Juma V. Mwapachu

TANZANIA IN THE AGE OF CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION

Juma V. Mwapachu

E&D Vision Publishing Dar es Salaam E & D Vision Publishing Limited P. O. Box. 4460 Dar es Salaam Tanzania. Email: [email protected] Website: www.edvisionpublishing.co.tz

Tanzania In the Age of Change and Transformation © Juma V. Mwapachu, 2018

ISBN: 979 9987 735 62 4

ii Dedication

To my wife Rose whose love and care is a gift of God.

iii Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms...... vii About the Author...... x Foreword ...... xi Preface ...... xiii

Part One: The Role of Leadership and its Dynamics ...... 1 Chapter 1: The Dynamics of Change and the Role of Leadership...... 3 Chapter 2: Leadership for Transformation ...... 14 Chapter 3: Kikwete’s Deliverology System - Fad or Innovation? ...... 22 Chapter 4: Magufuli and the Salary Ceiling Decision...... 26

Part Two: Creating an Entrepreneurial Tanzania...... 33 Chapter 5: Building an Entrepreneurial Tanzania ...... 35 Chapter 6: Tanzaphilia - Is Tanzania Exploiting its ‘Spell’ to Brand Itself?. 42 Chapter 7: Kikwete - Tanzania: Shape Up or be Unattractive ...... 47 Chapter 8: Dar es Salaam City Renewal - An Emerging Silver Lining? ..... 53

Part Three: Economic Challenges in a Turbulent World Economy...61 Chapter 9: Era of Slow Growth or End of Growth?...... 63 Chapter 10: Global Turbulence and Vulnerabilities...... 69 Chapter 11: Tanzania: Economic Light in a Gloomy World? ...... 73 Chapter 12: Obama Visit to Tanzania - the ‘Whys’?...... 97

Part Four: Industrialisation for Growth and Jobs...... 107 Chapter 13: Manufacturing Renaissance for Growth and Jobs...... 109 Chapter 14: Promoting SMEs - Challenges and Options...... 139 Chapter 15: Inequality - Tanzania’s Defining Challenge ...... 143

Part Five: Corporate Governance of State Enterprises ...... 149 Chapter 16: Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises - Dilemmas, Challenges and Solutions...... 151

iv Part Six: Economic Empowerment of Nationals...... 173 Chapter 17: Economic Empowerment Through Resources Nationalism. . . 175 Chapter 18: State - People Partnership in Capital Mobilisation...... 186

Part Seven: Private Sector Development and Business and Society...... 199 Chapter 19: Leadership and Private Sector Development ...... 201 Chapter 20: Business and Society - Building Trust and Partnership...... 206

Part Eight: Challenges of Education Pedagogy ...... 219 Chapter 21: Transforming Education Pedagogy - Pivotal in Quality Education ...... 221 Chapter 22: Reflections on Education and Intellectualism ...... 227 Chapter 23: Tanzania Education Climatology - Turbulence or Tsunami? ....232

Part Nine: The Future of Higher Education ...... 237 Chapter 24: University of the Future - Perspectives for Tanzania...... 239 Chapter 25: Role of African Universities for Human Excellence and Economic Competitiveness...... 273

Part Ten: Crisis of Knowledge and Skills...... 293 Chapter 26: Tanzania’s Crisis of Knowledge and Skills ...... 295 Chapter 27: Challenges and Opportunities for Engineers in SADC and EAC...... 305

Part Eleven: Social Challenges - Women, Religiosity and People with Disabilities...... 323 Chapter 28: Women Game Changers - Development and Politics ...... 325 Chapter 29: Surge in Religiosity - Politics or Social Fractures?...... 331 Chapter 30: Dynamics and Challenges Facing People with Disabilities . . . 336

v Part Twelve: The Role of the Media ...... 343 Chapter 31: The Media - ‘Democratising Democracy’?...... 345 Chapter 32: The New Constitution - Freedom and Independence of Media Industry...... 351

Part Thirteen: Reflections on the Tanzania Union ...... 357 Chapter 33: The Union Politics and Constitutional Dynamics ...... 359 Chapter 34: The Union - What is its Future?...... 377 Chapter 35: Brexit and its Lessons for Tanzania...... 393

Part Fourteen: Challenges Facing the East African Community. 403 Chapter 36: East African Community: Challenges of Politics and Institutional Weaknesses...... 405 Chapter 37: Is the EAC at a Tipping Point?...... 420 Chapter 38: EAC - Challenges of Progress and Stability...... 441 Chapter 39: EAC - Flip Flops and Search or Leap of Faith...... 447 Chapter 40: EAC Integration - Are Citizens Players or Spectators?...... 453 Chapter 41: Identities and Their Relevance in EAC Integration...... 463 Chapter 42: Role of East African Business Council in EAC Integration. . . 475 Chapter 43: Magufuli - A New Impetus in the EAC? ...... 479

Afterword ...... 484 References and Bibliography ...... 486

vi Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB African Development Bank Group AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Trade Pact AU African Union BOT Bank of Tanzania BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Economic Group CCM Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania) CHADEMA Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo CAG Controller & Auditor General CIA Central Intelligence Agency CEO Chief Executive Officer CET Common External Tariff CHC Consolidated Holdings Limited COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CSR Corporate Social Responsibility CTI Confederation of Tanzania Industries CUF Civic United Front DART Dar es Salaam Rapid Transport System DSE Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange EAC East African Community EACJ East African Court of Justice

vii EALA East African Legislative Assembly EABC East African Business Council ECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa EPA Economic Partnership Agreement EU European Union ESRF Economic and Social Research Foundation FDLR The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda GDP Gross Domestic Product ICT Information and Communications Technology IMF International Monetary Fund IUCEA Inter-University Council of East Africa KMTC Kilimanjaro Machine Tools Limited MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation MDG Millennium Development Goals MVA Manufacturing Value Added MKUKUTA National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty MKURABITA Programme inspired by Hernando de Soto to promote land registration to be used as collateral for loans. NEPAD The New Partnership for Africa.’ Development NHC National Housing Corporation NIC National Insurance Corporation NSE Nairobi Stock Exchange OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PAFMECA Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa PDB President.’ Delivery Bureau PEMADU Performance Management & Delivery Unit in Malaysia. PhD Doctor of Philosophy PEPFAR The U.S. President.’ Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief PIMCO Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC PSRC Public Sector Reform Commission

viii R&D Research & Development SEZ Special Economic Zone SID Society for International Development SIDA Swedish International Development Agency SME Small and Medium Enterprise SOE State-Owned Enterprise SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TANAPA Tanzania National Parks TANESCO Tanzania National Electric Supply Company TEMDO Tanzania Engineering and Manufacturing Design Organisation TIB Tanzania Investment Bank TIC Tanzania Investment Centre TNBC Tanzania National Business Council TIRDO Tanzania Industrial Research and Development Organisation TPA Tanzania Ports Authority TPDC Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation TPSF Tanzania Private Sector Foundation TRA Tanzania Revenue Authority TSFYDP Tanzania Second Five Year Development Plan UAE United Arab Emirates UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization US United States of America or USA WB The World Bank

ix About the Author

uma V. Mwapachu has had a long Jcareer in government, private sector and civil society in Tanzania, regionally and internationally. He has been Tanzania’s Ambassador to France, Secretary General of the East African Community, Chairman of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite, Chairman of the University of Dodoma Governing Council, Vice Chairman of the University of Dar es Salaam Governing Council, President of the Society for International Development, Chairman of the East African Business Council and Chairman of the Confederation of Tanzania Industries. He has sat and sits on several business boards of directors in areas such as mining, banking, insurance, marine logistics and teak plantation. He has published three books: Management of Public Enterprises in Developing Countries (1983), Confronting New Realities-Reflections on Tanzania’s Radical Transformation (2005) and Challenging the Frontiers of African Integration-The Dynamics of Policies, Politics and Transformation in East African Community (2012). He holds a degree in law from the University of East Africa, a Post-Graduate degree in International Law from the Indian Academy of International Law, New Delhi, and has doctoral degrees (Honoris Causa) in literature and in politics from the University of Dar es Salaam and the National University of Rwanda respectively. In December 2011, Kenya President, Mwai Kibaki conferred on Ambassador Mwapachu the Moran of the Order of the Golden Heart (MGH). He lives in Dar es Salaam and is married to Rose.

x Foreword

or nearly 20 years, Africa’s economic growth was heralded as Fa turning point for the continent. It was hoped and surmised by many that the so-called “Africa Rising” phenomenon would propel large sections of Africa out of poverty. Little was said at the time that the growth was largely driven by raw material exports from a limited number of countries and consumption by the middle class. With the down-turn in international commodity markets and doubt about the expansion of the middle class, Africa is forced to re-examine its future. Not every country benefited from the commodity boom. Some countries experience steady growth because of endogenous investments in infrastructure, human resources and consistency in governance. These countries are offering new lessons on how Africa might chart a new development that is consistent with its historical aspirations for regional integration and self-sufficiency. In this refreshing book, Ambassador Juma Mwapachu uses the case of Tanzania to map out the frontiers of such a path. He returns the reader with vivid examples to basic issues that underlie sustained development. The central message in Tanzania in the Age of Change and Transformation is that surviving in an uncertain world is going to take considerable capacity in entrepreneurship and innovation. The book outlines a number of measures that could play a key role in the entrepreneurial turn of the country. What particularly stands out is the emphasis that the book places on leadership, human capabilities and institutional innovation. In his view, such age requires an increase in the generation of

xi new ideas and proposals for change. This requires a society that is open to debate and leadership that is able to harness the creative sprinklings of dissent. The book seeks to bring together the diversity of elements that make it possible for a country to withstand uncertain change. It does so with remarkable candour. The strength of the book lies in pointing to contemporary realities, using the author’s personal experience and displaying mastery of national, regional and international dynamics. It contains original material and insights that only Mwapachu, given his deep knowledge of Africa’s development history, can provide. It is a book about Tanzania. It is a book about Africa at large. It is also a book about today’s world where traditional values that have for centuries underpinned economic theories are being challenged in the very countries that promulgated them. Speaking truth to power takes a speaker with intellectual courage. Ambassador Juma Mwapachu is that speaker. In this book, he has spoken and I hope readers will take the time to hear him. The book is so rich in lessons and practical experiences that peril awaits those who ignore them. I recommend it without hesitation.

Calestous Juma Professor of the Practice of International Development Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, United States Author, Innovation and Its Enemies: Why People Resist New Technologies (2016).

xii Preface

‘‘To build this country we have to make many changes. And in order to change it we must be willing to try what is new. It is useless to long for the good things of today if we are not prepared to change the habits of the past which prevent our making use of the means to achieve those good things.’

Julius K. Nyerere Inaugural Presidential Address on 9 December, 1962.

