The Napoleon Series

The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 16, Part VI

By: Maurice Weil

Translated by: Greg Gorsuch THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

(after the documents of the imperial and royal archives of Vienna)

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THE ALLIED CAVALRY

DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

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CHAPTER XVI.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA UNTIL THE MARCH OF THE EMPEROR ON ARCIS-SUR-AUBE (from 5 to 17 March). CRAONNE. - LAON. - REIMS.

Dissatisfaction caused by the orders of Gneisenau. --On the left wing of the Army of Silesia, the order of Gneisenau was reluctantly obeyed. They had stopped, but neither Yorck nor Kleist could bring themselves to the thought of losing, without cause, all the benefits of their brilliant coup de main. The astonishment and amazement of the generals had been matched by the rage of the soldier, who did not understand this sudden stop. Without the need to consult them, Yorck and Kleist immediately dispatched to headquarters in Laon, trusted officers to expose with their complaints and protests, the projects whose execution, far from jeopardizing the salvation the Army of Silesia, would have completed the annihilation of the Marmont and placed the Emperor in an almost desperate situation.

The Count of Brandenburg came first to Laon; he had, on behalf of Yorck, begged Gneisenau to allow the two Prussian corps to debouch on the rear of Napoleon. As operating in this way would prevent the Emperor from crossing the Lette (Ailette) again: one had a chance to take him; in any case it was sure to inflict serious losses when he would open the way to Soissons. Gneisenau remained unshaken. "The Emperor stands before Laon," he responded to all the arguments, and this urged his redoubled prudence.

Returned a second time by Yorck. Brandenburg was not happy. Dejected and desperate by the responses of Gneisenau he met at the gates of Laon, Colonel von Grollmann, Chief of Staff of the IInd Corps, who had protested in the name of Kleist against the termination of the pursuit. There was still hope that the personal influence of Grollmann, who enjoyed an old friendship with Gneisenau, would successfully overcome the resistance and fears of the Chief of the General Staff. It did not happen; far from seeking the annulment of the provision given in the morning, Grollmann was forced to bring his general and Yorck an order dictated to both generals to approach Laon and come back, Yorck to Athies, Kleist to Eppes .

Not content to stop after a won battle, Gneisenau further compelled the victorious troops to fall back. If the Emperor could tell he alone represented an army of 100,000 men, one can conclude from what happened at Laon on 10 March that without Blücher there was no Army of Silesia. Everything stopped, everything languished from the time the disease struck him down and stopped him from infusing the power of his energy and hatred in the minds of his advisers, of his collaborators. Gneisenau, despite all his merits, despite all his intelligence, for all his share in the success of his leader, was nothing without him. Having no influence, no standing over the soldiers, Gneisenau neither inspired any confidence among the corps commanders who, Prussians as well as Russians, considered him a pedantic and as a man devoid of any practicality.

In a letter written by Müffling, 12 March, we find these words: "The attack made by Napoleon, 9 March, was imprudent. That of 10 March was the height of imprudence." But then what about the commandment that tolerates and undergoes twice of such imprudence! Napoleon had attained, through its boldness of the 10th, the object he had for that day: he wanted to impose and he succeeded, so as he could safely perform his retirement in the afternoon and reach Soissons. It was said at that time in the army that Blücher suffered from a derangement of his mental facilities; they gave as evidence the fact that Yorck have received orders with a signature upside down. The truth is that Field Marshal suffered from Ophthalmia which prevented him from personally and directly following the course of the fight, to weigh and consider the resolutions he had to take as commander in chief.

Müffling, says again later of these events, in a letter to Droysen, 13 December 1847, and forgetting the share of responsibility incumbent on him in the resolutions taken by Gneisenau, said, "Sacken was beside himself. Vorontsov during this ridiculous and childish fight, with which Napoleon sought to deceive us on 10th in the morning, hastened to ask me why we had returned and canceled the orders; he considered the new provisions as a calamity, as a disaster. Langeron, who, as the oldest of the generals of the Army of Silesia, afraid of being forced to take command and feeling justifiably that he wouldn't be obeyed by the Prussian generals, exclaimed leaving the Field Marshal's room "In the name of God, take that corpse with you."

Until then, the personality of Blücher prevented jealousies, suspicions and rivalries from emerging. From when Gneisenau took over the management of operations, long stifled dissent broke out not only between Prussians and Russians, but between Prussians and Prussians. What would have been done in such circumstances if a Russian general had been intermediately charged as commander in chief? Up to Craonne it was the Russians who had always marched in the front line and it stopped operations at the same time when, because of the considerable losses sustained by them in recent actions, the Field Marshal had decided that the Prussians take the lead of the army.

Yorck, more than any other generals, had been deeply mortified by the order of Gneisenau, he attributed to the personal animosity of the chief of staff, with whom he had long been at variance. Too self-possessed to let it show, too proud for recrimination, Yorck bowed to the orders and hid under a false gaiety, under apparent calm, feelings that animated and rage simmering in him.

At 10 at night, he had brought his corps to Athies. The distress was so great around Laon that the inhabitants of nearby villages came to beg the Prussian general to give them bread. The cold was so intense that, despite the formal orders of Yorck, the Prussians, to warm up, lit and kindled their bivouac fires, first with the chairs, then with the roof skeleton of the church. These acts of indiscipline and vandalism were hardly likely to calm the resentment and discontent of Yorck.

