Volume 14 | Issue 20 | Number 6 | Article ID 4965 | Oct 15, 2016 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Focus

Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese

Nakano Koichi

This essay examines why nationalism seems to deteriorated following President Lee Myung- be on the rise in Asia and beyond at a time bak’s visit to Takeshima/Dokdo islets also when globalization is also becoming more subject to competing claims of salient, by focusing on the political dynamics similar to the standoff with , allegedly out that propelled both changes in Japan in the of frustration with the lack of progress in post-Cold War era. The more open and liberal dealing with the “” (the women type of nationalism that appeared in Japan in who were subjected to sexual slavery in the 1980s to the mid-1990s was followed by an wartime military brothels at the behest of abrupt revisionist backlash beginning in the Japanese military authorities) issue. The same late 1990s. This illiberal, authoritarian turn in 2014 Cabinet Office survey indicates that 66.4 contemporary nationalism was confirmed and per cent of Japanese harbor negative accelerated during the premiership of Koizumi sentiments towards . Jun’ichiro (2001-06), when further neoliberal reforms were simultaneously implemented. I Considering the fact that negative sentiments argue that the New Right transformation of against China were consistently around 20 per th Japanese –the combined ascendancy of cent until the June 4 Incident in 1989, while economic liberalism and politicalthose against South Korea less than 40 per cent illiberalism—is the driving force ofuntil as recently as 2011, these are worrisome contemporary nationalism in Japan. developments that raise concerns about the future of Northeast Asia. Jingoism and Revisionism Moreover, a study of influential conservative According to annual surveys conducted by the monthly magazines, Shokun! and Seiron, also Cabinet Office, in recent years negativeconfirms similar trends of growing antipathy in sentiments vis-à-vis China and South Korea the media. Articles with titles that include such have risen sharply in Japan. The 2014 survey words as han-nichi (anti-Japan), invariably in revealed that 93% per cent of the Japanese relation to China and Korea, dramatically respondents have negative sentiments towards increased in the late 1990s, and continued to China, as it appears to be a growing threat to rise sharply through the 2000s (Jomaru, 2011, Japan. The rise took place in two stages, first in 390-392). The popular Manga Ken Kanryu the mid-2000s, during the of (Hating the Korean Wave Manga) published in Koizumi, when he made annual pilgrimages to 2005 broke the hate-mongering taboo, and Yasukuni Shrine that derailed bilateralspawned a countless number of similar relations, and then further in the early 2010s as publications, whose principal message was tensions rose over the Senkaku/Diaoyuhatred of Korea and China. Today, territorial dispute in the East China Sea. sensationalist books and magazines that fan anti-China and/or anti-Korea sentiments have Regarding Japanese sentiments vis-à-vis South become an alarmingly ubiquitous feature of Korea, there was a sharp drop in positive Japanese bookstores, and indeed, commuter feelings in 2012 as bilateral relationstrains, where the adverts of populist weeklies

1 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF persistently exhibit hate messages targeting of historical revisionism in mainstream politics these two nations. and media. The sharp rise in hate-mongering articles in conservative media mentioned above was directly triggered by reports in 1996 that all Ministry of Education approved history textbooks for use in junior high schools from 1997 included references to “comfort women.” In a virulent reaction to this development, revisionist nationalists in politics and in the media launched an organized revisionist counterattack. Revisionists champion an exculpatory and valorizing narrative of Japan’s wartime actions and seek to revise the prevailing mainstream consensus that they condemn as ‘masochistic’ for being too critical of Japan’s conduct.

