And Reformational Philosophy (Dooyeweerd)
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Acta Theologica 2015 35(1): 201‑222 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/actat.v35i1.12 ISSN 1015‑8758 © UV/UFS <http://www.ufs.ac.za/ActaTheologica> D. Strauss THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY WITHIN RADICAL ORTHODOXY (MILBANK) AND REFORMATIONAL PHILOSOPHY (DOOYEWEERD) ABSTRACT This article aims to show that, despite agreeing on some basic issues such as rejecting the dogma of the autonomy of reason and accepting that there is no territory independent of God, Radical Orthodoxy and Reformational Philosophy nonetheless differ. While both philosophy and theology, according to Radical Orthodoxy, investigate being qua, being only theology has the task to relate being to God. This view still continues the medieval nature‑grace split. Alternatively, it is argued that the distinctive feature of scholarly endeavours, namely modal abstraction, may enhance an appreciation of the special scientific nature of theology, without advocating a “static division of human life” into “distinct spheres”. 1. INTRODUCTION A key concept in the Christology of Milbank is methexis (participation/ sharing). It derives from Plato’s theory of ideas where it is employed alongside the notions of parousia (presence) and koinonia (communion) as applied to the eidè, which have an existence in themselves.1 Milbank explains that the central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is found in the notion of “participation” as “developed by Plato and reworked by Christianity” (Milbank et al. 2006:3). However, since Vorster (2012) discusses the notion of participation, alongside others such as poesis, incarnation, 1 To auto – see Phaedo 1000 D, where the three terms are used in connection with the eidos beauty. See Hamilton & Huntington (1997:86). Prof. D. Strauss, School of Philosophy, North‑West University, Potchefstroom. E‑mail: [email protected] Produced by SUN MeDIA Bloemfontein Strauss Theology and philosophy the cross, atonement, forgiveness and the relationship between Christ and the ecclesia, they will not be explained further. 2. A POST‑SECULAR REJECTION OF THE DOGMA OF THE AUTONOMY OF REASON In his work on Radical Orthodoxy, Smith (2004) introduces this movement as “post‑secular”. This qualification reveals crucial shared concerns operative in the circles of Radical Orthodoxy (RO) as well as within Reformational Philosophy (RP). One of these concerns is their rejection of the dogma of the autonomy of reason. Milbank (2006b:22) investigates the theological critique of Hamann, Jacobi, Wizenmann and Herder – “of philosophy construed as the autonomy of reason”. In the Introduction to Radical Orthodoxy, Milbank et al. (2006:1) explain that the essays compiled in this volume attempt “to reclaim the world by situating its concerns and activities within a theological framework”. Speaking theologically should display “a theological difference” while mingling “exegesis, cultural reflection and philosophy in a complex but coherently executed collage” (Milbank et al. 2006:2). Therefore, they distance themselves from the inclination of Barthianism which assumes “a positive autonomy for theology, which rendered philosophical concerns a matter of indifference” (Milbank et al. 2006:2). They remark that nouvelle théologie is exceeded by radical orthodoxy that “wishes to reach further [by] recovering and extending a fully Christianised ontology and practical philosophy consonant with authentic Christian doctrine” (Milbank etal. 2006:2). The term “orthodox” is understood “in the most straightforward sense of commitment to creedal Christianity and the exemplarity of its patristic matrix” (Milbank et al. 2006:2). The term “radical” indicates a return to patristic and medieval roots, and especially to the Augustinian vision of all knowledge as divine illumination, [thus transcending] the modern bastard dualisms of faith and reason, grace and nature (Milbank et al. 2006:2). While realising that the tradition should be reconsidered, this orientation intends to deploy its vision by systematically engaging in a critique of “modern society, culture, politics, art, science and philosophy” (Milbank et al. 2006:2). This shows that Radical Orthodoxy advocates an integral (in the sense of all‑encompassing) view of creation which rejects the idea that 202 Acta Theologica 2015: 1 any sphere or realm of creation may be withdrawn from the gift which creation is. In this view, Christian theology does not surrender to an “alien Hellenistic theme” because it does realize that for Greek philosophy there was an uncreated material residue that was not created, and so not a gift, and which therefore limited the sway of methexis (Milbank 2003:xi). Does an integral view of creation challenge the distinction between philosophy and theology? 