Police Pursuits After Scott V Harris: Far from Ideal? by Geoffrey P

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Ideas in POLICE American FOUNDATION Number 10 Policing June 2008 Police Pursuits After Scott v Harris: Far from Ideal? By Geoffrey P. Alpert and William C. Smith

t approximately 3 a.m. per hour, crashed into the milk Long, and at the trial in October on February 10, 1941, wagon, seriously injuring Mr. 1949 the jury rendered a verdict A Milton Elmore was Elmore. Both Mr. Elmore and for $588.83 in favor of the milk working as he drove a horse the Ideal Pure Milk Company company for its property damage drawn, lighted milk wagon sued Officers Chambers and and a verdict for $10,588.85 northwardly along Center Street in Owensboro, Kentucky, and began to turn left in a westerly Ideas in American Policing presents commentary and insight from leading crimi- nologists on issues of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers. The direction onto Fourth Street. papers published in this series are from the Police Foundation lecture series of the A few moments earlier, police same name. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not officers Robert Chambers and necessarily represent the official position of the Police Foundation. The full series is available online at http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/library.html. Jack Long had observed a © 2008 Police Foundation. All rights reserved. parked car occupied by Wren Shearer, a person whose “bad Geoffrey P. Alpert is a professor in the Department of Criminology reputation had become known to and Criminal Justice at the University of South Carolina. He has 1 them.” Shearer sped off to avoid been conducting research on high-risk police activities for more investigation by the police, and than twenty-five years, and is a nationally recognized expert on before Mr. Elmore completed police violence, pursuit driving, and training. his left turn, Shearer, who was William C. Smith, an attorney, served as the legal advisor for the fleeing at approximately 75 miles NHTSA task force that produced the original Law Enforcement Driver Training Reference Guide. He has written extensively on 1 Chambers v Ideal Pure Milk Co., police pursuit liability and risk management issues. 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1952) at 590. in favor of Mr. Elmore, as have changed dramatically, but 70 percent of all pursuits resulted compensation for his injuries. that transformation may have, in a crash, 50 percent of all The verdict was challenged by in fact, come full circle with the pursuits ended in serious injuries, the officers, and on appeal to the 2007 United States Supreme and 20 percent of pursuits Kentucky Supreme Court the trial Court decision in Scott v Harris.3 resulted in a death (Fennessy, court’s decision was reversed. The At a minimum, a number of the Hamilton, Joscelyn, and Merritt supreme court noted: “Charged judicial parameters thought by 1970). Unfortunately, the as they were with the obligation many observers to have been report relied more on anecdotal to enforce the law, the traffic reliably established have been information than quantitative laws included, they would have called into question, and the data. Nonetheless, the report been derelict in their duty had operational management of police captured more than the simple they not pursued him. The police pursuit operations has again been passing interest of those were performing their duty when thrust to the forefront as a matter already concerned with police Shearer, in gross violation of his of concern for law enforcement emergency vehicle operations. duty to obey the speed laws, agencies (Lum and Fachner, A second generation of research crashed into the milk wagon. To forthcoming). on pursuits was initiated in the argue that the officers’ pursuit 1980s and relied on quantitative caused Shearer to speed may be Where Have We Been? data from police agencies. The factually true but it does not California Highway Patrol follow that the officers are liable Since 1960, police departments (CHP) led the effort, collecting at law for the results of Shearer’s have dramatically changed the a variety of information from negligent speed. Police cannot ways in which they respond to law enforcement agencies in be made insurers of the conduct fleeing suspects. During the California, and reported that of the culprits they chase. It is 1960s and 1970s, there was very 29 percent of pursuits resulted our conclusion that the action of little attention paid to the pursuit in a crash, 11 percent ended in the police was not the legal or issue, other than with respect injury, and 1 percent resulted in a proximate cause of the accident, to officer safety concerns. In death (California Highway Patrol and that the jury should have other words, police departments 1983). While the CHP study been instructed to find for the trained officers how to drive and was fraught with methodological appellants.”2 provided them with defensive and shortcomings, it has been The Chambers decision was emergency driving skills, the focus recognized as the first of a series handed down in 1952 and clearly being on technical proficiency. of studies that, ultimately, would indicated that while the actions Little attention was given to learn from the shortcomings of of the officers most likely caused the crashes, injuries, and deaths the earlier studies and improve the offender to flee, they should involving innocent bystanders over time. Whereas Physicians not be held legally responsible whose sole transgression was, for Automotive Safety concluded for the actions of the fleeing typically, being in the wrong that pursuits were extremely suspect, even though he crashed place at the wrong time. During dangerous and reform was into and injured an innocent the late 1960s, however, a necessary to save lives, the bystander. During fifty-six years watchdog group called Physicians CHP study concluded that since the Chambers decision, for Automotive Safety, comprised “[a] very effective technique in the laws relating to police of emergency room physicians, apprehending pursued violators emergency and pursuit driving released a report asserting that may be simply to follow the violator until he voluntarily stops 2 Ibid. at 590–591. 3 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). or crashes” (1983, 17).

