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Policy Focus 2017-2

The Fight for The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry

Summary Key Points

Africa has become a new competing arena ‹‹ and its Gulf allies have distanced between Saudi Arabia and . Both states have the from Iran through financial turned their focus to the continent, developing ties incentives. with a number of African states on both economic and security levels. As international focus remains centered on the and the Levant, ‹‹ Iran is looking to expand its presence in West Africa Africa’s importance in the regional rivalry is often through the formation of further -styled overlooked. By focusing on key strategic issues ideological proxy groups. found throughout the continent, including the formation of in East and North Africa, ‹‹ Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are deploying soft as well as the role of ideological proxies in West power to increase diplomatic ties with Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper offers a holistic analysis of the role Africa plays in the rivalry between Saudi African states. Arabia and Iran. The implications of these issues are also examined to emphasize their effects on ‹‹ The exportation of conservative forms of to Saudi-Iranian relations, as well as stability in Africa. the continent is increasing Islamic and religious throughout Africa.

‹‹ African states that have benefitted from substantial financial from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are being drawn into Middle Eastern conflicts and disputes.

Gerald Feierstein, Craig Greathead 2017 Gerald Feierstein Introduction Gerald Feierstein is the Director of the Center for Gulf Affairs at the Middle audi-Iranian rivalry in the Persian Gulf lit- East Institute. He retired Storal, , and the Levant domi- from the U.S. Foreign nates attention paid to Service in May 2016 after a 41-year career. At the their broad for regional, polit- time of his retirement, ical, security, and sectarian domination. But Feierstein held the person- al rank of Career . with nearly 650 million adherents to Islam Over the of his (53 percent of Africa’s total population), career, he served in nine untapped natural wealth, and strategic loca- overseas postings including three tours of duty in , as well as tours in Saudi tion, the African continent offers equal if not Arabia, , , , and . In 2010, greater rewards to the regional rivals if they President Obama appointed Feierstein U.S. Ambassador can gain a competitive advantage. Unsurpris- to , where he served until 2013. From 2013 until his retirement, Feierstein was Principal Deputy Assistant ingly, Africa has become another arena in Secretary of State for Affairs. the Saudi-Iranian rivalry; a reality made clear by Saudi Salman’s call for a Saudi-Africa Craig Greathead to be held before the end of 2017. Craig Greathead is an un- dergraduate at the From the formation of strategic alliances in University of St Andrews, the Horn of Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and . He is majoring in , French, and In- the Maghreb, to the use of ideological prox- ternational Relations with ies in West Africa, this paper will look at var- a focus on Persian Gulf ious elements of the ongoing rivalry as well politics. He works with the analysis team of as analyze how they may shape Saudi-Iranian the U.K based risk analysis relations, Africa, and the wider . and security consultancy Frontier Horizons. He has previously reported on politi- cal and economic events in Yemen and .

The Horn of Africa has emerged as the of the states in the region eagerly welcomed principal focus for Saudi-Iranian competition Iran’s friendship. on the African continent. Prior to reaching Most significant among Iran’s regional suc- agreement with the international communi- cesses was , which proved a vital Ira- ty on the nuclear deal in 2015, Iran struggled nian ally for many years. The two states to break out of the isolation imposed in re- established a cooperative military and intel- sponse to its nuclear weapons programs. The ligence-sharing relationship. Sudan became a Horn of Africa was one of the few in transshipment point for Iranian arms the to offer the Iranians opportunities re-supply to partners in Gaza and Lebanon, to develop relations. Similarly suffering under primarily and Hezbollah. the weight of international sanctions, several

Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 1 and also proved to be sym- with Iran. In 2014, the Sudanese expelled pathetic partners for Iran, with Eritrea be- Iranian officials, accusing them of spreading coming a key ally in the region. The use of Shiite Islam through their cultural centers. Eritrean by the Iranian navy was a no- announced, at the same time, that table strategic asset for Iran as it offered the it was joining the Saudi camp. Beyond finan- Islamic Republic a foothold in the cial inducements, the have used their and Gulf of , as well as a strong naval diplomatic leverage to entice the Sudanese position in Saudi Arabia’s backyard. Since , pledging to help Sudan break out of its 2015, the Iranians used access to Somalia as diplomatic isolation. As part of that effort, a principal gateway for arms and the Saudis have led a push to overcome the supplies to the Houthi rebels fighting against International Criminal Court indictment of the Saudi-backed Yemeni . Sudan’s president, al-Bashir, for war crimes and genocide in Darfur. Most recent- Had they been able to sustain the relations, ly, the Saudis raised eyebrows when they in- access to Eritrea and Somalia, coupled with vited Bashir to attend the Arab-Islamic-U.S. control of the Yemeni Red Sea through summit with President in Ri- the Houthis, would have enhanced Iran’s yadh in May, although Bashir ultimately de- ability to threaten international shipping in cided not to attend, presumably as a result the Bab al-Mandeb. The capacity to challenge of U.S. pressure. international commerce passing through the two strategic chokeholds in the region—the Diplomatic aside, it is clearly Sau- Bab al-Mandeb and the — di Arabia’s far greater economic clout, along has long been perceived as a principal strate- with its position as the leader of the Sunni Is- gic objective for the Iranians, providing them lamic world, which has allowed it to succeed with a significant deterrent against outside in its competition with Iran for influence in pressure. Iranian interest in demonstrating Sudan. In 2016, the Saudis deposited $1 bil- the capacity to challenge shipping in the Red in Sudan’s Central Bank, presumably as Sea was apparent in 2016, when several at- a reward following Khartoum’s decision to tacks on U.S. and naval vessels were break relations with Iran as a result of the launched from the Yemeni side of the Bab attack on the Saudi in . The al-Mandeb. Saudis have also used their economic power to strengthen their bilateral ties to Djibou- Recognizing the threat to their interests if ti, Somalia, and Eritrea, all of which have cut Iran were allowed to establish a foothold their ties to Iran. in the Horn, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the effort to counter Iranian influence. While Iran’s traditional influence in the Horn The most notable Saudi success has been of Africa was once a threat to Saudi Ara- in provoking the break in Sudan’s relations bia and its interests, the recent moves to

2 Feierstein and Greathead Figure 1: Growing G.C.C. Presence in East Africa

increase Saudi involvement in the have Beyond the security component, Saudi and allowed the kingdom to extend its “securi- Emirati engagement in the Horn reflects ty belt”. The recent establishment of sev- their interest in safeguarding access to food eral military bases by Saudi Arabia and its supplies. Unable to provide for their own principal Gulf ally, the United Arab food needs domestically, and uncomfortable (U.A.E.), in the Horn of Africa has given the relying entirely on food imports across long Saudis a launching pad from which to elimi- distances, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Co- nate Iranian influence in the region. In Janu- operation Council (G.C.C.) states have in- ary 2017, Saudi Arabia and formally vested heavily in the purchase of land for ag- agreed to the of a military base ricultural production in East Africa. In Saudi in the East African state. With the U.A.E.’s Arabia, the King Abdullah for Saudi new military installation in the of Agricultural Investment Abroad has played a , as well as the jointly operated key role in promoting deals between Saudi military base in Assab, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia investors and land owners in and and its Gulf ally have successfully distanced Sudan in particular. Presumably, Gulf owner- the region from Iranian influence. ship of agricultural lands in Africa will help

Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 3 guarantee a reliable food supply in G.C.C. ners. Prior to the recent rapprochement states as their populations continue to grow. between and the Saudis, looked skeptically at the growing Saudi presence on But it has also promoted a backlash within the African side of the Red Sea. In particular, Africa as concerns grow over foreign owner- the were angered by a visit to the ship of vital farmland. A U.N. Food and Agri- Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a cultural Organization report noted that: “As source of Egyptian-Ethiopian bilateral strain, or markets make land available by a senior advisor to King Salman, Ahmed to prospecting investors, large-scale land ac- al-Khatib, in December 2016. Ostensibly in- quisitions may result in local people losing ac- tended to showcase Saudi-Ethiopian bilateral cess to the resources on which they depend interest in renewable energies, the Egyptians for their food security—particularly as some interpreted the visit as an unsubtle inter- key recipient are themselves faced vention in their backyard. At the same time, with food security challenges.” Overall Gulf Egyptian officials expressed “suspicion” over agricultural in Africa amount- Saudi plans to develop a military presence ed to over $30 billion between 2004 and in Djibouti and insisted that the Saudis seek 2014, according to the Dubai Chamber of Egypt’s “permission” before proceeding with Commerce. (N.B.: In fairness, the Saudis and their plans. are hardly alone in what has been dubbed “land-grabbing.” , , and Closer ties to Saudi Arabia and a growing de- , among others, have been simi- pendence on Saudi largesse has also drawn larly engaged in the practice.) the East African states uncomfortably into the middle of intra-Gulf conflicts. Although Indeed, while greater Saudi engagement in Somalia has remained neutral in the Sau- the Horn of Africa has largely succeeded di-Emirati-Egyptian dispute with (and in eliminating Iranian influence, it has been is therefore at risk of losing an $80 million do- a source of friction with other Saudi part- nation from the Saudis), Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti have all sided with Saudi Arabia and downgraded Egyptian officials their relations with Qatar. As expressed “suspicion” a result of their decision, Qa- tar withdrew several hundred over Saudi plans to peacekeepers from the Eritre- an-Djiboutian border where develop a military they had been deployed since presence in Djibouti 2010 to maintain a 2008 bor- der agreement mediated by . Immediately following

4 Feierstein and Greathead Figure 2: Violent Incidents and 2017 .M.N. Protests in

the Qatari withdrawal, Djibouti accused the bia and Iran export their differing views on Eritrean military of occupying territory in the Islam to the wider Islamic community. contested Dumeira Mountains, ratcheting tensions and drawing U.N. and African This divide is most evident in Africa’s most Union engagement. populous state, Nigeria. are pre- dominantly Sunni . The country is governed by a Sunni, President Muhamma- West Africa du Buhari, and the Salafist extremist group Boko also operates in the country. Historically, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in East Caught between the two of Nigeria’s Africa has been a zero-sum for stra- Sunni Islamic community, Nigeria’s Shiite mi- tegic power. But in West Africa, and nority finds itself increasingly under threat. Tehran play out their rivalry primarily as a Iran, in its self-declared role as leader of the sectarian battle between Sunni and Shiite Is- Shiite, has attempted to justify interference lam. A once notably tolerant region in terms in Nigeria’s domestic affairs on the grounds of religious freedoms, West Africa is now an that it is the legitimate guarantor of the secu- area of rising sectarian tension as Saudi Ara- rity of its fellow Shiites. In particular, Iran has used the killing of over 300 Shiites by the Ni-

Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 5 Foreign funding of states, including , , and , are and Islamic also being drawn into the Sau- schools leads to a rise in di-Iranian ideological proxy conflict. Sunni-Shiite sectarianism For Iran, this ideological battle gerian government during a rally in Decem- in Nigeria fulfills another of ber 2015 as an excuse to warrant its con- its regional ambitions: establishing Hezbol- tinuous support for an Iranian-inspired Shiite lah-styled proxies throughout Africa. Iran extremist group, the Islamic Movement of and Hezbollah see several African countries, Nigeria (I.M.N.), and its currently imprisoned with weak state institutions and porous bor- leader Ibrahim Zakzaki. I.M.N. has been la- ders, as potential platforms from which Iran belled a terrorist organization by Nigeria’s can threaten the wider region in the event of government and its events have been target- growing pressure in the . Hezbol- ed by the government, , and the lah already has a foothold in West Africa due Izala Society, a Sunni group that is strongly to the presence of a large Lebanese diaspo- backed by Saudi Arabia. King Salman has sup- ra, who use the and drug trades ported the Nigerian government’s attempts to help fund and supply arms to the group to suppress the I.M.N., while President Has- in Lebanon. Having the I.M.N. as another san Rouhani has allegedly called for an inves- proxy would help fortify Iranian influence in tigation into the imprisonment of Ibrahim West Africa. Saudi Arabia’s attempts to limit Zakzaki and the recent violence against Ni- the I.M.N.’s growth by supporting rival Sunni geria’s Shiite community. groups such as Izala, as well as doing little to condemn the actions of Boko Haram when Both sides in the Saudi-Iranian proxy con- it targets the I.M.N., highlight Nigeria’s im- flict are now investing in and supporting rival portance to both Saudi and Iranian interests groups throughout the region in to gain in West Africa. both an ideological and strategic foothold in West Africa’s Muslim communities. Saudi and Thus, in contrast to Saudi Arabia’s apparent Iranian interference in the domestic affairs of dominance in East Africa, Iran is competing African states follows a cycle: foreign fund- effectively with its regional rival on the ideo- ing of mosques and Islamic schools leads to logical front in West Africa. Iran’s invaluable a rise in Sunni-Shiite sectarianism, which in assets of Ibraham Zakzaki and the I.M.N. are turn allows both sides to intervene, alleged- providing Tehran with the ability to disrupt ly in support of their respective sect. While key Sunni states in the region, as well as en- Nigeria remains the country where growing suring the creation and development of valu- religious intolerance is most apparent, other able proxy groups. As Saudi Arabia naturally

