Philosophia Reformata 69 (2004) 151-181

INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL OF DOOYEWEERD

DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

1. Introduction On the basis of an ini tial ref er ence to a num ber of crit ical ap prais als of H. Dooye- weerd's phi los o phy, this ar ti cle pro ceeds by pro vi sion ally fo cus ing on the im age of Franz Xavier Von Baader1 – who was in tel lec tu ally ac tive dur ing the first part of the ninetee nth century (he lived from 1765-1841) – in second ary liter a ture (late nine- teenth century and early twenti eth century ). The main concern, however, is to enter into a more detai led evalu a ti on of the claim made by J.G. Friesen (2003), namely that all the ba sic sys tem atic in sights and dis tinc tions found in the philos o phy of are already present in the thought of Von Baader. That Dooyeweerd was in deed in flu enced by nu mer ous phi los o phers and philo soph i cal in- sights spanning the enti re history of philos o phy is beyond doubt. However, that there is any di rect influ ence on his thought from Von Baader cannot be substa nti ated on the ba sis of the available sources even though it is not unli kely that he might have been aware of the exis tenc e of Von Baader. Both the quota ti ons used by Friesen in support of his the sis and an exten sive reading of the origi nal Col lected Works of Von Baader serve as a ba sis for the as sess ment of the claims made by Friesen. In fact, there are a num ber of philosoph i cal disti ncti ons found in the origi - nal works of Von Baader (not menti oned by Friesen) that, consid ered in isola ti on, are much closer to views of Dooyeweerd. How ever, once these are placed within the context of Von Baader's thought, the striking and signif i cant dis tance be tween the thought of Von Baader and Dooyeweerd once again becom e appar ent. Von Baader is a fasci nat ing phi loso pher in his own right since he also aimed at an inte gra ti on of his Christi an faith and his philosoph i cal endeavours. Conse quentl y, there are in deed impo r tant sim ilar ities also on the level of a shared Chris tian faith betwee n Dooyeweerd and Von Baader. Yet, as soon as the dom ain of philosoph i cal re flec tion proper is en tered, the dif fer ences be tween these two think ers are so prom i- nent that what they share di minishe s into insig nif i canc e. It turns out that highli ght- ing merely ver bal or for mal sim i lar i ties is not suf fi cient to sub stan ti ate the gen eral thesis made by Friesen. Von Baader's thinking is im bedded in the intel lec tual cli - mate of his time to such an extent that one cannot fail to observe the concep tual dis- 1 On the WEB I have dis cov ered that a complete set of the Col lected Works of Von Baader is avail - able in the Librar y of MacMaster Univer sity (Ham ilton, On tario, Can ada). In Novem ber 2003 I visited Ham ilton where I had the oppor tu nity to access these works and to make num erous photo cop ies of sec- tions rele vant to this ar ticle. I have also much profited from the work of Peter Koslowski. 152 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

tance betwee n the thought of Dooyeweerd and that of Von Baader. The anal ysis is conclude d with an as sess ment of the “mysti cal” el em ent in the thought of Von Baader which al legedly had an influ ence on the thought of Dooyeweerd. (This arti - cle em ploys the shortened Harvard method of refer enc ing.) 2

2. Orientation In advance it should be noted that the fairly young tradi ti on of refor m ati onal phi - losophy, in spite of a shared bibli cal point of depar ture and moti vati on, does not re - present a con cep tual unity. Nei ther Dooyeweerd nor Vollen ho ven (or any of the later genera ti ons of philoso phers) ever claimed a ca noni cal status for their provi - sional and in princi ple fal li ble philo sophi cal in sights and dis tinc tions. Since the author of this arti cle devel oped a thorough im ma nent criti cism on Dooyeweerd's epis tem ology and his of the Ge gen stand-rel ati on (see Strauss, 1984), ques- tioning the enti re argu m ent of Dooyeweerd's transce nden tal cri tique, it must be clear from the out set that his as sess ment of the ar ticle written by Frie sen will fo cus ex clu - sively on the schol arly sound ness of the argu m ents form ulat ed and claims made by the latter and of the support ing quota ti ons that Friesen extra cted from the works of Von Baader. Dooyeweerd is fully aware of the fact that his philosophi cal ideas did not fall from the sky. With num erous strings they are tied to the enti re philosophi cal tra di- tion as well as to the ideas of his contem porar ies . Acknowl edg ing this state of affai rs also consti tutes a key elem ent in the “problem histori cal” method of D.H.Th. Vol - lenho ven. In addi ti on to this fact it must be noted that Dooyeweerd's thought evinces an on- going dy nam ics – he was con stantly re con sid er ing cer tain ba sic dis tinc tions and there is also a noti ceable shift in facets of his term inol ogy. For exam ple, J. Kraay discerns three suc ces sive concep ti ons in the devel op m ent of Dooyeweerd's sys tem atic ori enta ti on (see Kraay 1979/1980). Often ti mes Dooyeweerd will add a footnote in a later work highli ghting the fact that he correct ed a shortcom ing in an ear lier po si tion and ex plain ing his new ori en ta tion.3 Par ticu larly in the light of the origi nal ity of the new philosophi cal under sta nding of real it y advance d by Vol lenho ven and Dooyeweerd – though elaborat ed in a dis- tinct way by each of them – it is alway s fas cinat ing to try to discover pos sible sources that may shed light on certai n disti ncti ons and insight s and which may thus ap par ently cause them to be less original than ini tially sus pected.

3. Critical studies on Dooyeweerd's philosophy A fairly criti cal apprai sal of Dooyeweerd's philoso phy is found in the studies pub - 2 Only the first ref erence in the main text to the name of an au thor will men tion that person's initials. Subse quently the name, date of appear ance and page num ber referr ed to will be mentioned within pa ren- the ses. 3 See for ex am ple his self-crit i cal rem arks about the sub ject-ob ject rela tion (NC-II:374 ff.) and Dooyeweerd, 1950:75 (note 8) regard ing the foun da tional func tion of things found in na ture. IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 153

lished by schol ars such as C.A. Van Peursen (1959), A.L. Conra die (1960), and V. Brüm mer (1961). Dooyeweerd responded to Van Peursen (1959) (see Dooyeweerd 1960), while the views of Conra die and Brüm mer were discusse d by J.P.A. Mekkes (1962). More sym pathet ic critical studies are found in the excel lent intel lec tual biog - raphy of M. Verburg, the Ph.D-thes is of R.D. Henderson (1994) and the as sess ment of A.M. Wolter s (1985).4 Criti cal stud ies falling within the cate gory of lack ing suf fi cient (i.e., lack ing con- vinc ing) textual support, are found in the work of A. Anto nit es (see Strauss 1973) – who at tempted to “dem onstra te” that the phi losophy of Dooyeweerd is fully in the grip of the neo-Hegel ian thoughts of F.H. Bradley (the tutor of Bertra nd Russel l) – and J.G. Frie sen (2003) who aims at dem onstra ting a similar claim in re spect of the thought of Von Baader. Bradley advo cat ed an under sta nding of the diverse facets of re ality as being a self- contradictory ap pear ance of what he termed the “Ab so lute.” His panen the ism (lit er ally: “pan- en- ab solutism”) re solved eve ry thing within the sup- posed contradiction-free Ab so lute Whole. Though this construc tion in no way re - veals any inher ent point of contac t with the philosophi cal ideas of Dooyeweerd, there is a link with the holi sti c background found in the thought of Hegel and his (rom anti c) contem porar ies – amongst whom Von Baader is also found. * * * Before I enter into a dis cussion of the 2003 arti cle of Frie sen a brief overview will be given of some traces of Von Baader's thought as they are found in diverse sec on - dary sources. In some cases his name is merely men tioned (see for ex am ple W. Win - delband, 1935:481, 521), while in others a more exten sive expo si ti on is found. R. Fal ken berg char acter izes Von Baader as a liberal- minded medie val thinker who went through the criti cal philoso phy (of Kant) in his search for a solu ti on to the pro- b lem of rea son and faith. In an im portant respec t Von Baader indeed conti nues the age- old re al is tic heri tage [in terms of which “univer sal s” pre-exis ted in God's Mind (ante rem), re side in side crea tures (in re), and are after wards grasped by hum an un- der stand ing (post rem)], for P. Koslows ki menti ons that ac cording to Von Baader knowledge is only acquire d through re-thi nking the creati onal ideas that are not cre- ated by the hum an being. 5 Fal kenberg also menti ons that Von Baader sym pathi zed with neo-Pla tonism, Augustine, Thom as Aqui nas, Eckhart , and Paracelsus and above all with Jakob Böhme and his follower Louis Claude St. Marti n (1743-1804). In line with the thought of Im manuel Kant he com mences with the episte m ologi cal problem , with Fichte he observe s in self-consc iousness the es sence (and not merely 4 Wolters assert s that the “under ly ing worldview of Dooyeweerd's thought stands in essen tial conti - nuity with the vision of neo-Calvin ism , while the philosoph i cal elabo ra tion of that vision is ba sicall y con- structed with concep tual tools from Ger man philos o phy – chiefly neo-Kantian ism , sec ond arily pheno - menology” (1985:16). Wolters also refers to N. Hartmann. However , see the last footnote (note 60) of this arti cle. Per haps it would be more correc t to say that Dooyeweerd elabo rat ed his own philos o phy in re ac - tion to the concep tual tools found in neo-Kantian ism and pheno m enol ogy (and in that re action par tially took over some of their distinc tions) . 5 “... der Mensch ... kann nur erkennen, indem er die Schöpfungsideen, deren Schöpfer er nicht ist, nachdenkt” (Koslowski, 2003:325). 154 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

a propert y) of the hum an spirit, with Hegel he recog nize s in God the Abso lut e Spirit (Geist) (both Subject and Object of knowledge) (Falken berg, 1905:410). He re jects a straight-forward panthe ism becaus e al though hum an thinking shares in the di vine wisdom it does not becom e an inte gral part of it. Phi loso phy dif fer en ti ates in three sub di vi sions, namely and the ol ogy, na ture philoso phy, and philoso phy of mind (corre lat ed with the “object s” God, na ture and the hum an being) and should be treated in a reli gious way. Hum an self-consci ous- ness is a being-known by God (co gi tor, ergo cogit o et sum – I am being thought, therefore I think and I am). God first of all create d the im ma te rial world – in which two forces op er ate; de sire and wis dom, mat ter and form. The ma te ri ali za tion of the world is an ef fect of the fall into sin (Fal kenberg, 1905:411). With refer ence to Kos - lowski's book A.P. Bos also menti ons Von Baader's view of the genesis of matter from the ideal world (where evil is con ceived as a “pri va tion” of the good) (re view ar ti cle, Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 2003:171, see page 172 where it is menti oned that accord ing to Von Baader “man's coarse- material cor po re ality is a result of the Fall”). Coples ton points at a convic ti on of Von Baader that may be com pared with the stance of refor m ati onal phi losophy: “It was Baader's convic ti on that since the time of Francis Bacon and René Descart es phi losophy had tended to becom e more and more di vorced from reli gion, whereas true philoso phy should have its founda ti ons in faith” (1985:146). Yet this fairly gen eral statem ent rep re sents an ele ment both of the Augusti n ian and the Thomistic tra di tion as well of the Cal vin is tic leg acy and there - fore a further analy sis of the con text of this state ment is needed – re spec tively in the thought of Von Baader and Dooyeweerd – if the aim is to show that Dooyeweerd derive s this idea parti cular ly from Von Baader. The way in which Coples ton form u - lates the point rather gives the im pression that the old problem of rea son and faith is resolve d by Von Baader by giving pri macy to faith,6 whereas Dooyeweerd ar gued (eventu all y through his transce nden tal cri tique) that one should penetra te to the cen- tral root of both “faith” and “rea son” without merely opt ing for the pri macy of the one over the other, i.e. one ought to take into ac count the depth dim ension of hum an exis tenc e where the seat of the direc ti onal choice betwee n God or an idol is found. It is therefore under sta ndable that Dooyeweerd speaks in a very ar ticu late way about the meaning of faith, making a clear disti ncti on betwee n the uni versal modal struc - ture of the as pect of faith and its ulti mate root: The modal law-sphere of faith is of ten iden ti fied with re li gion, which is very det ri men- tal to re li gious self-knowl edge. Up to now we have al ways spoken of faith as of a modal mean ing-func tion, viz. as the sec ond ter minal func tion of tem po ral hu man ex pe - rience and tem poral real ity. As a subject-fun ction faith is at the same time the termi nal 6 Von Baader be lieves that the hum an under stand ing as a natu ral ability to know require s a divinely given knowl edge of God in order to partake in a supra- natu ral capac ity to know, which ful fills, ele vates , and highlights the natu ral ly fi nite and im perfect hum an knowledge: “Unser Verstand als natürliches Erkenntnisvermögen verfügt aber von Natur nicht über die nichtnatürliche, supranaturale Dispo sition zur Erkenntnis. ... Wir können Gott nur durch Gott und in seiner von ihm selbst gegebenen spe cies oder Form erkennen. Die Gotteserkenntnis ist daher dasjenige, was die Theologen das lu men gloriae nennen, eine von Gott dem Menschen mitgeteilte, sein natürliches endliches, unvollendetes Erkennen vollendende und erhebende Erleuchtung” (Koslowski, 2003:373-374). IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 155

