sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 18 November 2011 Fighting for spoils Armed insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile
Introduction ances of the communities that joined Despite claims by rebel leaders, the insurgent leaders in taking up arms the insurgencies have remained Beginning in the aftermath of state against the government and the army. almost completely operationally and national elections in April 2010, Key findings include: independent of one another, and South Sudan has faced an eruption of the self-interested motivations of armed insurgencies, the majority of As of late October 2011 the major the commanders make a future them led by former Sudan People’s insurgents in Greater Upper Nile unified rebellion unlikely. Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders have not made significant headway There is strong circumstantial evi in the Greater Upper Nile region. The in achieving their purported political dence that the forces of Peter Gadet conflicts sparked by these insurgent objectives. Commanders formerly and George Athor have received commanders, and SPLA counter loyal to Peter Gadet, as well as two logistical and materiel support, measures, have directly or indirectly Shilluk commanders, continue to including small arms and ammu caused the deaths of thousands of South pose active military threats. nition, from Khartoum and other Sudanese, provoked mass displacement With the arguable exception of the external sources. of communities in Greater Upper Nile, Shilluk groups, the main insurgen The SPLA’s at times indiscriminate and challenged the government’s cies are not authentic expressions of attempts to crush the insurgencies ability to secure this strategic and discontent in marginalized commu have increased the deep-seated volatile region. nities. Instead, the commanders anger among many of the disen In a number of cases, the rebellions have manipulated legitimate local franchised minority communities are closely connected to state and grievances, mobilizing supporters— most affected by the violence. national politics and governance chal particularly idle young men—to The repeated outbreaks of violence lenges, and the often-contradictory fight on their behalf for their own during the integration of former responses to them have exposed deep objectives. militias into the SPLA reveal a sharp rifts both within and between the SPLA and the government. At a time when the Republic of South Sudan faces multiple other threats along its border with Sudan, its authorities have made some short-term gains in counter ing the insurgencies, but have ultimately failed to contain the rebel threat. This current stalemate leaves the new coun try vulnerable and unstable. This Issue Brief reviews the roots of the armed insurgencies led by George Athor, Peter Gadet, and other Southern commanders—all of whom have claimed to seek systemic changes to the Juba-based government or to overthrow it. It assesses the current approach of the SPLA and the government of the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) to con taining them, concluding that it is both ad hoc and unsustainable. Furthermore, Fighters loyal to Gatluak Gai awaiting integration into the SPLA at an assembly area outside Bentiu, Unity state, August 2011. the response fails to address the griev © Maggie Fick
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 Table 1 South Sudanese insurgent commanders as of November 20111
Commander Force name/ Location Status Notes affiliation
Peter Gadet Formerly South Sudan Mayom county (Unity) Dormant; signed a ceasefire deal with the Some of Gadet’s forces moved from a rear base Liberation Movement/ and the Unity–South government in early August 2011 in South Kordofan to Mayom after the cease- Army (SSLM/A) Kordofan border area fire was signed; Gadet approved the relocation of these forces to the Mapel area in Western Bahr al Ghazal state in early September so that the integration process with the SPLA could begin; since then, neither side has pub- licly released details regarding this pending process. There are 980 soldiers awaiting inte- gration near Mapel.
Gadet breakaways SSLM/A Koch, Mayom, and Active These rebels, who at various points have fought (James Gai Yoach, Rubkona counties together and/or under Gadet’s command, act Kol Chara Nyang, (Unity); Unity–South independently from one another for the most Bapiny Monituel, and Kordofan border areas, part. Yoach launched an attack on Mayom Matthew Puljang) including Nyama and town on 29 October and is believed to have Timsah in South laid new landmines near Bentiu in August. Kordofan state
George Athor South Sudan Ayod, Fangak, and Dormant, but at large; a January 20113 cease- Precise whereabouts unknown since last Democratic Pigi2 counties, and fire agreement collapsed clashes with the SPLA in March–April 2011 Movement / South possibly Akobo reportedly dislodged him from northern Sudan Army (Jonglei) Jonglei. Given a series of recent minor inci- dents, forces loyal to Athor are believed to pose a continued threat to stability in this area.
Gatluak Gai n/a Koch county (Unity) Killed in July 2011 in disputed circumstances His forces have yet to begin integrating with and Unity–South immediately after he signed a ceasefire the SPLA; immediately following Gai’s death, Kordofan border area brokered by the Unity state government they were relocated to an assembly point near Bentiu, and then on to the Mapel area in Western Bahr al Ghazal where Gadet’s forces were transferred in early September. There are 350 soldiers awaiting integration near Mapel.
Shilluk rebels (Robert n/a Western bank of the Gwang: inactive (signed a peace deal with the Ogot’s and Olonyi’s forces attacked the village Gwang, Alyuak Ogot, River Nile in Upper government in August 2010 and was integrated of Kaka in Fashoda county in August; the SPLA and Johnson Olonyi) Nile state, including into the SPLA with the rank of major general); has recently said that it believes Ogot, Olonyi, Fashoda, Malakal, Ogot and Olonyi: active and at large and their forces are hiding out in rear bases Manyo, Melut, and in South Kordofan and/or White Nile states. Panyikang counties; and Akoka county (Upper Nile)
David Yau Yau n/a Pibor county (Jonglei) Inactive; signed a ceasefire deal with the Like Gatluak Gai’s troops, Yau Yau’s forces are government in June 2011 awaiting integration, but neither Yau Yau nor the government has announced a firm plan for this process. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) airlifted the majority of the forces Yau Yau claimed to command from Pibor to the village of Owinykibol in Eastern Equatoria to await integration. They are estimated to number 200 fighters.
Gabriel Tang-Ginye n/a Fangak county Inactive; since April 2011, Tang-Ginye has Holds Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) major gen- (Jonglei); rumoured remained under house arrest in Juba and the eral rank, but expressed intent to rejoin SPLA troop movements SPLA has not released details about his precise in October 2010. Was rumoured to be allied from White Nile state whereabouts or the conditions of his detention. with Athor, and was active in the same area into Upper Nile state His forces, meanwhile, suffered heavy casual- where Athor’s forces clashed heavily with along the western ties in the village of Kaldak in northern Jonglei SPLA troops in February–April following the bank of the River Nile in an April clash with SPLA commando forces breakdown of Athor’s ceasefire with the SPLA. into northern Jonglei that resulted in the capture of Tang-Ginye and several of his top commanders. Integration of these forces into the SPLA has not yet occurred, but nearly 500 of Tang-Ginye’s men are receiv- ing monthly salaries from the SPLA as they await integration in Mapel.