The corps of Kleist spent the night at Veslud and at Festieux; Langeron and Sacken at Chambery; Bülow, in Laon. The troops of Winzingerode bivouacked at Semilly and Molinchart. The cavalry of Katzler at Corbeny; that of Benckendorff, to Berry-au-Bac.

Although, thanks to the timidity of Gneisenau, the Emperor had escaped from the danger that could have come from a movement of the corps of Yorck, Kleist and Langeron maneuvering by Bruyères and the château of Corneil against his right, by Festieux, Corbeny and the plateau of Craonne against his rear, it was nonetheless high time for him to think about retirement and take advantage of the hesitations and unexpected delays in the Army of Silesia.

Action of the Cossacks of Benckendorff at Crouy. --While there was still fighting in Laon, Benckendorff was ordered to menace the rear of the French army. Unable to debouch at Laffaux, guarded by the cavalry of General Grouvel which ensured communications between Soissons, Chavignon and Étouvelles, forced to make a big detour to Anizy-le-Château, Coucy-le-Chateau, Bagneux and Vauxrezis, he had reached the hills south of Terny, managed to throw a few parties between Laffaux and Soissons beside Crouy, manhandled the French cavalry posts and fell back in the night before the battalion of the Vistula coming out of Soissons. In withdrawing, he had captured Baron Malouet, Prefect of the Aisne, traveling by carriage from Soissons to Laon on the orders of the Emperor, and almost took Nansouty who, hotly pursued, had slashed the Cossacks and won the banks of the Aisne. The general, whose horse was killed when he was run into the river, had been obliged to escape, jumping into the water and crossing the Aisne by swimming.1

Marmont prepares to retire on Roucy and Fismes. --Marmont was at Berry-au-Bac whose Commander, warned by fugitives from the disaster of Athies, had to barricade the approaches and the bridge. The Marshal2 had rallied his world somehow; but his infantry had no cartridges and the artillery reduced to ten pieces, lacked ammunition.

The Russian light cavalry had appeared at La Bôve and on the plateau of Craonne. Fearing on the one hand, a movement of the vanguard of the Army of Silesia on Vailly and from there on to the left bank of the Aisne, wanting on the other to approach the Emperor and Soissons, the Marshal, having communicated his intentions to General Corbineau in Reims, after having advised him to recall the detachment sent to the side of Rethel, decided to stand the 11th in the morning, in Roucy and Fismes.

Marmont was so little thinking of staying in an isolated position and in a point like that of Berry-au-Bac, where he might both be cut from the Emperor as soon as Allies would have crossed the Aisne at Vailly, as attacked in front by the troops who had driven him from Athies, and finally threatened on his rear, and on his right by the Russians of Saint-Priest, the Prussians of Jagow and the cavalry of Tettenborn. Movements of Tettenborn. --In order to monitor more closely the movements of the French troops, Tettenborn, after the attempt made on Reims the 7th, had returned the 8th to Épernay and was then returned on the 9th in the morning, to Dormans. He prepared there all the means necessary for crossing so as to be able to jump immediately on the lines of communications of the French if that their retirement extended. He had without further delay and for the 9th, sent parties, on the one hand to Château-Thierry and Montmirail, the other towards Soissons in Fère-en- Tardenois and from Villers-Cotterêts by Oulchy-le-Château. It was, moreover, observing the road of Fismes by Captain von Bismarck who, after picking up in these parts quite a few stragglers and isolated, had communicated to him the first slightly positive news on fighting of the 9th.3 Finally, to be more in the proximity of Saint-Priest who approached him, also, on the road from Soissons, Tettenborn then resolved to bring the bulk of his cavalry on a central position; and sojourned in Port-à-Binson.

However, he left two regiments of Cossacks in Dormans and a regiment in Épernay.

Movements of Saint-Priest. --Saint-Priest, still at Sillery, was waiting for the arrival of General Panchulidzev to attack Reims. Informed by Tettenborn of the retrograde motion of Marmont, he pushed on Fismes parties that had to fall back before armed peasants. He proposed, in addition, to direct to Laon by road of Montcornet, Major Medvédieff who had just joined with 600 Cossacks from the flying corps of Kaisarov and through which he wanted to give the Field Marshal news of the army of Schwarzenberg.4

1Commandant Gérard, Commander of Soissons, to the Minister, Soissons, 11 March; General Grouvel to the Chief of Staff, L'Ange-Gardien, 10 March; General Neigre to the Chief of Staff, Soissons, 10 March, 10 o'clock at night (Archives of the War); BENKENDORFF, Of Cossacks and Their Use in War, pg. 36, 38 and Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 12 March, 10 o'clock in the morning (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 229).

"General Benckendorff who the 10th during the Battle of Laon, was with his Cossacks in the rear of the enemy, took the opportunity to skirmish with the garrison and Soissons to throw disorder and terror along the route. He made many prisoners. The enemy's army is demoralized. They lack of food and its cavalry has no fodder."