Zaitokukai Demonstrations Target ethnic Thus, in January 1997, Tsukurukai (short hand Koreans in Japan name for Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai, Japan Society for History Textbook While there has been no violence or riots Reform) was launched by rightwing media against the Chinese or the Koreans in Japan in figures and academics, while in February, the recent years, hate demonstrations against the late Nakagawa Shoichi and Abe Shinzo led a Zainichi Korean population have become a group of junior revisionist to launch prominent social issue, particularly since the the Young Parliamentarians Association that establishment of Zaitokukai (short hand for Consider Japan’s Future and History Education, Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, and in May, Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi) Citizens’ Group Against Special Rights for was established as a powerful lobby group that Koreans in Japan in 2007. “Ordinary” Japanese, brought together neonationalist intellectuals who previously were content to consume hate- and business leaders with the religious right mongering publications and spread jingoistic (Shintoist groups as well as new religions). messages on the Internet against the Zainichi Nippon Kaigi also has a parliamentary arm with population subsequently took to the streets and members mostly hailing from the Liberal spewed invective while terrorizing ethnic Democratic Party (LDP), the party that has Korean permanent residents of Japan (Noma dominated Japanese politics since it was 2013; Sakamoto 2011). Zainichi are targeted established in 1955. This flowering of the based on groundless beliefs that they are revisionist movement on multiple fronts came accorded special privileges and because they to a head in 1997. From the very beginning, are the collateral damage of worseningsuch rightwing/conservative media relations with South Korea over unresolved conglomerates as Fuji-Sankei group (that historical grievances and clashing territorial publishes Seiron as well as Sankei newspaper) claims, anger over ’s abduction of and Bungei Shunju (that used to publish Japanese nationals, and anxieties generated by Shokun! among others) provided a media ’s missile and nuclear weapons platform for these concerted efforts (Tawara program. 1997; Sasagase et al 2015; McNeill 2015).

Secondly, there has been a spectacular ascent Although serious scholars in the late 1990s

2 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF dismissed revisionist claims as baseless, and in conflict with available evidence, by the time Abe succeeded Koizumi as Prime Minister in 2006, all reference to the “comfort women” disappeared from the main texts of the government-approved textbooks.

One key point that needs to be made at this juncture is that these two phenomena—jingoism and revisionism—are essentially elite-driven processes rather than reflecting grassroots sentiments or public opinion. Political and media elites took the lead in fanning negative sentiments against Japan’s neighbors, often, of course, in response to what they considered to be provocations by their Chinese and Korean counterparts. However, when we look at the chronology of these developments, it is evident that among the Japanese people was instigated by Revisionists seek to rehabilitate the the political and media elites inglorious wartime past

While it is entirely appropriate to ask in what Neo/liberal Path to Nationalism sense the “top-down” xenophobia (anti-China and anti-Korea sentiments in particular) and The rise of contemporary nationalism since the historical revisionism discussed here constitute late 1990s is all the more curious once we “nationalism,” these are clearly worrisome consider how it all came about in the first trends that stoke risings tension between Japan place. After all, Japan was seemingly set on a and its East Asian neighbors, where anti- steady path to neoliberal internationalism since Japanese sentiments are a touchstone of the 1980s. “nationalism.” When the Basic Treaty with South Korea was signed in 1965, the Joint Communiqué noted the “regrets” (ikan) and “deep remorse” (fukaku hansei) expressed by the Japanese side and similarly, when diplomatic ties between the People’s of China and Japan were established in 1972, the Joint Communiqué stated that, “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself” (sekinin wo tsukanshi, fukaku hansei suru) (Hattori 2015, 9-10; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1972).

