JAMES BURNEY ro THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EARL SPENCER:

A DoclJilent in the History of the Naval Mutinies of 1 m

by

Hugh Sproule

A Thesis

Submi tted to The Facul.ty or Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in English 1958 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PartI: The naval mutiny of 1797 p.l

Part II: Biogra.phical sketch of James Burney 31

Part III: The text of the letter from James 42 Burney to Earl Spencer, wi th notes and commentary

Part IV: Conclusions 58 Introduction

The career of James Burney (1750-1821) included nearly sixty years of experience in naval affairs, in voyages of exploration

throughout the world, and in publication of scientific writings on

travel and discovery. During the naval mutiny in 1797 he wrote a letter to Lord Spencer, then First Lord of the Admiralty, in which he

set forth what he believed to be the causes of the uprising, and made recommandations whereby the naval service might be improved. Burney' s letter must have been lost or removed from the Admiralty records, because no mention is made of it either by his biographer or by those writing of the mutiny.

A copy of the letter is preserved in the Pierpont Morgan

Library, in a collection of letters and documents b,y or relating to

James Burney. It is in Burney' s hand, and appears on two sheets of ivory-coloured bond paper, written on both aides. Each sheet measures eight inches by twalve and three-quarters inches. The first sheet, which bears the first and second pages of the letter, is water-marked, n C W Willmott 1815." The second sheet, bearing the third and fourth pages of the latter, is water-marked with an oval shield beneath a crown; contained wi thin the shield is a lion rampant before an obelisk.

Both sheets are faded to a paJ.e brown colour, but are not otherwise discoloured, marked or disfigured.

In addition to the letter from James Burney to Lord Spencer, a number of other letters in the Pierpont Morgan Library were used in preparing this paper, as were also certain letters in the Barrett and

Osborn Collections. In the selection and organization of this material, the assistance of Professor Joyce Hemlow and Professor Archibald E.

Malloch is gratefully acknowledged. 1

I

Throughout the winter of 1796-97, i t became clear to the

people of England that the war wi th France was going from bad to worse. Pitt•s attempt to treat for peace with the newly-activated

Directoire had failed, and the fear of, aFrench invasion persisted in the public mind in much the same way as did the fear of a German invasion during the last war. This popular tmeasiness was made worse by such bitter trials as a soaring national debt, ruinously high priees, and a foreign trade heavily damaged by French and

Dutch strength on the high saas. Worry changed to open dismay, however, when the Navy, long celebrated as the nation•s true bulwark, seemed to have become inadequate and ineffectuaJ.. In December, a large French fleet had sailed unopposed out of Brest, and only b,y violent storms and gales was prevented from landing troops in Bantry

Bay, County Cork. Another sma11 task force actually did affect a landing at Fishguard, but was soon captured by the local militia •

.Along wi th these disquieting alarUills of imminent invasion came the news that the banks had suspended payments in gold and were offering pa.per currency instead. The gloom was lightened for a moment in

February when the Spanish fleet was defeated off Cape St. Vincent.

This British victory was acknowledged wi th an earldom ( St. Vincent) and an annua1 pension of three thousand pounds a year to Admiral

Jervis. On the same occasion Nelson was given an Order of the Bath.

The most important consequence, however, was the restoration of the

Navy as the beloved symbol of national strength and pride. That service was not destined, alas, to occupy such a position for long. 2

On Easter Sunday, April 16, 179'7, when the Channel Fleet

was ordered from Portsmouth to St. Helen• s on the Isle of Wight

(the usual place of rendezvous where the ships assembled to await

favourable winds), the signal was not obeyed; with no anchor weighed 1 or sail unfurled, the Fleet was plainly in a state of mutiny. This

unhappy and dangerous situation was the immediate faul t of the

Admiral ty who, having for several weeks ignored petitions from various

ships of the Channel Fleet for long-overdue pay increases, for fair

measures of the food and supplies sold to them, and for the redress

of such grievances as brutal treatment and inequity of prize money,

now committed a final act of folly, but with the reasoning that if

the ships were sent off to sea, the developing troubles might be

kept from spreading. For several weeks before Easter, seamen had

been preparing and forwarding anoeymous petitions to the Admiral ty;

they had agreed amongst themselves that once they could be sure

that their petitions had been placed before the Admiral ty, they

would force the Admiral ty to consider them, by the deviee of taking

charge of the ships until an acceptable answer should be received.

On Easter Sunda.y morning, therefore, the crews of all the ships at Portsmouth were watching Admiral Gardner• s fiagship, the Roya1

1 Conrad Gill, The Naval Mutinies 9f.l1!21. (Manchester, 1913). There is relatively little material elsewhere on the mutiny, wi th the exception of G.E. Manwaring and Bonamy Dobree, The Floating Republic (New York, 1935), a work hypercritical of the Admiralty and less objective than Gill, although the two share much similar source information. David Bonner Smith, in various articles appearing in The Mariner• s Mirror, a periodical devoted to nautical affairs, also uses largely the same sources as the two works just mentioned. Except as otherwise indicated, Gill' s work, the most thorough, scholarly and best-documented on the mutinies of 1797, has furnished the material for my brief account. Sovereign; when the seamen on the other ships saw her acknowledge

the signal. to proceed to sea, and then perceived that she did not o bey the signal, they realized that this order was to be their answer from the Admiralty- on the subject of their petitions. They proceeded, accordingly, with their pre-arranged plans to mutiny.

The men in the Que en Charlotte were first to give the sign of recognition, which consisted of repeated cheers from the hands on deck; the sign was picked up and relayed through ail the ships in harbour. Then two representatives ( styled "Delegates") from the

Queen Charlotte, followed by two elected from the Royal George, were rowed through the Fleet, in crder to arrange that avery ship like­ wise send two Delegates to a meeting aboard the Queen Charlotte that same evening.

The Admiralty had received frequent warnings of threatened disorders, but had set these aside as normal complaints from a service long noted for chronic dissatisfaction. Several weeks before the mutilly began, some ships' companies had tried the deviee of sending petitions directly to the semi-retired Admiral of the Fleet, Lord

Howe (the much-beloved "Black Dick"), who wasmtering at Bath.

Although he was much concerned at the seriousness of' these signa of unrest, he was not in a position to ta.ke direct action, and turned them over to the Ad.miralty where they might be considered in the light of other information which their Lordships might have acquired in the matter. They instructed Seymour, one of their n'IJ!lber, to visit Ports­ mouth, from which he returned with nothing remarkable to report. It was evidently his reassurance, coupled wi th the extrema unpopularity of any measure requiring an increase in Navy estimates already em­ barrassingly large, that prompted Spencer, the First Lord, to ignore 4 the petitions and give them no formaJ. recognition. In the middle of

Roly Week, both Sir Peter Parker (Port Admiral at Portsmouth), and

Lord Bridport (Admiral of the Channel Fleet) had written to the

Admiralty, warning that serious mischief was a.foot. In a letter of

April 1.3, Bridport had asked for instructions, since he had heard

that nt disagreeable combinations• were forming, particularly on the

Queen Charlotte." (Gill, p.l6) He was therefore much surprised that

his reply from the Admiralty gave no instructions, in view of the

fact that they had sent to him, under the same cover, those same

petitions which had been originally sent by the sea.men to Lord Howe.

Seeing for the first time this eloquent evidence, Bridport was alarmed

to recognize how extensive the impending mutiny seemed to be. The

seriousness of his concern is indicated in his reply to the Board on

April 15:

I • • • conclme • • • their Lordships will not direct the squadron to proceed to sea, before soma answer is given to these petitions, as I am afraid i t could not be put in execution witho ut the appearance of serious consequences, which the complexion of the fleet sufficiently indicates. (Gill, p.l8)

De spite the traditionaJ. immovability of the Board of Admiralty, i t is

only fair to admit that they would undoubtedly have issued more useful

instructions if they had received this latter o~ Bridport•s sooner.

As it was, they had been disturbed by a letter from Parker written on

April 14, containing specifie details and information about the forth-

coming mutiny. In the face of Parker' s latter, then, they sent an order for the Channel Fleet to proceed to sea, and in so doing, likely

thought that they were doing the most practicable thing under the circumstances. In any event, the sailing order was issued before they had received Bridport's latter of April 15, and at a time when they were under the impression that they were in possession of information more recent than he. The same Ad.miral ty latter that contained the 5

sailing order made formal acknowledgement of the receipt of the seamen1 s

petitions: •The application has been communicated to their Lordships

and the suhject will have that serious consideration which its importance

requires." (Gill, p.25) When it became Bridport1 s office to transmit

this communication to his captains in Portsmouth ( whereupon each

captain would read i t out to his own crew) , he made the following

addendun, which did little to help matters: "The Commander-in-Chief

trusts this answer will be satisfactory, and that the different ships'

companies will immediately return to their duty, as the service of the

country requi.res their proceeding to sea." (Gill, p.25) The non-

committal answer of the Admiralty on the question of the petitions,

as weil as Lord Bridport•s dutiful but unsympathetic note appended

tb.ereto, convinced the seamen that only through mutiny could their

cause be given enough publicity to gain the support of the people.

While the Board of Admira!ty was being informed of how

matters stood now at Portsmouth on Easter Sunday, April 16, the

Delegates met that same night aboard the Queen Charlotte and took

the government of the Fleet into their own hands. Until. a satis-

factory answer was forthcoming from the Admiral ty, the mutineers

bound themselves to abide by the following regulations:

Fir§t: Every Ship shall diligently keep a Quarter Watch and every Man found below in his Watch shall be severely punished. Secondly: Every ship shall give three cheers at 8 o' clock in the morning and at sunset in the evening. Thirdly; No Woman shall be permitted to go on shore from any Ship, but as many may come in as pleases. Fourthl::t: Any person attempting to bring Liquor into any Ship on any pretence whatever, or any found Drunk, to be severely punished. FifthlY; The greatest attention to be paid to the Orders of the Officers. Any Person failing in r .espect due to them or neglecting their Duty, shall be severely punished. 6

Sixthly: Every Seaman and Marine in the Fleet to take an Oath of Fidelity, not only to themselves but to the Fleet in general. Seventhly: That no Ship shall lift an anchor to proceed from this Port until the desire of the Fleet is satisfied. EighthlY: That there shall be no Liberty from Ship to Ship until all is regularly settled. • • ,

Every Man swore by his Ma.ker that 'the Cause we have underta.ken we per­ severe in till accomplished. 1

In case of Disturbances on board any of the Ships: A Red Flag at the fore top gallantmast head, and two.lights at night one above the other; a Boat with the Delegates to repair immediately to that Ship. 2

That the seamen undertook to follow these rtiles and to reject

King1 s Regulations and Admiral ty Instructions followed hitherto, is

borne out by their reply to Lord Bridport•s reminder concerning the

service of their c01m.try:

The Ship' s Company[H.M.S. Londorij are very much obliged to Lord Bridport for his goodness and kind intentions, but are under the necessity of àcquainting him that his Lordship's Answer is not satisfactory; and we cannot think of proceeding to Sea mtil there is a regular Answer to the Regulations agreed on today and until the Fleet is altogether satisfied. 3

As proof of the mutineers strong sense of honesty and

responsibility as well as their patriotism, there is the instance of

the Romney and the Venus. which were to have sailed on April 17 as

escort vessels to a convoy of supply shipping to Newfoundland and

Halifax. Acting on the Delegates' orders for the Channel Fleet (a

part of which they then were) , the two ships refused to sail. They

did put to sea later, however, on receipt of the following latter

from the Delegates1 meeting aboard the Queen Charlotte:

To the Seamen aboard H.M.S. Romney. It is the desire and earnest wish of the Fleet that you will proceed peacably and regularly to Sea with the Convoy you shall have

2 D. Bonner Smith, "The Naval Mutinies of 1797, 11 The Mariner• s Mirror, XXII (1936), 65-86. 3 Smith, pp. 68-69. 7

under your charge, as we would in no wise wish to bring the I.njury of Country in our cause in no wise, and we shall proceed in your behalf in a regul.ar way and we are fully satisfied of your Loyalty in our Cause. 4

It will be apparent, then, tb.at up to this point, and indeed throughout

most of its course, the mutiny of the Channel Fleet at Spithead was

executed in an admirably calm, reasonable and well-regulated mannar,

wi thout needless force or violence.