2Marmont to the Chief of Staff, Berry-au-Bac, 10 March, 8 o'clock at night, (Archives of the War.) 3Tettenborn to Schwarzenberg, Port-à-Binson, 13 March . (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 241.)

4Saint-Priest to Volkonsky, Sillery, 10 and 11 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 205 a and 205 b.)

Retreat of the Emperor on Soissons. --Fortunately for the Emperor, to whom the two-day battle had cost more than 6,000 men, the inaction of Gneisenau would encourage retirement and allow him to withdraw successively and without too many difficulties the troops he had held up to the evening before Laon.

The Old Guard, part of his artillery and the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions of the Guard could thus leave the battlefield about 6 o'clock in the evening and go to bed at Chavignon. Mortier set off when night fell, without either the Prussians of Bülow or the Russians of Winzingerode having noticed his movement on Urcel. Charpentier and cavalry filed by the road of Anizy-le-Château on Laffaux. 2 battalions, 300 horses and 2 cannons forming the rearguard, only quit Clacy an hour before daylight.

On the highway, it was Ney who was still to be the rearguard and hold on to Étouvelles with a handful of men and the dragoons of Roussel.5

11 March. --Actions of Chaillevois, Mailly and Crouy. --The night had been quiet; but in the morning, the Russian cavalry of the far right sprang in the tracks of Charpentier and Colbert meeting with their last echelons between Chaillevois and Pinon. On the high road to Soissons, Chernishev with his Cossacks, 1,500 infantry and a few cannons, having attacked at 9:30 the adjutant commander Sémery who, marching to the extreme rearguard of Ney and Rousseau, had in the morning again reconnoitered the position of Laon had evacuated Étouvelles only after ensuring that the column of Charpentier and Colbert was about to reach Chavignon. Seeing that he could not hold any longer at Chivy and at Étouvelles without compromising the fate of his company, he began retreating on Mailly. Harassed by Cossacks who sought to outflank and surround him, Sémery resolved to ambush them and give them a lesson that would require them to hold off. Hiding a part of his total in the woods that lined the road, he continued to retreat with the rest of his troop, followed by the Cossacks. Greeted at this time by fire coming from both sides of the road, charged with the bayonet by the infantry of Sémery, who had turned around, pursued by the dragoons of Roussel, the Cossacks turned back. They nonetheless continued to observe the adjutant commander, but they now gave up the harassment and stood for the rest of the day at 2 or 3 kilometers from his last echelon.

Arriving at Chavignon at 10:30, Sémery not leave again, after forming his last two echelons in close column, until only one o'clock in the afternoon, when he was ordered to move by Crouy on Soissons and beyond the troops of Mortier. Informed that a Russian column of cavalry menaced General Charpentier, Sémery accelerated his movement and took up a position at the Laffaux mill at the junction of the highway and path of Pinon. He resumed his movement after having given Charpentier and Colbert time to defile, and had received from General Ismert, commanding a brigade of Roussel, the advice that he was able to cover the retreat.

When his little column had reached Crouy, Sémery in accordance with his orders, passed the troops of the Marshal and went with him to the location for his brigade. Meanwhile, General Ismert, whose orders required him to stay on the height, probably leaving too late, had fallen back on his side, and the Cossacks, taking advantage of the departure of dragoons to charge the newly formed division of the Young Guard posted on the heights, had crushed and thrown them in disorder on Soissons. The infantry of Mortier and the Sémery had to deploy to chase the Cossacks and force them to leave the vicinity of Crouy.6

At 3 o'clock, the entire army, the less the Sémery Brigade, which came into town at 6 o'clock in the evening, was

5Until the last moment, the Emperor believed in the possibility of the evacuation of Laon. By giving Ney orders for the retirement, he recommended him to make sure before leaving that "Blücher did not evacuate Laon." (Order from the bivouac before Laon, 10 March, 6 o'clock in the evening. Records of Berthier.) 6Adjutant Commandant Sémery to General Béchet de Léocour, Soissons, 11 March; General Rousseau to Marshal Ney, Soissons, in March it (Archives of war), and Blucher Schwarzenberg, Laon, March 12, 10 am (KK Kriegs Archiv., III, 229).

"Chernishev pursued the enemy on the road to the gates of Soissons where there was still in the evening large masses of infantry. Napoleon pushed through on this road a column from 20,000 to 25,000 men. Two additional columns have crossed through Vailly. The villages are full of wounded enemy, and especially the French left wing that had lost many." safe at Soissons and concentrated around the town whose command was entrusted to a young and energetic officer, commandant Gérard. The Old Guard was housed in the city; Ney in the suburb of Saint-Wast; Mortier at Crouy; Charpentier at Cuffies; Colbert in Saint-Médard with parties in Bucy-le-Long; Letort in the suburb of Saint-Crépin; Exelmans in the Saint-Christophe suburb; Roussel at Crouy and the farm of La Perrière. Mortier commanded all troops remaining on the right bank and composed of the 2nd Division of Old Guard, the Division of the Young Guard stationed at Crouy, of the divisions of Charpentier and Boyer de Rébeval, the dragoons of Roussel and the Poles of Pac.7

But if he had managed to save his army, the Emperor was nevertheless obliged to recognize that the useless and bloody victory of Craonne, that two days of Laon had singularly diminished the effectives, especially considering how few with which he had begun his march from the Aube towards the Aisne. "The Young Guard melted away like snow," he wrote again from Chavignon, 11 March to Joseph.8 "The Old Guard stands. My horse guard melts away as well. It is essential that General d'Ornano take all means to remount all the dragoons and chasseurs and first of all the old soldiers." Blücher was well informed when he said to Schwarzenberg in his dispatch of 12 March:9 "The cavalry generals reported to Napoleon that he would completely destroy his cavalry if he continued to operate in this way; but they were roundly scolded by him."