While leaders of the countries at the time

3 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF considered these expressions sufficient and subsequently admonished Prime Minister appropriate, the issue of war memory gained in Koizumi not to visit, arguing that doing so salience and became a diplomatic issue in the undermines national interests. shape of the history textbook controversy that erupted in 1982 over alleged changes in the What is crucial to understand here is that wording of Japanese descriptions of its invasion Northeast Asia, and indeed, the whole world, of China (that turned out to be incorrect). In was going through a period of liberal opening response, Japan issued the 1982 Miyazawa in the 1980s as the Cold War was nearing its Statement on History Textbooks by Chief end. China embarked on its extensive economic Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi noting that reforms in 1978, and they were further the “spirit in the Japan-ROK Joint Communiqué accelerated by the mid-1980s. This led to a and the Japan-China Joint Communiquésomewhat more pluralistic society and political naturally should also be respected in Japan’s leadership—a country that was now rather school education and government textbook different from the time when and authorization. Recently, however, the Republic Zhou Enlai held power. Similarly, the of Korea, China, and others have beendemocratization movement was flaring up in criticizing some descriptions in Japanese Korea throughout the 1980s, resulting in the textbooks. From the perspective of building June 29 Declaration of democratization in 1987, friendship and goodwill with neighboring as the military dictators lost their grip on countries, Japan will pay due attention to these power. Even in the , Mikhail criticisms and make corrections at theGorbachev came to power in 1985 and began Government’s responsibility” (Chief Cabinet the process of perestroika (restructuring) and Secretary of Japan 1982). glasnost (opening, transparency) that ushered in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. China, This led to the adoption of the so-called however, crushed the Tiananmen Square pro- “neighboring countries” clause in the Ministry movement in 1989 as its leaders of Education criteria for textbook approval that resorted to violence in a bid to prevent a stipulates that “due consideration should be Soviet-type scenario, deny popular demands for made from the point of view of international representative government and preserve the understanding and international cooperation communist party’s monopoly of power. These when dealing with modern history issues that developments indicate that even in involve neighboring Asian countries.”authoritarian regimes, the government was no Improvements have since been made in history longer able to fully control popular demands textbooks, but in contemporary Japan this and address public concerns, and that their clause is hotly contested by the revisionist polities were becoming more pluralistic, and right; by 2015 PM Abe has all but abandoned it. thus, less stable.

On August 15, 1985, marking the 40th It was in this context that Japan under anniversary of the end of the Second World Nakasone was also pushing through neoliberal War, then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro reforms with the professed ambition to play a paid an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The stronger leadership role in the liberal economic Chinese government protested his visit, noting order. Japan was part of the 1985 Plaza Accord that the Class-A war criminals that were found that triggered the rapid appreciation of the yen guilty of orchestrating Japan’s rampage in Asia (which in turn unleashed the bubble economy are enshrined there. By 1986, Nakasone in Japan), and a key participant in the Uruguay decided to suspend future visits to the shrine in Round of multinational trade negotiations since consideration of the Chinese criticisms and 1986. Following the June 4th Incident, Japan

4 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF joined the western sanctions against China, but Fund in 1995 to provide redress to these aging it also became the first country to lift them, victims. Also in 1993, Prime Minister Hosokawa with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visiting Morihiro became the first Japanese prime Beijing in 1991, followed by the Emperor’s visit minister to publicly acknowledge that Japan in 1992. was engaged in a “war of aggression” in the Second World War (Hosokawa 2010, pp. Beyond the economy, the 1990-91 Persian Gulf 30-31). This liberal trends regarding war Crisis tested Japan’s liberal internationalist responsibility culminated in the Murayama orientation as Iraq invaded Kuwait. Japan’s Statement of 1995 acknowledging and “checkbook ,” contributing $13 apologizing for Japanese wartime aggression billion towards the coalition campaign but (Murayama Tomiichi was the socialist Prime committing no troops, drew U.S. criticism for Minister in 1995 in a with ducking the risks of combat due tothe LDP). constitutional constraints on its military forces. As the Cold War was coming to an end, there Illiberal, Revisionist Turn was growing pressure from the U.S. and its European allies for Japan to play a leadership The liberal opening up of societies around the role not merely in the global economy, but also world continued in the post-Cold War era, and in the security arena. Overcoming strong it seemed as if the vexing history issues that political opposition, the government succeeded emerged were going to be resolved by the same in enacting the Peacekeeping Operation Law in liberal political elites. Liberalization of political 1992 allowing the dispatch of military forces in systems, however, also meant that liberal elites UN-sanctioned peacekeeping efforts. were no longer in full control of social demands, or in fact, even of government Japanese political leaders at the time, including . The quest for international the nationalist Nakasone, thought that Japan’s reconciliation over history issues turned into an prestige would benefit significantly from unpredictable process involving multiple actors military normalization. They also understood that are not neatly divided across national that reconciliation with the former victims of lines. As mentioned in section 1 above, certain Japan’s militarist past, most particularly, China political and media elites manipulated anti- and South Korea, was an absolute prerequisite China/anti-Korea sentiments and historical to realize those ambitions. This is why they revisionism for their own purposes from the were prepared to go a long way in trying to late 1990s. Indeed, nationalists’ grandstanding come to grips with the past. It is possible to say in the late 1990s onward has intensified that even ardent nationalist sentiments during tensions across borders, reinforcing nationalist this period displayed distinctly liberaldiscourse in their respective countries at the characteristics. expense of moderates.

