising the anti-aircraft defence of that is appointed Naval Commander and Air Base. Marshal Air Commander. The (&) Reconnoitring a subsidiary base at actual dates, times and places are the joint Geiranger and arranging for its anti-aircraft responsibility of yourself, the Naval Com- defence and for the requisitioning of trans- mander and the Air Commander. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946 2611

5. You are authorised, in conjunction with French Contingent. the Naval and Air Commanders, to plan and 5th Demi Brigade Chasseurs Arrived. carry out any combined operation which you Alpins (Three Battalions). jointly consider necessary for the achievement ioi3th and ioi4th Light Arrived. A.A. Batteries. (12 guns). of your object. One Section Engineers ... Arrived. 6. A list of the Allied iorces which are already operating in Central Norway is give a SICKLE.—Commander Maj.-Gen. Paget. Force Headquarters Arrived. in Annexure i. H.Q. 15 Inf. Bde. Arrived You are already familiar with the roles of i Green Howards Arrived. these forces. i K.O.Y.L.I. Arrived. lY. &L Arrived. 7. A list of reinforcements which have not 15 Inf. Bde. Anti-Tk. Coy. Arrived. yet been despatched from the U.K. but which H.Q. 148 Inf. Bde. Arrived. are at your disposal, is attached.* In addition, 1/5 Leicesters Arrived. Reduced to a His Majesty's Government are prepared to composite battalion. 8 Foresters Arrived. Reduced to a withdraw from France the remainder of the composite battalion. 5th Division, should you require it. Artillery. 8. You will act in co-operation with, but not 51 Field Regt. Less i Bty. Due to arrive 28/29. under the command -of, the Commander-in- 71 Field Regiment Not yet embarked. H.Q. 56 Lt. A.A. Regiment Ready to embark 6th Chief, Norwegian forces. May. Should the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief 167 Light A.A. Battery Ready to embark 6th wish to evacuate any part of the Norwegian May. forces in conjunction with your force, you 168 Light A.A. Battery Arrival complete 25/26. 260 A.A. Battery (3") ... Arrived. should -include their evacuation in your plan. 82 A.A. Regiment (less Ready to embark 28th. You are at liberty, however, to insist that a i Bty.). condition of such evacuation should be that One Bty., 58 Anti-Tk. Reft. Due to arrive 27/28 the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief should Engineers. place any force to be withdrawn .under your 55 Field Coy. (less i section) Arrived. command. Medical. 9. Should you become a casualty or other- 146 Field Ambulance ... Arrived. wise be prevented from exercising command of 189 Field Ambulance ... Due 28/29. your force, command will pass to the next Drivers of 189 Field Amb. Due 28/29. senior British Officer, who will exercise com- L. of C. Troops. mand and, in the event of a French General 687 Artizan Works Coy. Not yet started. Officer being with the force, assume the acting R.E. rank of Lieutenant-General until another British Officer can be appointed. COPY. 10. In order to ensure secrecy, you will ADDENDUM No. i TO INSTRUCTIONS FOR restrict knowledge of your object to those LT. GENERAL H. R. S. MASSY, D.S.O., M.C. officers who must know it for the proper execu- 1. Certain independent companies are being tion of your plan. formed, and will come under your orders. It (Sd.) J. G. DILL, General, is the intention that they should operate in the vfor S. of S. area between exclusive Mosjoen and inclusive War Office, Bodo. 27th April, 1940. 2. In addition, arrangements should be made to withdraw part of the French detach- ANNEXURE i. ment in Maurice Force along the road and rail- DETAIL OF THE ALLIED FORCES WHICH ARE way to Mosjoen. ALREADY OPERATING IN OR EN ROUTE TO 3. The role of the above detachments will, CENTRAL NORWAY. be:— MAURICE.—Commander Lt.-Gert. Carton (a) To prevent the enemy seizing key de Wiart. positions with parachute troops. Unit Pemarfts (&) To delay the enemy's advance by Force Headquarters ... Due to arrive 27/28. land by every means, particularly demoli- Adv. H.Q. arrived. tions. H.Q. 146 Inf. Bde.—Brig. Arrived. Phillips. 4. These detachments should be self-con- 4th Lincolns Arrived. tained for as long as possible. You should i/4th K.O.Y.L.I Arrived. make arrangements for their subsequent main- Hallams ... Arrived. tenance by sea. Artillery. 193 A.A. Battery (of 82 A.A. Due 2gth. APPENDIX C. Regt. 3-7*). (vehicles sail 27th). INSTRUCTION TO MAJOR-GENERAL CARTON DE 166 Lt. A.A. Battery Due 27th (personnel WIART COMMANDING FORCES SCHEDULED FOR arrived). (vehicles of 166 Lt. A.A. Sail 27th. Due about " MAURICE " OPERATION. Bty.). ist May. i. His Majesty's Government and the Govern- Engineers. ment of the French Republic have decided to H.Q. R.E. 61 Division ... Not yet started. land an expedition in Central Norway with the Section 55 Field Coy. Arrived. object of Medical. (a) Providing encouragement for the Nor- 158 Field Ambulance Due about ist May. wegian Government. (16 motor ambulances). (6) Forming a rallying point for the Nor- 147 Field Ambulance Due from Narvik for • wegian Government and armed forces. 146 Inf. Bde. (c) Securing a base for any subsequent * This appendix was not received. operations in Scandinavia. 26l2 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 29 MAY, 1946