func tion of hu man ex istence in the tran scen den tal di rec tion of time. As such it is found in all human be ings, in be liev ers in Christ as well as in those whose faith re veals it self in an apostate direc tion. There is an apostate faith, and there is a faith which can only come into ac tion in man through the Spirit of God. But both func tion within the modal struc ture of a law-sphere, implanted in hu man nature at cre ation. In both a sharp dis - tinc tion must be made be tween the sub jec tive func tion, the prin cipium, the con tent, the di rec tion and the root of be lief. And in both cases it is ob vi ous that the func tion of faith can not be iden ti fied with the re li gious root of tem po ral ex istence or, in the words of the Ec cle sias tes, with the heart from which spring the is sues of life. Believ ing, logi cal dis- tinction, feeling, etc. are tem poral func tions de limited from one an other in law-spheres of mu tu ally ir re duc ible mean ing-mo dal i ties. But the re li gious root of our en tire ex is - tence is not a func tion; re li gion is not en closed in a tempo ral law sphere (Dooye weerd, 1996-II:298).7 These disti ncti ons are not found in the thought of Von Baader. The latter in fact aimed at absorb ing every part of his philoso phy in his system of “reli gion-phi los o - phy” (Re lig ions phi loso phie). Erd mann sharply criti cizes the way in which Franz Hoffm ann, as General Editor, subdi vided the Col lected Works of Von Baader by dis tin guish ing be tween Meta phys ics, Na ture Phi loso phy, So cial Phi loso phy and Phi- losophy of Reli gion, for whatever is contai ned in his works, even nature philoso phy, ac tu ally belongs to Re lig ionsphi loso phie.8 The last thing one can say of the philoso - phy of Dooyeweerd is that he had the inten ti on to absorb his enti re phi losophy into a “phi loso phy of re lig ion”! Coples ton also refers to the specula ti ve idea of God found in the thought of Von Baader: In God himself we can dis tin guish higher and lower prin ci ples, and though the sen sible world is to be re garded as a di vine self-man i fes ta tion it none the less rep re sents a fall. Again, just as in God there is the eter nal vic tory of the higher princi ple over the lower, of light over dark ness, so in man there should be a pro cess of spiritualization whereby the world would re turn to God. It is ev i dent that Baader and Schelling9 were kin dred souls who drank from the same spiri tual foun tain (1985:146). Von Baader's view of the “sensi ble world” negate s the in te gral meaning of what Dooyeweerd calls the bib lical cre ation mo tive. In the light of the fact that Dooyeweerd wrote an ex ten sive se ries of ar ticles deal - ing with the struggle for a Christi an poli tics (to be publi shed as Volum e 6 of the B Se ries of the Col lected Works of Dooyeweerd) and given the fact that Von Baader advo cat ed – in oppo si ti on to the secular athe isti c “power-Sta te” – the ideal of the Chris tian state, one might have hoped that Dooyeweerd would refer to Von Baader in this work. Unfor tu nate ly such a refer ence is nowhere found in this serie s of arti - 7 Since all the edi tions of A New Cri tique of The o ret i cal Thought are mere cop ies of the first (1953-1958) edi tion, ref er ences to NC could ac tually be under stood to refer either to this first edition or to any other later edi tion. 8 Erdmann holds that “eigentlich sein ganzes System ” is “Religionsphilosophie” and he contin ues by say ing that “alles, was in seinen Werken enthalten ist, selbst das, was in der logischen und natur philoso- phischen Abtheilung steht, eigentlich in die Religionsphilosophie gehört und nur für diese brauchbar ist” (Erdmann, 1856:31). 9 F. Hoffmann, the edi tor of the Col lected Works of Von Baader re peat edly ex plains that Von Baader opposed the panthe ism of Schelling. See Von Baader, 1853:285-286, foot note. 156 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

cles. Nonethe les s, one may discern some similar iti es: both Dooyeweerd and Von Baader re ject the ato mistic so cial con tract theo ries of the En light en ment. Von Baader also challenges the idea that the state is the ul tim ate sov er eign power – God alone oc cu pies this po si tion.10 But what about the lim ited (i.e., non-ult imate) sover - eignty (in terms of Groen van Prinste rer, Kuyper and Dooyeweerd: “sphere-sove r - eignty”) of the state and other so cie tal col lec tivi ties? Similar to tra di tional scho las tic and reform ed scholas tic approache s Von Baader on the one hand calls upon the “moral law” and the penetra tion of so ciety by re lig ion and mo ral ity, and on the other still oper ate s with the dominant hum anis ti c view accord ing to which sov er eignty is either assigne d to the mon arch or to the peo ple. Coples ton explai ns: The ul ti mate sov er eign is God alone, and rev er ence for God and the uni ver sal moral law, to gether with re spect for the hu man per son as the image of God, are the only real safeguards against tyr anny. If these safeguards are neglected, tyr anny and intol er ance will re sult, no mat ter whether sov er eignty is re garded as re siding with the mon arch or with the peo ple. To the athe istic or secu lar power- State Baader op poses the ideal of the Chris tian State. The concen tra tion of power which is charac ter is tic of the secular or the athe istic na tional State and which leads to in justice at home and to war abroad can be over come only if re lig ion and moral ity pene trate the whole of hu man soci ety (1985: 146). Talk ing about “re lig ion” and “mo ral ity” adja cent to each other re flects the implicit tra di tional nature- grace split – where re lig ion and mo ral ity belong to the higher “spiritual- ethical” dom ain (as opposed to the secu lar do main of na ture). The authen- tic Rom an Catholi c posi ti on, accord ing to which this spiritual- ethical dom ain ought to have the guid ance in socie tal life, is capture d in the slogan that grace does not can cel na ture, but per fects it (grati a natura non tolli t, sed per fi cit). Even arti culat es this legacy within the context of his disti ncti on betwee n general and par ticu lar grace (where Christ is eliminated in the former sphere).11 In parti cular Kuyper holds that the (“side- ways”) influ ence of the congre ga ti on of Christ on “state and civil soci ety ” should result in a “moral tri umph”, aimed at taking hum an life to a higher level, to en rich and pu rify it and to al low it to be dis closed in its full - ness (Kuyper, 1931-1932- II:249). Com pare the tradi ti onal Rom an Catholi c view – in line with the thought of Thom as Aqui nas – where the Rom an Catholi c church later on took the follow ing posi ti on in the papal encyc li cal Quad ragesimo anno (15 May 1931): Surely the church does not only have the task to bring the hu man per son merely to a tran sient and de fi cient hap pi ness, for it must carry a per son to eter nal bliss (cf. Schnatz, 1973:403). 10 Copleston rem arks: “In them he express es a reso lute oppo sition to the theory of the State as a re sult of a so cial com pact or con tract between in di vid u als. On the con trary, the State is a natu ral in sti tu tion in the sense that it is grounded in and proceeds from the nature of man: it is not the product of a con vention. At the same time Baader strongly at tacks the no tion that the State is the ul tim ate sov ereign power. The ul- tim ate sov ereign is God alone” (1985:146). 11 Just com pare Kuyper's notion of the prayer to be used by the councils of munic i pal i ties where ref er- ence should be made only to God's provi dence, that will allow “alm ost every one to par tici pate in the prayer” (Kuyper, 1917:285). IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 157

The differ en ti ati on betwee n the sover eignt y of the monarch as opposed to the sover - eignty of the people as it is used by Von Baader ac tuall y originate s in the dis tincti on made by Nic colò Ma chiav elli between mon ar chies and re pub lics. Dooye weerd re- jects this en tire dis tinc tion: by its very na ture the state is a pub li c le gal in sti tu tion, a res pub li ca: An authen tic state is not really pres ent as long as the author ity to gov ern in ef fect be - longs, as a feu dal right, to the pri vate pre roga tives of a ruler who in turn can con vey, pawn, or lend them to offi cials be long ing to the ruler's realm or even to pri vate per sons. Ac cord ing to its na ture and in ner struc ture, the state is a res pub li ca, a “publi c entity .” It is an in sti tu tion quali fied by publi c law, a commu nity of gov ern ment and sub jects founded typi cally on a monop oly of sword power within a given ter ri tory. As Groen van Prin sterer de clared in his sec ond pe ri od of in tel lec tual de vel op ment, every true state has a re publi can char ac ter. Thus the di vi sion of the forms of the state into monar - chies and repub lics com monly made since Machiav elli is basi cally in correct. The word re pub lic in di cates noth ing what soever about the form of govern ment. It merely signi - fies that the state is a pub li c rather than a pri vate [163] in sti tu tion. But the word monar - chy does per tain to a form of govern ment; the gov ern ment here is mon ar chi cal, that is, a sin gle per son is the head of gov ern ment. Con versely, the word mon ar chy does not re - late to the question of whether a mon archy complies with the char acter of the state as a re pub lic. Through out the course of history many monar chies have lacked the char ac ter of a state, since gov ern mental author ity func tioned not as an of fice serv ing the res pub- li ca but as the pri vate prop erty of a par ticu lar ruler. Govern mental ju risdic tion was an un dif fer en ti ated feu dal pre roga tive. In such cases one should speak not of a state but of a realm (reg num), which was the prop erty of a king. Not every realm is a state (Dooyeweerd, 2003:162- 163). Dooyeweerd's radi cally new the ory of the state as a pub lic le gal in sti tu tion (with its typi cal foun da tional and typi cal leading func tion) is absent in the quasi scholas tic approach of Von Baader. The latter in fact found a starting-point for his poli ti cal views in the thought of Edm und Burke (see Van der Ven, 1957:1772). J.J. Louët Feis ser menti ons Von Baader's inven ti on that further ed the cause of glass pro duc tion (during the year 1809) and also his inter acti on with the natural sci - enti st J.W. Rit ter and the philoso phers F.H. Jacobi and F.W.J. Schell ing (Louët Feis- ser, 1956:424).12 The En cy clo pe dia Bri tan nica hon ours his ecu meni cal ac tivi ties (his contri buti on to the form ati on in 1815 of the “Holy Al li ance” which, as a se cu- rity pact, was intende d to ensure a peaceful world – it was estab li shed amongst Rus- sia, Austri a, Prus sia, and France) (1975:703) and it also menti ons the fact that Von Baader es tab lished a Jour nal: Eos (= “dawn”) in serv ice of the “Mu nich cir cle”. H-U. Lessing menti ons Von Baader's rejec ti on of feel ing as the ba sis for an appre - ciation of what is “mysti cal.” Von Baader re serves the term mys ti cal for re search ing the natural and divine secret s (“He im lichkeiten”) (Lessing, 1984:271). The Grote Win kler Prins points out that the influ ence of the views of Schell ing is seen in the concep ti on of the world-soul: “The world is concei ved of as an organ ism with a di-

12 An anony m ous refere e pointed out that this arti cle of Louët Feisser does con tain fac tual mis takes. For ex am ple, it re fers to Böhme as a pu pil of “Mar tin,” whereas in fact Louis-Claude de Saint-Mar tin lived more than a hundred years after Böhme died (1743-1803). 158 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

vine cen tre”.13 The hum an being is not autonom ous since it is absorbed in the large whole (Grote Win kler Prins, 1971:798). This brief overview of some of Von Baader's philosophi cal ideas would hardly prompt those fa mil iar with Dooyeweerd's philoso phy to suspect the kind of depend - ence that Frie sen in his 2003 ar ticle claims to ex ist.14 Let us now procee d and look at the way in which he wants to demon strate that all the impo r tant sys tematic in no va - tions and disti ncti ons of Dooyeweerd's philoso phy are indeed anti cipate d by/in the thought of Von Baader. In order to dem onstra te the amena bil ity of the method em - ployed by Frie sen some typical ex am ples will be con sid ered, since a de tailed treat- ment of every sin gle point raised by him will ex ceed the limits of a sin gle ar ticle. 15

4. Some views of Von Baader intersecting with views of Dooyeweerd 4.1 Religion, autonomy and society Von Baader expli cit ly wants to procee d from a bibli cal perspec tive. He holds that faith in God, in Christ as Redeem er, enable s the hum an search for truth (Von Baader, 1921:94). The life of the “Geist” (spirit/soul) is re lig ion, i.e., serv ice to God.16 The unbe li ever alway s enter s into some or other form of “Bigot ter ie” – albeit it “Natur-” or “Geistes bigot terie” (Von Baader, 1921:115). The meaning and aim of all re lig ious ac tivi ties (cul tic ac tions) are to re ha bi litate the hu man be ing and to re - store the origi nal covenant (contra ct) with God.17 Von Baader radi cally reject s the attem pt of “non-rel igious” phi losophy to decla re the hum an being, in abstra cti on from God, as abso lut ely sover eign. He says that the law of authorit y is not a hum an dis covery , but finds its founda ti on in God.18 Taken on their face- value these views could have been arti culat ed by Kuyper, 13 Fur ther on we shall see that the idea of an or gan ism and the im age of a Cen tre with its pe riph ery are indeed es sential in the thought of Von Baader. 14 Friesen be lieves that his anal ysis has dem on strated that the “fol low ing ideas of Dooyeweerd can all be found in Baader: (1) all philos o phy is reli gious (2) the reli gious antith e sis (3) the 'Wetsidee' (4) the dogma of the auton om y of thought (5) idola try as the absolutization of the tem po ral (6) Ground Motives in history (7) the four types of Ground Motives (8) the three ideas within each Ground Motive (9) the method of antinomy (10) the use of Kant's ideas to crit icize Kant's own Critique of Pure Reason (11) cos- mic time (12) the supratemporal heart (13) the analogy of the prism (14) mo dali ties (15) sphere sover - eignty (16) sphere univer sal ity (17) analo gies of time (18) antic i pa tion and retrocipation (19) Man as the tem po ral root (20) Christ as the Second Root (21) the cen trality of love (22) pre-theo ret ical expe ri ence (23) the Subject -Object rela tion (24) the Gegenstand re la tion (25) the o ret i cal syn the sis and (26) cul tural devel op ment as an unfold ing” (2003:1). [Since Friesen's arti cle is available on the WEB any phrase quoted from his analy sis could im medi atel y be found with the al search function of Word Process ing pack ages.] 15 However , in a WEB discus sion (“Thinknet”) I have made available addi tional com ments – on the basis of which a prelim inary inter action with Friesen took place. 16 “Das Leben des Geistes ist daher – Reli gion – Gottesdienst” (Von Baader, 1921:111). 17 “Der Sinn und Zweck alles religiösen Tuns (Kultus) ist kein anderer, als die Reha bil i ta tion des Menschen zur effektiven Widerherstellung seines Urkontrakts oder Bundes mit Gott” (Von Baader, 1921:194). 18 “... so vermochten auch die Menschen nicht von selbst sich zur Gesellschaft zu constituieren, und nur ihre Gesellschaft mit Gott konnte und kann jene unter oder mit sich begründen; daher: omnis potes tas a Deo. Daß das Gesetz der Autorität keine menschliche Erfindung ist, beweiset die irreligiöse Philosophie zwar ohne ihr Wissen schon damit, daß sie diese Macht nicht mehr zu erklären vermag, so wie sie von IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 159