Thus, when the first victim of Japan’s comfort Several different factors coalesced to further women system appeared in front of the TV the illiberal, revisionist turn. First, after more cameras in 1991 calling for the Japanese state than fifty years since WWII, the late 1990s saw to assume its responsibility, the government a rapid generational turnover among political conducted an investigation including interviews elites, with those with direct personal with former comfort women that led to the experience of the war replaced by younger 1993 Kono Statement (Kono Yohei was Chief politicians with no such experience who were Cabinet Secretary of Japan in 1993) and building political careers in the post-Cold War subsequently established the Asian Women’s era in which there was no apparent rival

5 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF to neoliberalism. In many cases, they proud of, its egalitarian society. Insecurity and were also born and raised in privilege as precarity hit the lower strata of society and hereditary scions of political dynasties. These youth especially hard, leading to increased new elites often opposed expressions of war suicide, divorce, non-marriage, deflation and guilt and contrition, and disavowed thelower productivity because firms no longer reconciliation initiatives of previousinvest in training disposable workers. In this generations. They are also prone to exhibit a acute social crisis, political leaders sought to rather more cynical, neoliberal worldview, divert attention to “external enemies.” according to which self-interested actors vie to get ahead at the expense of each other in domestic politics as well as .

Tellingly, while Miyazawa in 1991 was the first postwar prime minister to hail from a political dynasty (he had also served as an elite bureaucrat like many of his predecessors), since 1996 to date no less than seven of the ten prime ministers came from political dynasties. The oligarchic tendency becomes even more striking when one considers the fact that of these hereditary prime ministers, Abe, Fukuda A poster for the Rally Against Precarity Yasuo, Asō Tarō, and Hatoyama Yukio are, in fact, sons or grandsons of postwar prime ministers. While not all of the hereditary Again, on this front Japan was not alone or politicians share a revisionist outlook, their unique, as the predominance of neoliberal predominance, particularly at the very top, economic policies everywhere meant that the does point to the emergence of a privileged social fabric was torn apart as oligarchic ruling class. In fact, it is highly ironic that in often lacked the fiscal resources, Northeast Asia, where “nationalism” has raised or indeed political will, to ensure minimum regional tensions to unprecedented levels, standards of national wellbeing. “Nationalism” Japan and its neighbors, China, South Korea, or xenophobic campaigns provided a “no-cost” and North Korea, are all currently led by alternative to provision of adequate social hereditary politicians. security, enabling the ruling elites to dodge their responsibilities and offer a false sense of Significantly, the rightward political shift in national unity that elided the marginalization st Japan in the 21 century coincides with and expansion of the “have-nots.” As Dr. economic decline, creating a volatile context Samuel Johnson famously remarked as early as for a rising tide of nationalism. Japan faces 1775, is ‘the last refuge of a prolonged economic stagnation, relativescoundrel’ while in contemporary Japan it decline, and mushrooming public debt, in constitutes conservatives’ palliative for what addition to growing disparities between rich ails the nation. and poor that undermine the norms and values that have been a foundation of postwar national Last, but not least, these processes were cohesion. In other words, the oligarchicaccelerated by neoliberal internationalist political tendency is also evident in theorientation that we noted earlier. There are economic sphere, in a country known for, and four key elements in this process. First, since