They were not, however, the only ones the Emperor roundly rebuked. If, at first, he had, in his letter of the 10th, had coldly and calmly considered, a rarity for him, the disaster of Athies, if he had simply said: "It is only an accident of war, but it is unfortunate in that moment when I needed happiness," he could not contain his anger at the news of Marmont's movement on Fismes.

"The Duke of Raguse behaved like a second lieutenant," he wrote to Joseph.10 Already, a few hours earlier, he instructed the Chief of Staff to express to the Marshal in the toughest and harshest terms, the dissatisfaction caused him by marching the 6th Corps on Fismes. The abandonment of the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, a position which, if it was somewhat in the air, had a much greater importance as it covered Paris, was in any case premature, since only a few troops of cavalry had appeared before Corbeny and the horsemen of Saint-Priest had not gone beyond Jonchery. The Marshal obliged to comply with precise orders, left two battalions in Fismes and went towards evening with the bulk of his corps to Roucy, but not before writing to the Chief of Staff to tell him that he was "prepared in advance to the fate that awaited him."11

State of the Army of Silesia. --If the Emperor had escaped miraculously from the grasp of his opponent, his situation was far from reassuring. Fortunately for him, the total halt of operations for the Army of Silesia was in all respects to be detrimental to this army. It was thought necessary to rest the troops at a time when the last soldier understood that immediate action, an energetic prosecution could put an end to a campaign that from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy was found too hard and too long. But one had not even thought of providing for the needs of corps, to ensure for their sustenance during this untimely halt, exhausted in a region devastated and ruined. Lacking everything, the soldiers of Blücher, despite all the efforts of their generals, despite the personal intervention of Yorck,12 sought to obtain by looting the resources that the command had failed to provide them. A letter from

7Correspondence, nos 21462 and 21463, and General Orders, Soissons, 11 March. (Records of Berthier; Archives of the War.)

8Correspondence, no 21461.

9Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 12 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 229.)

10Correspondence, nos 21460 and 21461. 11Marmont to the Chief of Staff. (Archives of the War.)

12We thought it best to borrow from the biography of Yorck the narrative of the scene that will be provided below and that will give an idea of the character of the general state of mind he was in, the noble and generous feelings of a man who, animated by the most ardent patriotism, had always sought to soften the fate of the vanquished and to protect the people against the excesses and brutality of his soldiers:

Langeron to Blücher, dated that day, allows one to get an accurate picture of the distress of the Army of Silesia during the days which preceded and followed the victory of Laon. "I am forced to present to Your Excellency," in this way expressed the Russian general, "the distress of my corps. It is four days that my troops have been here.13 A part of my food wagons are with the corps of the Comte de Saint-Priest, the other was taken by the enemy, and, since I have taken a stand here, my corps touched 3,250 pounds (livres) of bread. At the moment, my troops are absolutely destitute and without food. The Councilor Timme assures me that it is impossible to obtain anything and he could not get Councilor of State Ribbentrop. The villages and suburbs were completely looted before my arrival and I earnestly beg Your Excellency to meet my emergency needs of salt, bread and meat."14

As so aptly put by General Lewal in his Tactics of Resupply, "instead of using the regular requisitions, the armies lived by extortion and marauding. This inhuman method, immoral, alienated people, emptied nourishment, destroyed food sources, developed greed and destroyed the discipline."

"The causes of these evils were the lack of care, preparation and consistency in meeting the needs of the troops. Those that thus developed the bad feelings, engendered violence, did so from the deprivation of the necessities of food. Hunger is a bad counselor."

The other corps of the Army of Silesia were no better off than those of Yorck and of Langeron, and one can easily imagine that such absolute distress was hardly likely to allay the general discontent, to end the misunderstandings and resentments.

The personal intervention of Blücher might have alone overcome these difficulties; but the old Field Marshal, still sick, was far from being able to resume management of affairs and effective command of his army.