On Easter Sunday, when Lord Bridport saw that the mutiny was

plainly spreading throughout the Channel Fleet, he sent Rear-Admiral Sir

Charles Pole with this news to the Board of Admiral ty in London, where

he was to confer wi th their Lordships. So impressed were they wi th the

seriousn.ess and urgency of the situation that on Monday, April 17, Lord

Spencer met with Pitt, the Prime Minister, and resolved to set out at

once for Portsmouth, in order to deal personally with the mutiny. In

the following letter, Spencer acquainted the King wi th what was going

on:

Earl Spencer has the honour of in:torming your Majesty tb.at in consequence of intelligence received in the course of yesterday and this morning from Portsmouth of representations from the companies of your Majesty1 s ships at Spitb.ead on the very delicate subject of an increase in pay, which appears to have been brought forward and en­ forced in an unpleasant manner, he has, after consulting Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, thought it his duty to go thither immediately accompanied by two other members of the Board of Admiral ty, in order to take such measures as may appear the most advisable for putting a stop to, and if necessary, for redressing the grievances complained of without suffering the dissatisfaction which seems to have arisen to proceed any :turther. He forbears at this moment entering into any further detail on this subject on which he flatters himself he shall be en­ abled on his return to make a more particular and satisfactory report to your Majesty. 5

When the party arrived from London, they met with Lord Bridport

and the other flag officers, and after lengthy discussion, agreed to 4 Smith, p.70. 5 The Spencer Papers 1794.-1801, ed. Julian S. Corbett, II (London, 1914), 109. This volume is number XLVIII in the Publications of the Navy Records Society. 8 meet the demands of the seamen part way insofar as pay was concerned;

basic pa.y was to be increased by four shillings a month for those on

the high seas, and by two shillings a mon th for landsmen; wh en a seaman

was disabled through wounds, pay henceforth was to be allowed until he

either returned to duty, or received a pension and care tb.rough the

Greenwich Hospital. The day the mutiny broke out, Bridport had asked

that the seamen in each ship state their own particular grievances

to him through their captains. In consequence, the Admiralty were

confronted with many petitions otb.er than those dealing with pay;

esepcially did they receive requestsfor improvement in the quality

and variety of food, for honest measures of the same which they bought 6 from the ships1 pursers, and for shore leave when in port. These

demanda from :many different ships were drawn up and consolidated by

the Delegates in the form of a Fleet Petition which was presented to the Admiral ty representatives while they were preparing their initial offer concerning pay.

This offer of a pay increase was sent to the Delegates, and the Admiralty were then obliged to wa.it for an answer for nearly the

Whole of a day because four of the Delegates chanced to be ashore at the time. The interim was occupied with considering the Fleet Petition and another set of demanda contained in a letter of April 19 which rejected the first offer by the Board of a pay increase, and reiterated the early demands for energetic reform in the matter of fresh food of better quality and honest weight and measure; it also demanded that the marchant seamen of the East India Company be included in the

Greenwich Hospital proposal. The letter closed with a firm refusal

6 The ships' personnel bought messing supplies from the purser who, according to a timeless custom, protected himself from loss of stores through n shrinkage" by issuing fourteen ounces while charging for a pound. 9 to weigb. anchor until a satisfactory answer should be forthcoming from the Admiralty. It did not, however, make further reference to the earlier requests for shore leave.

The Board considered this latest set of demands until late on the night of April 19, and thought of various plans to cope with a situation which was becoming more serious every hour. One proposal, not acted upon, was that the more amenable ships be sent to sea and the more recalcitrant be dealt with individually, at their Lordships' pleasure. Finally they decided upon a policy of intimidation, and instructed Lord Bridport to have his captains, each a board his own ship, read out the Articles of War with particular emphasis on the severity of punishment prescribed for mutiny, and sternly remind the seamen of "the dreadful consequences which necessarily will attend their continuing to transgress the Rules of the Service, in open 7 violation of the Laws of their Country."

The next day, April 20, the Admiralty representatives met again with the Portsmouth fiag officers, and in the course of the conference were convinced that at least the most pressing of the demands contained in the Fleet Petition would have to be conceded before the ships would obey any sailing orders. Accordingly, a second ' offer from the Admiralty included more generous offers of increased pa.y, but made no specifie promiis-e t of improvement in food or of shore leave. It must be admitted, however, tmt the Admiralty did make relatively generous concessions to the seamen. One ought to note in this connection that Lord Spencer' s chief objection to the "delicate subjectn of increased pay had been based upon the expanse involved;

7 Smith, p.7S. 10

yet when Pitt had been informed of what had been granted by the

Admiralty at Portsmouth, he replied to Spencer:

Downing Street, Thursday, M:idnight, 20th April, 1797.

My dear Lord, - Before any latter can reach you, I think the business must have been brought to a point. At ail events I see no ground to suggest a.eyth:ing new, and have no doubt in my mind of the proprietl of your decision, and of the proposai mentioned in your letter of 2 past three to-day. I most anxiously hope i t will produce the intended affect. The amount of the expanse is comparatively of no consequence. 8

As the officers of the Channel Fleet had predicted during

their last meeting wi th the Admiraity, most of the sailors appeared

ready to return to duty men they heard the latest proclamation of pay increases. The Delegates, however, were more sceptical; fearing reprisais especially harsh towards themselves as the leaders in the mutiny, they refused to permit full acceptance of the Admiraity offer until (in addition to that promise of pardon which the Board had added to their promise of increased pay), a full and comprehensive pardon should be granted by the King himself. I t was on this point that trouble broke out afresh. On April 21, Admiral Gardner (aboard whose ship, the Royal Sovereign, the mutiny had commenced on April 16) undertook to vi sit the Queen Charlotte, the scene of most of the meetings of' the Del.egates, in the hope of' persuading the men to accept the

Admiralty of'fer. At first he was successful, but in the midst of' his preparation of an expression of thanks to their Lordships on behalf of the seamen, other Delegates came a board and raised the contentious question of the Admiralty pardon. Here Gardner lost his temper wi th the mutiny, _ cursed and swore at the men and threatened to hang every fifth man in the Fleet; in the ensuing scuffle, Gardner and his colleagues had to be put hastily ashore, lest furth.er harm be done to them. His

8 ~ .SJ?!!!ncer P.apers, II, ils~n6. 11 visit, however, did much mischief, because it seemed to justify the

Delegates• warning of heavy punishments to follow upon the mutiny.

In arder to secure their own saf'ety, then, the seamen struck the broad pennant of the Admiral, and mounted the guns in preparation for action.

Spencer now left Portsmouth for London, realizing that a pardon must be o btained from the King before anything further could be accomplished wi th the Channel Fleet. In compacy wi th Pitt he went to

Windsor for an audience in which the King was so urgently petitioned that the pardon was granted immediately and prepared wi th such e:x:­ pedi tion that copies of i t were put aboard all the ships in Portsmouth on Sunday morning, April 23. Thus concluded the first phase of the mutiny at Spithead, with some important concessions made by the Admiralty, pardon from the King himself for the seamen, and with the Prime Minister plainly willing to approve their cause.

After the troubles of Easter Week, peace and tranquillity seemed to prevail in the Channel Fleet, but i t was not to last long.

Sailirg orders had been issued, and by April 28, most of the ships had made for St. Helen• s and were there awaiting favourable winds. There followed several days' bad weather, and during the delay, impatience, suspicion and discontent commenced again to develop as realization grew that there had not yet been any official parliamentary recognition of, or accession to, their demands which the Admiralty had previously granted. In point of fact, a Bill on behalf of the seamen had been prepared, and during the time the ill feeling was spreading at St. Helen' s, i t was moving along through the normal channels of legislative procedure

(with which the seamen, of course, were unfamiliar) and was ready for

Commons b,y May 5. This day chancing to be a Friday, a motion for ad­ journment nntil the next week was put forward - a qui te customa.ry and 12 usual procedure - but the suggestion of delay and procrastination which the Opposition chose to draw from the motion prompted one of

their number, the Duke of Bedford, to threaten to demand a full in­ vestigation of conditions in the Navy, and to censure the Government in the strongest terms. The press took up the attack, wri ting of the adj ournment as being intended by Pi tt to a void a full and public ventilation of the circumstances which led to the mutiny. When the seamen heard such accounts, they were more suspiciousthan ever that parliamentary tricks were being used to evadB tb.eir demanda. Indeed, their worst fears seemed to be confirmed when an Admiralty order, issued early in May, now was circulated in the Channel Fleet, requiring that the Marines be maintained at at state of readiness with arms and am­ munition, and that all captains of ships curtail their own shore leave.

To the seamen, therefore, it appeared that they were to be cheated out of their deserts by an indifferent or hostile officialdom; the failure of the Bill to become law by May 6 was to have serious results.

On Sunday morning, May 7, all the former signs of mutiny re­ appeared aboard the London. The threatening nooses once more dangled from the yard-arms, cheers were given, and tours of the Delegates from ship to ship commenced again. The officers were once more deprived of their commanda, wi th sorne being sent a shore, and others merely confined to their quartera. Admiral Colpoys attempted to deal with the situation a board his own ship, the London, by reasoning with the crew and sending them below, so that if Delegates should come on board, they would be prevented from colli.ng in contact with his own men. However, when the

men of the London heard a party of Delegates on the upper decks of

a slmip moored nearby, they attempted to rush the companionways, where

they were met by armed off icers and Marines. In the skirmish, several 13

seamen were shot down, one of them fatally wounded by Bover, the :·.:first

Ji.eutenant. Only the direct physical intervention of Admiral Colpoys

prevented the men from hanging Bover from the yard arm; after mu.ch

heated argument, the immediate threat of physical violence diminished

a little, but the .admiral, {1aptain and ·f1rst Lieutenant were confined

to their quartera for the entire night, during which they expected at

any time to be taken out and hanged. Bover, who had hi therto been a

quite popular officer, was released the next day, but the other two

remained in confinement until news reached the ship that the Bill had

been passed.

By this time, of course, the public began to be much alarmed.

Stories reached London that Admiral Colpoys had been tried by his own

crew, and the London Chronicle carried other dismaying although often

grossly inaccurate accounts of violence and bloodshed in the Channel

Fleet, along wi th tales in a somewhat lighter vain, of officers put a shore so swiftly and unceremoniously that they brought wi th them no

gear, or even clothing, beyond what they wore. With the ever-present menace of a French invasion, it wa.s disconcertingly plain that the Navy in its present disaffected state would leave England utterly exposed and defenceless against hostile fleets. The King, in a letter to

Spencer, wrote:

Queen1 s Ho use, 9th May, 1797. 50 minutes past 7 o•clock.

I cannot sufficiently express my concern at the account received last evening from Earl Spencer of the fresh mutiny in the Channel fleet, which is accompanied by more serious outrages than the first. It would be idle to lament that the meaeures for increasing their pay have been delayed for two weeks coming forwa:rd in Parliament, or that the wind has proved easterly which would have carried them out to œa. • • • 9

9 The Spencer Papers, II, 124. 14 Another latter to Spencer (from a .Tohn White, aboard the Royal William)

describes the situation from an officer's viewpoint:

The ineffectua.l stand made by the officers of the London you must have beard of before this can possibly reach London. The particulars of that melancholy event we only learnt from seeing one of her boats towed past us wi th wounded men and officers going to the hospital, and from the post­ man, who assured us that the quarter-deck wa.s, when he left her, as much stained w.i th blood as if the ship had just come out of action • • • In my lifetime I never saw such want of discretion as in these said dele­ gates. Instead of sober steady men whom I expected to have seen, they really were drunken ignorant creatures, neither governed by sense ( though uncultivated) nor anyth.ing else that could ~ven give: a colour to their proceedings, so that I am clearly of the opinion that were their most sanguine wishes gratified even in their own idea, all would not do because they are now goaded on by devils who nothing b~ the destruction of their devoted country will suffice ••• , One of the delegates declared to me • • • that there would not be an English man-of-war belonging to the Crown this day fortnight. 10

Wi th such gloomy tidings on every side, the Admiralty tried still other expedients, and sent a special messenger to Portsmouth on May 9 with the news that the Bill had been approved. On May 10 this information wa.s passed through the Fleet, along with the even more impressive announce- ment that Lord Hpwe himself wa.s to make a personal visit to the sea.men in Portsmouth.

It may very weil be that Howe1 s popularity with the men did as much as the passage of the Bill toward settling their grievances.

Unlike the Admiralty, he recognized the Delegates as the official re- presentatives of the seamen, and treated them accordingly. He visited the ships throughout the Fleet, talking wi th both Delegates and sea.men, rebuking and scolding when necessary, but always as their friend and sympa thizer. Moreover, he carried with him the proclamati on of the Royal pardon, Which considerably strengthened his work of reconciliation. Even wi~~ this, however, not all the mutineers were satisfied, for some felt that the wording of the pardon wa.s still such as might permit the Lords

10 The Spencer Papers, II, 124-126. 15 of the Admiralty to prosecute them under the terms of the Articles of

War. I t was finally necessary for the pardon to be re-worded before it was uniTersally accepted by the Channel Fleet. The crews on some of the ships continued to be dissatisfied with their officers, especially those who had a reputation for the infliction of needlessly brutal and degrading punishment; not until there had been considerable re-arranging of rosters of officers, with some transferred to other ships and some sent ashore on half-pay, were the last, lingering causes of trouble removed. After a gala tour of the Fleet by Lord and Lady Howe, in the company of Sir William Pitt ( Governor of Portsmouth) and Lady Pitt and officers and Delegates, the whole party was dined at Pitt's hospitality in his residence. Although Howe himself was so exhausted by the shi);>- visiting that toward the last, he had to be lifted aboard and carried on the sailors' shoulders, his work on this occasion was completely successful in removing the last vestiges of bitterness on the part of the seamen, who had hitherto believed that no-one from Admiralty cared very much for them or was concerned at their grievances. His visit likewise reassured many who still feared that official re- tribution might yet overtake them, so that the return of the Fleet to usefuJ. service was completed quickly. Lord Howe' s services on this occasion were properly recognized when, on June 2, he was invested with 11 the Order of the Garter. It is true that later there were sporadic and short-lived uprisings in the Fleet, but the important mutiny at

Spithead was now quite concluded, with considerable good will now existing between Admiralty, officers and seamen.

