British Geostrategy for a New European Age Luis Simón and James Rogers

THE RUSI JOURNAL

British Geostrategy for a new European Age Luis Simón and James Rogers

For decades, European security has been assured by a grand, Anglo-American inspired political and economic project on the continent. Today, there is a risk that the old certainties are unravelling. In a previousRUSI Journal article, Luis Simón and James Rogers warned of the new risks in Europe; now, the authors offer a strategy for Britain to retain its vital place at the crux of an open, liberal European system.

n the pages of this journal a year ago, Ocean, reached initial operational and Paris (and Warsaw) to discuss we warned of a return of geopolitical capability, and a prototype stealth fighter European security arrangements. To Icompetition in Europe, pointing has generated widespread interest the continent’s southeast, Turkey is also to the formation of bilateral groupings among military experts and political emerging as an important geopolitical among the main continental powers pundits.3 Furthermore, Japan’s increasing actor, often adopting positions that clash (chiefly Russia, France and Germany).1 assertiveness – as evidenced by a new with the interests of Britain and the rest Importantly, these relationships defence review that breaks with the of the European Union on energy security have started to bypass the post-war country’s post-war introspective tradition or Middle Eastern affairs (particularly multilateral structures – the Atlantic – and America’s whopping investment of concerning Israel, Iraq and Iran). Alliance and, increasingly, the European over £8 billion for upgrading its military Against this backdrop, this article Union – which, for over six decades, station in Guam are among many other assesses the extent to which Britain can have organised European political and examples illustrating the increasing prevent the collapse of the balances economic cohesion around integration geopolitical centrality of East Asia.4 that have underpinned economic and representative government. Having These developments exert a ‘pull’ effect prosperity and general security on the identified the US’s gradual withdrawal emanating from eastern Eurasia, which European mainland since the Second and downscaling of Europe as a focus continues to weaken America’s presence World War. We move from geopolitics of its geostrategy, we argued that the on the European continent, removing the to geostrategy. We argue that Britain’s proliferation of bilateral groupings could decisive factor that has helped Britain to position in the unfolding decade will lead to a de-structuring of a largely manage the regional geopolitical balance depend on the decisions over the next British-inspired Europe. Over the last year for over six decades. few years. Here, new and strengthened things have moved quickly; both in terms At the same time, budgetary crises bilateral alliances can and must play of tectonic geopolitical shifts globally and across the EU have highlighted tensions a key role in safeguarding Britain’s in Europe, and Britain’s response to those among key member states over the influence over an increasingly challenging changes. strategic direction of the European regional environment. Indeed, the The rise of Asia (and China in Monetary Union, testing the resilience British Conservative-Liberal coalition particular) is now a dominant theme for of European economic integration and government, in office for almost a year, foreign policy experts. China’s economy political stability.5 The US ‘reset button’ has already started to adapt to new has, so far, emerged from the global with Russia has crystallised into a new realities: not only has it renewed an financial crisis stronger, with larger Atlantic Alliance-Russia strategic concept historic military alliance with France, capital reserves to buy itself influence and forced Poland’s hand into a more but it has also strengthened economic across the world – including in Europe.2 accommodating stance toward Moscow.6 and political ties with the Nordic space. Economic growth has come hand-in- Russia’s gains and role in Eastern Europe, However, these successes aside, Britain’s hand with military modernisation: in southeastern Europe and the Caucasus bilateral policies must also be anchored 2011, a new anti-ship ballistic missile, are now broadly recognised, and Moscow in an institutional framework such as specifically intended to push American takes part in an informal yet increasingly the European Union; otherwise, the carrier groups deeper into the Pacific institutionalised framework with Berlin chances for long-term success will

RUSI 156_2 TEXT.indd 52 13/04/2011 10:17:53 No room for the UK? French President Nicolas Sarkozy, centre, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, right, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, left, meet for a two-day summit in Deauville to discuss joint security challenges, October 2010. Courtesy of AP Photo/Remy de la Mauviniere.

