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Terrorism: Libya’S Role in the Nsi Tability of the Region Cara Rabe-Hemp Illinois State University Illinois State University ISU ReD: Research and eData Graduate Research - Criminal Justice Criminal Justice Spring 4-11-2014 Terrorism: Libya’s Role in The nsI tability of The Region Cara Rabe-Hemp Illinois State University Cayla Comens Illinois State University Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/grcj Part of the International Relations Commons, Other International and Area Studies Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Rabe-Hemp, Cara and Comens, Cayla, "Terrorism: Libya’s Role in The nI stability of The Region" (2014). Graduate Research - Criminal Justice. 1. https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/grcj/1 This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Criminal Justice at ISU ReD: Research and eData. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Research - Criminal Justice by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For more information, please contact [email protected]. (—THIS SIDEBAR DOES NOT PRINT—) QUICK START (cont.) DESIGN GUIDE Terrorism: Libya’s Role in The Instability of The Region How to change the template color theme This PowerPoint 2007 template produces a 36”x48” You can easily change the color theme of your poster by going to the presentation poster. You can use it to create your research DESIGN menu, click on COLORS, and choose the color theme of your poster and save valuable time placing titles, subtitles, text, Cayla Comens & Cara Rabe-Hemp, Ph.D. choice. You can also create your own color theme. and graphics. Illinois State University We provide a series of online tutorials that will guide you through the poster design process and answer your poster production questions. To view our template tutorials, go online to PosterPresentations.com and click on HELP DESK. You can also manually change the color of your background by going to Abstract Pre-Qaddafi Regime Instability of The Region Arc of Instability VIEW > SLIDE MASTER. After you finish working on the master be sure to When you are ready to print your poster, go online to • During the 16th Century, Libya became part of the Ottoman go to VIEW > NORMAL to continue working on your poster. PosterPresentations.com When media focuses its attention on the subject of terrorism, Libya the country of Libya is not typically at the forefront of the Empire • February 5, 2011: anti-government protest erupted in How to add Text Need assistance? Call us at 1.510.649.3001 discussion. However, Libya has a deep hand in terrorism • Between 1911 and 1912 Italy took control of Libya, away Benghazi, Libya The template comes with a number of pre- dating back to when Colonel Muammar Qaddafi took control from the Ottomans (Gascoigne, 2001) formatted placeholders for headers and text • Armed conflict between rebels and the Libyan government blocks. You can add more blocks by copying and of the country in 1969. During the years that Qaddafi was in This ignited what turned out to be a 20 year ensued in the following months control, he financially backed terrorist organizations, who pasting the existing ones or by adding a text box QUICK START insurgency, lead by Omar al-Mukhtar of Libya • February 20, 2011: rebels took control of Benghazi from the HOME menu. repeatedly aimed their sights on the United States and their • Italians surrendered in 1947 Used the city as a based to launch attacks on Qaddafi allies. Even after the fall of Qaddafi’s regime, terrorism is still Text size Zoom in and out • United Nations (UN) awarded Libya their independence in strongholds (Arsenault, 2011) As you work on your poster zoom in and out to the level a part of the governmental strategy in the country. The attack Adjust the size of your text based on how much content you have to that is more comfortable to you. in Benghazi against an American compound, which resulted in 1949 (Davis, 1990) • October 20, 2011 Qaddafi and his son were captured and present. The default template text offers a good starting point. Follow Go to VIEW > ZOOM. 4 American deaths shows that terrorism is alive and well • 1969 Muammar Qaddafi takes control of Libya after executed (World Report 2012: Libya, 2012) the conference requirements. within Libya. In this analysis, I will show the history of Libya overthrowing King Idris I This marked the fall of Qaddafi’s 42 year-old regime Title, Authors, and Affiliations How to add Tables prior to Qaddafi’s regime, and terrorism during and after Source From: http://moroccoonthemove.com/2013/05/18/africas-arc-of-instability-an-investigative-report-by-the-toronto- To add a table from scratch go to the INSERT menu and Start designing your poster by adding the title, the names of the authors, • September 11, 2012: US Consulate attack in Benghazi star/#sthash.RksW72EZ.dpbs Qaddafi’s regime. I will also show the connections between click on TABLE. A drop-down box will help