While the difficulties at Spithead were being resolved with so much cordiality, a sinister picture of unrest and disorder commenced

11 The Gentleman's Magazine, LXVII (1797), 625. 16

to a.ppear at the Nore and a.t Yarmouth among the various elements of the North Sea Fleet. On May 1, aboa.rd Admira.l Gardner' s flagship Venerable,

the now-familia.r mustering of ha.nds in the forecastle and the cheering

ha.d taken place. The meeting broke up after a talk from Duncan, who

came away feeling tha.t he had disspelled any mutinous spirits which

might be in sympathy with the cause proceeding a.t Spithead. On May 6,

however, mutiny ha.d clearly developed at the Nore when the twelve or

more ships stationed there each elected Delegates to meet aboard Admiral

Buckner' s flagship, the Sandwich, with the intention of making plans and

drawing up regulations a.pparently in imita.tion of their brother seamen

in Portsmouth. On May 12, while Buckner and several of his officers

were awa.y at a court-martial, the mutiny in the Sandwich commenced in

earnest with men crowding the open decks and cheering, and with the

nooses hanging from the yard a.rms. While the disorder quickly spread

through the other ships, i t was several da.ys before there was any serious

violence. The interim seems to have been occupied in further planning

and organization.

Although i t is not possible to say why there should have been

so long a delay separating events at Portsmouth from those at the Nore,

there ca.n be no doubt, from the simil.arity of' procedure, orders and

routine, t hat the men at the Nore were following the exa.mple and precedent of Spithead. There were certain differences, however. One of the most

important of these, and one which may throw some light on the later developnents at the Nore, was tha.t the quality of the men a.t the Nore wa.s generally inferior to that of the men at Portsmouth. At the Nore there was a much larger proportion of men who had been delivered up to the Na.vy from gaols, parish workhouses and debtors' prisons; ma.ey, when convicted of various felonies, had elected the Navy rather than penal 17

servitude or transportation when the choice was offered; still others 12 had joined the Navy as "quota-men." Since there were at the Nore, then,

large numbers of social misfits and malcontents and failures serving in

the Navy more or less unwillingly, the difference in behaviour between

these and the men at Portsmouth is not to be wondered at. When ashore

in Sheerness, the Nore mutineers paraded arrogantly about, accompanied

by their own ships' bands and patriotic music, and openly held committee

meetings in taverns in the presence of the general public. Aboard ship,

however, they managed things qui te efficiently, even in view of the trouble

of having to attend to the complexities of victuaJ.ling and supply themselves,

since they had, in many cases, put ashore the officers who normally looked

after such work. As at Spithead, ships' discipline was tightly maintained, with especially severe punishment for drunkenness and default of duty.

At the outset of the mutiny, at least, there were relatively few cases of such trouble, since a spirit of goodwill and loyalty prevai led among

the sailors, and moreover, they were bound to uphold each other through the terms of the mutineers oath of allegiance. The position of the average seaman was not materially changed (Gill, p.l22); he continued to perform the sa.me duties and execute the same orders as formerly;he was severely punished, as before, if he failed to carry out such orders.

The difference, of course, was that now he considered himself under the command of an elected "captain," and perhaps felt a new sense of freedom.

On May 14, four Delegates from the Nore set out for Portsmouth to secure direct information on the state of the mutiny at Spithead.

After a rather ironical mishap while passing through London (they were

12 Various districts, especially those poorly populated, in arder to raise their quota of seamen allocated by the government, offered bounties of sometimes as much as seventy pounds to any who would volunteer for naval service. Richard Parker re-entered the Navy l.ID.der such ci rcum­ s tances. 18 seized by a press gang as likely-looking materiaJ. for the Navy on account of their seamen-like appearance but were later released), they reached Portsmouth and saw for themselves that the seamen's demands were being granted in terms generally acceptable, and that they had Lord Howe's pledge to guarantee the extent of the Royal pardon. One might have imagined that the Delegates returning from Spithead with such favourable accounts of the satisfactory ending of the mutiny and with copies of the pardon vtould have discouraged further mutinous adventuring at the Nore, especially since many of the Nore seamen were convinced that the concessions made at Spithead would be extended to themselves. Their elected leaders wished to have the mutiny continue, and tried to hinder the spread of the news from

Portsmouth among their ships; they were especially displeased to find that their Delegates had brought back wi th them copies of the pardon as positive proof of Admiralty goodwill. The Delegates at the Nore were led by the celebrated Richard Parker, who assumed the rank, style, prerogatives, and to a considerable extent, the dignity of an Admirai of the Fleet. Wi th a good education and undeniable qualities of leadership developed in a rather erratic naval career, and with a personality that combined the dreaming mystic and the prsctical executive officer, this strange and enigmatic man had little difficul ty in maintaining a loyal following amongst the Nore seamen or in dealing directly with the Admiralty. Apart from his satisfaction with his role as leader, he was driven to continue the mutiny to a successful finish lest half-concessions or no concessions at all from the Admirai ty should leave him and the other Delegates to face heavy punishment for inciting to mutiny. There were other reasons for the 19 prolongation of the Nore mutiny. {Gill, pp. 134-137) Sorne of these

included feelings of ill will toward a government rumoured to be weak

and perhaps capable of being intimidated by an extended mutiny; a

perverse wish to do mischief for i ts own sake was indulged in by many

of the quota-men and felons, so ill-fitted emotionally and morally

for life at sea. There was also a sense of exhilaration as the hated

bonds of the officer hierarchy were flung aside. Not the least of

such reasons is the feeling of rivalry between fleets and ships which perhaps prompted the men at the Nore to outdo those at Spithead in making daring threats to the Admiralty and in demanding spectacular concessions from them.

This last principle seems to be supported by the terms submitted to Admirai Buckner on May 20:

(i) The SBllle indulgences should be allowed to the seamen at the Nore as were granted to those at Portsmouth. (ii) Leave should be granted to go a shore when the ships were in port. {iii) All ships should receive arrears of pay to six months. (iT) No officer discharged from a ship should return without the consent of the ship' s company. (v) Two months' pa.y in advance to pressed men on ships long in commission. (vi) Pardon for deserters who should return. (vii) Fair distribution of prize-money. (viii) Articles of war should be made easier and more moderate. (Gill, p.141)

While most of these demands had been made in one form or another by the Channel Fleet, the men at the Nore requested, in addition:

(i) Trial by jury composed of seBlllen and marines in courts-martial. (ii) Tenpence a day for marines. (iii) Immediate payment of bounties. (Gill, p.l41)

It can be seen at once that these demands were a good deal more excessiTe than those made at Portsmouth. In fact, so radical did the Admiralty consider them, especially those which required alteration in the Articles of War and trial by jury, that only the first, which 20 dealt with the concessions at Portsmouth, was granted. Most of the others, which would have seriously interfered with effective naval administration, were rejected on the grounds that they would have placed important power in the bands of the seamen, amongst whom there would always be the foolish and the irresponsihle. The service was by no means rea~ yet to replace vested and experienced officialdom with elected seamen whose wisdom might frequently be open to question, however good their intentions. It may have been the case that some of the mutineers felt that the government might be intimidated into granting their requests in order to get the North Sea Fleet back into service as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the feeling in the

Admiralty was that they bad already dealt generously with the seamen, and if these requests were granted, others would immediately follow, and there would be no end to them.

On May 20, Buckner and two of his captains met with the leaders in an attempt to reason with them, but their efforts were frui tless and they departed wi th a fresh list of grievances presented by Parker. When the se last were placed before the Admiral ty, they were rejected altogether, of course, except those that had already been granted at Spithead; Buckner was insttructed to deal. f'irmly wi th any threat or show of violence. Little more was done now to meat the emergency than to strengthen the garrison at Sheerness with two additional regiments of militia. While the Admiralty was standing firm in refusing further concessions, and was plainly preparing to sit out the time mtil the mutineers should come to terms, the men took the next step by drawing up all the Nore ships in a defensive position well offshore. In the course of this manoeuvre, each ship fired a token shot at the Sheerness Fort. 21

Aboard Buckner' s own flagship, Parker now displayed before the Fleet

the red flag, symbol of his usurped authority; shortly afterwards, he went ashore and roughly intervened in a court-martial over which

Buckner was presiding. In a letter of May 22, the mutineers demanded

that the Admiralty send a deputation to Sheerness. The Admiralty at first refused, but gave way in a few days when they saw how extensive, and how dangerous to public safety the mutiey at the Nore had become.

They were much concerned when they discovered that the officers had been qui te unable to bring about any kind of surrender or truce, and that the men, holding the ships weil out of range of shore batteries, intended to blockade the Thames and the Medway in order to seize shipping for their own purposes. After a Cabinet meeting, Spencer on May 27 again found himself heading a deputati on to meet œval mutineers, this time at Sheerness, and this time carrying no con­ cessions other than the Royal proclamation of pardon.

On May 28, the members of the Admiralty met some of the

Delegates ashore, but refused to meat with the committee aboard the

Sandwich un.til the mutineers surrendered. The latter refused, am the two sides were deadlocked. On May 29, further unsuccessfl.Ù. attempts were made to arrive at some agreement. While no solution presented itself, the Delegates claimed that most of the men at the

Nore were in favour of continui.ng the mutiny; the Admirai ty therefore saw no purpose in r emaining at Sheerness, and returned to London wi th a determinati on now to deal wi th the mutiny by force. They had already gained considerable ground, since they had shown the public at large thei r willingœss to meet with the seamen and to try to reach agreement with them. The seamen at the same time did their cause much harm when they displayed unreasonable and stubborn perversity in refusing to give the Admiralty a hearing on any but the mutineers' terms. Once popmar 22

feeling set i tself against the Nore seamen, the difficW.ties of main­

taini.ng the mutiny increased tenfold~ The most immediate resl.Ü. t was

the cutting off of supplies of food and fresh water from shore at

Sheerness. Loss of public support commenced to influence those men

who had been lukewarm toward the mutiny; many of these became even

less interested in carrying on the fight, so that much commotion

took place in the ships as quarrëls broke out between the mutineers

and the others who wished to give up. Two loyal ships did manage

to eut their cables and escape from the Nore, where the mutiny now

had to be maintained by threats and outright terrorism. (Gill, p.l60)

The seamen were confronted with the need ito choose between surrender

( either peaceful or induced by tbirst and starvation) or flight in

their own ships to a port friendly to their cause in Ireland, France

or America. Flight from the Nore might indeed have been attempted

in desperation, if the fleet there had not sud.denly been reinforced

by several mutinous ships from Admiral Duncan' s North Sea Fleet at

Yarmouth.

This surprising turn of events occurred when Dtmcan

received Admiralty orders to proceed to sea against the Dutch and

at the seme time employ his more reli able ships against those in a

state of mutiny at the Nore. Since his ships had been visited by

Delegates from the Nore almost a week before this Admiralty order

of May 27, th.ere can be no doubt that the def ection must have been

pre-arranged. One of Duncan' s ships, at least, was not altogether

without justification in withdrawing from him; it had not been pa.id

in nineteen months. In view of Duncan' s lengthy naval experience,

i t is remarkable that he should have had so little foreknowledge of what was goir:g forward, and that he serio'WSly expected his ovm men 23 to take up arms against their brother seamen at the Nore. He may have thought that on the eve of a probable engagement with the enemy, no consideration could have persuaded his men to disobey his orders or turn their backs upon him. Deserted now by nearly all his ships, nevertheless Duncan sailed out to the Texel with only two vessels under his command; there he remained in the face of the enemy for several days before he was reinforced b.Y ships despatched from the

Channel Fleet. Ironically enough, when his disaffected ships reached themr destination at the Nore, it was generally thought ashore that they had come to be paid.

Thus reinforced, the mutineers proceeded to blockade the

Tbames and seize shipping that passed downstream from Deptford. In four days they had detained more than a hundred ships, and the congestion in the Nore became such that Parker ordered only naval supply ships to be stopped in future. The Admiralty soon stopped these from 1eaving Deptford, and the seamen now turned to pi11aging sma11 vesse1s and raiding sheep farms on the I s1e of Grain. The 13 mutiny now was maintained b.Y ducking, tarring-and-feathering, and other bizarre and barbarie punishments that gave evidence of the 13 "Chronic1e," ~ Annual Register, XXXIX (1797), June 5:"They tie the unfortunate victims feet together, and their hands together, and put their bed at their back, maldng it fast round them, at the same time adding an eighteen pounder bar-shot to bring them down. They afterwards ma.ke them fast to a tackle suspended from the yard-arm; and hoisting them near1y up to the b1ock, a11 at once let go, and drop them souse into the sea, where they remain a minute, and then are again hoisted and let down alternately, till there are scarce any signs of life remaining. After this they hoist them up by the heels, for the purpose of getting the water out of their stomachs, and usually put them into their hammocks." ------

degradation and brutaJ.ity of those who supported i t. Even civilians ashore were threatened with such treatment if they hindered the mutineers in any way. There was a great commotion that extended as far as London when Pitt and Dundas (of the Admiral ty) were hanged in effigy at the Nore; observers mistook this for a genuine execution of those officiais, and the story gained wide credence. Ali these wild and erratic outbursts ma.rked the clima.ctic phase of the Nore mutiny when the seamen gradually became awa.re that continued efforts to resist authority were useless, and when the formerly disciplined and orderly mutineers gave themselves up to recklessness and folly.