be poor due to the sheer scale of the steppe, the European plain has fertile necessary to quash Imperial Spain’s bid forces working against British interests. farmland, numerous river systems and for ‘Universal Monarchy’ in the sixteenth In this spirit, we propose a series of good harbours that have, over the last century. It was against growing Dutch policy recommendations that include a few centuries, underpinned trade and naval power that the British fought to strengthening of the bilateral relationship unrelenting agricultural and industrial negate the dominance of the United with Germany, an opening of the military development.8 These geographic Provinces in the seventeenth century. It agreement with France to other European enablers provided Europeans with the was at Waterloo, in Belgium, in the early countries and a greater willingness stimulus necessary to forge the world’s nineteenth century, that Britain delivered towards economic and political first modern industrial nation-states the final knockout blow to France’s bid government at the European level. and build ‘go-anywhere’ empires. The for European hegemony. And, it was European plain’s northwestern tip is only for the northwestern pivot during The European Plain and British particularly significant: it has long served the twentieth century that London was Security as the geopolitical ‘pivot’ of Europe. Since prepared to sacrifice its global imperium The UK has, for over three centuries, Charlemagne, all the European great on not one, but two occasions to prevent been the ultimate arbiter of European powers – France, Spain, Germany and the the Low Countries’ incorporation into a affairs. The British, safe in their island UK – have struggled to control this zone. hostile German order – or, indeed, get citadel, have been free to gear their For Britain, this makes the Low swallowed up by the Soviet empire that military towards power projection, Countries particularly significant. Control followed.9 providing the means to usurp budding of the northwestern pivot is essential for After 1945, the UK (backed by the European overlords. The central logic of the two overriding and deeply entwined US) concentrated on devising a lasting British geostrategy has been to maintain objectives of British geostrategy: firstly, institutional arrangement in Europe to a favourable balance of power on the the maintenance of a favourable balance prevent another devastating great power European mainland – and particularly of power on the European plain and run on the Low Countries. The Atlantic the European plain – to prevent a the European mainland more broadly; Alliance and European integration were threat from materialising to the heavily and secondly, ensuring that Britain’s central to this enterprise. Here, it is populated English core, which, in global maritime power projection – a crucial to remember that in spite of turn, would jeopardise Britain’s wider prerequisite for commercial activity – is its early reluctance to directly engage global interests.7 Stretching from the unhindered. So it was in the Netherlands in the European Community (and its French Atlantic coast to the Russian that the British poured the resources reservations to fully engage in the EU

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today), Britain has always understood Moscow’s assertiveness towards what it political and economic rules that have European integration as part of a wider, regards as its ‘near abroad’ snuffed out governed European politics for decades. largely British-inspired, French-executed the likelihood of further pro-European In this regard, the emergence of the and American-backed geopolitical democratic revolutions throughout the triumvirate between Russia, Germany agenda. After all, the ‘software’ region. and France (recently joined by Poland) to governing European geopolitics over Likewise, the 2008 conflict was discuss European security arrangements the past six decades – free trade and crucial in undermining Ukraine and has acquired a different meaning, not representative government – was only forcing it into rapprochement with Russia, least due to America’s ‘reset button’ made possible when filtered through a best illustrated by the recent change of rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia. Paris and particular ‘hardware’, that is, a British government in Keiv and the renewal of Berlin, in particular, see the rise of an and American-led maritime Europe, Russia’s lease over the naval station in increasingly multipolar European order tamed through institutions but ultimately Sevastopol.12 Not only does this represent as almost inevitable, underpinned by backed by their overwhelming military a setback in Ukraine’s ‘European’ Russia’s resurgence in the east, Turkey’s power.10 Ever since, European geopolitics orientation, but it also amplifies Russia’s rise to the southeast and the emergence has been organised