Dooye weerd or Vollen ho ven. But let us look at the con text in which they appear. Two pages further on Von Baader says that author ity is moral in nature – and he dis tin guishes it from power (Macht) as physi cal force. Al though com pletely jus ti fied in his re jec tion of Rous seau's view that the gen eral will is always cor rect, Von Baader speaks about a co er cive (physi cal) force and char acter izes it as an ag gre gate that lacks a proper concen tra tion becaus e the unify ing moral prin ci ple is absent (Von Baader, 1865:6). The term “aggre gate” re veals his re action to the ato mistic (in di vidu al is tic) ori en ta tion of the Aufklärung, and it must be under stood from the per spec tive of his own “or ganic” pref er ence – echo ing the ho lis tic (uni ver sal is tic) mode of thought during the first half of the nine teenth century (amongst others man- ifest ed in the rom anti c movem ent – in spite of other differ ence s with rom anti cism). The quota ti on given in the last footnote actu all y starts just after he has explai ned his “or ganic” view: There fore with out so cial, or ganic hi er ar chy, with out power, author ity and sub mis sive- ness amongst them there can not be a com plete or gan ism; ... (Von Baader, 1865:5).19 It should also be noted that in di vidu al ity is only proper when it is concei ved of in or ganic terms (and incor po rat ed in an organic struc ture).20 4.2 Sphere sovereignty and enkapsis versus organicism Perhaps one of the most striking posi tive ideas found in the thought of Von Baader is given in a form ula ti on which is just as close to the idea of sphere sover eignt y as those norm ally menti oned by Dooyeweerd with refer ence to Johan nes Al thusius (from his Politica Me thod ice Di gesta, 1603 – see Dooyeweerd, 1996-III:662- 663). Von Baader ex plic itly speaks about the free life of a crea ture “within its lawful re - gion” (“inner der ihr geset zli chen Region”) . This state ment indeed closely approxi - mates the idea of sphere sover eignt y. Unfor tu nate ly Von Baader did not develop an arti culat ed analy sis of the dim ensions of functi ons (modal aspect s) and enti ties needed to elaborat e the idea of a “lawful re gion (sphere).” In addi ti on he someti mes sim ply does not want to ac knowledge the cos monomic signifi cance of God's law for crea tion, for ex am ple when he op poses the term “free from law” (“ge setzfrei”) to law less (“ge setzlos”) and against law (“geset zwid rig” ) (Von Baader, 1921:198) or when he re lates the idea of coop era ti on accord ing to a princi ple with G.W. Leibniz' s concep ti on of the “har mo nia praes tabilita”.21 The organicis tic em pathy present in Von Baader's thought does not allow for the rec og ni tion of an in ter twi ne ment of dif fer ently struc tured en tities into a new to tal ity Gott dabei abstrahirt und den Menschen absolut souverain deklarirt” (Von Baader, 1865:5). 19 “Ohne sociale, organische Hierarchie, ohne Macht, Autorität und Unterthänigkeit unter dieselbe besteht folglich kein vollständiger Organismus; ...” 20 “Ein solcher Begriff der Individualität ist aber gerade das Gegenteil einer organischen und wahr - haften Individualität eines organischen Gebildes, in welchem das Individuelle das Indivisibile und das Immiscibile zugleich ausdrückt” (Koslowski, 2003:460). 21 “... daß das Verhalten einer Kreatur als Mitwirkers zu der werkzeuglichen, nichtintelligenten Natur stets ihrem Verhalten zu ihrem Prinzip entspricht, wie es nicht zu leugnen ist, daß zwischen beiden Verhaltensweisen eine Har mo nia praestabilita stattfindet, an welche jeder Mensch im Herzen glaubt, auf die jeder hofft, und die jeder fürchtet” (Von Baader, 1921:199). 160 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

in such a way that the in ter nal struc tural na ture of the in ter laced en tities is con tin ued (maintai ned) in spite of their presence within the whole. Dooyeweerd intro duced the idea of enkap tic in ter lace ment for this phenom enon. Von Baader, by contra st, af- firms that such a union will ter minate the inde pend ent sphere of opera ti on of what - ever is in ter laced: From what has been said one in ad di tion ap pre ci ates the cor rect ness of the propo sition: that every union can only origi nate and exist through a shared sub jec tion, simi lar to the op po site as it applies to dis- union. If, for that mat ter, two or more for merly in de pend ent en ti ties (We sen) are to build a to tal ity, then they have to cease to be mu tu ally in de pend - ent.22 In the context of a differ ent argu m ent Von Baader form ulat es a general princi ple, stat ing that every self- foundation and ev ery “ac qui si tion of in de pend ence” (Ver- selbstän digung) only comes into exis tenc e through the coin ci dence of its own oppo - sites.23 In an ear lier con text the same idea is for mu lated as fol lows: Every “Verselbststän digung” is as found ing a synthe siz ing (Zu sam men schließung), en - compass ing or an im manent connection of an object, from whence it fol lows that I can - not and should not close my self off to what is higher, but that pre cisely only through my own being- closed- off with Him I can at tain my in de pend ence (closing- off) out - wards and downwards. 24 As soon as the appar entl y relati vely positi ve views of Von Baader are consid ered within their “em beddednes” in his broader concep ti on, however, it consta ntly hap - pens that the philosophi cal arti cula ti on and elabora ti on given by him turns out to de- viate radi cally from the philosophi cal stance found in Dooyeweerd's philoso phy.

22 “Man sieht übrigens aus dem Gesagten auch die Richtigkeit des Satzes ein: daß jede Union nur durch eine gemeinsame Subjektion entsteht und in ihr besteht, sowie das Gegenteil von der Desunion gilt. Sollen nämlich zwei oder mehrere bis dahin selbständige Wesen eine Totalität bilden, so müßen sie eben aufhören, gegeneinander selbständig zu sein, und daß sie dieses können (ja auch nur wollen können), kann ihnen nur von einem gemeinsamen Höheren gegeben sein” (Von Baader, 1921:186). 23 “... wie jede Selbstbegründung und Verselbständigung nur durch das Zusammenschließen eigenen Gegensatzes wird” (Von Baader, 1921:209). The “coincidentia oppositorum” of Nicolas of Cusa is ap par - ent. 24 “Jede Verselbständigung ist als Gründung Zusammenschließung, Einschließung oder immanente Beziehung eines Gegensatzes, woraus folgt, daß ich gegen mein mir Höheres mich nicht schließen und abschließen kann und soll, sondern daß ich gerade nur durch mein Zusammengeschloßensein mit Ihm meine Selbständigkeit (Abschließen) nach auswärts und abwärts zu erhalten vermag” (Von Baader, 1921:171). IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 161

5. Views of Von Baader highlighting the distance between himself and Dooyeweerd 5.1 Good and evil: organic and inorganic The statem ent of Von Baader quoted above to illu m inate his posi ti on in re spect of the in ter twi ne ment of dif fer ently na tured en ti ties (enkap sis), is precede d by a signifi - cant rem ark about the highest sense of the term or gan ism. The word “organ ism ” in this sense is under stood in such a way that every branch at once origi nates, exist s and passes away with all the oth ers, imply ing that a truly liv ing en tity is nei ther di - visi ble nor is it com posed out of parts.25 This view on the one hand dates back to Ar- istot le's defi niti on of the soul in which the word 'or ganikon' has always been misun - der stood26 and is still alive in the bio logical thought of neo- vitalists from the twen ti - eth century such as H. Dri esch and E.W. Sinnott . Von Baader as so ciates the dis tinc tion be tween what is or ga nized and dis or ga n i- za tion with the di rec tional an tith e sis be tween good and evil (sin) (Von Baader, 1865:192). Differ ent nuance s of this view are found, for exam ple where the contra ry betwee n love and hate is under stood in terms of the oppo si ti on betwee n or ganic and in or ganic.27 This po si tion also fits Von Baader's iden tifi ca tion of antinomy and lack of wholeness (“Widerspruch” and “Unganzheit” – Von Baader, 1921:203; on page 193 the inor ganic is identi fied with the hell). Koslowski also ex plic itly mention s this op po si tion of or ganic and in or ganic – identi fied by Von Baader with the anti the sis be tween good and evil.28 This orien ta ti on is consis tent with the more general vitalistic con vic tion that life as the truly “primi tive” and “in ex pli ca ble” is orig inal and that every inor ganic , non-living being is to be thought of as non-origi nal (de- rived).29 5.2 God and the human being In line with the ideas of Böhme Von Baader af firms that creatures are not di rectly 25 “Das Wort Organismus wird hier in seinem höchsten Sinne genommen, so daß nämlich jedes Glied nur mit allen übrigen zugleich entsteht, besteht und vergeht; weswegen ein wahrhaft Lebendiges weder teilbar noch (aus Teilen) zusammensetzbar ist ...” (Von Baader, 1921:186). 26 See Bos, 2003a:85 ff., 93-94, 107-108, 162, 174, 200. 27 “Die Liebe ist das organische und organisirende, der Haß das desorganisirende, anorganische Princip” (Von Baader, 1865:2). 28 “... daß man den Unterschied zwischen einer organischen oder wahrhaften und einer nicht- organischen oder schlechten Verbindung nicht genau erkannte ...” (Koslowski, 2003:446). 29 Koslowski explains his view as follows: “Wenn aber das Leben und seine Daseinsform der organischen Verbindung das Ursprüngliche, Unerklärbare und darum alles Erklärende sind, folgt daraus, daß das unmittelbar Hervorbringende dieses Lebendigen ebenfalls nur Lebendiges oder Organisches sein konnte. Alles unorganische, unlebendige Sein kann nicht als ursprüngliche, sondern muß als derivierte Seinsweise gedacht werden” (2003:448-449). The twenti eth century ho lis tic biol o gist, A. Meyer defends a sim ilar convic tion. J. Needham sum mariz es the posi tion of Meyer as follows: “Thus Meyer, in his inter - esting discus sion of the concept of wholeness, maintains that the funda m ental concep tions of physics ought to be de ducible from the funda m ental concep tions of biol ogy; the lat ter not being re ducible to the form er. Thus entropy would be, as it were, a special case of bio log i cal disor ga ni za tion; the uncer tainty princi ple would follow from the psy cho-physi cal rela tion; and the princi ple of rela tiv ity would be de riv- able from the rela tion betwee n organ ism and envi ron m ent” (1968: 27 note 34). 162 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