3. SEPARATING PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY Milbank complains that it was Duns Scotus who for the first time established a radical separation of philosophy from theology by declaring that it was possible to consider being in abstraction from the question of whether one is considering created or creating being. Eventually this generated the notion of an ontology and an epistemology unconstrained by, and transcendentally prior to, theology (Milbank et al. 2006:23). This conviction already reveals a key element of the way in which Milbank understands theology. In his Foreword to Smith’s work on Radical Orthodoxy (2004), Milbank elaborates on his understanding of philosophy and theology. He understands philosophy as “the coordination of all merely natural enquiries” (Milbank 2004:37). He also states that “being” is the “‘object’ of philosophy” (Milbank et al. 2006:37, note 49). In addition, he mentions that he finds “Kuyper’s understanding of theology (...) bizarre and inadequate”. In the context of the “best Catholic tradition”, theology for Radical Orthodoxy cannot be a “specialism” as for “Kuyper and Dooyeweerd”.2 He adds the following significant remark: If it were, it would be idolatrous, for theology concerns not one area, not one ontic item among others, but esse as such, the ground of all beings, and all in relation to this ground and source. It follows (and this is one point that Smith fails to grasp) that if the Christian contribution to, say, economics, is always a theological contribution, then this is precisely because even the articulation of faith has, in part, to do with the economic realm and the difference faith makes 2 In his work on the subject philosophy of the science of faith, Troost explains the critical position assumed by reformational philosophy in respect of Kuyper’s view of theology (see Troost 2004:384, 386 ff.). 203 Strauss Theology and philosophy to our consideration of this realm (think of many of the sayings of Jesus). One does not here need overcomplex divisions among types of theology. For Catholic tradition, every Christian is a theologian, because faith is always somewhat reflective, albeit in the mode of symbol, ritual, and narrative (Milbank 2004:14). In his Theology and Social Theory, Milbank remarks that the first eleven chapters of this work preludes to the assertion that sociology is “a social science”. For the “inhabitants of the altera civitas, on pilgrimage through this temporary world” theology is “the queen of the sciences” (Milbank 2006a:382). 4. MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF THE TERM “THEOLOGY” IN RADICAL ORTHODOXY Although this statement acknowledges the scientific character of theology, Milbank’s use of the term theology also includes other meaning‑nuances. According to Smith, Radical Orthodoxy harbours “a fundamental ambiguity” (similar to what Dooyeweerd discerns in the thought of Augustine), asking for a clarification of the term “theology”. Smith distinguishes four different meanings attached to the term ‘theology’ within Radical Orthodoxy: • It leaves the term “theology” undefined. • Theology “is clearly equated with a science, a mode of theoretical discourse, analysis, and reflection”. • Theology is linked to confession and even practice. • Theology is linked to revelation and Scripture (Smith 2004:168). In this instance, Smith asks several key questions and then quotes Dooyeweerd on the dangers of dogmatic theology: Is Christian faith to be equated with Christian theology? Is Christian revelation to be equated with theology? Is Christian confession theological in a scientific sense? How are we to do justice to the ‘sense of the faithful’ if Christian faith is collapsed with Christian theology? Must every Christian be a scientist in this respect? (Smith 2004:168). Smith is quoting from Dooyeweerd’s lecture series in the United States (1959), which was published under the title In the twilight of Western thought. In it, Dooyeweerd (2012) dedicates Chapters 5, 6 and 7 to the relationship between philosophy and theology: 204 Acta Theologica 2015: 1 • Chapter 5. Philosophy, theology, and religion (pages 79‑90). • Chapter 6. The object and task of theology (pages 91‑106). • Chapter 7. Reformation and scholasticism in theology (pages 107‑116. The context from which he quotes contains Dooyeweerd’s concern that theology is a scholarly discipline as well as his plea that theology should not be confused with the Word of God. At stake is not “the divine Word‑revelation”, but “exclusively the scientific character and bounds of a theological dogmatics and exegesis” (Dooyeweerd 2012:93). Dooyeweerd approaches “these difficulties in a serious way” and even warns: For dogmatic theology is a very dangerous science. Its elevation to a necessary mediator between God’s Word and the believer amounts to idolatry and testifies to a fundamental misconception