CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION: DATAINSEARCH OFATHEORY CHARLES H.KENNEDY Departmentof Politics,W Akeforest University, Winston-Salem, NC, U.S.A
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404 VOLUME 26 Journalof Asianand African Studies V ol.26 (1991) pp. 1-10 CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION: DATAINSEARCH OFATHEORY CHARLES H.KENNEDY Departmentof Politics,W akeForest University, Winston-Salem, NC, U.S.A. DAVID J.LOUSCHER Departmentof Political Science, University of Akron, OH, U.S.A. Threeconceptual themes have dominated social science literature pertaining to civil-military interaction-militaryprofessionalism, theories of the coup d’ etat,and governmental performance. Thischapter brie y describesthe content of these themes and places the contributions to this volume withinthe context of such literature. Journalof Asianand African Studies V ol.26 (1991) pp. 11-26 FROM THEDEFENSE OF THENA TION TOAID TOTHECIVIL: THEARMY INCONTEMPORARY INDIA SUMIT GANGULY Departmentof PoliticalScience, Hunter College, City University of New York,New York,NY , U.S.A. Unlikemany professional armies in the developing world the Indian Army has shown little or no interestin political involvement. During British colonial rule the of cers and the men of thearmy weresocialized into accepting the notion of political neutrality. Independent India’ s politicians, mostnotably Jawaharlal Nehru, carefully reinforced this tradition. In thepast few decades several developmentshave threatened this Nehruvian legacy. Increasing ethnolinguistic violence coupled withthe venality of local police forces have led to increasing reliance on the Army to maintaincivil order.Its tactics and strategy are designed to ghtorganized forces not urban mobs or elusivecivilian terrorists.More importantly, in an ethnically plural state like India, repeated use of theArmy to quell communalviolence threatens to politicize the Army. Inordinate reliance on the Army to maintain civilorder may also help erode its long-standing tradition of political neutrality. When the Army beginsto assume duties normally restricted to the civil bureaucracy the temptation to intervene in politicsincreases dramatically. Journalof Asianand African Studies V ol.26 (1991) pp. 27-42 THEMILIT ARY AND POLITICS INPAKISTAN HASAN-ASKARI RIZVI Departmentof PoliticalScience, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan Theassumption of powerby Ms. Benazir Bhutto after the November 1988 general elections marked therehabilitation of civilian rule after a longspell of themilitary’ s directand indirect rule in Pak- istan.The top brass who assumed the command of the Army after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq haveexpressed their support for the Constitution and the elected civilian government. However, the militarycontinues to bean important political force and Bhutto has to treadher path carefully. Given thedelicate political situation, strong opposition to Bhutto in Punjab,and a well-establishedtradi- tionof themilitary’ s directrole in politics, a returnof the military to powerin thefuture cannot be ruled out. Anearlier version of this study appeared as the “ Legacyof Military Rule in Pakistan” , Survival Vol.XXXI, No.3 (May/June1989), pp. 255-268. VOLUME 26 405 Journalof Asianand African Studies V ol.26 (1991) pp. 43-60 BANGLADESH MILITARY:POLITICALINSTITUTIONALIZA TION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CRAIG BAXTER Departmentof PoliticalScience, Juniata College SYEDUR RAHMAN Departmentof PublicAdministration, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, P A,U.S.A. AsBangladesh completes 18 years of freedom it will also complete almost 14 years of military governmentor governmentsdominated by themilitary. This chapter examines the praetorian regimes oflatePresident Ziaur Rahman (1975-81) and President Hussain Muhammad Ershad (since 1982) whotook over the reign of government soon after the assassination of PresidentZia. Although both leadersused a similarapproach their strategies and tactics were different. Zia sought initial support fromthe military/ civilianbureaucracy but dealt harshly with military uprisings during this regime andlater reduced resource allocation to the military/ civilianbureaucracy channeling more resources tothebusiness groups and rural areas. Ershad on theother hand continues to maintain the support ofthemilitary/ civilianbureaucracy by providingthem with more resources while at the same time seekingrural support. Neither has gained legitimacy although Ziaur Rahman came closer to attaining it. Journalof Asianand African Studies V ol.26 (1991) pp. 61-75 THEMILIT ARY INBLACKAFRICAN POLITICS STEVEN THOMAS SEITZ Departmentof PoliticalScience, University of Urbana-Champaign,Illinois, U.S.A. Thisarticle examines the thesis that SubSaharan policy makers maximized political survival at the costof arrestedeconomic development. The supporting argument suggests that the nascent nation- statesof SubSaharan Africa were too fragile to foster “ rational”economic development, and that theyalso lacked an economic infrastructure for encouraging political development. Thus political participationat the cost of unmanageable public spending was pitted against either authoritarian developmentor military rule, both of which came at the cost of nation-building and citizenship. Participatoryregimes fostered nation-building through public consumption; military regimes could resistsuch pressures and hence better control public indebtedness. Authoritarian regimes fostered economicdevelopment; military regimes could foster economic austerity. Freed from the tasks of nation-buildingand economic development, military regimes in SubSaharanAfrica could foster the developmentof state institutions for enforcing public order and austere economic accounting. Journalof Asianand African Studies V ol.26 (1991) pp. 76-95 THESOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY:THEDILEMMAS OFEXPANDED INFLUENCE INDECISION-MAKING ROBERTGRIFFITHS Departmentof Political Science, University of NorthCarolina at Greensboro,NC, U.S.A. Duringthe regime of President P .W.Botha,circumstances combined to give the South African se- curityestablishment an unprecedentedimpact on decision making. Greater threat perception, along withPresident Botha’ s closeassociation with the military allowed the security forces to institutional- izetheir in uence at everylevel of government.The creeping militarization of South African politics meantthat domestic and foreign policy, as well as economic decisions, were subject to military in u- .