The Fight for Africa the New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry
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POLICY FOCUS 2017-2 The Fight for Africa The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry Summary Key Points Africa has become a new competing arena Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have distanced between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both states have the Horn of Africa from Iran through financial turned their focus to the continent, developing ties incentives. with a number of African states on both economic and security levels. As international focus remains centered on the Persian Gulf and the Levant, Iran is looking to expand its presence in West Africa Africa’s importance in the regional rivalry is often through the formation of further Hezbollah-styled overlooked. By focusing on key strategic issues ideological proxy groups. found throughout the continent, including the formation of alliances in East and North Africa, Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are deploying soft as well as the role of ideological proxies in West power to increase diplomatic ties with Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper offers a holistic analysis of the role Africa plays in the rivalry between Saudi African states. Arabia and Iran. The implications of these issues are also examined to emphasize their effects on The exportation of conservative forms of Islam to Saudi-Iranian relations, as well as stability in Africa. the continent is increasing Islamic extremism and religious sectarianism throughout Africa. African states that have benefitted from substantial financial investment from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are being drawn into Middle Eastern conflicts and disputes. Gerald Feierstein, Craig Greathead SEPTEMBER 2017 Gerald Feierstein Introduction Gerald Feierstein is the Director of the Center for Gulf Affairs at the Middle audi-Iranian rivalry in the Persian Gulf lit- East Institute. He retired Storal, South Asia, and the Levant domi- from the U.S. Foreign nates the international attention paid to Service in May 2016 after a 41-year career. At the their broad competition for regional, polit- time of his retirement, ical, security, and sectarian domination. But Feierstein held the person- al rank of Career Minister. with nearly 650 million adherents to Islam Over the course of his (53 percent of Africa’s total population), career, he served in nine untapped natural wealth, and strategic loca- overseas postings including three tours of duty in Pakistan, as well as tours in Saudi tion, the African continent offers equal if not Arabia, Oman, Lebanon, Jerusalem, and Tunisia. In 2010, greater rewards to the regional rivals if they President Obama appointed Feierstein U.S. Ambassador can gain a competitive advantage. Unsurpris- to Yemen, where he served until 2013. From 2013 until his retirement, Feierstein was Principal Deputy Assistant ingly, Africa has become another arena in Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. the Saudi-Iranian rivalry; a reality made clear by Saudi King Salman’s call for a Saudi-Africa Craig Greathead summit to be held before the end of 2017. Craig Greathead is an un- dergraduate student at the From the formation of strategic alliances in University of St Andrews, the Horn of Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Scotland. He is majoring in Arabic, French, and In- the Maghreb, to the use of ideological prox- ternational Relations with ies in West Africa, this paper will look at var- a focus on Persian Gulf ious elements of the ongoing rivalry as well politics. He works with the country analysis team of as analyze how they may shape Saudi-Iranian the U.K based risk analysis relations, Africa, and the wider region. and security consultancy Frontier Horizons. He has previously reported on politi- cal and economic events in Yemen and Kuwait. East Africa The Horn of Africa has emerged as the of the states in the region eagerly welcomed principal focus for Saudi-Iranian competition Iran’s friendship. on the African continent. Prior to reaching Most significant among Iran’s regional suc- agreement with the international communi- cesses was Sudan, which proved a vital Ira- ty on the nuclear deal in 2015, Iran struggled nian ally for many years. The two states to break out of the isolation imposed in re- established a cooperative military and intel- sponse to its nuclear weapons programs. The ligence-sharing relationship. Sudan became a Horn of Africa was one of the few regions in major transshipment point for Iranian arms the world to offer the Iranians opportunities re-supply to partners in Gaza and Lebanon, to develop relations. Similarly suffering under primarily Hamas and Hezbollah. the weight of international sanctions, several Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 1 Eritrea and Somalia also proved to be sym- with Iran. In 2014, the Sudanese expelled pathetic partners for Iran, with Eritrea be- Iranian