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UNITED STATES of AMERICA V. KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED

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UNITED STATES of AMERICA V. KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED D-101 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Commission Order Regarding v. Pro Se Filing: KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED, WALID “The Islamic Response to the MUHAMMAD SALIH MUBARAK BIN Government’s Nine Accusations” 'ATTASH, RAMZI BIN AL SHIBH, ALI ABDUL-AZIZ ALI, MUSTAFA AHMED ADAM AL HAWSAWI 1. On 5 March 2009, the Commission received and reviewed in chambers D-101, an unclassified document titled “The Islamic Response to the Government’s Nine Accusations”, filed pro se by the above named Accused. 2. The Commission directs that copies of this pleading be served upon the prosecution and defense counsel of record, to include stand-by counsel. The Commission further directs the pleading be provided to the Clerk of Court for immediate public release. 3. As this pleading seeks no specific relief, no responses are required by either the prosecution or defense. 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to have this order translated into Arabic and served upon each of the Accused So Ordered this 9th day of March, 2009: /s/ Stephen R. Henley Colonel, U.S. Army Military Judge UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) VS. ) ) THE ISLAMIC RESPONSE TO THE KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED ) WAllO BIN 'ATTASH ) GOVERNMENT'S NINE ACCUSA"rIONS RAMZI BIN AS-SHIBH ) 'ALI 'ABO AL-'AZIZ 'ALI ) MUSTAFA AHMED AL-HAWSAWI ) In the Name ofAllah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate The 9/11 Shura' Council Many thanks to God who revealed the Torah, the Bible, and the Quran, and may God praise his messenger, the prophet Mohamed, so that he causes mercy to the two realms. Also, may God praise the prophet's household, his entire companionship, and his followers until judgment day. With regards to these nine accusations that you are putting us on trial for; to us, they are not accusations. To us they are badges of honor, which we carry with pride. Many thanks to God, for his kind gesture, and choosing us to perform the act of Jihad for his cause and to defend Islam and Muslims. Therefore, killing you and fighting you, destroying you and terrorizing you, responding back to your attacks, are all considered to be great legitimate duty in our religion. These actions are our offerings to God. In addition, it is the imposed reality on Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, in the land of the two holy sites [Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia], and in the rest ofthe world, where Muslims are suffering from your brutality, terrorism, killing ofthe innocent, and occupying their lands and their holy sites. Nevertheless, it would have been the greatest religious duty to fight you over your infidelity. However, today, we fight you over defending Muslims, their land, their holy sites,and their religion as a whole. The following is our Islamic response back to your n.ine untenable, just like a spider web, accusations: First, "the conspiracy accusation": This is a very laughable accusation. Were you expecting us to inform you about our secret attack plans? Your intelligence apparatus, with all its abilities, human and logistical, had failed to discover our military attack plans before the blessed 11 September operation. They were unable to foil our attack. We ask, why then should you blame us, holding us aCcountable and putting us on trial? Blame yourselves and your failed intelligence apparatus and hold them accountable, not us. Page 11 With regards to us, we were exercising caution and secrecy in our war against you. This is a natural matter, where God has taught us in his book, verse 71 from An-Nisa: ((0 you believers! Toke your precoutions, ond either goforth (on on expedition) in parties, or go forth together.)) Also, as the prophet has stated: "War is to deceive." With regards to the second, third, and forth accusations; "Attacking civilians," "Attacking civilian objects," and "deliberately causing grave bodily harm": We ask you; who initiated the attacks on civilians? Who is attacking civilian objects? And who is causing grave bodily harm against civilians? Is it us, or is it you? You are attacking us in Palestine and Lebanon by providing political, military, and economic support to the terrorist state of Israel, which in turn, is attacking unarmed innocent civilians. In addition, Israel attacks Palestinian and Lebanese civilian objects by bombing them and destroying them. Furthermore, Israel is causing grave bodily harm by using weapons that are forbidden internationally, such as: cluster bombs in Lebanon and the rubber and live ammunitions in Palestine and breaking bones of Palestinian children. Moreover, the Israeli criminal list is long and endless, against civilians in Lebanon and Palestine. In