The Effects of Campaign Contributions on State Legislators
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ABSTRACT Title of dissertation: THE EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ON STATE LEGISLATORS Adam Howard Hoffman, Doctor of Philosophy, 2005 Dissertation directed by: Professor Paul S. Herrnson Department of Government and Politics Tremendous increases in campaign contributions at the state legislative level, both from labor and business interests have led to suspicions regarding the influence of money on legislative voting. This study seeks to assess the degree to which campaign funds flowing from private interests to state legislators, influence how legislators vote on bills that affect those private interests. This study addresses the influence of money on roll call votes using campaign contribution data from 4,000 legislators in 22 states fo r the 1998 and 2000 election cycles. The analysis shows that in states with nonprofessional legislatures, campaign contributions from business interests do indeed influence how legislators vote on business -supported legislation. Unlike professionalized le gislatures, where such factors as significant staff support, and stricter campaign finance laws mitigate the influence of lobbyists and campaign contributions, legislators in nonprofessional legislators are often overburdened with complex policy proposals along as well as numerous contributors and lobbyists ready to provide both campaign money and advice when it comes to voting for business -backed legislation. Disaggregating the analysis to the individual state level provides for a detailed examination of t he political forces and policy environments, both historically and in the present that have shaped how and why the major players in state capitols maintain their influence over policy outputs. Findings that link the contributions of business interests to legislative voting raise important concerns including the declining representativeness of state legislators as well as the possibility of corrupt practices or the perceptions of corruption among the public when money is exchanged for votes. THE EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ON STATE LEGISLATORS By Adam Howard Hoffman Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirem ents for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2005 Advisory Committee: Professor Paul S. Herrnson, Chair Professor James G. Gimpel Professor Karen M. Kaufmann Professor Irwin L. Morris Professor Alan Neustadtl ©Copyri ght by Adam Howard Hoffman 2005 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank my advisor and chair of my committee, Professor Paul Herrnson. Professor Herrnson served as a motivating force that allowed me to finish my dissertation in a timely manner. His patience, advise and thorough review of my drafts were invaluable. I would like to thank the other members of my committee, including James Gimpel, whose dynamic classes on state politics helped spark my interest in writing about power and influence in state legislatures. Irwin Morris provided valuable comments and suggestions that helped keep my writing focused. I would also like to thank Karen Kaufmann for her willingness to join my committee at a late hour and for all her suppor t during my graduate study at UMD. A special thanks to fellow graduate student, Nate Bigelow who was kind enough to offer his help on everything from methodology to theory, not to mention his wonderful golf tips. My good friend Peter Horkitz provided muc h needed diversions and balance from my otherwise cloistered life inside Tydings and Tawes Hall. Also, I would like to thank my long time friend Carl Atteniese, with whom I have had decades -long conversations and debates about power and inequality in Ameri ca. Thanks also must go to my mother whose loving and unwavering support over the years have made me believe that I could achieve all that I have. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to the one person who has shared it all with me, my wife Anne. She is the love of my life and my best friend, and this work is truly the product of a team effort. The completion of my dissertation coincided with another team effort, the birth of our beautiful daughter, Isabella. Sharing in her birth and life were the prima ry motivating factors in progressing and ultimately finishing this project, so I also dedicate this dissertation to Isabella. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Devolution and Corruption in the States 2 The Debate for Campaign Finance Reform 5 The State Setting 11 Project Overview 13 Chapter 2: Money, Business and Politics – The Ties that Bind 20 The Need for Money 21 Exchanging Money for Votes 23 Money and Corruption 27 Repr esentation 32 Interest Groups – Still the Upper Class Accent 37 Defining the Business Interest 45 Summary 48 Chapter 3: What Determines Contributions? 50 The State of Campaign Finance Regulation in the States 51 The Increasi ng Need for Money 55 The Distinction between Professional and Nonprofessional Legislatures 56 Predicting Campaign Contributions 58 Campaign Contribution Data -Moving Beyond PACs 59 Findings 70 Summary 74 Chapter 4: Doe s Money Buy Votes? 