procee ding from God, but procee d out of “eternal na ture” (“der ewigen Natur” – Von Baader, 1921:193). Von Baader talks about an as tral soul (Von Baader, 1921:177) and a world body (Von Baader, 1921:208). In addi ti on he also refers to a sen si tive spirit (Nervengeist) and a vi tal spirit (Lebensgeist) (Von Baader, 1921:181) – rem inding us of the dis tincti on betwee n the anima vegetativa and anima sensitiva in ar is to te lian Scho las ti cism. By im pli ca tion he sug gests that the dif fer ence in sex betwee n man and woman is only appar ent after the para dise (Von Baader, 1921:182-183). The hu man be ing car ries within it self the end of a to tal free dom from nature (Von Baader, 1921:200).30 When Von Baader speaks about a “na tur freie Geist” (a spirit free from na ture – see Von Baader, 1921:157), it should be read in com bina ti on with his re mark that “love” is love only be cause it is “na tur frei”, i.e., free from de sire and need (Von Baader, 1921:113). What Von Baader says about the mo ralit y of the genius ech oes the irra ti onal ism of the early Rom anti c Move ment (see Dooyeweerd, 2003:52, 176 ff.). The law func tions as dis ci pli nar ian to wards the aim of the lib er ated mo ral ity of the genius, 31 similar to true faith which is, like the genius, not bound to any for- mula.32 Given this background it is not diffi cult to under sta nd why Von Baader also speaks about the (gen ial!) divine creati on as be ing free from law.33 5.3 Fall into sin as a falling away from the idea (and from unity) Von Baader refers to a fall of na ture from the idea (wisdom ) that took place “in” God (Von Baader, 1921:161). A similar form ula ti on is else where found in his Col- lected Works: “such that here a fall of na ture from the idea (wisdom ) took place in God” (Von Baader, 1851:248). A subtl e after -effect of the long-standing sim plicit y meta physics , dat ing back to Greek phi los o phy and Xenophanes (see Visagie, 1982:8 ff.), is found in the posi ti on Von Baader takes with regard to unity and mul ti plic ity. The for mer is as so ciated with what is good, and the lat ter with the evil of the fall. In the proces s Von Baader dis tin guishes be tween a “higher” and a “lower” na ture as well, as so ciat ing fall with mat ter.34 Union and di vision repre sent the oppo si ti on betwee n good and evil (see Von Baader, 1851:59). The fall into sin caused the “mate ri al iza tion” of the hum an 30 “... insofern der Mensch die Bestimmung einer gänzlichen Naturfreitheit in sich trägt.” 31 “Die Re li gion nähmlich sieht das Gesetz als ein zeitliches Mittel und als Zuchtmeister an, um zum Zweck (d.i. zur freien, moralischen Genialität) zu gelangen” (Von Baader, 1921:198). 32 Von Baader quotes Böhme saying: “Der rechte Glaube ist (wie das Ge nie) an keine Formel gebunden, er wirkt in und mit Gott, dem absolut Freien, seines Lebens Kraft und Stärke nur in der rechte Liebe holend, welche in die Freiheit geht, indes das Gesetz nicht tiefer als in den Naturgrund reicht” (Von Baader, 1921:199). 33 “Irrigerweise sehen nun viele diese Reflexion als identisch mit dem Bewußtsein selbst an, so daß ein gesetzfreies Tun, d.h. eben das geniale (göttlich, schaffende), das bewußtlose, instinktive wäre, während das letztere doch eigentlich durchaus kein Selbsttun ist und ebenso tief unter dem gesetzlichen, als dieses unter dem gesetzfreien steht" (Von Baader, 1921:198). 34 “Übrigens kann ein solches widernatürliches Befangensein in einer niedrigern Re gion oder Natur nicht an ders als entzweiend, Einung aufhebend und also Zusammengesetzheit bewirken auf die Elemente der höheren Natur selbst rückwirken. Wie dieses von dem Fall (katabolhv) der nichtintelligenten Natur IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 163

being. Koslowski rem arks that the bibli cal refer ence regard ing the clothing of the first hum an couple with ani m al skins conti nue a long-standing exe ge sis reaching back to Gregor of Nyssa, namely that through the fall into sin the hum an being was transform ed into a mate ria l-bodily nature : the nature of the hum an nature was there- fore changed through the fall into sin.35 In pass ing we may note that Von Baader views time as the suspen sion of eter nity (Koslowski, 2003:415) and redem pti on as an “Entzeitlichung” (liber a ti on from time) (Koslowski, 2003:416 ff.). 5.4 State and Society Von Baader identi fies the nature of a so cial col lec tiv ity with what Dooyeweerd calls an or gan ized com mu nity (Dutch: “verband”). Accord ing to Von Baader “Gesell- schaft” al ways en tails a rela tion of sub jec tion (1865:11). His view does not allow for com munal forms of socia l life where a rela ti on of super- and subor di na ti on is absent – such as within the extende d fam ily and a people in the sense of an ethnic or cul- tural com munit y. He assigns a leading and inte grat ing role to love within the state – ne glect ing completely what Dooyeweerd calls the ju ral quali fy ing func tion of the state. But the most striking differ ence betwee n Dooyeweerd's view of the state and the under sta nding of Von Baader is found in the rela ti on betwee n legis la tor and law. “Fi nally we even hear some of the new advo cat es of law speaking about laws to which the legis la tor should be subject ed – and the same confu sion in the concept of law reigns in most theo ries of the state.”36 It looks as if Von Baader here opts for a state- absolutistic view, ele vat ing the head of state above all posi tive law. 5.5 Form and matter adjacent to nature and freedom Where Von Baader discusse s his views for a logic of the future he does not hes itat e to inter pret the Scriptura l use of the word Lovgo" [Lo gos], in the sense of wisdom , with the words “Urform” or “Urmaass” (1851:528). The origi nal Greek dual ism be- tween form and matter is thus project ed into the bibli cal word Lovgo". At the same time Von Baader does not hes itate to af firm the ap par ent deeper syn the sis be tween na ture and free dom aimed at by Böhme. He says that ac cord ing to the latter the Ab - so lute (der Ungrund) as na ture (desire ) and free dom (lust) resolve s it self in order to be re con nected deeper within it self.37 Schelling struggled with the same problem and ended up with a dupli cated tension: “But just this inner neces sity is it self freedom ; a als Leiblichkeit gilt, wodurch diese zur Materie im engern Sinne entstellt ward" (1921:96). 35 “Baader schließt mit dieser Deutung der Schriftstelle von der Bekleidung des ersten Menschen- paares mit Tierfellen an eine in der patristischen Exegese verbreitete Deutung an, die auch z.B. von Gregor von Nyssa vertreten wurde. Die in der Bibel berichtete Bekleidung des ersten Menschenpaares mit Tierfellen nach dem Fall bedeutet danach, daß der Mensch durch den Fall materiell-leiblich wurde, also die Natur seiner Natur gewandelt wurde” (Koslowski, 2003:363 note). 36 “Endlich aber hören wir einige dieser neueren Gesetzeseiferer sogar von Gesetzen reden, denen der Gesetzgeber unterworfen sein soll!! Dieselbe Verwirrung im Begriffe des Gesetzes herrscht auch in den meisten Staatslehren” (Von Baader, 1921:197). 37 “... wird sich der Richtigkeit der Konstruktion Böhmes überzeugen. Nach ihm hebt sich das Abso - lute (der Ungrund) als Natur (Begierde) und Freiheit (Lust) auf, um durch Wiederkonjunktion sich tiefer 164 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

person' s being is essen ti ally that person' s own deed” (1809:385). Inste ad of provid ing us with a real synthe sis , Schell ing thus sim ply du pli cated the ini tial dia lec ti cal ten sion be tween free dom and ne ces sity. This is par ticu larly seen from some other quota ti ons present ed by the transla tor from Schell ing's Sys tem des tran scen den talen Ide al is mus,38 where it turns out that a “plan of nature ” thus “grad - uall y intro duces at least a mecha nisti c lawful ness into history ” (1936:109). On the other hand, within the third phase of history , “what appeare d in the earli er one as fate and as nature will develop and reveal it self as Foresight ” (1936:110). 5.6 Trinitarian “theo-” In Von Baader's thought the wish to incor po rat e the doctri ne of the Trinit y into the general ontol ogy of fi nite being is similar to the posi ti on taken by He gel. Only in an analogical way is it possi ble to apply the logic of divin it y to the ontol ogy of what is fi nite. Yet the Trini tar ian on tol ogy is ap pli ca ble to vari ous on tic re la tion ships. If it is the case that every self- contained form dis plays a three fold dif fer en tiation, 39 then also the form-givi ng princi ple or ground must display the same “threefold ness” (Ko- slowski, 2003:456). * * * Against this general background, aimed at provid ing the reader with a glimpse of some of the philosophi cal refle cti ons of Von Baader, we can now in more detai l turn to the ar ticle of Frie sen.

6. Friesen: Von Baader as the main source of Dooyeweerd's philosophical ideas J.G. Friesen indeed managed to highli ght certai n simi lari ties be tween Von Baader and Dooyeweerd. The logical point to be observe d, however, is that similar iti es al- ways pre sup pose dif fer ences. The crucia l ques tion therefore will be to what an ex- tent one can conclude – on the ba sis of ver bal and for mal similari ties – to genu ine over lap ping philo sophi cal con cep tions. The analy sis below is intende d to explore core facets of this is sue. Having quoted Dooyeweerd say ing: It is a matter of life and death for this young philoso phy that Christi an schol ars in all fields of science seek to put it to work in their own spe cialty, Frie sen menti ons a similar wording of Von Baader: a war of life

in sich fassen, höher in sich (in Majestät) erheben zu können” (Von Baader, 1921:203-204). 38 Publishe d in 1800, Works, Vol.III, pp.603-604. 39 Both num ber and space ana log i call y reflect this triadic im ita tion of the trin ity, for accord ing to Von Baader all num bers are re duc ible to the “Dreizahl” and within trig o nome try all fig ures are re duc ible to the tri angle (see Koslowski, 456). IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 165

and death – and then conclude s that a “similar polem ical spirit” is found in Von Baader and Dooyeweerd. Given their shared Christi an convic ti ons and their aware - ness of the struggle be tween Christi anit y and vari ous non-Chri stian spiritual forces op era tive in their re spec tive setting s, this is not sur pris ing. Yet, the real is sue con - cerns the questi on whether or not the philosophi cal views of these two thinkers in - deed converge as well. Friesen provides num erous refer ence s extra cted by him from the works of Von Baader in order to show that this conver gence indeed is a re alit y. While some is sues will be treated in footnotes , the use of subhead ings may make it eas ier for the reader to fol low the subse quent discus sion. 40

6.1 and

Frie sen im me di ate ly con tin ues his ex pla na tion by say ing that “Baader was op posed to the Enli ghten m ent's mecha nisti c and atom isti c idea of nature (Be gründung, 92, ft. 4). Be cause of this, Baader is often referred to as a philoso pher of Rom anti cism, which em pha sized the un me di ated knowl edge of in tui tion, and the im por tance of our expe ri ence ” (Friesen, 2003:2). This reac ti on against the mecha nisti c and atom is- tic incli nati on of the Enli ghten m ent era is a shared fea ture of the Rom anti c peri od – and in rom anti cism it is mainly advance d from an organi cis tic per spec tive. Through ro man ti cism the enti re ninetee nth century came under the spell of this organi cism. In fact, in his ini tial intel lec tual de vel op ment Dooyeweerd also ex pe ri enced the af - ter-ef fect of this orien ta ti on, becaus e unti l the mid thirti es he frequentl y talked about an or ganic co her ence in his sys tem atic ac count of re al ity. Two ob ser va tions (re s er- vati ons) ought to be menti oned in this re gard: (i) The organic mode of thinking does not originate in rom anti cism – it actu all y dominates the Aristotelian- Thomistic tra di tion and con tin ued to ex ert its in flu - ence also within re formed the ology. This is a differ ent source of Dooyeweerd' s use of the term or ganic – becaus e during the peri od in which he still used this term he was already highly critical of ro man ti cism and of ho lis tic or uni ver sal- is tic modes of thought; (ii) By the late twen ties Dooyeweerd ex pe ri enced the “lin guis tic turn” and started to substi tute “organic ” with “meaning” – a new and de cisive devel op m ent in Dooye weerd's thought com pletely foreign to the thought of rom anti cism and the in tel lec tual milieu of Von Baader since the lat ter pre- dates the lin guis tic turn. 40 A first rel atively mi nor is sue is found where Friesen compares Dooyeweerd and Von Baader un der the subhead ing “All phi loso phy is reli gious” (2003:3). Dooyeweerd says that theory (and all the other is- sues of life) are in the direc tion-giving grip of some or other re li gious ground-motive – but he does not say that “all philos o phy is reli gious”. Runner is best known for this statem ent (“life is reli gion”) . The first quota tion provided in this context actu ally highlights the dis tance betwee n Dooyeweerd and Von Baader. Friesen says that Von Baader “speaks of the 'reli gi os ity of sci ence, and the sci en tific char acter of re li gi os - ity' (Fermenta, p. 207)” (2003:3). It has been one of the major battles of reformational philos o phy with theolo gians to deny that faith (“re ligion”) is sci entific in char acter . Both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven view re li gion as the whole-hearted ser vice of God – en tail ing that all walks of life are re li giously de ter- mined – but it does not mean “life is re li gion.” 166 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