Instead of pushing in all directions the two columns of the French army who fought in Laon, preventing Marmont to join the Emperor, from giving his troops a few hours of rest and reorganizing his army corps and his divisions reduced to ridiculously low effectives, Gneisenau, yielding to considerations that cannot be determined with precision, probably paying more attention to political15 considerations than the needs of the military situation, not

"11 March was celebrated by order, for blessed actions, to thank God for the victory. Yorck attended the service, and when the preacher Schulz had finished his discourse, Yorck massed around him the division of Horn and took his turn to speak. He told the troops he was happy and proud to have been, with his corps, the instrument of Providence, but that while if he gave it full justice to the bravery of his soldiers, he was deeply pained and grievously affected by their excesses and indiscipline. "Pillage and destroy," said the general, "are now your watchwords and it is your sacrilegious hands that destroyed the house of God spared by fire during the fight. The mute stones," continued Yorck, "will accuse you before the tribunal of the Supreme Judge." Then, pointing to his soldiers the cross (the Cross to the Merit) that adorned his chest: "Do you know," he said, "this cross; do you know how it is engraved. It says: to each according to his merits. It is the motto of Prussia. Have you lived up to it? You defiled it, you have belied the motto of the King, you have dirtied his name and that of the motherland, you have trampled on my honor and hers. You are no longer the corps of Yorck; I am no longer your general. You are a band of brigands and I am a bandit leader!" He then explained to them what the consequences of their indiscipline, showed them that once the links of this discipline are relaxed, the real military disappears, he rebuked the grenadiers of West Prussia to have left their wounded colonel in the hands of the enemy. Finally, he called upon them to have to swear that they would now war honestly, as brave Prussians and not bandits; a man by company should leave the ranks to take the oath he demanded. General von Horn walked out first and swore in the name of the Regiment du Corps, then came the sub-officers and soldiers of various regiments that put into the hands of Yorck, the asked oath." (DROYSON, pages 365-60.)

13Langeron had been since the 8th in the outskirts of Laon and Chambery.

14General Langeron to Blücher, Laon, 11 March. 15According the Tagebuch of Count Nostitz (Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 1884, V, 121), General Boyen, Chief of Staff von Bülow, that Gneisenau consulted at every moment, had demonstrated to the Chief of Staff of the Army of Silesia the importance primarily to operate so that the King of Prussia possessed a large and beautiful army daring to take the only resolution permitted by the circumstances, paralyzed by a responsibility he exaggerated the extent and consequences of, persisted to stop operations, to believe essential an illogical and harmful concentration in all respects, to dissatisfy everybody, to impose in his armies suffering and privations which carried a serious breach of discipline in demoralizing the men, and to lose by his timidity, through inaction, all the benefit of the advantages gained during the days of 9 and 10 March.

Information provided by Tettenborn to Schwarzenberg. --Tettenborn and Saint-Priest, withdrawn by the same position they occupied in the rear of the Emperor and Marmont, by the direct and immediate action of Gneisenau, with whom they could only correspond by long detours, had carefully kept abreast of the movements of the Emperor. Tettenborn, returning to Port-à-Binson, was connected on the right with Saint-Priest, to the left and by Orbais and Vertus with Kaisarov, who succeeded Platov and was held beside Fère-Champenoise. His parties continued to go to Reims, Fismes, Villers-Cotterêts, Soissons, Chateau-Thierry, Coulommiers and La Ferté- Gaucher, despite the difficulties opposing their enterprises by the almost general uprising of the peasants, despite the ambushes that held them up and their fusil fire that issued from the outskirts of villages and the crossing of the woods. Preventing the wishes and orders of Schwarzenberg, who wrote to him from Troyes16 inviting him to obtain news of the enemy, to learn with Kaisarov, precisely what was happening on the way from Reims to Châlons and Vitry, to inform the General Staff about the movements of Saint-Priest, he had already managed to learn that the Emperor, though he did guard the bridge of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, repaired and barricaded that of Château-Thierry , seemed in no case prepared to go down the Marne Valley.17

March of Saint-Priest on Reims. --Saint-Priest,18 who the Generalissimo had made to take similar instructions,19 had just been joined by reinforcements and had expected to resume operations against Reims. The 11th in the morning, Panchulidzev arrived at Sillery with his column, composed of the regiments of Eletz, Rilsk, Yekaterinburg, 1st and 30th Eiger, horse eiger regiment of Chernigov and two batteries, and approximately 5,000 men strong. These reinforcements brought the total number of troops under de Saint-Priest to the respectable figure of 14,000 to 15,000 men. Thanks to the intelligence he had managed to establish with some royalists of Reims, it was not difficult to obtain precise data on the weakness of the garrison who only had now a hundred horses, fifty gendarmes and three small cadre battalions. He had also learned that General Corbineau had unsuccessfully requested reinforcements and General Defrance, posted with honor guards half way to Berry-au-Bac in Reims, had little more than 300 horses in Saint-Thierry and Chalons-sur-Vesle. His spies returning the 10th in the evening, had finally brought him the news of the unsuccessful attempt by the Emperor against Laon during the day of the 9th. The cavalry parties sent by General Emanuel to the side of Fismes completed further this information, and in the afternoon of the 11th, Saint- Priest, certain now of the retreat of the Emperor on Soissons, made the resolution to attack Reims in three columns, the 12th at daybreak.20

12 March. --Taking of Reims by Saint-Priest. --The first of these columns, that of the left wing, under the command of General Jagow, composed solely of Prussian troops, assembled at the Cormontreuil the 12th at 3 o'clock in the morning; at the same time, that of the center, two Russian regiments and two Prussian battalions in strength, at the moment when peace was signed, and would have them believe there was no longer a need to risk anything.

16Schwarzenberg to Tettenborn, Troyes, 11 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, ad 199.)

17Tettenborn to Schwarzenberg, Port-à-Binson, 13 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 240.)