—— —— In 1986, Alpert and Anderson concomitantly, police departments Technique (PIT) maneuver,6 the published an article, The Most began to modify their policies federal courts would evaluate Deadly Force: Police Pursuits, and to restructure their training the officer’s action as involving which sought to sharpen the to address the awareness. a “seizure” for purposes of focus of law enforcement and Lawsuits also played a major a Fourth Amendment claim. academic observers on the part in modifying police policies The courts typically worded inherent risks and potential and practices where vehicular their analyses in the context of dangers of police pursuits. During pursuits were at issue. A major Tennessee v Garner 7 and Graham the same timeframe, a series of litigation trend evolved such v Connor.8 With the advent of studies was published, following that whenever a person, whether the 1990s, through its decisions the CHP research model but suspect or innocent third party, in Brower v County of Inyo 9 and using improved methodology was injured by actions arising County of Sacramento v Lewis, 10 and sampling techniques (Alpert from a police pursuit, suit was the U.S. Supreme Court provided and Fridell 1992; Alpert, Kenney, almost certain to follow. And in a barely translucent analysis of Dunham, and Smith 2000). many instances the filing involved the liability parameters of police The findings from these second- some allegation of violation of a pursuits under federal civil rights generation studies highlighted federally secured right that the law. The decisions in Brower and the dangerous nature of pursuits plaintiff sought to redress under Lewis did little to provide any and the risks posed to both Section 1983.4 While countless type of operational guidance, police and citizens. The empirical civil rights suits were filed, with however, to law enforcement research debunked two common varying degrees of plaintiff agencies legitimately seeking to myths: most fleeing suspects are creativity, courts throughout the balance a need to apprehend dangerous violent felons; and if country responded to them in against a requirement to protect the police don’t chase suspects, an overall inconsistent fashion, public safety in pursuits. But they all suspects will continue to flee, applying different standards, did spawn a cottage industry thereby greatly endangering public interpreting even agreed- safety. What emerged from the upon standards differently, and 6 A Pursuit Immobilization research findings was the fact handing down widely varied Technique (PIT) is a maneuver that that most suspects who flee the rulings on highly similar factual begins when a pursuing vehicle pulls alongside a fleeing vehicle so that either police were young males who had patterns. By the early 2000s, front quarter panel of the pursuing committed minor offenses and the only reasonably sure bet in vehicle is aligned with the target vehicle’s who had made very bad decisions civil rights based pursuit actions rear quarter panel. The pursuing officer is required to make momentary contact to flee. Additionally, the research appeared to be that if a police with the target vehicle’s rear quarter supported the finding that if officer used a physical “means panel, accelerating slightly and steering the police were to restrict their intentionally applied”5 to stop a into it very briefly. The effect of the properly performed maneuver is that pursuit policies and not chase all fleeing suspect, such as ramming the rear wheels of the target vehicle offenders, no wholesale fleeing or a Pursuit Immobilization lose traction, causing it to skid to a was likely to occur by those stop so that the pursuing officer or a back-up vehicle is able to then block signaled to stop by the police 4 Title 42 U.S. Code Section 1983 the target’s escape and apprehend the (Alpert, Dunham, and Stroshine is frequently referred to as the Federal suspect. Unfortunately, the process does not always work as planned. The PIT is 2006). Civil Rights Act. Although Section 1983 creates no rights in and of itself, it does designed to work safely at speeds slower By the late 1990s, the provide a remedy for violations secured than 40 MPH and in safe locations. collective awareness of society by the U.S. Constitution or statutory 7 471 U.S. 1 (1985). provisions. 8 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1988). had been opened to the 5 Brower v County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 9 489 U.S. 593 (1989). dangers of pursuit driving and, 593, 597 (1989). 10 523 U.S. 833 (1998).

—— —— of consultants and experts who disagreement with respect to Technique (PIT), police speculated, based on the tea the appropriate standard to be actions that have typically been leaves left by the Court and the applied to the actions of the classified— both judicially and subsequent iterations provided by police, especially in the context operationally—as applications the federal circuit courts, where of Fourteenth Amendment of deadly force. The Court’s police pursuit liability would due process claims. Even after proclamation in the Brower ultimately settle. Unfortunately, Lewis, the Supreme Court’s decision that “a seizure occurs those prognostications suffered anointment of the “shocking when governmental termination from the same lack of clarity as to the conscience” standard for of a person’s movement the historical precedent provided substantive due process claims is effected through means by the courts. left many courts with less than intentionally applied,”16 taken clear guidance and caused many in conjunction with the holding Where Are We Going? observers to speculate as to the in Garner that deadly force may factual circumstance in which not be used to seize a fleeing The 2007 United States Supreme the standard might ever have suspect unless the suspect poses 11 Court decision in Scott v Harris, application. Although pursuits a significant threat of death or while in the minds of many involving seizures of suspects serious physical injury to the a definitive comment on the fared better in terms of judicial officer or others, led many to state of potential police pursuit clarity, due in large part to conclude that the police use liability, must be viewed in the the relative clarity of Fourth of such maneuvers as PIT and context of a convoluted, and Amendment decisions and the ramming against those who had often confusing, jurisprudential availability of an “objective committed only minor traffic heritage. From the early years of reasonableness” standard against offenses would implicate an the high court’s constitutional which to govern police action,14 unreasonable seizure, supporting analysis of pursuit-related issues, the plight of third parties injured Section 1983 Fourth Amendment broached in such cases as Brower by the activities of fleeing liability. However reasonable such 12 v County of Inyo, until its suspects or pursuing police a conclusion may have appeared pre-Scott decision in County of officers remained an unresolved based on the then-existing 13 Sacramento v Lewis, the Court’s question at the center of a lively judicial landscape, the contours assessment and characterization discussion. of reasonableness changed of police actions, victim injuries, In the context of Fourth significantly after the decision in and corresponding responsibilities Amendment pursuit claims, Scott. has left inferior federal and many observers felt that the The 2007 Supreme Court state courts to speculate on the Supreme Court’s insinuation of decision in Scott v Harris 17 ultimate parameters of police its 1985 decision in Tennessee v involved a factual scenario in constitutional liability under Garner 15 into the discussion of which a police officer rammed 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The pursuit-related seizures provided a suspect who was fleeing for a ruminations of those inferior a reliable backdrop against which speeding violation. The opinion courts produced an extensive to evaluate such police pursuit surprised onlookers, not so body of opinions whose tactics as ramming and the so- much for the ultimate outcome only consistency was their called Pursuit Immobilization but by its marginalization of the importance of the Garner

14 11 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). Graham v Connor, 490 U.S. 386 12 489 U.S. 593 (1989). (1989). 16 489 U.S. 593 (1989) at 597. 13 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 15 471 U.S. (1985). 17 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).