Sources: Small Arms Survey (2011c–h); field research August–October 2011
2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 18 November 2011 disconnect between the govern Southern government does not fully April 2010 elections ment’s accommodation policy and control. Small arms stocks are wide The CPA enshrined national elections the deep animosity of some key spread in the region, despite numerous as a milestone to be held before South players in the army towards the civilian disarmament campaigns, Sudan’s January 2011 referendum on armed groups. which continue.4 self-determination. They were includ The current approach of integrat Home to a number of sub-clans ed primarily at the behest of the inter ing insurgent commanders—with from the Dinka and Nuer tribes, among inflated ranks—and their men is not others, the region was the site of brutal national community as a means of sustainable and may act as an incen Southern infighting during the civil consolidating the peace-building 9 tive for potential future rebels. war that resulted from the 1991 split in process. But by April 2010, more the SPLA.5 The division eventually led than five years after the agreement to the formation of a host of militias was signed, other than the Juba Dec Roots of rebellion under the umbrella of the South Sudan laration virtually no substantive Defence Forces (SSDF), a loose coalition efforts had been made to reconcile By September 2011 at least a dozen of Khartoum-supported commanders former enemies in the South. The dis individuals had launched or coordi who stoked much of the deadly South puted 2009 national census moved nated at least seven insurgencies against ern infighting. Intra-Southern conflict local tensions to the political forefront the Southern government since the split largely along ethnic lines, with the and the disputed state elections proved April 2010 elections (see Table 1). At Dinka-dominated SPLA fighting dozens its peak, rebel militia activity stretched to be the flashpoint that reactivated of SSDF-affiliated tribal militias. intra-Southern conflict. from near the South’s border with After the official end of the civil Ethiopia to multiple points along its The conduct of the state elections war, President Salva Kiir opened the was a bitter disappointment for many border with Sudan, including Darfur. door to former SSDF commanders to communities and outside observers. The most powerful groups have mainly rejoin the SPLA with the 2006 Juba Sudan People’s Liberation Movement conducted their operations in the Declaration.6 The agreement was an (SPLM) politicians and allied security Greater Upper Nile region—encom implicit recognition of the fact that forces allegedly committed widespread passing Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile SSDF commanders still retained sig human rights abuses, arbitrarily arrested states. The strength and stamina of the nificant local authority and control. rebellions have varied dramatically By bringing the commanders into the opposition members and observers, over the course of each movement, as army with high ranks and absorbing and created a climate of oppression have the threats that each group poses their men, the president hoped to and intimidation that called into ques to government authority and stability. neutralize the former enemies. While tion the results of several high-stakes With some important exceptions, militia integration has continued to gubernatorial races in strategic states.10 the insurgencies have similar roots pose a persistent problem for the The international community, focusing and dynamics. In most cases, they are SPLA, this initial gamble was largely on January 2011 and the likelihood of led by opportunistic individuals set on successful—following the signing of the Southern secession, largely failed to exploiting local resentment towards Juba Declaration there were relatively criticize the polls or call for official the South’s government institutions few incidents of serious intra-Southern investigations into allegations of fraud. and security sector, which are perceived militia-related conflict. Less than a month after the elections, as exclusionary by many citizens. Nevertheless, the legacy of the three Southern dissidents had launched Despite their rhetoric, the primary Northern-backed militias casts a shadow insurgencies against the government, aim of the rebel leaders has been to over efforts to implement important citing disputed elections in Jonglei increase their own power within these aspects of the CPA’s security arrange and Unity.11 Others would soon follow, institutions, however, rather than to ments. Deadly fighting broke out in inspired by the military gains these improve them for the betterment of November 2006 and February 2009 early insurgent commanders made. their communities. between SPLA and SAF components Given the lack of opportunities, eco of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) nomic and otherwise, for unemployed, stationed in Malakal, the capital of The civil war and its aftermath idle young men in many communities Upper Nile, involving forces loyal to in Greater Upper Nile, these self-styled It is not surprising that the majority Gabriel Tang-Ginye.7 Land-related rebel commanders succeeded in mobi of the rebellions have occurred in the conflict between the Shilluk and Dinka lizing local support relatively quickly. strategic, oil-producing Greater Upper tribes along the banks of the River Nile Nile region. Jonglei, Unity, and Upper in Upper Nile and all-out conflict involv Aside from the prospect of minor mate Nile states are most representative of ing a number of tribes in Jonglei also rial gains in the form of weapons, food, the serious governance and security escalated in the post-CPA period. The and the freedom to loot, the rebellions challenges that plagued South Sudan violence worsened state-level tensions arguably provided a sense of purpose during its six-year Comprehensive Peace and strengthened a widespread local for young, disenfranchised Southerners Agreement (CPA) period. Following perception that the Juba government living outside the reach of govern independence, the region, part of which has failed to intervene to stop South ment authority where they have not forms much of the South’s border with ern communities from using violence benefited from any ‘peace dividends’ Sudan, remains a volatile zone that the against one another.8 promised in the CPA.
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 3 Key insurgents more than two decades of conflict. Salva Kiir, approved a process of inter Alternately an asset to both the Garang- nal promotions and reappointments This section focuses on the insurgent led SPLA and, during key periods in that worsened already strained rela commanders who have posed the the war, to the SSDF, Gadet recently tionships among some senior SPLA greatest threat to the authority of the boasted of his importance as a ‘com officers and former militia fighters Southern government and to general mander in the oil fields’ during the integrated at the officer level.15 When stability in South Sudan since the April war.12 His command over loyal forces it became clear that powerful former 2010 elections. Some insurgencies— in this strategic border area enabled him militia leaders had been overlooked namely the Shilluk-led revolts over to implement the opposing military for promotion while lower-ranking, land issues in Upper Nile state—did objectives of both the SPLA and the mainly Dinka, officers were given not fundamentally challenge the gov SSDF, often at great cost to civilian higher ranks, Gadet (a Bul Nuer) and ernment’s national authority. However, populations.13 Viewed with suspicion others became concerned. In December the unresolved status of these revolts in the initial stages of the integration 2010, more than a month after his new highlights the ability of marginalized process for temporarily remaining appointment was confirmed by the minority groups in a strategic oil- with SAF Military Intelligence after SPLA, he first visited 3rd Division producing zone to pose a persistent the Juba Declaration, he subsequently HQ in Northern Bahr al Ghazal state, threat, and their areas of control remain agreed to join the SPLA with the rank where he had been appointed as deputy significant (see map). of major general.14 division commander.16 He reportedly The timing of his rebellion is signifi viewed this position as below his sta Peter Gadet cant. When the first wave of armed tion and resented serving as deputy Peter Gadet’s proven military capabili insurrections against the government to a Dinka division commander.17 ties were both an asset and a threat to began following the elections, Gadet, While George Athor used what he the SPLA during the second civil war. who was serving at the time as the air claimed was his unfair defeat in the A key player during the most brutal defence commander at SPLA General polls as a pretext for rebellion, Gadet’s periods of the conflict in oil-rich west Headquarters (GHQ) in Juba, remained motivation thus likely stemmed from ern Upper Nile (now Unity state), his in his post. In late October 2010 the frustration with his position within loyalties changed multiple times over SPLA commander-in-chief, President the SPLA.
