Nueva17 East Africa Al-Shabaab Aff.Pdf
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We Affirm. Contention one is landmines. Irin News reports in 2013 that Al-Shabaab uses landmines as a means to secure territory and strategic locations. Michael Moore of the Landmine Monitor furthers in 2011 that extensive minefields exist in nearly every East African country, making land unusable. Professor Adinoyi of the University of Nairobi furthers in 2013 that these landmines have paralyzed development efforts in East Africa by cutting off access to water, farmlands, and urban markets. Unfortunately, Steinar Essen of the Landmine Action Review explains in 2015, East African removal programs received only one-seventh of the funds they needed to operate, causing most activities to be suspended. Landmine clearance is effective. The State Department explains in 2017, past US efforts have helped over 16 war-torn countries declare themselves mine-free. Contention two is Al-Shabaab. Wachira Maina at The East African reports in 2017 that Trump intends to withdraw the US from the fight against Al-Shabab, which will prompt Ethiopia and Kenya to withdraw and allow Al- Shabab to grow strong again. Additionally, Jonathan Masters at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2017 that the UN peacekeeping mission AMISOM is pulling out of the region and transferring responsibility to the local Somali forces, risking the full collapse of the Somali government. Bronwyn Bruton at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2010 that a collapsed Somalia would provide fertile ground for terrorism, drug trafficking, and a host of other ills that would spill beyond the border. We solve in three ways. 1. Direct engagement. Hassan Mohamud at Al Jazeera explains in 2013 that increased US counterterrorism is essential in the fight against Al-Shabab, as it has historically helped reclaim territory and cut off Al-Shabab’s supply of fighters, funding, and materials. 2. Second, drones. Cathy Haenlein at the Royal United Services Institute explains in 2015 that US drone strikes against Al-Shabab have been empirically effective at weakening the group, with a single strike killing 30 of the group’s members, including key leaders. Additionally, Philip Attuquayefio at the University of Ghana finds in 2014 that in the context of proliferation across the continent, increased drone use in Africa provides vital intelligence on terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab to gauge the capabilities of groups and avoid devastating miscalculations. He furthers, African governments don’t have the capacity or political will to gather intel, while traditional US ground forces can’t due to lack of infrastructure, the multi-country geographical spread of terrorist groups, and inevitable sovereignty conflicts over border crossings. 3. Third, special operations. Linda Robinson at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2013 that currently special ops are currently focused on “direct action”, which entails an endless and ineffective game of terrorist whack-a-mole, whereas “indirect action” would fund an approach in which the US works with local militaries to achieve lasting outcomes. Sam Ehrlich at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2015 that implementing this multilateral project in East Africa would require more financial backing, which is why prioritization is key. Ehrlich continues that higher funding would create more governmental accountability and allow the US to train host nations, resulting in better civilian protection and effectively fighting back groups like Al-Shabab. Failure to beat Al-Shabaab causes three impacts. 1. First, worsening humanitarian crises. Mark Hanrahan at NBC News explains in 2017 that conflict and violence in Africa both create humanitarian crises and prevent aid from ever reaching the people who need it. Moreover, Jason Burke at the Guardian reports in 2017 that US laws require that no aid ever reach terrorist groups like Al-Shabab, creating a chilling effect where humanitarian aid organizations don’t risk sending aid to areas with terrorism. 2. Nuclear terror. Lisa Saenz at the University of Texas explains in 2013 that because many African countries have nuclear reactors with enriched uranium and the entire continent is built on uranium ore, the probability of Al-Shabab conducting a nuclear terrorist attack against the US is continually increasing. John Mutua at the African Security Review furthers in 2015 that this is uniquely likely due to poorly secured nuclear materials across the continent, ease of trafficking due to porous borders, the proliferation of nuclear expertise, and terrorist controlled land in East Africa providing a prime location for nuclear weapons development, testing, and launch. Empirically, counter-terrorism stops nuclear terrorism, as Shalev Meir at the Strategic Intelligence Service finds in 2015 that US intelligence teams working with Kenya stopped Al-Shabab from using several backpack-sized nuclear weapons that were destined for a massive attack. Strategic studies professor Robert Ayson concludes