—— —— decision handed down more not use deadly force to seize a the seizure of a suspect are than twenty years earlier. In fleeing suspect unless the suspect to be analyzed under the Harris, the Court never explicitly poses a significant threat of death Fourth Amendment’s objective questioned the logic behind or serious physical injury to the reasonableness standard, a Garner but implied a flaw in the officer or others. The impact rule that encompassed claims application of that case’s standard of Garner has been to set into resulting from the police use of of reasonableness to pursuit place a reasonableness standard force against a fleeing suspect. cases involving questions of the regarding the use of deadly force In short, Graham made clear dangerousness of the fleeing to apprehend fleeing suspects. In what was implicit in Garner. In suspect. the wake of Garner’s holding, the context of the use of force The purpose of this paper law enforcement agencies have to effect the seizure of a fleeing is to examine the use of deadly typically viewed the case’s suspect, Graham confirmed the force in the course of police significant threat qualification Garner message that the force pursuits and to review the in the context of a dangerous used by the police to seize a changing ways the Supreme or forcible felony suspect. suspect must be proportional Court has analyzed danger in With substantial unanimity, to the threat posed by the the pursuit context. Of necessity, law enforcement agencies have suspect. The Court, in Garner, we will first revisit, briefly, excluded minor misdemeanors or had concluded that the suspect the Garner decision and then traffic offenses from the Garner must pose an immediate threat examine the relatively recent calculus, prohibiting their officers to human life for there to be a application of Garner in the from using applications of deadly justification for the use of force pursuit context, as set out in force against “non-dangerous” that is likely to kill or cause Brosseau v Haugen.18 Finally, fleeing suspects.20 serious injury to the fleeing we will look at the Court’s Garner’s focus on suspect. For many, the clear rule recent analysis of Garner in reasonableness was clarified of Garner seemed a logical fit for Scott v Harris and discuss by Graham v Connor,21 in the seizures performed in the course the implications that analysis context of a non-deadly force of a vehicular pursuit, since most may have for the operational scenario, to put into place observers were in agreement that management of pursuits by the rule that claims involving the application of physical contact law enforcement agencies and, by a police vehicle in a pursuit generally, for policing in America. 20 For example, the Kansas City, should be evaluated as an action Missouri, Police Department advises involving deadly force. in its Pursuits and Emergency Vehicle The Fourth Amendment The facts in Garner show that 19 Operations Procedure that “[o]fficers will and Tennessee v Garner not initiate a vehicle pursuit unless they Memphis police officers Elton The facts and holding of Garner, determine that there is reasonable belief Hymon and Leslie Wright were that the suspect presents a clear and as mentioned briefly below, have immediate danger to the safety of others. called to the scene of a residential been widely disseminated and Factors involved in this decision may burglary. Upon arrival and after discussed in law enforcement include the commission of a dangerous a brief investigation, Officer felony.” [Procedural Instruction 06–11, circles since the decision was effective date 11–21–06, at Annex B, Hymon saw the suspect, Edward announced in 1985. In essence, C. (Initiating or Continuing Pursuit)] Garner, running away from the Garner has come to stand for the accessed online at http://www.kcpd. rear of the house, preparing to org/masterindex/files/pi/PI0611.pdf, proposition that the police may May 2, 2008. The guidance provided by scale a chain link fence at the the KCPD is fairly representative of the rear of the property, and yelled, practice of large urban law enforcement 18 543 U.S. 194 (2004). agencies. “Police. Halt.” After the suspect 19 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 21 490 U.S. 386 (1988). continued to flee and did not

—— —— stop when ordered by Officer always justify killing the suspect. Additionally, the Court’s proffer Hymon to do so, the officer shot A police officer may not seize an of the hypothetical situation and killed Mr. Garner, who was unarmed, non-dangerous suspect where “. . . there is probable an unarmed, slightly built eighth by shooting him dead.”24 cause to believe that [the suspect] grader. The officer did so under The Court recognized that has committed a crime involving the authority of a Tennessee limited circumstances might the infliction or threatened statute that provided that, if, justify the use of deadly force: (1) infliction of serious physical after a police officer has given “Where the officer has probable harm”26 does little to address notice of an intent to arrest a cause to believe that the suspect the timeframe in which the criminal suspect, the suspect flees poses a threat of serious physical commission of the offense must or forcibly resists, the officer may harm, either to the officer or to have occurred. One could query use all the necessary means to others . . .;” or “. . . if the suspect whether a convicted murderer effect the arrest.22 The question threatens the officer with a who committed his crime decades before the Court was whether the weapon or there is probable cause before but who now, detained use of deadly force to prevent the to believe that he had committed pending trial for a non-serious escape of an apparently unarmed, a crime involving the infliction offense, attempts to escape from suspected felon constituted an or threatened infliction of serious a police officer after being hailed unreasonable seizure under physical harm . . .;” (2) if deadly to stop, meets the Garner criteria the Fourth Amendment. The force is “necessary to prevent for the use of deadly force. Court ruled that a police officer escape;” and (3) “. . . if, where The absence of clarification has who uses deadly force to seize feasible, some warning has been fostered what some have come to a fleeing felony suspect who given.”25 Without meeting all of refer to as the Garner “temporal “poses no immediate threat” to the above conditions, the Court proximity” problem. human life violates the Fourth noted that the use of deadly force Prior to the Garner decision, Amendment.23 The Court also is constitutionally unreasonable. many police agencies had already noted, “It is not better that all Interestingly, Justice White’s formulated deadly force policies felony suspects die than that majority opinion commented that justified the use of deadly they escape. Where the suspect only on the likelihood that the force only when the officer’s life poses no immediate threat to the suspect would commit future or the life of another was being officer and no threat to others, violent crimes if he remained threatened at that moment. After the harm resulting from failing to free, but was silent to the dangers Garner, many more departments apprehend him does not justify that could occur during the adopted that language, which has the use of deadly force to do escape. One critical aspect of the become known as the defense-of- so. It is no doubt unfortunate case that was left unaddressed life policy. when a suspect who is in sight was the meaning of the term escapes, but the fact that the “immediate.” The Court did not An Invitation to Change? 27 police arrive a little late or are explain or define what it meant Brosseau v Haugen a little slower afoot does not by the term, leaving others to A noteworthy case that may interpret whether “immediate” have set the stage for the connotes instant, as in imminent, Court’s decision in Scott v 22 The statute provided that “[i]f, urgent, as in close proximity Harris is Brosseau v Haugen. In after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, to, or some other meaning. Brosseau, the Court reversed a the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982). 24 Ibid. 26 Ibid. at 3. 23 471 U.S. 9–10 (1985). 25 Ibid. at 11–12. 27 543 U.S. 194 (2004).

