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Amazed Am I Ere I Made Zama an Analysis of Hannibal’S Last Battle by Patrick Waterson Slingshot 262, Jan 2009

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Amazed Am I Ere I Made Zama an Analysis of Hannibal’S Last Battle by Patrick Waterson Slingshot 262, Jan 2009 Amazed am I ere I made Zama An analysis of Hannibal’s last battle by Patrick Waterson Slingshot 262, Jan 2009 The �tle palindrome is rather like the standard Hannibal knew that the situa�on he faced had been reconstruc�on of Hannibal’s inten�ons for the ba�le of duplicated – or nearly so – in a previous Punic War Zama. It looks neat but something is missing. (Polybius I.32-34). The year was 255 BC. The Roman army under Regulus had defeated the Carthaginian army We are generally told that Hannibal deliberately sought in Africa, commanded by Hasdrubal, Hanno and Bostar ba�le knowing himself to be inferior in cavalry, collected at a ba�le near the city of Adys, and was ranging freely a disputed number of elephants for reasons that are not from its base at Tunis while a Numidian invasion was wholly clear, brilliantly threw away half his infantry and causing further concern. Back then, the problem had not then brilliantly failed to achieve success with the other been bad troops, it had been bad leadership. In the most half. recent ba�le, the Carthaginian mercenaries had, perhaps Hannibal would seem to deserve a dunce’s cap for surprisingly, “delivered a gallant and vigorous charge, and his planning and showing in this ba�le rather than forced the first legion to give ground and take to flight” approba�on as a military genius. (Polybius I.30) before being surrounded and cut up by the second legion because the cavalry and elephants were Below is an account that seeks to shed some light on the unable to support them. mystery of what Hannibal planned for Zama. The primary source throughout is Polybius (mainly Book XV, rever�ng The situa�on had been remedied, in the best on occasion to Book I) – Livy’s version of the ba�le is too Mediterranean tradi�on, by the appointment of a Spartan confused and irra�onal to be of value for this exercise. general. Arriving with a con�ngent of mercenaries from GAUL IBERIA Rome ITALY Mediterranean Sea Bagradas Carthage Adys NUMIDIA Zama Rome and Carthage in 202 BC 1000km Greece (possibly not the best of mercenaries, as they suffi cient account of the Carthaginian cavalry, which far seem to have been the ones routed by the Romans in outnumbered their own.” the subsequent ba� le) came Xanthippus, an offi cer This superiority in cavalry was one of Xanthippus’ who quickly came to the no� ce of the desperate city cornerstones for winning the ba� le. The other was the authori� es. Xanthippus was placed in charge of the use of elephants, and in this he went against standard Carthaginian army for the forthcoming ba� le, and we Hellenis� c prac� ce. What we know of Hellenis� c prac� ce should pay careful a� en� on to his prepara� ons, for (at Ipsus, Raphia and elsewhere) was for the elephants to they do seem to explain what Hannibal was intending to be assigned suppor� ng light troops and deployed on the replicate in 202 BC. wings, usually covering the juncture between infantry and Xanthippus, according to Polybius, displayed his “… cavalry, the be� er to in� midate enemy cavalry and overlap decisive manner of leading out the army, drawing it up (and perhaps close in against) the vulnerable fl anks in regular forma� on in front of the city, manoeuvring of phalanxes. Intervals between individual elephants the various detachments and giving his commands in were o� en extensive, generally in the range 10-50 yards. the correct military terms, stood out in striking contrast Xanthippus appears to have deployed his elephants to the ineptness of his predecessors.” He advanced shoulder to shoulder, without suppor� ng light troops, and against Regulus’ 15,000 foot and 500 horse with 12,000 against the enemy infantry only. foot, 4,000 horse and “nearly 100” elephants. The foot Given that Regulus began with around 15,000 total consisted mainly of “a phalanx of Carthaginian ci� zens” infantry, less any losses in the engagement men� oned with some mercenaries, evidently those who had arrived previously, this indicates a standard consular two-legion with Xanthippus. There were placed behind an almost army with allies. He deployed his men “many maniples solid phalanx of elephants, which drew up shoulder-to- deep,” which implies that he deployed six maniples deep shoulder ahead of the Carthaginian troops. There were rather than the usual three. The Roman legion contained insuffi cient elephants to cover the en� re Carthaginian 30 maniples in what would later become ten cohorts. infantry front, so the mercenaries were le� unscreened. Given that Regulus would begin with 120 no� onal Xanthippus placed