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Mitigation Assessment Team Report: Hurricane Irma in Florida

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Mitigation Assessment Team Report Hurricane Irma in Florida Building Performance Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance FEMA P-2023 / December 2018 MITIGATION ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT Hurricane Irma in Florida Building Performance Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance FEMA P-2023 / December 2018 Big Pine Key, FL FEMA / J.T. BLATTY, 2017 Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. Additionally, neither FEMA nor any of its employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process included in this publication. Users or information from this publication assume all liability arising from such use. All photographs and figures used in this report were taken by the MAT or developed for this report unless stated otherwise. Map imagery sources (unless otherwise noted in the report): Aerial imagery: Google Earth Pro, https://www.google.com/earth/ (used with license, accessed September 2017 through November 2018). Aerial imagery: Esri World Imagery, http://services.arcgisonline.com/arcgis/rest/services/World_Imagery/MapServer (used with license, September 2017 through November 2018). Topographic imagery: Esri World Topography, http://services.arcgisonline.com/arcgis/rest/services/World_Topo_Map/ MapServer (used with license, September 2017 through November 2018). Copyright information: Figures on 1609.3(1) and 1609.3(2) are excerpted from the 2017 Florida Building Code-Building Sixth Edition; Copyright 2017 Figure R301.2(4) is excerpted from the 2017 Florida Building Code-Residential Sixth Edition; Copyright 2017 Washington, D.C.: International Code Council. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. www.ICCSAFE.org The definition for Wind-Borne Debris Region and Section R301.2.1.2 are excerpted from the 2017 Florida Building Code (6th Edition); Copyright 2017 Washington, D.C.: International Code Council. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. www.ICCSAFE.org Members of the Mitigation Assessment Team Team Leader Team Manager Report Manager Gregory Wilson Manuel Perotin, PE, CFM Samantha N. Krautwurst, PE FEMA CDM Smith AECOM Team Members Bill Blanton, CFM Sean McGowan, PE FEMA FEMA Frances Bui, PE Robert Nystrom, PE CDM Smith CDM Smith Erin Cobb, CFM Glenn Overcash, PE FEMA AECOM Bill Coulbourne, PE, F.SEI, F.ASCE Manuel Perotin, PE, CFM AECOM CDM Smith Christopher P. Jones, PE John “Bud” Plisich Durham, NC FEMA Samantha N. Krautwurst, PE Rebecca Quinn, CFM AECOM RCQuinn Consulting, Inc. William Maples, PE Eric Stafford, PE CDM Smith AECOM Steve Martin, CFM, CPM Stuart Ulsh Florida Division of Emergency FM Global Management Internal Support GIS Specialist: Technical Editors and Formatting: 508 Compliance: Betsy Hicks, PE, CFM, AECOM Young Cho, AECOM Carol Cook, AECOM Caitlin Olson, CDM Smith Susan Ide Patton, PG, AECOM Ivy Porpotage, AECOM Graphic Artists: Amy Siegel, AECOM Lee-Ann Lyons, AECOM Billy Ruppert, AECOM Executive Summary Hurricane Irma struck Florida’s coast on September 10, 2017, as a low Category 4 storm and caused building damage across the entire affected area. Hurricane Irma made landfall on the East Coast of the United States at Cudjoe Key, FL, with maximum winds NOTEWORTHY STORM near 130 miles per hour (mph) and a minimum pressure METRICS of 931 millibars (mb) (NOAA NHC, 2018). Later that • One of the strongest hurricanes day, Hurricane Irma made a second landfall on Marco ever observed in the open Island as a low Category 3 hurricane with maximum Atlantic Ocean sustained winds of 115 mph and a central pressure of 936 mb before tracking up the Florida Peninsula and into • One of only five hurricanes with Georgia on September 11 (NOAA NWS, 2017). Sustained measured sustained winds of hurricane force winds (i.e., 74 mph or greater) were 185 miles per hour (mph) or reported along much of the east coast of Florida, from higher Jacksonville to Miami. The Naples Municipal Airport • Maintained 185 mph sustained reported a wind gust of 142 mph. In addition to the long wind speed for 37 hours, the periods of heavy rain and strong winds, storm surge longest period for any tropical caused flooding along the Florida coast, particularly on cyclone the east side of the State in the Jacksonville area (NOAA NHC, 2018; NOAA NWS, 2017). Hurricane Irma resulted in one of the largest evacuations (approximately 6.5 million people) and most extensively used sheltering operations for the State of Florida (Florida House of Representatives, 2018). Presidential disaster declarations were issued for Florida, Georgia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands following the storm (FEMA, 2018c). Hurricane Irma caused damage