in 2010 that a nuclear terrorist attack would cause US leaders to assume the worst and put the nuclear arsenal on high alert, in turn causing Russia and China to anticipate US retaliation, creating incentives for both sides to preemptively strike and start a full nuclear war. 3. Bioterror. Bob Feldman at the US Army explains in 2014 that frightening diseases like Ebola are in insecure African labs that are an easy target for terrorists. Maria Kelley at American Military University explains in 2012 that because Al-Shabaab has huge funding from numerous state sponsors, support from Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, and territorial control, it’s in the perfect position to acquire or create bioweapons for an attack. Amanda Teckman at the Council on Foreign Relations furthers in 2013 that an Ebola bioterror attack would be uniquely devastating in East Africa because of the high fatality rate and infectiousness, lack of a cure, and huge flow of investors, tourists, students, and NGOs in the region that would result the disease spreading globally. Underview Stuart Armstrong at the University of Oxford explains in 2015 that low probability high magnitude impacts are often ignored because humans are psychologically biased against scenarios that are outside our experience and are thus difficult to comprehend, which justifies overcompensating and taking preventative action since our gut response will be ill-calibrated. FRONTLINES Summary OV Impact calc – extinction first means we prioritjize all lives cx, there’s not low risk they dropped the impact – psych bias is armstrong and dropped bioterror BIOTERROR Al-Shabaab has the funding and territory to steal ebola from unguarded labs or create a bioweapon in their own facilities - that’s Feldman and Kelley - means it’s TRY OR DIE for stopping ebola bioterror - an East African attack would go global due to huge flow of travelers and high infectiousness, lethality, and lack of a cure means it would either cause extinction or end civilization as we know it - that’s Teckman and Keating Bioterror outweighs - a pandemic would end civilization and risk extinction, and it turns case even if the disease gets contained - borders would be closed and travel to ground zero in East Africa would be banned which means no more aid, and aid organizations would be too busy recovering from the disease to solve the grid, landmines, food, vaccines, DCTs. PICK ONE We solve - Attaquayefio says US drones are the only way to gather intelligence about the weapons capabilities of terrorist groups and stop attacks - neither US conventional forces nor local governments can gather the same high quality intel as drones, - BUT successes like the Meir evidence won’t continue because the Maina evidence says the US is withdrawing from the fight which will cause Al-Shabaab to resurge which is why prioritization is necessary and also non-uniques their link turns. We solve - Ehrlich says renewed funding trains local forces in conjunction with special ops to stop Al Shabaab and Robinson says that form of indirect action creates lasting change and eliminates the threat for good. Line by line framing issue is that the intel internal link is insulated from the question of whether the Aff totally solves for Al-Shabaab because even if they still exist if we have drone intel it stops bioterror attacks from succeeding so most of their arguments don’t answer this scenario. THEY DROPPED THE IMAPCT and all the turns case stuff AT: uq 1. Pullout now – that’s Maina – their al jazeera ev is unspec – and amisom pullout now All the turns – inev they already hate us only question is if we stop attacks Powers Wood Bergen not about Africa or CTE Bruton card saying they solve isn’t about hum assistance AT: Turns to drones: 1. These are just disads - they don’t turn our internal link about drone intelligence stopping nuclear terror from Attuquayefio 2. No link - the Attuquayefio ev says the vast majority of drone usage in Africa is for intel, not killing. AT: Special ops trains govts that abuse human rights 1. We solve - The Ehrlich evidence says that more funding means more supervision of government forces which stops human rights abuse. 2. Just a disad - doesn’t disprove that Special ops can crush Al-Shabaab and nuclear terror massively outweighs human rights violations. CASE TAKEOUTS We’ll concede we don’t solve Al-Shabaab - that takes out their case 1. Somali government collapse causes terror and drug trafficking spillover to the region which makes aid delivery impossible - that’s Masters and Bruton. 2. Al Shabaab resurgence means A, terrorists steal food aid which causes war - that’s Knack and Keaton and offense for us, B, aid organizations are legally barred from sending aid to the region - that’s Burke, C, grid development is impossible, and D, the landmine problem gets worse. Extend Anderson - aid means governments spend less on helping civilians and more on war, - that means the net amount of assistance stays the same which takes out all their offense but it also turns the whole case - war exacerbates hunger destroys infrastructure and means new landmines.