6.2 Law and subject In Frie sen (2003:3/3) one reads: Both Von Baader and Dooyeweerd use the word 'su bject' in the sense of be ing sub- jected to God's law. Dooyeweerd uses the French word 'su jet' – the created being is sub jècted to a law that does not originate from this subject it self (NC, I, 110; WdW , I, 76: 'o nde rworpen zijn'). Baader speaks of be ing 'su bject' in this same sense. The crea - ture must be sub or di nated un der the Crea tor (Werke, VIII, 84). This subor di na tion is a 'b eing sub ject.' Baader speaks of sub jec tion ('Sub jek tion') and also coins new words here, sub jici er en der and sub jiziert (Werke, IV, 47 ft; Wel tal ter, 162; Zeit, 56). The presence of similar words (sujet, subject , subject ed, being subject ) seems to suggest concep tual agree ment. But what does Dooyeweerd say about God's law? He sometim es gives a brief char acteri za tion of God's law by saying that it de ter mines and de lim its what ever is sub jected to it. In other words, Dooyeweerd em ploys the idea of be ing sub jected as the strict cor re late of (God's) law. The quota ti ons from Von Baader do not speak about a corre la ti on betwee n a (deter mining and de lim it ing) law and what is (cor rela tively) sub jected to this law, but rather men tion that crea - tures are sub or di nated un der the Crea tor. This lat ter idea is a gen eral fea ture of a long-sta nding Christi an tradi ti on but does not support what Friesen conclude s. His quoted sen tence: “Baader speaks of be ing ‘sub ject’ in this same sense” is written di- rectly af ter he quoted Dooye weerd saying that “cre ated be ing is sub jècted to a law” – but the support quota ti on cited to show that Von Baader uses “subject ” in “this same sense” merely speaks about the subor di na ti on of God and sub ject, and not of law and sub ject (unles s Von Baader identi fies God and law).41 Frie sen could have made an appeal to another quota ti on provided by him a bit further on in order to sup port a for mal simi lar ity with the thought of Dooyeweerd regard ing the law- subject cor rela ti on. Before I menti on the quota ti on I have in mind, I have to say in ad vance that it will be cited as part of a larger ref er ence to Friesen's ex pla na tion, be - cause this broader context will once again highli ght im portant differ ence s in spite of the ob vi ous simi lari ties.42 Each crea ture is set un der its law, in a re gion or place in which it is to serve God. Our bliss is found only in ful fill ing this law and serv ing God (Wel tal ter, 172, 178). The pe - riph ery is re lated to its supratem po ral Cen ter in an 'o rganic' re la tion. [21] We have free movement of life in the pe riph ery when we are re lated to the Cen ter: “...die Begriffe des Zentrums und der Peripherie hier in ihrem gegenseitigen Bezug in einem und demselben organischen Systeme zu nehmen sind. Denn in einem solchen bewirkt nur die Ruhe, das Gesetztsein ('le posement') des Zentrums die freie Bewegung in seiner Peripherie (in seinem Äußeren), weil jede Bewegung nur aus dem Unbeweg - lichen hervorgeht...” (Zeit, 24 ft.4) (Friesen, 2003:3/3). 41 Friesen men tions that Von Baader says that “the law lim its the crea ture; it is a Hemmung or lim i ta- tion” (Friesen, 2003:2/3). Since Hemmung has the neg a tive con no ta tion of ham per ing, standing in the way of, ap ply ing brakes, and so on, it must be clear that Dooyeweerd and Von Baader have dif fer ent ideas of “begrenzing” (limi ta tion). In fol low ing Kuyper Dooyeweerd views God's law as a “law for life” (“levenswet”), as en abling, which is the oppo site of ham per ing. 42 From a purely log i cal point of view sim i lar i ties al ways pre sup pose dif fer ences! IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 167

The first sen tence once again re flects a gen eral bib lical per spec tive: law-abid ing obedi ent service to God – somethi ng to be found in Christi an thinking ever since the time of the New Testa m ent (the com mandm ent of love), Augus ti ne and so many other think ers in the Chris tian tra di tion.43 Dooyeweerd ar tic u lated this bib li cal idea in a philo soph i cal the ory of modal and typ i cal norms. There fore, if one wants to show that Dooyeweerd's philo so ph i cal con cep tion derive s from the philo soph i cal ideas of Von Baader, the require ment is to show where Von Baader arti cu lat ed the idea of modal norms/prin ci ples and typ i cal norms/prin ci ples an tic i pat ing/pre dat ing Dooyeweerd. Unfor tu nate ly the quota ti ons given above do not accom plish this de ci - sive chal lenge. In ad di tion Von Baader op er ates with a view of re ality where the lat - ter is seen as an “organic sys tem” – a view not found in Dooyeweerd's philos o phy. 6.3 Center and Periphery Dooyeweerd frequentl y re fers to the self-hood as the re lig ious cen tre of hum an exis - tence and he also empha sizes the cen tral signifi cance of Christ who, accord ing to Christ's hum an nature , is to be seen as the to tal ity of mean ing of crea tion. But Dooyeweerd does not oper ate with an anony mous idea of a cosm ic “Center ” which, “as es sence”, is sup posed to “stand ... over” the so- called “pe riph eral points”.44 6.4 The Aristotelian unmoved mover? Also look at the (above-quoted) strange idea that movement procee ds from the un - moved: “weil jede Bewegung nur aus dem Unbewegl ichen hervor geht” . Galileo' s law of iner ti a, used by Dooyeweerd in support of his (eventual ) account of the kine- mati cal mode, con tra dicts this out dated Ar is to te lian mode of thought.45 In pass ing we can note that Von Baader disti nguishe s betwee n a me chani cal and dy namic per- spec tive, ap proxi mat ing Dooyeweerd's dis tinc tion be tween the kine mati cal and physi cal as pects of re al ity. Un for tu nately Von Baader con stantly iden ti fies this dy - namic ele ment with the or ganic (see for exam ple Von Baader 1851:52 ff.). 6.5 Autonomy Von Baader's reac ti on against the idea of hum an auton omy, al ready al luded to above, surely does exhibi t a funda m ental bibli cal trait in his thinking – at least dat- ing back to Calvin. Read out of context one may think that at this point Von Baader indeed stands within a broader Christi an tradi ti on. Unfor tu nate ly the subse quent ex - 43 Friesen trans lates a quo tation from Von Baader in cor rectly in service of find ing the simi lari ties he wants to find: “Gott setzt nur und wird nicht gesetzt, der Mensch (jede Intelligenz) wird gesetzt und setzt nicht' (Werke, II, 456). Friesen translate s this as say ing: ”God only places things under law and is not Him self un der law; Man (each in tel li gence) is un der law and does not place things un der law" (Friesen, 2003:3/3). The Ger man word “gesetzt” and “setzt” merely means “being placed” without the ad dition: “un der law”! 44 Friesen quotes the follow ing words of Von Baader: “The Centra l Total ity is differ ent than just the sum of all the periph era l points (Peripherie-Punkte); rather, the Cen ter stands as es sence (Inbegriff) over them” (Friesen, 2003:3/8). 45 Ga li leo re al ized that mo tion is origi nal and irre duc ible and that it does not need a cause (as Ar istotle believe d). One can only speak about the cause of a change of mo tion – but then the shift to the phys ical as pect has al ready been made. 168 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

po si tion of Frie sen al ready re veals a prob lem atic ac count [pos si bly quasi pan- (en)the is tic in na ture]: Baader says that we can choose to find our cen ter ei ther in God or in our own self. We ei ther affirm the Central Unity or we deny it (Zeit, 24). As Sauer says, if our cen ter is in God, then we un der stand our selves as or dered (gesetzt), as par tic i pat ing in a pre vi - ously given Ground. Or we can choose to deny our true cen ter and at tempt to find our ground in our own self (Selbstsetzung) (Sauer, 28, cit ing Werke, XIV, 61f). The foun - da tion of our ex istence can be im manent, in sofar as it is founded in one self by one self, or 'emanant' – founded in an other be ing (Werke, II, 520) (Friesen, 2003:3/4) What is uncle ar is whether or not Von Baader upholds the Cre ator-creati on disti nc- tion in all of this – whereas in Dooyeweerd our being re born in Christ never eradi - cates the Cre ator/crea ture dis tinc tion and it never el evates the hu man be ing to the level of God (thus transgress ing the law as boundary betwee n God and cre ation). The cen tral re li gious di men sion of re al ity re mains sub jected to the fullness of God's law, the centra l com mandm ent of love.46 6.6 Absolutizations Frie sen be lieves that the same re jec tion of ab so lu ti za tions pres ent in Dooyeweerd's thought is found in Von Baader's philoso phy: The de nial of our true Cen ter re sults in an ab solu ti za tion of the tempo ral ('Ver götterung oder Vere wigung der Schein- Zeit') (Zeit, 23). The ne ga tion of God al ways re sults in idola try or the ab so lu ti za tion of the tem po ral (Werke, I, 21). This is what the Bi ble re - fers to as the de ny ing 'Spirit of Lies,' and the 'Murderer in the Be gin ning.' It is the original lie of Luci fer, the pro ton pseu dos (Zeit, 25, 41 ft. 21). Dooyeweerd also re fers to this pro ton pseu dos or 'radical lie' (NC, II, 561–563). Dooyeweerd says that this ab - solu tiz ing is the source of the many –isms of thought, such as psy cholo gism, histori - cism, etc. (NC, I, 46) (Frie sen, 2003:3/5). Al though Von Baader men tions the ab so lu ti za tion of the tem po ral, his ex pres sion “Schein-Zei t” suggest s a funda m ental under-eval uation of the tem poral – which is cer tainly not merely “appear ance” (“Schein”). Since Von Baader does not know the vari ous modal aspect s as disti nguishe d by Dooyeweerd, he cannot possi bly have had a view in which he criticizes the ab so lu tiza tion of mo dal as pects – left alone a thor- ough analysis of the vari ous -isms, ab so lu tiz ing some or other mo dal func tion as found within the vari ous dis cipli nes. 6.7 Ground-motives Explai ning what Dooyeweerd under sta nds by a ground-m otive Friesen re fers to the Dutch term “grondm oti ef” but then – without critical ly account ing for the step – jumps over to terms like “grondidee ” (ground-idea ), “grondprin cipe ” (ground prin - ciple) and so on. All these other terms refer to the dom ain of thought and could never be equated with the cen tral re lig ious mean ing attac hed by Dooyeweerd to the 46 In pass ing we may note that the fact “that the Fall affecte d our reason ing abil ity” is com mon knowl- edge in the Christian tradi tion because this point is fre quently highlighte d in the Bible (just com pare St. Paul's re mark where he re fers to the fleshly mind – noo;" th'" sarkov" [noòs tês sarkós] – Colossians 2:18). (Cf. Van Woudenberg, 1998.) IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 169

term ground- motive. But Frie sen had to make this jump, becaus e the quota ti ons gathered from Von Baader do not menti on the term ground- motive anywhere (not to speak about the absenc e of Dooyeweerd' s under sta nding of the in te gral mo ti vat ing power of a ground-m otive theoret ical ly arti culat ed in di verse ground- ideas). Conse - quently, since Von Baader does not speak about ground-m otives, Frie sen once again had to “re- interpret” other phrases (par ticu larly Grund prin zip) to serve his purpose of estab li shing similar iti es be tween Von Baader and Dooyeweerd. Baader express es a similar idea, us ing the term 'Grund- Prinzip' or 'Ground Princi ple or Idea' (Zeit, 60). Prin ci ples lie at the Ground (Grund) of our knowl edge (the ol ogy, physiol ogy, natu ral phi losophy ); these prin ci ples may be open or hid den (Werke, V, 254, cited by Sauer, 128). Baader also re fers to 'R eli gious Ground Atti tudes' ('Grund- einstellungen': Werke, II, 296; cited by Schuma cher, 17) or 'root con vic tions' ('Wur- zelüber zeu gun gen' or 'idées causes or mères': (Ele men tar be griffe, 533) (Frie sen, 2003:3/6). In the on-going ar gum ent the dubi ous noti on of a “center ” once again surface s. Frie- sen menti ons Von Baader's awareness of the histori cal givenness of dia lec ti cally op - posed ab so lu ti za tions but ap par ently does not re alize that such an aware ness by far transce nds the contri buti on of Baader and even the dawn of Christi anit y. One can just as well make an ap peal to the dia lec ti cal think ing of Heracli tus in order to show that there are “similari ties” be tween Heracli tus and Dooyeweerd. Fur ther more, since the idea of oppos ing abso lu ti zati ons are fully em bedded in the problem atic – quasi- pan(en)theis ti c? – idea of a Cen ter, one should be extre mely cauti ous to estab li sh a di rect link with Dooyeweerd's thought in this re spect. The next challenge which Frie sen has set for him self is to show that Von Baader already arti culat ed all four ground-m otives disti nguishe d by Dooyeweerd. He there- fore at tempts to show that Von Baader al ready alluded to the bibli cal ground-m otive of crea tion, fall and redem pti on by menti oning what Von Baader indeed says about crea tion, about fall and about re dempti on. He then conclude s that it “corre sponds with Dooyeweerd's char ac teri za tion of the Chris tian Ground- Motive.” Ap ply ing the same pro cedur e could select alm ost any thinker within the Chris tian tra di tion (from Augustine onwards) – and every time such a thinker will be found to have said somethi ng about creati on, fall and redem pti on. This will be the case not becaus e those thinkers influ ence d Dooyeweerd per se, but becaus e they have had acces s to the Bible itsel f – and the story of the Bi ble sim ply unfolds in the succes sion of crea - tion, fall and re demp tion! There fore, one can just as well use num erous medie val or mod ern prot es tant authors in a similar way, but it will not help in as cer tain ing whether or not they in fact already had the pecu li ar (original and novel) Dooyeweer- dian idea of a (radical and in tegral) ground- motive. Similarly, the mere fact that Von Baader employed the terms form and mat ter in his analy sis of Greek phi losophy does not warrant the idea that this mode of speech sur faced late in the his tory of philoso phy, for already Aris tot le, in his Meta phys ics, capture d the phi losophy pre ceding his own contri buti on by using the terms form and mat ter. If it would have been the inten ti on of Frie sen to show that Dooyeweerd's 170 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

