“The Financial Services Reform Act and Australian Bank Risk”
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“The financial services reform act and Australian bank risk” Bernard Bollen AUTHORS Michael Skully Xiaoting Wei ARTICLE INFO Bernard Bollen, Michael Skully and Xiaoting Wei (2010). The financial services reform act and Australian bank risk. Banks and Bank Systems, 5(1) RELEASED ON Thursday, 18 March 2010 JOURNAL "Banks and Bank Systems" FOUNDER LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives” NUMBER OF REFERENCES NUMBER OF FIGURES NUMBER OF TABLES 0 0 0 © The author(s) 2021. This publication is an open access article. businessperspectives.org Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2010 Bernard Bollen (Australia), Michael Skully (Australia), Xiaoting Wei (Australia) The Financial Services Reform Act and Australian bank risk Abstract This paper examines changes in the risk of eight Australian banks following the introduction of the Financial Services Reform Act of 2001 in Australia. This legislation introduced a new licensing regime into Australian finance and extended it to cover all financial services providers. It, among other things, required specialized staff training for specific positions of customer interaction as well as the mandatory and continuous disclosure of all fees and charges as well as the risks associated with financial products offered to the public. Using daily prices and the market model over a five-year sample period (2001 to 2006) we found different reactions between the larger and smaller banks. It provides some evidence that the larger banks may have reduced their level of systematic risk. In contrast, the smaller banks either experienced no change, or in one case perhaps a slight increase. These differences may reflect the degree of change required with their complying with the Act. The larger banks, which already had extensive staff training operations in place, were better placed to meet these new requirements, whereas the smaller banks required a greater relative investment in their initial and ongoing compliance. These results remain robust to the impact of the 2002 dot com stock market downturn. Keywords: bank risk, banking, Australia, regulation. JEL Classification: G21, G28. 2 Introduction © legislation for the various industry sectors . It also protects retail clients3 as they are deemed to have The Financial Services Reform Act (FSRA) is less ability or skills to access the financial Australian government legislation administered by information or to evaluate financial products the Australian Securities and Investments compared with wholesale clients. To enhance Commission (ASIC). In regulatory terms, it is consumer protection, it requires all financial service considered “unique in that it is a single code that providers continuously to disclose any material regulates a vast variety of products and services” information which may affect clients’ decision (Pearson, 2006). It was first proposed by the making. Finally, it leads to greater competition Financial Systems Inquiry Report1 in 1997, so the between financial firms due to clients’ knowledge of Australian financial system could meet the their costs and performance and so it would likely challenges of globalization, convergence and raise product quality (Pearce, 2005). technological change (Lim, 1997). The report offered three reasons for reform. First of all, there The FSRA was only one part of Australia’s major was a change in customer financial needs caused by regulatory reforms in the 1990s whereby a mix of changes in demographics, work force patterns and state and federal regulations and regulators were customer attributes. Secondly, advanced technology absorbed into what might be best called a tripartite had expanded information networks, encouraged system. The Australian Prudential Regulation electronic channels use for financial services and Authority (APRA) became Australia’s one increased both domestic and international prudential regulator while the Australian Securities competition. Finally, financial system reform was and Investment Commission (ASIC) took also forced by Australia’s own regulatory changes responsibility for the financial markets, market to include compulsory superannuation, taxation conduct, clearing and settlement systems and arrangements and the liberalization of cross-border consumer protection as well as corporate activities. capital flows. The FSRA was designed to keep the These operations were then effectively overseen by financial market true, fair and honest (Financial the central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, Services Reform Act, 2001). In order to achieve this which retained responsibility for monitoring the goal, it provides a single unified licensing regime country’s systemic risk and payment systems. which covered all financial markets, products and The first main requirement of FSRA is for all service providers (including individuals, financial service providers to hold a licence and partnerships, trustees and companies) under one regulatory scheme rather than having different 2 As Harding (2001) explains, the FSRA, technically part of the revised © Bernard Bollen, Michael Skully, Xiaoting Wei, 2010. Corporations Act, also helped to reinstate the Australian government’s 1 Australia’s Financial Services Inquiry was appointed by the Australian powers to act in these matters. Previously, it had effectively shared government in June 1996 to examine the results of Australia’s financial many of these powers with the state governments. deregulation; the impact of technology and other future change; and 3 Generally speaking, a retail client includes individuals and small recommended an appropriate regulatory system, accordingly (Financial businesses. Under Corporations Act 2001, a financial product is provided System Inquiry, 1997). Ramsay (2001) provides some useful to a retail client when the financial product is not a general insurance background to the report as well as linking its views to the resulting product, a superannuation product or a retirement saving account and the FSRA as Von Nessen does (2006). financial product is not provided for use in connection with a business. 58 Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2010 thereafter comply with all the rules under FSRA consequences and be heavily regulated. Despite (FSRA, 2001). The FSRA was passed by the concerns of the costs of the FSRA, some banks Australian Parliament on August 23, 2001 and offered some positive reactions. Indeed, the National commenced operations on March 11, 2002 with a Australia Bank (NAB) applied for its financial two-year transition period, i.e. it was not fully services licence six months before the deadline effective till March 11, 2004: seven years after it was (March 11, 2004) (NAB, 2003). Additional staff proposed by the Financial Services Inquiry. training was also undertaken at the Bank of Businesses that commenced after March 11, 2002 Queensland (Liddy, 2004), National Australia Bank had to obtain a financial services licence but existing (NAB, 2003) and other Australian banks between entities did not need one until March 11, 2004. This 2003 and 2004; most banks found it beneficial. gave them two years to adapt to the new rules. Since the implementation of the FSRA, various Therefore, the full effect of FSRA should only be arguments about its benefits and effectiveness have observed after March 11, 2004. The FSRA’s other emerged. One stream has focused on the impact of the main requirement concerns disclosure (FSRA, 2001). FSRA on bank risk. The FSRA was introduced with This information has to be relevant, clear and the main purpose of integrating the financial system. In concise. When financial services are provided to their analysis of financial services providers, some retail clients, financial services guides (FSG), researchers have argued that it may have changed bank statements of advice (SoA) and product disclosure risk as well. This lower risk resulted from the FSRA’s statements (PDS) are required. The FSG outlines the more strict disclosure requirements. This requirement basic information that any retail client is entitled to of more information facilitates more effective market receive. The SoA explains the fees, commission or discipline through which bank risk is reduced any association that might affect the advice. The PDS (Moutsopoulos, 2005). The FSRA’s requirement of a states the features of the financial product and the higher level of staff qualifications and staff training benefits and risks of investing. These statements are may also have lowered bank risk in that greater staff meant to help retail clients better understand financial competence should reduce operational risk (Shepherd, products and so make better investment decisions. 2006). Nevertheless, the FSRA is also claimed to be However, it has been argued that FSRA may not less effective than expected. Despite the extra achieve this goal due to the lengthy, complex information, consumers may not be able to understand documents provided (Pearce, 2005). The arguments it (Phillip, 2004). Furthermore, even if they could for and against the FSRA’s effectiveness are understand these documents, Haigh (2006) argued that discussed further in the literature review section. as these product disclosures are not subject to audit, this may weaken their effectiveness. So the bank risk After the FSRA’s implementation, the Australian might not have been reduced after all. Worse still, banks publically expressed their concerns about its some banks may have sought to offset the FSRA’s operational impact. The Bank of Queensland