around two presence around the Black Sea. Similarly, of an American-Russian relationship to principles (free trade and representative Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria, hedge against China.15 In such changing government); one geographic pillar (the its flirting with Iran and increasingly circumstances, and without prejudging northwestern pivot); and two institutions confrontational approach towards Israel, their different perspectives and interests, (NATO and the European Union). threaten to disrupt the balance of power France and Germany see Russia’s return This constellation was given renewed in the Middle East, just as closer Russo- to a prominent place in European emphasis after the end of the Cold War: Turkish relations would effectively shut geopolitics as necessary in order to 1991 marked the high point of Britain’s the European Union out of the Middle increase predictability and stability on approach; all existential threats to British East and Central Asia.13 Finally, Iran’s the continent. security were erased. The rollback of acquisition of nuclear weapons and The rationale for a pan-European Soviet and Russian power ensured that long-range missiles could destabilise the settlement might have taken a the geopolitical fulcrum of power finally Middle East, and bring Central Europe 180-degree turn in the space of ten years. rested in the Low Countries, with the under direct threat for the first time. If in the late 1990s France and Germany Atlantic Alliance and the European Next, mainland Europeans have saw the concept of a pan-European Union – with Britain dominant in both – grown progressively more interested security community as instrumental in a position of economic, ideological and in Russian designs. In October 2010, for hedging against excessive American military supremacy. German, French and Russian leaders power, they see today’s Medvedev met at the French resort of Deauville Proposal as a means to overcome Is Britain’s Post-Cold War to discuss the so-called ‘Medvedev Washington’s ongoing disengagement European Order Falling Apart? Proposal’ for a new European security from the continent. In some European The challenges to Britain’s preferred architecture.14 Moscow’s objective capitals, the belief is taking hold that a European settlement are now very is simple: to transcend the ‘British- new institutionalised framework that real. Firstly, European affairs are no inspired’ European status-quo. Russia comprises the continent’s remaining longer at the top of US geostrategic loathes this order for circumventing its great powers (chiefly Russia, Germany priorities, as they were during the Cold potential reach deeper into the European and France, but also Poland) is required War and for much of the 1990s, when peninsula. But this is old hat; Russia has to buttress European stability.16 Insofar the management of the Soviet demise always sought more influence in Western as this threatens to disintegrate the demanded greater attention towards Europe. Back in the Cold War Moscow established European architecture and European developments ranging from welcomed West Germany’s Ostpolitik displace the epicentre of European German reunification, through the crises and Charles de Gaulle’s project for a geopolitics away from the northwestern in the Western Balkans, to the conception Europe stretching from the ‘Atlantic to pivot and towards Central and Eastern and implementation of eastern the Urals’. Russia saw these as windows Europe, Britain’s ideological, geographic enlargement. Recent events illustrate of opportunity for revising the British and and institutional framework risks this US disengagement. Irrespective of its American-led European order. However, coming apart. An eastwards shift in the direct causes, Russia’s invasion of Georgia the sheer danger of the Soviet threat balance of power may, to some extent, in 2008 confirmed the re-establishment and British-American determination undermine the basic economic and of Moscow’s grip in the Caucasus – a marked strict limits to France and (West) political liberalism of post-war European ‘geographic corridor’ vital for the future Germany’s flirting with Soviet Russia. geopolitics. of European energy security.11 The But unlike in the past, the conditions Russian invasion showed that neither are today ripe for a renewed ‘pull’ from Whither the ‘Special Americans nor Europeans were the the east – especially from Russia (and Relationship’? exclusive actors in the European Union’s from behind it Turkey and China) – Over the past sixty years, the US has been eastern neighbourhood anymore. And resulting in a qualitative reshuffle of the crucial in helping provide Britain with