Map Areas of activity, Southern armed insurrections, 2010–2011 SUDAN
ETHIOPIA Rumoured Gabriel Manyo SUDAN SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN Tang-Ginye troop Renk CAR movements from Juba White Nile state DEMOCRATIC into northern REPUBLIC KENYA Jonglei state OF THE CONGO UGANDA Melut Nyama Timsah Area of insurrectionist activity Fashoda Maban UPPER George Athor Pariang Abyei NILE Peter Gadet town Panyikang Abiemnhom Malakal 1 Baliet Gadet breakaway forces Rubkona Malakal Gatluak Gai 2 Bentiu Pigi/ Longochuk Mayom Guit Fangak Khorfulus/ Shilluk rebels 3 r al Ghaza UNITY Canal Nasir Gabriel Tang-Ginye ah l Maiwut B Koch Ulang Nyriol David Yau Yau Alleged Gadet breakaway Leer Ayod rear base WARRAP Mayendit Possible 1 Includes James Gai Yoach, Kol Chara Nyang, Bapiny Monituel, Akobo ETHIOPIA and Matthew Puljang. Duk Uror Panyijar 2 JONGLEI Killed July 2011. 3 Includes Robert Gwang, Alyuak Twic East Pochalla Ba Ogot, and Johnson Olonyi. hr SSOUTH O U T H a SSUDAN U D A N l J International boundary e Rumbek b e Bor State boundary LAKES l South Pibor County boundary Bor National capital 200km State capital
Source: Small Arms Survey
4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 18 November 2011 Before Gadet’s defection from the ill-defined integration process with reports about the location of these SPLA in March 2011, the security situ the SPLA. He visited them with an forces and their intentions, but given ation in his home area of Mayom county UNMIS delegation in mid-August. recent rhetoric, they are believed to have was already volatile due to the ongoing On 6 September his spokesman told their sights on the state capital, Bentiu. activities of other Nuer rebels conduct reporters that Gadet had reached an A number of anti-tank landmine explo ing operations against the SPLA using agreement with the SPLA for his men sions in the first week of November rear bases in the disputed, but SAF- to be relocated to Western Bahr al along the Bentiu–Mayom road are occupied, oil fields on the Unity–South Ghazal state. Moving these forces out also believed to have been caused by Kordofan border. In mid-April Gadet of the battlefield area may ultimately mines planted by the same forces who issued the Mayom Declaration, accus increase the chances of peaceful integra launched the assault on Mayom. ing the Southern government and army tion, but the process has since stalled. In a long and detailed communica of corruption and tribalism and calling tion on 3 November, the commanders for Southerners to join a new ‘libera Gadet breakaway militias accused the UN Mission in South Sudan tion struggle against unjust rule by (UNMISS) of supporting the SPLA in our sons and daughters in the SPLM During their various revolts against its military engagement with the SSLA led government’.18 He organized his the Southern government, James Gai through the provision of vehicles, fuel, forces under the name of the South Yoach, Kol Chara Nyang, Bapiny and accommodation to SPLA and state Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. Monituel, and Matthew Puljang—all officials in UN compounds, in violation On 21 April, less than a week after Nuer men from Unity state, several of its mandate.25 he issued his declaration, Gadet’s with SAF backgrounds—have some forces launched a serious assault on times acted in coordination under the the town of Mankien, south of the banner of the SSLM/A. Although these George Athor county capital of Mayom, seizing it men launched their insurgencies over Lt. Gen. George Athor, a member of for a day before SPLA reinforcements election grievances and other complaints the Padeng sub-clan of the Dinka tribe arrived and recaptured it. After his against the SPLM/A, they joined Gadet and a former member of the SPLA, forces took Mankien, they advanced in a fragile alliance of Unity state-based holds the highest public profile of the toward Mayom town, causing signifi forces after he launched the SSLM/A insurgent leaders, in part due to his cant civilian displacement, destroying in early April. senior stature in the SPLA prior to his the local market and some homes, and On 3 August Gadet’s spokesman, resignation in the run-up to the April looting and severely damaging the Bol Gatkuoth, announced the decision 2010 elections. Athor, who served after compound of an international NGO to sign a ceasefire with the government 2005 as a former deputy chief of staff with an office in Mankien.19 The second and begin integration. The following and as commander of the 8th Division attack by his forces on Mankien was day, Yoach, Nyang, Monituel, and forces in Jonglei, resigned from his equally destructive: UN sources esti Puljang split from Gadet (but retained post at SPLA GHQ in Juba in order to mate that more than 250 people were the SSLM/A identity), releasing an open run for governor in Jonglei, his home killed and more than 20,000 displaced letter accusing Gadet and Gatkuoth of state. The SPLM leadership actively dis as a direct result of Gadet–SPLA fight accepting a bribe from President Salva couraged his candidacy, instead backing ing in Mayom county, mainly during Kiir.21 Their decision to opt out of the incumbent governor Kuol Manyang.26 the April and May clashes.20 These two ceasefire poses both a significant new Unlike some of the other rebel clashes had an enduring impact on risk of insecurity and a challenge to commanders, Athor had been a true stability in Unity state in the immediate militia integration efforts. SPLA loyalist since he joined the run-up to and aftermath of secession The four leaders did not commu guerrilla movement in 1983. He was in July. nicate publicly again until 27 October, never a part of the SSDF. Shortly after Gadet himself spent little time in when they released another joint letter his defeat in the Jonglei state elections, Mayom during his forces’ campaigns; condemning Unity governor Taban however, he and his forces—some of he shuttled from Nairobi to Khartoum Deng, warning of a forthcoming mili whom reportedly defected immedi and the border area out of reach of the tary campaign to oust him, and advis ately from the 8th Division in Jonglei SPLA 4th Division in Bentiu. He trav ing NGOs and UN personnel to leave and the 3rd Division in Northern Bahr elled to Jordan in July, purportedly the state.22 Two days later their forces al Ghazal27—began launching attacks for medical treatment, then to Nairobi clashed with the SPLA around Mayom on SPLA installations in south-western for discussions with representatives town.23 The SPLA claimed it had evicted Upper Nile and in Athor’s home area of President Salva Kiir on the terms of the rebels from Mayom county, killing in northern Jonglei. As a former high- a ceasefire, which was signed in early 60 insurgents with the loss of 15 civil ranking SPLA officer trained as an engi August. His extensive travels provided ians in the process. The insurgents, by neer, he quickly proved his operational ample opportunity to secure external contrast, claimed to have taken both capabilities as a commander as his support for his insurgency. Mayom town and Tomor, capturing forces gained ground across northern Soon after the agreement was SPLA soldiers, gaining new recruits Jonglei state, preventing humanitarian signed, his forces began moving south from the army, and seizing weapons access and gaining local support that from the Unity–South Kordofan border in the process.24 As this Issue Brief was proved useful in eluding the SPLA’s area to Mayom to assemble for an being finalized, there were conflicting subsequent counter-attacks.
