The Idea of the Individuality Structure and the Concept of Substance
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1 The Idea of the Individuality Structure and the Thomistic Concept of Substance: A Critical Investigation into the foundations of the Thomistic doctrine of being [De Idee der Individualiteits-structuur en het thomistisch Substantiebegrip: Een critisch onderzoek naar de grondslagen der thomistische zijnsleeer] by Herman Dooyeweerd Excerpts translated by J. Glenn Friesen (2007) Philosophia Reformata 8 (1943), 65–99; 9 (1944) 1–41, 10 (1945) 25ff, 11 (1946) 22ff. Note: The text below is a provisional translation of excerpts from this article. Copyright is held by the Dooyeweerd Centre, Ancaster, Ontario, and publishing right is held by Mellen Press, Lewiston, New York. A definitive translation will be published in the series The Collected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd. Translator’s Introduction This is an important article by Dooyeweerd contrasting his Idea of the individuality structure with the concept of substance. It is a very long article (131 pages), and was published in four installments. Most of the article concerns detailed criticism of Aristotle and of Thomas Aquinas. This is a translation of about 26 pages of the article. The largest excerpt is from the concluding installment, pages 41-52. I believe that these excerpts in particular help to understand Dooyeweerd’s own ideas. In particular, we see how his Idea of individuality structures is something that can be understood only from the standpoint of our supratemporal religious root-unity. Dooyeweerd also says that Aristotelian logic is inextricably linked with the view of substance, an idea that Dooyeweerd rejects. We can also understand how, although he is critical of Roman Catholic thought in this article, Dooyeweerd later appreciates the new Catholic theology with a different view of the selfhood.1 1 JGF: See Dooyeweerd’s 1964 lecture, “Center and Periphery: The Philosophy of the Law-Idea in a Changing World,” translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/1964Lecture.html]. 2 Apart from clarifying the Idea of individuality structures, this article is helpful in understanding Dooyeweerd’s Idea of the Gegenstand-relation. It is therefore useful in understanding Dooyeweerd’s last article2, where he says that the Gegenstand-relation has been confused by some reformational philosophers with the subject-object relation. A. Philosophia Reformata 8 (1943), 65–99 [p. 65] Now one of the fundamental propositions of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea is that temporal reality explicitly gives itself in naïve experience only in its individuality structures. Furthermore, we understand the individual things that are entrusted to this experience only within these structures. [pp. 72-74] In its transcendental critique of philosophy, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has demonstrated that theoretical thought, by virtue of its inner structure, requires a supra-theoretical point of departure of an intrinsically religious character, and that it can therefore never be autonomous with respect to that point of departure. For in contrast to the pre-theoretical attitude of thought in naïve experience, the theoretical, scientific attitude of thought is characterized by what is called the ‘Gegenstand-relation,” in which we set the logical aspect of thought over against the non-logical aspects of the field of investigation, which thereby becomes the “Gegenstand” of the logical analysis. The scientific problem first arises in this distancing, in this splitting apart and setting over against each other of the modal aspects. In this Gegenstand-relation, the non-logical aspect, which forms the field of investigation, finds itself in a true theoretical anti-thesis over against the logical aspect of thought. This anti-thesis, this setting over against, is the product of a theoretical splitting apart of the aspects of reality, which in naïve experience are given as a unity3 in an unbreakable coherence. And this splitting apart is only possible by means of theoretical abstraction, in which we subtract [aftrekken] from temporal reality in its given structure precisely that which holds the aspects in that unbreakable coherence. This appeared to be the cosmic order of time, in which all aspects of reality are grounded in their modal structure, and which overarches all of them, and interweaves each of them with the other in an unbreakable way, and which itself expresses itself in their structure. 2 Herman Dooyeweerd: “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject- Objectrelatie,” Philosophia Reformata 40 (1975) 83-101 [‘Gegenstandsrelatie’]. Translation and discussion online: [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/ Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html]. 3 JGF: The contrast is between the ‘uiteen-stelling’ or splitting apart of theoretical thought with the ‘in-een’ or unified experience of naïve experience. 