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the means to secure its key geostrategic European endeavours. It will help Britain Eeuw. Eighteenth- and nineteenth- objectives on the European plain. But as hedge against the potential failure of any century Britain gave this great European the attacks of 11 September 2001, the new political order and the UK’s inferior vision its maximum expression, not least subsequent interventions in Afghanistan alliance infrastructure, and would also in a geographical sense. But it remained, and Iraq and the geopolitical rise of East continue to provide an insurance policy of ultimately, a European enterprise. As Asia have sucked American power out last resort against a hypothetical Russian such, the acceleration of European decay of Europe and into the east and south resurgence – let alone any attempts – whether due to a resurgence of regional of Eurasia, Britain has progressively, and of the latter to extend its power to the conflict or the inability of Europeans to quickly, lost its geopolitical anchor.17 Baltic states, or beyond the Vistula or project their power in pursuit of their This compounds Britain’s new European Carpathians. While the possibility of an security – would inevitably drag Britain question. eventual American ‘return’ to Europe down too. Recent developments in Russia, should not be discounted, the Special As it confronts an increasingly Georgia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have Relationship cannot remain the nexus uncertain European environment, Britain run against British national interests, of British geostrategy, if only for the is left with two options: the first one is and represent a setback to traditional simple fact that the importance the US to recognise that a multipolar Europe British objectives in and around Europe; now attaches to the Pacific and Indian is inevitable; the second is to play to namely, the maintenance of a balance Oceans far outweighs its attention to Britain’s geopolitical strengths by making of power centred on the northwestern contemporary Europe.20 And this cannot the successes of the past three centuries pivot and spread of economic openness be the case for Britain, for obvious permanent. If Britain accepts a multipolar and democratic government throughout geographical reasons. Britain’s European Europe, it should devote its efforts to the continent. Why has Britain stood strategy must be autonomous of the couching the effects of multipolarity idle while the political structures so many uncertainties that surround the by crafting a network of bilateral meticulously put together over the past evolution of American foreign policy. partnerships with all great European three centuries are pulled apart? The longer it takes for Britain to realise powers. Britain has already fallen behind The answer is simple: current that there is a growing need for a in this version of the game: whilst Britain British strategy is not equipped to change of direction, the sooner new has improved its relationship with France, respond adequately to the ongoing narratives and institutions – like ‘grand its ties to Germany could be improved assault on the post-1991 European European bargain’, ‘Franco-German- and its relationship with Russia is rather order, due to strategic complacency and Russian triumvirate’, ‘new security weak. All the other three major European an over-reliance on the so-called ‘special architecture’ – will gain hold among powers have a far more advanced relationship’ with the US. During the mainland European elite and public infrastructure of bilateral relationships Second World War, many Britons came opinion, to the detriment of British than Britain has. Although Britain must to believe that the US was indispensable interests. do its best to improve its bilateral for sustaining the fulcrum of European standing with key European partners, it power in the north western pivot. But Bilateralism within cannot limit itself to such steps. In fact, as Washington lowers its guard in the Multilateralism bilateralism alone would lead to a Europe continent, Britain’s tried-and-tested Indeed, to assume that the UK can stay scattered economically and politically, approach may no longer be appropriate.18 aloof from the European mainland or posing a threat to a British-inspired Recent events clearly prove that the conceive of a future where continental order whose essence necessarily requires special relationship no longer provides Europeans underperform economically it to be multilaterally tamed through an appropriate framework for defending and militarily while British power thrives British-backed institutions. In order to British interests and values in and around next to the US, or some sort of renewed succeed in restoring the balances that the European peninsula, though we Commonwealth, is a dangerous fantasy. have governed European geopolitics should not overestimate the extent of a Historically, British power has thrived to over the past few decades, Britain potential American retreat.19 the tune of military, financial and political needs to complement a reinvigorated There must be no misunderstanding developments