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 5 From the early days of his rebellion, Box 1 Arms, cattle raiding, and insurgencies in Jonglei Athor insisted in statements made by satellite phone from his bush hideout Since early 2009 resource competition and cattle-related conflict in several Southern states have changed that his movement—under the banner from a common, but relatively low-level security threat to an increasingly deadly and politically sensitive of the South Sudan Democratic Move phenomenon with much wider implications.28 The pre-independence Southern government attempted to ment and its military wing, the South address the cattle-raiding violence in 2009–10 using a tactic it had deployed since 2005: SPLA-led civilian Sudan Army—was fighting for politi disarmament campaigns.29 Previous research has indicated that the often-repressive campaigns have 30 cal and military reform. His strategies, stoked rather than reduced inter-communal conflict. however, which included laying land For Athor, the volatile security context in Jonglei—coupled with his senior stature in the army and mines and distributing arms in civilian local relationships in his home state—gave him ample opportunity to procure small arms and munitions and mobilize local support in northern Jonglei, his principal area of operations. His successful mobilization areas, have further destabilized large of communities on the basis of election-related and other grievances made him the most threatening rebel areas of Jonglei, which since the sign leader in the pre-referendum period.31 Discontented, unemployed, and idle young men from the Lou Nuer ing of the CPA has been among the tribe in Akobo county, which borders Ethiopia, are believed to have joined his rebellion—less for ideological most volatile and insecure states in reasons than for the practical purpose of gaining access to weapons that would improve their strength in the South. battles with neighbouring rivals. Some reports indicate that Athor explicitly provided Lou Nuer youths with To date, the SPLM/A’s alternating weapons so that they could attack their enemies—namely the Murle—on condition that they would also fight attempts to militarily defeat and politi against his enemy, Jonglei state governor Kuol Manyang.32 cally reconcile with Athor and his In recent months inter-communal violence and cattle raiding in Pibor and Uror counties between the forces have failed. A 5 January cease rival Lou Nuer and Murle tribes have increased dramatically. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humani- fire agreement broke down, partly over tarian Affairs estimated that some 2,000 people had been killed and more than 130,000 people displaced in the question of military ranks for him inter-tribal conflict from 1 January through 31 October 2011.33 A number of sources cite a link between Athor’s and his inner circle, and was followed rebellion and the April–August 2011 series of cattle raids and clashes between well-armed Lou Nuer and by a wave of fighting in February and Murle youth. A Lou Nuer spiritual leader named Dak Kueth Deng stands accused by some government officials March. Since then, he and his forces of organizing youths from his tribe in Akobo and other counties, including Uror, and obtaining weapons 34 have remained relatively quiet, although from Athor. He is also believed to have mobilized—even urged—Lou Nuer youths to launch raids against the Murle in Pibor in June. there were reports of minor clashes More recently, Athor has reportedly lost authority in the area as some of the Lou Nuer youths have split in September and October in Ayod from him to protect their families and fellow tribespeople from further conflict. county. He is said to have recently spent time in Sennar and Blue Nile states in Sudan and, more recently, Although his wartime history is less At a rally, Machar publicly endorsed back in Jonglei near the border with well known than other Unity state a state-level reconciliation process Ethiopia. Despite his frequent absences strongmen such as Gadet and Paulino and later travelled with a delegation from Jonglei, his alleged provision of Matiep, Gai is remembered by some that included his wife and the gover weapons to youths from several dis Unity citizens for his brutal actions nor throughout Unity to encourage enfranchised minority groups in the during the war as a member of various citizens to participate peacefully in state, namely the Lou and Jikany Nuer Khartoum-backed militias responsible the referendum.36 (see Box 1), underscores his ability to for civilian deaths and displacement Governor Taban Deng led the state- continue indirectly to destabilize the during oil field-clearing campaigns.35 led reconciliation process; however, area by fuelling local conflicts and Following their first attacks on his near-authoritarian control of the eroding state authority. SPLA bases in Abiemnhom and Mayom political and military hierarchies of counties near Unity’s border with South the oil-rich state has made him widely Gatluak Gai Kordofan, Gai’s forces continued their unpopular.37 Following Southern low-level insurgency throughout 2010 secession, Gai came to Bentiu for The late Lt. Gen. Gatluak Gai, a Nuer in attacks on SPLA and Southern police more intense negotiations. On 20 July from the Jagei sub-clan and a former convoys and bases in Koch county. he signed a ceasefire agreement that colonel in the Unity state prisons system, Rumours circulated during this period reportedly granted him the rank of succeeded in dramatically elevating that he was ill or injured and had been lieutenant general in the SPLA. This his stature in Unity when he launched transported with assistance from the was a dramatic promotion into the his insurgency in the aftermath of the government of Sudan to Khartoum for upper echelons of the army from his elections. Unlike Athor and Yau Yau, treatment, or that he was merely in pre-rebellion title of colonel in the Gai did not compete in the elections, hiding in border areas in and around Unity state prisons system. But three although he did back the independent the Heglig oil fields. days later, on 23 July, he was shot dead gubernatorial candidate Angelina Teny, His attacks alerted the Unity and under disputed circumstances.38 The wife of Southern vice president Riek Juba governments to the fact that in killing has deepened mistrust between Machar. His support for Teny was security could disrupt the all-important the army and the rebel forces and in reportedly due to his resentment of January 2011 self-determination refer creased wariness among commanders incumbent governor Taban Deng, who endum. In November 2010 Vice Presi considering integration. refused to appoint Gai as commissioner dent Machar and his wife, the defeated Despite rumours of links between of his native Koch county in 2008. gubernatorial candidate, visited Bentiu. Gai and other rebel groups, interviews
6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 18 November 2011 with former militiamen and others a week later, Olonyi’s forces launched He studied theology in Kenya and familiar with the movement indicate an early morning raid on the Upper South Sudan before taking a civilian that his own hubris prevented strate Nile state capital of Malakal. The SPLA job in Pibor county with the South gic alliances that could have given the quickly repulsed the attack, leaving at Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Com disparate movements a better chance least 30 rebels and several government mission. Like Athor, he competed as an of credibly challenging the Southern soldiers dead, according to early SPLA independent candidate in the Jonglei government.39 Even if he had lived to estimates.44 The aggressive rebel assault state elections, but for a much more begin the integration process of his on the state capital provoked a harsh junior post as a state assembly member. forces into the SPLA,40 the precedent response from the army, which used After his electoral defeat, reportedly set by his meteoric promotion would the incident as rationale for rounding by a large margin, Yau Yau and forces have endangered the SPLM/A’s ability up scores of Shilluk youths, arbitrarily allied to him launched