‘Our politics need to be re-designed. Our educational order is not yet wired for this new age. Every business will have to be reshaped, like it or not. Our foreign policy, as we’ve seen, demands a new vision and direction... Our cities demand redesign as they become wired for connected life. Our economy, our employment, our habits of trade, our management of nature and environment-all these will be changed irrevocably by connection—’

Joshua Cooper Ramo The Seventh Sense.

xiii he second decade of the 21st century has so far presented Tseveral challenges and developments, globally, regionally and in Tanzania. Despite the differences in geographical spaces, the turbulences, vulnerabilities and challenges in the fields of politics, economics, social conditions and technological advances, there have been elements of commonalities as well as impacts. The commonalities and impacts for a long time have been positive. However, the same may not be the case with Trump as President of the US. Trump’s administration has already given birth to political, economic and social nationalism which has met popular revolts of the people. Trump’s political style appears to disrupt the conventional globalisation that had become the economic ‘normal’ in several decades. The disruption has global impacts. The EU is particularly concerned that Trump’s lukewarm policy on the solidarity of the EU and its opposition to the Climate change agreement contribute to an uncertain global solidarity. It is also a situation that gives Russia the upper hand to destabilise the Ukraine and the Crimea. It is noteworthy that China has become the second global economic power, taking advantage of a liberal market globalisation and has exploited the potentials of the US market. It is not clear what will happen to China-US trade under Trump. The somewhat warm visit of the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, to the US early in April 2017 will need sometime for it be assessed concretely. In Europe, political populism is surging. EU’s future is at stake following growing nationalism which also seems to feed on Trumpism. Even Pope Francis has reflected on such concerns. Speaking at the 60th anniversary of Treaties of Rome at the end of March 2017, the Holy Father called upon European leaders to defeat populism and revive European solidarity and unity. The Financial Times of 25 March 2017 equally cautioned European states about showing themselves more willing to putting ‘realpolitik ahead of moral standards’ because such stance may not ‘help in exerting influence’ outside EU borders. Brexit contributes to the anxieties about the future of European solidarity and unity. The future of a vibrant UK could also be at

xiv peril. The entry of Macron into power as President in France and the return to power of Merkel in Germany, though narrowly, point to a new age of US-European opposing views of global order. Brexit should raise challenges over the negotiations between the EAC and the EU in concluding the Economic Partnership Agreement, particularly following the polarisations within the EAC with Kenya and Rwanda signing the EPA while Tanzania and Uganda stalling and maybe being outrightly against EPA. The future of EAC as an integration project may, in this context, take a murky path. The surge in terrorism marked by ISIS in Iraq and Syria and in other forms of militant Islamism took a complex and difficult position in recent years. Its diversity- the use of modern attack weapons and use of non-weapon terror attacks, such as use of trucks and cars with moving targets (in places such as Paris, Nice, Brussels, Berlin, Istanbul, London and Stockholm) make it difficult to map out effective measures of dealing and destroying it. The complexity of ISIS is well captured from Pankaj Mishra’s recent book entitled, ‘The Age of Anger- A History of the Present’. Mishra notes that ISIS ‘represents an ultimate stage in the privatisation of war that has progressively characterised, along with many other privatisations, the age of globalisation... It is the canniest and more resourceful of all traders in the flourishing international economy of disaffection.’ In Africa, the Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Al Shabaab in Somali types of terrorisms have destabilised some parts of Nigeria and, in the case of Somalia, they have turned Somalia into an enduring failed state. It is evident that the higher interconnectedness of the world through digital technology and instant communications will not only forge higher economic relations but will also contribute to diverse disruptions-technological and those caused by terrorism. This book is about the political and economic changes in Tanzania as well as about the broader social dynamics that impact national transformation. My views and insights encapsulated in the book are partly drawn from papers and articles published and unpublished between 2010 and 2016. I have radically reviewed the papers and articles to reflect new thinking and current perspectives to fit the

xv changing political and economic dynamics. They also include latest data to offer greater clarity of emerging economic policies and status and leadership engagements. Noteworthy is that most of the book chapters comprise materials that have not been published as yet. In determining the structure and approach of the book, I have been influenced and inspired by Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz. In his book entitled, ‘The Great Divide-Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them.’ He posits, ‘I have resisted the temptation to revise or expand the articles gathered here, or even to update them. Nor have I restored the many ‘cuttings’ of the original pieces, important ideas that had to be left out as I struggled to meet assigned word limits. The journalistic format has much to commend itself: its pieces are short and punchy, responding to the issues of the moment... As I wrote these articles, engaging in the often-heated debates at the time, I kept in mind the deeper messages that I wanted to convey.’ In the past decade, my mind has been troubled by several problems and challenges facing Tanzania and the EAC region in which it operates. My concern is particularly heightened by what I see as the ‘dilution’ of serious academic engagement in addressing these problems and challenges. Even when some academics (few of them) participate in Television talk shows which loosely cover political and economic challenges, academic contributions in newspapers which, to me, would be more effective, are virtually non-existent. What is particularly bewildering is why, in the age of change, tumult (notably political) and enduring poverty, Tanzania should not find itself in a state where conversations and exchange of views through media and civil platforms should be more serious and passionate. Contextually, there is much to learn from a book entitled, ‘A World of Struggle-How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy’ written by a distinguished Harvard Law School Professor David Kennedy. In that book, he aptly postulates, ‘In a world where so much is open to debate and conflict is all around us, how can it be so difficult to contest and change the things that matter? Things like the distribution of wealth and opportunity or how and share. Or the pattern of environmental distribution or the ubiquity of kleptocratic rule. The answer is not a mysterious constitutional settlement, the

xvi obscure workings of a disaggregated public hand or global value consensus. The answer lies in the strange alchemy of expertise and struggle through which our world is made and remade.’ Why has Tanzania lost the culture of ‘open debate’ and contestations? But could it be that Tanzania is witnessing a crisis of democracy? Or is Tanzanian democracy merely, losing ‘its glamour’ as Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs have interrogated in an April 2017 snapshot article in the journal, ‘Foreign Affairs’ entitled ‘Democracy Is Not Dying-Seeing Through the Doom and Gloom’, And what is ‘glamour’? The article cites reports like the Afrobarometer which show a good progress in Africa in Africans rejecting nondemocratic forms of government. Question is whether such rejections are bearing positive changes? The conclusion of the article, which I go along with, is that the state of democracy in the world and in several African countries ‘is much less healthy than predicted during the early years of democracy’s third wave’. In a broader context, though, we should ask: is Tanzania not trapped in the failure of a broad capacity to contest and change the difficulties which engulf it? In addition, we continue to pertinently ask, ‘where have all our intellectuals gone’? And what has also led to the weakening of the partnership between government, academia and business leaders that used to thrive during President Mkapa’s regime? Could it be that we are also witnessing a renewal of such partnership from what has started to emerge since early April 2017, as exemplified by the large meeting organised in Dodoma by the Ministers of Finance and Planning and Minister of Industry and Trade, involving business leaders and economic players to discuss the state of the national economy? I hope that such meetings will not be episodic. Their continuity and frequency will help the government to better shape its economic policies. In this book, I address many of these questions within the context of the broad themes that feature in the above quote from Joshua Cooper Ramo. I examine issues related to leadership and governance, role of the media and free expression, role of women, branding of the country, building Tanzania through entrepreneurial initiatives,

xvii education and development of skills, industrialisation and crisis of jobs, private sector development, business and society, adapting country policies to fast changing global economic environment, tackling inequality, empowering nationals economically, revisiting state-owned enterprises, religion and people with disabilities, the challenges facing the Tanzania Union and the state of the East African Community. I hope that this book will stimulate debates in Tanzania and in the EAC region and help us to better understand and appreciate the dynamics of leadership and to assist in gendering ideas that shape new policies and programmes that build solid democratic systems and processes; promote higher social and economic prosperity and deepen political and economic integration.

Ambassador Juma V. Mwapachu Dar es Salaam Tanzania. November 2017

xviii PART 1

THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND ITS DYNAMICS

‘To move toward a fundamental change, we need leaders with a different kind of vision and commitments. These leaders must demonstrate a strong commitment in the principles of equality, equity and empowerment, particularly gender equality and equity and women’s empowerment. They need to be committed to use power not as an instrument of domination and exclusion but as an instrument of liberation, inclusion and equality. The globalization process is creating new opportunities for enhancing knowledge and making money, but only the more endowed are able to have access to these opportunities and they are disproportionately benefiting from this process. What is needed from leaders... global, national, and local... is a strong commitment in the principle of social justice and concrete policies and actions to create conditions enabling the poor and the marginalized groups to have equal access to the new knowledge and opportunities. Individuals and communities need to be empowered to negotiate better terms of competition in the global market. The government has a role to play in empowering citizens and communities’.

Rounaq Johan Transformation Leadership in the 21st Century, UNDP Human Development Report, 1999, p. 22.

Chapter 1

The Dynamics of Change and the Role of Leadership

he French critic, journalist, and novelist, Jean-Baptiste Alphonse TKarr wrote back in 1849 at the height of the 1848 European Revolutions that ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’, literally translating into ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’. A profound statement for a long time. The English Poet, TS Eliot was later to surmise in his poem, ‘Four Quartets’:

‘Time present and time past Are both perhaps present in time future, And time future contained in time past. If all time is eternally present All time is unredeemable. What might have been is an abstraction Remaining a perpetual possibility Only in a world of speculation’.

3 The World Has Changed But how times have changed from such earlier thinking. Today, humanity, in both rich and poor countries, lives in times of rapid, tumultuous and often disruptive change. Change is the new normal. As Mohamed El-Erian of PIMCO put it during the time of the global financial crisis in 2008,‘it was clear to us that, despite the very high hurdle that we always apply to such a statement (namely expectation to a return to the conditions prevailing before the crisis of 2007), the world has changed in a manner that is unlikely to be reversed over the next few years.’ Put differently, things no longer remain the same. Our lives- personal and communal our social, cultural, political and economic systems and values as well as our businesses and economic activities are all, increasingly, prone and impacted by the rate and pace of change.

Future Shock Back in 1970, the American Social critic, Alvin Toffler, in a startling book entitled ‘Future Shock’, alarmed the world when he observed that ‘in the three short decades between now and the twenty-first century, millions of ordinary psychologically normal people will face an abrupt collision with the future. Citizens of the richest and most technologically advanced nations, many of them will find it increasingly painful to keep up with the incessant demand for change that characterizes our time. For them, the future will have arrived too soon.’ Toffler did not refer to the people in poor and technologically underdeveloped countries. There was no need for him to express the inevitable greater pain. It was simply evident.

Nyerere and Ideas of Change It is interesting to note though that the ideas about rapid change and their implications to societies did not escape the minds and visions of some of the leaders in the developing world even at the turn of political independence. For example, Tanzania’s founding President, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, as early as December 1962, in his Inaugural Presidential Address, was seized of what change

4 meant in transforming his newly independent state. He posited that ‘to build this country we have to make many changes. And to change it we must be willing to try what is new’. He affirmed that it was ‘useless to long for the good things of today if we are not prepared to change the habits of the past which prevent our making use of the means to achieve those good things’. Thus, in reference, for example, to changing the habits of the past of Tanzanian rural populations, in 1973 Nyerere decided to initiate a nation-wide villagization programme which involved the forced movement of rural populations from their scattered homesteads into planned villages. In a widely publicized academic paper published in 1976, I described the villagization project as ‘a revolutionary strategy for development’. Nyerere’s philosophy was that it could not be cost- effective for the government to provide welfare facilities that transform the lives of the rural citizens if they were to be left to live in scattered homes. The villagization programme was an expression of radical, disruptive change. It sought to destroy old ways and habits of rural life and create new ones. It manifested, by definition, what Joseph Schumpeter described back in 1942 as ‘creative destruction’. However, the villagization programme failed, mainly because the ideology of change that drove it did not fit the strong cultural values that underpinned rural life in many parts of Tanzania. One clear evidence the failure of the villagization scheme is the return of many of the people who had been moved from their original homesteads returning to their homes in the 1980s. Second, is the decline of production, especially in Southern Tanzania (Mtwara and Lindi) involving cashew following the massive shifts of the rural people from their traditional homesteads. Those areas had become no go areas because lions had taken over and a number of villagers who tried to go and harvest their cashed were eaten up.

Lessons from Failure of Villagization The failure of villagization provides a useful lesson for addressing the character of needed change and how and when it can readily be embraced and absorbed. As Nassam Nicholas Taleb, author of the

5 famous book, ‘The Black Swan’ has noted in another book entitled, ‘Fooled by Randomness-The Hidden Role of Change in Life and in the Markets’, ‘risk taking is necessary for large success; but it is also necessary for failure’. Thus, in the brave new world of rapid change and instability, leadership is best viewed as the capacity to be bold in taking risks, often, calculated risks. Much later in his life, Nyerere was to be clearer about the whole idea of change; its management and the role of leadership. Speaking at the Conference of the Association of Commonwealth Universities in Ottawa, Canada, in August 1998, close to a year before he died, Nyerere noted that ‘change has, throughout history, been a constant part of human experience. But today change is more rapid than ever before; its implications are very comprehensive, and yet its first approach is often imperceptible... -For any society, and for every individual, adapting to change at the present speed is very difficult yet avoiding change is impossible.’ In that address, Nyerere referred to how national cohesion and stability were exposed to changing socio-economic dynamics that breed and cause societal strain due to inequalities of wealth and power and the persistence of ‘economic woes; He lamented the dismantling of the Arusha Declaration which, to him, formed the bedrock for building social justice and addressing the drivers of inequality. He must have felt betrayed in his avowed pursuit to lead and sustain the kind of change that constituted real social and economic liberation.