officials, accusing them of spreading coming a key ally in the region. The use of Shiite Islam through their cultural centers. Eritrean ports by the Iranian navy was a no- Khartoum announced, at the same time, that table strategic asset for Iran as it offered the it was joining the Saudi camp. Beyond finan- Islamic Republic a foothold in the Red Sea cial inducements, the Saudis have used their and Gulf of Aden, as well as a strong naval diplomatic leverage to entice the Sudanese position in Saudi Arabia’s backyard. Since shift, pledging to help Sudan break out of its 2015, the Iranians used access to Somalia as diplomatic isolation. As part of that effort, a principal gateway for smuggling arms and the Saudis have led a push to overcome the supplies to the Houthi rebels fighting against International Criminal Court indictment of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, for war crimes and genocide in Darfur. Most recent- Had they been able to sustain the relations, ly, the Saudis raised eyebrows when they in- access to Eritrea and Somalia, coupled with vited Bashir to attend the Arab-Islamic-U.S. control of the Yemeni Red Sea coast through summit with President Donald Trump in Ri- the Houthis, would have enhanced Iran’s yadh in May, although Bashir ultimately de- ability to threaten international shipping in cided not to attend, presumably as a result the Bab al-Mandeb. The capacity to challenge of U.S. pressure. international commerce passing through the two strategic chokeholds in the region—the Diplomatic initiatives aside, it is clearly Sau- Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz— di Arabia’s far greater economic clout, along has long been perceived as a principal strate- with its position as the leader of the Sunni Is- gic objective for the Iranians, providing them lamic world, which has allowed it to succeed with a significant deterrent against outside in its competition with Iran for influence in pressure. Iranian interest in demonstrating Sudan. In 2016, the Saudis deposited $1 bil- the capacity to challenge shipping in the Red lion in Sudan’s Central Bank, presumably as Sea was apparent in 2016, when several at- a reward following Khartoum’s decision to tacks on U.S. and coalition naval vessels were break relations with Iran as a result of the launched from the Yemeni side of the Bab attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. The al-Mandeb. Saudis have also used their economic power to strengthen their bilateral ties to Djibou- Recognizing the threat to their interests if ti, Somalia, and Eritrea, all of which have cut Iran were allowed to establish a foothold their ties to Iran. in the Horn, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the effort to counter Iranian influence. While Iran’s traditional influence in the Horn The most notable Saudi success has been of Africa was once a threat to Saudi Ara- in provoking the break in Sudan’s relations bia and its interests, the recent moves to 2 Feierstein and Greathead Figure 1: Growing G.C.C. Presence in East Africa increase Saudi involvement in the area have Beyond the security component, Saudi and allowed the kingdom to extend its “securi- Emirati engagement in the Horn reflects ty belt”. The recent establishment of sev- their interest in safeguarding access to food eral military bases by Saudi Arabia and its supplies. Unable to provide for their own principal Gulf ally, the United Arab Emirates food needs domestically, and uncomfortable (U.A.E.), in the Horn of Africa has given the relying entirely on food imports across long Saudis a launching pad from which to elimi- distances, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Co- nate Iranian influence in the region. In Janu- operation Council (G.C.C.) states have in- ary 2017, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti formally vested heavily in the purchase of land for ag- agreed to the construction of a military base ricultural production in East Africa. In Saudi in the East African state. With the U.A.E.’s Arabia, the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi new military installation in the territory of Agricultural Investment Abroad has played a Somaliland, as well as the jointly operated key role in promoting deals between Saudi military base in Assab, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia investors and land owners in Ethiopia and and its Gulf ally have successfully distanced Sudan in particular. Presumably, Gulf owner- the region from Iranian influence. ship of agricultural lands in Africa will help Africa New Focus of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 3 guarantee a reliable food supply in G.C.C. ners. Prior to the recent rapprochement states as their populations continue to grow. between Egypt and the Saudis, Cairo looked skeptically at the growing Saudi presence on But it has also promoted a backlash within the African side of the Red Sea. In particular, Africa as concerns grow over foreign owner- the Egyptians were angered by a visit to the ship of vital farmland.