on the European plain.21 approach towards bilateral alliances in here: the Anglo-American partnership The British owe their power and historical Europe with a broader policy that ties will continue to be of great importance capital to their position in Europe, the site all of those together in a multilateral to the UK. Britons and Americans are of so many key innovations over the last framework, which not only ensures the united in their commitment to a global five hundred years: financial innovation, maintenance of economic and political order based on free trade, representative modern science, geographical discovery, cohesion around internal free trade and government and, ultimately, a balance of military technology, democracy, free constitutional government, but also power in Eurasia that does not threaten, trade and the rise of the modern nation- maintains London at its heart. but rather underpins those principles. state.22 Such values find their origins in Additionally, a close relationship with Ancient Greece and Rome, and were Re-Centring Britain Washington will continue to fulfil further ‘finessed’ by Renaissance Italy As an island surrounded by the sea, important functions for London’s and the Netherlands during the Gouden Britain is geopolitically exceptional. It has

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developed a maritime persona, which has an alternative to Franco-German primacy balances, as well as to serve as the been both a strength and a weakness: a in economic matters.23 However, the basis for European global power in strength because it has provided the ‘Nordic drive’ serves another, perhaps a world where the rise of continent- incentive to maintain formidable naval more important, purpose: to consolidate sized superpowers is inevitable. Given power, which has enabled Britain to British power in the Baltic and hedge its population, size, resources and project its interests overseas; and a against Russia. In part in response to the central geographical position on the weakness because it has sometimes sensitivities of the Nordic states, some of European plain, Germany’s inclusion discouraged active British participation which have set up their own initiatives to in any such design is essential. For in European affairs. When the European co-operate in military matters, London obvious geographical and historical mainland seems stable Britain tends to has seized the moment to build up its reasons, France’s security and economic disengage, hiding behind the sea and its influence around the Baltic Sea and prosperity are directly tied to that of navy while pursuing interests elsewhere. perhaps send a signal of its interest Germany. France will not simply choose When the mainland becomes unstable in the geopolitics of the future of the Britain to the detriment of Germany: a Britain eventually gets stuck in, bringing wider Arctic region, and its potential strong Franco-German relationship is its full power to bear. This leads to a mineral wealth.24 Most significantly, not optional for Paris. Further, without see-saw effect in British geostrategy. This though, the new British government a sign of a British commitment to the must stop. As history shows, isolation has worked hard to upgrade Britain’s wider European framework, France will from the European mainland can never oft-overlooked entente with France. On perceive Britain’s attempts to improve be splendid: it is during periods of British 2 November 2010, the British prime bilateral relations as a simple hedging isolation that the European balance of minister and French president signed strategy devoid of deeper meaning. power tends to go awry. Today, Britain two historic treaties to foster deeper This would only encourage France to faces a similar choice: it can either military co-operation over the next continue investing in a diverse alliance continue to pursue other interests, fifty years, including nuclear weapons portfolio on the continent – including a seemingly oblivious to European affairs, research.25 The financial boons aside, highly developed bilateral relationship with all the consequences that are bound a tighter alliance with France will also with Russia – and, ultimately, accelerate to follow; or it can take a renewed and bring important geopolitical benefits the crystallisation of a multipolar deeper interest. to the UK. After all, France is the only Europe. Furthermore, aside from being Accordingly, if Britain is to succeed other European state with a great- indispensable to the economic and in restoring the geopolitical system that power-style ‘strategic culture’; not only political success of Europeans, a greater has governed European geopolitics is France willing to deploy force and British input into Brussels and a stronger through the last six decades, it requires maintain an extended regional military Anglo-German relationship would a mutually inclusive two-track