The “Rise”of the Chinese Intellectuals and its Consequences

Yawei Liu (刘亚伟)

Director China Program The Carter Center September 14, 2011 [email protected] www.chinaelections.org An ultimate American intellectual in Chongqing

• Kissinger: I understand the first thing Xi Jinping did China Program after he was elevated to the CMC vice chairmanship was to visit Chongqing. He spent three days in Chongqing and spoke highly of Chongqing’s achievements. • He made a special trip to Chongqing to meet with

Bo Xilai after meetings with the young leaders in | The CarterCenter Beijing: Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao and Wang Qishan. • It is very significant for American companies to settle in Chongqing. •Kissinger to Bo: I first met you when you were the mayor of Dalian. You organized a fashion show attended by 50,000 people. I saw you last time at the dinner of the Olympic Games. •Bo to Kissinger: You are a legendary hero in China. People do not remember names of American presidents, but they all know you. • Kissinger: As an intellectual visiting Chongqing, I saw the vision for the future by the Chinese leaders; I am shaken by the vitality of the city. China Program | The Carter Center

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• At a December 2010 meeting on economic development, Bo Xilai said that Chongqing should introduce a fair

and balanced way of dividing the cake | while baking the cake. Only when the The CarterCenter cake is fairly divided will the bakers have incentives to bake a bigger and better cake. In July 2011, the Chongqing Municipal Government adopted the resolution to eliminate three gaps and get rich together.

• On July 10, 2011 at a plenary session of the Guangdong Party Congress, Wang Yang told the representatives dividing the cake is secondary to baking the cake. China Program | The Carter Center 88% believe the debate 45% believe you cannot 52% believe baking and 2% believe baking a ★ ★ ★ ★ on the cake theory is very important as it is crucial to forming consensus on future reform. have fish and the bear’s paw at the same time. In other words, they strongly support the Chongqing approach and oppose the Guangdong model. dividing the cake can be mutually beneficial. In other like the words, they also Chongqing approach. bigger cake is more important. Is the cake theory important? This is a reflection of the growing frustration of Chinese who do not seem to enjoy the benefits of the economic reform. China Program | The Carter Center totality, Guangdong should • Efficiency vs. justice: 2010 GDP: Guangdong at • Efficiency 12.2% & Chongqing at 17.1% Guangdong is a coastal province• that has always led the nation in economic growth. Chongqing is a mountainous city whose growth became phenomenal did not took over; it since Bo Xilai and Huang Qifan under Wang Yang’s watch grow so fast Gini • coefficient: Guangdong at 0.65 and Chongqing at 0.45 In • economic and political be more concerned about dividing the cake and Chongqing more focused on baking a bigger cake. policy debate gets blown• A up out of proportion because of ideological differences and political uncertainty. Guangdong and Chongqing: A Contrast China Program | The Carter Center ality in this world; but a socialist utopian ogether and this process : There has to be a due process from getting rich The best way to achieve a healthy and harmonious Getting rich together is scheme that cannot become re getting rich is only possible for a few; 2) earlier to getting rich t cannot be fair and just if it is controlled manipulated by the government using illegal and extralegal means; 3) society in a nation that is pursuing money and power recklessly is to restore individual rights and dignity through means like collective bargaining, curtailing of executive powers and popular elections. Yu Chongsheng 1) Getting rich together is a pseudo goal China Program | The Carter Center ce battle that has to be ce between reform and the outbreak of a civil war : If we lose this battle, the Chinese Communist Party China will face two CCP loses power, If the Only the United States a nd Japan like to see China People say there is a ra Getting rich together is a fier revolution in China; the Chongqing reform must succeed because failure is not acceptable. won; 2) will be driven out of power; 3) nightmarish situations: 1) and 2) the disintegration of Chinese nation; 4) degenerate into this sorry state; 5) Zhao Lei 1) The failure of the Chongqing model is… China Program | The Carter Center ： It is about deepening rule of law; It is about expanding democracy; It is about establishing the social security It is about opening government information and It is about growing the civil society; But Guangdong is a province of extreme wealth 1) 2) 3) network; 4) budgetary transparency; 5) 6) and dire poverty; Guangdong for sure needs a more balanced growth; several mass incidents recently occurred in Guangdong. Xiao Bin The Guangdong model is about… China Program | The Carter Center is a national issue that cannot The Guangdong model cannot be reproduced; nor the Chongqing model. 1) Guangdong inherited the manufac turing capacity from Hong Kong; 2) Guangdong benefited from the cheap labor army; 3) Guangdong has had policy privileges from the central government. By the same token, 1) Chongqing has Bo Xilai and Huang Qifan who can get national policy exceptions from the central government; 2) Chongqing has plenty of land to develop; 3) Chongqing has the banks in its pockets. What is more important what we are informed in this debate and how it will impact China’s political development in the near future. More equitable distribution of wealth be resolved without meaningful public participation through institutionalized channels. What model? There is no model! China Program | The Carter Center ） ) ) is the only politics in town now. 民生政治 Five-Year Plan is dedicated to three reforms: th 发展是硬道理，稳定是硬任务 economic reform, social reform and administrative •The Arab Spring has simply deepened this conviction: Wu were delivered in this context. The nos” “six Bangguo’s welfare politics ( ( • debate has convinced the top leadership that This priority for the Party is not to make itself more accountable, but to devote more resources provide better services for the people, and increase their purchasing power weave a social security net that has never been there for most of the Chinese people. •Hence the 12 •The challenge is can these reforms be achieved without political reform. (Without reform, will all fail? It is a long overdue delayed political reform China Program | The Carter Center