18It is worth remembering here that Saint-Priest, who arrived in the last days of February in Saint-Dizier, had previously been ordered to approach the Army of Silesia. On 5 March, Saint-Priest had effected in Châlons his junction with the reinforcements that General von Jagow had lent to Kleist and waited until up to the 11th at Beaumont for the arrival of the detachment of General Panchulidzev. 19Schwarzenberg to Saint-Priest, Troyes, 11 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, ad 199.)

20Saint-Priest to Prince Volkonsky, Sillery, 11 March in the morning and 9 o'clock at night (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 207, a and b), and General Emanuel the Comte de Saint-Priest, Bézannes, 11 March 4 o'clock in the afternoon (Ibid., III, 207 c). under Major General Pillar, formed on the heights in front of Sillery. Both marching columns, the first by the left bank, the second from the right bank of the Vesle, were especially responsible for diverting attention from the French to entertain through demonstrations, if the surprise that would be attempted by the third column would have failed. The latter, composed of four Russian regiments and three Prussian battalions, led by Saint-Priest in person and by General Emanuel and which had been given Cernay-lez-Reims as an assembly point, had to take the suburb and gate of Cérès. The generals Gurielov and Panchulidzev with two Russian regiments, two Prussian battalions and two cavalry regiments remained in reserve between the Mézières road and the Berry-au-Bac.

At 5 o'clock in the morning, Jagow arrived at the gate of Paris, that he was cannonading and took it. Pillar met some resistance to the gate Dieu-Lumière, that a few voltigeurs of the Guard, hastily rushed from the gate of Cérès gate, tried to defend; but threatened in their rear by the Prussians emerging through the gate of Paris, the voltigeurs just had time to retire very quickly on the gate of Mars. Saint-Priest and Emanuel, whose column had strayed in the night, came at a time when the few French troops who managed to gather at the gate of Mars, were trying to pull back on the right bank of the Vesle, on Saint-Brice and La Neuvillette. The infantry, kept in good order by its superiors, covered in part by swamps and protected by the woods, put up a good countenance and succeeded, after throwing back the cavalry of Panchulidzev to join General Defrance in Chalons -on-Vesle. The cavalry, instead of remaining at the level of the infantry, had been thrown back mostly to the left at the end of Reims and was met, sabered and taken by the dragoons of Kiev.21 General Defrance was, moreover, moved to the immediate relief of the troops surprised in Reims. After stopping the cavalrymen of General Emanuel at the level of La Neuvillette, he had escorted them out of Reims, but had not yet dared attempt an attack against the same city. At night he brought his cavalry to Chalons-sur-Vesle, where he covered the position of Marmont at Roucy and Berry-au-Bac.

The Russians took quarters in the city; the Prussians were ordered to be confined in Jonchery, Muizon, Rosnay, Thillois, Gueux, Ormes, Bézannes, Cormontreuil and Sillery, and scout with their cavalry ahead of Jonchery and Rosnay. Despite the comments of the General Jagow, despite the advice given by the cavalry who found Jonchery occupied by the French, Saint-Priest refused to secure the cantonments of his troops. He consented, however, to allow the Prussian cavalry to return to Rosnay, where Jagow had posted two battalions of the 3rd Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment. Believing he was absolutely safe from harm, especially since he had received the news of the Emperor in retreat on Soissons, convinced that the French cavalry appearing at Jonchery was among the troops chased from Reims in the morning, Saint-Priest, instead of increased vigilance, had given the order that a Te Deum be sung at Reims for the Russians, at Bézannes for the Prussians, on the 13th.

Action of the Cossacks of Tettenborn at Tréloup. --The parties that Tettenborn had pushed on the right bank of the Marne in the direction of Soissons and Villers-Cotterêts, had not noticed any serious French movement until the evening. "The reversal of the Emperor," he wrote to Schwarzenberg, "is confirmed to me with information from the country people and especially by conduct of the peasants who opposed me on my far left, arms in hand, and for two

21Report of the General Defrance, Chalons-sur-Vesle, 12 March, 10 o'clock in the morning; General Defrance to Marmont, Ibid., 7:30 in the morning. Colonel Jacquemard, 5th Voltigeurs of the Guard, to the Chief of Staff (Ibid., 11 o'clock in the morning) (Archives of the War), and excerpts from the report of General Comte de Saint-Priest to the Emperor of Russia, Reims, 12 March 1814 (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, ad 243).

"I hasten to honor Your Majesty with the keys of the city of Reims I stormed this morning at 6 o'clock. The cavalry of the garrison who wanted to emerge, was totally destroyed. 2,000 prisoners, which included General Lacoste, Colonel Régnier and many officers with 10 cannons fell into our hands."

"What gives the most honor to our troops is that there has not been any disorder. The attack was made on several sides with such élan that the loss was not significant ..."

"I got here the positive news of the defeat suffered by Napoleon at Laon and the retreat on Soissons which followed ..."

