Volume 14 | Issue 20 | Number 6 | Article ID 4965 | Oct 15, 2016 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese Nationalism Nakano Koichi This essay examines why nationalism seems to deteriorated following President Lee Myung- be on the rise in Asia and beyond at a time bak’s visit to Takeshima/Dokdo islets also when globalization is also becoming more subject to competing claims of sovereignty salient, by focusing on the political dynamics similar to the standoff with China, allegedly out that propelled both changes in Japan in the of frustration with the lack of progress in post-Cold War era. The more open and liberal dealing with the “comfort women” (the women type of nationalism that appeared in Japan in who were subjected to sexual slavery in the 1980s to the mid-1990s was followed by an wartime military brothels at the behest of abrupt revisionist backlash beginning in the Japanese military authorities) issue. The same late 1990s. This illiberal, authoritarian turn in 2014 Cabinet Office survey indicates that 66.4 contemporary nationalism was confirmed and per cent of Japanese harbor negative accelerated during the premiership of Koizumi sentiments towards South Korea. Jun’ichiro (2001-06), when further neoliberal reforms were simultaneously implemented. I Considering the fact that negative sentiments argue that the New Right transformation of against China were consistently around 20 per th Japanese politics –the combined ascendancy of cent until the June 4 Incident in 1989, while economic liberalism and politicalthose against South Korea less than 40 per cent illiberalism—is the driving force ofuntil as recently as 2011, these are worrisome contemporary nationalism in Japan. developments that raise concerns about the future of Northeast Asia. Jingoism and Revisionism Moreover, a study of influential conservative According to annual surveys conducted by the monthly magazines, Shokun! and Seiron, also Cabinet Office, in recent years negativeconfirms similar trends of growing antipathy in sentiments vis-à-vis China and South Korea the media. Articles with titles that include such have risen sharply in Japan. The 2014 survey words as han-nichi (anti-Japan), invariably in revealed that 93% per cent of the Japanese relation to China and Korea, dramatically respondents have negative sentiments towards increased in the late 1990s, and continued to China, as it appears to be a growing threat to rise sharply through the 2000s (Jomaru, 2011, Japan. The rise took place in two stages, first in 390-392). The popular Manga Ken Kanryu the mid-2000s, during the government of (Hating the Korean Wave Manga) published in Koizumi, when he made annual pilgrimages to 2005 broke the hate-mongering taboo, and Yasukuni Shrine that derailed bilateralspawned a countless number of similar relations, and then further in the early 2010s as publications, whose principal message was tensions rose over the Senkaku/Diaoyuhatred of Korea and China. Today, territorial dispute in the East China Sea. sensationalist books and magazines that fan anti-China and/or anti-Korea sentiments have Regarding Japanese sentiments vis-à-vis South become an alarmingly ubiquitous feature of Korea, there was a sharp drop in positive Japanese bookstores, and indeed, commuter feelings in 2012 as bilateral relationstrains, where the adverts of populist weeklies 1 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF persistently exhibit hate messages targeting of historical revisionism in mainstream politics these two nations. and media. The sharp rise in hate-mongering articles in conservative media mentioned above was directly triggered by reports in 1996 that all Ministry of Education approved history textbooks for use in junior high schools from 1997 included references to “comfort women.” In a virulent reaction to this development, revisionist nationalists in politics and in the media launched an organized revisionist counterattack. Revisionists champion an exculpatory and valorizing narrative of Japan’s wartime actions and seek to revise the prevailing mainstream consensus that they condemn as ‘masochistic’ for being too critical of Japan’s conduct. Zaitokukai Demonstrations Target ethnic Thus, in January 1997, Tsukurukai (short hand Koreans in Japan name for Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai, Japan Society for History Textbook While there has been no violence or riots Reform) was launched by rightwing media against the Chinese or the Koreans in Japan in figures and academics, while in February, the recent years, hate demonstrations against the late Nakagawa Shoichi and Abe Shinzo led a Zainichi Korean population have become a group of junior revisionist politicians to launch prominent social issue, particularly since the the Young Parliamentarians