6 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) changes accelerated. was introduced in 1994, the LDP became a much more centralized party. Diversity of Xenophobia, Revisionism, and internal opinions that used to moderate (or Authoritarianism under Koizumi and Abe dilute, depending on one’s point of view) the overall party stance, and thus, offered a While there is no denying Koizumi’s strong thriving environment for consensus-seeking charisma and mastery of political theatrics, it moderates, was replaced by the predominance would be a mistake to overlook the institutional of uncompromising conservatives with extreme underpinning that was put into place by his views. Second, electoral system reform was predecessors in analyzing the sources of his soon followed by administrative reform that effectiveness as a political leader. Koizumi was centralized power in the prime minister’s fortunate in being able to make use of the office. This confluence of developmentsnewly concentrated power afforded him as the facilitated the emergence of a “top-down” style leader of the LDP and as prime minister to of governance that was inspired by themarginalize critics, promote loyal followers, neoliberal, corporate model. Third, electoral and propel his agenda. His neoliberal agenda of system reform and the party realignment that “structural reform with no sacred cows” was ensued brought about the demise of the Left, not always popular within the party, but he namely the , that used to shrewdly made up for it by fanning and provide effective opposition and served as a exploiting “nationalistic” sentiments. His check on the reactionary inclinations of LDP annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were a governments. When Murayama, the Socialist case in point. There is no record of interest on prime minister, stepped down in 1996,his part in Yasukuni before or after he served moderates in the LDP also lost their pivotal as prime minister (unlike Abe, who deeply position in the evolving coalition politics. cares about it). Koizumi nevertheless claimed Fourth, by 1998, it became evident that the that the visits were a matter of his “heart” and new main rival for the LDP-led government was dismissed Chinese and Korean criticisms as the neoliberal Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ); domestic interference. He thus shrewdly overall, these rivals for power occupy the same invoked nationalist symbols to appear as a ideological niche. After Prime Minister Obuchi resolute leader and advance his economic Keizō failed to spend his way out of economic program, a marked contrast to PM Abe who stagnation, a new neoliberal consensusinvokes economic reform to divert criticism emerged between the DPJ and Koizumi’s LDP from his revisionist agenda targeting wartime that signaled the beginning of an era of history and the constitution along with ramping ideational politics. This marked the end of the up Japan’s security profile. era of interest politics in Japan, when the government had ample resources to satisfy its supporters and silence opponents. The ideas, , and identities that the LDP would effectively mobilize in the new era were nationalistic, revisionist, and even xenophobic to a degree.

The late 1990s thus served as a transition period when these changes in the illiberal, revisionist direction were emerging, but it was not until the 2000s under Koizumi that these

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premiership in Japan overlapped with the presidency of George W. Bush in the U.S. In a striking departure from prevailing assumptions that Japan needs to reconcile with China and Korea as a pre-condition for military normalization, Koizumi even went so far as to claim that “There is no such thing as U.S.-Japan relationship that is too close. Some people maintain that maybe we should pay more attention to other issues and that it would probably be better to strengthen relations with other countries. I do not share such views. The Koizumi’s “Children”-1st time elected U.S.-Japan relationship, the closer, more politicians-obediently follow him to intimate it is, the easier it is for us to establish Yasukuni Shrine better relations with China, with South Korea, and other nations in Asia” ( 2005). The Bush Administration The hardcore nationalists, who dislikedperceived Koizumi’s instrumental use of Koizumi’s privatization and deregulationrevisionism as “healthy nationalism” allowing reforms that they viewed as a sellout to U.S. Japan to assume a greater, if subordinate, corporate interests, nevertheless cheered him military role in the alliance framework, as he stubbornly refused to cave in to Chinese damaging the prospects for reconciliation with and Korean criticisms and continued to visit its former victims. Yasukuni (Nakano 2006, 403). The New Right technique Koizumi employed replicatesGiven the loss of economic opportunities, Margaret Thatcher’s mobilization of nationalist however, the Japanese business community support for the Falklands War when her ensured that when Koizumi finally stepped monetarist economic policies were proving down, his successor, Abe, would work to deeply unpopular in the early 1980s.rebuild Japan’s ties with China by refraining Ultimately, as Koizumi’s signature reform from visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Abe duly acted project of postal privatization encountered stiff pragmatically at the time (though he later said opposition from within the LDP, he took the that he regretted not having visited Yasukuni unusually authoritarian route of firingas prime minister), and in any case, his first uncooperative ministers from the cabinet, stint at the premiership lasted only for a year expelling from the party Diet members opposed as he suffered a humiliating upper house to his scheme, and called a snap for election defeat in 2007 at the hands of the then the lower house to counter the upper house’s ascendant DPJ. Within that year, however, Abe rejection of his bill. Such a move on his part changed the Basic Law on Education to include would not have been possible without the “love of country” as a goal of education, centralized power conferred on him by the upgraded the Defense Agency to a full-fledged political and administrative reforms of the ministry, and set the rules for conducting an 1990s. eventual referendum for constitutional revision.