77 Measuring the Business Interest 78 Campaign Contributions 79 District, Candidate and State Level Variables 83 The Need for Two -Stage Simultaneous Models 88 Findings 89 Summary 96 Chapter 5: The State of the States 97 Professional Legislatures Republican Controlled - Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Ohio 100 Democrat Controlled – Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, 108 and New York Nonprofessional Legislature s Republican Controlled – Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, 116 Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon Democrat Controlled – Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 128 Indiana and Connecticut iii Summary 134 Chapter 6: The Role of Money in State Politics – A Closer look at Four States 137 Kansas – Republican Dominance and Traditional Influence 141 Connecticut – Business Power and Influence 151 Wisconsin – The Influence of Money Despite a Progressive Tradition 159 New York – The Mitigating Effect of Centralized Power 169 Summary 176 Chapter 7: Conclusion 179 Endnotes 190 Appendix 192 References 216 iv List of Tables 3-1. PAC Limits to Candidates 52 3-2. Limits on Corporate and Labor Union Contributions to Candidates 53 3-3. Limits on Individual Contributions to Candidates 54 3-4. Means Table for Control Variables 58 3-5. The Effects of Legislator, District and State Factors on Labor and Business Contributions to State Legislators 74 4-1. The Effect of Campaign Contributions and other District and State Level Factors on Legislators' Probusiness Votes in Nonprofessional Legislatures 92 4-2. The Effect of Campaign Contr ibutions and other District and State Level Factors on Legislators' Probusiness Votes in Professional Legislatures 95 5-1. Average Contributions to Legislators 99 5-2. Institutional Factors Among Four Categories of Legislatures 100 5-3. Average Percent of Contributions to all Legislators 136 6-1. Types of Legislatures for Sample of States used in Study 139 6-2. Top Contributing PACs to Kansas House Candidates 146 6-3. The Effect of Campaign Contributions and other Distric t and State Level Factors on the Probusiness Votes of Kansas House Members 147 6-4. Top Contributing PACs to Connecticut House Candidates 156 6-5. The Effect of Campaign Contributions and other District and State Level Factors on the Prob usiness Votes of Connecticut House Members 158 6-6. Top Contributing PACs to Wisconsin Assembly Candidates 167 6-7. The Effect of Campaign Contributions and other District and State Level Factors on the Probusiness Votes of Wisconsin Assembly Members 168 6-8. Top Contributing PACs to New York Assembly Candidates 172 v 6-9. The Effect of Campaign Contributions and other District and State Level Factors on the Probusiness Votes of New York Assembly Members 176 Appendix Tables 2-1. Meas ure of Campaign Finance Laws 192 3-1. The Effects of Legislator and District Level Factors on Business Contributions to Legislators in States with Professional Legislatures 193 3-2. The Effects of Legislator and District Level Factors on B usiness Contributions to Legislators in States with Nonprofessional Legislatures 193 3-3. The Effects of Legislator and District Level Factors on Labor Contributions to Legislators in States with Professional Legislatures 1 94 3-4. The Effects of Legislator and District Level Factors on Labor Contributions to Legislators in States with Nonprofessional Legislatures 194 vi List of Figures 3-1 Contributions to Democrats and Republicans in Profess ional and Nonprofessional Legislatures 64 6-1. Democrat and Republican Share of Legislative Seats in the Kansas House 1986 -2002 143 6-2. Average Contributions to Kansas House Candidates 145 6-3. Average Contributions to Connecticut Hou se Candidates 157 6-4. Democrat and Republican Share of Legislative Seats in the Wisconsin Assembly 1986 -2004 160 6-5. Total Contributions to Professional Legislators 163 6-6. Percentage of Contributions to Wisconsin Assembly Candidates 164 6-7. Average Contributions to New York Assembly Candidates 173 Appendix Figures 5-1a. Florida -Total Contributions 195 5-1b. Florida - Percent of Contributions 195 5-2a. Pennsylvania -Tot al Contribution 196 5-2b. Pennsylvania - Percent of Contributions 196 5-3a. Michigan -Total Contributions 197 5-3b. Michigan - Percent of Contributions 197 5-4a. Wisconsin -Total Contributions 198 5-4b. Wisconsin -Percent of Con tributions 198 5-5a. Ohio -Total Contributions 199 5-5b. Ohio -Percent of Contributions 199 5-6a. Illinois -Total Contributions 200 vii 5-6b. Illinois -Percent of Contributions 200 5-7a. Marylan d-Total Contributions 201 5-7a. Maryland -Percent of Contributions 201 5-8a. Missouri -Total Contributions 202 5-8b. Missouri -Percent of Contributions 202 5-9a. New York -Total Contributions 203 5-9a. New York -Percent of Contr ibutions 203 5-10a. Arizona -Total Contributions 204 5-10b. Arizona -Percent of Contributions 204 5-11a. Colorado - Total Contributions 205 5-11b. Colorado -Percent of Contributions 205 5-12a. Idaho -Total Contributions 206 5-12b. Idaho -Percent of Contributions 206 5-13a. Iowa -Total Contributions 207 5-13b. Iowa -Percent of Contributions 207 5-14a.