—— —— Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals drove with “wanton or willful stated concern that, at the time decision28 denying qualified disregard for the lives . . . of she shot him, Haugen posed a immunity to an officer who others.”29 significant risk to police officers or others in the area.33 had shot a suspect in the back The court of appeals as he was attempting to flee in concluded that a reasonable The Supreme Court his vehicle. The facts were that jury could find that, at the time reversed the Ninth Circuit’s Officer Brosseau responded to a Brosseau fired her gun, Haugen opinion, expressing no view as fight between Haugen and two did not pose a significant threat to the correctness of the court other men in Haugen’s mother’s of harm to her or others and of appeals’ decision on the yard. Haugen ran away when that Brosseau’s conduct violated constitutional question of the 30 Brosseau arrived, and two other the Fourth Amendment. The use of deadly force itself, and officers and their dogs arrived to court noted that “Under Garner, instead limiting its opinion to help search the neighborhood. deadly force is only permissible the question of whether at the The other people involved in the where ‘the officer has probable time of the officer’s actions it was skirmish, including Haugen’s cause to believe that the suspect “clearly established” that they girlfriend, her daughter, and poses a threat of serious physical violated the Fourth Amendment’s the two men who were fighting harm, either to the officer or to restrictions on the use of deadly 31 with Haugen, were instructed others’.” Viewing the evidence force. The Court held that to remain in their vehicles at in favor of Haugen, the court the law was not so “clearly the scene. Haugen returned and concluded that “Brosseau’s established.” In dicta, however, attempted to flee in his Jeep. use of deadly force was a the Court gave a possible hint 32 Brosseau pointed her gun at clear violation of Garner.” of its inclination to continue Haugen and ordered him to The court of appeals made the modification of the precedent get out of the vehicle. When following findings in support of set in Garner.34 After Brosseau, Haugen ignored her order, its conclusion. many observers anxiously Brosseau broke the driver’s Viewing the evidence in awaited a factual scenario that window with her handgun and Haugen’s favor, Brosseau shot would provide the Court the hit Haugen on the head with Haugen in the back even though opportunity to fully address the he had not committed any it. As Haugen began to drive contours of Fourth Amendment away, Brosseau stepped back and crime indicating that he posed a significant threat of serious pursuit liability, beyond the fired a shot through the rear physical harm; even though narrow issue of qualified driver’s side window, hitting Brosseau had no objectively immunity addressed in Brosseau. Haugen in the back. Brousseau reasonable evidence that Haugen Many observers anticipated that stated that she shot Haugen had a gun or other weapon; the Court would find fertile even though Haugen had not because he presented a threat ground in the facts in Harris to started to drive his vehicle; and of serious bodily harm to the provide an expanded explanation other officers who were on foot even though Haugen had a clear path of escape. Viewing somewhere in the neighborhood the evidence in Haugen’s favor, 33 Ibid. and the persons in the occupied there is insufficient objective 34 In particular, the Supreme Court’s vehicles at the scene. Haugen evidence to support Brosseau’s comments regarding Smith v Freland, pleaded guilty to “eluding,” [954 F. 2d 343; (CA6 1992)] appear to give some indication of approval of which, according to the court, an officer’s decision to use deadly force, constituted an admission that he 29 Ibid at 860. albeit through the medium of a firearm, 30 Ibid at 872. against a pursued suspect who “had 31 Ibid at 873. proven he would do almost anything to 28 339 F.3d 857, 9th Cir. (2003). 32 Ibid at 874. avoid capture” (at 347).

—— —— of Fourth Amendment pursuit not have even initiated a traffic Reynolds’ report, he assumed jurisprudence, especially as it stop. Deputy Reynolds decided the pursuit was in connection related to the use of deadly force to pursue Victor Harris for with the undercover operation to stop a fleeing suspect. speeding. As Harris sped away and, as a result, Scott became In Harris, the facts centered from the officer, he passed other one of several police officers on a high-speed chase, a video motorists by crossing over double who joined the chase to assist of the chase,35 and the ostensible yellow traffic control lines and Deputy Reynolds. Responding to use of deadly force, albeit not also raced through a red traffic Reynolds’ radio broadcast, Scott through the medium of a firearm. light. Deputy Reynolds radioed estimated that, in order to join To many observers, the facts in dispatch and reported that he was the pursuit, he reached speeds in Harris provided an exceptional chasing a fleeing suspect. excess of 100 miles per hour on opportunity to address numerous Shortly after the pursuit the narrow two-lane road. From ambiguities in constitutional was initiated, Deputy Reynolds the evidence available in the pursuit issues, and the anticipation obtained Harris’ vehicle’s license record, it also appeared that he felt by many long-time observers plate number and radioed this forced numerous motorists from was strangely akin to that felt information to his dispatcher. the roadway in his efforts to join before the Garner decision was Deputy Reynolds received the the ongoing pursuit of Harris. At released. Unlike Garner, however, name and address of the owner the time he became involved in a decision that provided important of the car (Victor Harris) but the pursuit, Deputy Scott, who opportunities to digest and analyze did not broadcast information had not been requested to join the Court’s language, the Court’s about the underlying offense— the pursuit, did not know the decision in Harris would come speeding—for which he was underlying offense for which the to be viewed by many as the chasing Mr. Harris. Based on pursuit had been initiated. premature closing of a door behind the speeding offense and the fact The pursuit began in Coweta which lay many unanswered and that the car was known to be County, Georgia, and ultimately troublesome questions. lawfully registered to Mr. Harris, ended in Peachtree City in Deputy Reynolds’ initiation of Fayette County, Georgia, near Why Are We Here? the pursuit violated CCSD’s Harris’ home. As the chase vehicular pursuit policy, which entered Peachtree City, Harris On March 29, 2001, at stated that officers were not slowed his vehicle, turned on his approximately 10:40 p.m., authorized to engage in pursuits blinker, and entered an empty Deputy Clinton Reynolds of for offenses such as speeding drugstore parking lot. Scott, by the Coweta County, Georgia, when they had information about then in close pursuit of Harris, Sheriff’s Department (CCSD) a fleeing suspect that would allow was unable to stop his vehicle was stationed on Highway 34 apprehension of the suspect at a in time to follow Harris into when he clocked Victor Harris’ later time. the parking lot but he entered vehicle traveling 73 MPH in a At the time of Reynolds’ call, the exit to the complex and 55 MPH zone. Deputy Reynolds Timothy Scott, another Coweta attempted to block Harris from flashed his blue lights to attempt County deputy sheriff, was parked escaping. Unfortunately, this to get Harris to slow down, by a church about a mile away. effort to stop Harris in the and later testified that if Harris Along with Deputy Reynolds, his parking lot failed and, as the had slowed down, he would assignment on that evening was videotape of the chase shows, to assist undercover officers who Harris, undeterred by Scott’s