This operation will- be carried out concur- 6. Should you become a casualty or other- rently with but independent of the operations wise be prevented from exercising command of already initiated in Northern Norway. the force, command will pass to the next senior 2. You are appointed to command the Allied British officer, who will exercise command, and forces which are being despatched to Central in the event of a French General Officer being Norway. with the force, assume the acting rank of Major- General until another British officer can be 3. Your role will be to secure the Trondheim appointed. Area. 7. As soon as you are established ashore you Subsequently you should take such steps as will get in touch with any Norwegian forces in are possible to secure the use to the Allies of your vicinity, inform them of the impending the road and rail communications leading from arrival of further Allied forces and secure their Trondheim, especially to the east. co-operation in action against any German 4. Points of Landing. forces. (i) It is suggested, but of this you, together 8. The Royal Navy are making preliminary with the S.N.O., must be the final judges, that landings in'the Namsos area with landing par- the initial landing should be in the Namsos ties about 300 strong in all and it is their inten- area, and should be carried out by Morgan's tion to seize and hold any point in the Namsos and Phillips' Brigades. area at which your disembarkation might take (ii) A second landing should be carried out place. about Trondheim preferably to the east of the 9. Your force is not organised for a landing town, and after the Navy has cleared the Fjord in face of opposition, and it is not intended of German vessels, by I47th Inf. Bde. and that you should undertake such an operation. Chasseurs Alpins. 10. During the voyage and during landing (iii) Administrative facilities should initially operations, the senior naval officer will be in be developed about Namsos until Trondheim command, and he will decide, in co-operation has been secured. with you, where and when to land. 5. A forecast of the dates of arrival in the 11. A note as to the strength of the Nor- Trondheim-Namsos area of the elements of your wegian forces in the area, and of the strength force is as follows: — of any German forces operating in the vicinity (a) I46th Inf. Bde., Brigadier Phillips, is being given to you separately. available on I5th April. 12. Your force will constitute an independent (6) One infantry' brigade (less one bat- command directly under the War Office. You talion), under Brigadier Morgan, should be will keep a constant communication with the available about dawn i7th April. War Office and report as regularly as is practic- (c) i47th Inf. Bde., with artillery and able as to the situation. ancillary troops, should be available on 20th (sd.) EDMUND IRONSIDE, or 2ist April. C.I.G.S. (d) Two battalions Chasseurs Alpins avail- The War Office, able (in same area) i8th April. I4th April, 1940.

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