"I have already moved forward to Berry-au-Bac to reconnoiter the enemy and try to establish my direct communication with the Field Marshal Blücher that should soon move forward." days are quiet, despite the presence of French army."22 An attempt made against Dormans by troops sent from Château-Thierry, had managed to surprise a Cossack party has 300 horsepower at Tréloup on the right bank of the Marne, but had been unable to dislodge the Colonel Pfuel who held Dormans with two regiments of Cossacks.23

Gneisenau modifies the cantonments of the Army of Silesia. --New orders. --Serious events, though of an quite personal nature, had marked this day of 12th. Blücher, always sick, bedridden, almost blind, was still unable to overcome with his ordinary energy the timidity of Gneisenau. The latter, increasingly determined not to start operations until the Field Marshal would be able to attend to business or at least to ratify the proposals submitted to him, had resolved to grant a few days rest to the Army of Silesia and expand, for that purpose, its quarters.

Winzingerode, whose cavalry watched the course of the Aisne upstream of Soissons, was with his infantry to relieve at Laon the IIIrd Corps (Bülow) who was directed on La Fère and on the right bank of the Oise to seize the Pont- Sainte-Maxence and that of Verberie, then Compiegne with the cooperation of Langeron. The cavalry of the latter had for a mission to scour the countryside between the Aisne and the Oise, while his infantry, once it was master of the bridge of Vic-sur-Aisne was to fall back on Compiegne. Bülow was, moreover, to establish in La Fère and Chauny magazines for the supply of the Army of Silesia. Sacken had orders to advance the 12th up to Chavignon and 13 March, from Chavignon in the direction of Soissons. Kleist was to settle first between Bouconville Chermizy and then on the plateau of Craonne to the level of Oulches. As for Yorck, Gneisenau attributed the worst quarters to in the body, the most exhausted cantonments going up de Corbeny towards Berry-au-Bac.

The 12th in the evening, Bülow was around Chauny; Langeron, at Coucy-le-Château; Sacken at Chavignon; Winzingerode at Laon, Kleist at Bouconville and Chermizy; his cavalry vanguard with Colonel Blücher, at La Maison-Rouge; the flying corps Major Colomb in Pontavert.

It was there that Gneisenau, in the letter to Schwarzenberg24 that he signed for Blücher, said "advanced on Aisne." He had for two days had so abnormally assigned a role in his large cavalry that he was obliged to add: "I will know tomorrow if the enemy is in Meaux or Chateau-Thierry." Finally, it is noteworthy to read in the status of the Emperor whom he had given the time to recuperate again, that he ended his dispatch with the words: "A march on Reims in the hope of beating Saint-Priest and acting by Épernay against the flank of Your Highness would be an unpleasant thing; but I do not think the French army in a state of being able to actually making such a movement."

Yorck quits the army. --Means used to induce him to resume his command. --Yorck had until then executed without a murmur, without leaving anything published of his displeasure, the orders that he condemned. Katzler had come with his cavalry around Berry-au-Bac, the cavalry reserve to La Ville-au-Bois and Juvincourt, Horn to Craonne, his cavalry to Craonnelle, Prince William to Corbeny. Nothing at all in the attitude of the General foreshadowed the resolution he had taken, and he was going to surprise everyone by its sudden execution. An incident, insignificant in itself, a measure to which, under ordinary circumstances, Yorck would attach no importance, was to persuade him to immediately put into effect projects, that such a cool spirit, so reflective as his, had nurtured for the last two days, an idea that was suggested to him first and had continued to strengthen with troubles, resulting in believing himself to be intentionally stifled by Gneisenau since his brilliant success of Athies.

From the time he was ordered to abandon the pursuit, Yorck was convinced that Gneisenau took advantage of his momentary authority to satisfy old grudges against him. He had waited since then, tried to contain himself and contain his feelings and finally gave with the greatest calm instructions for the march and the establishment of his troops in cantonments in which his army was to find no resources. Everything seemed forgotten; the legitimate irritation of Yorck seemed calmed, when the insignificant order, the detachment of a hundred horses to be made available to the commissary General Ribbentrop, some escorting a convoy headed to the Netherlands, the others to get the supplies necessary for the army, came as the final straw (to break the camel's back). Yorck, after showing this order to Major von Schack, after having presented his grievance against Gneisenau, announced that he had

22Tettenborn to Schwarzenberg, Port-à-Binson, 13 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 241.)

23General Vincent to the Chief of Staff, Château-Thierry, 12 March. (Archives of the War.)

24Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 12 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 229.) resolved to leave the army. It was in vain that this officer tried to convince him, to return to other feelings. Schack had to obey and write under the dictation of Yorck two letters, one addressed to the Field Marshal in which he stated that his health required him to leave the army and retire to Brussels; the other to Prince William to whom he entrusted the interim command of the Ist Corps. Meanwhile, the traveling carriage that Yorck almost never used was loaded. Warned by Schack, the aide de camp of the General, Count Brandenburg, was not happy. Persisting more than ever in his resolution, Yorck charged two officers to immediately send to their destinations the two letters, that he had just signed. The chief medical officer of the headquarters of the Ist Corps, Dr. Hohenhorst, appeared at that time. He had seen the harnessed carriage and concluded a disease of the General that returned, in effect, that he was very ill and therefore forced to move away. But when the doctor offered to accompany him, Yorck refused to grant his prayer, by explaining that he was attached, not to him personally, but to the corps headquarters. Then embracing Schack and Brandenburg, he quickly left the room, crossed the hall where were the others of his staff officers who, suspecting nothing until that time, had not been able to recover from the surprise they experienced when their general shook each of their hands, bade them farewell. The lieutenant of artillery Hoeken, one of Yorck orderly officers, jumped on horseback and followed for some time the carriage of the General. Yorck sent him away, saying: "I no longer need orderlies."