strategy. posture through its military stations in also serve a more specific purpose for First, Britain needs to develop its Africa, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, Britain: compensating for the fact that bilateral partnerships more rapidly, and but it is also willing to spend money on France enjoys a more developed alliance more effectively. Second, it must engage military research and development.26 By infrastructure in the continent, and multilaterally by seeking the transition working together, London and Paris could reinforcing Britain’s own position in the of the European Union to a politico- ensure that they remain – and entrench framework of a British-French grande military association, while simultaneously themselves as – Europe’s leading entente at that.28 In this regard, Britain positioning itself in the European driving powers, thereby reinforcing a strong and must identify key issues where it can work seat. Both tracks are inseparable. Lack ‘strategic’ Europe as opposed to a weak with Germany, such as the promotion of of engagement in the European Union and ‘pacifist’ one.27 market reforms in general, and that of a limits Britain’s ability to develop special Nevertheless, it is imperative that liberalised European military-industrial relationships with its main European neither Britain’s ‘Nordic drive’ nor and technological market in particular. partners. Likewise, without a portfolio the Anglo-French grande entente are Finally, if London is to preserve the of strong bilateral relationships London conceived of in a narrow sense, as merely balances that have assured its security cannot seriously aspire to lead and another ‘asset’ to strengthen London’s and economic prosperity for decades, engineer European integration in a way position within a multipolar Europe or it cannot seek anything other than that benefits British interests. as a solution to address immediate and absolute control over the European pressing financial difficulties. Closer mainland’s adjacent seas. This requires Alliance-making co-operation, particularly between a strengthening of bilateral alliances The UK has enjoyed some initial success London and Paris, must be set within a with other key European partners and, in diversifying its alliance portfolio in wider European design whose objective crucially, the anchoring of all those Europe. The coalition government has must be the re-invigoration of the initiatives under the broader multilateral moved quickly in driving forward a new European Union, remodelled to more framework of a renewed EU under grouping of Nordic states to create a effectively suit British interests. This is British leadership. A strong, British-led, European vanguard for industrial and crucial to both reverse the increasing maritime Europe requires command over technological innovation, and possibly de-structuring of Europe’s regional the Mediterranean Sea; the projection

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of a strong presence in the Arctic; and, Conclusion an end.30 As the means no longer deliver via the Atlantic Ocean and Red Sea, Insofar as Britain and the US have framed Britain’s ends, an uncomfortable question deep oceanic power projection into the European system since the end of has arisen: is the UK able to adapt its the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Second World War, they have looked means to its ends, through a reappraisal beyond. This mandates that Britain step on in recent years as the structures of bilateral European relationships and up its relationship with key partners they built have started to dissolve. a leadership position in the European along those routes, with a view to both The UK bears a special responsibility for Union, or has its geostrategic insight courting them bilaterally and integrating this situation because its geopolitical been swallowed by sixty years of them multilaterally. Beyond the European position – as an offshore balancer par effective dependence on the US? Can northwestern pivot, Spain and Portugal excellence – provides it with enviable Britain find the courage to prevent a are key to British-led European maritime influence over the European mainland. multipolar European system from taking security, especially in relation to control The US was fully committed to Britain’s hold, while simultaneously ensuring that of the Mediterranean and Northern agenda both during and immediately the EU’s geopolitical retreat, economic Africa, as well as European power after the Cold War. Aside from underperformance, political disarray projection into Latin America and West facilitating Britain’s global presence, and global irrelevance are halted and Africa. Particularly important for the the Anglo-American special relationship reversed? The jury is still out. ■ Mediterranean, as well as Northern served a crucial regional end: ensuring Africa and the Levant, are Italy, Greece, Britain’s