Leadership and Changing Minds For as Harvard Professor Howard Gardner has aptly postulated in his book, entitled, ‘Changing Minds-The Art and Science of Changing Our Own and Other People’s Minds’, ‘leaders almost by definition are people who change minds-be they leaders of a nation, a corporation, or a nonprofit institution.’ For almost two decades, between 1965 and 1983, Nyerere seemed to be a master at changing minds, politically and economically. Or was he simply a good ‘manipulator’ of minds? It is important to understand well the dynamics of change and the role leadership plays in mustering such change. This is key because

6 of the disruptive character of rapid and discontinuous change in the world today. Take the case of business firms. Their agility and adaptiveness in the context of regional and global economic, financial and technology changes, hugely depend on the role of governments. This is so because issues about investment and tourism attractiveness and business competitiveness generally hinge on regulation, tax burden, fiscal deficits, debt burdens, a transparent and fair rule of law and geo-political certainty. At the same time, there are also broader societal issues relating to: • Conflict and terrorism; • The state of democratic integrity and effervescence that are increasingly animated by a more connected citizenry, especially among the millennials, who feel more empowered and emboldened through digital technologies; • Freedom of the media; • Broader political activism of the political parties and the citizens; • Prudent management of climate-related resources that not only offer resources sustainability but also mitigate violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers/peasants which are surging; • The growing place and role of nationals who constitute the diaspora.

Creative Destruction and Impact These issues are dynamic and require dynamic leadership that is empowered by what Professor Adam Grant describes as ‘originality’- ‘the act of creative destruction – demolishing the old way of doing things’ without for fear of rocking the boat or for purposes of ‘maintaining stability and attaining conventional achievements.’ It would be wrong, in such vein, to be tempted by a narrow focus on what drives management of change. This is because the orthodox focus on impact of the new technology may be unrealistic. This is not to belittle the emergent role of the internet-of-things, and how companies and economic, activities are generally better enabled continually to innovate and create new products that meet

7 the changing tastes of consumers even in a developing country like Tanzania. Kenya should pride itself for developing the M-Pesa IT technology which is not for sale except for being copied. Such disaggregation should open a more objective discussion on how EU machinery products could undermine Tanzania’s industrialization 15-25 years from when the EPA comes on stream. The EU countries, as it is, are committed to reviewing its trade relations with Africa. Germany thinks that the trade rules are ‘unfair.’

Mkapa and Ideology War Vs EPAs Former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa was almost at war in his Op-ed in the East African newspaper of 30 July 2016, about how the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU) would not only suffocate Tanzania’s industrialization strategy but would also adversely affect fiscal revenues of imports from the EU even when the EPA duty free rules will take effect only between 15 and 25 years of signing the EPA. His view is well represented by the position of the South Centre based in Geneva which he chairs. The same view is also supported by the UN Economic Commission for Africa. It could be that former President Mkapa’s position is also receiving support from German Chancellor Merkel who in June 2017 observed that EPA needed to be revisited because it imposes inequality of trade relationships. It is also important to interrogate the differential decision taken by a group of SADC countries, notably, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho (with Angola opting to join in future) to sign the EPA on 10 June 2016. How will Tanzania, a SADC member, deal with this group? The same question should confront Tanzania in the EAC-EPA impasse with Kenya and Rwanda signing the EPA.

Overplaying the Economics of Competition It is important though to undertake rigorous analyses of trade patterns of African countries with non-EU countries to determine if their vulnerability is limited to trade relationships under EPA. Going by

8 the trade matrix of Tanzanian imports for the period 1995-2013, the leading exporters to Tanzania by US Dollar values are, sequentially: India, China, UAE, South Africa, Kenya, Switzerland, United States, Japan, Bahrain and the United Kingdom being last. Their average share is 70.9% (UK contributing only 2.0%). The portion of remaining others whose share is 27.2% may include Germany and other EU countries. Actually, Bank of Tanzania Annual Report of 2015 data shows that the share of Tanzania’s imports in total imports were as follows; China-34.7%; India-13.5%; South Africa-4.7%; UAE-4.4%; and Kenya-4.1%. Totaling 61.4%. Even then, the ‘grey area’ of the 27.2% that probably particularly concerns President Mkapa should be addressed by thoroughly disaggregating the imports in product profiles. What kind of industrialisation is Tanzania pursuing that would be threatened by EU’s industrial exports to Tanzania? Will the EU countries still be producing industries of the technology that threaten Tanzania’s production of goods it requires and which it cannot produce? On the tax revenues issue, Tanzania cannot, on one hand, champion economic self-reliance and, on the other, champion optimization of tax revenues from imports. Tanzania needs to build a strong national economy that enables it to raise levels of revenues that are in fit with its recurrent and development needs. An economy that over-relies on import taxes is dangerous. External trade relationships should be driven by the desire to build strong, robust and resilient national economies.

Political Innovation and Economic Governance The foregoing notwithstanding, rapid technology change and its disruptive character that now exacerbates the divide between the rich and poor world is undoubtedly a matter of serious concern in the quest for global equality and solidarity. Yet my view with respect to such a growing dilemma is that without the right kind of leadership that is responsive, on a timely basis, to the dynamics of change, such technologies would bypass a country anyway. The reality is that Tanzania, in particular, has not in recent decades taken adequate and bold steps to advance its technological capacity and

9 competence. The annual reports of the World Economic Forum on Global Competitiveness vindicate this position. And the reason for such weakness has been political leadership. In this vein, the Kenyan, globally celebrated Professor Calestous Juma of Harvard Kennedy School, United States, in his new seminal book entitled, ‘Innovation and its Enemies-Why People Resist New Technologies’, takes leadership to task about its centrality in transforming societies by embracing and leading innovation. He notes that we live in a world where the ‘next frontier of leadership’ will have to focus on ‘how society is prepared to respond not only to global grand challenges but also to new social problems generated by technological advancements and engineering applications.’ He further asserts that it will be absolutely essential for leaders to be ‘more adaptive, flexible, and open to continuous learning. They will be called upon increasingly to take decisions in the face of uncertainty and amid controversy.’ Professor Juma views ‘political leadership on innovation’ and the existence of ‘institutions of science and technology advice’ as strategic vehicles of economic governance.

Contrasting Lee Kuan Yew and Nyerere Analysts who contrast the leadership of Nyerere and other African leaders with Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, argue that Singapore’s greater economic success which saw that country achieve higher per capita GDP than the United States in a single generation was primarily due to Lee Kuan Yew’s astuteness and agility in greater understanding of the defining changes in global economics and in daring to transform a natural resource deprived country largely through the application of knowledge. Unlike Nyerere, Lee Kuan Yew believed that the essence of a successful nation-state was intense competition which allowed every individual to achieve within a provided level playing field. For him, the inequalities resulting from such an economic system had to be viewed within the prism of an economic growth that would, over time, act as a rising tide that lifts all boats. It is the same philosophy of management of change which China’s Deng Xiaoping adopted for

10 China’s radical transformation from 1978. Rwanda’s Paul Kagame is today viewed as an archetype of such philosophy as well. Of course, Lee was accused by the west of authoritarianism and ‘subverting’ democracy. Yet, for him, economic growth, prosperity and democracy were inseparable. He believed that democracy could not be about promises (which probably defined much of Nyerere’s economic leadership). It had to be about performance results that requires rigorous societal discipline which, unfortunately, often gets confused with subversion of liberty and freedom. Kagame suffers from similar skewed accusation.

Is Magufuli another Lee Kuan Yew? There is growing body of opinion in Tanzania that similar leadership style is emerging under President John Magufuli. To Magufuli, as he has pronounced a few times, democracy should be reduced to the politics of the electoral process. Thus, with the elections having lapsed, the winning political party should be allowed to govern; to succeed or fail. The next election should become the judge. The political opposition, on the other hand, is contending that democratic politics, fundamentally, as Professor Rajni Kothari once wrote, is ‘about distribution of power, not its centralization.’ He sees the prohibition of political activities as ‘centralization’ of power which fails the test of constitutional democracy. The challenge is that the governance process being applied in managing change in which political parties are excluded from participating is subject to contention. In other words, democracy is fundamentally about participation. It is not about exclusion. As Professor Calestous Juma has put it, democratic governance is about ‘deliberative decision-making. The process helps society to identify areas of common interest and learn how to share risks and benefits.’ It cannot be reduced to a once in five years’ participation in elections kind of activity. To be reduced as such would negate the fundamental meaning of a democratic parliamentary system whose bedrock is functioning political parties. Above all, it is a constitutional rather than a political matter.

11 The Failure of African Leadership in Technology However, Professor Calestous Juma cautions that experiences in some countries shows that too much deliberative decision-making in the name of democratic governance has worked against innovation and has thwarted political courage to take its course in situations demanding quick and resolute action. This is a matter that should quickly find resolution if democracy is to prevail and become the support pillar for both inclusive national transformation and sustainable peace and stability. In sum, what is clear is that leadership stands out as a vital factor in the management of change. It is an attribute that is partly reflected in Professor Robert Paarlberg’s book entitled, ‘Starved for Science-How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa’. Paarlberg quizzes: ‘why so many political leaders in Africa have been willing to follow the lead of the rich, particularly the European rich, in cutting back on public- sector investments in agricultural science and placing stifling regulations on agricultural GMOs. Why have these policy tastes of the rich been adopted by governments in Africa, where poverty remains pervasive and where more rather than less agricultural science is so desperately needed?’ I agree with Paarlberg that many African leaders are failing Africa by summarily rejecting agricultural biotechnology. Yet, it is inconceivable that Africa’s and Tanzania’s re-awakening to the quest for industrialization can take off with desired zeal and success without the productivity of agriculture being tackled. It is agribusiness and the creation of robust agricultural value chains that connect Africa’s regional markets and, later, the global markets, that would underpin and drive such industrialization. Indeed, given the menace of climate change-the droughts, the El-Nino effects, the floods, the fast depletion of forest cover, a particularly serious problem in Tanzania, decline in fresh water fish resources and the declining underground and surface water sources, the realization of Tanzania’s new industrialization strategy much depends on the timely adoption of agricultural biotechnology. Without the introduction, for example, of drought and pest resistant crops, constant vulnerability of agricultural production would be

12 enhanced. President Magufuli’s boldness and adeptness in embracing and applying agricultural biotechnology can stand out as the saviour. But will the President rise to such reality?

Conclusion Tanzania like many other countries face a continuing ‘abrupt collision with the future.’ It has no choice. The very pace and nature of change-social, political, cultural, economic and technological-is disruptive. It is the type of environment which Charles Dickens so powerfully captures in the opening lines of his novel about the French Revolution entitled, ‘A Tale of Two Cities’: ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times... it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair...’ Whether we like it or not, Tanzania faces global uncertainty; it cannot also choose its neighbours; it cannot shore itself up from the terrorism that afflicts others; it cannot stop the rise of new actors in its social milieu by the very reality of the changing demographics with new demands of such millennials who are increasingly connected and empowered through social media; it cannot upset the inflection point where the balance between the individual and the state is increasingly influenced by a new democratic culture and urbanization; it cannot stop the media play its gate-keeping role. Tanzania’s ability to face challenges of such rapid changes demands a hope of best times; a spring of hope. It also demands a leadership that believes in inclusiveness and allows, to paraphrase Chairman Mao Zedong’s speech of 1957, ‘hundred flowers to blossom and a hundred schools of thought to contend’.