a series of attacks to accommodate other insurgents. detaining them, and generally wors beginning in mid-May 2010. Many of ening relations between the Shilluk his armed engagements with the SPLA The Shilluk rebels community and the Dinka and Nuer over the next several months resem populations in Malakal. bled minor banditry attacks more The numerous Shilluk-led rebellions The SPLA response and rhetoric than full military operations. Despite in Upper Nile dating from before the added additional fuel to the Shilluk the relatively low death tolls from April 2010 elections to the present differ grievances. In nearly all of the commen these clashes, ongoing insecurity in the in many respects from the other rebel tary on violent incidents between the latter half of 2010 forced aid groups to lions examined in this Issue Brief. SPLA and these rebels over the past reduce their activities almost exclusively Robert Gwang, Alyuak Ogot, and 18 months, Southern officials under to Pibor town, resulting in many out Johnson Olonyi initially each led sep scored the role of Dr Lam Akol, the lying areas of the county receiving little arate insurgencies. All of them served dissenting Southern (Shilluk) figure or no assistance.47 at various times in branches of the with a long history of involvement with Prior to President Salva Kiir’s first Southern security forces, but their the National Congress Party who is amnesty offer to the rebels at large in stated reasons for rebelling were not deeply mistrusted by many Southern Greater Upper Nile in late September explicitly linked to discontent with ers. The SPLM claims that Akol’s SPLM– 2010 (see below), Yau Yau agreed to the leadership of the SPLA, police, or Democratic Change party, launched begin negotiations with the government, prisons services. Instead, each of their in 2009, is a ‘front’ for his Khartoum- but these talks came to a standstill after rebellions has aimed to draw attention backed military ambitions in the he was accused of attacking a group to Shilluk community-wide land-related South.45 While he may be supporting of civilians in late October 2010 in a grievances against Dinka populations Ogot’s and Olonyi’s forces, the prob remote area of Pibor. in Upper Nile. In the Shilluk kingdom— lems between the Shilluk and the Juba The latest negotiations between on the western bank and parts of the government go far beyond the question Yau Yau and the SPLA are the most eastern bank of the Nile—popular of Akol’s support, however. important aspect of his rebellion in support for the rebellions stemmed The most recent clashes between relation to the other insurgencies. In from widely held perceptions of a pro- SPLA forces and Shilluk rebels occurred April 2011 the SPLA initiated a second Dinka Upper Nile state government in the town of Kaka in northern Upper negotiations process through 8th Divi and an openly hostile SPLA presence Nile state on 19–20 August. The SPLA sion commander Bol Kong and Pibor in the area.41 says its soldiers stationed near Kaka county commissioner Akot Maze.48 In Gwang declared his opposition to were initially ‘overwhelmed’ by mili mid-June UNMIS transported Yau Yau the government prior to the April 2010 tia forces who attacked the town after to Juba, where he told reporters that elections and signed a peace deal with crossing the border from a rear base he had already signed a ceasefire agree the government—in exchange for a in South Kordofan.46 Of all the insur ment and was prepared to finalize dramatic promotion to the rank of gencies, the Shilluk rebellions perhaps details of the integration process of major general—in August 2010. Ogot’s most clearly illustrate the deep-seated his troops into the SPLA.49 Since then and Olonyi’s activities in Upper Nile nature of local community grievances he has remained in Juba while his intensified in2011 . Two major incidents and the challenges the Southern gov forces continue to await an SPLA- in March underscored the threats that ernment faces in reconciling not only led integration process to be held in these two groups were capable of pos with the rebel groups, but also with Owinykibol, a small village in Eastern ing even in an area with a relatively the communities allied to them. Equatoria state,50 where they were heavy SPLA presence.42 Olonyi’s forces transferred after he travelled to Juba. who had assembled—along with While he enjoys comfortable accom civilians loyal to or associated with David Yau Yau modation in the Southern capital, his the group—next to the 7th Division David Yau Yau’s rebellion in his native armed men are waiting in the bush HQ in the riverside town of Owachi Pibor county, home to largely disen for their integration process to begin. south of Malakal clashed with the franchised Murle, stands out from the Given the unstable situation in Pibor SPLA on 6–7 March. At least 60 Shilluk other insurrections launched in the county following a series of raids from were killed, according to a Human post-elections period because of his April to June 2011 and, more recently, a Rights Watch investigation.43 Less than notable lack of military experience. serious counter-attack by Murle youths
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 7 in neighbouring Uror county, the Box 2 Materiel support to the insurgents presence of fewer armed men in the area is likely a positive development. Khartoum’s wartime policy of backing Southern and external militias as a means of countering the SPLA, It is believed, but not confirmed, that stoking internal Southern violence, and prolonging the war has been well documented.53 The SPLM/A has Yau Yau’s men may have distributed repeatedly claimed that the National Congress Party has continued to back the rebels; in some cases, the some of their weapons to the Murle insurgents themselves have proclaimed this. Bol Gatkuoth said in August 2011 that Gadet’s group had received youths for the August attack. funding from Khartoum from oil revenues intended for the South as part of the CPA. According to Bol, ‘there are lots of [weapons] factories in Khartoum if you have money’.54 In late October Bol reiterated to the Small Meanwhile, Yau Yau is expected to Arms Survey that Khartoum was a significant source of weapons to the group.55 enter the SPLA with the rank of major It is also clear that logistical support is being provided. Many of the insurgent leaders have spent time general, a surprisingly senior rank, in Khartoum or operated rear bases from the Northern side of North–South border areas. There are also given his civilian background. If this credible reports of the forcible recruitment of Northerners in Khartoum to fight in Gadet’s rebellion in goes through, the high rank will make Unity state56 and strong circumstantial evidence of external support based on the number and types of the SPLA’s task of reconciling with weapons captured from insurgent forces (see below). other commanders still in the bush— Fieldwork, interviews, and inspections of captured weapons suggest that Peter Gadet’s forces are namely Athor, the Shilluk rebels, and extremely well equipped with small arms and light weapons. Videos released by Bol Gatkuoth57 show pos- the Gadet breakaway militias—much sibly hundreds of Gadet’s forces marching in an undisclosed location (possibly Mayom county) carrying more difficult. what appear to be new Chinese Type-56-1 assault rifles (a variant of the Soviet AKS-47). This new arsenal stands in contrast to those of other insurgent groups in South Sudan and the region, which typically rely primarily on older weapons, whether in general circulation or captured from army forces during the course Coordination? of fighting. In one of the undated videos, the uniformed men on parade chant in their native Nuer language Despite repeated claims by various about Gadet’s ability to obtain weapons for them.58 His men have also laid significant numbers of landmines. insurgent leaders—and the SPLA— The UN Mine Action Office recorded six explosions in Mayom and neighbouring Abiemnhom county in the there is little evidence of significant first half of May in areas controlled by Gadet.59 60 joint military operations by Upper Nile In early 2011 the SPLA captured hundreds of weapons in battles with insurgents