objectives in Europe were Dr Luis Simón recently obtained his PhD Malta and Cyprus. Poland, Lithuania, upheld. However, following 9/11 and at Royal Holloway, University of London. Latvia and Estonia, and the Nordic states the prolongation of its interventions in He is currently a postdoctoral researcher of Sweden, Denmark and Finland, are key Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as rising at the Institute for European Studies to the Baltic zone – crucial as the outer uncertainty in East Asia, the US has grown (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and co- defensive perimeter of the European less able and willing to place British ordinates the security and defence panel plain – as well as for deeper European designs at the centre of its own effort – at Fundación Alternativas in Madrid. In projection into the Arctic. Finally, Bulgaria a trend that will only continue with the 2009 he was a Visiting Fellow at the and Romania are mandatory for the EU’s rise of China in East Asia and India in the European Union Institute for Security influence around the Black Sea, itself Indian Ocean. Studies, where he published an critical to its presence in the Caucasus, This is not theoretical abstraction. occasional paper on the planning aspect the Middle East and Central Asia. Both Recent events in Georgia, Ukraine, of EU military operations. He has been a stronger bilateral relationships with those Turkey, Iran and elsewhere are powerful guest researcher at RUSI. countries and their integration within illustrations of the ongoing retreat of an expanded (EU-anchored) version British power in the wider European James Rogers is a DRS Scholar at the of the recent Anglo-French military neighbourhood. Equally, closer bilateral University of Cambridge, where his main agreements is crucial for Britain to secure relationships between Germany, France, interests are European security and its influence within the wider European Poland and Russia that bypass the British- military policy, and geostrategy. In 2008, neighbourhood. Through this wide backed post-war institutions are further he was a Visiting Fellow at the European British-led, EU-anchored politico-military evidence of change. In response, the Union Institute for Security Studies, enterprise, the foundations could be laid UK needs better partnerships with the where he compiled a report on the for the execution of Britain’s historical Nordic countries, France, the Netherlands geopolitics of the Eurasian coastal zone. European objectives, namely a regional and Belgium to secure its influence He has also given presentations on balance of power that underpins free in its immediate neighbourhood. maritime geo-strategy to the European trade and representative government. London then needs to use the EU to Parliament’s Sub-Committee for Security Furthermore, it would offer Britain maintain the continent’s power fulcrum and Defence, France’s Institute of Higher access to the financial and industrial mass around the northwestern pivot; this National Defence Studies and Belgium’s needed to afford state-of-the-art military will require a step-change in British Royal Institute of International capabilities, whose possession would strategic thinking. Last year, the former Relations. deter potential aggressors and contribute British ambassador to Washington, Sir to ‘silent security’ in the twenty-first Christopher Meyer, stated at RUSI that century.29 the ‘special relationship’ was a means to

NOTES

The authors would like to thank Professor 1 Luis Simón and James Rogers, ‘The 2 Wieland Wagner, ‘Capitalizing on the Christopher Coker for his comments on an Return of European Geopolitics: All Euro Crisis: China expands its influence earlier draft of this article. Roads Lead Through London’, RUSI in Europe’, Spiegel Online International, Journal, (Vol. 155, No. 3, June/July 2010), 14 December 2010. pp. 58–64.

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3 Office of the Secretary of Defence, in Middle East’, IISS Strategic Comments 25 Declaration on Defence and Security ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military (Vol. 16, No. 38, October 2010). On the Cooperation, 2 November 2010. For and Security Developments Involving Russo-Turkish rapprochement, see Suat an overview, see Luis Simón and James the People’s Republic of China 2010’, Kiniklioglu, The Anatomy of Russian- Rogers, ‘The New Franco-British Entente 2010, . Brookings Institution, 2006). for Spain’, OPEX Memorandum No. 151/2010, Fundación Alternativas, 4 Japanese Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence 14 Katrin Bennhold, ‘At Deauville, Europe Madrid, November 2010. For additional of Japan 2010’, . See October 2010. military co-operation, see Etienne de also Praveen Swami, ‘US to build £8bn Durand, ‘Entente or Oblivion? Prospects super base on Guam’, Daily Telegraph, 25 15 Simón and Rogers, op. cit. and Pitfalls of Franco-British Co-operation