13 Chapter 2

Leadership for Transformation

If you fail to honour your people, they will fail to honour you; It is said of a good leader that When the work is done, the aim fulfilled, The people will say, ‘We did this ourselves’. Lao Tzu, 604–531 B. C., Founder of Taoism, Tao Te Ching

ransformation is all about fundamental change. Transformational Tleadership is leadership that drives, fosters and inspires fundamental change. Tanzania, like other developing countries, are in search of different kinds of politics and governance in which a different kind of leadership will emerge to bring about fundamental change.

Nyerere’s Take on Leadership Attributes In August 1961, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika, in an address at the Police College in Dar es Salaam, described leadership as having ‘many aspects but, most of all, it is the

14 qualities of the mind which establish a man among his fellows. The ability to think logically, the capacity to express himself clearly and concisely, that masterly of his job which enables him to understand fully the implications of his decisions.’ Later in life, after he had long retired and had had the opportunity to assess what leadership entailed in the context of a fast-changing world, Nyerere were to offer a more intense interpretation of leadership. Addressing the Commonwealth Universities Association in Ottawa, Canada in August 1998, he observed, ‘decades ago, as President of my country, I told Tanzanians that the choice before them was to change or be changed. I was wrong. There was no choice. They had to change, and would still be changed.’ He went on to elaborate that ‘in retrospect, I think that the burden of leadership was easier for my generation than it is for the leaders of to-day. The demand for change was coming from us –the leaders and people alike. We were speaking on behalf of a united society in demanding an end to the visible, and thus easily understood, alien control over our lives. Very few of the leaders of the Independence Movements understood that political freedom could be virtually negated by ever-increasing external economic power over us. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was probably the first of us to realise that fact, with his much-derided talk of “neo-colonialism.” But even he said “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto you.’’ Nyerere concluded by asserting that ‘the present generation of leaders have not only to deal with the effects of the economic realities about which most of us knew very little, they have also to do so when the expectations of the people are higher than the general understanding of what is happening and why.’ Clearly, Nyerere had gone through a major transformation in understanding the new dynamics of leadership in a new world of globalization, of the deeper role played by international financial institutions, of the emergence of wealth and privilege, even within sections of poor countries like those in Africa, and of the surge of pluralistic democracy.

15 Political Realities and Leadership Response In fact, while Nyerere, for example, was a strong advocate and defender of a two-terms Presidential system of leadership in Africa in the early 1990s, it would seem that a year before he died he may have developed a different position probably informed by the colossal tragedy of the Rwanda genocide of April, 1994, the post Mobutu Democratic Republic of Congo complex and tumultuous political governance system, and the complexity of the heavily tribal and kingdoms-influenced Ugandan political system. He must have wondered whether the goals of political unity, peace and stability could be assured through the two terms presidential system. It is thus not surprising, in this context, that at the same Ottawa conference, Nyerere were to postulate that ‘Democracies in the countries of the South should be allowed to develop their own institutions and characteristics. The people of Burundi, for instance, do not have to be apologetic about wanting to devise a democracy which suits Burundi. What is important is that it should be a democracy, but a democracy that is acceptable to the People of Burundi, and which serves their best interests.’

No Conventional Attribute of Democracy The same argument can logically be extended to Rwanda and Uganda. I find Nyerere’s shift to what indeed represents the ‘best interests’ of the people as the important criteria for democratic choice of leaders most pertinent. In other words, it is not so much about how many times individuals present themselves to lead a country but whether they are acceptable because they represent those ‘best interests’. The British Westminster model of democracy, as indeed of the Indian one, the largest democracy in the world, follows this logic and system. I wonder what could happen were Tanzania to adopt the Westminster form of government in its new constitution and ditching the current Presidential system of government? After all, one of the most ardent concerns about the Presidential system of government centres on the extensive powers of the President and the resultant subjugation of the powers of Parliament.

16 Respect of Separation of Powers There are concerns about the state of the separation of powers. Some Parliamentarians feel that the executive is using political party majorities in Parliament to encroach on the sanctity of separation of powers. Such sentiments have been expressed during budget sessions and enactment of laws. One can add that such exhortations speak to the importance of respect of the rule of law and the sanctity of the broader constitutional separation of powers. It shocks the mind, for example, when one reads the Controller and Auditor General making reference in his reports about the lack of efficiency of the Judiciary in dealing with tax cases. Such a statement is a clear violation of the separation of powers.

Role of Leadership Has Changed Professor Barbara Kellerman in her book, Followership: How Followers are Creating Change and Changing Leaders, posits: ‘Leadership is in danger of becoming obsolete. Not leaders-there will always be leaders-but leadership as being more consequential than followership’ Professor Kellerman spoke on the importance of ‘followership’ at the Joint Mid-Year meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents, the National Association of Bar Executives, and the National Conference of Bar Foundations, in Boston, USA, in February 2009. She pointed out that while followers were important when they did something-which seems obvious-they were equally important when they did nothing. Doing nothing matters to the group, organisation or a nation. The main point I am making is that leadership of countries, African countries specifically and Tanzania in particular, as a function and as a responsibility, has gone through a sea change in the past two decades. There is much that can be learnt from Nyerere’s own mindset transformation on the issue. There is much what Professor Kellerman espouses. Well allowed and managed, followership defines good leadership. It is the philosophy which Nyerere advocated and pursued during most of his leadership period. What is critically important for Tanzanians is to open up a broad,

17 open and frank conversation and dialogue about what they see as the role and purpose of political leadership at the top today and be ready to articulate what their expectations are, for the economy and for their prosperity, from such leadership. For example, much has been said and conjectured up to now, brief as the period is, about President John Pombe Magufuli’s style of leadership since his taking over the reins of power in late 2015.

Tanzania’s Expectations of Leadership In sum, the question is what will move Tanzania forward: first, to get the new constitution it desires and which, on the one hand, crucially creates a Union structure and system that fits today’s realities and meets the expectations of both Zanzibaris and Tanzania Mainlanders and, secondly, embeds the ethos and thrust of consensus building as a vehicle of building trust, tolerance and confidence across political affiliations? At the same time, what will be required to uplift education and skills standards; improve health service delivery; electrify the villages and give them safe and potable water; leap frog infrastructure development particularly on the railways and ports development fronts; improve lakes and air transportation; transform agricultural productivity and inject agribusiness and value chains? What will it take to reform the public services through meritocracy; new forms of training and development and decent remuneration and pensions; and to build an entrepreneurial nation that is best able and positioned to optimally exploit available national resources and human potential for a real and vibrant social and economic transformation that creates jobs, wealth and uplifts living standards of the whole people? In my view, these are the vital demands that should define the role of leadership in Tanzania today. The demands require an intimate understanding of their nature, gravity and dynamic character. Above all, and important, they require urgent responses and thus putting to question the need for qualitative and quantitative clarity on priorities within the confines of availability of resources-human in( terms of knowledge and skills) and financial, both of which are extremely scarce.

18 Nyerere’s Personal Qualities are a Model In this vein, Nyerere’s mantra from the late 1960s about ‘to plan is to choose’ takes pre-eminence but it is important to qualify the mantra because planning today should be undertaken more wisely and prudently within a more complex and unpredictable global context defined by economic discontinuities, cyclical economic turbulences and volatilities, and not overly national, as Nyerere had subsumed in what was relatively a more ‘stable’ economic era. However, what distinguished Nyerere from many other leaders of his time, and this attribute remains a good lesson for the leaders of today, was his high levels of intellect, knowledge, competence, discipline, selflessness, principles, ethical governance and, above all, his sense of courage, firmness, boldness and conviction about his beliefs, action orientation, and his commitment to Tanzania’s development.

New Leaders Must Understand Global Dynamics But returning to the challenges of leadership today, suffice to offer some examples from President Kikwete’s administration. In early 2015, the Kikwete administration went on a hype about Tanzanians attaining a middle-income status come 2025. Reason: the large natural gas finds in southern Tanzania’s Indian Ocean deep seas. That promise, unfortunately, has quickly been undermined by the huge collapse in global oil prices. The price of US shale has declined from US Dollars 60 per barrel to 38 in mid-2017. Prices of oil stay at a low, below US $ 50 per barrel. One could add that Tanzania was also earning more than two billion US dollars from gold exports per annum in 2014. These have been affected by other domestic conditions. Other commodities like coffee, tobacco, cashew nuts and tea also face volatile market prices. In other words, it is difficult to plan under such volatile market and domestic policy conditions. It is clear that a political leadership that maps out economic megatrends that helps it to have clear sights of probable futures is imperative. The obtaining global unpredictable environments call forth a national leadership that is perceptive, creative, agile, risk conscious, open to new ideas and which pursues

19 consultative engagements with a broad diversity of stakeholders in society and global investment community. Nationally, these stakeholders are: Members of Parliament, across their political divides, leading academics and scientists, the business or private sector, civil society, including faith leaders. Building a coalition of views and consensus building on how best to construct a robust national economy that is strongly resilient to exogenous factors is, in my view, the defining characteristic of a modern leadership at the top.

Leadership Does Not Operate in a Vacuum I need not underscore the reality that leadership never exists or operates in a vacuum. It operates in environments that are always dynamic and ever demanding. Take the case of the Tanzania Union. Yes, it has lived or survived for 53 years. But it is difficult not to be honest that the Union has been fragile for years. Thanks to various reasons which are analysed in detail in Part Thirteen, good leadership from Nyerere’s era has made the Union subsist. But has the Union become stronger? I believe that there are some Tanzanians who hold the view that the Union could be more solid and satisfying. The Nyalali, (1992) Kisanga (1989) and Warioba (2013) Commissions, one after the other, made and have made recommendations which respond to new realities and new expectations of the citizens (maybe not necessarily of the political leaders) who are the principal partners of and in the Union. Tanzanians are eagerly waiting for a political leadership that would boldly allow Tanzanian citizens to decide what kind of Union best suits their expectations and needs. If there is one issue that would test the maturity of Tanzania’s pluralistic democracy, it is going to be how the form of the Tanzanian Union is determined, constitutionally. It will be the litmus test of how inclusive Tanzania’s governance is.

The Union Question-Highest Test for Leadership In Shakespeare’s play, ‘Measure for Measure’ there is a famous quip which states: ‘Our doubts are traitors, and make us lose the good we oft might win, by fearing to attempt.’ Allowing Tanzanians to

20 decide the form of Union they want cannot continue to be treated as a taboo; as sacrilege. Tanzanians might ‘win’ by having a stronger and healthier Union if allowed to give a voice through a ballot. Nobody is a ‘traitor’ in this issue. In this regard, President Magufuli should lead in planting the seeds of a competent democracy that is meaningful and which the people will value and respect.

Conclusion To conclude, let me cite one of the most celebrated of African novelists, Chinua Achebe. In his 1988 essay entitled ‘The University and the Leadership Factor in Nigerian Politics’, he wrote: ‘Leadership is a sacred trust, like the priesthood in civilised religions. No one gets into it lightly or unadvisedly, because it demands qualities of mind and discipline of body and will far beyond the need of the ordinary citizen. Anybody who offers himself or herself or is offered to society for leadership must be aware of the unusually high demands of the role and should, if in any doubt whatsoever, firmly refuse the prompting.’ It is worth reflecting upon this wisdom.

21 Chapter 3

Kikwete’s Deliverology System Fad or Innovation?

round the world, there is an effervescence in ideas on different Aforms of innovation and how, in a complex, brave new world, such ideas can bring about social and economic transformation and higher returns to economic enterprises. Specifically, in the realm of state governance, there is a broad spectrum of ideas on how governments can better execute their policies and decisions and improve delivery of public goods and services. It is a thrust which McKinsey have come to define as “deliverology”. A leading McKinsey authority on the subject of deliverology, Diana Ferrell, in a paper entitled, ‘Government Designed for New Times’, has clarified this concept as follows: ‘It is possible to make huge strides in addressing critical challenges, even without resolution of the many ideological and policy dilemmas. From government spending to tax collection, education improvement to health outcomes, and welfare reform to job creation, we see the potential for meaningful improvement, to do more and better with less. What is needed is government management by design, built to fit these difficult times: government that identifies the most critical solvable problems, reorganizes where necessary to deliver the right solutions, and abandons the tools and approaches that no longer work.’