One should note here also that under Koizumi When Abe returned to power in December there was a decisive shift away from the 2012, he faced a rather different set of political internationalist foreign policy orientation that conditions. The rival DPJ suffered a Japan adopted since the 1980s. The Koizumi catastrophic defeat, while there were a couple

8 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF of new parties that were positioning themselves the wealthy. Abe has also tried to position even further to the right of the LDP on many himself as an advocate for womenomics, but issues and were indeed willing to collaborate to here again the rhetoric exceeds the reality. He advance this agenda. Abe also successfully reshuffled his cabinet in September 2014 with silenced potential dissent from big business by his media spin masters emphasizing the record giving a boost to stock prices with thenumber of five women ministers (plus a woman reflationary policies of “,” devaluing policy chief for the LDP), but nearly all of these the yen to make Japanese exports more women politicians were better known for their competitive, and advocating restarts of Japan’s far-right revisionist views than for their idled nuclear reactors. feminist policy orientation. Indeed, Yamatani Eriko (National Police and Disaster Abe also gained the enthusiastic backing of the Management Minister), Takaichi Sanae Sankei and Yomiuri newspapers, which acted (Internal Affairs and Communications as media cheerleaders for his policies and pit Minister), and Inada Tomomi (LDP Policy bulls for his critics. Having suffered from Chief), in particular, were notorious for their negative media coverage in his firstanti-feminist and extreme revisionist views, in premiership, Abe sought to tighten his grip on addition to dubious ties to Neo-Nazi and/or the media, placing a trusted henchman with no xenophobic activists. media experience as the head of Japan’s flagship public broadcaster, NHK. The revisionists launched orchestrated, vitriolic attacks in 2014 against the liberal-leaning Once the upper house election of summer 2013 Asahi newspaper after it retracted a handful of was out of the way, with a handsome victory for articles on the “comfort women” from the Abe’s ruling coalition, he revealed his true 1990s that were based in part on false colors by setting up the National Security testimony. Abe also seized the opportunity to Council, pushing through the highlyattack the critical newspaper and served as controversial Designated Secrets Law that gave cheerleader-in-chief even as emboldened largely unchecked discretionary power to extremists issued death threats against a government officials to designate documents as university that employed one of the former state secrets, and visiting Yasukuni Shrine on Asahi journalists who wrote some of the the first year anniversary of his second“comfort women” stories that were not in fact premiership. In July 2014, he further revised based on the false testimony. This the official government interpretation of the McCarthyism-style campaign by reactionary constitution to enable Japan to exercise the nationalists threatens press and academic right of collective self-defense by a mere freedoms in Japan while intimidating cabinet decision – something that successive moderates. (Uemura with Yamaguchi 2015). postwar LDP governments had repeatedly acknowledged would require constitutional When Abe called a snap election in December amendment. 2014 to consolidate his hold on power, the LDP’s official campaign pledge included a The prospects for revision have beenpassage that said, “We shall act to restore strengthened by Abe’s 2016 electoral victory, Japan’s honor and national interest by but there are no longer doubts about Abe’s real presenting firm counterarguments against agenda as Abenomics increasingly seems to groundless accusations based on falsehood have promised more than it has delivered and, through external communication to the because its main success is boosting stock international community,” a thinly veiled market prices, critics dismiss it as welfare for reference to its plan to use the Asahi retraction

9 14 | 20 | 6 APJ | JF to challenge the consensus that the “comfort women” were sex slaves (Liberal Democratic Party 2014). This revisionist campaign aims to convey the misleading impression that the whole of the sex slave system was an Asahi fabrication, and rewrite Japan’s shared history with Asia in ways that imperil Japan’s regional interests.

