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The Fifth National Report of the Russian Federation

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The Fifth National Report of the Russian Federation THE FIFTH NATIONAL REPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT Prepared for the sixth Review Meeting in frames of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Moscow 2017 This fifth National Report of the Russian Federation has been drafted in accordance with Article 32 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Report describes in detail the obligations arising from the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and compliance with them by the Russian Federation. The Report has been prepared by the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom and the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service with the involvement of: ● Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Science (IBRAE RAN); ● Federal State-Funded Institution Scientific and Engineering Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (FSFI SEC NRS). 2 Table of Contents List of abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 5 Section A. Introduction ................................................................................................... 7 А.1. Purpose of the Report ........................................................................................ 7 A.2. Structure of the Report ....................................................................................... 7 A.3. Conclusions Drawn From the Discussion of the Fourth National Report of the Russian Federation Presented at the Fifth Review Meeting ................................................ 8 A.4. Main Guideline Documents on the Safe Management of SNF and RW and the Introduced Amendments ................................................................................... 10 Section В. Policies and Practices (Article 32) .................................................................. 13 В.1. Policy in the Field of SNF Management .............................................................. 13 В.2. Practices of SNF Management .......................................................................... 13 В.3. Policy in the Field of Radioactive Waste Management ......................................... 15 В.4. Practices of Radioactive Waste Management ..................................................... 16 В.5. Criteria Used for Definition and Classification of Radioactive Wastes .................... 18 Section C. Scope of Application (Article 3) ..................................................................... 21 Section D. Inventories and Lists (Article 32) ................................................................... 22 D.1. SNF Management Facilities (Article 32 (i)) .......................................................... 22 D.2. SNF Inventories (Article 32 (ii)) .......................................................................... 24 D.3. RW Management Facilities (Article 32 (iii)) ......................................................... 24 D.4. RW Inventories (Article 32 (iv)) .......................................................................... 25 D.5. Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (Article 32 (v)) .......................................... 28 Section E. Legislative and Regulatory System ................................................................ 29 E.1. Implementing Measures (Article 18) ................................................................... 29 E.2. Legislative and Regulatory System (Article 19) ................................................... 29 Е.3. State Regulation of Safety in the Field of Atomic Energy Use (Article 20) .............. 45 Section F. Other General Safety Provisions .................................................................... 57 F.1. Responsibility of the License Holder (Article 21) .................................................. 57 F.2. Human and Financial Resources (Article 22) ....................................................... 60 F.3. Quality Assurance (Article 23) ........................................................................... 64 F.4. Operational Radiation Protection (Article 24) ...................................................... 66 F.5. Emergency Preparedness (Article 25) ................................................................ 68 F.6. Decommissioning (Article 26) ............................................................................ 71 Section G. Safety of Spent Fuel Management ................................................................ 74 G.1. General Safety Requirements (Article 4) ............................................................ 74 3 G.2. Existing Facilities (Article 5) .............................................................................. 82 G.3. Siting of Proposed Facilities (Article 6) ............................................................... 84 G.4. Design and Construction of Facilities (Article 7) .................................................. 87 G.5. Assessment of Safety of Facilities (Article 8)....................................................... 89 G.6. Operation of Facilities (Article 9) ........................................................................ 91 G.7. Disposal of Spent Fuel (Article 10) ..................................................................... 95 Section H. Safety of Radioactive Waste Management ..................................................... 96 H.1. General Safety Requirements (Article 11)........................................................... 96 Н.2. Existing Facilities (Article 12)........................................................................... 102 Н.3. Siting of Proposed Facilities (Article 13) ........................................................... 104 Н.4. Design and Construction of Facilities (Article 14) .............................................. 106 Н.5. Assessment of Safety of Facilities (Article 15) ................................................... 107 Н.6. Operation of facilities (Article 16) ..................................................................... 108 Н.7. Institutional Measures after Closure (Article 17) ................................................ 111 Section I. Transboundary Movement (Article 27) ........................................................... 114 Section J. Disused Sealed Sources (Article 28) ............................................................ 118 Section K. Planned Activities to Improve Safety ............................................................ 119 K.1. Accomplishments of the Russian Federation Pointed Out at the Fifth Review Meeting 119 K.2. Addressing the Challenges Pointed Out at the Fifth Review Meeting .................. 119 K.3. Planned Efforts to Improve Safety (Suggestions) ............................................... 121 K.4. Areas of Good Performance ............................................................................ 122 K.5. Good Practices ............................................................................................... 123 K.6. Suggestions ................................................................................................... 123 K.7. Overview Matrix .............................................................................................. 124 Section L. Annexes .................................................................................................... 127 Annex B1. SNF Management ................................................................................. 127 Annex B2. RW Generation ..................................................................................... 128 Annex E. Framework Normative and Legal Acts ....................................................... 128 4 List of Abbreviations — Atomic Peaceful Large (abbreviation for water-cooled graphite-moderated AMB channel type thermal neutron reactor, operated at Beloyarsk NPP) ASA — acceptable specific activity BE — back-end BN — fast neutron reactor with Na-cooling CMP — joint stock company Chepetsky Mechanical Plant DWIF — deep-well injection facility for liquid radioactive waste EGP — loop-type graphite power reactor EIA — environmental impact assessment — Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and EMERCOM Elimination of the Consequence of Natural Disasters FA — fuel assembly FMB — floating maintenance base FMBA of Russia — Federal Medical and Biological Agency FNP — federal norms and rules FR — fuel rod — Federal Target Program Nuclear and Radiation Safety in 2008 and until FTP NRS 2015 — Federal Target Program Nuclear and Radiation Safety in 2016-2020 and FTP NRS-2 until 2030 FZ — Federal law GD — guideline document GRW — gaseous radioactive waste GSP NFCF — General Safety Provisions for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities HLW — high-level waste IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency ICRP — International Commission on Radiological Protection ILW — intermediate-level waste — Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Scientific Centre of the Russian Federation —Institute of Physics and Power Engineering named after A.I. IPPE Leipunsky (FSUE SRC IPPE) IRRS — Integrated Regulatory Review Service IRS — ionizing radiation source — Institutional Target Program for the Infrastructure Development and Spent ITP SNF Nuclear Fuel Management
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