October 2010. on Defence’, RUSI Future Defence Review 16 Euractiv, op. cit. Working Paper 8, September 2010; and 5 S ee Charles A Kupchan, ‘The Potential Julian Lindley-French, ‘Britain and France: Twilight of the European Union’, Council 17 See Paul Newton, Paul Colley and A Dialogue of Decline? Anglo-French on Foreign Relations Working Paper, Andrew Sharpe, ‘Reclaiming the Art of Defence Co-operation and Implications September 2010. British Strategic Thinking’, RUSI Journal for the European and Euro-Atlantic (Vol. 155, No. 1, February/March 2010). Security and Defence Relationships’, 6 Euractiv, ‘Poland invites Russia to For a broader overview on the challenges Chatham House International Security Weimar Triangle’, 7 February 2011. to Western power and cohesion, see Programme Paper 2010/02, 2010. Christopher Coker, ‘Rebooting the West: 7 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and the US, Europe and the Future of the 26 In this regard, François Heisbourg has a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First Western Alliance’, RUSI Whitehall Paper famously spoken of France and Britain British Empire, 1714–1783 (London: (No. 72, 2009). sharing an ‘extrovert’ strategic culture, Penguin, 2007). in contrast with the more ‘introvert’ 18 If anything, America’s mounting debt instincts of other continental Europeans. 8 George Friedman, ‘The Geopolitics of and global military commitments point François Heisbourg, ‘Europe’s Strategic France: Managing its Influence in a towards a further coolness towards Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity’, Changing Europe’, Stratfor Geopolitical developments in Europe, at least in the Survival (Vol. 42, No. 2, 2000), pp. 5–15. Monographs (Austin, TX: Stratfor, short and medium term. See Stephen September 2010). Walt, ‘Wither Europe (and NATO)?’, 27 Britain and France look set to dominate Foreign Policy, 10 May 2010; and Foreign Europe in the future, population-wise. 9 N iall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made Policy, ‘Is NATO Ready for Retirement’, 24 See Ian Traynor, ‘Europe of the Future: the Modern World (London: Penguin, September 2010. Germany shrinks, France grows, but 2003). UK population booms’,Guardian , 19 S ee Nicholas Spykman, The Geography of 27 August 2008. It seems likely that 10 The UK and US provided the ‘hard’ the Peace (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace Britain and France will also continue security that allowed the ‘soft’ projects to and Company, 1944). to account for roughly one-third of the flourish. See Robert Cooper, ‘What does European Union’s total economic output; power mean today?’ in French Ministry 20 On this, see for example: James Rogers, approximately three-fifths of European of Foreign and European Affairs (ed.), ‘From Suez to Shanghai: The European military expenditure; and almost two- Europe and Power (Paris: Culturesfrance, Union and Eurasian Maritime Security’, thirds of European military research and July 2008), p. 199. Occasional Paper No. 77, European Union development. These projections are Institute for Security Studies, 2009; and based on a combination of data from 11 For an authoritative overview of Russia’s Robert Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian the European Defence Agency, Goldman invasion of Georgia, see Ronald Asmus, A Ocean and the Future of American Power Sachs, International Futures, the Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, (New York, NY: Random House, 2010). Stockholm International Peace Research Russia, and the Future of the West Institute and the World Bank. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 21 S imms, op. cit., p. 684. and Jonathan Eyal, ‘Europe and Russia: 28 Simón and Rogers, op. cit. A Return to the Past’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 22 Sally Dugan and David Dugan, The Day 153, No. 5, October 2008), pp. 40–47. On 29 O n the concept and importance of ‘silent the World Took Off: The Roots of the Georgia’s importance to Europe, see Dov security’, see Jeremy Blackham and Industrial Revolution (London: Channel 4 Lynch, ‘Why Georgia matters’,Chaillot Gwyn Prins, ‘Why Things Don’t Happen: Books, 2000). Paper No. 86, European Union Institute Silent Principles of National Security’, for Security Studies, February 2006. RUSI Journal (Vol. 155, No. 4, August/ 23 A ndrew Rettman, ‘UK: Northern Summit September 2010), pp. 14–22. 12 B BC News, ‘Parliamentary chaos as was not anti-European’,EU Observer, 21 Ukraine ratifies fleet deal’, 27 April 2010. January 2011. 30 C hristopher Meyer, ‘The UK-US Alliance: Still Special or Just Another Partnership?’, 13 O n Turkey’s new approach to the Middle 24 S tratfor.com, ‘The Baltic-Nordic-British Remarks at RUSI-Legatum Institute East, see ‘Turkey’s bid to raise influence Relationship Summit’, 18 January 2011. Conference, London, 18 May 2010.

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