Moreover, Abe pursues this revisionist agenda internationally, as Japanese diplomats in New York sought unsuccessfully to have McGraw- Hill revise its description of the comfort women Choreographing Closer US-Japan Security in an American history textbook (Fackler 2015). Ties 2015 This provoked a public relations disaster for Japan and publication of a letter by a group of Abe’s self-righteous nationalism and strong US-based historians (including eminent revisionist streak has alienated neighbors and scholars such as Carol Gluck and Sheldon made Washington increasingly abashed. Even if Garon) expressing “dismay at recent attempts the Pentagon thinks of Abe as their man in by the Japanese government to suppress Japan because he has delivered more on statements in history textbooks both in Japan America’s longstanding security requests than and elsewhere about the euphemistically the rest of Japan’s post-WWII prime minsters named ‘comfort women’ who suffered under a combined, he is making himself an awkward brutal system of sexual exploitation in the partner because nobody can pretend that service of the Japanese imperial army during shirking the burdens of the past is anything but World War II” in the newsmagazine of the narrow-minded and counterproductive American Historical Association (Dudden et al. nationalism. 2015, 33). Since the U.S. government remains firmly opposed to revision of the KonoThis article is adapted from Nakano Koichi, Statement, Abe and his supporters have “Political Dynamics of Contemporary Japanese conducted hit-and-run attacks against it in the Nationalism” in Jeff Kingston, ed., Asian Diet to discredit this mea culpa whileNationalisms Reconsidered (Routledge, 2016). denouncing the 1996 UN Coomaraswamy Report on “comfort women” (UN Commission Bibliography of Human Rights 1996). Revisionists are thus waging a campaign to deny that Japan was Cabinet Office of Japan (various years). Gaiko responsible for forced recruitment of young in kansuru Yoron Chosa (Public Opinion Survey women and that the “comfort women” system concerning Diplomacy). constituted sexual slavery, again tarnishing the http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html dignity of the nation and its victims. (Last retrieved on February 9, 2015).

Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan (1982). “Statement by on History Textbooks.” August 26, 1982. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/state820 8.html (Last retrieved on February 9, 2015).

