EU-Russia Relations in the Context of the Eastern Neighbourhood
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EU-Russia relations in the context of the eastern neighbourhood Professor Elena Korosteleva Published: May 2015 This study is part of a series of policy Policy (ENP) rendered it a ‘wider- briefs on Europe and its neighbours European’ focus with an overarch- in the east and south. In this series ing responsibility over the region un- licy Brief we publish papers commissioned or derpinned by an ‘enlargement-light’ Po produced by the Bertelsmann Stif- strategy (Commission 2004). How- tung in cooperation with regional ever, with the launch of the Eastern partners in the framework of our Partnership Initiative (EaP) in 2009, work in this field. the policy gradually acquired a more pronounced (and contested) region- Setting the scene: de facto com- building narrative (Commission peting, de jure conflicting region- 2009). At its core was the promotion al projects?1 of low-key technocratic strategies of engagement to codify an EU-centred The EU’s approach towards the agenda into a series of roadmaps eastern neighbourhood has evolved and Associations’ requirements, with to become an inclusive EU-centred some profound implications for the regional policy wider region.3 With the articulation of its ‘proximity The policy’s ‘regional’ framing was policy’ in 2002, the EU registered its predicated on two fundamental explicit interest towards the eastern principles of EU effective multilat- region, but had no particular strate- eral regionalism - externalisation of EU-Russia relations in the context of eastern neighbourhood gy or vision to support its intentions.2 EU governance and the promotion The initial policy resembled more of ‘European cohesiveness’, thus of a generalist security-predicated naturally prioritising the EU legal aid package, primarily intending and economic acquis to ‘first and to safeguard EU borders (Youngs foremost… ensure that the bene- 2009). Its subsequent reformulation fits of the single European market into a European Neighbourhood based on free movements of goods and services, labour and capital, were as widely spread as possi- 1 This paper is originally a report submitted un- ble’ (Ibid). As far as the European der the Call for Evidence by the British House neighbourhood was concerned, as of Lords on the EU-Russia relations. We thank the author for making it available to us for pub- the Commission further argued, ‘the lication within this policy brief series. Full report EU [specifically] wished to promote of the House of Lords is available here: http:// key concepts of EU regional policy www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf 2 Hence, the initial inclusion of Russia (sub- 3 sequently rejected by the latter), and almost EU region-building policies de facto assume incidental of the Southern Caucasus. For more the primacy of economic inter-regional coope- discussion see Korosteleva 2012; Delcour ration, without a prospect of EU membership for 2011. the willing partners. 2 such as open markets, respect for As a region-building project, the environment, participative democ- policy by definition entails inclu- racy and partnership in the con- sion and exclusion (Delcour 2011), ception and implementation of its favouring conformity and isolating licy Brief development policy’ (Commission resistance, which also extends to Po 2014; emphasis added). Russia, which had originally re- fused to be part of the EU’s ENP, Having encountered much criti- and presently has set to pursue a cism from its own institutions and region-building strategy of its own. the region itself, by 2012 the ENP/ EaP became reduced to ‘a set of From the start Russia has intended instruments’4 to further promote hegemonic region-building policies the eastern region’s internalisation towards the eastern neighbourhood, of EU norms and regulations, sup- while carefully observing EU ac- ported by a complex machinery of tions in the region. financial tools and inclusive of all levels of society. The instruments Following the dissolution of the in particular evolved to reflect the USSR, and the subsequent inter- EU’s manifold aspects of economic state integration tendencies, espe- and legal acquis, as transcribed in cially in economic and humanitarian individualised roadmaps (Commis- fields, in 2007 Russia, Belarus and sion 2012) and more recently, the Kazakhstan, at the latter’s initiative, EU-Russia relations in the context of eastern neighbourhood EU Association Agreements, now inaugurated the Eurasian Customs signed with Ukraine, Moldova and Union (ECU), an (alternative) Rus- Georgia. The anticipated impact sian-led, region-building project of these agreements, as claimed, in the post-Soviet space (Eura- was to develop ‘capacity of the sian Economic Commission 2013). third countries to set strategies The construction of the ECU and and prioritise convergence of their the forthcoming Economic Union regional policies with those of the (EEU) allegedly emulates the EU’s EU’ (European Commission 2014:7, supranational structures (Karlyuk emphasis added). The overall aim, 2012) and has considerably moved as initially