22 The concept of deliverology has found broad application in many countries. Tony Blair as Prime Minister established within his office a Delivery Unit (PMDU) and has celebrated its positive impact in his memoirs. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Razak, in September 2010, launched in his office a Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU meaning “the driver” in Malay) and appointed Malaysia’s most celebrated management executive, Idris Jala to a cabinet post and as head of PEMANDU. Idris hired McKinsey to help PEMANDU devise a Transformation Delivery System. President Jakaya Kikwete was also quick to recognize the benefits of deliverology when he visited Malaysia in May 2011. The President deserves our kudos for being receptive to such management innovation and for particularly recognizing that the realization of Vision 2025 and the current Development Plan would falter if “follow up mechanisms and delivery systems remain weak.” President Kikwete has underscored the need to ‘formulate sound delivery frameworks and hold political leaders and top executives responsible for their failure.’ Such a bold focus to shift from a traditional over- emphasis on plans to execution and delivery is a welcome departure and thrust in government management. Of course, one could question its belatedness and whether, moreover, the adoption and probably adaptation of the Malaysian delivery system would not end up being a ‘fad’! For in as much as governments, like all human organizations, go through learning experiences and sometimes subject themselves to the dynamics of change and innovation, it would be irrational optimism not question whether our own government’s past and present delivery systems have not worked optimally because of institutional deficiencies and/or shortcomings in directional leadership, human capacities, competences and mindsets. Put differently, would the establishment of a Delivery Unit, of itself, be a magic wand in changing the management culture and mindsets in the government? The point is this: we read and hear a lot about ‘Asian Values’ and ‘Confucian Culture’ and how they influence work ethics, discipline and the primacy of public service meritocracy and roles over politics. So, it would be instructive to

23 learn from PEMANDU to what extent such values have played a part in improved delivery. Notwithstanding, the foregoing, I fully endorse President Kikwete’s move following the advice of Malaysians and McKinsey to establish a Delivery Unit to manage and monitor the execution of strategic decisions in the identified six sectors of the economy. However, I believe that the effectiveness of the government delivery system under establishment would ultimately hinge on how the government addresses four fundamental issues. First, arresting the ubiquitous lures of corruption and decisions often based on political expediency and patronage. Second, re-igniting and dynamising meritocracy in public service as well as training and retraining of public servants. It is regrettable that the bureaucracy today is full of people, at highest levels of authority, who have not seen a paper room for years. Third, building a pro-growth framework, as articulated by President Kikwete, from the new delivery system, requires the immediate removal of regulatory impediments. It is unquestionable that our economic and business environment is overburdened by over regulation. It stifles and undermines efficiency and effectiveness of operations. Indeed, it is one reason why Tanzania performs very poorly on World Bank and World Economic Forum indices on ‘Ease of Doing Business’ and on ‘Competitiveness’. The World Bank Doing Business 2017 entitled, ‘Equal Opportunity for All’ provides Ease of Doing Business Ranking. The ranking covers 190 countries. In Africa, Mauritius is ranked best at 49; Rwanda at 56, Kenya at 92, Uganda at 115, Tanzania is at 132. Burundi’s ranking is 157 and South Sudan at 186. Clearly, Tanzania has much to improve. Fourth, appointing an outstanding Tanzanian to head the Delivery Unit. Borrow a leaf from Malaysia. The Delivery Unit should have wide powers and independence of responsibility and authority to perform its task. The unit should also be given flexibility to recruit the best available talent from both the government and the private sector. This means that the unit should offer highly competitive terms of service.

24 sometimes lose; those who do not leap always lose.’ The analogy may shock some minds, especially in Tanzania, but it is one that my own country people should seriously take to heart.

EAC-Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune? Even then, it is important to heed the caution which the East African Court posed; that variable geometry should be exercised as an exception, not as a rule and pointedly adding that “institutionalised flexibility might lead to break-up of the Community orits transformation into a mere free trade area.” And here lies the rub? As the EAC begins to experience what Shakespeare’s Hamlet muses as “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”, you wonder where the citizens of East Africa are. Are they concerned? Where is their voice of concern? Yes, there have been some media write –ups about current EAC’s unsettling developments. The East African Law Society has also portrayed its concern in writing. But what about the ordinary citizens themselves? Are they players or mere spectators? How do they, in their diversity- national and in varying walks of life, some organised, most lacking any form of civic representation, except their five yearly voting rights at national levels, make their voice heard? And would their voice make a difference? Or are we not experiencing an environment so well captured in WB Yeats’ epic poem,

‘The Second Coming’ ‘Turning and turning in the widening gyre The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold.’

Do Citizens Have a Role? I am raising these questions to draw a realistic framework for a conversation about what exactly we mean by involvement of ordinary citizens in EAC matters and what institutional structures are available or could be made available for such citizens to exercise a democratic right over the integration project. Let me put forward

456 what I consider to be some of the critical dilemmas that the EAC integration project faces in this context. Yes, one of the fundamental principles of the EAC is that the Community shall be people-centred. However, does this principle actually infer that it is the will of the people, the citizens of the EAC Partner States, which shall constitute the basis of the authority of the EAC’s governing system? Surely, we all know that the EAC is not a supra-national institution. It is every bit an inter-governmental body in which decisions by nation-states are reached through their officials and Ministers by way of consensus except where variable geometry is invoked. So, if decisions that take regional force are principally determined on the basis of national criteria and preferences, where does the idea of citizen agency and engagement at regional level come from? Can the EAC Council of Ministers, for example, be effectively lobbied by citizens or even by regional citizen representative bodies like the East Business Council, the East African Law Society and other active civil society organisations, to take decisions that run contra to what a national Cabinet or legislature has proclaimed as policy direction? We all know that this does not happen. It is thus important to be clear about the locus for citizen involvement in EAC integration so as to determine the effectiveness of roles of citizens across their diversity. In this vein, it is not surprising that the question of citizen involvement that ostensibly falls under Article 127(4) of the EAC Treaty is coined in terms of the Secretary General creating an enabling environment for ‘consultations’ between the private sector, the civil society, other interest groups, and appropriate institutions of the Community. The Treaty, in other words, is silent about a broad-based citizen agency in EAC affairs. Could this be because citizens are considered national; not regional? Could this lacuna, moreover, be the triggering point on the need for the Treaty to be amended to invoke a broad- based citizen agency in EAC’s integration process? In turn, would such an idea be appropriate considering that the EAC is an inter- governmental institution? And can it effectively bridge current participatory democratic deficits within the EAC Organs? In the next part, I explore lessons from the European Union and

457 offer proposals on how citizen agency can be propelled in the quest to deepen and widen EAC integration. It was only in February 2012, following the amendment of Article 11(4) of the Treaty on European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, that a legal framework and tools were established and put in place to respond to EU citizen’s demands for greater voice in EU’s affairs. The EU Treaty now provides for the European Citizens’ Initiative. Through this Initiative, at least one million citizens from a number of EU member states can now, by their signatures, call upon the EU Commission to bring forward new policy and legislative proposals that respond to demands of the citizens. In this regard, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new dimension of participatory democracy which forges a closer link between the EU and the EU citizens. In recognition of the introduction of the Citizen Initiative, the year 2013 is designated by the EU as the ‘European Union Year of Citizens’, marking the 20th Anniversary of the establishment of the EU Citizenship under the Maastricht Treaty.

East African Citizens’ Initiative With the EU experience in mind, I wish to propose two things: First, that the EAC Treaty be amended to establish an East African Citizen Initiative. Alternatively, the EAC Council of Ministers should table a bill in the East African Legislative Assembly to enact a law that provides for the Initiative. Second, that the Secretary General of the EAC proposes to the Council of Ministers and the Summit at their sittings in November this year the proclamation of 2014 to be Year of East African Citizens as a clear and unequivocal commitment to opening up a new page in EAC’s integration process where the voice and will of the citizens shall begin to be heard and considered. It will be essential, however, to clarify exactly on what issues the citizens should be engaged on. This is not intended to trample on rights of citizens; it is a mere act of leadership. In this regard, the starting point should be to develop ‘Stories of EAC’s Success’ so far, as well as provide an outline of new ambitions and the challenges which the EAC faces, going forward.

458 Areas of Focus for Citizen Agency Third, and this flows from my experience, I think that the whole debate about citizen participation, whether at national or regional levels, proceeds from the premise that individual citizens have the knowledge and capacity to influence and drive change in institutions. Yet the drivers and dynamics of change can be quite complex, particularly when one considers that the major issues that underlie EAC integration touch on the lives and livelihoods of ordinary citizens. These issues include: jobs, regional value chains, food security, free movement of food commodities, goods, services and labour; integration of capital markets, regional infrastructure, trans- boundary human and animal diseases, climate change, ecology stability, management of inland waters such as Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, Nyasa, Albert, Kivu etc; free movement of people and the right of establishment, shared education facilities and faculties and a new wave of citizen political and human rights.

Awareness Deficit about the EAC In other words, effective citizen agency at the level of the EAC requires intimate knowledge about the role of the EAC, in the light of the existing broad perception that the social and economic factors that impact citizens are invariably national based. It is a reality, that both the political leadership, the media and organised civil society have the propensity to address issues that have a bearing on regional integration from a dominant national perspective. In such circumstances, a huge awareness deficit of regional as opposed to national issues exists which negatively impacts the EAC project. Given such an environment, how do you promote a churning of broad-based citizen consciousness and action on regional integration beyond conventional seminars, conferences and forums? And how do you also promote a mind-set shift of ordinary citizens from national- based issues to a focus on the big picture of costs and benefits of regional integration? Where lies the navigational reference point for galvanising a regional integration ethos and thrust among the citizens? Can the Citizen Initiative become the reference point? These are important questions that can inform the form and depth of citizen engagement.

459 Evidently, we are all accustomed to think and act within the prism of national political party structures and processes. Yet such structures are primarily focused on national elections and legislative politics and laws; not on regional integration questions. Indeed, even the Members of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) are elected by national legislatures with a strong political party bias. And while there can be no escape from such bias, indeed even EU Parliamentarians who are directly elected by citizens at national levels win seats through the support of their political parties, the situation could probably be somewhat different were EALA members elected directly by the citizens.

Institutional Changes to Democratise the EAC There are a number of institutional challenges that confront the quest for citizen agency in deepening EAC integration. Unless they are addressed and bold changes undertaken, citizens will remain spectators, not players, in the integration process. The following are some of the key challenges: The EAC is principally run and managed as a techno-managerial institution. It is national Governments that are on the steering wheel; they directly engage gears, apply the accelerator and the brakes of the vehicle called the EAC; the EALA which, ostensibly, is the Voice of the Citizens, is unelected by the citizens. It derives legitimacy from the National Assemblies and Parliaments that elect them, even when there is no defined accountability between the two legislative organs. The EALA members lack proper structures at national levels where, purportedly, they could promote structured dialogue with the citizens; most National Assemblies and Parliaments lack effective Special Committees that specifically deal with EAC integration issues in spite of the fact that the EAC is the only REC in Africa that has special Ministries and Ministers responsible for EAC matters; there is a great deal of ad hocity at national levels in dealing with regional integration issues, normally prompted by the need to prepare for meetings held at EAC dealing with different sectoral integration issues.

460 A Disconnect with the Citizens In contrast to what takes place at national levels where the executive branch of government would table important policy issues before the legislature to secure legitimacy and the ostensible will of the people, you rarely witness important issues pertaining to EAC integration being tabled before the national legislatures except in the case of ratification of Protocols and that is only in those countries where such a legislative ratification system exists, Tanzania being one. At the EAC level, neither is EALA perceived to represent the will of the citizens, nor does the EAC Council of Ministers table important policies before EALA as a matter of course, even for simple discussion, except when the EALA considers the Annual Budget. To say the least, there is a huge disconnect between governments and citizens, at both national and regional levels, on regional integration matters. The East African Court of Justice has done commendable work in the last seven years in promoting an East African jurisprudence, including that which touches on political rights of citizens as so well exemplified in the Anyang Nyong’o case. However, the extended jurisdiction of this Court to cover broad based commercial disputes that fall within and arise as a result of the Customs Union and the Common Market and which also encompass political and human rights issues would provide a deeper space for citizen engagement in EAC Affairs and give the EAC greater legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.