In the meantime, the government persevered in its drive to eut off completely any shore support for the mutineers. There was even serious talk of stopping the seamen' s mail. Supplies and pay had been stopped on May .30. At the same time a defense boom was rigged to seal off the harbour at Sheerness, and another was planned to seal off the Thames Estua.ry, in order to prevent the now desperate men from moving up river to attack Gravesend or Tilbury. To prevent any of the mutinous ships from escaping to the open sea, marker buoys in the Nore were taken up and the shore light-houses were put out; only the most foolhardy would risk a passage amongst shallow channels, shoals and sandbars ever shifting with powerful tides - navigation difficult enough at the best of times. The shore ba.ttery at Sheerness was strengthened to protect the dockyard. A mortar battery was set up on the Isle of Grain and at night the sailors in the ships out in the Nore could see the glare from the furnaces by means of which, supplies of cannon bal.ls were constantly kept at gl owing heat. Watches and pa.trols of the military were posted everywhere ashore, ali arowd the clock. The naval authori t i es, backed by the full s trength of public opinion, bad now done nearly everything possible to entrap the 25

ships and seamen witb.in the Nore, and could now wait wi.th confidence

for the surrender, which was plainly not far off.

The stories and rtllllours of mutiny and violence at the Nore,

coming on the heels of the acco1m.ts of the Spithead mutiny, aroused

public opinion so strongly against the mutineers that the government

felt itself obliged to take further action against them. Apart from

their foolhardy activities just described, the seamen owed their

current unpopulari ty to the desertion of so many ships from the North

Sea Fleet just as it had been ordered to proceed to sea against the

Duteh. While 1 t must be admi tted that the Admiralty order on that

occasion was that some of the ships under Duncan were to sail to the

Nore, the order could scarcely be used to pardon or condone such a wholesale desertion which, to the minds of most people, constituted

that most dastardly of all crimes - striking one' s colours before

the enemy. In view of aroused public feeling, then, more stringent punishments than ewr were prescribed for inciting to mutiny; one

such was death without benefit of clergy. This Bill, passed in

Gommons on July 5, was of such severity that it was voted to remain

in force unly a month after the opening of the next session. (Gill, p.206)

At the height of the mutiny, the citi zen::; of Sheerness were so angry with the mutineers that on one occasion, a riot broke out wi th Parker and other Delegates in the midst of i t, and the citizens would surely have hanged him if they could have gotten their hands on h~.

Unable to secure supplies ashore, wi th public sentiment violently against them ( supported by rumours of a reward of a thousand pounds for the arrest of a Delegate, and of ten pounds for a common seaman), and wi th quarrels continuously aboard ship, the Delegates were now forced to decide immediately whether to fight, to try to escape by sea, or to surrender. Since there were so many serious difficulties 26 to consider, no matter what they chose, the Delegates now undertook a direct appeal to the King himself. Captain, Lord Northesk was given a letter to place before the throne; the following is an extract from it:

We have already laid a State(ment) of our Grievance before Your Majesty1 s Board of Admiralty, which Grièvances we have reasons to imagine, "''are never properly stated to you, as we are sorry to have reason to remark the conduct of your present Ministers seems to be directed to the ruin and overthrow of yo;ur- Kingdoms, and as their Duty to its good and advantage, a partie~ instance of which is the Council they have given Your Maj esty with regard to us in pro­ claiming us Rebels, traitors and Outlaws. This Council if we ha.d not been men particularly attached to your Majesty•s sacred person and Government, moderate but firm in our demands, would before now have driven us to some acts of Outrage and Revenge that might have shaken the very foundations of this Kingdom. We here give you a list of our Grievances • • • and after thus ma.king our Wants known to Your Majesty • • • 'l'ii th you i t now rests to determine whether you will or will not get a Redress of our Suffering. • • • we must assure j'our Majesty till ail those disgraceful Proclamations, which proscribe Outlaws are contradicted, till we have all our Grievances redress• d and till we have the same supply from and communications as usual with the shore, we shall consider ourselves masters of Nore Shipping. We have already determined how to act, and should be ex­ tremely sorry we should be forced to repose in a.nother Country, which must avidently be the case if we are denol.Ulced as Outlaws in our own. Your Majesty' s Ministers seem to build their hopes on starving us into a compliance, but this is a wrong Idea. We have as much Pro­ visions and Stores as will last Six Months. • • • but were i t the reverse, and that we had but two days Provisions, we would sooner die in that state tb.an give Up the least article of our Demand.s.(Gill,pp.216-217)

This appeal was refused by the King on a1l points, and another, drafted later in less threatening terms, was likewise rejected.

Faced with a total rejection of their demands, the seamen in desperation now determined to take at least part of the Fleet to sea, apparently with the intention tha.t a rendezvous would be made a.t the "New Colony," a. place n.ever located since, but thought to have been in either France or America. By this time, of . ~ourse, the leaders had no hope of pardon or amnesty, and were therefore prepared to adopt almost any plan, no matter how dangerous. On Jl.Ule 9 a signal was made 27 aboard the Sandwich to weigh anchor, but the Fleet did not act upon

it. A mJnber of reasons likely deterred the mutineers from taking

night in His Majesty' s ships. Some may have feared the dangers of

the now-umnarked Thames Estuary. Doubtless others did not wish to

sail to foreign parts wi th the idea of residing there permanently.

It was likely the case also, that by June 9, many had had quite enough of the terrorism and disorganization of the last stages of the mutiny, and thought that conditions woul.d become much worse in ships fieeing from British shores and pursued by the Navy. By this time, probably only the most obdurate wished to see the mutiny prolonged further. For some time Parker had recognized the presence of a large loyal element in the ships at the Nore, and had tried to placate the se men by ordering special observance of Restoration Day (May 29) and a celebration in honour of the King' s Birthday. He destroyed any re­ assurances he might thus hava giTan, however, when he deliberately misread to the seamen the replies to their petitions, and added his own derisive commenta to the Royal pardon as he careful.ly twisted its terms to deceive the illiterate men into thinking that they coul.d expect severe punishment for the mutiny, no matter Where their loyalties might have been placed.

In ~ event, once the signal to proceed to sea had generally been disregarded, the mutiny feil to pieces quickly as one ship after another struck i ts red fiag and surrendered. This phase was not wi thout incident, however; a midship:mal'J. aboard the Leopard was killed; the

Repulse, once more under her lawful officers, fied from the other mutinous ships for the Medway against the tide and ran agro'l.lild on a sandbar,under heavy fire from the Directorat the command of Parker; eventually the Repulse was able to free herself and drift into the safety of the harbour at Sheerness. On June 10 and 11 the surrender continued, and by June 12, when Admiral Peyton arrived at the Nore

to d~nd a complete and uncond.i tiona.l: surrender, only two ships

still remained in mutiny. By June 1.3 the Nore mutiny was ended,

although the public uneasiness caused by i t was not removed by the

knowledge that there were maey desperate men being held aboard the

ships, as weil as four hundred in the various prisons about Sheerness.

Many of those resp~ible for the mutiny had already made

their escape, some as early as June ll. On June 15, about twenty men escaped to Calais from the Inflexible, and there were several

instances where men reached other ports in France and Rolland, eithar

Q1 purchasing passage in small vessels or commandeering them outright.

Parker did not attempt any such flight; whether through fear of capture or hope of mercy, one cannot be certain. On June 12, the captive officers were released; some were temporarily re-confined on June 13 and then released the next day. By June 14 the officers had. resuned their posts and Parker' s power was ended. He was tried by court-martial, condamned, and on June .30 was hanged from the yard arm of the Standard. Again, a latter from the King refiects the feelings of the serious-minded towards the mutiny and especially towards Richard Parker as i ts leader:

Kew. 27th June, 1797. 1.3 minutes past 4 P .M.

The offence of which Richard Parker has been convicted is of so heinous and d.angerous a nature that I can scarcely suppose there can be an;y legal objection, after confirming the sentence for his being hanged, to order his body to be hung in chains on the most conspicuous land in sight of the ships at the Nore. Earl Spencer has therefore very properly directed the legality of the hanging the body in chains to be enquired into, and if it can be done is to order it to be effected.

George, R. 14 14 The Spencer Papers, II, 159-160. 29 Parker's execution stirred wida public interest, nevertheless, for there were those who saw the man, not as a dangerous felon, but rather as a hero and a martyr to the cause of freedom against tyranny.

There is no evidence to indicate that Parker' s body was gibbetted in accordance with the King' s wishes. Had it been so treated, the time must have been short indeed, because a commentator, in a notation for July 4, remarked: "The body of fF,ichar4} Parker the mutineer, which was taken out of the new naval burying-grou.nd at Sheerness, was brought to • • • Little Tower-Hill, on Saturday evening [July 1] • . . ' ..15 It was buried this morning ear1y, in the vault of Whitechapel church.

Finally, lest Lord Spencer be thought heartless and unmerciful in connection with Parker and the mutiny, it should ba observed:

Lord Spencer was so grieved at being obliged to sentence Richard Parker to death, that by way of compensation and soma alleviation of her grief', he allowed his widow !1200 oll{l400 a year so long as she lived. · 16

Courts-martial continued throughout the summer at Sheerness; with charges laid against more than 400 mutineers, an official tab­ ulation shows 52 sentenced to be hanged (of these, only 24 were actually executed), S sentenced to be flogged or imprisoned, and

354 pardonad. There were minor uprisings later, but the ill-feeling responsible for the mutiny gradually spent itself and discipline and spirit aboard sMp was much improved in consequence. Duncan himself' was so much impressed by the change for the better, that four months later, he requested the ralease of' those still in prison, that they might serve under him again•.

A very brief' review of the Spithead and Nore mutinies must

15 nchronicle, a ~ Annua.l Regis ter, xmx ( 1797) , July 4. 16 ~ Spencer Papers, II, 103-104. .30 emphasize that in the two cases, while there was a great difference

between the kind and extent of the demanda made, the type of men

involved, and the methods employed, nevertheless the whole mutiny

did much to cali public attention to the situation of the British

sailor and the harshness and injustice of his life, with the result

that his pay was immediately increased, and eventually improvements were made in his food and living conditions. It is regrettable that the Nore uprising accompli shed much lesa than did that at Spitb.ead, and at the same time aroused so much feeling against the mutineers through the folly of their leaders. De spite their ignominious defeat and the strong animosity toward them b,y the public at large, they were generously treated ey the law, which was not in those days especially noted for lenity. The happiest result of both mutinies, there can be no doubt, was the resolution of long-standing ill-will and the restoration of understanding and good feeling between the

Ad.miralty, the officers and the seamen of the British Navy. 31

II

It now becomes necessary to turn to James Burney, author

of the letter to Lord Spencer on the subj ect of the mutiny. Wi th

many years• service at sea in the Navy throughout the world in peace

and in war, and with a name for honesty, forthrightness and humanitarianism,

BUrn.ey·had ample experience in naval matters to justify his opinions

in this matter.

James Burney was born on J 1.me 13, 1750, in London, where

his father, Charles Burney, was organist at St. Dionis Backchurch.

In the next year the family removed to King' s Lynn, where James later

attended the grammar school for a brief period. At the age of ten,

after the family had returned to London, he entered the Royal Navy as

a captain' s servant through tl:e influence of a family friand, Captain

John Montagu, in whose ship, the Princess Amelia, young Burney first

sailed. At the age of eleven he saw a good deal of action during the

naval blockade off Brest. In 1762 he transferred wi th his patron to

the Magnanime, from which, after three months1 service, he was dis-

charged a shore wi th a testimonial letter from Mcntagu, who wrote:

"Burney is a very ingenious good Boy and I sincerely wish him weil; 1 & hope he will answer all your (Charles Burney' s] Expectations.n

In June 1763, he again signed on as captain' s servant, this time in the Niger, where his two years of service were not especially re- markable, there being then a period of comparative peace at sea.

1 A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from JohnMontagu to Charles Burney, 16 Sept. 1762. .32

By means of this apprenticeship at sea, Burney was now in

the same position of advancement as if he had spent half the time a board

ship and half in naval academy (a programme he would likely have followed had he been the offspring of a more wealthy family) • By 1766, he was

prepa.red to 1mdertake training as a midshipman; in February of that year he was entered as such in the books of the Aquilon. In mid-June he passed his seamanship certification requirements and was ready to qu.ali.ty

as lieutenant. His next voyage was in the East Indiaman Greenwich, on which, signing as an ordinary seaman, he visi ted the East Indies. Wi th a troublesom-e and ill-disciplined crew, Burney had about a year' s ex- perience with the harshness and severity by which order and authority were maintained. He evidently kept out of trouble, as his name does not appear in the captain1 s log, where all offences and punishments are 2 rccorded.