35 http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ were making a controlled buy of effort, collided with Scott’s patrol opinions/06slipopinion.html. illegal drugs. When Scott heard car and then sped off back onto

—— —— another road, Highway 74, where up.” Deputy Scott took over district court denied Scott’s he once again drove at high as the lead vehicle and then summary judgment motion, speeds, crossing double yellow requested permission from his which was based on a claim of lines and running a red light. supervisor, Sergeant Fenninger, qualified immunity. The Eleventh It is important to note that to use a PIT maneuver on Harris, Circuit affirmed on appeal, when Harris had first turned into although neither he nor any concluding that Scott’s actions the parking lot, there were two other member of the Coweta could constitute deadly force and Peachtree City Police Department County Sheriff’s Department that the use of such force violates (PCPD) officers in their patrol had ever been trained in its Harris’ constitutional right to be cars already in the lot, but they usage. Fenninger responded to free from excessive force during were unaware of the underlying Scott’s request by stating over a seizure. The United States basis for the unfolding pursuit, the radio, “Go ahead and take Supreme Court granted a writ of not having been so apprised by him out. Take him out.” At the certiorari on the second prong of the Coweta County deputies time of his approval to Deputy the immunity question—whether or their dispatcher. This lack of Scott, Fenninger was aware that the law gave fair warning to communication to the Peachtree there were no other vehicles or Deputy Scott that his conduct City officers would come to pedestrians in the area and that was unlawful—and heard oral play a significant part in the Mr. Harris posed no immediate arguments. It published its written outcome of the chase because threat to the officers or to others. decision on April 30, 2007, the Peachtree City officers were According to Scott, he became reversing the denial of qualified equipped with and had immediate concerned that both his and immunity by the Eleventh Circuit access to stop sticks, devices that Harris’ vehicles were moving too and granting summary judgment are designed to slowly flatten quickly to safely execute a PIT to Deputy Scott. the tires of a fleeing vehicle so maneuver. Instead, he picked a as to allow the safe termination moment when no motorists or The Opinion of a pursuit. The Peachtree City pedestrians appeared to be in As in other qualified immunity officers did not become involved the immediate area and made cases decided after Saucier v in the pursuit of Mr. Harris, contact with Harris’ vehicle by Katz,36 the Court addressed the made no attempt to block his ramming it with the push bumper threshold question of whether vehicle, and did not attempt of his patrol car while traveling Scott’s actions could be seen to use their stop sticks, as they at approximately 90 MPH. The as violating a constitutional had not been made aware of the ramming resulted in Harris losing right. Even though the Court underlying basis for the Coweta control of his vehicle, rolling specifically notes that in resolving County pursuit and were subject it down an embankment, and the question of qualified to their department’s violent- crashing. As a result of the crash, immunity a court is required felony-only pursuit policy. They Harris was rendered quadriplegic. to view the facts alleged in the did, however, block nearby Immediately after Deputy Scott light most favorable to the party intersections in an effort to rammed Harris’ vehicle, Deputy asserting the injury, it does not protect members of the public Reynolds notified dispatch that from the Coweta County pursuit. there had been a crash. 36 As the pursuit left the parking Mr. Harris filed suit under 42 Saucier v Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). Under the analysis lot, Deputy Scott requested to U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging the required by the Court in Saucier, a be the primary pursuit unit, use of excessive force resulting court must first find that a violation of a constitutional right has occurred before stating over the radio, “Let me in an unreasonable seizure under it can inquire as to whether the right was have him...my car’s already tore the Fourth Amendment. The “clearly established.”

—— —— do so, instead substituting its Court decided that the videotape ultimately, not upon whether the own view of the facts. Perhaps provided incontrovertible evidence force used was deadly but only on the most unique feature of the that Harris presented a threat whether it was reasonable. The Supreme Court opinion was to others on the road, and that Court also gave little attention to the reliance on the videotape the only question remaining for the fact that Harris’ underlying that was taken from Deputy resolution was whether Scott’s use offense was speeding, and instead Scott’s patrol car. All but one of force to eliminate the threat voiced its greatest concern over of the justices agreed that Mr. was “objectively reasonable.”39 its view that the act of fleeing was Harris drove in a dangerous and The underlying act of a threat to everyone, and that reckless manner and presented a speeding played little, if any, role those who flee recklessly from the real threat to any driver on the in the majority’s assessment of police implicitly authorize officers roadway. The majority opinion, the appropriateness of the level to seize them with the force in an exceptional departure of force used by Deputy Scott, necessary. In sharing the basis for from the Court’s standard of the Court focusing instead on its opinion, the Court offers the review of district court factual the threat it believed Harris to following contemplation: determinations, viewed Harris’ pose to the public. The Court So how does a court go about version of the events underlying rejected Harris’ request that weighing the perhaps lesser the pursuit as being “so utterly it analyze Scott’s actions as an probability of injuring or killing discredited by the record application of deadly force, as numerous bystanders against (videotape) that no reasonable set out in Tennessee v Garner, the perhaps larger probability jury could have believed him.”37 and instead chastised both of injuring or killing a single The high court’s de novo factual Harris and the court of appeals person? We think it appropriate in this process to take into review is all the more interesting for seeking to apply Garner as account not only the number in that the Eleventh Circuit Court an “on/off switch that triggers of lives at risk, but also their of Appeals reviewed the same rigid preconditions whenever an relative culpability. It was videotape as the district court and officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly respondent, after all, who reached the same opinion as the force’.”40 The Court’s opinion intentionally placed himself lower court: that Harris’ depiction noted that Garner did not and the public in danger by of the events was credible and create a rule but “. . . was simply unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that warranted consideration by a an application of the Fourth ultimately produced the choice jury, not disposition by summary Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ between two evils that Scott judgment. The Supreme Court’s test, to the use of a particular confronted. Multiple police cars, observations notwithstanding, a type of force in a particular with blue lights flashing and review of the referenced videotape situation.”41 The majority opinion sirens blaring, had been chasing might cause an observer versed drew no distinction between respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning in police practices and procedures excessive use of force and the to stop. By contrast, those who to question the actions of the use of deadly force in its analysis might have been harmed had police officers themselves who, of Deputy Scott’s behavior. Scott not taken the action he did even in the words of the majority, The Court’s opinion rested, were entirely innocent. We have were “. . . forced to engage in the little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for Scott to take same hazardous maneuvers just 38 Ibid. at 1775. the action that he did.42 to keep up.”38 Nonetheless, the 39 Brower v County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 40 Scott v Harris, 127 S. Ct. at 1777 37 Scott v Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1775–76 (2007). (2007). 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid at 1778.