3 It is therefore in the first place the cosmic order of time which first makes theoretical thought possible with its Gegenstand-relation.4 Theoretical thought–and this is the second step of the transcendental critique–can really not stop with the theoretical anti-thesis, that is, the problem of the “Gegenstand.” It always tries to obtain a concept of the “Gegenstand.” In order to do this, it must necessarily proceed from the theoretical anti-thesis—the setting of the logical over against the non-logical aspect—to the theoretical syn-thesis, in which the aspects that have been split apart and set over against each other are again connected into a theoretical unity. Only in this way do we come to a logical concept of number, spatiality, movement, organic life, feeling, history, language, beauty, justice and the remaining modal aspects of reality. And with this arises the central problem of any possible philosophy: From which standpoint do the aspects, which have been set apart and set over against each other in the Gegenstand-relation, permit themselves to be united again in the theoretical view of totality? This is the critical question about the “Archimedean point’ or ‘point of departure’ of theoretical thought in general, and of philosophical thought in particular. As will become clear, this point of departure may never try to reduce the non-logical Gegenstand-aspect, which forms the field of investigation, to the logical aspect of thought, or to another aspect that has already been synthetically grasped by a concept, for in this way we would fail to appreciate the irreducible character of the aspects. A unity that is constructed in this way is in conflict with the structure of the Gegenstand- relation, and such a unity can never be accounted for or explained in a purely theoretical, purely scientific way. It always amounts to the absolutization of one aspect at the cost of the uniqueness of all the other aspects. Theoretical synthesis can only honour the uniqueness and mutual irreducibility of the aspects if it chooses the point of departure for science above the Gegenstand-relation (and therefore above theoretical thought itself). It must choose this point of departure in the religious root-unity of all modal aspects and individuality structures of reality, as these are grounded in the cosmic order of time.5 Now as the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has shown in its transcendental critique, the choice of the Archimedean point is determined by the religious Ground-motive of philosophy. Only the Scriptural Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption through Christ Jesus can concentrate theoretical thought upon the integral religious root-unity of the temporal aspects and of individuality structures.6 4 JGF: This idea of temporal coherence is the first of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental Ideas. The others are the Ideas of Totality, and of the Origin. 5 JGF: Note: It is not only the modal aspects, but also all individuality structures that find their root-unity in this religious center. 6 JGF: The reason that only the Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption can afford this point of departure is because Dooyeweerd understands each of those terms in 4 Only this Ground-motive can deliver to theoretical thought the integral Idea of the Origin, which in the third step of the transcendental critique was seen to determine the content of the Idea of the deeper (root-) unity of all the aspects that were split apart in the theoretical Gegenstand-relation. In contrast to this, as long as a thinker proceeds from an intrinsically dualistic and dialectical Ground-motive, this integral root-unity will remain hidden to him, and he will be left seeking the common denominator–in which must be sought the necessary unity of all theoretical diversity–within the theoretical concept itself. [p. 75] [The Philosophy of the Law-Idea] does not claim to give us an actual theoretical concept of the creaturely spiritual (religious) root-unity of the temporal cosmos. But it does theoretically give an account to us of the way in which we must allow our theoretical thought to be directed by the Scriptural Ground-motive, if theoretical thought—according to its inner nature and structure—is really to come to a synthetical knowledge of the structures of temporal reality. This philosophy points to no other way to penetrate to the spiritual root-unity of the temporal cosmos other than the way of religious self-knowledge and knowledge of God given by Divine Word revelation.7 This philosophy is therefore essentially concentrically directed to the supratemporal religious dimension of the horizon of human experience, from which all temporal-theoretical diversity is understood in the central vision of its spiritual unity. And from this dimension alone can the temporal dimensions of this horizon of experience disclose to us its diverging structures. In contrast, the Thomistic concept of being lacks a true center, and can therefore never show the way for theoretical thought to discover the true structures of temporal reality. [p. 78] Undoubtedly, Thomas arrives at the Idea of an Origin-Unity in the divine fullness of being of everything that exists.