In December 1771, again through the influence of Montagu (now

Lord Sandwich and First Lord of the Admiral ty) , Burney was permitted to sign on for Captain Cook' s second expedition, as able seaman. Before they left England he passed the Navy Board examina.tions for the rank of lieutenant, but his certification did not become effective until several months later. His ship, the Resolution,sailed in April 1772, but soon returned to Gravesend on being found almost unmanageable under way at sea; finally fitted out properly for the long voyage, she sailed in July with the Adventure via Madeira for the Cape of Good Hope. While in South

2 The most complete source of material on the 1ife of James Burney is G.E. Manwaring, 1a Friend ~ Admirai (London, 19.31) • Unless otherwise indicated, this is the work which has been used to supp~ biographical detail. 33 Africa, the first lieutenant of the Adventure fell ill, and here

Burney received his initial promotion, to be second lieutenant in the Adventure. After severa! months of fog and bad weather amid the ice fields of the Antarctic, during which time the expedition crossed the Antarctic Circle, land was finally sighted which later proved to be Tasmania. Wi th a party in the ship1 s cutter, Burney was the f:iirst Englishman to set foot on the island. He kept a journal throughout the voyage in which he records this and a great many other events in a clear, factual and unemotional style consistent with scientific method and accuracy, yet lacking some of i ts coldness.

In April, the Adventure visited New ZealaDd and made rendezvous with the Resolution, from which she had become separated in the ice fields, many weeks earlier. When both ships had completed what repairing and refitting was possible, and the crews, many of whom had been suffering from scurvy, were restored to health qy the fresh food now available, the Resolution aDd the Adventure sailed straight eastward for severa! weeks into quite unknown seas. No important discoveries were made, and certainly no hoped-for continent made i ts appearance. Fresh trouble ., now developed in the form of scurvy and flux ( dysentery) , and was especially marked amongst the crew of the Adventure. Early in August i t be came urgent to leave off this unrewarding area of explorati on and seek a landfall to the westward, where there were known to be severa! groups of islands. On August 17, 1773, both ships reached

Otaheite, al:though the crews were so weakened from illness that the ships were nearly wrecked on reefs offshore as they attempted to make harbour. After the usual exchange of gifts with the chiefs, and the procurament of supplies by ba.rter with. the natives, they returned to 34 New Zealand in October, and brought with them an interesting passenger,

O:iDai., who was later to cause such a sensation in London society as the ideal "noble savage,n with manners and morals far transcending those precepts set forth in Lord Chesterfield' a Letters. After being separated again from Cook1 s ship Resolution, the Adventure arrived at

New Zealand. While completing repaira in December, 17!3, the crew suffered a horrible experience when one of their shore parties was ambushed by hostile natives. Burney' s journal describes the hide6us details of cannibalism when only entrails and dismembered parts and bits of clothing remained as evidence of what had happened. (Manwaring, pp. 40-46) The Adventure sailed for home via Cape Horn, intending only a short lay-over there, but when she arrived in South Africa, the crew were so ravaged wi th disease that a stay of several months was required.

Burney did not reach England 1mtil July, 1774.

Much of the remaind.er of that summer Burney spent being ad­ mired as a world traveller and raconteur; his father and he spent several days at Hinchingbrooke, the seat of Lord Sandwich. O:iDai. was there too, and James Burney had learned enough of his language on the voyage home as to be able to act as interpreter. That autumn Burney was appointed second lieutenant in the Cerberus; the next summer she carried

Howe, Burgoyne and Clinton to America, and was used chiefly in that theatre to protect the arrival of troop transports. Cerberus also served to cover the landing of British forces at the Batt1e of Bunker' s

Hill in 1775. In September Burney was appointed first lieutenant, and now ranked third aboard ship after the captain and executive officer.

During that autumn his Shi.p was frequentlyengaged in patrol, pursuit and interception work off the coast of New England. In D~ember 17!5, 35

Admiral Sa:muel Graves wrote to the Admiralty in London: "Lieutenant

[James] Burney wishes to go again to the South Seas, I have appointed 3 Mr. A.tkins in his stead." This transfer must have had the approval

of Sandwich as First Lord ( to whom Graves had addressed himself) , since

Burney was granted permission to join Captain Cook' s third expedition,

this time as first lieutenant of the Discovety. Because of his reputation

of reliability and skill in keeping records and making accurate maps

and charts, Burney was engaged to draw maps of bays and harbours and

to preserve descriptions of landmarks for the use of future explorera

and navigators. It was the plan of the expedition this time to sail

into the Pacifie and seek a passage to England. through the Arctic Ocean.

Agà:in Burney maintained an accurate and careful journal. As formerly,

there were delays before sailing, this time occasioned b,y the detention

of Burney' s captain, Charles Clerke, in debtors' prison. In August,

1776, the Discovetl sailed for the Cape of Good Hope and after the usual

stop there for repairs and revictualling, they reached Kerguellen Island

on Christmas Day and took aboard fresh provision, inclu:ling penguin meat.

Here they determined on Tasmania as the next .rendezvous for the two

ships, and reached there after many weeks and every conceivable trouble

in the ~or.m o~ shattered masts, ripped sails, ice, heavy fog and gales.

In mid-February of 1777 they proceeded to New Zealand, where they found

their former shore base overgrown wi th lush vegetation that had spread from the gardens planted on the earlier expedition. Attacks of hostile natives now became troublesome. They next visited the Society Islands, where Burney provides a vivid account (Manwaring, p.83) of the natives'

3 ~ Sandwich Pagers 1'771-l'l82, editors G.R. Barnas and J.H. Owen, I (London, 1932), 81. This volume is number LXIX in the Publications of the Navy Records Society. attempt to ambush the entire party under the pretence of a friendly meeting. At other islands the expedition continued to have difficulty in procuring fresh food and water; matters were made worse b,y the thirst and suffering of the live cattle carried on board during the voyage. In the Friendly Islands, however, all needed supplies were readily avails.ble, and Omai (now on his way home to Otaheite) was especially useful in dealing with tœ natives, explaining their tongue and custom$ to his British friands, and bargaining for them. Otaheite was the next port of call, and Omai was left there to be reunited w1 th his people. In December of 1717 the party sailed northward, and the place where they spent Christmas is still called nchristmas Island."

After a visit to the Sandwich Islands, they sailed northeast, and on

March 31, 1778, Burney describes in his journal the people on the shore of Vibat is now known as Nootka Sound and gives one of the earliest accounts of the Canadian Indians on the west coast. The search for a northern passage continued to Alaska. On June 26 the ships were nearly wrecked on reefs off the Aleutians. Throughout August, 1778, the

Bering Straits were explored~ In September, the ice and cold sent the party south, where they land.~d on the Ka.mchatka Peninsula and met the

Rus sian factor there; a party went inland and visi ted the governor o:f that desolate place, and learned that he had had instructions from his government to give the expedition avery assistance. The advice they received here, along with their own observations, convinced them that it was too late in the year for further exploration in northern waters, and the expedition then proceeded south, reaching Hawaii in November. 37 They did not manage to locate a satisfactory harbour until the next

year in Janua.ry. At first the natives seemed friendly enough, but

their persistent thefts became such a nuisance that they had to be

punished, and this aroused resentment so that they became hostile

and troublesome. It was in connection with a theft that Captain Cook

had gone ashore on Februa.ry 14, 1779; in the course of his investi­

gation, a melee broke out between the natives and his party. The

former had made fearsome weapons for themselves with stolen spikes

and nails and were dangerous adversaries; Captain Cook was killed

despite the heroic efforts of Lieutenant Màesworth Phillips to save him. (:Manwaring, pp. 133-142) The expedition then sailed to the

Sandwich Islands, and in May of 1779, resum.ed the search for a

northern route to England. In June their records report terrible

Aleutian storms amid active volcanoes which showered their decks with boiling mud, cinders, and red-hot stones. During that summer,

Captain Clarke of the DiscovèD!; :' died of tuberculosis after a lingering illness. On this event, Burney (who had been first lieutenant under

Clerke) discontinued his journal, probably because of the extra work now required of him. By this ti.me, the loss of two captains and the condition of the ships determined the party to leave off the search of northern waters and set sail for home by way of Japan and South

China. At Macao (Canton) at the end of November, 1779, they learned for the first time of the war between Britain and France and the United

States; here Burney made a complete transcription of his journaJ.s, in case the originals might be lost during a possible contact wi th enemy ships on the way home. The remainder of the trip was uneventful, except for violent storms Which forced them into anchorage at Stromness, where

Burney was appointed captain of the Discovecy. His promotion to the rank of commander was confirmed when they reached Deptford on October 6, 1780. 38 At this point in the account of Burney' s career, a pause might be mace to reflect on the kind of man he has shown hi.mse1f to be. Throughout his own writi:cgs, and more significant1y, from the accounts b.1 others, he appears as a kindly, warm-hearted naval officer of generous sympa thy and understanding towards tho se under his com- mand, yet with sufficient firmness and severity, when needed, to merit confidence and respect. Of even more importance, we learn from his carefully-kept j ournals that he was an accura te observer and a skilled and competent sailor. Finally, we have come to have considerable faith in Burney for his penetration and clear understanding. Such a unique combination of humanitarianism, honesty and sense entitles to serious consideration, his views on the naval troubles in 1797.

At a house party at Chessington with Samuel Crisp and other family friends in Janua.ry, 1781, James Burney became interested in Sally Payne, whom he was later to marcy. While his biographer does not mention it, he secured another command at this ti.me, likely through his patron, Lord

Sandwich. In a letter of Ju.ne 18, 1781 to Lord Shuldham, Burney ex- presses his disappointment with the ship that was given to him as his first real command:

• • • instead of a Ship, I find she is a smal.1 Brig • • • • has on board 1$ Guns Which instead of six are four pounders, has no Carro~es, and not ports suf'ficient to fight more than $ Guns of a Side, the 9 • port pointing directly forward, fit only for running out a Gun in ti.me of Chase, but of no use in time of action. She is called by the Marchants '230 Tons' or thereabouts~ but upon survey proves to be 148! Tons, and has neither accommodations nor occasion for so many as 120 men. . . . I expected to meet rlth some dif.ficW.. ties, which I hoped to get the better of, but find them greater tlB.n I could possibly have imagined. An agreement is drawn up and sent for the people to sign, wherein i t is pro­ vided that in cases of misbehavioœ, they are to be puni shed by loss of wages or prize money. Corporal pmlishment is not to be inflicted but by joint determination of the Commander and 4 of the Marchants O.fficers.4

4 Autograph copy (~· ierpont Morgan Library) of a latter from James Burney to Lord Shuldham, 18 June 1781. .39

The letter, closing with a wish that it be forwarded to the Admiralty,

and that he (Burney) be suspended from this particular command, contains

a strong suggestion that he had been deliberately misled as to the size

and quality of the ship Defiance. It was qui.te customary for captains

to wri te to the Admiral ty, but there are few examples to be found of

such vigo rous and energetic phrasing. Burney' s letter may provide some

hint of the reason for future disappointments in promotion and recog­

nition. That same year, nevertheless, he did secure another command,

that of the Latona (.38 guns), a ship very much more to his taste even

though the command i tself (Commander Burney vice Captain Conway) was

only temporary. I t ended in March, 1782, after an uneventful winter,

when Capta.in Conway returned to duty. The experience was not wi thout

value, since i t gav-e Burney a good deal of experience in the severe

hardships of llfe at sea in winter wi th the North Sea Fleet, and also

provided him wi th a knowledge of the kind of men who were ordinarily

assigned to that service.

In the same year, 1782, he was appointed captain of the

Bristol (50 guns), and undertook to make the ship ready to join the

fleet in the East Indies. These preparations moved Burney to send

more sharp and curt letters to tb.eir Lordships (Manwaring, pp. 166-16S),

complaining of grossly inadequate supplies of tropical gear and medications, and making vigorous recommandations about the state of

the gunnery equipment. In company with about twelve other ships,

Burney sailed in September wi th instructions to proceed to India

by way of Trinidada, so that they might pick up some sailors who had

been put ashore there. They proceeded the nee to Madras, arriving in mid-April, 178.3. During the summer the Bristol was in action several

times against the French, and served the various garrisons along the

Malabar Coast in the uprising against the British East India Company 40

led by Tippoo. Burney continued to be engaged in this kind of defensive

and supporting action until late in 1784, when the Bristol returned to

England. Once again, this time on active war service, did Burney add

to his knowledge of naval life and work.