6 Feierstein and Greathead seeks to combat this expansion, the rivalry as “honorable.” In Yemen, despite several is deepening religious intolerance and Islamic attempts by Saudi Arabia to convince Alge- extremism in the West African region. ria to join its military coalition against Irani- an-backed Houthi rebels, has refused to intervene. Finally, Algeria’s non-member- North Africa (Algeria) ship in the Saudi-formed Islamic Military Al- liance (an which has been accused Algeria is a key target for Iran in Africa. Since of sectarianism due to the non-membership the resumption of diplomatic ties in 2000, of notable Shiite states including Iran), high- the two states have developed strong eco- lights Algeria’s determination to stay clear of nomic and diplomatic relations. One of the Saudi Arabia’s increasing dominance in the few states to voice support for Iran’s nuclear politics and conflicts of the Middle East. The development program, Algeria is seen by the Algerian Constitution also prohibits the de- Iranian government as a vital “launching pad” ployment of Algerian military forces outside not just into the Maghreb region, but into of the country. the African continent as a whole. Iran sees Algeria, an economic and military Strong diplomatic relations between Algeria power in Africa, as essentially up for grabs in and Iran look set to continue. In a June 2017 the regional rivalry between itself and Saudi state visit to Algeria by Iran’s foreign minis- Arabia. The more Algeria remains officially ter, Mohammad Javad Zarif, both sides reit- neutral in the rivalry, the more Iran will seek erated their desire for increased economic, to expand existing ties to the . cultural, and counterterrorism cooperation. Unlike its opportunities elsewhere in Africa, The establishment of a production site in Al- however, Iran has few options to influence geria for Iranian car manufacturer Iran Kho- Algerian policy. Indeed, with its sights set dro in 2016 underscores the strengthening firmly on expanding its own influence and relations. presence in Africa, Algeria is as likely to find Strategically, Algeria’s unwill- ingness to follow Saudi Ara- bia’s lead in ongoing events The more Algeria in the Middle East reinforc- remains officially es Iran’s diplomacy. Algeria is neutral in Saudi Arabia’s dis- neutral in the rivalry, the pute with Qatar and, echoing the Iranians, has called for di- more Iran will seek to alogue; the Qataris have de- expand existing ties scribed the Algerian position

Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 7 itself competing with Iran on the continent an- relationship reaches back to as it is to partner with it. the era of the Shah, when Iran was one of the only OPEC members willing to sell oil to the state in violation of U.N. sanc- Sub-Saharan Africa tions). Saudi Arabia, for its part, has promised $20 million in cheap oil through the Saudi The Saudi-Iranian rivalry in Sub-Saharan Af- Fund for National Development to promote rica is primarily waged through soft power bilateral ties with . policies as well as the promise of invest- ments, particularly in the oil and gas fields. Iran looks to Sub-Saharan Africa not only Both states use their abundant natural re- for political and diplomatic support, but also sources to obtain allies and advance their as a source of raw material for its nuclear strategic goals. program. Through cheap oil and gas exports, Iran ensures diplomatic assistance from Af- In a demonstration of its efforts, Iran wel- rican states in vital international bodies in- comed the opening of a Beninese embassy cluding the Security Coun- to Tehran in June. Rouhani greeted the new- cil and International Atomic Energy Agency. ly arrived ambassador and heralded an era Iran looks to strengthen ties with African of increased cooperation between the two states to increase support against interna- states in various economic, cultural, scientific, tional sanctions and measures taken against and political fields. For Iran, the cornerstone the country. Moreover, Iran has pursued of its presence in the region is its tradition- bilateral relations with several Sub-Saharan ally strong ties with South Africa, advanced African states that possess deposits primarily through the sale of cheap oil and to ensure supplies for its nuclear program. gas to the main regional power. (The Irani- In this regard, Iran has recent- ly looked to improve relations with (Africa’s third With limited strategic largest uranium producer) as goals in the region, well as , where Iran owns a 15 percent stake in the [Saudi Arabia] appears Rössing Uranium Mine. While heavy international sanctions motivated primarily by have blocked Iran’s easy access the need to counter to global uranium markets, Iran has been able to bypass Iran’s influence sanctions through the illicit trade in uranium in Sub-Saha- ran Africa due to poor levels