in western Unity state. Among the items seized, which the Small Arms Survey has viewed, were more than 100 new Type-56-1 assault rebel movements over the past 18 rifles, which appear to be identical to the kind featured in the Bol videos, suggesting similar sourcing. The months. One exception was the brief, SPLA-captured rifles were fully loaded with a single variety of ammunition with head stamps and casing loose, and now-defunct alliance among construction that appear to be similar to varieties manufactured in Khartoum. In a separate sample of weap- some of the western Unity state-based ons that were seized during fighting with Athor’s forces in northern Jonglei, the same type of ammunition rebels, including Matthew Puljang was also observed. In addition, SPLA forces confiscated four relatively new Chinese-produced Type-80 and Kol Chara Nyang, under Gadet’s general-purpose machine guns (a variant of the Soviet PKM) and eight rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) command from April to June 2011. For launchers that resemble Iranian-manufactured varieties.61 example, in March Khartoum-based During the same period, the SPLA captured weapons from various insurgent forces along the border SAF major general Bapiny Monituel, of Upper Nile and Jonglei states. Among other items, the SPLA seized one Chinese-manufactured Type-54 whose forces had recently clashed heavy machine gun (a variant of the Soviet DShK) and a crate of 7.62 x 54R ammunition (for general-purpose machine guns) manufactured in China in 2009 from Athor’s forces during fighting in March 2011. The history of with SPLA troops in Unity, signalled Northern backing of Southern militias fighting the SPLA, the repeated claims of Gadet’s group, the type of weap- his intention to form a rebel coalition ons and ammunition recovered from the insurgent forces, and the fact that China and Iran are top exporters 51 with George Athor. If such an alliance to Sudan all point to Northern arming of at least Peter Gadet and George Athor. The Small Arms Survey has took place, it did not succeed in chal begun tracing arms and ammunition captured by the SPLA to further clarify their possible chains of custody.62 lenging the SPLA in a unified manner. Insurgent leaders have also sought support in the Horn of Africa and beyond. George Athor visited Another exception is the possible Asmara, Eritrea, in early 2011. In its 2011 final report the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea docu- collaboration of Yau Yau’s forces with mented a correlation between RPG rounds that Eritrea supplied to an Ethiopian opposition group and RPGs the much larger and stronger forces of that had been seized from Athor’s militia. The report does not describe how and by whom those weapons George Athor. Yau Yau’s sole area of were supplied.63 As noted above, Gadet was also in Jordan in July. operation, Pibor county, was included in the now-defunct January 2011 cease fire agreement between Athor and the SPLA. In the February–March SPLA– Athor clashes in northern Jonglei follow ing the ceasefire breakdown, reports emerged that Yau Yau’s forces had moved north out of Pibor county to join forces with Athor’s troops. Given the limited force strength of Yau Yau’s group—estimated to be 200 at the most—and the limited supply of heavy weapons it reportedly possessed, the joining of forces between Athor and Yau Yau may have been engineered as a means to boost the credibility of the Chinese Type-54 12.7mm heavy machine gun (copy of the DShK) seized from George Athor’s forces in Jonglei state. notion of a ‘unified rebel front’ rather Photo taken April 2011. © Jonah Leff than as a tactical move.52
8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 18 November 2011 Probably the most important reason troops and forces loyal to George Athor ported to Juba, where he remains under alliances have not materialized is the and Gabriel Tang-Ginye, respectively, house arrest. The prospects for the egotism of individual commanders in remote areas near the Jonglei–Upper integration of his more than 1,000 men and their overwhelmingly selfish Nile border killed hundreds of civilians into the SPLA are uncertain at best. motivations for rebelling. According and combatants and nearly completely His soldiers in Mapel are the only ones to Gatluak Gai’s former operations restricted UNMIS and NGO access for to have undergone disarmament and commander, Gai said of a possible weeks, for example. In these instances, receive salaries so far. Their weapons alliance with Athor: ‘[I want] no one civilians in affected areas, some of are being held in Yirol. in front of [me] but God.’64 Historical whom were affiliated with insurgent Several months after Salva’s first disputes between insurgent leaders, par forces, bore the brunt of the SPLA– amnesty offer, his government, with ticularly between Gai and Gadet—who rebel fighting. There is a risk that these logistical assistance from UNMIS, were once related through marriage— populations may resist—and possibly formed a presidential committee to may also have prevented collaboration spoil—peace negotiations in the short attempt negotiations with George between rebel leaders. term or join future insurgent move Athor, who remained in an unknown ments in the longer term. bush hideout in northern Jonglei.70 Days before the January 2011 independence GoSS and SPLA responses Ceasefires and peace processes referendum, a deal between the SPLA— Government and army responses to not the government—and his forces President Salva Kiir has initiated two the insurgencies in Greater Upper was brokered and signed in Juba, but amnesty drives since the outbreak of Nile have fluctuated between military Athor’s men were absent from the the first rebellions. In early October2010 , engagement and attempts at political 5 January ceremony. His forces did immediately before the All Southern accommodation. But the enormous not ultimately disrupt the peaceful Sudanese Political Parties Conference, pressures facing the new republic, and conduct of the referendum, but the he issued an executive order pardoning fractures within and between Juba’s deal soon fell apart. Moreover, subse the army officers who had rebelled and political administration and military, quent clashes between Athor’s troops calling for them to return to the SPLA.66 have contributed to the lack of a coor and the SPLA in February and March On 9 July 2011, during his Independ dinated, cohesive counterinsurgency 2011 further damaged relations between ence Day speech, he issued another strategy. Militarily the SPLA has suffered local communities in northern Jonglei amnesty call, appealing to ‘all those 71 from the distances involved in reach and the government. ing the insurgents, the refusal of some who may have taken up arms for one More recently the government of its forces and ground commanders reason or another to lay down those brokered ceasefire agreements with to willingly accept the integration of arms and come to join your brothers Peter Gadet and David Yau Yau. As 67 their ‘enemies’, and the guerrilla-style and sisters to build this new nation’. discussed below, the real challenge to tactics of some of the rebels. In general, His initial call was heeded not by these efforts comes in peacefully inte the army has gained and lost territory the most prominent of the insurgents grating their forces into the SPLA. in equal measure, and 18 months after at the time, George Athor, but by SAF major general Gabriel Tang-Ginye— the 2010 elections rebels continue to The challenges of integration elude government control in large areas the powerful wartime Nuer militia of the region. leader who was granted a senior SAF The implementation challenges that The severity and breadth of the rank shortly before the signing of the emerged following the Juba Declaration 68 military response have sometimes CPA. Tang-Ginye’s reconciliatory showed the many difficulties of bringing betrayed a sense of panic within an visit to the South in October 2010 did former enemy forces into the national 72 army that believes the insurgents to not result in a lasting settlement with army. The army remains divided be the ‘front line’ of a possible wider the SPLM/A, however. In early 