When he reached home, England was temporarily at peace with

the European powers; macy ships were being decommissioned, and there

was little likelihood that Burney would receive another appointment very

soon. He occupied this lull in his career by resuming his earlier

romance with Sally Payne; they were married on September 6, 1785, at

Cheesington. Family letters mention them as spending mu.ch of the

next year in Surrey, and early in 1787, James Burney was looking about

for a farm and house suitable for settling into. A letter by his

sister Susan describes James:

••• studying very hard, & all kinds of things at once -Law­ Physic -- Politics -- & Histor,y -- basides French, & Latin -- He has set himself a task for a year I think, to read a certain Nf of pages a day- I believe he said a hundred on an average - It keeps him in full employment which is a good thing -- 5

In 1788 Burney refreshed his interest in politics and history by attending the trial of Warren Hastings with his sister Frances (the celebrated Fanny Burney), who had secured tickets through her office as Second Keeper of the Robes. (Manwaring, p.l95) His naval. career at this time continœs to be mysterious, but that he was still without a command is plain from a note in Fa.nny' s diary that he wished her to use her influence at court "for a ship of thirty-two guns or indeed 6 for any employm.ent now that England was at war on the sea." Burney himself wrote to Chatham, First Lord of the Adm.iral ty, and was granted an interview (Manwaring, pp.l96-l9-"1L), but neither his own enterprise nor 5 A.L.S. (Osborn) from Susanna Burney Phillips to Fanny Burney, 25 Mar. 1787. 6 Joyce Hemlow, The History of Fanmr Burney (Oxford, 1958), p.213. 41 his sister1 s infl.uance was able to secure for him another command. In a letter from Captain Bligh to Burney in July, 1791, there is a hint, but no proof, that Burney may haTe assisted with the editing or the preparation for publishing, of the famous account of the voyages and the mutiny on the Bomty. In April of 1791 he again applied to the

Ad.miralty without success. In a petition to the King in 1806, Burney mentions the number of times he applied to serve in the Navy during the war:

••• on the Promotion of the Senior Captains of rour Majesty's Navy to be Flag Officers in April, 1804, he was set aside and placed on the Retired List, not having been employed on actual service during the War which immediately preceded the said promotion. Your Majesty's Memorialist humbly representa that his not having been employed in the War • • • was not in consequence of neglect on his part, for tha.t at Tarious times during that War, and upon other oc­ casions since he was last in actual service, he offered his services to the Board of Admiralty, and both by wri ting and by personal application solicited to be employed. 7

in 1797, when the menace of foreign invasion was uppermost in every mind, the amdety of Burney to serve his country is refiected in his Plan of _Defence Against Invasion, a pamphlet of su.fficient interest and consequence to warrant a second edition that same year. Another of his papers offered a remedy for the financial criais when the banks temporarily suspended payments in gold. Other crises in this same year concerned Burney even more, however; as a professional sailor, he was dismayed much more than the average citizen at the spectacle of the mutiny in the Navy, and at the national panic that followed the desertion from Admiral Duncan of most of the North Sea Fleet almost in the face of the Dutch naval forces. On this occasion, James Burney felt obliged to set before the First Lord of the Admiral ty wha t he felt were tge causes of the mutiny, and to recommend certain changes which m.ight im- prove the quali ty and spirit of the naval service.

7 Autograph copy (Pierpont Morgan Library) of a petition from James Burney to King George III, 26 Dec. 1806. 42

III

Copy of a Latter to the R. Hon~e Earl SP;_encer.

June 15th, 1797.

My Lord

It is with considerable embarrassment that I -venture on this

; address; but trusting that no other motive will be imputed to me

than regard for the interests of the Navy, I am encouraged to hope

your Lordship will excuse the liberty I talee in thus offering my

sentimentf!.

I believe the great defects in the Naval Laws and Regulations

10 to have been the principal, if not the sole, cause of the late mutiny.

Certain it is, they have caused a disinclination in the best seamen

to their being employed in His Majesty1 s Naval Service. As the

declaring my opinion freely and without disguise to your Lordship

can occasion no injury to the service, I am not apprehensive of

15 suffering .in your Lordship1 s opinion in professing my belier, that

the Articles of War as at present existing, and a.s I have seen

innumerable instances of their being acted upon, a.re by much too 4.3

severe and oppressive; and that they certainly do produce the effect

of deterring good men from entering into the service of the Navy.

20 The best discipline consists in regularity and method. When

suCh is the practice, and Where men believe their officers bear

them good will, severity of punishment is not necessary. To the

superiority of our commerce and not to the severity of discipline,

is to be attributed the superiority of British Seamen, of which

25 many striking instances occur in our privateers and marchant vessels.

If a few of the regulations which bear the most hard on seamen were

amended, it is probable that mutiny would become discreditable among

the seamen themselves, which would be the best securi ty against any

repetition of what has happened, as then no combination could be [MS 2]

.30 carried to any extent. Whatever is done would be best done whilst

the war yet continues, that when Peace arrives and the seamen

are discharged, they might carry with them favourable impressions

of His Majesty1 s Naval Service.

The points which principally call for redress are lst, the

.35 distribution of prize monay; 2~ the Articles of War and the modes

of punishment; and .3d, the want of some regulation respecting leave. 44

On the lst, the justice of their claim is manifest, seeing that

under the present regulations it may happen, that when a Captain

receivesJllOOO, the share of a Seaman might not amount to a guinea.

40 Respecting ~~e Articles of War, the hardship which most immediately

occurs, and which occasions to seamen the greatest repugnance, is, the

being liable to corporal punishment for small offences. This, no

doubt, will be thought necessary; but that men should be liable to such

punis'hm9nt at the arbitrary will of any person and wi thout trial, might

45 without difficulty, and I hope your Lordship will think, ought to be

avoided. Trials might be instituted in single ships for small crimes,

by the Captain or commanding officer being empowered to order such

persons as the Admiralty or the Legislature should think proper to

declare qualified, to constitute a Court. Such trials take place in

50 regiments, and something of the same kind is practised in the Ships

of the East India Company. The misapplication of the Articles

0~ of War and the power of punishment vested in individual hands, is 1\

too weil known to requi.re proof. I served in a Ship where avery

one of the maintopmen were stripped and fiogged at the gangway for [M S .3]

55 no other cause than that another ship in company got her topgallant 45 yards up first, and not from any wilful negligence on the part of our

men. Had we been the first, possibly the topmen .)f the other ship

might have been sufferers. The custom wi th many officer has been, if

any two men are found fighting, to tye both up, and without the smallest

60 enquiry, to punish both. Yet I believe every man rrli.ll acknowledge that

in many cases the receiving the first blow is an irresistible provo-

cation.

The punishment of flogging from ship to ship likewise demands

consideration, and perhaps limitation. A criminal is sentenced to

65 receive 500 lashes (a punishment more severe than 1000 lashes as

inflicted in the army). He receives 250 lashes at one time; not

more lest his life should be endangered; and is sent to an Hospital

to be cured, e.fter v.hich he is to suffer the remaining part of his

sentence.

70 The remaining article respecting liberty: though leave of absence to

visit friands would be attended with too much danger of losing men b,y de-

sertions, yet reasonable liberty whilst in port and not under sailing

orders, to a moderate number at a time, might be allowed; and an ar t icle to

that effect might be inserted in the Captains instructi ons, stating likewise, 46 75 that those who when on leave misbehaved, or did not punctually return

to their time, shotù.d forfeit their future claim to liberty. If further

punishment for outstaying the time of leave were never inflicted, it

wotù.d have this good affect, that men wotù.d not be tempted to desert

·de from fear of corporal corporal punishment, provided that their return [M S 4J 1\

to the Ship was of their own accord; for if, after the expiration of

their leave they were discovered and brought on board, they would then

become placed in the situation of deserters. Such amendments in the

He condition of seamen would be the means of rendering the service so "

popular as in a great measure, if not wholly, in future to remove the

necessit.Y of pressing.

For that which I am going to add, I am anxious to bespeak your

Lordshipl s particular indulgence, sensible tb.at I am taking a liberty

beyond that of stating general ideas on the service. If, in punishing

the present mutiny, many e7..amples shâl..l be made, i t will throw much

90 discredit upon the general character of the British seamen; whereas,

if i t shall be judged proper, when the mutineers are wholly in the

power of ~overnment, to make any amendment in the naval laws in

favour of the seamen, then lenity can produce no other effect than

that of creating good will and attachment. 47 95 One more circumstance which I take the liberty to mention is,

that the service on the North Sea station is much more fatiguing,

and in winter time particularly is attended with so much more danger

and hardship than the service on any other station, that i t is not

improbable a continuance on that station may have created among the

100 seamen, a degree of impatience which may have had a considerable

effect in producing the Mutiny.

I have the honour to remain

with the greatest respect

Your Lordship1 s most obedient

105 and humble servant

James Burney

ble To the Right Hon •

Earl Spencer (Copy) COMMENTARY

Line 1, Earl Spencer: George John, second Earl Spencer (1758-1834),

gradu.a.ted M.A. (Cambridge), 1778. In 1780 he was returned to

the House of Commons for Northampton and voted wi th the whigs.

In 1783, succeeding his father as Earl Spencer, he removed to

the upper house and supported the po1icy of Pitt as privy

council1or. In 1794, after a few months as ambassador extra­

ordinary to Vienna, he was appointed first lord of the admiralty,

and held that office for six years, during which time he directed

the Navy through the battles at St. Vincent and Camperdown, and

through the mutinies at Spithead am the Nore in 1797; he was

responsible for the selection of Nelson in the Mediterranean,

where the Battle of the Nile was won. Lord Spencer' s career

embraced the highest concept of public service, as a president

of the Royal Institution, trustee of the British Museum, Master

of Trinity House; much of his energy was spent in the deve1op-

ment of his library at Althorp, one of the finest in Europe. It

later formed the nuc_leus of the John Rylands Library in Manchester.

"Calm, gentle, dignified, distinguished by his grace, his learn­

ing, and his humani ty • • • • he looked upon himself as born to

serve the State • • • wi th plenty of sound sense and a kindly

nature, he mada up for any lack of genius by the activity and

enthusiasm n th which he pursued his duties • • • • " (Manwaring

and Dobree, p.41)

Line 2, June 15th, 179.7: On this date the last vessel at the Nore had

submi tted, and Admiral Keith wrote that the mutiny at the Nore

seemed quite extinguished. (Gill, p.241) Burney likely wrote

at once on this date because from his previous experience he knew

that Admiralty prosecutions would begin immediately. 49

Line ~ liberty: This reference to "libert,yn in addressing the First

Lord of the Admiralt.y must be regarded merely as polite usage,

since the Publications of the Navy Records Society abound in

examples of captains writing to the Board of Admiral ty. For

instance, see Captain Dixon to Spencer (The Spencer Papers, II,

151-152), wherein Dixon offers personally to murder Richard

Parker.

Lina lO,muti:n..y: Burney must have meant that of the Nore, because the

uprising at Spithead had been settled in the middle of May.

Line 11, tlley have caused • • • Service: There can be little reasonab.le

doubt that seamen of any kind found the naval service unattractive.

One proof of this point is the size of the bounty offered (soma­

times as much as seventy pounds) to anyone who worud "volunteer."

In a merchantman, if the seaman found the food, discipline or

other candi tions not to his liking, he could leave the ship at

tlle end of the voyage; moreover, he could spend his shore leave

as he pleased. The seaman in the Navy had to remain aboam his

ship, virtually a prisoner, as long as it was in commission -

sometimes for several years-- accept poor food,submit to any

brutality the officers cared to inflict, without shore leave,

and with appeal to the Admiralty as his only remedy. (Gill, p.2S2)

Line 16,Articles of ~: These first appear in the Statutes of 13 Charles

II C.ix 1661, "An act for the establishing articles and orders

for the regulating and better government of his Majesties navies,

ships of war, and forces by sea." Of those which have application

hera, the following axcerpts are offered: 50

II Every person • • • ~ing unlawful and rash oaths, cursings, execrations, drunkenness, uncleanness, or other scandalo~ actions • • • shall be punished by fine, imprisonment or otherwise, as the court-martial shall think fit.

XVII All sea-captains, officers or mariners, that shall desert the services or their employment in the ships, or shall run away, or entice others to do so, shall be punished with death.

XIX No person in or belonging to the fleet, shall utter any words of sedition or mutiny ••• upon pain of death.

XXI None shall presume to quarrel wi th his superior officer, upon pain of severe punishment, nor to strike any such person, upon pain of death • • • •

XXIII None shall quarrel or fight in the ship ••• upon pain of imprisonment, and such other punishment as the of'fence shall deserve, and the court-martial shall impose.

XXVII No man • • • shall sleep upon his watch, or negligently par~ · form the duty imposed on him ••• upon pain of death, or other punishment, as the circumstances of the case shall re­ quire.

XXXIII All other faults, misdemeanors, and disorders committed at sea, not mentioned in this act, shall be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases used at sea.

XXXIV (2) No court martial where the pains of death shall be in­ flicted shall consist of less than five captains at least • • •• (J)in no case ••• there shall be execution of such sentence of death, wi thout the leave of the lord high ad­ miral.

In 1749 these regulations were included in a new naval code of no very great difference, except that it made slight alterations in the functions of the court-martial so that the latter enjoyed increased powers of jurisdiction. "The Act ••• has, with a few alterations ••• constituted the naval code up t9 our own time. It has been said said, with great justice, that the penalty of death recurs in it as often as the ourses in the Commina tion Service: of thirty-six articles of war, ten award the punishment of death, subject to no qualification or mitigation; twelve 1 death, or other such punish- ment' as the court-martial shall deem the offender to deserve • • • .n 51 (J.E.R. Stephens, C.E.Gifford, F. Harrison Smith, Manual of

Naval Law. London, 1901. pp.32-33) . The greatest revision

in the naval code took place in 29 & 30 Victoria C .109, 1866,

when leniency was introduced in the form of fewer offences for

which capital punishment was prescribed. While cowardice,

treason, mutiny with violence, and seduction to mutiny still

carried wi th them the death sentence, offences such as in­

subordination, striking an officer, and desertion were henceforth

to be puni shed wi th varying degrees of penal servi tude. By this

Act of 1866, corporal punishment was limited to forty-eight lashes.

Its terms evidently abo1ished section XXXIII of 13 Charles II,

which had hitherto sanctioned, as "customs ••• used at sea,n

such hideous and degrading abuses as gagging, tongue-scraping,

starvation, and keel-hauling.

Line 20, method: Burney likely means consistency of behaviour on the part

of the officers. In his own experience he surely saw many in­

stances of an offence or misdemeanor treated with hareh brutality

on one occasion, and on another, the same offence overlooked and

unpunished. His ideal of discipline combined steady and reasonab1e

firnmess and justice.