idea of the Greek ground- motive ac tuall y derive s from Aris tot le, this mere “fact” would have been “convinc ing” in terms of the method em ployed by him.47 When Frie sen writes about “The three ideas within each ground moti ve” (Frie sen, 2003:3/8) the chosen heading is mistake n. Accord ing to Dooyeweerd the centra lit y of a ground-m otive transce nds the realm of theoret ical thought – and it is within the lat ter that the transce nden tal ideas find their seat, not in the ground moti ve direct ing them. 6.8 The coherence between modal aspects In sup port of the claim that Von Baader already came to the idea of co her ence be - tween modal as pects Frie sen writes: One of Baader's main themes is the neces sity of a coher ence between the natural and the Spiritual [Geistlich]. He em pha sizes the co her ence be tween In tel li gence and Na ture (Ele men tar be griffe, 550) and be tween eth ics and physics (Be gründung, 23, 49). Some - times Baader uses the word 'Zu sam men hang' (e.g. Wel tal ter 68–the co her ence of all things in the All). Else where he uses the word 'Kohärenz'. The true coher ence is an 'e- mbodiment' which shows itself in the tempo ral re gion in 'the ar ray (Ord nung) of the pe - riph ery' (Zeit, 36). This order of the pe riph ery cor re sponds to Dooyeweerd's co her ence of tem po ral func tions (as pects or modes). A closer look at this method of com pari son will substa nti ate my fear that super fi cia l ver bal simi lari ties are explore d in order to assert that the same philosophi cal theory is pres ent – where in fact it is not. First of all we have to rem em ber that Dooye weerd ad vo cates the view that there is a three fold tran scen den tal idea (which is in the grip of a centra l ground-m otive) opera ti ve in theoret ical thought regard ing the co her - ence, to tal ity and Ori gin of all meaning. Dooyeweerd's idea of co her ence first of all re lates to the diver sity of mo dal as pects. But the similar ity be tween Von Baader and Dooyeweerd stops at the word “co her ence” be cause the phe nom ena fea tur ing in the quotes from Von Baader are not at all mo dal as pects! Merely empha sizing the co - her ence betwee n “intel li gence and nature ” therefore does not provide any substa n- tial evidence regard ing the ac tual philosophi cal concep ti ons of Von Baader and Dooyeweerd. Moreo ver, Dooyeweerd analy ses the co her ence be tween dif fer ent mo - dal aspect s of real it y – somethi ng differ ent from talk ing about the co herence be- tween eth ics and phys ics – neither physics nor are mo dal as pects. The center- periphery root metaphor used by Von Baader is sim ply equated with Dooyeweerd's idea of an inter-m odal meaning-cohere nce – Dooyeweerd would never – in the con - text of his the ory of inter- modal con nec tions (an tici pa tions and ret ro ci pa tions) – speak about “em bodim ent” or order ing of the periph ery . At this point the test would be to find – within the thought of Von Baader – an analy sis of any (Dooyeweerdian) mo dal as pect in its ret ro ci pa tions and an tici pa tions, quali fied by the meaning- 47 When Friesen mentions that Von Baader is react ing to Kant's du alism be tween nat u ral ne ces sity and hum an freedom – which in deed could be identi fied as the ba sic prob lem in Kant's thought merely on the basis of a first reading of Kant's CPR it self (see Kant's Critique of Pure Reason , Second Edition, 1787, B:xxvii-xxviii) – it does not provide any thing com ing close to Dooyeweerd's analy sis of the ori gin and sub se quent de vel op ment of the re li gious di a lec tic present in hum anis tic thought since the Renais sance . IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 171

nucleus of the aspect and dif feren ti ated into analogies on the law-side and the corre - lat ing factual side. Anythi ng short of this would merely highli ght the theo reti cal dis - tance betwee n Von Baader and Dooyeweerd – in spite of verbal and form al similar i- ties that are in deed pres ent (such as the use of the word “co her ence”). 6.9 God as the “absolute Center” of creation Frie sen writes: Baader also re fers to the idea of Total ity. The Central Total ity is differ ent than just the sum of all the pe riph eral points (Peripherie- Punkte); rather, the Center stands as es- sence (In be griff ) over them. Just as the sum of all crea tion does not con sti tute a crea - tor, so the Cen ter is more than the sum of the pe riph ery (Be gründung, 63 ft. 7). Simi- larly, Dooyeweerd says that the re lig ious Cen ter of our ex istence ex presses itself in all modal as pects of time but can never be ex hausted by these (NC, I, 58). Baader iden ti - fies Man as the mir ror of To tal ity (Schu macher, 57). Although Man is the mir ror of To - tal ity (as the im age of God), ul ti mately God is the ab solute Ori gin and ab solute Cen ter of crea tion (Frie sen, 2003:8). Here the spec u la tive metaphys i cal view of Von Baader re garding God as the “abso - lute Center ” of cre ation surface s and is relat ed to Dooyeweerd – somethi ng Dooye - weerd nowhere said and never would have said. Dooyeweerd does not know any- thing of “periph eral points” where the “Center ” stands over them. Nothing more than the word “total ity” is given in this context – but what Dooyeweerd and Von Baader respec tively say about “total ity” highli ghts the huge abyss betwee n their philo soph ical ac counts. (i) First of all, the orig inal modal seat of the term “to tal ity” is given within the modal aspect of space (where the “whole-parts rela ti on” is lo- cated – see NC, II:457). (ii) Sec ondly, the idea (in its techni cal Dooyeweerdian sense) of the mean ing-to tal ity of re al ity emplo ys this spa tial term but uses it in a way transce nding the lim its of spa tial concept s. But precis ely for this rea son Dooyeweerd would never, in respec t of the centra l re li gious di mension of re alit y, oper ate with a whole-parts (or: center -periph ery ) scheme in a purely concep tual manner – as it is done by Von Baader . 6.10 The method of antinomy It should be kept in mind that Dooyeweerd also fre quently speaks about the inher ent tension within a dia lec ti cal ground-moti ve – and then he em ploys the term “anti- nomy” in order to highli ght what happens within the dom ain of theo ret ical thinking (as an expres sion of a ground-moti ve dia lec tic). Com pare for exam ple NC, I:169 where the new Chapter -heading reads: “The devel op m ent of the ba sic antinomy in the cosmonomic idea of hu man is tic im ma nence-phi los o phy”. A clear and correct account is given of Dooyeweerd's view in this re gard: “Dooyeweerd uses the cri te rion of antinomy to dis tin guish one modal as pect from an - other. 'Antinomy' means 'con tra dic tion be tween laws.' The laws of dif fer ent modal as - pects may not con tra dict one another, but this is what hap pens when we absolutize cer - tain as pects. Antinomy is distin guished from con tra ri ety within a modal sphere, as in log i cal con tra dic tion” (NC, II:37) (Friesen, 2003:9). 172 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

Friesen then pro ceeds: In a similar way, Baader sees du al istic Ground Prin ci ples (or an tino mies) aris ing when - ever we ab solu tize one part of creation. “So wie man versucht die Materie (das Zeitlich-Räum liche) als etwas in sich Ganzes (Abso lutes) zu begreifen, wird man die dia lek tischen Fort bewegung aus ihr inne, welche sich je dem Vere int- und Fest hal ten- (zum Stand brin gen-) Wol len des in sich Ve rune in ten und also Bestandlosen wid er setzt. [...] Diese Materie weist uns hier mit auf eine Ano mie und An tino mie, welche ihrem Ent ste hen und Bes te hen un ter liegt, und wie sie nur zu folge ei ner Dif fer en zie rung zum Vorschein kommt, so muß sie mit der in getre te nen Re in te gra tion des in Differ enz Ge- kom me nen wie der verschwin den” (Werke, II, 488: Schriften, II, 103). I do not read in the words of Von Baader that an tino mies arise from the ab so lu tiza - tion of a part of crea tion (if an tino mies in Dooyeweerd's sense are at stake, “part of crea tion” should read: “aspect of creati on”). What is here as serted by Von Baader is that mat ter – that is somethi ng with an individuality- structure in terms of Dooyeweerd's philoso phy – points at an “Anom ie” and “Anti nom ie” which under - lies its origi na tion (Ent ste hen) and ex is tence (Bes te hen). Ac cord ing to Von Baader matter only comes to the fore through a dif fer en tia tion, but it once again has to dis- ap pear through the occur rence of a re-in te gra tion of what has been manifested in dif fer ence.48 To be honest , in this case I do not even have any verbal similar ity to hold on to – the enti re story about matter sim ply has nothing to do with the abso lu ti - zati on of modal aspect s. We here find an exam ple of an obvi ously un- Biblical dia lec ti cal ap proach which pos tu lates (an in her ently an tinomic) mat ter that has to dis ap pear in the com ing re in- te gra tion. Von Baader himself plays with a dialec ti cal whole- parts scheme. Yet, what is com pletely absent in the quota ti ons from Von Baader is what Dooyeweerd in tro duced as the cos mo logi cal prin ci ple of ex clud ing an tino mies (the prin cip ium ex clu sae an tino miae), that lies at the foun da tion of the logi cal prin ci ple of con tra -

48 Von Baader por trays God as the “Vollender” or “In te gra tor” of nature (1921:193). IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 173

dic tion.49 Dooyeweerd writes: Antin omy in this inter- modal theo reti cal sense ought to be sharply distin guished from the intra- modal re la tion of con tra ri ety, in clud ing logi cal con tra dic tion. Con trar ies like logical- illogical, polite- impolite, beautiful- ugly, lawful- unlawful, moral- immoral, belief- unbelief, and so on, pres ent them selves within the same mo dal aspect of mean - ing. They do not con tain a real an tin omy be tween dif fer ent modal law- spheres. In its theo reti cal char ac ter the lat ter im plies a logi cal con tra dic tion; but a logi cal con tra dic - tion as such is not an an tin omy in the inter- modal sense here in tended, re fer ring as it does to the tran scen den tal Idea con cern ing the mu tual co her ence of mean ing be tween the dif fer ent mo dal as pects of ex pe ri ence (1996, II:37). Frie sen conti nues his expo si ti on with refer ence to the rem ark by Von Baader that any “attem pt to abso lu ti ze the periph ery (the tem poral ), or to attem pt the coor di na - tion of points on the periph ery without their subor di na ti on to the Center will re sult in a polar dual ism or anti nom y (Wel tal ter, 331) (Friesen, 2003:9). Here it is clear that Von Baader iden tifies the word antinomy with what he appar - ently calls a “po lar du alism .” What Dooyeweerd has in mind con cerns all the cases where an at tempt is made to re duce the mean ing di ver sity within re ality to merely one of its modal aspect s – for exam ple, if every thing is his tory (law, mo ral ity, and so on) then there is nothing left that can have a his tory (see Dooyeweerd, 1996, II:228-229). Where did Von Baader intro duce antinomies in this sense as the intermodal foun da tion of the log i cal prin ci ple of con tra dic tion? For exam ple, the il- log ical con cept of a “square cir cle” con stitutes a log i cal contra dicti on – it confuses two spa tial figures in an intra-modal sense (which does not follow from an antinomy) – whereas the argu m ents of Zeno against mul ti plic ity and move ment are in deed antinomic in an intermodal sense be cause they serve the at tempt to re duce move ment to space. It is of course the case that ev ery antinomy en tails a log ical con - tra dic tion, but the re verse is not true (the illog ical con cept of a “square cir cle” does not pre suppose an antinomy). 6.11 Time Friesen menti ons that Von Baader disti nguishe s “three kinds of time” (Zeit, 19). True time is the eternal or the supratemporal (überzeitliche); it en compasses a past, present and future . Our heart, the reli gious root, exist s in this supratemporal, or true time" (Friesen, 2003:4). What a strange construc tion we find in Von Baader: “true time,” which “is the eter nal” is “supratemporal”!? How can true time be “supratemporal”? And why is a noti on of “eternit y” neces sary if “the eter nal” is nothing but “true time?! Sub se quently it is ex plained that only “the supratemporal (eter nity) is true time” (Friesen, 2003:4). “Eternit y is not just infi nit ely protra cted time. Spinoza's idea of a 'tem po ral eter nity' con fuses the Cre ator with the crea ture in a pan the istic way (Elementarbegriffe, 538). The supratemporal is the now, the si multa neous Present, nontemporal and perm anent. It is perm anent in the sense that once we achieve it, we do not fall back into cos mic time. But the supratemporal must not be seen as perm a- 49 I assume that if Von Baader says that antinomies arise from the absolutization of modal as pects, such as the num eri cal, the spa tial, the kinematical and so on, Friesen indeed would have quoted such statem ents. But he did not provide such quota tions and I did not find any thing like this in the Col lected Works of Von Baader ei ther. 174 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

