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Egypt's Revolutionary Youth

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Egypt's Revolutionary Youth Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co Egypt’s Revolutionary Youth WP From Street Politics to Party Politics Nadine Abdalla S The youth movement that led Egypt’s 25 January 2011 revolution is far from being demobilized today. It is currently undergoing an institutionalization process as several new political parties representing the youth are being founded. Indeed, political em- powerment and inclusion of the youth in the democratic process are important for the success of the current transitional process. No less important would be for them to find a balance between street politics and conventional politics. Only then could the youth present a viable political force that is strong enough to effectively participate in and influence the formal political process. The new youth-dominated parties, however, face an array of challenges. The internal cohesion of some is threatened by differences of political opinion. Structural weaknesses and lack of organizational capacities hinders the ability of others to perform effectively. Capacity-building, political education and leadership skills will be crucial for these parties to become effective players in Egypt’s transition. A few days after President Hosni Mubarak’s Coalition of Revolutionary Youth resignation in 2011, the youth that had The first organization formed by the youth triggered and led the events of the January was the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth. 25 revolution coalesced into different kinds It comprised a broad range of parties and of political organizations. Those associated movements from diverse political orienta- with the religious movements joined the tions. The Coalition was composed of the Freedom and Justice Party (affiliated with main activists who had organized the pro- the Muslim Brotherhood) and the Nour tests that began on January 25. In the post- Party (for the Salafists). Others attempted to revolutionary period, it focused on street safeguard the aims of the revolution by politics to pressure the Supreme Council of joining new non-religious parties that were the Armed Forces into meeting the youth’s participating in the formal political pro- “revolutionary” demands, such as the dis- cess, or by becoming part of networks that missal of the Mubarak-appointed Prime continued to engage in street politics. Minister, Ahmed Shafiq. Mobilizing people and organizing demonstrations was their primary approach for nearly a year and a Nadine Abdalla is a Ph.D. Fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the Stiftung SWP Comments 11 Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation March 2013 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 1 half. The Coalition helped several of its from more politically compromising posi- members to acquire political capital rele- tions. On the one hand, they were not vant for leadership in future political inclined to be convinced by less idealistic organizations. Nevertheless, its exclusive positions in order to achieve political gains. focus on street politics was a missed oppor- On the other hand, their leaders were un- tunity in terms of building the social base able to communicate the political com- necessary to fare well in elections. On 7 July promises they had to make in order to 2012, the Coalition was officially dissolved, generate support. given that the transitional period was con- sidered to be coming to an end with the election of President Mohamed Morsi in New parties of the older generation late June 2012. A large number of its lead- The youth who did not join these “youth ers acknowledged that the time had come parties” entered other political parties to participate in the formal political established in the post-revolutionary process. period, such as El-Masryin El-Ahrar (socially and economically liberal), El-Hizb El-Masry El-Dimoqrati (social democrat), El-Tahalof The youth’s new political parties El-Shaa’by (leftist). In the January 2012 elec- The second kind of organization in which tions, those parties performed better than the youth have been regrouped is politi- the youth parties, but they still remained cal youth parties such as El-Adl (centrist), far behind the Muslim Brotherhood and El-Tayar El-Masry (post-Islamist), Masr the Salafists, achieving 13, 16, and 7 seats, El-Horeya and El-Waa’y (both socially and respectively (out of a total of 508 seats). economically liberal). The youth form the However, in all three parties, albeit to dif- majority of the membership base for all ferent degrees, generational conflicts quick- of them. However, they fared poorly in the ly came to the fore – the youth complained January 2012 parliamentary elections about being shut out of decision-making (El-Adl and Masr El-Horeya won only one processes and opposed the positions of the seat each). Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, older generations. In consequence, a large whose history stretches back 80 years and number of youths either defected from which commands a strong social base, these parties or withdrew into inactivity. those newly established parties were unable The difficulties witnessed during the to build sufficient grassroots in order to transitional process as well as the experi- mobilize electoral support. Lack of organi- ence during the 2012 parliamentary elec- zational experience, of resources, of promi- tions prompted many youth to make nent leaders who could attract donations, revisions as they realized that electoral and an age composition that restricted success depended on at least three factors: their appeal to older generations, were 1) a stronger emphasis on the formal politi- among the structural shortcomings that cal process in addition to street politics, prevented them from performing effective- which requires the construction of struc- ly and reaching out to a broader segment turally strong political parties that can of society. In addition, the cohesion of these perform more effectively; 2) gathering all parties was threatened – albeit in different revolutionary forces and uniting smaller degrees – by a lack of internal discipline, entities through coalition-building, namely and by the inexperience of their leaders because one of the reasons for the failure in the management of internal struggles. of non-Islamist parties in the parliamentary This was especially the case with the El-Adl elections had been the lack of coordination party, in which the revolutionary, idealistic among them; 3) forming multi-generational youth who formed the base were unable to parties that are representative of a larger submit to hierarchical decisions derived segment of society. SWP Comments 11 March 2013 2 After the June 2012 presidential elec- The second wave of youth parties tions, the third- and fourth-place contend- The Constitution Party: The main moti- ers Hamdeen Sabahy (leader of the Nasserist vation to establish the Constitution Party Karama Party) and Abdel Moneim Abul was to regroup all the revolutionary youth Futuh (a dissident former leader of the forces under one umbrella. The party Muslim Brotherhood who is popular among claims to be a social liberal or social demo- the rebellious youth of the organization), cratic party. Its political program is based formed the Popular Current (El-Tayar on three main stances clarifying its socio- El-Sha’aby) and the Strong Egypt (Masr political and socio-economic agenda: El-Kaweya) parties. Mohamed El-Baradei, 1) Rebalancing the relations between the the former Secretary-General of the Inter- state and the citizens: This balance should national Atomic Energy Agency who had occur by guaranteeing the separation withdrawn his presidential candidacy in between the state and the government, and January 2012, established the Constitution therefore the neutrality of the state’s Party (Dustour) Party. Both the Constitution institutions. Guaranteeing public and Party and the Popular Current are members individual freedoms are considered equally of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a important. 2) Rebuilding Egyptian culture coalition assembling the majority of the in a way that guarantees the acceptance of oppositional leftist and liberal parties and others and promotes a culture of diversity: movements. It was established in reaction This should be implemented through to the constitutional declaration issued by education and by guaranteeing the right to President Morsi on 22 November 2012, creativity and expression, reflecting the with the main purpose of uniting the oppo- socially liberal orientation of the party. sition’s activities. 3) Establishing an economic order that Still, some of the weaknesses identified guarantees a minimum of social justice, earlier also exist in the new parties and with progressive taxation to be used as a movements. Although all of them are com- major tool for achieving this objective. mitted to non-violent protest, achieving a In contrast to the first wave of political balance between conventional politics and parties that emerged after the revolution, street politics remains a major challenge. the Constitution Party has the potential to To date, a decision has not been taken on mobilize considerable political, social, and whether to work from within the formal moral capital. In particular, the leadership system or to remain outside. The NSF’s of Mohamed El-Baradei, considered by February 2013 decision to boycott the par- many youths to be the “godfather” of the liamentary elections – in protest against revolution, has attracted many defectors the refusal of the current rulers to amend from the parties that were established the constitution, guarantee the full in- during the first post-revolutionary phase dependence of the judiciary, and form a and led them to join the Constitution Party. new government that is more representa- The dynamism of these youths provides tive than the current one – is a case in the party with a considerable potential for point here.
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