Line 23, commerce: It can only be conjectured that Burney refers to the

vast British merchant fieet (the largest in the world in the

reign of George III) supported and comp1emented by the Royal

Navy and the ships of the East India Company. Such a fleet

provided extensive opportunities for the training and active ser­

vice of marchant seamen. ( C. Northcote Parkinson, Trade in the

Eastern Seas 1793-1813. Cambridge, 1937. pp. 219-220) Burney 52

may have seen n striking instances" of marchant seamanship when he

was captain of the Bristol in the East Indies, since men-of-war freq111ently provided corwoy protection for the ships of the East

India Company. (Parkinson, pp.304-316) Line 25,privateers: These evidently were common at the time, although it is not clear whether Burney meant enemy privateers that had been seized and put to the service of the Navy, or British privateers, chartered and similarly employed. In 1798, in connection with defence against irwasion, there was issued an Admiralty order requiring "Any privateers in port ••• equipped to be engaged on such an occasion, to join the King' s ships." (The Spencer Papers, II, 250; The Sandwich Papers, IV,

97-99) Line 29,combination: If the majority of the seamen were satisfied, it would

be difficult for mal contents t o fi nd a sufficient following to start a mutiny.

Line 38,present regulations: Apparently Burney1 s estimate of the inequity was

a modest one. It is difficult to discover prècise facts on the subject, since the Admiralty exercised authority over the distribution of prize money, and used it as a source of patronage, as Burney himself implies:

"if any capture is made, half my share is claimed by the Marchants. The people' s share is likewise to be taxed, and this is in faveur of a M:; Halliday, who in the agreement, appoints himself Agent for all Prizes ••• ·" (James Burney to Lord Shuldham, 18 June 1781) The diBtribution of prize money would also have depended upon the size

and number of ships claiming shares, and also upon the rank and the

seniority of the officers involved. 11 After the battle of Navarino,

some thirty years later, ·ibe Admiral got

(Manwaring and llilr.œ, p.143) A contemporary cartoon showed a seaman 53 praying nthat the bullets might be distributed 'like the prize-

monay-- the lion's share to the officers.'" (Gill, p.287)

Line 42, coruoral punishment for small offences: According to naval law,

every offender was to be brought before the captain, the charge

read out, the evidence heard (inclu.ding that of the culprit),

and punishment awarded. In actual fact, however, this pro­

cedure was frequently avoided. Seamen were 11 started" (struck

about the shoulders vd th a lmotted rope), or hi t wi th anything

a displeased officer might chance to be carrying; speaking

trumpets and telescopes were frequently misused thus; the officer

could further arder that the seaman be flogged or lashed, if

he wished. Such punishments were inflicted for a great variety

of offences, many of little consequence. (Gill, pp.268-275)

Line 50, something of the ~ • • • Compaey: Piscipline on board an Indiaman was m.aintained by the same IDlethods as used in the Navy. Deprivation of grog, 1 starting~t confinement in irons, and flogging were the standard punishments. They were inflicted frequently or seldom, severely or otherwise, according to the ideas of the individual commander. • • The worst feature of i t (startingl was that it was often ordered in a fit of anger or impatience •••• The officer of the watch might inflict it vd thout reference to the captain. There was a case in one Indiaman of a mate having an old seaman r started' until he dropped unconscious -- all this quite unjustly, as it after­ wards appeared. · (Parkinson, p.217)

In his letter to Lord Shuldham. (see p.39), Burney mentions

the arrangements for discipline aboard the Defiance (evidently

an armed brig); seamen were to be punished for minor offences

by loss of pay, and corporal punishment for more serious

affences was to be awarded anly after conviction by a kind of

court-martial. It is curious that in 1781, Burney included

this procedure wi th the other candi tians -- the ship too small,

the crew tco n1m1eraus, the armament inadequate, the dis tri butian

of the prize money unfair -- because of which he desired to 54 be relieved of his command of the Defiance; yet in 1797, this

would appear to be precisely the method of trial he recommended

in his latter to Lord Spencer. Quite apart from this change of

mind, one should note that nearly al1 naval commentators agree

that the effectuai service of a ship in those days would have

been seriously, perhaps dangerously hindered, if the crew had

enjoyed the privilege of a full hearing for offences which were

generally deal t wi th swiftly, if harshly.

Line 52,P9'W'!j1tQf ptmishment ••• hands: Power of punishment was vested,

but also usurped, when punishment was inflicted wi thout a

hearing, and out of al1 proportion to the offence, in so many

instances.

The criminal law of England has been gradually mitigated ••• and is now in accordance wi th true humani ty and the requirements of modern society. The consolidated law of the navy is by this [Naval Discipline] Act brought into conformity wi th the law of the land: a necessary distinction must always erlst; for the strict maintenance of discipline, among bodies of men ma.ssed to­ gether in ships of war, demands for the most part absolute authority in the commander, and absoiute subordination in the seamen. 'The salvation of the conntry depends upon the discipline of the fieet; without discipline they would be a rabble, dangerous only to their friands, and harmless to the enemy.' But discipline is not a power that can stand by i ts own strength alona: the abuse of the na.me has often been the bane of the ser­ vice. In times past many captains broke the spirit of their crews by petty tortures and petty persecutions -- punishment in fact where no puniShment was due: there was no escape from tyranny wi thin the na.rrow confines of a ship. (Stephens, Giffard and Smith, pp.36-37)

One might note also that ". • • there was no limit to what the

captain could do to make men' s lives miserable, nothing some-

times he did not do •• •" (Manwaring and Dobree, p.60)

Lina 63, The punishment • • • ship: A punishment intended to serve as

a powerful example w.tUl the ships in the fieet, in the course

of which, the culprit was rowed in a boat from his own ship

to every ship in the fieet. As the pazt,ycame alongside each 55

ship, the rnaster-a.t-arms of that ship read out the charge and the boatswain' s mate did the flogging, the victim ei ther in his own boat or dragged aboard the ship in question. The party then rowed to the next ship, where the process wa8 repeated. So severe was this punishment that death often followed; the prisoner was occasionally offered the choice of being hanged instead. {Man­ waring and Dobree, p.61)

Line 65,.s: prmishment ~ heayy ••• J!m: The cat o1 nina tails was a much more formidable weapon than the strap with which field

punishment was inflicted, and did serious damage to the lungs and

kidneys in addition to flaying the skin and macerating the ex­

posed muscles.

Line 67,Hospi~: If at sea, the victim was sent to the ship's sick bay

where the surgeon or surgeon1 s mate treated his wounds; if in port, he was taken ashore to the base hospital for treatment.

In Portsmouth, the Haslar Hospital was constantly occupied with

such patients. Lina 70, liberty: Unless special permission was granted by his captain for shore leave, the seaman was obliged to remain on board as long as the ship was in commission. While in port, however, visiting from ship to ship was generally allowed, and visitors from shore also were permitted. Even if a ship were entering

port to be decommissioned, the seamen aboard her might be im­ pressed for service in an outward-bound ship. In no case could

the seaman claim shore liberty as a right. (Gill, p.282) The

reason for the denial of shore leave, of course, was the m­ popularity of the naval service, from which men escaped whenever

an opportunity presented itself. 56 Line 74, Captain' s instructions: Instructions to captains usually

originated wi th the fleet admiral; in this instance, they

would certaiDly require to be drawn up by the Lords of the

Admiralty, who would then forward them to the variou.s fleet

and port admirals, by whom the orders would then be relayed

to the captain of each ship.

Line 79, corporal _ oorpora1: The second use of the word 11 corporaln here

is presumably an inadvertent repetition at the start of a new

manuscript page.

Line 85, necessi t.z of pressing: The harshness of naval life, the poor

food and the lack of liberty continued the need for impressment

long after the mutiny. In the general decommissioning of many

ships during the brief èourse of the Peace of Amiens in 1802,

large numbers of seamen left England immediately, rather than

run the risk of serving again in the Navy. (Gill, p.288) In

actual fact, impressment was only intended to be used in time

of war, as a conscription measure, but the unpopularity of the

service cau.sed i ts employment to be considerably extended. In

the space of roughly twelve months while the Peace of Amiens

was in effect, the total number of volunteers did not even

ma.ke up the complement for a single ship. (Gill, p.283) Com­

mencing in 1835, a register of seamen was kept, and new reg­

ulations introduced whereby a man might not be forced to serve

in the Navy against his will for more than five years. This

amendment seems to mark the end of impressment. (Manwaring and

Dobree, pp.257-258) 57

Line 96, service .9ll: the North Sea station: From our earliest history,

continuous foul weather in winter, violent storms and icy

gales have traditionally been the portion of those who serve

in the North Sea. The discomforts and dangers of climbing

aloft and manning icy rigging and yard-arms and handling ropes

and sails frozen with salt spray, and living in cold and wet

qua.rters wi thout means of drying clothes and bedding must have

tried the hardiest spirit. The North Sea Fleet, based at

Yarmouth and Sheerness, patrolled the east coast of England and

Scotland, the Inner and Outer Hebrides, the coast of the

Scandinavian Peninsula, the Baltic, and the coasts of the Low

Co1mtries and northern France to the Channel. Monotony and

boredom, along wi th physical hardship, made this work more

distasteful and mattractive than any other service in the

Navy, especially at a time when the spectacular engagements

were most often going forward in the Atlantic and Mediterranean

area.

Line 98, it is not improbable ••• Mutiny: The mutiny at the Nore

involved only ships of the North Sea Fl eet. 58

IV

It is not possible to assess precisely the justice and effectiveness of James Burney' s recommandations. As for the severity of naval discipline in 1797, it was not more harsh than it had been for more than a hundred years previously. Moreover, as we have seen, the safety of a ship required strict discipline and obedience, and the ab­ solute authority of the captain had to be maitained. The mutineers themselves recognized this important fact in their own disciplinary regulations, which were by no means lax or easy-going. Nevertheless, from whatever cause, after 1797 there was a gradual decrease in the number of courts-martial for brutality of officers, and a similar decrease in lesser complaints against despotic tyranny. While this may be accounted for by the defeat of the French Navy and the fact that fewer ships were kept in commission after Trafalgar, a more likely argument would suggest the gradual growth and spread of humani tarianism based upon a new concept of the right of ··the individual. The Articles of War were not seriously altered until 1866, however. But it was not the Articles themselves of which the seamen chiefly complained, so much as their misapplication and abuse in the form of excessive cruelt,y; only the more radical of the Nore mutineers asked that they be modified. Apart from the loss of certain individual rights, which must ever be an unfortunate necessity in an efficient naval establishment, the constitutional rights of the seamen were protected by law. There were also means by which grievances might be ventilated, as shown in the anonymous petitions to Lord Howe. I t must be borne in mi nd also that the lavy was not ruled entirely by incompetent and heartless despots; there were also officers such as Jervis and Nelson, of widëly- 59 respected firmess, honesty, and_fàirness; while the great triumphs of the British Navy were not won undar cruel martinets, neither were they accomplished with slackness and indifference. Burneyrs ideal of "regularity and method" on the part of the officers may well have been responsible for Trafalgar and the adulation of i ts heroes by' the seamen serving under them. One feels that the Articles of Vlar, as then extant, had they been applied scpPulously and honestly, could not likely have caused serious hardship or produced general bad feeling in a properly-run shlhp. It would then appear that Burney errs some­ what in suggesting that the Articles of War, per se, were a chief cause of naval discontent. While œrere punishment followed, · justly or unjustly, on the heels of a variety of faults and misdemeanors, i t clid not likely occupy as much of the seamanr s time and thoughts as the much more pressing and immediate interest in the question of poor pay, inequity of prize money, and the absence of shore leave.

As a direct re sult of the Spithead mutiny, pay (not alte red since the Restoration) was brought into line with that of the other services. There was no change in the allocation of prize money. The proportion was roughly a thousand shares for a captain (many more if he happened to be o~ flag rank or higber), from five hundred to two hundred for other officers (depending on rank and seniority), and a single share for an ordinary seaman. It is difficult to see why the Admiral ty did not ma.ke even a token concession in this regard. In spite of the incontrovertible argument advanced qy the Nore mutineers that a seaman had quite as much at stake as did an officer in risking his life, and that the los3 of life ih either instance wrought severe hardship upon the man1 s farnily, it was the firm determination of the

Board to grant nothing requested at the Nore. There was another reason for the Boardrs firmness, namely their responsi bility to make up the 60 difference in an officer1 s income if it were diminished by the award of a larger share of the prize money to the seamen. (Gill, pp. 2g6-2g7) The Admiralty was equally determined against the concession of shore leave, evidently for the reason cited earlier, that liberty ashore would make the problem of wide-spread desertion even more difficult to manage. As late as the last war, however, shore liberty continued to be considered b,y the Navy as a privilege, not a right, and i t was still necessary for a seaman to make formal application throughhis divisional officer to see the executive officer if he wished to go ashore longer than overnight.

There can be no doubt that the Nore mutineers were treated with exceedingly generons leniency in view of the seriousness of their offence, and the severity of the Articles of War on the subject of mutiny. Only half the number of those sentenced to death were actually executed, and the others, who received sentences of flogging or im­ prisonment, were treated lightly indeed in rel~tion .to · the ptmishments that were so much a part of Ship-board experience.