nent in a static sense” (Friesen, 2003:4). Eternit y as the supratemporal is not only true time, since the supratemporal (i.e., eter nity) is the now, the “si multa neous Pres ent” while it is as serted that it is “nontemporal and perm anent” (is per ma nence not re lated to en dur ing?). What Von Baader in deed calls ap pear ance time is equated by Friesen with what Dooyeweerd calls “cos mic time” – but note the ab sence of the pres ent (the now) in Von Baader's un der stand ing of “Scheinzeit”: The time of our tempo ral world or cosmos is what Baader calls 'a ppearance time' (Schein zeit). This cos mic time has only a past and a fu ture, but no present (Werke, II, 27). There is only a present- less and sepa rated 'one thing af ter and out of another' ('nacheinan der und auseinander ') in the pe riph ery out side of the Cen ter (Zeit, 57). The clas sical legacy of spec ula ti on about time and eter nity consta ntly explore d the time-order of the first two modal i ti es disti nguishe d by Dooyeweerd, namely succes - sion and si mul ta ne ity. When ever in fin ity is under stood in its most prim iti ve (num eri - cal) meaning of suc ces sion (endles sness – the suc ces sive in fi nite) eter nity is merely desig nate d as an (endles s) on-going dura ti on of time, but when the spa tial intu it ion of si multa ne ity is ex plored the ac tual in fi nite (or, as I pre fer to des ig nate it, the at once in fi nite – see Strauss, 1996) gave rise to the idea of eter nity (supratemporality) as the time-less “now”. Dooyeweerd never enter ed into this spec ula ti ve tradi ti on, but it is clear from that what Von Baader has said that he is wres tling with a re combi na - tion of the el e ments of this spec u la tive tra di tion.50 7. The “mystical” Dooyeweerd In this connec ti on Friesen writes in his seventh main secti on: Dooyeweerd em pha sizes that the idea of cosmic time is the ba sis of his philo sophi cal the ory of re al ity (NC, I, 28), and that the idea of the supratemporal self hood must be the presup po si tion of any truly Chris tian view. Further mor e, he says that we can have actual expe ri ence of the supratemporal. This is Dooyeweerd's mysti cism . Let us begin by recog niz ing that the Bi ble does dis tinguish be tween time and eter- nity. Further more, hum anit y, accord ing to the Bible, has an eter nal des ti na tion. The prob lem seems to arise from the fact that we are used to iden tify crea tion with what is tem po ral, i.e., how is it pos si ble to find within our tem po ral crea tion some form of exis tenc e extende d into eternit y? 7.1 In fin ity and eter nity Without enter ing into an exten sive discus sion of the idea of eter nity, it may be pointed out that what phi loso phers and theolo gians throughout the his tory said about eter nity is (as briefly menti oned in an earli er context ) actu all y depend ent upon the kind of in fin ity they (consci ously or uncon sci ously) im plicit ly assum e. If they accept what is tra di tion ally called the po ten tial in fi nite (the ex pres sion: the suc ces sive in fi- nite is prefer a ble) then endles sness in the lit eral sense of the word is incor po rat ed 50 Much more is discussed by Friesen, but I leave this issue aside with the addi tional rem ark that the no tion of “ap pear ance-time” sug gests a de val u a tion of time not found in Dooyeweerd. Friesen writes: “But cosm ic time was not intended from the begin ning of cre ation; it is a re sult of the Fall”! Dooyeweerd did not advo cate such a view. IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 175

within the idea of eter nity. The suc ces sive in fi nite ex plores the quan tita tive time-or - der at the law-side of the ar ith meti cal aspect and thus it un der lies the view of eter - nity as an end less du ra tion of time. But if the so-called ac tual in fi nite (rather to be des ig nated as the at once in finite )51 is chosen as point of orien ta ti on, then eter nity is seen as time less ness – a-tempo ral i ty, of ten iden tified with the time less pres ent.52 By and large the metaphys ical spec u lation about eter nity was there fore de ter - mined in a dom inant way by the static spa tial meta phys ics of be ing.53 It is only since the rise of that the last two hundred years wit nessed a prom inent re-emer gence of the “end less du ra tion” (suc ces sive in fi nite) tra di tion – for ex am ple ex em pli fied in Os car Cullmann's work Christ and Time (1949:48 ff.).

7.2 Cosmic time As is known, Dooyeweerd indeed intro duced a radi cally new philoso phy of time in which it is shown that suc ces sion and si mul ta ne ity are merely two (mo dal) ex pres - sions of the meaning of what he calls cos mic time – and that nei ther, as such, pro- vides us with an inte gral idea of eter nity. The ex pres sion “tem po ral re al ity” is meant in an in te gral sense, en com pass ing all mo dal as pects and all individuality- structures. But it should be noted that be fore Dooyeweerd de vel oped his phi los o phy of time (dur ing the late twen ties of the twen tieth cen tury), he al ready had real ized that the hum an being cannot be enclos ed within the dim ensions of modal aspect s and enti ty struc tures. Dooyeweerd first gained the bibli cal insight that the hum an self-hood (heart) is su pra-modal and su pra-struc tural and then devel oped his theory of cos - mic time – as that cosm ic di mension under ly ing and em bracing both the modal as- pects and in di vid u al ity-struc tures. By con ceiv ing cos mic time as a unique cos mic di- men sion em bracing the modal and typi cal dim ensions of creati on, and by view ing the hum an self-hood is supra-m odal and supra-st ructura l,54 it follow s that the hu man heart ought to be seen as “supra-t em poral ”.55 Since it could hardly be denied that hum anit y has an eter nal des ti na tion and that being hum an therefore hinges on the boundary -line of time and eter nity, I think it is bib li cally jus ti fied to af firm the time-tran scend ing nature of the core meaning of be- ing human . 51 This rep re sents a nu mer i cal an tic i pa tion to the spa tial time-or der of si mul ta ne ity (see Strauss, 1996:164 ff.). 52 See Parmenides B Fr.8, 3-6 and Plotinus, Enneads III/7. Boethius for mu lated his clas si cal def i ni tion as fol lows: “Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vi tae tota simul et perfecta possessio” – De consolatione Philosophiae V,6; contin ued by Augustin in his De civitate Dei (XII,19), and so on. The same legacy is found in the “nunc aeternum” of Kierkegaard and in the relate d ideas of the Dutch theolo gian K. Schilder. 53 The discov ery of irra tio nal num bers by the Py thago reans caused a switch from the the sis that “ev- ery thing is num ber” to a spa tial orien ta tion (the geometrization of Greek mathe m atics) , opening up the “space” needed for a static metaphys ics of be ing. 54 See for exam ple the para graph-heading in his arti cle on the task of a philosoph i cal anthro pol ogy: “The super-structura l char acter of the hum an exis ten tial center and the unqual i fied structure of the hum an bodiliness” (Dooyeweerd, 1961:40 ff.). “Het boven--structureel karakter van het menselijk existentie - centrum en de ongequalificeerde structuur der menselijke lichamelijkheid.” 55 The word-play be tween super- and supra- tem po ral should not mislead us. Dooyeweerd only em - ployed the expres sion supra- tem poral (for ex am ple, 1996, I:31, note). 176 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

7.3 The aevum Dooyeweerd might have made it eas ier for himself if he merely em pha sized this time-tran scend ing nature of being hum an. The way in which he proposed to “re- fresh” the noti on of an aevum actu all y com es very close to my sugges ti on. In his se- ries of ar ticles on time (that ap peared in Philosophia Reformata) the first refer ence to the aevum is in connec ti on with the idea of a cre ated eter nity (see Dooyeweerd, 1936:69). In the second (follow-up) arti cle on The Problem of Time and its Antinomies on the Imma nence Standpoint Dooyeweerd expands on this issue. His posi ti ve ac count of intro duc ing this term reads as fol lows: Yet I would like to take over the term “aevum” in the sense of an in terme di ate state be- tween time and eternity. It may be less ob jection able because it arose within the con- text of a Christian ar gu menta tion which felt the need for a dis tinc tion be tween the su - pra-tem po ral in a creaturely sense and eter nity in the sense of the be ing of God. In hu - man self-con scious ness as cen ter of the re li gious con cen tra tion of all tempo ral func - tions we in deed en coun ter the su pra-tem poral mean ing of this aevum. As an ac tual con - di tion the aevum there fore is noth ing but the creaturely con cen tration of the tem poral upon eter nity in the re li gious transcen dence of the bound ary of time (Dooyeweerd, 1939:5). In Dooyeweerd 195956 as well as in Dooyeweerd 196057 he responds to those who ques t ioned his no tion of the su pra-tem po ral. 7.4 Is Dooyeweerd a mystical thinker? In his ar ticle on the words “Mys tik” and “mys tisch” Less ing first of all mention s the Greek root of these terms which is re lated to the meaning of the word “se cret,” that which is not re vealed.58 Since Imm anuel Kant a more critical tone sur faced in re - spect of what is mys ti cal. The eight eenth and nine teenth centu rie s in general devel - 56 “De theologische exegesen van deze tekst, die in plaats van 'eeuw(igheid)' willen vertalen de 'tijden' of 'de geschiedenis' ontnemen hem de centraal-religieuze zin; evenals de bekende tekst van Pred.: 'Uit het hart zijn de uitgangen des levens' door een bepaalde theologische exegese zijn centraal-religieuze zin verloor, toen men het hart als 'zetel van het gevoel' ging verstaan. Wanneer het slechts gaat over 'de geschiedenis', dan kan men de term 'hart' in de eerstbedoelde tekst rustig vervangen door 'historisch bewustzijn', of naar een oudere scholastieke opvatting door de 'menselijke rede', of 'het menselijk denken'. Maar het heeft bepaald geen zin in plaats van de 'eeuwigheid', 'de tijden' of 'de geschiedenis' te stellen, wanneer men gelijk Spier in zijn boek Tijd en Eeuwigheid eraan vasthoudt, dat het woord 'hart' hier bedoeld is in de zin van het religieuze centrum van het menselijk bestaan. Want 'de geschiedenis' in haar tijdelijke zin moet juist in 's mensen hart haar concentratie op Gods eeuwig heilsplan krijgen. Zonder deze concentratie blijft de geschiedenis een tijdelijk proces zonder enige richting op wat de tijd te boven gaat, tenzij dan op een eeuwigheidsidool in de zin van de zich dialectisch ontvouwende 'idee'. Maar hoe kan het 'hart' in de bovenbedoelde zin als religieus concentratiepunt van de geschiedenis fungeren, wanneer het geheel en al 'binnen de tijd' zou zijn besloten? De invoering van een 'religieuze tijd' kan hier geen baat brengen, omdat de religieuze concentratie juist een centrale relatie tussen het menselijk ik en de eeuwige God impliceert die nooit in de tijd kan opgaan. Bovendien valt niet in te zien hoe zulk een religieuze tijd iets anders zou kunnen zijn dan wat in de W.d.W. de geloofstijd genoemd wordt. De term 'religieuze tijd' blijft hoogst problematisch wat zijn mogelijke zin betreft" (1959:116-117, note 3). 57 "In de afvallige richting van het menselijk hart is dit beeld Gods geheel verduisterd, maar in Christus Jezus is het ons in zijn ware zin-volheid geopenbaard. En slechts in en uit Hem leren wij in de gemeenschap van de H. Geest verstaan, in welke zin wij in het centrum onzer existentie de tijd te boven gaan, of schoon wij tegelijk binnen de tijd besloten zijn“ (1960:103). 58 “Mystik, mystisch (griech. mustikh;; [sc. paravdosi"], mustikov"; lat. mystica, mysticus; engl. mys - tic, mysti cal; frz. mystique; ital. mistica, mistico. 1. Das griech. mustikov"; (Adjektivbildung vom Verb IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 177

oped a nega tive sen ti ment dis quali fy ing mys ti cism as “Gefühls re lig ion” and oc ca - sionall y even as “an unheal thy growth of the hum an being, as a source of be ing men tally disturbed , and there fore a case for the psy chia trist.”59 Dooyeweerd does ac knowledge the limita ti ons of hum an under sta nding, and ex- plicit ly em ploys the epis tem ologi cal disti ncti on betwee n what can be grasped in concept s and what can only be approxi m ated in (what I pre fer to call) concept -tran - scending knowl edge, i.e., the dis tincti on betwee n con cept and idea. The deep ened meaning of an aspect , accord ing to Dooyeweerd, only gives acces s to “idea- knowledge” (1996, II:186 ff.) and the same appli es to the inter-m odal identi ty and whole ness of an enti ty that can only be approxi m ated in a tran scen den tal idea (1996, III:65). In its techni cal sense the idea of cos mic time falls in this cate gory and it also holds for the centra l re ligious di mension of re alit y. Since the tri-unit y of transce nden tal ideas in Dooyeweerd's philoso phy does not acknowl edge somethi ng “mysti cal” in the sense of “not-being- revealed,” it is inap - pro pri ate to char ac ter ize his thought as mys ti cal or in the grip of some or other form of mysti cism. The mode of thinking of a truly mysti cal thinker closely borders upon the pitfall of a nega tive the ol ogy and of an ir ra tion al is tic approach. Since Dooye- weerd re jects both ra tion al ism and ir ra tion al ism his in ten tion is in deed to side- step the one-side dness entai led in both these philosophi cal orien ta ti ons. God is re vealed to us, but that does not mean that we can concep tu all y grasp God – as hum an beings we can only approxi m ate God through the aid of a concept- transcending idea of God. But this view is not mysti cal or in the grip of mysti cism. The wonder and awe that we have for God and God's creati on hum bles our thinking and it fills us with modest y, but it does not by defini ti on tempt us into mys ti cism. Dooyeweerd's dis tincti on betwee n the di mension of cosm ic time em bracing the modal and typical dim ensions as they are all rooted in the centra l re ligious di men- sion of creati on does not justi fy the conclu sion that his thinking is mysti cal, not even when the corre la ti on betwee n supra-m odal and supra structura l is inter preted as supra- temporal. If one wants to appre ci ate this view of Dooyeweerd positi vely, as Frie sen indeed wants to do, it is none the less not nec es sary first of all to in ter pret it as mysti cal.