—— 10 —— The Tale of the Tape should not rely on the plaintiff’s movement, the tape may require The case was presented, and the statement where such records, as expert explanation by someone Court decided it, on qualified videotapes, exist. familiar with the dynamics of immunity grounds, the facts as One interesting aspect of the vehicles and with police represented by each side never the Court’s opinion, however, practices, so as to allow fair and being presented to a jury. The is that its reliance on the single objective understanding. This unique element in the case, as videotape carries with it no understanding notwithstanding, noted before, is the Court’s mention of the other three the Court stated that it was deference to, and its apparent videotapes that had been entered “. . . happy to allow the videotape 46 fascination with, the videotape into the record: “In total, there to speak for itself.” In so stating, it repeatedly mentions. The are four police tapes which the Court deflected any need to Court viewed the videotape of captured portions of the pursuit, question any interpretation other the chase during oral argument all recorded from different than its own, although clearly 45 and posted a link to it on the officers’ vehicles.” Thus, the neither the district court nor Court’s Web site for the public Court, in reliance on one of the court of appeals interpreted to view. The significance of the four videotapes, substitutes the chase in the same fashion tape is its role in the Court’s its interpretation of the facts as the Supreme Court majority. de novo determination of the underlying the chase for that of This presents cause for concern facts considered in the summary the district court and the court of because apparently the three- judgment motion. In a summary appeals. While the existence of a judge panel of the court of judgment motion, as the single existing videotape should appeals had also viewed the Court notes, the trial court is still give pause to a wholesale videotapes and described a very “. . . required to view the facts appellate reversal of the factual different version of events. and draw reasonable inferences findings of at least four other ‘At the time of the ramming, ‘in the light most favorable judges, the selective reliance apart from speeding and to the party opposing the on a single videotape of four running two red lights, Harris [summary judgment] motion.’ available, all taken from different was driving in a non-aggressive fashion (i.e., without trying to In qualified immunity cases, vehicles involved in the pursuit, ram or run into the officers). should prompt more extensive this usually means adopting (as Moreover . . . Scott’s path on the court of appeals did here) consideration. Nonetheless, the open highway was largely the plaintiff’s version of the the Court determined that no clear. The videos introduced facts.”43 In this case, however, reasonable juror could believe into evidence show little to no the Supreme Court noted Harris’ version of the facts. vehicular (or pedestrian) traffic, allegedly because of the late “an added wrinkle . . . [the] It is well understood that videotaped recordings of police hour and the police blockade . . . existence in the record of a of the nearby intersections. vehicular operations can help videotape capturing the events Finally, Scott issued absolutely in question.”44 Relying on a jurors interpret, after the fact, no warning (e.g., over the single videotape, the Court ruled the reasonableness of the taped loudspeaker or otherwise) prior 47 that Harris’ version of the facts behaviors. Typically, however, due to using deadly force.’ to camera angles, environmental was blatantly contradicted, and As Justice Stevens noted in features, lighting, vehicle went on to indicate that courts his dissent: speeds, and the direction of

43 Ibid. at 1774. 45 Ibid. Stevens, J. dissenting at 46 Ibid. at 1775, footnote 5. 44 Ibid. at 1775. 1785, footnote 7. 47 Ibid. Stevens, J. dissenting at 1785.

—— 11 —— If two groups of judges can the level of force based on likely Highway Patrol 1983; Alpert disagree so vehemently about outcome—something it states et al. 2000). In its assumed role the nature of the pursuit and there is no obvious way to do. of fact finder, the Court espouses the circumstances surrounding The Court explains the logic one of the classic myths about that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror by considering the number pursuit driving: if the police could disagree with this Court’s of lives at risk and also their don’t chase, then everyone will characterization of events.48 relative culpability. In that Harris flee. As an example, research disobeyed the initial order by by the Orlando, Florida, Police A Practical Application Deputy Reynolds to stop, he Department documented that intentionally placed himself and only 107 suspects fled from The Court balanced the risk of others at great risk. By contrast, more than 40,000 stops between harm created by Deputy Scott’s members of the public who March 2004 and February action of ramming Mr. Harris’ might find themselves at the 2005. This occurred after the vehicle with the threat created by wrong place at the wrong time department’s highly restrictive Mr. Harris’ fleeing from Deputy were clearly innocent of any pursuit policy was made public Scott. Even though the Court wrongdoing. Under this analysis, (Alpert et al. 2006). admits that there is no obvious the wrongdoer, irrespective of Second, the Court did not see way to quantify these risks, it the underlying offense, shoulders fit to address the great risk that noted that Harris “posed an the total responsibility for the Scott’s ramming of Harris’ car actual and imminent threat to consequences of the actions of posed for the innocent motorists the lives of any pedestrians who all involved parties, including the the Court claims that act was might have been present, to other police. Appropriately, the Court intended to protect. In its de novo civilian motorists, and to the shifts any blame away from the factual determination of the threat officers involved in the chase.”49 innocent bystanders but it places to citizens, the Court neglects, While the Court allowed that total blame and culpability on the or refuses, to consider the role Deputy Scott’s actions posed a fleeing suspect. Missing from the played in this calculus by Deputy high likelihood of serious injury equation is the responsibility of the Scott. Substituting its viewing of or death to Harris, although not police officers and what we know a single videotape for evaluation specifically declaring Scott’s action about the dynamics of pursuit. of Scott’s conduct by those as an application of deadly force, First, the opinion includes more familiar with acceptable it noted that the action did not language that questions what police operational practices, pose the near certainty of death Harris, or any other fleeing the Court sidesteps the issue posed by shooting a fleeing felon suspect, might do after the police of potential harm to the public in the back of the head or pulling end a pursuit by turning off or the reasonableness of the next to a fleeing motorist’s car emergency lights and siren. The ramming of Harris’ vehicle from and shooting the driver.50 For all language of the Court is silent a police practices perspective and, intents and purposes, the Court with respect to any commentary instead, focuses on the relative seems to have approached its on the established dynamics of culpability of Harris. The record analysis of the reasonableness of pursuit and ignores published in the case establishes that Harris’ an application of force through social science research findings vehicle veered to the right and a process of quantification of on the likelihood that a suspect collided with a telephone pole will slow down and reduce the after it was rammed by Deputy 48 Ibid. risk to the public, himself, and Scott. Because no innocent 49 Scott v Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1778 (2007). the police should the police driver, passenger, or pedestrian 50 Ibid. terminate pursuit (California was injured, the Court was able