). April through May 2011) in the 变，四大危险，四大考验 异 质思维， 的危险 三个没有 、 消极腐败 执政、改革开放、市场经济、外部环境考验；精神懈怠、能力不足、 People’s Daily. • neutrality of Hu Jintao in this debate is intriguing; his The speech on 7/1 did not signal political reform but has dampened the growing arrogance among many Chinese model advocates ( not making his position very clear, although in Jinping is • Xi general he seems to be on the left. In China it is always better to be on the left than right. • Jiabao’s No one has echoed Wen advocacy for political reform; Wen, although censored repeatedly by the media under his control, has not lost any of power. the media itself has suffered schizophrenia: • Even series (10/21 to 11/2, 2010) that were Qingyuan” “Zheng and the “tolerating thinking Wen seen as frontal assault on ( series differently” • 脱 离群众 It reveals a lack of consensus at the top China Program | The Carter Center Chinese scholars are sharply divided among themselves. • • on the right have no top leader to follow, censored Those by the media occasionally, criticized leaders often and the wikileaks. by severely compromised • are on the left have coalesced behind Bo Xilai Those and poised to “storm” the capital next year. There is also as one of their effort by these intellectuals to count Xi Jinping own. • left consists of many scholars that are US educated or The live in the West. (Wang Shaoguang, Cui Zhiyuan, Pan Wei & Zhang Weiwei are the most representative) • right is lonely, being cast as slaves or running dogs of The the United States while left has vocal support from top echelon of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese intellectuals have lost their compass China Program | The Carter Center Hate crimes with Chinese characteristics China Program | The Carter Center • Could this be China’s Hamilton-Jefferson debate that may eventually lead to partisan politics? • It is bad that there no elite cohesion, but it always good to have policy debate in the open. It is even more important not to see the other side as an enemy of state, and use patriotism as clubs of suppression. Developing the sense of loyal opposition is crucial but difficult. will have a huge impact on the future • future of Bo Xilai The of China, particularly if he ascends to a more important position at the Standing Committee of Politburo; however, he should be given credit for waging an open, ugly and populist battle to earn political capital. of this will make 2012 more suspenseful and years after • All uncertain and even dreadful. A silver lining? China Program | The Carter Center ) 7 日 月 12 ： 年 对台谋求和解 对外谋求和平 soever to break up or as the superpower is a 对内谋求和谐 Globalization vs. Core Interests 中国取代美国称霸，那是神 话 , 2010 Peace with foreign nations Peace Domestic harmony Reconciliation with Taiwan It is economic globalization that has made China’s There is no intention what The security of the basic system of the nation National sovereignty and territorial integrity Sustained and stable economic growth China replacing the US overthrow this system The core drivers of China foreign policy are • • • Zheng Bijian (November 22, 2005): • peaceful rise possible • Dai Bingguo (November 2008): China’s core interests— • • • • myth ( China Program | The Carter Center ) 腾别人 Shut up, America! 三不折 We do not criticize others from a We do not export revolution We do not export hunger So we hope those foreigners stop Xi Jinping echoed Dai’s definition of echoed Xi Jinping China’s core interests recently when welcoming VP Biden. 8/19/2011 中国人民珍视自主选择的发展道路 和政治制度，珍视国家主权和领土 完整。 Xi’s “three nos” • • • moral perspective ( • making fuss about China. China Program | The Carter Center

and the United States is ooperate; therefore, it is using of a century humiliation Intellectual into an alliance and rebuild the

ld help America restore its through indirect and small steps cooperation and always seeks to with a patience perfected by

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The China model isThe the product From 2004 to 2010, in 6 years Ramo years has moved From 2004 to 2010, in 6 Again… from all positive to increasingly concerned is keenly aware of its shortcomings and avoids direct • China confrontation It seeks victory without war • and destroying satellites ) (cyber attack • The thousands years of history and urgency a rising superpower. not war but their inability to work together on international affairs does not believe• China US will c all means to protect itself maximize its own interests • biggest danger between China The • and the US should enter China China shou international order; economy • But China lacks the spirit of