Association that establishment of Zaitokukai (short hand for Consider Japan’s Future and History Education, Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, and in May, Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi) Citizens’ Group Against Special Rights for was established as a powerful lobby group that Koreans in Japan in 2007. “Ordinary” Japanese, brought together neonationalist intellectuals who previously were content to consume hate- and business leaders with the religious right mongering publications and spread jingoistic (Shintoist groups as well as new religions). messages on the Internet against the Zainichi Nippon Kaigi also has a parliamentary arm with population subsequently took to the streets and members mostly hailing from the Liberal spewed invective while terrorizing ethnic Democratic Party (LDP), the party that has Korean permanent residents of Japan (Noma dominated Japanese politics since it was 2013; Sakamoto 2011). Zainichi are targeted established in 1955. This flowering of the based on groundless beliefs that they are revisionist movement on multiple fronts came accorded special privileges and because they to a head in 1997. From the very beginning, are the collateral damage of worseningsuch rightwing/conservative media relations with South Korea over unresolved conglomerates as Fuji-Sankei group (that historical grievances and clashing territorial publishes Seiron as well as Sankei newspaper) claims, anger over North Korea’s abduction of and Bungei Shunju (that used to publish Japanese nationals, and anxieties generated by Shokun! among others) provided a media Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear weapons platform for these concerted efforts (Tawara program. 1997; Sasagase et al 2015; McNeill 2015). Secondly, there has been a spectacular ascent Although serious scholars in the late 1990s 2 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF dismissed revisionist claims as baseless, and in conflict with available evidence, by the time Abe succeeded Koizumi as Prime Minister in 2006, all reference to the “comfort women” disappeared from the main texts of the government-approved textbooks. One key point that needs to be made at this juncture is that these two phenomena—jingoism and revisionism—are essentially elite-driven processes rather than reflecting grassroots sentiments or public opinion. Political and media elites took the lead in fanning negative sentiments against Japan’s neighbors, often, of course, in response to what they considered to be provocations by their Chinese and Korean counterparts. However, when we look at the chronology of these developments, it is evident that xenophobia among the Japanese people was instigated by Revisionists seek to rehabilitate the the political and media elites inglorious wartime past While it is entirely appropriate to ask in what Neo/liberal Path to Nationalism sense the “top-down” xenophobia (anti-China and anti-Korea sentiments in particular) and The rise of contemporary nationalism since the historical revisionism discussed here constitute late 1990s is all the more curious once we “nationalism,” these are clearly worrisome consider how it all came about in the first trends that stoke risings tension between Japan place. After all, Japan was seemingly set on a and its East Asian neighbors, where anti- steady path to neoliberal internationalism since Japanese sentiments are a touchstone of the 1980s. “nationalism.” When the Basic Treaty with South Korea was signed in 1965, the Joint Communiqué noted the “regrets” (ikan) and “deep remorse” (fukaku hansei) expressed by the Japanese side and similarly, when diplomatic ties between the People’s Republic of China and Japan were established in 1972, the Joint Communiqué stated that, “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself” (sekinin wo tsukanshi, fukaku hansei suru) (Hattori 2015, 9-10; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1972). While leaders of the countries at the time 3 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF considered these expressions sufficient and subsequently admonished Prime Minister appropriate, the issue of war memory gained in Koizumi not to visit, arguing that doing so salience and became a diplomatic issue in the undermines national interests. shape of the history textbook controversy that erupted in 1982 over alleged changes in the What is crucial to understand here is that wording of Japanese descriptions of its invasion Northeast Asia, and indeed, the whole world, of China (that turned out to be incorrect). In was going through a period of liberal opening response, Japan issued the 1982 Miyazawa in the 1980s as the Cold War was nearing its Statement on History Textbooks by Chief end. China embarked on its extensive