Since the Admiralty did not carry out Burney's suggestions with regard to the Articles of War, prize money, or shore leave, it is not likely that they heeded his recommandation that mercy be shown in dealing with the mutineers. No matter on whose instance, however, the Admiralty did extend mercy in a magnanimous fashion, and the wisdom of this policy was amply revealed in the immediate improvement of morale in the Navy. The new attitudes of the seamen showed themselves in the triumph at Camperdown that same autumn, and possibly reached a climax at Tra:fia!gar in 1g05. Most of the writers on the subject feel that even if there had been no mutiny in 1797, times and customs were undergoing radical change, and that eventually t hose concepts of en­ +ightened humanitar ianism which were now developing would have made 61

their appearance in the Navy. ~he oft-cited writers on the mutiny,

had the latter of James Burney been known to them, would have disagreed with his theory as to the cause of the Nore mutiny; they are much more inclined to blame it, not on the Articles of War, but rather on

the quality of men at the Nore and their wish to go beyond the achieve­

ments of Spithead. From what we have seen (supra, p.41) of the continued

rejection of Burney1 s applications for service in the Navy, and the fact that his Plan for Defence, despite its sense and marit with reference to the emergency of 1797, is not included in the collection of "Invasion 1 Papers," it seems plain that Burney' s opinions were not welcomed- by

the Admirai ty at that time. In this connection, i t is significant that his latter concerning the mutiny does not appear in any records of the Admiralty, either accidentally or through intent, although it is clearly a latter of some importance, in view of the experience and understanding of its author. Probably it received no more recognition that mere formal acknowledgm.ent by the First Lord.

The letter from Burney to Lord Spencer:rai.ses the question that it may have adversely affected his chances of aàvancement in the naval service. It might account for his neri and possibly his most serious reverse, the fact of his being passed over in 1S04, in the general prmmotion of senior captains. Certainly, in composing a latter that openly espoused the cause of the mutineers, he must have put himself in the same position wi th the Admiral ty as did Whi tbread, who strongly 2 supported their cause in parliament and visited with them in Portsmouth.

Various family letters suggest that James' 11 whiggishness" went beyond mere outspokenness and mere criticism of authority. In 1787, his sister

1 The Spencer Papers, II, 223-361. 2 Gill, pp.350-351. 62

Susan wri ta3 of James attacking a chance visi tor "on Matters of taste and the fine arts, & afterwards on Poli tics - M~ Pitt - M~ Hastings,

& c • • • • When he meets a new person to whom he can unfold his opinions (wc~ are Sometimes not qui te as original as he thinks them,

& at others, such as scarce anybody but him.self w~ support,) his 3 earnestness to talk, & unwillingness to have done is really comic -"

Since in this same latter, Susan praises James' wife for holding her peace and avoiding argument, it is tempting to think that here is nothing more than an illustration of female mistrust and dislike of energetic political discussion, and not a searching analysis of dangerously liberal opinions on the part of her brother.

Susan1 s ideas of James' r adicalism were shared by her father, who was comi.nced that James' troubles with the Admiralty were all attributable to his whiggish principles and whiggish friands. In a letter to James' brother Charles, whose own career had been marked by reverses and disappoitrtments, Doctor Bur:m:ey blameâ Lord St. Vincent and his intimacy with James for the latter' s difficulties, and expresses himself in terms of great bitterness on the subject:

Paini!:>m & poli tics haàbba en his ruin - soured his temper; & instâad of being an Admiral to w : his standing entitled him, set aside by 1. St. Vincent, the very man who abetted him in his disloyalty, promised him a ship - &rwhen he was told that James had got a Twist, & was a Jacobin - he told M. Coke, L. Crewe, & Dudley North, that he loved ..ê: Jacobin - but when J. applied to him for the performance of his promise - he was upbraided for his political principles - & laid on the shelf for the rest of his life by the noble Admiral, notwi thstanding his declared partiality for Jacobins. 4

Wi thout evidence to the contrary, this tale of Doc tor Burney' s cannat be denied, but a number of criticisms of it may be offered. To

3 A.J... S. (O s born) from Susanna Burney Phillips to Fanny Burney, 25 Mar. 1787. 4 A.L.S. (Osborn) from Charles Burney to Charles Burney, Jr., 31 May 1808. 63 begin with, Doctor Burney does not make admission of a letter which James received from Lord St. Vincent in 1806: "Whenever I am referred

to, I shall be ready to bear testimony to your abili ty, as a Circum-

navigator, and ingenui ty, as an author, upon Subj ects of discovery,

Characters, which have placed youvery high in the estimation of ••• 5 S~ Vincent." It will be evident that St. Vincent here recognize,d favourably the abilities and talents of James Burney, but since he was not in office at the time, there was little he could do for him. Next,

Doctor Burney's account does not explain that fact that James Burney had suffered repeated disappointments at the hands of the Admiralty for more than a decade before Lord St. Vincent was appointed First Lord in 1801. Lastly, the biographers of Lord St. Vincent do not appear to be in accordance with Doctor Burney on the subject of Jacobinism (a term liable to a wide variety of interpretations in any case); certainly in 6 a letter of July 9, 1797, to Lord Spencer, St. Vincent expresses strong abhorrence of mutinous principles,in the vigorous punishment of an out- break of such trouble in his ships in the Medi terranean. He was every- where celebrated as a just, but exceedingly strict disciplinarian, who spared neither seamen nor officers in his zeal to promote efficiency

in ·th• Navy. It is true that when St. Vincent, then out of office, attacked the corruption of naTal administration under Pitt, he was supported b,y Fox; beyond this, however, there is little in the record of St. Vincent to support Doctor Burney's charge of Jacobinism. Perhaps the most we can say on the subject of James Burney's professional dis- appointments and the letter to Lord Spencer, is that his behaviour in 5 A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from Lord St.Vincent to James Burney, 29 Dec. 1806. 6 The Spencer Papers, II, 410. this instance was consistent with that on the occasions when he wrote to the Admiral ty from the . ·D&f:iance, strongly inferring that he had been cheated, and from the Bristol, expressing sharp criticism of the administration. It is more likely that this circumstance harmed his cause with the Admiralty, rather than his friendship which Doctor

Burney claims he enjoyed with Lord St.Vincent.

On the question of James Burney1 s troubled career, one further observation should be made. There would not appear to be sufficient evidence to show that he was whiggish enough to damn himself wi th the

Pitt administration, or convincing proof that he was close enough to

Lord St.Vincent as to expect patronage for himself from that quarter.

One is tempted, therefore, to enquire whether his disappointments might not have stemmed from an eariler identification wi th Lord Sandwich. As late as 1775, Burney used his influence with Sandwich, then First Lord, to have himself removed from the American theatre of war in order to join the third Cook expedition. In 1782, during the last weeks of

Lord Sandwich' s incumbency, Burney secured an excellent command, that of the Bristol. It may perhaps be more than coincidence that Lord

Sandwich went out of office permanently in 1782, and that when Burney brought the Bristol back to England, he was never again able to secure a command for himself. It may also be conjecturedthat Burney' s name at the Admiralty, long associated with the patronage of Lord Sandwich, derived little benefit from the scandalous reputation of the latter, once he was out of office. Corruption and mismanagement in the Navy were at their worst during Sandwich1 s administration; his career was permanently da.maged by the spectacW.ar circumstances of the murder of his mistress, whom he had kept in his house during the previous sixteen years. ------

65

James Burney did u1 timately receive his just reward, but

i t came too late to be of much good to him. In 1814 his step-sister,

Maria Rishton, bemoaned that James, although the eldest son, had

derived so little benefit under the terms of his father's will, "and how ••• he suffer1 d poor Fellowl for the independance of his political

Creed, tho1 allowed by the best Judges to be one, if not the first

Navigator now living of Captain Cooks School - his present laborious work will hand him dawn as such ta posterity • • • who se decline of life is embitter1 d by professional disappointment, broken health, and 7 comparitive Povertyl" Nevertheless, these were his best and most pro- ductive years, in which he brought forth his Chronological History of the Voyages and Discoveries in the South Sea __qr, Pacifie Ocean. This exhaustive and authoritative work in five volumes, amply supplied with accurate maps and finely-drawn sketches of geographical features, was completed in 1817. Burney' s Chronological His tory of ~ North-Eastern

Voyages of Discovety (which included a survey of all Russian exploration made in northern waters) appeared in 1819. One ought not to neglect mention of James Burney' s Treatise .Q.n the Game of Whist, a work of slight consequence when placed alongside the more impressive books on exploration, but informative and pleasing nonetheless. Undoubtedly his fame as a scientific author, along wi th his work in the Royal Society, won for him belated official recognition in the form of a promotion, in 1821, to be rear-admiral on the retired list. In this regard it might be of interest to make one last note on the vagaries and caprices of patronage. 8 In a letter of August 4, 1820, the Duke of Clarence (Admiral of the Fleet)

7 A.L.S. (Barrett) from Maria Allen Rishton to Fanny Burney d'Arblay, 21 June 1814. 8 A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from the Duke of Clarence to James Burney, 4 Aug. 1820. 66 advised Burney that he could not interfere on his behalf with the 9 Admiralty. In June 1S21, howeve;-, he informed Burney that he had written most strongly in his favour and trusted Burney would get what he so richly deserved. Burney' s promotion was made on the same date

(July 19, 1S21) as that on which St. Vincent was given an honorary promotion to be Admiral of the Fleet. One is tempted to conjecture that perhaps on this occasion, when honours were being awarded to mark the coronation of George IV, St. Vincent may have had the opportunity and the inclination to say a word in some official ear on behalf of

James Burney. There is not, at present, any means of su:pporting this idea wi th proof. In aey case, wh ether throug h a change of heart wi th the Duke of Clarence, or the good will of Lord St. Vincent, there was finally secured for James Burney that rank to which his talents and qualities had for so long entitled him.

9 A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from the Duke of Clarence to James Burney, 20 June 1S21. LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED

Manuscripts

A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from John Montagu to Charles Burney, 16 Sept. 1762.

Autograph copy (Pierpont Morgan Libr~ry) of a letter from James Burney to Lord Shuldham, 18 June 1781.

A.L.S. (Osborn) from Susanna Burney Philiips to Fanny Burney, 25 Mar. 1787.

Autograph copy (Pierpont Morgan Li brary) of a letter from James Burney to Lord Spencer, 15 June 1797.

Autograph copy (Pierpont Morgan Library) of a petition from James Burney to King George III, 26 Dec. 1806.

A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from Lord St. Vincent to James Burney, 29 Dec. 1806.

A.L.S. (Osborn) from Charles Burney to Charles Burney, Jr., 31 rJay 1808.

A.r..s. (Barrett) from Maria Allen Rishton to Fanny Burney d' Arblay, 21 June 1814.

A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from the D'l.l]:e of Clarence to James Burney, 4 Aug. 1820.

A.L.S. (Pierpont Morgan Library) from the Duke of Clarence to James Burney, 20 June 1821.

Books and Articles

Burney, William, The British Neptune. London, 1807.

"Chronicle," The Annual Register, xm:x (1797), 1-174.

Craig, Hardin, "Black Dick Howe, The Sai l or' s Friend," The Mariner' s Mi rror, XXXV (19490~ 18- 28.

Five Naval Journals 1789-1&7. Edited by H.G. Thursfield. London, 1951. (Vol. XCI i n the Publications of the Nawy Records Society) 68

~ GentJ.eman• s Magazine, LVII (1797), Parts I and II.

Gill, Conrad, The Naval Mutinies of J:ttJ... Manchester, 1913.

Hemlow, Joyce, The Histoty of Fanny Burney. Oxford, 1958.

"History of Europe," ~ Annual Register, XliX (1797), 1-265.

Hutton, William, Burford Papers. London, 1905.

Manwaring, G.E., MY Friend The Admiral. London, 1931.

Manwaring, G.E. and Bona.my Dobree, The F1oating Republic. New York, 1935.

The Naval Misce1lany. Edited by J .K. Laughton. 2 volumes. London, 1900- 1912. (Vols. XX and XL in the Publications of the Navy Records Society)

Parkinson, C. Northcote, Trade ,1!1 the Eastern Seas 1792,-18J.J. Cambridge, 1937.

Letters of Lord St. Vincent 1801-1804. Edited by David Bonner Smith. London, 1921-1926. (Vols. LV and LXI in the Publications of the Navy Records Society)

The Sandwich Papers. Edited by G.R. Barnes and J.H. Owen. London, 1932- 1938 •. (Voli. LXIX, LXXI, Lx::t:l, and LXXVIII in the Publications of the Navy Records Society)

Smith, David Bonner,"The Naval Mutinies of 1797," The Mariner• s Mirror, XXI (1935), 428-449· ------,"The Naval Mutinies of 1797, n The Mariner• s Mirror, XXII (1936), 65-86.

---,"The Mutilll at the Nore, 1797," The Mariner•s Mirror, XXXIII (1947), 199-203.

The Spencer Papers 1794-1801. Edited by Julian S. Corbett. London, 1913- 1914· (Vols. XLVI and XLVII in the Publications of the Navy Records Society)

The Spencer Papers 1794-1801. Edited by H.W~ Richmond. London, 1923- 1924· (Vols. LVIII and LIX in the Publications of the Navy Records Socie~)

Stephens, J .E.R., C.E. Gifford, and F. Harrison Smith, Manual of Naval 1.s!! and Court Martial Procedure. London, 1901.