Conclusion At a moment when the EAC is exposed to a worrisome situation, a new galvanising drive and enlightened leadership could not be more welcome. Professor Lester Thurow, conjecturing the critical situation of the type now facing the EAC, namely how to move towards the ‘EAC We Want’ in his magisterial book referred above, ‘Fortune Favours the Bold’, poses troubling but apt questions relevant to the Partner States’ posture towards the EAC: ‘Is it about policies, their institutions, their national environments or perhaps their attitudes? Or is it because they are not willing to be ‘explorers’; bold enough to

461 ‘take risks’?’ These questions need serious answers; political polemics and simple ramifications and justifications for the on-going state of drift and isolation of some Partner States is, with respect, unhelpful. Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his book entitled, ‘Fooled by Randomness’ teaches us that ‘execution begins with an important mental mind-set. Economic development requires the mentality of a marathon runner and not that of a sprinter.’ In my view, regional integration that works well requires nation -state leaders and citizens who think long term. Political ‘sprinters’ tend to get trapped and constrained by five yearly election commitments of Election Manifestos which invariably lack positions on fostering deeper regional integration. The ‘two speed’ EAC may, on its face, appear to infer ‘sprinting.’ In reality, however, it constitutes a ‘marathon’ mind-set in the sense of a long-term outcome that makes regional integration beneficial. The ‘EAC We Want’ needs a new vigour and impulse. It is the citizens of the EAC countries who have the important role of igniting the flame of East Africanness and of driving a deeper EAC integration process. Question is: who are they; how are they organised and what are the appropriate vehicles available to them to cause a difference? This is the burden of the debate, today and tomorrow, for all East Africans who continue to dream and hope about Mwalimu Julius Nyerere’s vision of the East African Federation.

462 Chapter 41

Identities and Their Relevance in EAC Integration*

‘Identity is perhaps one of the most complex and contradictory concepts studied by social scientists. It exists between a constant pull of opposing forces. It is both singular and plural, real and imagined, individual and collective, defined by sameness and by difference. Perhaps identity’s ambiguity derives from the fact that it does not simply exist, but is instead continually formed and reformed, created and shaped by the discourse of the individual and those around them. Because of the dialectical nature of identity, it is fundamentally both individualistic and pluralistic. It is pluralistic because the individual’s identity is created through discourse and relationships with other individuals and groups. It is individualistic because no two people will have experienced the same relationships or the same dialogue.’ Stephanie Persson ‘The Individual and the Collective’ A Discussion of Identity and Individualism-global-e- A Global Studies Journal http://global-ejournal.org/2010/12/11/the-individual-and-the-collective-a- discussion-of-identity-and-individualism/

* Adapted from a Presentation to the 2014 East African Uongozi Institute East African Student Participants, University of Dar es Salaam, 17 July 2014.

463 Identity Defined Thus, identity is something we uniquely possess: it is what distinguishes us from other people. However, identity also implies a relationship with a broader collective or a social group. When we talk about national identity, cultural identity, ethnic identity, gender identity, or religious identity we imply that our identity is partly a matter of what we share with other people. Professor Amartya Sen posits in his book entitled, ‘Identity and Violence-The Illusion of Destiny’, that ‘in our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups-we belong to all of them. A person’s citizenship, residence, geographic, origin, gender, class, politics, profession, employment, food habits, sports interests, taste in music, social commitments etc., make us members of a variety of groups. Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person’s only identity or singular membership category.’

Examples of Identity-based Conflicts World-wide In several parts of the world today, an emerging phenomenon is that of divided states in which political issues are violently contested and fought along identities and the East African Community should be attentive to the dangers which identities breed within the context of its roadmap towards an Economic and Monetary Union and, later, a political federation. There are a number of examples of such identities, of different characteristics and motivation around the world:

Sub-Nationalisms Kurds in Iraq; Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Darfur in Sudan, Tuareg group called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) which seeks to establish an independent state in North Mali; in India for decades a number of regions-Sikkim and Assam, Nagaland etc., have insurgency groups that espouse ethnicity-based sub-nationalisms and even quests for self-determination; Quebec in Canada equally espouses ideas about independence and so does Northern Ireland and, lately, Scotland.

464 Ethnicity Eastern DRC- M23 insurgency seeking equal citizenship status in DRC; and South Sudan where Salva Kiir’s Dinka tribe is grappling for power against Riak Machar’s Nuer tribe in the north of the country.

Religious Central African Republic- Christian versus Muslims though there are reports which also link the conflict to ethnicity as well as class which coincides with the religious divide-Muslim traders versus Christian peasantry; Russia-the Chechen Muslim Insurgency which seeks independence of Chechnya.

Religious Sects Sunni versus Shia in Bahrain, Syria and Iraq. In Bahrain, the Sunni monarchy is battling the Shiite majority population that seeks the installation of an Iran-type Islamic Republic; in Syria a minority Shiite Alawite regime under Bashar Assad is pitied against an uprising Sunni majority for political control while in Iraq the ISIS or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has militarily established a Caliphate in Central Iraq and which will extend its authority to Eastern Syria; what we are witnessing in Syria and Iraq are vicious and ferocious battles that are making a mockery of old colonial and imperial borders. New states and quasi-states are emerging through conflicting Islamic religious sect identities.

Militant Islam Northern Nigeria (Boko Haram); Somalia (Al-Shabaab) and Afghanistan-(Taliban). They all have a similar quest- that of establishment of Islamic Republics.

Identity-based Conflicts in the East African Community States Within the East African Community Partner States, identity politics and identity-based conflicts represent several flavours and forms:

Secessionist Identity The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in the Kenyan coast

465 of Mombasa seeks secession from Mainland Kenya. The Kenya government is also at an apparently paradoxical loss as to whether the recent spate of armed attacks in Lamu are Al Shabaab master minded or are part of a new identity grounded on divisive national politics.

Ethnicity Rwanda, Burundi- embracing the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic dichotomy; the role of the Hutu FDLR insurgency in Northern Kivu which Rwanda accuses for perpetrating the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and which seeks to militarily reinstate a Hutu regime in Rwanda. It would now appear, however, that SADC has succeeded to forge a peace deal between the Rwanda government and the FDLR and some demobilisation of arms has taken place and the process includes FDLR combatants being allowed to return to Rwanda.

A Variety of Communal-Ethnic Identities These include the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda under Kony; the Kikuyu - Kalenjin land-based conflict heightened in the 2007-08 Post Elections Violence in Kenya and the on-going natural resources conflicts between pastoralists and peasants over pasture and water largely in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

Extractive Natural Resources Conflicts over natural resources (oil and gas, water in particular) were experienced in Mtwara, Southern Tanzania and in Turkana, North Kenya.

The Zanzibar Identity Case What would be interestingly debatable is whether Zanzibar is manifesting elements of sub-nationalism in the context of the Tanzania Union being the sovereign state by virtue of the Union Constitution (but not by virtue of the Zanzibar Constitution as amended in 2010) and whether some of the exhortations by Uamsho whose English title is ‘The Association For Islamic Mobilisation And Propagation’ are not symptomatic of the desire to see Zanzibar

466 seceding from the Union as well as heightened erosion of secularism in Zanzibar and thus instigating, willy nilly, a dominantly religious identity based on Islam contrary to and in violation of the Zanzibar and Union Constitutions? Moreover, the increasingly heightened posture of Zanzibar as a national identity has serious ramifications on Tanzania’s accession to the East African Federation when it surfaces. Would Zanzibar then join the Federation on its own right that is if the new Union Constitution retains the current two-government structure with one sovereign state or would the United Republic of Tanzania be the sole acceding state party? There could be political challenges in the making depending on how this matter is dealt with.

The South Sudan and Somalia EAC Accession Cases In the cases of both South Sudan and Somalia which had applied for membership of the East African Community (EAC), their applications would have failed because Article 3 (3) of the Treaty establishing the EAC requires an applicant State to fulfill the condition of ‘adherence to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice’. Both States are not compliant to these conditions. In South Sudan, ethnicity is tearing the nation apart and human rights are violently abused. But South Sudan for political reasons was admitted into EAC. But South Sudan has been admitted into the EAC as member. Somalia, on the other hand, remains fundamentally a failed state.

Identity and the Illusion of Destiny It is important to recognise though that identity, as Professor Amartya Sen notes in his book entitled ‘Identity and Violence-The Illusion of Destiny’ can be ‘a source not merely of pride and joy, but also of strength and confidence’ and that it can, moreover, be a source ‘of richness and warmth as well as of violence and terror, and it would make little sense to treat it as a general evil.’ What is particularly troublesome to Sen is what he describes as the “illusion of destiny” that is sometimes attached to what is deemed to be a unique identity vis a vis the reality of plurality of societal affiliations

467 or what Professor Francis Fukuyama describes in his book entitled, ‘TRUST-the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity’ as “human sociability”. Indeed, Fukuyama further elucidates this idea by pointing out that ‘societies that are riven with barriers of distrust, based on class, ethnicity, kinship and other factors, will face extra roadblocks in their adoption of new organisational forms.’ In contrast, the EAC is constituted on the basis, as described in the Preamble of the Treaty establishing the EAC, of ‘close historical, commercial, industrial, cultural and other ties for many years’. In other words, there existed a strong bond and an affiliation among the founding members that supported the establishment of the regional institution. If ‘barriers of distrust’ had existed, particularly in the context of a negative legacy from the EAC that collapsed in 1977, Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania would have found it difficult to re-enact regional cooperation and integration and extending it to Rwanda and Burundi. Let me reinforce Professor Sen’s point. I believe that identities in their broadest spectrum, but largely within the ambit of ethnicity and religion, are not inherently the cause or triggers of conflict and violence. Rather, they tend to be exploited by political and community leaders (sometimes by religious leaders as well as so well demonstrated in the Rwanda genocide of 1994) with an avowed instigation as a lever and “a powerful weapon to brutalise” others in pursuit of power, wealth, resources and even a misconceived jihad as well demonstrated by the motivations of Al Qaida and other militant Islamic factions like Al Shabaab and Boko Haram.

Social Capital and Human Sociability as Drivers of Collective Identity Fukuyama’s idea about ‘new organisational forms’ resonates well with the conjecture whether regional integration institutions can constitute the institutional arrangement best placed to address and mitigate the ‘illusion of destiny’ along ethnicity lines and promote ‘human sociability’ on a grand scale. It is an idea partly founded on the late Professor James S. Coleman’s thesis of social capital developed in his magisterial book entitled, ‘Foundations of Social

468 Theory’ and in which he defines social capital as ‘the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organisations’. To Professor Coleman, the ability to associate is a function of the degree to which communities share norms and values and are able to subordinate individual (as well as national) interests to those of larger groups (including regional).

Birth of Ethnic Categorisations in EAC Countries While identities in the EAC Partner States have taken different forms- ethnic, racial and class (notably vis a vis ex-Settler British community and Asians in Kenya and Asians in both Tanzania and Uganda, and the expulsion of Asians by Idi Amin in 1972 stands out) and religious, the notable weight of history is ethnic identity. The worst form of this weight of history-colonial history at that, is the entrenchment of ethnic identity in Rwanda and Burundi. In imposing ethnic categorisations in Rwanda and Burundi, the colonialists were fomenting sectarian confrontation. Professor Amartya Sen in his book ‘Identity and Violence’ above referred, postulates that ‘violence is fomented by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on gullible people, championed by proficient artisans of terror.’