addition, was it not you that attacked an entire population in Iraq, destroying civilian targets and its infrastructure? Was it not you that has killed one million Iraqi children caused by your oppressed economic sanctions, which you imposed after the first Gulf War? In fact, it was you who had wiped out two entire cities off the face of the earth and killed roughly half a million people in a few minutes and caused grave bodily harm by nuclear radiation? Did you forget about your nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? You are the last nation that has the right to speak about civilians and killing civilians. You are professional criminals, with all the meaning the words carry. Therefore, we will treat you the same. We will attack you, just like you have attacked us, and whomever initiated the attacks is the guilty party. In God's book, verse 193, AI-Baqara, he states: ((The sacred month is for the sacred month, andfor the prohibited things, there is the law of equality. Then, whoever transgresses the prohibition against you, you transgress likewise against him.)) God stated, in verse 179, AI-Baqarah: ((And there is (a saving of) lifefor you in AI-Qisas (The law of equality in punishment), 0 men ofunderstanding, that you may become A/~Muttaquin (the pious).)) God also stated, in verse 40, AI-Shura: ((The recompense for an evil is an evil like thereof.)) Page I 2 :T1!J !GC,­ In verse 45, AI-Maida: ((Life for life, eye for an eye, nose fora nose, ear for an ear, tooth for a tooth, and wounds equalfor equal.)) In verse 193, AI-Baqara: ((... Let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression.)) With regards to accusations five and six. "Crimes in violation of the law of war." and "Destroying property in violation of the law of war": Who is breaking the law of war in this world? Is it us, or is it you? You have disobeyed all heaven and earth's laws of war, to include your own laws. You have violated the law of war by supporting the Israeli occupation of Arab land in Palestine and Lebanon, and for displacing five million Palestinians outside their land. You have supported the oppressor over the oppressed and the butcher over the victim. Also, you have violated the law of war by attacking an independent sovereign Arab nation with you first crusade campaign in 1991. By force, you have occupied the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. In addition, today, you are occupying Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, you have violated all laws of war, and in particular, your treatment of Prisoners of War, in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are the best example of such violations and your "Black Sites" for torturing prisoners. This, and with your "Abu-Ghurayb" prison in Iraq. Guantanamo camps are witness to all of that. So, you are the first class war criminals, and the whole world witnesses this. You have no values and ethics and no principles. You are a nation without a religion. On the other hand, we are a great nation, with a great religion, values, ethic s, and principles, which we comply with and follow, and we invite people to following our ways. History will testify on our actions. You should look back at Salah AI-Din and how ethically he treated your crusader ancestors that were prisoners to him. We fight you to defense our nation, our religion, and our land. All heavenly and earthly laws guarantee our rights to do so. We, Muslims, are content with God's book, the Quran, to fight you with. God has granted us to fight, in verse 39, AI-Hajj: ((To those against whom war is waged, permission is given (to fight,) because they are wronged and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid.)) God stated in his book, verse 190, AI-Baqara: ((And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but be not the transgressor, Allah likes not the transgressors.)) ancLascsi.",ed ._,S/St:1- Page I 3 With regards to the seventh accusation, "Hijacking and/or endangering a vessel or an aircraft": In return, we ask you: Which is more dangerous; Hijacking and/or endangering a vessel or an aircraft, or endangering an entire population with a military occupation, killing and endangering innocent civilians by starving them with an economic sanction? If you do not respect the innocent in our countries, then we will do the same, by exposing you to danger and hijacking in the air, at sea, and land. In God's book, he ordered us to fight you everywhere we find you, even if you were inside the holiest of all holy cities, The Mosque in Mecca, and the holy city of Mecca, and even during sacred months. In God's book, verse 9, AI-Tawbah: (("rhen fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, and besiege them and lie in wait for them in each and every ambush,)) Remember, that you are the ones who attacked the Iranian civilian aircraft, flight 655, in 1988 with your Cruise missiles over the Hermuz straights, killing all of its 290 passengers, among them 66 children.
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