At the headquarters of the Ist Corps, there was dismay; no one knew what to do, what party to stop. Prince William had already started his movement. Unable to convene a board and as the moments were precious, Schack resolved to proceed with the counts von Brandenburg and von Lehndorff, to the Field Marshal and try with him a supreme approach that would give them back their General. "We arrived at Laon," Schack says, "when everyone was at the table. Gneisenau was sick. Müffling, having quarreled with him, pretended indisposition to stay completely away. The Field Marshal was really sick." The Chief of Staff of Blücher felt it necessary to make an example and, transfer Yorck to a courts martial; but none of them would dare propose a measure to Blücher that the old Field Marshal would never have consented.25 Then the three officers of Yorck were given an official letter that the old Field Marshal signed without knowing what it contained and in which they pretended to believe in the illness of the General, by simply expressing the hope of his quick return to the army. Schack and Brandenburg became aware of that letter. Passed it on to Yorck, convincing him to persevere in his resolution. Then they turned to Count Nostitz, explained to him the situation and decided to report to Blücher. "The Field Marshal," Count Nostitz, wrote about him, "listened to my prayers. Overcoming the unbearable pain he felt and although he suffered from a violent Ophthalmia, Blücher, who did justice to the value and merits of Yorck, wrote in large letters these three lines: "My old friend, the history has never known us anything like this. Be reasonable and come back."

At the same time, Prince William addressed his general a letter that ended thus: "The departure of Your Excellency plunges into the deepest affliction those who were fortunate to have served under you. Those for whom the reasons that led you to such a resolution, are not a mystery, know your generous character and hope you will not abandon at such a critical time in the holy cause of the fatherland. Prussia has never been more in need than now of its generals. On which of them could it more seriously rely, than whoever, in Courland began so brilliantly to restore its old glory and who after having given the signal for the reversal of foreign domination, has led his battalions victoriously from the banks of the Duna to the banks of the Seine. As your fellow citizen, as your lieutenant and as grand-son, son and brother of your kings, I beg you not to abandon the command."26

Armed with these two letters, Schack and Brandenburg27 ran after the carriage of Yorck and managed to bring it

25 After the Tagebuch of Count Nostitz, the letter of Yorck was read to the Field Marshal surrounded by generals Gneisenau, Müffling and Goltz, by the officers in charge of bringing it to the headquarters of the Army of Silesia. The same three general could not see fit to conceal their satisfaction at the departure of Yorck, and Goltz would immediately write the letter that was signed by Blücher without giving him time to reflect on the same. (NOSTITZ, Tagebuch; Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 1884, V, 125.) 26Prince William of Prussia to Yorck, Corbeny, 12 March.

27Based on the Tagebuch of Nostitz, the letter of Blücher was given for sending to Yorck at Corbeny by one of the ordnance officers of Blücher. The response of Yorck to Blücher is too characteristic not to be quoted here:

"The letter signed by Your Excellency was inspired and dictated by his loyalty that I have appreciated for a long time and I always appreciate; but this same loyalty to Your Excellency will allow you to understand the feelings of a man deeply mortified, whose heightened sense of dignity, that he has known was beyond reproach. I returned to my back into the midst of his troops, that his departure had dismayed and who greeted his return with enthusiastic cheers.

The victory of Laon had been so far for the Allies, if we except the resurgence of mistrust and jealousies between the different generals, without negative consequences. While the disease paralyzed Blücher, personal rivalries took such proportions that they prevented everyone from thinking of the most essential operations, to the most appropriate action. Neither Gneisenau nor Müffling. jealous of each other and having long fighting and opposing ideas, did not want to undertake anything, to propose nothing to the Field Marshal, too sick, too weak to be able to make a decision. Events were expected and, while expecting, illusions were left growing so much that Müffling wrote the 12th to Knesebeck, a letter that contrasts sharply with the ordinary tone of his correspondence:

"Here it ended so fortunately this great expedition which lasted from 24 February to 10 March. Fortune smiled on us and gave back recent through successes the cohesion in the army. It could deliver, if necessary, another ten fights and I think I can say that they'd be won. But all senior officers want peace because the misery is so great that we are unable to remedy it. Napoleon's situation must be even worse than ours, and if he is going against you, the cavalry will be in dire condition; the hungry and exhausted infantry will be unable to resist yours. But expect its share of some stroke of extreme boldness." And this already curious letter, ends with these still more curious words: "We others, we now have to become cautious."

Placed on the Napoleon Series: December 2015

post. I will fight as long as necessary to end the fighting, but soon after I will yield my place joyfully to the arrogance (sic) and to the system makers."

"I hope and wish with all my heart that Your Excellency will recover quickly."

"Corbeny, 13 March 1814."

"Von Yorck. "

(Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften herausgegeben von Grossen Generalstabe, 1884, V, 126, 127.)