—— 12 —— to sidestep the issue of actual the fleeing motorist at risk of officers, trainers, and policy harm. Likewise ignored by the serious injury or death.51 makers. The Harris decision Court was the fact that ramming In elocution, and possibly clearly gives law enforcement a vehicle at 90 MPH disables in theory, this rule is easy to the ability to “take out” fleeing the target vehicle driver’s ability understand: motorists who flee vehicles that threaten public to steer or guide the vehicle. from the police and threaten safety, without violating the Based on the angle and height of the lives of innocent bystanders driver’s constitutional rights. the ramming vehicle, a rammed can be stopped by the police While only a short time has vehicle can be forced to travel with whatever force is necessary, passed since the Court issued in any number of directions. including deadly force. If, under its opinion, the federal circuit In this case, it could have just the auspices of protecting the courts are already having to as easily veered to the left and innocent motoring public, an deal with the fallout from across the median into oncoming officer shot and killed a suspect Harris in factually similar cases. lanes of traffic. Thus, while the who was fleeing at high speed on For example, in August 2007, Court underpins its opinion on a highway, causing the suspect’s the Eleventh Circuit Court of the protection of innocent third vehicle to run into an adjoining Appeals rendered its decision in parties and the moral culpability tree line, it is fairly clear that Beshers v Harrison,52 a pursuit case of Harris, the fact remains, even there would be no constitutional involving an officer (Harrison) under the Court’s own factual liability for the police under of the Toccoa, Georgia, Police analysis, that the missile put Harris. In fact, after Harris, any Department who was chasing into motion by Scott’s ramming use of force, deadly or otherwise, Mr. Beshers for a minor offense. could have as easily injured those to stop a fleeing motorist, when Harrison realized Beshers was parties as protected them. The there is probable cause to believe a danger to him, the other irony of the Court’s factual re- he or she poses a serious threat to pursuing officers, and motorists evaluation in the case is that the the public, is going to be justified as he observed Beshers recklessly analysis does precious little to under the Fourth Amendment. weave in and out of traffic, cross provide protection to a potentially Unfortunately, the Harris the double center line, drive on endangered public and a great Court’s ruling is silent on the the wrong side of the road, and deal to “green light” unrestrained responsibility of the police, and its force others off the road. He also police vehicular tactics in those Fourth Amendment analysis can observed Mr. Beshers crash into agencies not holding a tight rein provide no basis upon which to a civilian’s car and was himself on their officers. The Court’s contemplate any possible recourse rammed several times by Mr. own statements confirm that for an innocent party who is injured Beshers’ truck while traveling the practice of “pursue until the by activities set into motion by around 60 MPH. Ultimately, wheels fall off,” a practice that the police, as the innocent citizen Beshers clipped the patrol car so many law enforcement driving would not have been harmed by being driven by Harrison and professionals and administrators means intentionally applied by the swerved off the road, colliding have worked to change, is now police (see, e.g., Lewis, ante). with a tree. He died on impact. back in vogue. As in Harris, the suspect in Beshers created a risk to himself A police officer’s attempt to Policy Implications and others by driving in a manner terminate a dangerous high- The Court has created a true speed car chase that threatens that was extremely dangerous. dilemma for law enforcement the lives of innocent bystanders Although the Eleventh Circuit does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places 51 Ibid at 1779. 52 No. 05–17096.

—— 13 —— Court of Appeals did not find outweigh the threat posed to the and a fleeing suspect. Likewise, specifically that Harrison had suspect by the officer’s use of many agencies currently train “seized” Beshers, it presumed deadly force, because the suspect their officers that Harris does is the one who chose to put that a seizure had occurred not change departmental policy everyone else at risk by refusing for purposes of its analysis and to stop. In other words, the and that, regardless of the opinion: danger to the suspect is given Court’s opinion, officers are not . . . [F]or purposes of this no weight. For all of its talk authorized to use deadly force appeal only, we operate under of a balancing test, the Harris against a fleeing suspect unless the presumption that Harrison court has, in effect, established authorized under a Garner a per se rule: Unless the chase ‘seized’ Beshers, as that term analysis, giving consideration occurs below the speed limit is defined under the Fourth to the underlying offense. Only Amendment.53 on a deserted highway, the use of deadly force to end a time will tell if this trend of Based on the holding in motor vehicle pursuit is always a reasonableness continues or if Harris, the Eleventh Circuit reasonable seizure. As a practical law enforcement agencies give in concluded that even if Harrison matter, a police officer’s qualified to the temptation to “take out” had intentionally used deadly force immunity to use deadly force those who elude them for minor in a car chase situation is now to seize Beshers, “. . . the use of offenses. It is important to heed virtually unqualified. Harris 54 such force was reasonable.” and this opinion allow a police Judge Presnell’s warning that, District Judge Presnell noted in officer to use deadly force with “. . . we will live to regret this a concurring opinion: constitutional impunity if the precedent.” If agencies ultimately fleeing suspect poses any danger A reasonable juror could reach decide, based on Harris, to to the public. In my humble this result, even though Beshers allow their officers the discretion opinion, I believe we will live to was suspected of comparatively to “take out” fleeing suspects, regret this precedent. minor offenses, and even though If a balancing test is to have irrespective of the underlying we have all witnessed hundreds any real meaning, a jury ought offense, the work of many law of vehicles speeding, passing to be deciding whether the risk enforcement driving professionals illegally, and running stop signs posed by the fleeing suspect is without causing an accident. and police administrators may too minimal, or the suspected As attested by the dangerous well have been for naught. In crime too minor, to make killing instrumentality doctrine, the Scott v Harris, the majority him a reasonable way to halt the operation of a motor vehicle is supported Scott’s actions as chase. Nevertheless, based on my inherently dangerous to others. reading of Harris, that decision taken in furtherance of the Thus, the chase occasioned has been taken away from the government’s critical interest by a fleeing motorist will itself jury where, as here, the fleeing in protecting public safety. The arguably create an immediate suspect has endangered others.55 and substantial potential for Court’s analysis and support, harm to the traveling public. While Harris has clear however, may potentially provide Yet this decision troubles implications for federal lawsuits, it a basis for reversion to pursuit me. Realistically, a suspect fleeing will not likely have any significant practices long thought abandoned the police in a car will inevitably by law enforcement professionals. violate some traffic laws. By impact on state negligence Perhaps the most interesting doing so, he will endanger the actions. Many law enforcement lives of innocent motorists (as agencies, well prior to the Harris implication of Harris that state well as the pursuing officers). opinion, had promulgated courts will have to consider And that danger will always policies that prohibit intentional is the use of videotapes. For contact between a police car example, defense attorneys may 53 Ibid at 11. well cite Harris as a precedent 54 Ibid at 16. 55 Ibid at 24–26. and ask a court to analyze a

