British Commonwealth
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
001298 ritish Commonwealth in the Post-War WOrld By ALFRED ZIMMERN d Lecture delivered at 'l'rinity College, Oxford, on 6 May I925 Prtfessor H. W. C. Davis in the Clzair FLORIDA ATlANTIC UNIVERSITY LIBRARY SOCIALIST· LABOR COLLECTION LONDON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS HUMPHREY MILFORD 1926 Pnce 0", Shilling net The :British Commonwealth in the Post-War WOrld By ALFRED ZIMMERN C!./.l Lecture delivered at Trinity College, Oxford, on 6 May £925 Professor H. W. C. Davis in the Chair LONDON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS HUMPHREY MILFORD 1926 Oxford University Press London Edinburgh Glasgow Copenbagen New r ark 'Ioronto Melbourne Cape 'Iown Bombay Calcutta Madras Shangbai Humphrey Milford Publisher to the UNIVERSITY Printed i .. England A I the OXFORD UNIVERSITV PRESS By Joh .. Jo/l1lso" Printer 10 Ihe Unioersily PREFACE 'My love for an institution', wrote the great Dr. Arnold, 'is the measure of my desire to reform it.' Somewhat similar is the attitude towards his country of a thoughtful Englishman, whose work keeps him much abroad and gives him unusual opportunities for observation and com parison. His affections are deepened by absence; but the very detachment which intensifies them widens also the range of his vision and imposes responsibilities of criticism, and sometimes of warning, from which home keeping patriots may be excused. It is from such preoccupations that the address here reprinted took shape. It was delivered at a peculiarly anxious moment in the evolution of our post-war foreign policy, when, oppressed by the multitude and urgency of new problems for which their minds were unprepared, too many seemed inclined to take refuge in an attitude of cowardly negation. If I republish it now, when that negative phase has passed, as I hope and believe for good, it is because, in the Foreign Secretary's own words, , Locarno is only a beginning '. For if Locarno represents a decisive turning-point in British policy, it represents also the definite ascendancy of certain processes of Continental thought and action to which reference is made in these pages. The ascendancy, but not the final consummation; for the Locarno docu ments on their technical side are singularly incomplete, and this incompleteness, with its resulting possibilities of A2 4 PREFACE uncertainty, deadlock, and even of breakdown, is due, as we must never forget, to the fixed attitude of the British government based, as has been repeatedly declared, upon the wishes of the British people-the Continental peoples, with one or two exceptions which it would be invidious to mention (exceptions moreover amenable to British influence), have not only accepted the new order but are ready to accept its natural consequences in the shape of obligations and organization. They are willing to i1tstitutional£ze their desire for peace. We, on the other hand, are still trying to make the best of both worlds, the old and the new. Hence the strange paradox that it is we, who like to think of ourselves as the peace makers, that have caused the Locarno settlement to be far less sweeping in its provisions for the compulsory settlement of disputes than in its provisions for security and sanctions. In the sphere of sanctions, indeed, we have committed ourselves to an interpretation of Article XVI of the Covenant which reproduces textually the relevant phrasing in the Geneva Protocol, thus demonstrating that our real objection to that document was against its arbitration provisions. If by dint of great goodwill and still greater ingenuity it has been possible for the statesmen of seven European countries to formulate their will for peace in a series of complicated local agreements, it is well that we should realize that, in the autumn as in the spring, it is we who are obstructing the development of a simpler and completer system. These remarks are not made in any cavilling spirit. Indeed, where the task has been rendered exceptionally difficult by limiting instructions, the merit of the successful negotiator is itself all the more exceptional. But at a moment when the way seems clear for other and perhaps even bolder efforts of international co-operation, PREFACE 5 it is important to recall that the intellectual difficulties between Britain and the Continent, enlarged upon in these pages, will still continue to confront us at every turn. Nor do I wish to suggest that, in the conflict between Continental systematization and British elasticity, the right is necessarily with our neighbours. No one has a keener sense than I of the value of our British experience and tradition, both in themselves and as an example to other peoples. But I hold that that experience and tradition are wrongly interpreted when it is suggested that they deter us from embodying their result either in general rules or in institutions. British history is in fact a record of periods of elasticity and experiment, periods when we 'kept our hands free' because we were' feeling our way', leading up to moments of definite constitutional achieve ment. To take but one single example: our long and not wholly fortunate period of 'feeling our way' in the sphere ofcolonial government was finally institutionalized, first in responsible government and then in the new system of equal partnership. The question before us is not one of choosing between a 'logical' system and 'illogical' compromises, but simply of deciding, on a careful study of the facts, whether or not the time has come for us to join with our associates in the League of Nations in the adoption of a new general rule-the abolition of the right of private war-and in devising the arrangements to make that rule effective. That there are risks involved I would be the last to deny. So there were in the policy of Lord Durham. But I believe that the risks of the more old-fashioned policy are far greater for all concerned, and particularly for ourselves: that, in fact, it exposes us to dangers which are already embarrassing British policy in more 6 PREFACE continents than one. And it will, I hope, be not one of the least advantages we draw from the Locarno settlement that it will leave us free to concentrate on those extra-European problems which will provide the real test both of the sincerity of our professions and of the working of post-war international institutions. October 22, 1925. THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH IN THE POST-WAR WORLD WHEN I was asked last November to address this meeting of the Oxford Branch of the International Universities League of Nations' Federation, I thought it would be a very delightful thing to be in Oxford in May. So it is; yet I find myself here this evening with very mingled feelings. For one thing, Oxford for me is peopled with ghosts. I ceased to teach here in 1909, four academic generations ago. That is a long time in the undergraduate life of a university, and a very considerable proportion of my pupils-and amongst them some of the most brilliant and one whom I trained to carryon my own teaching work-fell during the war. Oxford is full of their memories, and that is one reason why I have not been in Oxford so frequently in recent years. When I think of them I feel that they were unnecessary victims. Four fellows of New College fell as junior officers. They should never have gone as junior officers. I will not say that their sacrifice was wasted, but their service could have been better rendered under other conditions. They were victims of our wastefulness, of our lack of forethought. I remember how when Lord Milner came back from South Africa some twenty years ago he made what was for some of us an epoch-making speech at the New College Gaude, about the lesson of the South African War. He told us that the qualities of action, in which we British excelled, no longer sufficed, and that the need of the age for Britain was not action but thought. That lesson was never more needed than to-day. It is that lesson which our Federation-the Federation of which I am honorary president-is trying to drive home, because we believe that international politics can be studied in as scientific and scholarly a way as that History, Sir, which you adorn. After all, international politics 8 THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH is only conte,mporary history, and the master of history, Thucydides, devoted himself to that branch of the subject. That is why we are organizing this summer in Geneva, courses of lectures and discussions on some of the main problems of the present-day world. We believe that Geneva is not only an administrative centre, but also, in virtue of that very fact, an educational centre. There is collected there the finest equipment and the most skilled personnel for the conduct of international politics that the world has ever known, and there is no reason at all why all this should not be used for educational purposes as well as for the purposes set forth in the Covenant. We also believe that the main reason for the estrangement and difficulties and misunderstandings between nations is to be sought not in the actual problems over which the dis agreements become manifest, but in the ignorance by nations of one another, of their institutions, their customs, their culture. We propose, therefore, to give a considerable place to interpretative studies of various nations and groups of nations. In the Secretariat and the Labour Office there are something like forty different nations represented in the persons of distinguished individuals, and many of them have expressed their willingness to speak about their own coun tries.