Nyerere and Creation of a National Identity As we examine the place of identities in the context of the EAC Integration Project, it would be helpful to fast reverse to Tanganyika’s dawn of independence. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere was seized of what ethnicity could do to a newly established political entity. In 1962 he abolished Chiefdoms, including of his own family. In the Introduction to his first book entitled, ‘Freedom and Unity’, Nyerere celebrates the creation of a nation out of more than 120 tribes, out of peoples of different religions and different social groups, and a nation in which race is of less importance than a record of service and an expected ability to give service. Nyerere went on to state that ‘in Africa now the social ethic is changing, and has to change, from one appropriate to a tribal society to one appropriate to a national society.’ Question is, while Tanzania Mainland may significantly have achieved a national

469 identity (though multi-party electoral politics have given rise to a return to both ethnic and religion-based politics and the trend is beginning to show worrying tentacles) the other EAC Partner States, at varying levels, cannot claim to have achieved collective and cohesive national identities. Indeed, in his relentless quest and pursuit of the East African Federation, particularly from 1960 until 1964, it was quite evident that, to Nyerere, Africa as a whole was not only balkanised in terms of respect of bizarre and senseless colonial borders, but was also captive to the prison walls of ethnicity whose liberation could best emanate from an African-wide political federation and that Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika were better placed to kick off such a federation. Nyerere was also well seized of the reality that the reinforcement of identity as statehood, over time, would militate against the realisation of the East African federation. An intellectually smart Nyerere could also see that the de facto social and economic federalism that lay at the heart of the East African High Commission under the aegis of the British Colonial administration and which lasted until 1961 and later in the East African Common Services Organisation which was born in 1961 and lasted till 1967 when the erstwhile EAC was established, provided a strong edifice for justifying a political federation. But it was not to be. In Uganda, ethnicity was too deep seated through tribal Kingdoms with Kings on thrones! They were not prepared to whittle away or see their tribal authorities and power diminished through a political federation. It would be interesting to discern the position of Uganda’s Kingdoms on the East African Federation.

Can Regional Integration Mitigate National Identities? The key question then is whether deeper and wider regional integration through the EAC can result in the weakening of national identities and even in the pacification of on-going and potential identity- related conflicts in the region. Actually, when the applications of Rwanda and Burundi to join the EAC were being considered in 2006, an important factor that emerged was the potential to promote and improve the security, peace and stability of the applicant states

470 upon their accession. There was a sense in the EAC leadership at the time that it could be possible to demobilise the primordial bond or affiliation of identities in Rwanda and Burundi which are hugely responsible for the hatred and violent psyche that still simmers in those countries and facilitate the acceptance of a mitigating trans - nationality identity, namely East African. In fact, the adoption of the EAC mantra, ‘One People, One Destiny’ as part of EAC’s celebration of its 10th Anniversary in November 2009, was directed at ingraining a mental quest of de- nationalising identity and citizenship and promote a new common regional identity even if it were in the limited form of bolstering a spirit of ‘East Africanness’. Unfortunately, that quest suffered a serious setback when Tanzania unleashed the ‘Operation Kimbunga’ since last year which saw many non-Tanzanians being forcedly sent back to their original countries, mainly Rwanda and Burundi. The forced repatriations came in the wake of Tanzania’s proposal to Rwanda to negotiate rapprochement and peace with the FDLR, a proposal viewed by Rwanda as a serious violation of one of the fundamental principles governing the roles of EAC Partner States, namely, mutual trust, political will and sovereign equality. How to address neuralgic relationships within the EAC family is proving challenging. Poor relations between the Partner States cast a dark cloud on EAC’s quest to deepen and widen regional integration. Going forward, the EAC needs to prove that it is a case of the whole rather than the sum of its five parts where identities-national, ethnic and religious- play out. Competing pluralities should be downplayed. Of course, unitary citizenship would only be realised in the full bloom of a political federation. However, indications do not reflect a positive trajectory towards such land of promise. In fact, the EAC Partner States are even undecided about a transitional political unity in the form of a Confederation where dual citizenship, regional and national, would be possible.

Challenges of Constructing a Supra-Nationality Identity In his solid paper, ‘Reconceptualising identity, citizenship and

471 Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region, (published in, ‘Regional Integration, Identity, Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa), Redie Bereketeab makes a powerful observation as follows: ‘The nation-state as a specific spatial and temporal location has played a decisive role in the construction of national identity and citizenship. An endeavour that aspires to achieve a supra-nation- state integration ought therefore to shift the location of discourse from the nation-state---to a higher space in order to construct the regional identity and citizenship necessary to the configuration of a new identity and citizenship.’ This is the challenge before the EAC. But it is a challenge that is best tackled either by way of the Partner States watering down the intensity of the national identity posture based on nationalism or through political integration. It is quite evident that Tanzania, in particular, is reinforcing its national identity in relation to a number of efforts to deepen and widen EAC integration. There are clear examples. Tanzania has a lukewarm stance on the Common Market Protocol goal of allowing free movement of persons (and I deliberately exclude labour which probably requires a different level of consideration) and on the use of identity cards for purposes of nationals of EAC Partner States travelling intra-regionally. A study undertaken for the EAC in February 2009 by Dr. Regina Mwatha Karega on ‘Benefits Experienced by Ordinary Citizens from East African Community Regional Integration’ shows that ‘the most stated reason for having a sense of belonging to the EAC was the free movement across Partner States’ with 39.5% of respondents to interviews and questionnaires putting forward such reason. Surprisingly, the existence of the East African Legislative Assembly-the EAC Parliament-featured very lowly as an important factor for promoting a sense of belonging to the EAC. Only Kenya scored 7.2%, followed by Uganda at 3.7% and Tanzania a dismal 1.6%. Rwanda and Burundi were not part of the Study being relatively new members with their citizens yet to fully appreciate the role of EAC. However, it is also equally possible that in the past eight years since the Karega study was undertaken and mainly because of

472 significant improvements in the flow of information across the borders of the EAC Partner States, the region’s citizens’ perceptions of the EAC may have changed. Evidently, radio, television and mobile phone communications have significantly eroded the political boundaries of the EAC states. As a result, it could be possible that the intensity of diverse identities-national, cultural, demographic, ethnic, and religious- may also have weakened in the context of the quest to forge a regional identity. However, to what extent these new information and communication technologies and the advent of social media networks would help to shape and foster new East Africanness attitudes and identity is debatable. Is there real hope for realising an EAC ‘networked’ society that is largely driven by the digital age youth population which the EAC states are increasingly becoming rich of but are yet to fully exploit its fruits? Could this demographic dividend be the trigger, the catalyst and the locomotive power of creative destruction, a la Joseph Schumpeter’s terminology, where social relationships or identities that are dominantly nation-state based become disrupted to create a new order of supra-nationality identity? We have to wait and see. Yet such optimism conjecture may not be supported by what is taking place on the ground. For example, the EAC Common Market Protocol along with some key infrastructure projects, especially in railways, which could help in promoting a positive image and purpose of EAC integration, have generally seen lacklustre implementation. In this context, Tanzania’s seeming prevarication over the implementation of the Single Customs Territory, the Single Tourist Visa, the EAC Railway Master Plan and its generally pessimistic inclination towards the East African Federation proposal, would appear to have been the driving factors for the recent precipitation of a ‘two track EAC integration’ or to the emergence of what has come to be pejoratively described as the ‘Coalition of the willing’. Shall we see a different, more positive, attitude by Tanzania towards deeper and wider EAC integration going forward or will Tanzania’s dominant national identity continue to be the cog in the wheels of political integration?

473 Way Forward? The evident dysfunctional state of flux in EAC’s integration process summons some of Mwalimu Nyerere’s instructive comments about the general complexities of regional integration. In March 1965, Nyerere wrote an article for the journal of the American Society of African Culture entitled, ‘The Nature and Requirements of African Unity’ in which he argued that ‘For Africa, the lesson of East African experience is that economic cooperation can go a long way without political integration, but there comes a point when movement must be either forward or backward-forward into the political decision, or backward into reduced economic cooperation.’ There is in here a soothsayer message to be seriously heeded. More than fifty years after Nyerere wrote the 1965 article, Nyerere may be vindicated when we consider the continuing failure by the EAC Partner States to take bold decisions on East African political integration. The EAC may, indeed, willy nilly, experience even reduced economic cooperation. In fact, those EAC Partner States that appear to be more concerned about such a reversal in integration fortunes are opting to go it alone. They are busy deepening and widening integration- economically and politically; call it a process of variable geometry or the coalition of the willing. What is clear from what is emerging is that competing identities are taking pre- eminence in the EAC and do not augur well for those committed to seeing the EAC in its full collectivity becoming the success story of regional integration in Africa.

474 Chapter42

Role of East African Business Council in EAC Integration*

he East African Business Council is now 20 years old in 2017, Tslightly older than the current East African Community. And it is important to underscore this point because the birth of the EABC coincided with the passion and hectic efforts by the East African political leadership of Presidents Daniel Arap Moi, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and Benjamin William Mkapa to revive East African regional integration. I recall, as one of the founding leaders of the EABC, along with Manu Chandaria, who became EABC’s founding Chair, and our late distinguished Ugandan brother James Mulwana, that the driving spirit of business leaders in East Africa, at the time, was that without our total commitment and support, the East integration project would lack a solid edifice and the crucial confidence building ethos that was pivotal in inspiring and galvanising citizen alignment and support.

Birth of Recognition of EABC at EAC Level Indeed, the political leadership became intimately seized of this important coalition with business such that at the inauguration of the East African Community Treaty at Sheikh Amri Abeid Stadium in Arusha on 30 November 2000, I was, as Chair of the EABC then,

* The Guardian 2nd August 2016

475 honoured to address East Africans from the podium, in front of our Heads of State, as a representative of East Africa’s private sector. That day and occasion marked a historic celebration of the role of business in the emerging regional integration institution and the quest for regional prosperity which underlined the institution’s objectives. You could have yelled then that the die had been cast and that henceforth the EABC, as the ‘Voice of East African Business’ would become vital in helping to shape the policies that advance regional integration. But has the EABC been able to play such a role? Has the spirit that informed the involvement of EABC at that historic event on 30 November 2000 been kept alive and sustained? This question has engaged the EABC as well as the EAC Secretariat for almost the past eight years. You can understand that as a former EABC Chair who luckily found himself as Secretary General of the EAC for five years from April 2006, this question was a haunting one. There was no way that I could act ‘Brutus’ for EABC. At the heart of the struggle in making EABC become an effective ‘partner’ with the nation states that ‘own’ the EAC, as policies to widen and deepen integration received different thinking, approaches and decisions, was the fundamental question whether it was ‘constitutionally right’ for EABC to be made one of the EAC’s ‘organs’ even without necessarily being subjected to budget appropriations, that is being financed through the EAC Budget.

EABC Challenge to be Constitutional Organ of EAC Indeed, EABC’s position was, and I think still, is that its quest to become ‘constitutionally’ recognised and allowed to participate in EAC Ministerial policy meetings that have bearing on its mandate in catalysing regional integration had nothing to do with enjoying financial support from the EAC. Such posture would clearly undermine EABC’s financial wherewithal as a representative body of leading business enterprises in East Africa! EABC’s quest was thus motivated by the exclusive desire to partake in the EAC’s policy decision making processes because the integration process largely hinged on matters that were fundamentally social and economic. Unfortunately, to-date, the EABC is yet to make any in-roads on this ideological decision -making issue. And the impediment has

476 to be viewed, in my view, within a broad framework of thinking about how regional integration is perceived particularly among our political leaders in East Africa. I regret to say, at the out-set, that the dilemma that the EABC faces is fundamentally driven by a myopic leadership mentality in our region about what regional integration entails and what are the costs and benefits, not in the short term, but in the medium and long term.

Political Leadership to Change Mindset When East African business is seized and recognises in a long-term way, the realities of global trade and economics and responds to such dynamics and is undertaking cross-border business and investment flows, the political leadership in some of the EAC countries, while ostensibly appearing to be highly pro- foreign investment at national levels and globally hailed for it, is behaving in total zero-sum ways in relation to EAC regional business interactions. We should interrogate why we continue to face serious Non-Tariff Barriers that undermine the EAC Customs Union as an example! Or ask, why has the Common Market Protocol failed to take off even at the final year of its implementation in 2016? There is no short-term win-win outcome in any regional integration mechanism. The benefits always come later. It is misconceived to think that two countries at different levels of economic development, when they choose to co-operate, the more developed one would elect to mark time to wait for the other to catch up! Regional integration is about ‘enablers’ that would help a ‘leap forward’ to take place and thus bring about greater prosperity. It is not about equalisation of development. And this where right minds from institutions like EABC can come in handy within the policy organs of the EAC to contribute right thinking about how integration is actually a win- win arrangement.