—— 14 —— videotape of a pursuit as part of more than one-half century ago, Fennessy, E., T. Hamilton, K. a summary judgment, in hopes seem to take on new meaning Joscelyn, and J. Merritt. 1970. A Study of the Problem of Hot that the judge(s) views the tape in the wake of the high court’s Pursuit. Washington, DC: U.S. with the same concern voiced pronouncement in Harris that is Department of Transportation. by the justices in Harris (but far from ideal: Kahan, D.M., D.A. Hoffman, and see Wasserman 2008). Most Charged as they were with the D. Braman. Forthcoming 2008. interestingly, Kahan, Hoffman, obligation to enforce the law, the Whose eyes are you going to and Braman (forthcoming 2008) traffic laws included, they would believe? Scott v. Harris and the asked more than 1,300 subjects have been derelict in their duty perils of cognitive illiberalism. had they not pursued him.56 Harvard Law Review, Vol. 122. to view the Harris video. While Available at SSRN: http://ssrn. a majority of the respondents One can only hope that com/abstract=1081227 agreed with the Court on major those who are charged with Lum, C. and G. Fachner. issues, there were significant the protection of public safety Forthcoming 2008. Police differences of opinion among recall the lengthy dialogue that Pursuit in an Age of Innovation and Reform: The IACP Police the subjects across cultural and preceded the development of Pursuit Database Final Report. ideological positions. current pursuit practices and Alexandria, VA: International In addition to the concern policies and that they do not, Association of Chiefs of Police. that different people observe based on a reading of Harris, Wasserman, H.M., 2008. Video varying levels of risk in a pursuit divest themselves of their evidence and summary video, a tape may be even less professional responsibility to safely judgment: The procedure of important when considering the “serve and protect” those who Scott v. Harris. JUDICATURE, role of an innocent bystander in Vol. 91, No. 180 (January/ rely upon their sound judgment. February). Available at SSRN: the actions taken by the police http://ssrn.com/ during a pursuit. A police video References abstract=1095045 can capture what is directly in front of it, but it cannot Alpert, G., R. Dunham, and M. Stroshine. 2006. Policing: Cases Cited provide a proper context of the Continuity and Change. Prospect area, traffic on side streets or at Heights, IL.: Waveland Press. Beshers v Harrison, Eleventh Circuit, intersections, or other important Alpert, G., D. Kenney, R. Dunham, No. 05-17096, decided August 17, 2007. considerations that a fact finder and W. Smith. 2000. Police should consider when analyzing Pursuits: What We Know. Brosseau v Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 Washington, DC: Police (2004). the merits of continuing or Executive Research Forum. terminating a pursuit. The road Brower v County of Inyo, 489 U.S. Alpert, G. and L. Fridell. 1992. 593 (1989). from Chambers has been both Police Vehicles and Firearms: Chambers v Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 long and pockmarked, with Instruments of Deadly Force. S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1952). speculative interpretation and an Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 absence of operational guidance Alpert, G. and P. Anderson. 1986. U.S. 833 (1998). for those who must seek to The most deadly force: Police Graham v Connor, 490 U.S. 386 ensure public safety. The judicial pursuits. Justice Quarterly 3 (1988). March: 1–15. deference Harris ostensibly Scott v Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 pays to police officer discretion California Highway Patrol. 1983. (2007). with respect to the level of Pursuit Study. Sacramento: California Highway Patrol. Saucier v Katz, U.S. 194, 201 force to be used in any pursuit (2001). is troublesome. The words of 56 Chambers v Ideal Pure Milk Co., Tennessee v Garner, 471 U.S. 1 another supreme court, from 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1952). (1985).

—— 15 —— ABOUT THE POLICE FOUNDATION The Police Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting innovation and improvement in policing through its research, technical assistance, communication, and professional services programs. Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure, and works to transfer to local agencies the best new information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.

DIVISION OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, & PROFESSIONAL SERVICES BOARD OF DIRECTORS Karen L. Amendola Chief Operating Officer Chairman David Weisburd William G. Milliken Senior Fellow Edwin E. Hamilton President Director of Professional Services Hubert Williams Chief (Ret.) LeRoy O’Shield Senior Technical Assistance Advisor George H. Bohlinger III Greg Jones Research and Crime Mapping Coordinator David D. Cole Raymond Johnston Sr. Senior Systems Engineer Wade Henderson Eliab Tarkghen Systems Engineer Julie Horney Meghan Slipka William H. Hudnut III Research and Administrative Coordinator RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE David B. Lewis David Weisburd, Chair W. Walter Menninger Hebrew University and George Mason University Geoffrey P. Alpert Laurie O. Robinson University of South Carolina Weldon J. Rougeau Candace Kruttschnitt University of Minnesota Alfred A. Slocum Cynthia Lum George Mason University Andrew L. Sonner

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