to buildings across the entire affected area, as well as widespread power outages and interruptions in utility service. HURRICANE IRMA IN FLORIDA MITIGATION ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Mitigation Assessment Team Deployment and Observations Twelve days after Hurricane Irma struck the Florida coast (September 22–25, 2017), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed a pre-Mitigation Assessment Team (pre-MAT) to perform a preliminary field assessment of building damage in limited areas of Collier, Lee, Miami-Dade, and Monroe Counties. This pre-MAT was a small team sent in advance of the larger MAT to quickly observe and record select perishable damage data; locate damaged areas requiring further assessment; and determine the overall impact of the hurricane, scope of buildings and areas to be visited, and skillsets that would be needed for the larger, follow-on MAT. Following the pre- MAT, in response to a request for technical support from the Joint Field Office (JFO) in Florida, FEMA deployed the full MAT in December 2017 to assess the performance of buildings in Florida. A MAT conducts forensic engineering analyses of buildings and related infrastructure to determine causes of damage and success, and recommends actions that Federal, State, and local governments; the design and construction industry; and building code and standards organizations can take to mitigate damage from future natural hazard events. The MAT deployed to Florida assessed the performance of municipal buildings, coastal residential properties, and public facilities. The MAT focused on structures in Lee, Collier, Miami-Dade, and Monroe Counties. Summary of Damage Observed by the MAT Although Hurricane Irma was neither a flood nor wind design-level event, the storm caused widespread damage to residential and commercial buildings and infrastructure. Other long-term damage impacts include the loss of housing in the Florida Keys, damage to wastewater and potable water infrastructure, and minor to major erosion at different locations along the coastline. The extent of the wind and/or flood damage varied depending on the nature of the building design and construction. Chapters 3 and 4, as well as Chapter 5, provide additional insight into why a below design-level event caused the damage that it did. Flood. The storm caused moderate flooding and erosion in South Florida but was not considered a storm surge design event (i.e., exceedance of the 1-percent-annual-chance flood elevations was only observed where the combination of storm surge and rainfall caused severe flooding). Buildings in low-lying areas were damaged from inundation. Although inundation alone was a significant source of damage, some of the more dramatic structural failures observed were a result of the added force of wave action and scour. The extent of flood damage to buildings varied with the depth of floodwater, the amount of energy in the water (waves, velocity), and the nature of building design and construction (old versus new, at-grade versus elevated, manufactured housing [MH] units / recreational vehicle versus site-built/modular). Some of the structures destroyed by the storm were MH units located in the floodplain. Very few of these houses were elevated to the base flood elevation. Buildings constructed at or near grade were subject to deeper and more damaging flooding from either storm surge or rainfall-induced flooding. The MAT also spoke with building owners, operators, and managers of dry floodproofed non- residential buildings to understand the performance of dry floodproofing systems. In addition, the MAT visited 15 public restroom buildings and sites on or near the shoreline in public parks in Lee, Collier, Monroe, and St. Johns Counties. For those restrooms damaged by flooding, iii ii MITIGATION ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT HURRICANE IRMA IN FLORIDA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY the degree of damage ranged from complete destruction, to some structural damage, to damage to doors and fixtures only. The degree of damage depended on both flood conditions and building characteristics. Wind. The MAT focused primarily on one- and two-family dwellings, but also assessed some multi- family dwellings (apartments and condominiums) and MH units. Estimated wind speeds from Hurricane Irma in Florida did not approach the design wind speeds required in the last six editions of the Florida Building Code (FBC). Buildings designed and constructed to comply with the FBC met expectations by performing well structurally. Though not widespread, wind-induced structural damage to main wind-force resisting systems was observed in older (pre-FBC) residential construction and included roof failure and loss of exterior walls. Wind damage to
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