2011 internally along tribal and ethnic lines. conflict with Sudan. With ongoing con a series of security incidents in Upper Although the SPLA leadership has flicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile Nile and Jonglei involving militia forces reportedly been hesitant to grant insur states, and the stalemate in Abyei, this loyal to him and SAF components of gent leaders the unreasonably senior is a legitimate concern. But in a number the Malakal-based JIUs underscored ranks they are demanding,73 ‘integration’ of instances in which the SPLM/A the influence he still holds among forces has often ended up being a euphemism has used heavy-handed measures to he commanded during the war. In April for inflated ranks and other financial attempt to suppress opposition parties SPLA commandos clashed with his incentives, leaving the rank and file or to stamp out militia activity, the forces that had assembled in the village vulnerable within a wider army that results have been nearly uniformly of Kaldak in northern Jonglei, suppos still regards them as outsiders. The counterproductive. Reported violent edly for integration; casualties were SPLA faces numerous challenges, not engagements, ‘scorched earth’ cam in the hundreds, and the presence of least its slow transformation into a paigns, and ‘clean-up’ operations have landmines and continued insecurity civilian-led professional army. It is the often succeeded in angering local com severely limited access to the area by slow pace of this transformation that munities and creating the conditions the UN for weeks after the battle.69 is hindering effective integration.74 for continued instability.65 The clashes During the fighting, Tang-Ginye either With the important exceptions of a in February–April 2011 between SPLA surrendered or was captured and trans loose coalition of Unity state rebels
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 9 opposed to Gadet’s ceasefire deal and Reflections security to marginalized and periph one of the Shilluk insurgents, a number eral regions, providing services to While the government may have suc of key rebels have participated in communities that have not yet been ceeded in temporarily neutralizing amnesty processes. But all of the made to feel welcome as citizens in the several rebel leaders, it has failed to planned rebel integration processes75 new country, and promoting transpar manage the threat in the long term. The have reached stalemate or violently ency and curtailing corruption are all dangers of other dissenting Southern collapsed.76 In fact, the SPLA–rebel long-term goals worth pursuing vig ers opting to mobilize against Juba in clashes that occurred when insurgent orously. Publicly acknowledging the new rebellions, potentially with exter forces assembled at predetermined genuine grievances of marginalized nal support, are clear and persistent. locations to await integration were communities—rather than blaming the The history of the second civil war and among the most deadly battles fought actions of these groups on Khartoum— its aftermath in South Sudan suggests in the pre-independence period.77 They and ending the demonization of spe that the SPLA cannot defeat the insur have also caused further anger among cific ethnic groups would also be steps gencies militarily. To date, the alternat marginalized communities already in the right direction. ing approaches of the GoSS and the susceptible to rebellions. The preamble of the 2006 Juba SPLA to addressing the insurrections Technical and logistical problems Declaration emphasized ‘building have neither yielded significant divi are partly responsible for the failures trust and confidence’ between former dends nor supported a sustainable to date. The assembly points for insur enemies in order to ‘avoid past mis peace in the region. In some cases, their gents awaiting integration have often takes that have led to divisions and actions have actually worsened relations 81 been established in close proximity to internecine conflict’. But the agree with the communities in which rebel SPLA bases or division headquarters. ment itself focused almost exclusively commanders have found support. In The army may have opted to conduct on the modalities of the integration of addition to the internal divides within integration near SPLA installations in forces and the assigning of ranks to the Southern government and military, commanders—as if these steps alone order to attempt to safeguard its own the enormous external economic, mil could address the deep and bitter forces in the event of security problems, itary, and development pressures the enmity of the civil war years. In the but by doing so, low-level skirmishes new republic faces have necessarily post-CPA period the government has have quickly escalated into battles exacerbated the fractured response. continued in a similar vein, deferring the involving large numbers of forces. Even when the government and hard work of reconciliation in favour of The integration processes that have army have eschewed military action for amnesties and quick fixes. Until Juba in theory begun with the relocation of negotiations, the insurgent command opts to take a more active and impar forces to assembly and/or integration ers have been the main beneficiaries, tial role in the difficult task of recon points—namely those for men loyal to while their men have faced integration ciling Southern Sudanese, the threats Gai and Yau Yau, respectively—have into a hostile army with neither the posed by remaining insurgent groups also dragged on for weeks or months space nor the desire to include them. 78 and other disgruntled factions will after the signing of amnesty deals. Their future is uncertain, not least continue to plague efforts to stabilize On occasion this has occurred when because they will be among the first the fledgling country. rebel leaders have refused to provide forces to be pushed out of the army a list of the number and ranks of if and when downsizing takes place. troops ready to integrate—as in the The ‘integration’ model is, therefore, case of Gai. Logistical problems have an unsustainable band-aid approach to Notes also hampered progress. The SPLM/A an intractable and complex problem. 1 This table does not include Abdel Bagi has not always ensured that the fight Ayii from Northern Bahr al Ghazal, who A new model is needed, one that accepted President Salva Kiir’s amnesty ers have been adequately fed. With emphasizes long-term reconciliation offer in early October 2011. sizeable groups of armed men being with communities rather than accom 2 Also known as Khorfulus/Canal. forced to wait for undetermined peri modation with military commanders. 3 Ceasefire Framework Agreement (2011). 4 O’Brien (2009a); Young (2010); Taban ods of time for poorly planned and The RoSS has never openly addressed (2011a; 2011b). executed integration, tensions and the brutal wartime history of Greater 5 Young (2006, pp. 15–18). misunderstandings have inevitably Upper Nile and the roles of key 6 GoSS (2006). escalated. Southern leaders in it, nor has it held 7 For background on these incidents, see Mc Evoy and LeBrun (2010, p. 29). Ultimately, however, the failure of the insurgents and the SPLA account 8 Mc Evoy and LeBrun (2010, pp. 22–27). integration is indicative of both sides’ able for abuses in the post-CPA period. 9 NED (2008, p. 14). resistance to accommodation and com Through government inaction and 10 HRW (2010). 11 2011 promise.79 While some SPLA officers silence, impunity has become the norm. Small Arms Survey ( b). 12 Interview with Peter Gadet, Juba, August charged with implementing integra Amnesties that turn a blind eye to vio 2011. tion orders have been reticent about lence still fresh in people’s minds only 13 For background on Gadet’s wartime role or opposed outright to integrating their make old wounds worse. in the oil areas of Greater Upper Nile, see HRW (2003, pp. 56–59). enemies,80 rebel commanders also bear Good governance is probably the 14 Rands (2010, p. 15). some of the blame for their refusal to best weapon the RoSS can deploy 15 Interview with a security adviser, Juba, accept proposed ranks for their men. against the insurgents. Extending August 2011.