his cavalry “in advance of both wings,” maniples (two legions plus two allied legions), six maniples supported by the ‘most mobile’ mercenaries (evidently deep implies 20 maniples wide. Regulus’ maniples would ac� ng as hamippoi, infantry who accompanied cavalry into have been at about 70-75% strength and thus (assuming ba� le). This suggests that the mercenaries were either all he kept the usual depth) occupying 70-75% of their peltasts or a mixture of hoplite and peltast/psiloi types. usual 30’ per century, 60’ per maniple frontage, hence Regulus’ army “moved forward eagerly to meet them”. working out at 42’-45’ per maniple. At 20 maniples wide, Polybius says (IX.33) that “… alarmed by the prospect of this would give him a 900’ frontage (1,200’ had his units a charge by the elephants, … they sta� oned the velites in been at full strength). If Regulus accepted less ranks per the front line; behind them were drawn up the legionaries maniple, he could have preserved his no� onal 1,200’ in a forma� on many maniples deep, and the cavalry frontage. 2,000 of his 15,000 or so men overlapped the were divided between the wings.” The 250 or so cavalry elephants, so the elephants faced perhaps 13/15 of his covering each fl ank may have been expected to do more infantry frontage. 13/15 of 900’ is 780’, or just over 7.8’ than they were capable of, because Polybius adds: “This per African forest elephant (Xanthippus had ‘nearly 100’ order of ba� le was well enough designed as a defence of the beasts), which we can take to equate to 8’ per against the elephants,” perhaps a surprising asser� on animal – it would be hard to pack them closer than that. for those who believe that depth simply invites extra (If Regulus had a 1,200’ frontage, 13/15 of this is 1,040’, casual� es from the pachyderms, “but it failed to take equa� ng to about 10’6” per animal. I leave it to the Deployment at Bagradas Roman infantry Roman cavalry Carthaginian elephants Carthaginian phalanx Mercenaries Carthaginian cavalry reader to decide which he considers more suitable.) This casual�es (or at least any casual�es worthy of Polybius’ calcula�on assumes, naturally, that the elephants were note). Also of interest is the way the Carthaginian levies deployed in a single line. (the “phalanx of Carthaginian ci�zens”) were able to defeat the Roman infantry who managed to push through As the ba�le began, the outnumbered Roman cavalry between the elephants. This performance was not were quickly routed on both wings. Meanwhile matched by the Greek mercenaries on the right wing, who Xanthippus opened the ac�on against the infantry with had to deal with undisrupted legionaries (or, considering his elephants and “… the maniples in front fell back before socii the weight of the charge, were trampled underfoot and their wing posi�on, undisrupted , i.e. Italian allies) and perished in heaps in the figh�ng, but the main body of suffered accordingly. the legionaries, because of its great depth, was able for The noteworthy features of the ba�le are: deep Roman a while to hold its forma�on unbroken.” This is what deployment, vastly superior Carthaginian cavalry, the use apparently gave the Romans the momentum to push of large numbers of elephants on a very narrow frontage through between the elephants, accep�ng losses in transit as shock weapons, the effec�veness of Carthaginian (anyone who has watched the film ‘Return of the King’ ci�zen levies in unbroken forma�on against disrupted will have seen the Rohirrim doing something very similar legionaries, and the effec�veness of legionaries not in the ba�le outside Minas Tirith), and then regrouping disrupted by elephants. We might also remember to face “the Carthaginian phalanx of heavy infantry, the successful “gallant and vigorous charge” of the which was completely fresh and in unbroken order,” and mercenaries at Adys, even though they were no longer cut the disordered legionaries to pieces. Two thousand around at the Bagradas. legionaries on the Roman le�, having no elephants Now we scroll forward to 202 BC (Polybius, Book XV) and opposite them, set upon the Greek mercenaries forming see Hannibal making his prepara�ons. Scipio, basing the right of the Carthaginian infantry line and routed himself on Tunis, is ranging freely across the landscape of them, showing the difference in effec�veness between Africa. Hannibal, “weak in the cavalry arm,” enlisted “the an ordered Roman forma�on and a disordered (even best cavalry in Africa”, 2,000 Numidians under Tychaeus, if regrouping) one. The other 13,000 legionaries were to supplement his own. He then, in his own �me, moved encircled between the elephants and the Carthaginian to Zama, from whence he despatched three spies to scout cavalry and “From this point the Romans came under out the loca�on and composi�on of the Roman forces.
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