8. Conclusion Although I am glad that Frie sen intro duced me to the fas cinat ing thought of Von Baader, I am not at all con vinced that he has succeeded in mak ing a compel ling case muvw 'sich schließen', 'zusammengehen', bes. der Augen [1]) heißt zunächst soviel wie 'auf die Mysterien bezogen', 'mit den Geheimriten verbunden' [2], dann generell 'dunkel', 'geheimnisvoll' (Gegensatz: fanerovn, 'offen')” (Lessing, 1984:268). 59 “Kant spricht kritisch von Mystik und «Mysti cism » als einem «Übersprung (salto mortale) von Begriffen zum Undenkbaren, ... einer Erwartung von Geheimnissen, oder vielmehr Hinhaltung mit solchen». Sie ist «Schwärmerei», «vernunfttödtend» und «schweift ins Überschwengliche hinaus» . Dies entspricht einem im späten 18. und 19. Jh. einsetzenden breiten Sprachgebrauch, in dem «Mysticismus» als Schwärmerei und Gefühlsreligion abqualifiziert wird, ja auch gelegentlich als «krankhafter Auswuchs des menschlichen Wesens», «Quelle mannichfaltiger Seelenstörungen» und deshalb als Fall für den «psychischen Arzt»” (Lessing, 1984:270). 178 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

for what he claimed. His method of explor ing merely ver bal and in some cases for - mal similar iti es, did not suc ceed in showing any signifi cant concep tual connec ti ons betwee n the in trin sical ly philo sophical views of Von Baader and those of Dooye - weerd. Just as lit tle as it is pos si ble to “sell” Dooyeweerd's thought “out” to the neo- of F.H. Brad ley, is it pos si ble to at tempt somethin g similar with re spect to Von Baader, Nico lai Hart mann,60 or any other single phi losopher. Dooyeweerd benefit ed from the philosophi cal disti ncti ons and insight s of philoso phers spread over the enti re history of philoso phy – someti mes in a posi tive and someti mes in a nega tive sense. But someti mes, as in the case of the thought of Von Baader, there is sim ply no di rect link trace able. In itself it is strik ing that Ko slowski does not ar ticu late any philo sophi cal in sights and dis tincti ons pres ent in Von Baader's thought that direct ly or indi rect ly approxi - mates any sys tem atic philosophi cal disti ncti on made by Dooyeweerd! It will defi nitely be long to the task of pro duc ing a criti cal edition of the New Cri - tique to dem onstra te in which way Dooyeweerd is (posi tively and nega tively) con- nected with a tho u s a nd strings to the enti re history of philoso phy. Only then will it be possi ble to highli ght what ought to be appre ci ate d as his truly novel and crea tive con tri bu tions to phi loso phy.

9. Literature Bos, A.P. 2003. Re view of Koslowski's book: Philosophien der Offenbarung, Antiker Gnostizismus, Franz Von Baader, Schelling, in: Philosophia Reformata, Vol.68 (2003), (pp.169-173). Bos, A.P. 2003a. The Soul and its In strumen tal Body, A Re in ter pre ta tion of Ar is totle's Phi- losophy of Liv ing Na ture, Leiden- Boston: Brill. Brümmer, V. 1961. Tran scen den tal Criti cism and Chris tian Phi loso phy, Utrecht. Chris te lijke En cy clo pe die, 1956. Kampen: J.H. Kok. Con ra die, A.L. 1960. The Neo- Calvinistic Concept of Phi losophy , Dur ban. Copleston, S.J. 1985. A his tory of Phi losophy , Vol umes VII- IX, To ronto: Dou ble day (first print ing 1945). Cull man, O. 1949. Christ and Time, The Primi tive Chris tian Con cep tion of Time and His tory, Re vised edi tion, Translated from the Ger man by Floyd v. Fil son, Phila del phia: The West min is ter Press. Dooyeweerd, H. 1936. Het tijd sprobleem en zijn an tino mieën op het im manen ti e stand punt I, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 1(1936) (pp.65- 83). 60 Hartmann, for exam ple, intro duces ba sic cate go rie s suppos edly valid for all spheres and levels of being. This sounds quite “Dooyeweerdian”! A closer study of Hartmann's phi loso phy, however , does not reveal anything close to what Dooyeweerd has in mind with the modal and typi cal di mensions of re ality . Hartmann in fact distin guishes 24 princi ples of being, arrange d in pairs – and just enum erat ing them will reveal the distance with the views of Dooyeweerd: prin ciple – concretum; structure – mode; form – mat- ter; in ner – outer; de ter mi na tion – de pen d ence; qual ity – quan ti ty; unity – mul ti plic ity; una nim ity – con- flict; an tith e sis – di men sion; dis crete ness – con ti nu ity; sub strate – re la tion; el e ment – sys tem (see Steg - müller, 1969:237). IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 179

Dooyeweerd, H. 1939. Het tijd sprobleem en zijn antino mieën op het im manen ti e stand punt II, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 4(1939) (pp.1-28). Dooyeweerd, H. 1940. Het tijd sprobleem in de Wijs be geerte der Wet sidee, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 5(1940) (pp.160- 182). Dooyeweerd, H. 1940a. Het tijd sprobleem in de Wijs be geerte der Wet sidee, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 5(1940) (pp.1930- 234). Dooyeweerd, H. 1950. Het sub stan tie be grip in de mod erne na tuur phi losophie en de theo rie van het enkaptisch struc tuur ge heel, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 15(1950) (pp.66- 139). Dooyeweerd, H. 1959. Schep ping en Evo lu tie, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 24(1959) (pp.113- 159). Dooyeweerd, H. 1960. Van Peursen's cri tische vra gen bij “A New Cri tique of Theo reti cal Thought”, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 25(1960) (pp.97- 150). Dooyeweerd, H. 1961. De taak ener wijsgerige an thro polo gie en de dood lopende we gen tot wijs gerige zelfk en nis, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 26(1961) (pp.35- 58). Dooyeweerd, H. 1996, A New Cri tique of Theo reti cal Thought, Col lected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd, The Ed win Mel len Press, A- Series Vols. I-IV, (Gen eral Edi tor D.F.M. Strauss). Dooyeweerd, H. 2003, Roots of West ern Cul ture, Col lected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd, The Ed win Mel len Press, B- Series Vol ume 3 (General Edi tor D.F.M. Strauss – first edi tion 1979). En cy clo pe dia Bri tan nica, 1975. Baader, Mi cropædia, Vol ume 1, 15th Edi tion, Lon don. Erdmann, E. 1856. Franz Von Baaders Sämmtliche Werke und das darin entwickelte System, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, ed ited by Im man uel Hermann Fichte, Hermann Ulrici, J. von Wirt, N.F. 28 (1856:1-31). [Quoted from Koslowski, 2003.] Falkenberg, R. 1905. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Von Nikolaus von Kues bis zur Gegenwart, Leip zig: Verlag Von Veit & Comp. Friesen, J. Glenn 2003. The mysti cal Dooyeweerd. The re la tion of his thought to Franz Von Baader , in: Ars disputandi [http://www.arsdisputandi.org] Volume 3 (2003). Geert sema, H.G. (Ed.) 1994. Herman Dooyeweerd 1894- 1977, Breedte en actu al iteit van zijn fi lo sofie, Kampen: Uit geverij Kok. Grote Winkler Prins, Baader, 1971. Vol ume 2, Amster dam : Elsevier. Hender son, R.D. 1994. Il lu mi nat ing Law, The Construc tion of Her man Dooyeweerd's Phi - loso phy 1918- 1928, Ph.D.-thesis at the Free Univer sity of Amster dam Koslowski, P. 2003. Phi loso phien der Of fen ba rung. An tiker Gnos tizis mus, Franz Von Baader, Schell ing (Paderborn- München- Wien- Zürich: Ferdi nand Schön ingh, 2001; 2nd Im pres sion 2003). Kraay, J. 1979. Suc ces sive con cep tions in the de vel op ment of the Chris tian phi loso phy of Herman Dooyeweerd, in: Philosophia Reformata, 44(1979)(pp.137-149); Philosophia Reformata 45(1980) (pp.1-46). Kuyper, A. 1917. An tirevo lu tion aire Staat kunde, Vol ume II, Kampen. Kuyper, A. 1931- 1932. De Gemeene Gratie , Vol umes I- III, Third un al tered im pres sion, Kampen (date of ap pear ance of the first impres sion not in di cated). 180 DANIËL F.M. STRAUSS

Less ing, H-U. 1984. Mystik, mystisch, in: His tori sches Wörter buch der Phi loso phie, Darm - stadt: Wis sen schaft li che Buchge sellschaft (pp.268- 279). Louët Feisser, J.J. 1956. Baader, ar ticle in: Chris te lijke En cy clo pe die, Vol ume 1, Edi tors F.W. Grosheide & G.P. Van It ter zon, Kampen : J.H. Kok N.V. McIn tire, C.T. (Edi tor) 1985. The Legacy of Her man Dooyeweerd, New York : Uni ver sity Press of America. Mekkes, J.P.A. 1962. Wet en Subject in de Wijs be geerte der Wet sidee, in: Phi lo so phia Re for - mata, 27(1962) (pp.126- 190). Need ham, J. 1968. Order and Life, 2nd im pres sion, Lon don. Schell ing, F.W.J. 1809. Philo sophical In quiries into the Na ture of Hu man Free dom and mat- ters connected therewith , trans lated by James Gutmann, Chi cago: The Open Court Pub - lish ing Com pany, 1936. Schnatz, H. 1973. Päpstli che Ver laut ba run gen zu Staat und Ge sellschaft, Orig inal doku mente mit deut scher Ue ber setzung, edited by H. Schnatz, Darm stadt: Wissen schaft li che Buch- gesellschaft. Steg mül ler, W. 1969. Main Currents in Con tem po rary German, Brit ish and Ameri can Phi - loso phy, Dor drecht: D. Rei del Pub lish ing Company , Hol land. Strauss, D.F.M. 1973. Chris telike wetenskap bestem pel as neo-Hegeliaan se metafisik a, Jour - nal for Christian Schol arship , 9(1973) (pp.47- 82). Strauss, D.F.M. 1984. An Analy sis of the Struc ture of Analy sis, (The Gegenstand- relation in dis cus sion), in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 49(1984) (pp.35-56). Strauss, D.F.M. 1996. Fi lo sofie van de Wiskunde, in: Ken nis en Wer ke lijk heid, Tweede In- leid ing tot een Chris te lijke Fi lo sofie, Edi tor R. Van Wouden berg, Amster dam: Buijten & Schip per heijn (pp.143- 176). Van der Ven, F.J.H.M. 1957. De Rooms-Katholieke n en het So ci ale Vraagstuk, in: Cul tuur - geschie denis van het Chris ten dom, Sec ond Impres sion, Part II, Edi tor J. Wa ter ink and oth ers, Am ster dam: El sevier (pp.1770- 1790). Van Peursen, C.A. 1959. En kele cri tische vra gen in mar gine bij “A New Cri tique of Theo reti - cal Thought”, in: Phi lo so phia Re for mata, 24 (1959) (pp.160- 168). Van Woudenberg, R. 1998. Over de noëtische gevolgen van de zonde, in: Nederlands Theo - logische Tijdschrift 52:225-240. Visagie, P.J. 1982. Some basic con cepts con cern ing the idea of Or i gin in reformational Phi - los o phy and The ol ogy, in: Jour nal for Chris tian Schol ar ship, 18(1982) (pp.1-13). Von Baader, F. 1851. Gesammelte Schriften zur philosophischen Erkenntniswissenschaft oder Metaphysik, Sämtliche Werke, ed ited by F. Hoffmann & Julius Hamberger, Vol ume 2 (repli cated by Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1963). Von Baader, F. 1851a. Ele men tar be griffe über die Zeit, Vor lesun gen über Phi loso phie der Sozi etät, Sämtli che Werke, ed ited by F. Hoffmann & Julius Hamberger, Vol ume 14 (rep li cated by Sci en tia Ver lag, Aalen, 1963). Von Baader, F. 1852. Ge sam melte Schriften zur Na tur phi loso phie, Sämtli che Werke, edited by F. Hoffmann & Julius Hamberger, Vol ume 3 (rep li cated by Sci en tia Ver lag, Aalen, 1963). Von Baader, F. 1854. Ge sam melte Schriften zur Sozi etätsphi loso phie, Sämtli che Werke, ed- IN TEL LEC TUAL IN FLU ENCES UPON THE REFORMATIONAL PHI LOS O PHY OF DOOYEWEERD 181

ited by F. Hoffmann & Julius Hamberger, Vol ume 5 (rep li cated by Sci en tia Ver lag, Aalen, 1963). Von Baader, F. 1865. Grundzüge der So ci etätsphi loso phie, Ideen über Recht, Staat, Ge - sellschaft und Kirche, with re marks and ex pla na tions by Franz Hoff man, Würzburg: A. Stu ber's Buchhand lung. Von Baader, F. 1921. Fer menta Cogi ta tio nis, in: Schriften Franz Von Baaders , Selected and Edited by Max Pulver, Leipzig: Im Insel-Verlag. Von Baader, F. 1963. Sämtli che Werke, Sys tema tisch geord nete, durch rei che Erläuterun gen von der Hand des Ver fassers bedeu tend ver me hrte, voll stän dige Aus gabe der ge druck - ten Schriften samt Nachlaß, Bi og ra phie und Brief wechsel, Heraus ge ge ben von Franz Hoffmann, Julius Hamberger, An ton Lut ter beck, Emil August von Scha den, Chris toph Schlüt ter und Frie drich von der Os ten (Neudruck der Ausgabe Leipzig 1851). Wolters, A.M. 1985: The In tel lec tual Mi lieu of Her man Dooyeweerd, in: McIn tire 1985 (pp.1-19). Win del band, W. 1935 (Edi tor Heinz He im so eth). Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Phi losophie , Tübin gen: Ver lag J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Sie beck).