conceived, was to bolster apace from signing the initial treaty the formation of a Neighbourhood on the ECU Commission and Com- Economic Community (Casier et mon Territory (2007), to establish- al 2014), as part of the EU-centred ing the ECU in 2011 and the new inter-regionalist strategies. Eurasian Economic Commission in 2011, and a single economic space (SES) in 2012. The launch of the 4 EEU is anticipated in 2015, with fur- From the author’s interviews with Commissi- on officials in 2012 ther expansion of its membership 3 to prospectively include Armenia, Dragneva and Wolczuk contend, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and ‘unlike previous integration regimes, Iran. Noting this fast-flowing re- the ECU and SES provision have licy Brief gional integration, Vladimir Putin developed alongside Russia’s ac- Po commented: cession to the WTO in 2012,… in fu- ture agreements to comply with the ‘It took Europe 40 years to move WTO regime, even in the case of from the European Coal and Steel non-WTO members, and for WTO Community to the full European law to prevail over any conflicting Union. The establishment of the ECU provision’ (2014). Customs Union and the Common Economic Space is proceeding at Russia’s special interests in fos- a much faster pace because we tering closer cooperation with its could draw on the experience of ‘near abroad’ have been de jure the EU and other regional associa- stipulated in its foreign policy strat- tions. We see their strengths and egies of 1993 and 1998, and rein- weaknesses. And this is our obvi- forced further by pre-existing and ous advantage since it means we increasing cooperation across the are in a position to avoid mistakes region. Hence, the AAs’ signature and unnecessary bureaucratic by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, superstructures.’5 presuming closer political, eco- nomic and legal integration with the EU-Russia relations in the context of eastern neighbourhood The key features of this alterna- EU, has led to adverse reaction by tive regional integration project in- Russia, resulting in politicisation of clude market harmonisation,6 and two competing but not yet conflic- interest-driven multilateral partner- ting or incompatible region-building ships often led by Russia, with the projects in the neighbourhood. consent of other signatories. Since its launch this regional project has De facto regional competition: not received adequate international ‘shared’, ‘common’ or ‘no-man’s land’ recognition. At the same time, as neighbourhood? The EaP and ECU region-building 5 http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article- projects, by their design and ob- prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration- project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3- jectives, do not seem dissimilar in 6 This is different to the EU’s unilateral conver- their rhetorical projections by both gence requirements for DCFTAs, but similar the EU and Russia. At the same to the EU’s modus operandi with Switzerland, Canada, Norway etc. based on the conformity time the process of their realisa- assessment principles. See http://ec.europa. tion points to an enduring practice eu/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/ of tacit competition between the customs_security/aeo/mutual_recognition_ag- reement/index_en.htm projects and recently articulated 4 incompatibility of their respective media adversely affecting percep- economic components. This sense tions as well as prospects for future of rivalry between the two regional cooperation across the region. powers in the neighbourhood has licy Brief 7 been registered by public opinion Second, both the EU and Rus- Po as ‘alarming’ and unconducive sia claim to have an overlapping to the future sustainability of the ‘grand vision’ for the region, espe- region, and which, as the latest cially in terms of their prospective events in Ukraine illustrate, leads to inter-regional economic coopera- the long-term instability and conflict tion. The Commission, for example, in the neighbourhood, as well as contends: ‘Our vision is that these the disruption of global order. agreements should contribute in the long term to the eventual creation What are the seeming commonali- of a common economic space from ties and differences between the Lisbon to Vladivostok, based on the projects, and could they co-exist? WTO rules’ (Fule, 2013). In a similar manner, at the inception of the pro- First, both projects effectively tar- ject Vladimir Putin, the then Prime get an overlapping zone of interest – Minister, insisted that ‘we suggest the eastern neighbourhood – which, a powerful supranational associa- however, is framed in somewhat tion capable of becoming one of the conflicting terms by the EU and poles in the modern world and serv- EU-Russia relations in the context of eastern neighbourhood Russia. In particular, the former re- ing as an efficient bridge between fers to the region as ‘shared neigh- Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pa- bourhood’, de facto extending the cific region…. Alongside other key EU governance bias towards the re- players and regional structures, gion.