you select rows and the affiliated institutions. You can type or paste text into the Qaddafi & Terrorism • “In 2013, a total of 145 major terrorist attacks were and columns. provided boxes. The template will automatically adjust the size of your terrorism and the instability of the region following the fall of recorded, including kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, You can also copy and a paste a table from Word or another PowerPoint text to fit the title box. You can manually override this feature and Qaddafi. The findings of this investigation, will inform the • Financially backed terrorist organizations (Davis, 1990; Cortright Data Table document. A pasted table may need to be re-formatted by RIGHT-CLICK > change the size of your text. & Lopez, 2007) and direct assaults on government facilities and academic research, as well as the counter-terrorism efforts in FORMAT SHAPE, TEXT BOX, Margins. The Fatah personnel.”(Alexander, 2014, p.6) Libya. TIP : The font size of your title should be bigger than your name(s) and Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Graphs / Charts institution name(s). Terrorist & Extremist Groups Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) You can simply copy and paste charts and graphs from Excel or Word. Some reformatting may be required depending on how the original These groups have been known to operate or are currently document has been created. operating in the Maghreb and The Sahel regions: • Qaddafi successfully created the National Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (NAYLP) How to change the column configuration Adding Logos / Seals Responsible for some of the most brutal acts in Palestinian • Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) RIGHT-CLICK on the poster background and select LAYOUT to see the Most often, logos are added on each side of the title. You can insert a international terrorism (Davis, 1990) column options available for this template. The poster columns can also logo by dragging and dropping it from your desktop, copy and paste or by • Al-Mulathameen Brigade be customized on the Master. VIEW > MASTER. going to INSERT > PICTURES. Logos taken from web sites are likely to be • Libya was added to the “state-sponsors” of terrorism list by Al-Qaeda affiliate Source From: Alexander, 2014 : pg13. low quality when printed. Zoom it at 100% to see what the logo will look President Ronald Regan of the United States How to remove the info bars like on the final poster and make any necessary adjustments. • Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) If you are working in PowerPoint for Windows and have finished your • April 5, 1986: La Belle Discotheque nightclub in West Berlin was TIP: See if your school’s logo is available on our free poster templates Linked to al-Qaeda poster, save as PDF and the bars will not be included. You can also delete bombed and destroyed. References page. • Ansar Dine them by going to VIEW > MASTER. On the Mac adjust the Page-Setup to Libya was held accountable for the terrorist act Alexander, Y. (2014). Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2013. Retrieved match the Page-Setup in PowerPoint before you create a PDF. You can Islamist militant group from: http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/article/2652/Terrorism-in-N- Photographs / Graphics The nightclub was frequented by US servicemen also delete them from the Slide Master. Africa-and-Sahel-24Jan2014.pdf You can add images by dragging and dropping from your desktop, copy • Ansar al-Sharia Organization Many US servicemen were injured and 2 were killed in Arsenault, C. (2011). Libya: The Revolt that Brought Down Gaddafi. Retrieved from and paste, or by going to INSERT > PICTURES. Resize images the bombing Save your work Has al-Qaeda ties http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/aljazeeratop102011/2011/12/2011122 proportionally by holding down the SHIFT key and dragging one of the Save your template as a PowerPoint document. For printing, save as Source From: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/aqims -area-of-influence/2013/03/21/18c74f16-928a- 6114023696528.html corner handles. For a professional-looking poster, do not distort your Involved in 2012 attack on US Consulate in • At the G7 summit, Libya was publically labeled as a supporter of 11e2-9cfd-36d6c9b5d7ad_graphic.html PowerPoint of “Print-quality” PDF. images by enlarging them disproportionally. Benghazi international terrorism (Cortright & Lopez, 2007) British Petroleum. (2013). Statement on incident at In Amenas, Algeria [Press Release]. Retrieved from: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press- Algeria releases/statement-on-incident-at-in-amenas-algeria.html Print your poster • September 5, 1986 When you are ready to have your poster printed go online to • January 16, 2013: Hostage crisis at the In Amenas gas field Cortright, D., & Lopez, G.A.
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