8 Feierstein and Greathead Figure 3: Recent Diplomatic Visits to Africa (2015-July 2017)

of infrastructure and wide-spread corrup- zania and declared the state Saudi Arabia’s tion. priority country for trade and investment in Africa. As such, Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic Saudi Arabia, with limited strategic goals in strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa corresponds the region, appears motivated primarily by to its approach in East Africa, namely the the need to counter Iran’s influence. In the promise of large financial investments to last few years, the Saudis have undertak- gather support and challenge Iranian influ- en several diplomatic initiatives to diminish ence in the region. Iran’s position in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most notably, South African President canceled a trip to Iran and traveled to Saudi The implications for Arabia instead after an unannounced visit by Africa Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir in 2016. Furthermore, after the Iranian navy conclud- Saudi-Iranian competition for influence in Af- ed a deal with Tanzanian authorities allowing rica has been waged for a number of years. its navy to conduct regular visits to Tanzanian But it has sharpened in recent months, re- ports, it took only a matter of weeks before flecting a more aggressive stance by Wash- the Saudi foreign minister traveled to Tan-

Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 9 ington, at least rhetorically, to challenge Iran’s of their bilateral relations and the re-emer- regional ambitions, and the adoption of a gence after a seven-year hiatus of their terri- more robust Saudi foreign policy under the torial disputes. At a low point in Saudi-Egyp- leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin tian relations last year, Ethiopia and Djibouti Salman. also risked becoming battlegrounds in Ri- yadh’s dispute with Cairo as a result of their Although Iran continues to use Somalia as a relations with the Saudis. smuggling transshipment point for its arms and materiel support to the Houthi rebels But it is in the internal dimensions of Saudi in Yemen, the struggle for influence in East and Iranian involvement in the region that Africa has largely been decided in favor of poses the greatest threat to the African the Saudis and their Gulf allies. Saudi finan- states. The exportation of differing forms of cial power and diplomatic leverage have conservative Islam to the African continent swayed the states of the Horn of Africa in is leading to a rise in extremism in the re- their decisions. Increasingly, the Iranians and gion. As Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to Saudis have shifted their focus to West Af- fund and construct mosques and centers rica, where each side enjoys advantages. for Islamic learning, the consequent spread Although the Muslim populations of West of fundamentalist Shiite Islam and Wahha- Africa are predominantly Sunni, and thus in- bism, coupled with weak state institutions, clined to favor the Saudis, Iran can call on the is radicalizing populations. Somalia serves as loyalties of the large Lebanese community in a prime example of the dangers of export- the region, which is heavily Shiite and histor- ing conservative forms of Islam to weak or ically supportive of Hezbollah. fledgling states in the African continent. As such, as Saudi Arabia and Iran expand their The Saudi and Iranian attention to Africa ideological battle, this rising sectarianism will is, at best, a mixed blessing for the govern- lead to increasing security threats for several ments and people of the region. The com- states throughout Africa. petition has undoubtedly meant a financial and development windfall for the region as the two sides seek to buy loyalty. But it has also drawn the states into larger region- al conflicts that they can ill afford, not only between Iran and the Gulf states, but into intra-Gulf and intra-Arab disputes as well. As noted in this paper, Qatar’s confrontation with its G.C.C. neighbors has triggered the withdrawal of Qatari peacekeepers from Er- itrea and Djibouti, resulting in a deterioration

10 Feierstein and Greathead Endnotes

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Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 13 www.mei.edu