10 Sudan Issue Brief Number 18 November 2011 16 E-mail communication with a Juba-based on 6 and 7 March in the Owachi area 72 See, for example, Small Arms Survey security adviser, 7 September 2011. (HRW, 2011). (2008). 17 Interview with a security adviser, Juba, 44 Small Arms Survey (2011e, p. 3). 73 The SPLA is reportedly refusing to main August 2011. 45 Small Arms Survey (2011e, p. 2). Lam tain the rank of the 4 brigadier generals, 18 SSLM/A (2011a). returned to Juba in early October 2011— 1 major general, and 10 colonels in 19 Interviews with UN, SPLA, and interna an attempt, perhaps, at reconciliation. Gadet’s forces (communications with tional NGO sources, Bentiu and Juba, 46 Interview with SPLA spokesman Col. Apollo Mayang Maluit and Bol Gatkuoth, August 2011. Philip Aguer, Juba, August 2011. November 2011). 20 Internal document provided by a UN 47 Interview with UN official familiar with 74 See Rands (2010). source, Juba, August 2011. NGO activities in South Sudan, Juba, 75 The failed integration processes include 21 SSLM/A (2011b). August 2011. those of forces loyal to George Athor, 22 Sudan Tribune (2011). 48 Interviews with SPLA and UNMISS Johnson Olonyi, and Gabriel Tang-Ginye. 23 Interview with SSLA/Gadet spokesman officials, Juba, August 2011. The integration processes for forces loyal Bol Gatkuoth, Juba, October 2011. 49 Sudan Radio Service (2011). to Gatluak Gai, Peter Gadet, and David 24 SSLM/A (2011c); Sudan Tribune (2011). 50 Also spelled Awinkibol, the home village Yau Yau have neither a clear timeline nor 25 SSLM/A (2011c). of Obote Mamur, a high-ranking but a publicly disclosed plan. 26 E-mail communication from South Sudan erratic SPLA general. Yau Yau has been 76 Between February and April 2011 hundreds analyst, 9 September 2011. staying with Mamur in Juba. of SPLA soldiers, rebel fighters, and civil 27 Sudan Tribune (2010a). 51 Boswell (2011). ians were killed before or during attempts 28 ICG (2009); Small Arms Survey (2009, 52 Interview with UNMISS official, Juba, at the integration of rebel forces into the pp. 22–27). August 2011. SPLA in northern Jonglei and southern 29 O’Brien (2009b); Young (2010). 53 Young (2006); Schomerus (2007). Upper Nile states. 30 ICG (2009); Small Arms Survey (2009, 54 Interview with Gadet spokesman Bol 77 The most important example is the engage pp. 4–7). Gatkuoth, Juba, August 2011. ment between the SPLA and Gabriel 31 E-mail correspondence from South Sudan 55 Interview with Gadet spokesman Bol Tang-Ginye’s forces in Kaldak, northern expert, 8 September 2011. Gatkuoth, Juba, October 2011. Jonglei, on 23–24 April 2011. 32 E-mail correspondence with Juba-based 56 Bubna (2011) cites separate UN military 78 Small Arms Survey field research con international official, 26 September 2011. observer interviews with captured militia ducted in late October 2011 indicated 33 Figures are compiled on the basis of reports members in Riak, Unity state, that corrobo that in one area near Mapel, Western Bahr from local authorities and/or assessment rate one another. al Ghazal, 980 of Gadet’s men, 486 of teams. E-mail correspondence with UN 57 SSLM/A (n. d.). Tang-Ginye’s men, 784 SAF JIUs, and an OCHA, 9 November 2011. 58 ‘Gadet and [Matthew] Puljang have unknown number of Gai’s men were all 34 E-mail correspondence with Juba-based brought us some rifles. We want to chase waiting for integration. international official, 9 September 2011. Salva [Kiir] away. Salva should go away! 79 E-mail communication from former South 35 Interviews with Bentiu residents, Bentiu, We will capture the responsibility of oil ern Sudan NGO worker, 7 September 2011. August 2011. with the power of our rifles. Puljang and 80 A number of SPLA field commanders in 36 Small Arms Survey (2011h, p. 2). Gatluak [Gai] shall come together and Unity and Upper Nile states expressed 37 Interview with Rev. Matthew Deang, Gadet will supply us with guns!’ (trans their opposition to integration in inter chairperson of the Peace and Reconcilia lation of the videos provided by a native views conducted for this Issue Brief in tion Committee, South Sudan National Nuer speaker in Bentiu, August 2011). August 2011. Legislative Assembly, Juba, August 2011. 59 Fick (2011c). Athor’s forces have also laid 81 GoSS (2006). 38 Small Arms Survey (2011h, p. 3). mines in Jonglei. 39 Interview with Apollo Mayang Maluit, 60 Interview with small arms tracing analyst former deputy commander to the late who viewed the weapons, September 2011. Gatluak Gai, Juba, August 2011. 61 There are other credible reports that the References 40 As his soldiers await integration, Gadet SPLA captured 82 mm mortars with Boswell, Alan. 2011. ‘Latest Challenge for and his inner circle are reportedly repre Chinese-made rounds, as well as anti-tank South Sudan: Armed Internal Rebellion.’ senting them in negotiations with the SPLA. and anti-personnel mines (correspondence McClatchy Newspapers. 26 March. 41 Governor Simon Kun Puoch is a Nuer with UN representative, October 2011). Bubna, Mayank. 2011. ‘Understanding South from Nasir county, but his administration 62 For more information, see
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 11 Kiir, Salva. 2011. ‘President of the Republic of —. 2009. Conflicting Priorities: GoSS Security —. n. d. Five YouTube videos.
HSBA project summary States Institute of Peace. It has received support in the past from the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) and International Trade Canada and the UK Government for Sudan/South Sudan is a multi-year project Global Conflict Prevention Pool. Additional support has administered by the Small Arms Survey. It was previously been provided by the Danish Demining Group developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, and the National Endowment for Democracy. the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese partners. Through the Credits active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, Series editor: Emile LeBrun including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Copy editor: Alex Potter programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, Cartographer: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafix as well as security sector reform and arms control inter Design and layout: Richard Jones ([email protected]) ventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity. Issue Briefs are designed to provide timely periodic snap shots of baseline information in a reader-friendly format. The Contact details HSBA also generates a series of longer and more detailed For more information or to provide feedback, contact Working Papers. All publications are available in English Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA Project Manager, at: and Arabic at
12 Sudan IssueIssue Brief Brief Number Number 6 18 April November 2007 2011