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Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan (1993). December 2014. “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/1265 Yohei Kono on the result of the study on the 85_1.pdf Last retrieved on February 9, 2015). issue of ‘comfort women.’” August 4, 1993. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state McNeill, David. (2015) "Nippon Kaigi and the 9308.html (Last retrieved on February 9, Radical Conservative Project to Take Back 2015). Japan", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 48, No. 4, December 14, 2015. Dudden, Alexis et al. (2015). “Letter to the Editor: Standing with Historians of Japan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1972). Perspectives on History, March 2015, p. 33. “Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of Fackler, Martin (2015). “U.S. Textbook Skews China.” September 29, 1972. History, Prime Minister of Japan Says,” New http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joi York Times, January 29, 2015.nt72.html (Last retrieved on February 9, 2015). http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/world/asia/ -premier-disputes-us-textbooks-portrayal- Nakano, Koichi (2006). “Yasukuni Mondai to of-comfort-women.html?_r=1 (Last retrieved on Mukiau (Facing Up to Yasukuni Issue)” in February 9, 2015). Nakano, Koichi et al. (2006), Yasukuni to Mukiau (Facing Up to Yasukuni) (: Gluck, Carol (2013). “Change in Japan is a long- Mekong Publishing). distance run” (Interview), Asahi Shimbun, September 17, Noma, Yasumichi2013. (2013). “Zainichi Tokken” no http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ20 Kyoko (Lies about “Zainichi Privileges”) (Tokyo: 1309170004 (Last retrieved on February 9, Kawade Shobo Shinsha). 2015). Prime Minister of Japan (1995). “Statement by Government of Japan (2013). National Security Prime Minister ‘On the Strategy of Japan. December 17, 2013.occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhos end.’” August 15, 1995. hou/nss-e.pdf (Last retrieved on February 9, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/mur 2015). ayama/9508.html (Last retrieved on February 9, 2015). Hattori, Ryuichi (2015). Gaiko Dokyumento Rekishi Ninshiki (Diplomatic Document History Prime Minister of Japan (2005), “The Recognition) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten). President's News Conference With Prime Minister of Japan in Kyoto, Hosokawa, Morihiro (2010). Naishoroku (Diary) Japan.” November 16, 2005. (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Shuppansha). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=63396 (Last retrieved on February 9, Jomaru, Yoichi (2011). “Shokun!” “Seiron” no 2015). Kenkyu: Hoshu Genron wa dou Henyo shitekitaka (A Study of “Shokun!” and “Seiron” Sakamoto Rumi (2011),‘Koreans, Go Home!’ Magazines: How did the Conservative Opinions Internet Nationalism in Contemporary Japan as Change?) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten). a Digitally Mediated Subculture,The Asia- Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 10 No 2, March 7. Liberal Democratic Party (2014). “Jiminto Juten Seisaku 2014 (LDP Key Policies 2014).”Sasagase Yuji, Hayashi Keita and Sato Kei

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(2015) Introduction to Nippon Kaigi, The Asia- http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uemura-Takashi/42 Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 48, No. 5, Dec 14. 49 (Last retrieved on February 9, 2015). (translated by J. Victor Koschmann) UN Commission on Human Rights (1996). Tawara, Yoshifumi (1997). Dokyumento “Ianfu” “Addendum Report of the Special Rapporteur Mondai to Kyokasho Kogeki (Documenton violence against women, its causes and “Comfort Women” Issue and Textbookconsequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in Offensives) (Tokyo: Kobunken). accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45 Report on the mission to the Uemura, Takashi with Tomomi Yamaguchi Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the (2015). “Labeled the reporter who ‘fabricated’ Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of the comfort woman issue: A Rebuttal,” The military sexual slavery in wartime.” January 4, Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 13, issue 2, no. 1, 1996. http://www.awf.or.jp/pdf/h0004.pdf (Last January 12,retrieved on February2015. 9, 2015).

SPECIAL FEATURE

Nationalism in Japan

Edited by Jeff Kingston

Jeff Kingston, Introduction: Nationalism in the Abe Era

Akiko Hashimoto, Nationalism, Pacifism, and Reconciliation: Three Paths Forward for Japan‘s “History Problem”

Mark Mullins, Neonationalism, Religion, and Patriotic Education in Post-disaster Japan

Sven Saaler, Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan

Akiko Takenaka, Japanese Memories of the Asia-Pacific War: Analyzing the Revisionist Turn Post-1995

Nakano Koichi is Professor of at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University. In English, he has published articles in The Journal of Japanese Studies, Asian Survey, The Pacific Review, West European Politics, Governance, and a single-authored book entitled Party Politics and Decentralization in Japan and France: When the Opposition Governs (Routledge, 2010) among others. In Japanese, his publications include Sengo Nihon no Kokka Hoshushugi: Naimu/Jichi Kanryō no Kiseki (Postwar State in Japan: A Study of the Bureaucrats of the Ministry of Home Affairs) (Iwanami Shoten, 2013).

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Notes

1 Neoliberalism refers to a set of “small government” policies, including privatization, deregulation, elimination of trade barriers, and cuts in public expenditure, that generally result in a widening gap between the rich and the poor. 2 Only Mori Yoshirō (who comes from a family of local politicians) in the LDP, and Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko from the Democratic Party of Japan served as prime ministers despite lacking family connections in national politics. Abe is counted once even though he served on two separate occasions, 2006-07 and 2012- present. 3 Koizumi’s first cabinet also had five women ministers.

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