EABC to Build National Activism Role So, where does EABC move from here? My view is that EABC’s strength in influencing EAC integration has to shift from what I view as a ‘failed’ quest of being ‘institutionalised’ in the EAC organs to being an active player at the EAC nation- state levels. From my

477 experience as EAC Secretary General and probably as a crucial element of my then frustration as a leader of the EAC, the EAC Treaty, is framed in such a way that there is no ‘supra-nationality’ in the decision-making framework. The most important policy decisions are made at nation- state levels and then delivered at the EAC level. The frequent decision-making gridlock at the EAC is mainly attributed to this lack of supra-nationality EABC, in contrast, is a supra-national body. It arrives at its decisions with a regional perspective and particular vested interest in mind. As such, there would always be a fundamental ‘clash’ of legitimated decisions between the EAC and the EABC. In such context, why should EABC continue to fight for institutionalisation? I think EABC needs to change its strategy about how best it can influence and even ‘force’ policy directions and changes in the EAC. In my view, such change in strategy has to focus on the nation-state. This is where EAC decisions on widening and deepening integration actually take place. EABC must undertake a new mapping of the decision-making forces at national levels and organise themselves, in coalition with other business players and integration activists, to create a united front that promotes broad based conversations about the costs and benefits of regional integration. Take it from me, few of my country women and men and even political leaders, Ministers, Leaders of political parties, and MPs care much, if at all, about EAC integration. There is no serious national conversation that I know of in the past several years except on the issue about the ‘Coalition of the willing’, in the period between 2013 and 2015 which was also defensive and destructive, about Tanzania’s role and what it could benefit from the EAC integration process. EABC’s institutionalisation as an EAC Organ will not change this scenario. Its membership may, in fact, come to accuse it as an institution that plays second fiddle and for having been become an instrument of EAC ‘sovereignty’ politics! In my view, EABC’s strength will best emerge when it becomes an active player at national levels. It is a costly venture but then East African business enterprise can afford it because there is an adequate return. It is time to think differently about how East African business can help shape and drive deeper and wider EAC integration. EABC can rise to the occasion.

478 Chapter43

Magufuli A New Impetus in the EAC?*

ndeed, many observers who are well versed with the provisions of Ithe Treaty establishing the EAC would have been bewildered had Nkurunziza turned up. They even question why Burundi has not up to now been suspended from EAC membership, pursuant to Article 146 of the Treaty, given that one of the fundamental principles of the EAC requires Partner States to adhere to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human and people’s rights which President Nkurunziza is accused of violating. In the wisdom of the EAC Presidents, the Burundi political crisis needed a different approach from a rigid application of the Treaty. Personally, I support such stance because it is quite possible to throw Burundi into a bigger crisis and catastrophe of serious proportions by suspending it from membership. The position taken by the EAC Summit of nominating President Yoweri Museveni as Mediator and former President Benjamin Mkapa as Facilitator of the mediation process for the Burundi crisis is wise and should have been taken much earlier.

* The Guardian 5th March 2016

479 Enter South Sudan The flip side of the Burundi issue, was the welcome decision of South Sudan’s admission into EAC membership. Talking to a number of country delegates and East African Community legislators at the Summit prior to the announcement of South Sudan’s admission, I observed opposing views. The most preponderant view revolved around the Burundi crisis and questioning whether the EAC should allow another ‘Burundi’ into the EAC by admitting South Sudan? Can the EAC proceed full throttle in deepening and widening integration with politically fragile members on board and at what cost? Again, on the Summit decision to admit South Sudan into EAC membership I am in total support. In fact, precisely because of the political fragility of South Sudan the more the reason why its membership in the EAC is necessary. For whatever we may think about the nature and character of the on-going Burundi crisis, the truth is that Burundi has made significant progress as a result of its EAC membership. Burundi has been able to build state institutions, embark on a number of legal and regulatory measures to boost governance and strengthen its economy. South Sudan should benefit from similar structural transformations. As it is, South Sudan is intimately linked to Uganda and Kenya economies through trade, investment flows and infrastructure projects. Uganda and Kenya’s current exports to South Sudan are valued at US$ 200 million and 180 million annually, respectively.

Magufuli- Man of the Moment An important feature of the 17th Summit was the first attendance of a regional meeting by Tanzania’s President John Pombe Magufuli. There was thus an air of anxiety and eagerness combined as delegates waited to gauge the performance of the Tanzanian President who was supposed to hand over the chair of the Summit to the Burundi President. Tanzania was Chair of the Summit from November 2014 to November 2015. President Jakaya Kikwete could not hand over because President Magufuli was already President in November 2015 and the normal November Summit could not be held. It would have been a simple task for President Magufuli to hand

480 over the Chair to another President and it was the turn of Burundi However, President Nkurunziza, did not turn up and apparently had sent a message to his colleagues that he was not in a position to take up the Chairmanship. President Magufuli was requested to continue to chair the Summit for a year. My read about the choice of President Magufuli to continue as chair was not simply that he had not had the opportunity to lead the EAC in any substantive way. I believe strongly that the real reason lies in what the EAC leaders of Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya have been concerned about in the last two years, namely Tanzania’s lacklustre engagement and involvement in deepening and widening EAC integration. It would be recalled that the evolution of the ‘coalition of the willing’ and a ‘two speed’ EAC during the last two years represented an ‘unintended consequence’ of Tanzania’s laggard approach to integration. In President Magufuli- his simplicity, daringness, openness and drive, the other EAC Presidents see an opportunity for a new impetus for the EAC. The body language of Presidents Museveni, Kenyatta and especially Kagame was all too clear about loving Magufuli. I have never witnessed President Kagame being so smiley as at this Summit. Much is thus expected from President Magufuli to move the EAC into deeper and wider integration.

Promote East Africanness And what an opportune moment for the EAC leaders to witness a regional road project of much significance being launched under the chairmanship of President Magufuli in Arusha during the Summit meeting. The Arusha-Holili-Taveta-Voi Road comes in the wake of the flag bearer, the Arusha-Namanga-Athi River road. It is such infrastructure that helps to open the regional economic space, boosting trade, tourism, investments and generally lowering the costs of logistics which are too high in the EAC region. Of particular attention was the common narrative at the launch about the artificiality of borders that curtail the free movement of people and goods in the EAC region. Yet the Presidents had the previous day launched the new EAC e-passports which will come

481 into operation in January 2017 and which will also be usable for international travel. Passports are only used by a fraction of East Africans. Over 90% of the citizens cross borders ‘illegally’ and it such people that integration is yet to make much meaning. In 2010, the EAC Summit adopted the slogan, ‘One People, One Destiny’. Unfortunately, the slogan has remained a ‘slogan’. In mid-2013, the Tanzania Government rounded up people in regions bordering Rwanda and Burundi, ostensibly of Rwandan and Burundi descent, and threw them out across the borders as illegal immigrants under an operation described as ‘operation kimbunga’. The decision begged a fundamental question about how Tanzania values EAC integration and the quest and desire for the political federation of the EAC Partner States as enshrined in the EAC Treaty. It will be interesting to learn how President Magufuli will approach this issue of ‘East Africanness’. Under his leadership there is already a concern about nationals of EAC Partner States and especially Kenyans apparently not having their work permits renewed or approved. And yet Tanzania has ratified the EAC Common Market Protocol which provides for free movement of labour. In fact, one of the serious shortcomings in EAC integration is the deficient manner in which the Common Market Protocol is being implemented and enforced. Growth of trade is hampered as a result.

Conclusion As Chair of the EAC Summit President Magufuli will have to ‘walk the talk’, to cite his own words, at the conclusion of the Summit, in ensuring a disciplined execution of approved protocols and agreements. While the EAC leads other Regional Economic Communities in Africa in terms of levels of intra-regional trade, having doubled such trade between 2006 and 2013, it remains challenged by lack of a comprehensive sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards even when the SPS Protocol was enacted into law in 2013 with Tanzania and Burundi yet to ratify it. Once ratified by all the EAC countries, the SPS law would be a huge leap frog in intra-EAC trade.

482 The sectors that would be catalysed following ratification of the 2010 double taxation avoidance agreement; removal of flip-flops in the application of the Common External Tariff; harmonisation of consumption taxes-VAT and Excise Duties- which creates unfair competition and embracing the EAC Industrialisation Policy and Strategy are manufacturing value addition products, agricultural commodities and fish and veterinary products. President Magufuli’s term as Chairman of EAC Summit ended in April 2017 at a time when the EAC faces its serious budget crisis. The donor funding, notably from the EU, is dwindling. The Brexit- EU quagmire is unhelpful in easing the funding problem because the UK has been playing a leading role in the basket funding of the Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA). I believe that the UK Department For International Development (DFID) remains committed to provide funding. TMEA has been hugely supportive of many EAC projects that spur and boost integration. The EALA would also have debated the EAC budget for 2017/2018. However, the new EALA has not been constituted due electoral challenges.

483 Afterword

t is evident that the age of change, transformation, turbulence Iand vulnerability is becoming commonplace around the world. Going by the number of literature by well-known academics and professionals in politics, economics and finance, this scenario is gripping. I have in mind book titles such as age of turbulence, age of anger, the curse of cash, the great disruption and a world in disarray. It is not these tumultuous changes that are worrisome in themselves, destabilising as they are, as how they are led and managed. Of course, some of them are triggered or created by new leadership such as that of Trump or of populists feared to its rise in the EU. The British Prime Minister May is placed in the same mould, to some extent, because of the decision to exit the EU Single Market and how she made a tactful but risky decision to take the UK to an early general election. I think what is particularly worrisome is what the Project Syndicate Report, entitled ‘The Year Ahead 2017, Fatal Attraction points out. It observes that the challenge of addressing ‘the social and economic cleavages’, requires that we consistently ‘engage with those we view as “others”, in order to understand the genuine fears, concerns, and desires that often underlie the stridency of their voices.’ This challenge lies largely in the political leadership. It goes to the root of the maturity of democracy, freedom of expression and media and tolerance of and for dissent.

484 I am in total agreement with a view that dissent is a healthy virtue in a democracy. In a Harvard Business Review article of January 12, 2017 entitled, ‘True Leaders Believe Dissent is an Obligation’, William Taylor postulates, ‘You can’t be an effective leader in business, politics, or society unless you encourage those around you to speak their minds, to bring attention to hypocrisy and misbehaviour, and be as direct and strong willed in their evaluations of you as you are in your strategies and plans for them.’ Taylor concludes by asserting that where people have an obligation to dissent, leaders get the best minds and the best outcomes. My afterword in this book is a rallying call for a political leadership in Tanzania that embraces dissent. Dissent can be a good means towards the search for consensus and stability. Tanzania needs an active political and economic society. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere was a strong architect of this culture. At the Colloquium organised by the Mwalimu Nyerere Memorial University in Dar es Salaam in April 2017 former President Benjamin William Mkapa observed that ‘Nyerere was very good at listening to others before putting up his arguments and that he paid a lot of attention to dissenters to his views as well as to those who supported them’. Tanzania needs such leadership. No platform avails broad societal effective space for dissent than the media. But to what extent is the Tanzania media allowed the independence and freedom to offer such space? Professor Amartya Sen in his magisterial book entitled, ‘The Idea of Justice’, presents five justifications for allowing such media. First, because it provides the most direct contribution of free speech. Second, it has a major informational role in disseminating knowledge and allowing critical scrutiny. Third, it provides protective function in giving voice to the neglected and the disadvantaged. Fourth, informed and unregimented formation of values requires openness of communication. Fifth, it plays an important role of facilitating public reasoning. In sum, Sen argues that ‘the media is important not only for democracy but for the pursuit of justice in general’ He concludes that “Discussionless justice” ‘can be an incarcerating idea.’

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